SECURITY STABILIZATION TRANSITION RECONSTRUCTION & PEACE OPERATIONS

TRAINING WORKSHOP-DECEMBER 12-14,2006

FINAL REPORT

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SECURITY, STABILIZATION, TRANSITION, RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACE OPERATIONS INTEGRATED CIVILIAN-MILITARY PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING WORKSHOP REPORT

12-14 DECEMBER 2006

SPONSORED BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY
PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INSTITUTE
AT CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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The views expressed are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Army, the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

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Several individuals and organizations also proved critical in the conference's concept development. Dr. Janine Davidson of the Secretary of Defense's Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OSD), Mr. Tom Baltazar (USAID-OMA), Mary Ann Zimmerman of Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and Mr. Roy Williams were instrumental in focusing this event on pre-deployment training and implementing Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 as well as National Security Presidential Directive 44. PKSOI personnel without whom this conference could not have happened include Colonel Pat White, Colonel John Kardos, Colonel Mike Moon, Colonel Don Jackson, Lieutenant Colonel John Stepansky, and Mr. Jeff McNary, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Greg Hermsmeyer from OSD-SOLIC. PKSOI also appreciates the assistance of James B. Simms in helping draft the final report.

Forward

What follows is the final report from the second annual Security, Stabilization, Transition, Reconstruction and Peace Operations Integrated Civilian-Military Pre-Deployment Training Workshop. This Workshop focused on Integrated Civilian-Military Pre-deployment Training, sponsored by the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in close coordination with OSD-SOLIC, USAID, and S/CRS. This report was transcribed from video and voice tapes from the plenary and the back brief sessions. All presentation and brief back slides are provided in the Appendix.

The workshop gathered general practitioners and subject matter experts from the military services and US Government, the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and international organizations. The workgroups did an excellent job capturing short comings in current pre-deployment training. They made recommendations on actions to take in the short- and mid-term to define ways to improve and integrate all agencies in pre-deployment training. On many recommendations, organizations offered to take the lead on furthering progress with other participants.

This report is not the end of PKSOI's work. We will work with other organizations to implement the recommendations identified. One of the primary processes used to continue the work of this conference will be a new Training Community of Practice. By further solidifying the network created at this workshop, organizations involved in training may work together to increase the effectiveness of all organizations within the community.

PKSOI would like to thank each presenter and each participant for their dedication, time and effort in this successful workshop. We look forward to continuing to work with you to increase the world's ability to respond to stability and reconstruction operations.

Sincerely,

John A. Agoglia
Colonel, US Army
Director, PKSOI

Executive Summary

Background

The Integrated Civilian Military Pre-deployment Training Workshop was conducted at the Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania from 12 through 14 December 2006. This was the second annual workshop with agencies in the field of Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO). This workshop was one in the 2006 Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series events. The Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series was established in 2002 by the Chief of Staff of the United Sates Army (CSA) to address critical strategic level issues.

The three objectives of the workshop were to: 1) to capture lessons learned and best practices in the various pre-deployment training approaches; 2) to identify gaps and recommend improvements in pre-deployment training; and 3) to develop a "Roadmap" for the policies and procedures required to allow military and civilians to participate in each others training, and that pursues recommended improvements needed to fill the identified gaps. The final output of the workshop will be an exportable briefing that identifies lessons learned, best practices, gaps, and needed improvements in pre-deployment training, and identifies potential organizations with appropriate authority and resources to achieve the recommended improvements and actions in the "Roadmap."

Participants

The workshop participants represented a wide range of expertise in the SSTRO arena, and brought together training experts from the military services, the Joint Staff, international organizations (IOs), non-government organizations (NGOs), interagency offices, and selected institutes and centers of excellence to share peace and stability operations training information. Workshop facilitators were drawn from PSKOI and selected participants.

Methodology

PKSOI constructed the workshop to maximize contributions of each participant towards achieving workshop goals. The first day opened with a presentation by Mr. Asquino, Deputy Coordinator, Department of State (DoS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). He was followed by a panel focusing on operational experience (panel A), which included a series of presentations given by personnel who recently served in Afghanistan and or Iraq. Panel B, Practitioners, was conducted on the second day. This series of presentations was given by personnel from a variety of organizations involved in the pre-deployment training. Following each briefing session, attendees were broken down into five workgroups to examine various aspects of civil-military pre-deployment training. All workgroups included a diverse range of participants representing different types of organizations. The five workgroups briefed the plenary with their recommendations on how to improve civil-military pre-deployment training. Gaps were identified and solutions recommended to improve integrated civilian and military pre-deployment training required for SSTRO.

Presentations

Presentations were given in two groups. The first group, Panel A, was by personnel recently deployed in support of SSTRO, and included: a briefing on pre-deployment training by a US Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT), an overview of US Government (USG) and DoD contracting, a briefing on training for S/CRS, a briefing on the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) pre-deployment requirements, and an overview of the types of private security companies (PSCs) with recommendations for inclusion of PSCs in pre-deployment training.

The second group of presentations was given by representatives from a variety of agencies tasked to train forces and personnel to support SSTRO and included briefings on: US Army Training Support Brigade pre-deployment training for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the US Army Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), the US Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force Training Program

(MSTP), S/CRS training, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and the International Medical Corps (IMC).

Workshop Groups

Workshop participants were divided into five working groups, each focusing on a specific area affecting pre-deployment training: Group A looked at Humanitarian Assistance, Group B studied current and required SSTRO Policy, Group C examined initiatives in training and resourcing PRTs, Group D and E addressed traditional civilian-military pre-deployment integrated training. Workgroup recommendations are contained in Chapter Five.

Way Ahead

A number of initiatives emerged from the workshop, both internal to PKSOI, and as a part of the SSTRO community's efforts to improve integrated SSTRO training. Moving forward will require action by PKSOI as well as the rest of the SSTRO community.

In the short-term, several actions will be taken to sustain momentum gained from the workshop:

- PKSOI will consolidate point of contact information and create a database with relevant SSTR information.
- Nominations for an SSTR executive steering committee that focuses on sponsoring and hosting the next Training Workshop should be sent to PKSOI.
- PKSOI will create and begin distributing a monthly PKSOI Integrated Training Newsletter.
- The focus and the date for the next annual training workshop will be chosen by June 2007.

The medium- to long-term will require the SSTRO community working together to achieve many identified common goals:

- Population of the Integrated Training Website will be led by PKSOI and include inputs from across the field.
- Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) will consolidate and map SSTRO training opportunities across the community.
- 1st Army and USAID will link USG PRT training.
- USAID will share its pilot program for the collection, incorporation and application of lessons learned with other interagency (IA) partners by August 2007.
- USAID will launch its pre-deployment training program for its personnel deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq by June 2007.
- S/CRS will collect and analyze UN and NATO peace operations training modules for development of standards for IA individual training as a part of the NSPD 44 implementation.

PKSOI will continue to work with other agencies and organizations to ensure that the recommendations from this workshop move ahead. The SSTRO community's ability to innovate must match the dynamism of the operating environment.

Chapter 1: Opening Remarks by Mr. Mark Asquino, Deputy Coordinator, S/CRS

S/CRS is a relatively new organization formed two years ago. COL Agoglia and the PKSOI staff have provided us tremendous support. I want to talk this morning about S/CRS and what it has done in the last couple years. Also about National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) and the implementation process. Why S/CRS was established and what we are trying to achieve. As many of you know the US has been involved in 17 separate [reconstruction and stabilization operations] R&SOs since the end of the Cold War in places like Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan. These have ranged from places we have had troops on the ground and some have not had troops on the ground. What we have found in all these cases is that these operations have taken place in countries that were failed states with failed governance—that is, the failure of the state to control its territory. These states failed to provide their people the basic necessities. This leads to situations of terrorism and humanitarian disaster, crime, weapons proliferation and drug trafficking, etc. We have learned over the years in this process that if we are going to effectively control the effects caused by conflict in failed states, we as a government need to bring all the elements of our national power to one unified effort. Only by combining diplomacy, security development, intelligence, financial and human resources can we do a better job in those situations. Look at recently failed states, we will continue to be involved in these situations.

Civilian agencies need to be able to work more effectively together to better coordinate what we all do and we civilian agencies need to be able to work better with the military. This is no small undertaking. Most of you in this room have been involved in this process in one faction or another and you know the challenges. We have been charged to do something that is rather revolutionary. S/CRS is an interagency we have people from Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), from various parts of other military organizations. USAID, Department of Labor and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The S/CRS staff of 70 brings together an enormous amount of talent

and different ways of approaching problems. That is what we view as the essential element of approaching R&S tasks in a new fashion.

NSPD-44 was issued in December 2005 soon after DoD Directive 3000.5 was issued. The two documents compliment each other. NSPD-44 empowers the Secretary of State to do two things. First, "coordinating, planning and implementing reconstruction and stabilization assistance with foreign states and regions at risk or in transition from conflict or civil strife." Second the Secretary of State is responsible for leading and coordinating the integrated US effort to prepare and plan for reconstruction and stabilization of activities. Depending on the situation these operations can either be with the military or without the military. One of the most important aspects is pulling the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to work together, to harmonize civilian and military efforts in S&RO so that civilians and the military can work and plan together from the beginning. NSPD-44 has a very small mandate. We believe that if we are successful in its implementation it will provide high level policy makers with a comprehensive picture of existing capacities, needs, gaps and priorities which enable civilian agencies to respond to conflict and effectively partner with the military.

NSPD-44 lays out the capacities to build the capacity of the USG in unified operations.

There are a number of questions that S/CRS is looking at. Concerning planning and implementation, how do we plan for government conflict transformation in S&R situations? Both strategically transformation and local implementation. How can we better prepare for operations by harnessing mechanisms for funding, human resources, equipment and logistics and mobilization? How can we better achieve on-going civilian and military readiness? Finally, how do we conduct operations so that the interagency response maintains not only unity of purpose but also manages the complex process of insuring unity of effort? These are all tough questions and all ones we are grappling with in the NSPD-44 implementation process. I know a lot of people in this room have been working on these issues.

In the NSPD-44 implementation process, we have drawn in people from over twenty different agencies, to include Treasury, DoD, USAID, Agriculture, Justice, Commence, Corps of Engineers, Department of Forestry. In order for us to achieve a total government response we

have to get “buy ins” from the other agencies. We feel that the first four or five months have been tremendously productive and have resulted in establishing a basic framework to build a USG response to an international crisis. As we look at all of this and what we have achieved this workshop is very important to us. The following are some of the things people from S/CRS will look at during this workshop. How do we start planning for an emergency or crisis? How do we identify the skills and knowledge for successful response? How do we structure and provide training that is consistent with all the timely and changing conditions on the ground? How do we collect and incorporate new lessons learned and integrate these into civilian and military training? How do we assess if the training remains relevant and current? How do we work with people in the field to provide accurate and reach back capacity so we really allow the people to follow through on what we have provided them?

We need your help in answering these questions. Having looked at the list of this workshop’s participants there is an enormous amount of knowledge and expertise attending. We really do hope that the results of this workshop will help form the training elements of NSPD-44 so that we can look at the training gaps.

How do we get people out in the field to implement these plans? S/CRS has had no programmed operational funding for the last two years. The funds were zeroed out last year. We have been able to work with the regional bureaus on a selected basis to get some funding. S/CRS has sent some personnel to work transition security. They were followed up with people from our office’s active response force of about ten people who are trained and ready to respond in 48 hours. We sent several rotations of people out to Darfur, Chad and Nepal. We also have a standby reserve corps. This is a little bit like the military. There is a new initiative that involves both security and reconstruction that will hopefully receive some funding from DoD. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to provide up to 100 million dollars a year to DoS, specifically S/CRS to carry out S&RO. We received this money for fiscal year 2006 and 2007. DoS used some of this money in Lebanon, this year, to put people on the ground to support the embassies. Their two projects are unexploded ordnance and security training for the security forces.

In conclusion I want to tell what we in S/CRS feel is our core mission.

When dealing with failing states, there is a period of six months that is called the “golden hour.” This is when we still have the hearts and minds of the people.

We know that there are three central elements. One is building to civilian capacity. Another is integrated training and response. Finally the deployment of civilian expertise.

The last one is really important. We have learned the military does not deploy people without a clear plan of action. DoS does not always have a plan, rather DoS sends people to a country to assist. Our plan needs to be based on US objectives and commitment of international allies. We work very closely with our counterparts in Great Britain and Canada. People are the center of all our operations. We need to focus on how to give them the training they need.

Chapter 2: Panel A – Operational Experiences

First Presentation:
Brigade Combat Team Pre-Deployment Training,
COL Dave Gray

I want to provide you with my experiences as a recent practitioner on the ground. The briefing will include an overview on how the 1st Brigade used the time available and the tools available to train to go to Iraq. There are three things that are of importance for today's workshop. The first is to understand the environment. This includes understanding the units' missions, the units' capabilities and understanding the enemy. The enemy includes not just enemy forces and their capabilities, but also the context in which the brigade was going to operate in our assigned provinces in Iraq. In addition, in the brigade's case, we were not only undergoing pre-deployment training—we were also transforming our conventional infantry brigade of three infantry battalions into a BCT of six multifunctional battalions that included capabilities that previously existed at higher headquarters. Second, how we trained to defeat the insurgency. The insurgency consisted of two parts. The defeat of the insurgency forces, which is the brigade's primary mission, i.e., how to find, fix and finish the enemy. I am confident that we did that part very well. I want to focus on the other part which was defeating the insurgency by dealing with the complex environment involving issues addressed by this workshop. This presentation includes insights based on the brigade's after action review (AAR).

In order to understand the environment, you must understand the complexity of the specifics to the area of operations you are going into. Once you know your area of operations, you must tailor your pre-deployment training to focus on key strategic decisive locations that are key to your area of operations.



There are three levels one must examine to understand the environment one is going into. This is the first level of what I later called playing three dimensional chess in the dark. It is three dimensional because any move you made at any one of these levels had corresponding moves at another level both by coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and other players in the region… I say in the "dark" because while I do believe our opponent plays by rules, sometimes those rules are not exactly like our rules. You can see some measure of action and reaction.

So the first step is a good intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Geography matters. How they live and where they live and what terrain is between them and around them certainly matters. The strategic location may be a city, an oil pipeline or some other important location that is critical to the area of operation. The infrastructure in the area is also important, i.e., oil pipelines in your area have important infrastructure. Do these pipelines coincide with military key terrain?

The second level of training is cultural awareness. This goes beyond what we train the soldiers about customs, basic language,

how to interact with the Iraqis and conduct combat intelligence for the soldiers. For the leaders, what I wanted to focus on here is understanding the ethnic tribal structure, interface between the tribes, the political parties and the relationship between the tribes and the political parties. The population may include inter-tribal marriages that make it difficult to understand the people because the area may not include autonomous tribes. The way I approached the cultural training was to tap into formal instruction from academic institutions for expertise. Understanding Islam and its historic impact on the history of Iraq is important. We established a directed reading program that included counterinsurgency (COIN) and looked at some of the advisory efforts which were positive and some which had negative outcomes.

The third is intelligence preparation of the battlefield. This includes examining bordering countries and their relationship with Iraq and understanding the bordering countries' strategic interface is important.

The details of our training program focused on understanding operating in an urban environment. This included understanding the culture of the urban environment and the impact of tribes on the urban environment. Areas we were not prepared for, based on our own training, were police operations and security and reconstruction in urban areas. The brigade went to Nashville to train with civilian agencies concerning governance, emergency management, police station operations and how to train Iraqi police. The brigade conducted three leader training events without troops. These included guarding infrastructure, civil population crowd control in a bad neighborhood and how to attack and clear a major office building downtown without destroying the building.

The brigade conducted a number of command post exercises (CPXs) to intelligently understand our transformed organization and new technology. The brigade conducted several field training exercises (FTXs), including a rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to conduct a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX). The FTXs oriented on COIN and on how to obtain intelligence from the local population. The brigade supported the Military Training Team (MiTT) Academy, providing three teams to train the Iraqi military.

Insights

- Command Vision
  - Keep Strategic Objectives in forefront
  - Impartiality- Maintain Dynamic Balance
    - Deter Ethnic/Sectarian Violence
- Fight the Enemy, not the plan
  - Don't fixate on battlespace/troop to task
- Unifying Themes
  - Vertical/horizontal integration-Interagency Cooperation!
  - ISF Development, Kurdish Encroachment, Sunni Insurgency
- SOI Hierarchy Division of labor
  - Recognize Mom vs. Pop Tactics by SOIs across LOOs
- Unity of Effort
  - Common Vision working towards one endstate

I will not cover all these insights. The key to success, I believe, is working with partners in your area of responsibility, certainly folks from the interagency. There were a number of folks from the interagency. We set up the first PRT team in our area. You had to come up with mechanisms to interact, procedures and a common vision. Achieving the common vision in our area was not a common vision nor was it a US policy regarding some of the key strategic issues. We had to work together. This includes unity of effort, and finding a way to interact with all partners. We did some of that through role playing in our CPXs and situational training exercises. But more needs to be done to link us with people we are going to be working with. There I think use of technology systems that allow you to do video teleconferencing (VTC) with folks overseas, etc., is critical.

One problem involves being on the same sheet of music. The local population will play "mom against pop." The people will tell the commander one thing, the PRT another and the NGO a third and a defense contractor another.

It is critical during our training we all understand how each other works and we share information because that gives us a better understanding of the arena.

Second Presentation:
Foreign Service Institute (FSI) Training,
Mr. Henry Ensher

I was asked to provide insights into what it was like going to Iraq initially compared to the training we do now to prepare people for deployment.

First, I want to provide some background information. The major mission is to train foreign service officers (FSOs) for overseas deployment. The Institute has a full range of interagency representation. Second, as we go forward with COIN operations a core element should be that all agencies have full representation of the interagencies involved in all training. It is important to understand the sizes of different organizations supporting an operation. There are a limited number of FSOs, therefore there are a limited number assigned to each country.

In the beginning, an FSO went through pre-deployment training at Fort Belvoir, and received additional training in Kuwait. This training did not include in consultation, receiving a briefing on the area of Iraq deploying into, or specific reception and a DoS orientation. The deployment had a military focus—not a DoS focus. The movement into theater and in-theater reception procedures is now standardized. The current process is a more "civilianized" process. It is important in future deployments to have insured that the civilians feel comfortable with the process.

The current FSI one week course is called Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Course (DSAC). This training informs civilian employees what to expect in working in a military environment before the shooting stops, as in Iraq. The course gives the students a sense of the sounds of war, exposure to improvised explosive devices (IED), small arms fire, first aid, etc. Training includes limited briefing on what it is like to operate in a military environment. The first half of the course is taught at FSI and is designed to provide a very basic overview of Arab and Iraqi culture. The program includes an hour of basic Arabic language training. FSI recently sent a survey to DSAC graduates who have served in Iraq for several months to evaluate the training program. This program is a basic training program that will be improved. The reason I am attending this workshop is to determine who is doing what so that FSI can tap into other resources.

The process of selecting personnel is based on the “standard” selection process. This conflict is not a “standard” operation. To meet the personnel requirements DoS is using a variety of contracting procedures to hire personnel to fill requirements in the areas of conflict.

Potential areas of improvement include expanding the DSAC program, [and] establishing a round of consultations which includes a point of contact list for all agencies that are supporting the operation. This list of points of contact should be made available to personnel in the area of conflict. This capability does not currently exist. Finally, PRTs are different. They do not operate the same as working in the embassy in the country’s capital or working in Washington, DC. What is needed is formal PRT training involving all the interagencies which will provide a reach back capability. Once personnel return from the area of conflict they return to their previous employment, making it difficult to obtain lessons learned.

Third Presentation:
United States Government/DoD Contracting,
Mr. Mark Lonsdale

I want to focus on pre-deployment training, armed contractors in the battle space and the issues combatant commanders have on the ground with armed contractors.

FACT

Professional security contractors experienced in reconstruction security, convoy escort, protective details, and FOB security are a critical component of current and future Phase 4 S&R / SSR operations and US military Force Protection

"One Team – One Fight"

I think everyone has to accept that security contractors are part of Phase IV operations.

Because the military is now a very lean organization, a lot of functions previously done by military personnel are now going to contract personnel. In Iraq, there are some 20,000 security contractors and 100,000 reconstruction contractors on the ground. That is a significant force compared to the military force.

METT-TC

Army operational doctrine (FM 3-0) describes the integrated operational environment as factors of:

- Mission
- Enemy
- Terrain & Weather
- Troops
- Time available
- Civil Considerations (added 2001)
  - (Need to add Armed Contractor Considerations)

But which battle operating system engages the "C"?
Who is responsible for Civil Military Operations (CMO)?

Most of you have seen this. In 2001, the “C” was added for Civil Considerations. We need to add another “C” for armed contractors on the battleground.

Any company that is a member of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) adheres to a standard code of conduct, ethics and rules of engagement. There are some companies that are not members of IPOA, and are a concern on the battlefield.

Security company employees are in-country on DoD identification cards, not individual company identification cards. That makes them on the same team as the military: “Same team same fight.” They do not come under the Uniform Code of Justice (UMCJ), but do come under Department of Justice (DoJ) jurisdiction. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) said they will investigate any incident involving contractors that meet a certain threshold.

PSC Contracting Issues:

1. Qualification of the Company / Provider
2. Individual Standards
3. Vetting of Personnel
4. Company Registration & Insurances
5. Code of Conduct
6. Weapons Policies
7. ROE & Force Escalation / De-escalation
8. Identification – ID Cards / Uniforms
9. Tracking & Communications
10. OPSEC
11. Accountability

Contactors have their own issues. Their employment techniques are defensive in nature. If attacked, it may appear they are conducting offensive operations, but they are really defensive in nature. There are [operational security] OPSEC issues because of the large numbers of contractors employed, which include both US and local nationals. There is no one place an Iraqi can go to make a complaint about a contractor.

Who are these armed contractors?

1. Former US & coalition military
2. High percentage of former US and UK SF personnel
3. Former senior NCOs, Warrants & Officers
4. Mature & Experienced
5. Highly motivated & professional
6. Former SF Medics (18D), communications (18E) , EOD & K9 specialists
7. High percentage of Law Enforcement SWAT officers

Armed contractors include primarily retired officers, warrant officers and non- commissioned officers.

PSC Code of Conduct

1. Professional Appearance & Standards
2. Highest Standards of Personal & Professional Behaviour
3. Respect for International Laws, Conventions & Human Rights
4. Respect for Local Laws
5. Respect of local Custom & Culture
6. No Drugs or Drunkenness
7. No Proselytizing

This is an unofficial code of conduct. Private security contractors have standards. Not all contractors are the same. You need to know what contractors are working in you area of operations. Contractors

should wear recognizable uniforms. Convoy operations are the most dangerous. If you have a security company operating in your area of operations, you need to know what type vehicles and uniforms and their mode of operation.

Identification cards are a problem. There are a large number of different types of identification cards, each requiring different procedures at check points. It is difficult for the soldier manning the check point to understand the different procedures for the wide variety of identification cards. These procedures need to be standardized.

A major problem is contractors running convoys on main supply routes and the contractor convoy intersecting with a military convoy. There needs to be standard operating procedures (SOPs) for coming up on check points. There needs to be a more effective “blue force” tracking system. Contractor convoys should show up on the friendly tracking systems, but the friendly convoys should not show up on the contractor’s tracking systems.

WAY FORWARD

DOD could:

1. Set minimum personnel standards for armed contractors
2. Require pre-deployment training
3. Standardize Identification
4. Facilitate Communications
5. Blue Force Tracking (transmit only)
6. Set Rules of Engagement
7. Demand Accountability
8. Supply pre-deployment briefs on PSCs for Headquarters Staff & Ground Troops

These are some suggestions for the way forward. DoS set standards for their contractors. DoD needs to examine using the same approach. DoD can set the standards for personnel hired. While it may raise the cost to hire the personnel, the personnel hired will be better trained professionals.

Fourth Presentation:
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC),
Mr. Michael Schulz

Thank you for the invitation to attend this workshop. The topic fits well as a continuation of discussions on the same issues that are conducted elsewhere, for example throughout this year, at various fora at the United Nations. They were addressed during the session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) earlier this year in Geneva, but they are also discussed during the still ongoing UN General Assembly in New York. Numerous reports were studied and resolutions passed.

Obviously, the topic refers to conflict and to questions [regarding] how the military and the civil or the humanitarian sectors relate to each other. These issues are as high on the agenda of governments and various inter-governmental settings as they are complex and acute.

The UN agreed this year on the establishment of a new Peace Building Commission and a Peace Building Fund. I attended civil society hearings arranged by the Commission. I have to admit that to date, I personally have more questions than answers as to how peace building can function in its implementation, in cooperation between many actors including the military, UN troops, civil society and humanitarian institutions and organizations or the Red Cross.

Besides more operational questions, a more principle question I still have is whether there is an agreed definition of peace—peace as the objective to be achieved?

Those hearings reminded me of the fact that issues related to UN peacekeeping missions and, for example, so called “integrated missions” have been for some time and are still under discussion just as are other lessons to be learned from failed peacekeeping missions such as to Angola, Somalia or more recently Sudan.

The Commission will now draw up two country specific strategies: on Burundi and Sierra Leone, as if to test the Commission’s mandate. The mandate spells out that the Commission is to pool resources and expertise in conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, human rights and the rule of law, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction

and sustainable development. It is hoped that those first two missions will deliver practical answers in regards to a way forward.

It might be optimistic to state that the Peace Building Commission shall draw on expertise in conflict prevention as there might not be too much positive experience at hand. Nevertheless, conflict prevention remains an issue to be addressed with more of a sense of priority and urgency.

However, I was asked to contribute to today's discussion by expanding the topic and by sharing observations on military and humanitarian relations in non-conflict scenarios. This would imply to discuss those relations in the context of complex emergencies and natural or manmade disasters. Complex emergencies are those instances when natural or man made disasters and conflict overlap. I was told to talk from a global perspective, not merely from a US perspective.

Allow me to continue by clarifying two issues as if it were for us to depart from the same level of understanding and to develop some of the issues relevant under the topic. Needless to say that I speak from the point of view of the International Federation and in my function as Deputy Permanent Observer accredited to the UN in New York:

- First, who are the humanitarian actors? The Global Humanitarian Platform consists of three pillars: the UN, NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RC).
- Second, what are the issues? The humanitarian agenda is driven by two perspectives: one of humanitarian reform and another that is operational realities on the ground.

With regards to the first, the Global Humanitarian Platform, it is important to understand that while sharing one "Platform" the three pillars – UN, NGOs and RC – are distinctly different from each other. The RC is an organization sui generis. The RC Movement consists of three components: the National Societies, the International Federation that is the Secretariat of 185 National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies and the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), the guardian of the Geneva Conventions and additional protocols.

Internally, the Red Crescent Movement is governed by its humanitarian principles, its own constitution, policies and codes of

conduct or strategies. The principles are: unity, universality, humanity, voluntary service, impartiality, independence and neutrality. In times of conflict or complex emergencies a so called Seville Agreement stipulates the role and function of each component of the Red Crescent Movement. In times of either disaster, complex emergency or conflict, a so called Code of Conduct guides the actions of delegates and their respective organization, in terms of ethical behavior.

It is important to highlight the principles neutrality and independence. I had said above RC was an institution sui generis. This is in reference to our relations with other entities including governments and the military which, as a norm, are under the jurisdiction and command of governments. Sui generis means that RC recognizes the prime mandate of governments with regards to the humanitarian well-being of their peoples and takes a position of auxiliary vis-à-vis their governments, who in return must recognize and respect RC's humanitarian principles, and in particular neutrality and independence. This recognition is formalized by acts of law—so called decrees or RC laws. It is a relationship based on reciprocity.

These principles, neutrality and independence and I would even add impartiality, are key to the successful functioning of RC. They are prerequisites of humanitarian security, humanitarian space in which to operate on the ground and terms of access to the most vulnerable victims of any disaster or emergency.

In a sense, one might say the Global Humanitarian Platform is exclusive to others than the three pillars, but inclusive in the sense that it is open to defined and formalized partnerships and cooperation.

Secondly, with regards to humanitarian reform and operational realities on the ground. The first, reform and change, address the issue on two levels: a) in the thematic overall context of development, humanitarian assistance and environment; and b) in more operations, humanitarian response oriented context addresses the circle or continuum (preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, development and again, as the circle closes, preparedness and prevention) as key elements to development.

With regards to the first, the interdependence of development, humanitarian assistance and environment, I will come back to this thematic sequence in a moment.

With regards to the second, the circle of preparedness and prevention, response and recovery, as well as development, these elements address directly questions as to how best to strengthen humanitarian coordination and cooperation on the ground. This covers a very wide range of issues, from early warning following the Tsunami, to scaling up immediate assessment and response capacities, to working more effectively in so called clusters—groups of organizations highly specialized in emergency shelter, water and sanitation, health and nutrition, telecommunications and logistics or protection, etc. Newly created emergency response funds aim at facilitating more predictable and immediate responses.

There are many experiences made on the ground that reflect both best practice and lessons to be learned. I do remember cases in the past when the cooperation was hampered by unpredictability because military priorities were not the same as humanitarian priorities and vice versa.

On the other hand, I assume we are all aware of positive cooperation during the recent Tsunami or the earthquake in Pakistan and elsewhere. All indications are that cooperation has improved as we learn to understand each other better.

Important is that humanitarian operations are at all times and under all circumstances recognizable as humanitarian operations.

Looking ahead at the anticipated outcomes of this workshop.

- Lessons learned and best practices in the various pre-deployment training approaches.
- Identify Gaps and recommendations for improvements.
- Develop a “Roadmap” for the policies and procedures to allow the military and civilians to participate in each others training.

The discussion, on a global scale at the UN, centers around many issues and at the core around sovereignty. In this era of globalization, global trends span the global level and the communities down to each individual. This is also true from the humanitarian dimension as poverty is on the increase because of widening and deepening inequality, mass migration with multiple implications, the continuing spread of HIV/AIDS or the looming threat of a human avian influenza

outbreak, the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) exceeding those of refugees, etc.

Those trends are not only potential disasters, in many instances they are disasters in themselves. Under the span of those trends, governments are no longer fully part of the traditional equation between sovereignty and control. This is what makes it difficult to see how one policy or one roadmap that fits all could be found.

There was much discussion on the use of military assets during this year's session of ECOSOC and the United Nations General Assembly. As observers, we noted that while in the past, discussions centered around the question of how to enhance civil-military relations, while this year, the discussion focused more on how to limit the use of military assets. Restricting the use of military assets as a demand-driven tool of last resort was of equal importance to developing and developed countries. For the former, military assets present a threat to sovereignty as I had referred to earlier on; to the latter, developed countries, they present a hefty price tag.

This is notwithstanding that the European Union is further pursuing potential plans to increase the European capacity for rapid response, a concept that is based on humanitarian and civil and military cooperation. This is one of many issues to be followed as, for example, the draft of a European Constitution does not include any reference to the humanitarian principle of neutrality. The constitution was rejected per referenda in a number of European states, but the issue remains a concern.

Of note in this discussion was the wish of numerous member states to reinforce the Oslo and the Military and Civilian Defense Assets (MCDA) Guidelines. These Oslo Guidelines have been updated and renewed in November this year [2006] and spell out in great detail prospects and limits to civil-military cooperation. They do not cover reconstruction or rehabilitation activities. Complex emergencies are ruled by separate MCDA guidelines.

Interestingly, those guidelines refer to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, but not independence as applicable to Red Cross.

They are not stand alone guidelines. The Tampere Convention regulates telecommunications in times of disaster and, as just mentioned, the Code of Conduct directs ethical behavior and there are others.

That this workshop is exactly the kind of exchange we should seek on a continued basis. This is in a sense training as this forum enhances communication, understanding each other and each others standing, capacities, etc.

It would be good to have a better presence of the military – but also the corporate sector, the media, etc. – in other fora when relations with those sectors are discussed. For example, in context of evaluations of the Tsunami or Pakistan earthquake operation. It would add authenticity to such discussions.

I spoke of the Oslo Guidelines. During the meetings in Oslo and as frequently reported back from the field, one or perhaps the main deficit of those guidelines is the fact that they are not widely known. Some say because dissemination is not intensive enough, others state the need for translation into more languages, etc. Another deficit remains a degree of uncertainty when it comes to cooperation with the military as opposed to civil defense authorities.

As the humanitarian personnel are reaching out to regions and in countries not always easy to see how the military can follow other than through their respective governments and representations.

In the meantime, I recommend continuing realistic and pragmatic approaches, exchanging experiences and expertise on one level and practice their implementation, on a case-to-case basis, in the field, contributions by the military being a last resort, filling humanitarian gaps through special and specialized assistance.

Today, governments continue to spend and increase spending for military purposes. On a global scale in excess of 1 trillion US dollars per year are spent on military budgets, whereas the humanitarian sector receives a fraction of this amount. Funding might be perceived as an area of competition by many observers as there are only very few sources were new added funding for the humanitarian sector could come from.

But, finally, allow me to share with you a hypothesis under progress; one that might provide a new and different perspective for the future. I made a reference earlier to the importance of the thematic interdependence of development, humanitarian assistance and environment. The importance lays in the fact that the discourse over those issues increases the awareness of the fact that we are witnessing a dramatically widening humanitarian dimension that is

common to all global trends such as poverty/inequality, migration, HIV/AIDS, climate change, IDPs, Human Avian Flu and others.

The widening humanitarian dimension is reflected in a demographic, seismic shift in the numbers of vulnerable persons to those that are categorized as most vulnerable because of increased risks. Today, not less than 1.8 billion people are amongst the most vulnerable.

And tragically, while combating the risks and aiming at reducing poverty and hunger, it turns out that poverty and hunger in themselves are defeating efforts to reduce them; and, tragically, climate change, no longer as a matter of prophesy but scientific forecast, will lead to an increase in disasters, storms, droughts, floods, raising sea levels and different patterns in the spread of diseases, to name just a few. The consequences of climate change alone, besides traditional natural or manmade disasters, complex emergencies and conflicts, will turn out to be increasingly adverse to development and humanitarian work, to an extent that is bound to even reverse developmental progress.

It is foreseeable that such an increase in vulnerability and risks can or will lead to a situation where the humanitarian sector will start substituting for what is supposed to be primarily a government mandate. This is where there is in all probability a new scenario evolving that will force new and different kinds of cooperation among all participants demanded by humanitarian dimensions of a different and unprecedented scale.

Fifth Presentation:
Private Security Companies (PSC),
Mr. James Schmitt

My presentation will focus on the private security Industry and the need to standardize pre-deployment training. Mr. Longdale and I coordinated our briefings for this workshop. The issues affect more than the PSCs. The same issues affect other players in the area of operations that include NGOs, logistics operators and coalition forces that also employ PSCs. I will make three recommendations. I have one caveat: my comments are my personnel observations and do reflect my company. They also reflect those of the [International Peace Operations Association] IPOA, but do not reflect the feelings of all IPOA members. Armor Group has been in being for 25 years and has about 9,000 employees and has worked in 160 countries in the last five years. The company has a much codified ethics policy which is something that the industry is now taking on. The IPOA is two-and-a-half years old. It has 28 providers. They are not all PSCs, there are some NGOs and logistical providers. I brought copies of the IPOA bi-monthly publication, *The Journal of International Peace Operations*, that are free to attendees. The journal has 6,000 subscribers and captures a number of the issues being discussed at this workshop. As the industry looks at the future, we see an increased focus in stability support programs, reconstruction and contingency response. The increase will have an impact on our training in pre-deployment. It is critical that the training be integrated. The contingency response occurs across the spectrum of peacekeeping operations. Sometimes, there is high threat and low complexity, and sometimes there is low threat and high complexity. An example was the response to Katrina: There was low risk, but the operation was the most complex. Our training, and I submit training with USG agencies, needs to have both a hard and a soft focus. There needs to be better integration at the contract and procurement level so that one contract with one agency is not at odds, unintentionally, with a contract with another agency. Early in Iraq, some PSCs did harm to national objectives, [thus] standardization would help operations. There is another stakeholder: That is the delivery of training and reform in the local deployment area, meaning the host nation or the failed state. In Kenya, we have 17,000 employees. All but one is local nationals.

In conclusion, to get focus for this workshop, ultimately as private sector partners we want to assist the government and multi-national organizations to use the specific proven private firm capabilities to accomplish assistance.

There are three conclusions. First, we feel the industries needs to take ownership of industry standards. IPOA is on the 11th iteration of its code of conduct. This does not mean it is not right; rather that the code is getting better and better every time because it benefits all stakeholders, including tax payers and our organizations as providers.

Second, we need to integrate those standards into pre-deployment training. We feel we can do that at combat training centers. We can do it at our own facilities. Many of the firms have their own training facilities around the world, and there is ample space to conduct the training. This training can also be conducted at home station. It can be brought into programs like BCTP and MSTP by working the training into scenarios.

Third, the long-term issue is that when there is an on-going operation, there does need to be an interagency coordination cell. The cell could be done under Chief of Mission if it is a small operation, or done under the combatant commander [for a large operation]. There needs to be some coordination capability that brings in all the stakeholders, again not just PSCs, which exist in the area of operations. This needs to be codified by the contracting officers and needs to be in the statement of work. If the performance of work is not acceptable, the contractor needs to be held accountable. Finally, the lessons learned from the coordination cell need to go right back into the pre-deployment training. This needs to be a continually refined process. We stand ready to engage and eager to engage because everyone will benefit.

Sixth Presentation:
United States Aid International Development (USAID),
Mr. Phil Gary

I am going to limit my remarks to PRTs. First, we must understand the environment. There is a basic problem between what we are asking the PRTs to do and the national strategy. Afghanistan is a country steeped in history of warlords. As Colonel Gray said, you must understand the environment you are working in. In the contested areas, the strongest forces are the warlords. They have been hedging their bets. The warlords are not sure if the Taliban are going to come back, or if the international community is going to prevail. So the warlords stay on the fence, and we work with them and try to get them to be the stabilizing factor. We have done this for two-and-a-half years.

NSPD-44 talks about DoS and USAID. There is a critical missing part—DoJ. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and a lot of other domestic agencies are involved. Last year, we started a major effort to remove the poppy fields that are owned by the warlords. Who do you suppose the warlords are siding with? Into that situation, we put the PRTs with a mission.

Lesson one: when you get into the field, you have to make a local assessment of what you can and what you cannot do. Assessment must be of the resources you have within your PRT. One theme that I would push again and again is that people must be brought in and they must be trained together. One of the things we all do is to observe a certain amount of political correctness. We need to train together so that the team members feel free to state their opinions. The members are not going to always agree, but they must feel free to provide their own ideas. One must understand that we all do not have a common mission. We have an overall national strategy. When we send people to theater, we must send people to theater with a common mission. We must allow people who work together to train together so that they at least understand what they are supposed to do as a team.

Let me tell where I think we can make a difference: Every agency and organization has a set of policies one needs to follow to get promoted. We need to look at those policies because we consistently

promote people for things that are radically different from things we have been told to do on the ground. We are telling people to go to Afghanistan and Iraq to stabilize the country, and start to put in place the building blocks for the institutions. Train people, help mayors, help regional councils to get their feet on the ground. If I cannot put something in your efficiency report stating your accomplishments in the field, you will not be competitive. Are we really going to go out and build those building blocks, or are we going to go out and do some actions? In both countries, we have people who cannot take the time to be mentors and provide a catalyst. Instead, they must be doers.

The second is the challenge we have of conflicting institutional and national missions.

Mr. Schulz said there must be a separation between military and humanitarian. PRTs are a military unit and institution that use humanitarian tools to achieve an objective. How does this separation work? People must be trained to deal with this issue. Each nation has a philosophical difference of what we are trying to do. If we are not candid about these differences, we are not going to be able to train the men and women to go out to the field to do the things we want them to do. In our training sessions, contractors and NGOs have to be there because they live and work in the same area as the PRTs. We must get them on the same sheet of music. If we do not, then we are undermining our efforts. One of the things we need to start to do is to training political problems for our commanders and for our troops on the ground.

The difference between PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, with one exception, PRTs are run by lieutenant colonels and colonels. In Iraq, they are all run by DoS officers. Military men have a mission to carry out at the same time the DoS officer has a mandate to make that political system work. Unless these two come together to do training, they will not find a common solution that works. Bottom line, frequently the on the ground mission is different from the stated mission.

The last piece is who rules and why. This is an on-going debate. PRTs are a platform. One of the first things we must decide is what kind of a platform it is. Is it a platoon for an operation? Is it a civil affairs platform? After deciding what the PRT is, then we can decide how

to train it. The second step is who should be a commander? There is a lack of comfort level between military officers on the ground and formally retired DoS officers who are in charge. We must start to address this issue. We must send the correct people to do the job. We must establish criteria for the skill sets people have to have to be PRT commanders, or we are never going to get to the point that we are providing the correct people.

Finally, we say that Afghanistan and Iraq are our major battles. In Afghanistan, the commanders are colonels and lieutenant colonels. In Iraq, they are majors and captains. That has to do with who are commanding the PRTs. This makes a fundamental difference in picking up a phone and to make all this work.

Panel A: Questions and Answers

Question One

I did not hear any of the panel members address my issue, because it is not your job. How should we train people going into the field to include long term reconciliation and conflict resolution? Or should that be part of the job?

Answer One

Actually long term reconciliation and conflict resolution should be part of DoS's job. One of the key elements in the US policy on Iraq is reconciliation among the various sects. This is clearly a task for which we have to train. Now that we are three-and-a-half years into this exercise, we are beginning to grapple with how best to do that particularly in an interagency environment. This is a critical issue because we have decided that reconciliation is the core of the issue in Iraq.

Answer Two

One panel member does not agree that reconciliation and conflict resolution is going on in Afghanistan and Iraq. A lot of the local government training that takes place is in fact reconciliation training. We must be careful in the use of the term "conflict resolution." In Afghanistan, when working with local mayors, teaching them how

to be responsive to the people in that region. In Iraq, in a province that has an ethnic mix, part of the training is teaching them how to deal with other ethnic groups and to be reasonable administrators, and this is in fact teaching conflict resolution. The key is who should have this role? At a strategic level the deployers and policy makers have to weave that into each and every part of what they do. The way it is integrated will be different at different levels. Then it must be executed by different people up and down the line. Different people will have different roles. It is not a practical task to ask a special forces unit to concern itself with conflict resolution.

Follow-up Question

Should part of the military training for staffs include training in conflict resolution?

Answer

Actually, I believe it is happening on the ground. We may not call it conflict resolution, but clearly it is part of the strategy to deal with any of the areas, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or other places is figuring out who in the society you have to deal with. These are not all formal leaders, in fact that is mostly the case in Iraq where most of the people with power are not necessarily people in formal positions of power as they are in western society. An example is tribal sheiks. Some were elected leaders and others were not. On the ground, I believe we are getting some practical experience and training in how to negotiate and engage with people. At the brigade command level, we looked at how we were going to keep the ethnic agendas from continuing to advance.

Question Two

The first presentation focused primarily on information. I am not clear how information transitions into behavior? How do you reinforce the information with actual behavior of sergeants and corporals on the ground?

Answer

Good question and thanks. In my briefing I focused on leader information rather than behavior. As we rebuilt our organization, we

had to go out and exercise it. During the time between deployments, we went to the field often. In the field, we went through a number of scenarios we thought we would encounter in Iraq. We got some help from a veterans association that had many members who spoke Arabic who could role play. They were injected into all of our scenarios spent time in the field with us helping us learn about the Iraqi culture and as a result soldiers were exposed to that. In our exercise at JRTC, we tested every level of the organization from the brigade command and staff level down to soldiers about how to operate in the environment. Lastly, there is going to be a lot learned on the job. That is a fact of life. In the Army today, most non-commissioned officers have had one tour in either Afghanistan or Iraq or both.

Question Three

Question is on unity of purpose. Ideally we would all like to train together so we have a better understanding of one another from the civilian to the military side, private security forces, NGOs, IOs, etc. But that is not feasible. One way to help unify how we operate in the field is to have a very common understanding of the overall USG strategy from a policy prospective for that country, what the objectives are underlying that policy goal and what are the different programs of intervention that the US Government is doing to affect those kinds of changes. I wonder if in any of the training you offer your people, if the overarching policies are a part of the training? Do you provide an actual description of the overall US policy strategy for the particular country where your folks are going to be operating?

Answer One

Contractors use a very simplistic approach. There is not going to be peace without stabilization and there is not going to be reconstruction without stabilization. There is not going to be either of those without security. Contractors are in-country for the duration or until someone at a higher level tells us to leave. What we are looking for are the mechanisms to work together. This is what we are missing. My company has given me the latitude to go brief any BCT about my company and how security operators work in the field. The who, what and how we operate, so that when they get on the ground they can get in contact with us. If you have a problem where

do you file your complaint? If we have a problem where do we file our complaint? Where is the arbitration? Because we cannot just leave. There have been companies that left Iraq because of bad behavior. What we are primarily looking for is to be written into Phase IV doctrine planning so you have a paragraph for enemy force, friendly forces and also contractors in the battle space. So now when there is a briefing, contractors should be addressed. That the sergeant that is sending his convoy out on the ground knows that there are contractors working in his area of operations. If he does not know specifically where we are, he needs to know what we look like. So when he is doing his briefing he can tell his personnel what the contractor vehicles and uniforms look like. The tail gunner on the last vehicle in convoy is being told to shoot at anyone coming within a 100 meters, he should think first about what contractor's uniforms and vehicles look like before shooting at another set of vehicles approaching his convoy. We are looking for that mechanism of communication to be included in training.

Answer Two

The policy part is a part of the FSI Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism course (DSAC). Obliviously that is a very brief block of instruction. The policy bureau for the area of operations comes over to the DSAC and walks through very carefully what we are doing and why the US cares about the country. That part is in place. There is another part that is a longer session of training for people going to the region. In that one, we take the extra time to describe what the formal interagency process is to handle that country's policies. That gets into the question what does the National Security Council do at what level.

Answer Three

One of the questions you may want to ask COL Agoglia is to put together a one-stop shop on these issues. Because there really is not one place where DoS officers, contractors, NGOs, DoD officers, can all come together and pick up what you are addressing. You can go to different places but there is no one place to get this information and that is a critical gap.

Answer Four

For the military to understand the strategic objectives. I believe I highlighted that point. Understanding the strategic objectives is fundamental. It starts with the mission analysis before we go into theater. Does a private first class care about the strategic mission? No? Should commanders and their staffs understand the strategy and mission? Yes? Because everything we did in Iraq had to be nested with the strategic objective. We are not all of a common mind on how to approach that battle space. I have to keep coming back to this, by highlighting our interaction with the different factions. At one point, different tribal objectives may be opposing the overall objective. In some degree, these two factions interface, and in some degree they do not. These differences must be reconciled, but in support of the strategic objectives. It is the commander's job to keep his subordinate commanders updated about why we are there. That is important to soldiers even at the lowest level. I feel that does go on in the military. The bigger challenge is getting everyone in the battle space on the same page.

Answer Five

Answer from different contractor's perspective. DoS does a very good job explaining what the key success factors are and what the strategic objectives are. When our employees arrive in-country, they are in fact representing the DoS and USG. It is critical that the management at a minimum understands exactly why he or she is there and what we are trying to do. That is transcended down the organization much like it is in the military. If we do not do that, we are setting up ourselves for failure and our clients for failure.

Answer Six

You can get the information to the lowest level. When a DoS employee goes out the door with a personnel security detail we made it a practice of explaining to the commander of that detail where we are going, what we are doing and why we are doing it. That makes it clear to the security detail most of the time, as example, why it was important not to put your hands on people.

Question Four

With complex environments the way they are today, with PSCs floating around the battlefield along with USAID and other agencies, how does BCTP train all these people operating in the same area of responsibility? How does BCTP get all of this into a seven day exercise? When in most cases an organization is called to participate, the organization states they do not have the people or the time for their people to come to the one week or ten day exercises to show what the organization does. I know everyone says you "go to the interagency." I have a problem with interagencies. I do not believe there is any one person that controls the interagency. If it is it is the President of the United States. I am not going to him, I am going to the departments inside the agencies that belong to the interagency and tell them I have an exercise. Who are you going to send me? We used to get folks from DoS, but after we lost a personal relationship between my boss and DoS we can no longer get that support. I want the FBI, CIA, DoS to come to the next BCTP to prepare the unit for the next rotation. I cannot make it happen. The problem is that I have to do this process with every agency.

Answer One

The contract industries may be willing to have a contact group come out to BCTP at our own expense and discuss how we can inject realistic contractor play into your scenarios. That is one of the functions of IPOA.

Answer Two

One of the things that came up in last year's workshop is that there are different goals. The goal of training the military and preparing them, a role player may be adequate. Is that the same thing as providing integrated training? Where the other agency is going to get something out of the training? Is the second part the same thing as all the people who are going to be in-theater together getting together prior training in-theater? There are three different training objectives here, sometimes they are in conflict. In all three of those objectives, it seems that one of the major show stoppers is the capacity of the civilian agencies. These are big road blocks that need to be addressed in this workshop.

Question Five

In my experience, no matter how much training you do in advance there is a lot to be learned once you arrive in-theater, specifically in the cultural and ethnical areas. Are there any provisions for in-theater training, conducted after being in-theater for a couple months?

Answer

The question is in the ideal world, but it does not make sense to do in-theater training. There is no time in a six or twelve month rotation to take people out of the field and give them training. Anything that takes people out of theater during the deployment weakens the organization in-theater. Once you get to theater, you must learn by doing.

Question and Answer Wrap-up by Dr. Janine Davidson, OSD-SOLIC

We should take a hard look at some of the things the 1st Brigade did to prepare for their deployment. Some were based on personal relationships. Some they got lucky on.

We should take a look at things that contractors are doing on their own. For instance, the Code of Ethics, pretty amazing.

This workshop, should it be institutionalized to continue to bring us together?

The PRTs in general, are pretty adaptive, they probably also fall into the gap category in terms of pre-deployment side.

Interagency participation: The connecting that people manage to do in-theater, the way they find each other. Is there a gap there that they could be better prepared for.

<u>Gaps</u>

Being able to train together in real time with people you are going to work with in-theater. This may be a bridge too far. This group needs to explain why it is too hard. What sorts of legislation or policy changes are required to support these objectives? Internal things inside your organization that need to happen to make the training possible.

Civilian Capacity, Working with Congress to Improve this Gap

The idea of a one stop shop. [Dr. Davidson's] office is leading an effort to come up with an "office of complex contingencies" which will attempt to [be the one stop shop]. My office is partnered with DoS, DoD has established a wedge of funding to get the office started. The idea is that the office will be a clearing house of information like curriculum, ideas focusing on these sorts of efforts. PKSOI is an Army organization that impacts organizations outside the Army. PKSOI is a model for standing for "office of complex contingencies."

In-theater interim training. Again, is it something that can happen with one or two personnel, or an in-theater road show across the theater. Or is this just too hard to do?

Take these items and items that you capture from the presentations and question and answer discussions into workgroup.

Chapter 3: Panel B – Practitioners

First Presentation:
189th Infantry Brigade (Training Support Brigade),
LTC Len Matz

The purpose of today's briefing is to provide an overview of the mission and support provided by the 189th Infantry Brigade (Training Support Brigade) to units mobilizing and demobilizing from overseas deployments. The brigade is a multi-army component unit comprised of both Active and Army Reserve units and personnel organized into a brigade headquarters, plus four battalions which are located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The brigade's mission is below. Training is conducted in accordance with US Forces Command (FORSCOM), US Central Command (CENTCOM) and First Army Training Directives.

This is the Brigade's mission.

189th Infantry Brigade Mission

189th Infantry Brigade increases the operational readiness of Reserve Component units through pre- and post-mobilization training assistance, readiness assessments, evaluations and support. On order, assists installation commanders in mobilizing, deploying, reintegration training and demobilization of Reserve Component units.

The brigade mission essential task list (METL) includes the following:

- Provide pre- and post-mobilization training assistance, readiness assessments, evaluations and support to reserve component units.
- Conduct global war on terrorism (GWOT) training in accordance with CENTCOM, Coalition or Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) and FORSCOM training guidance.
- Assist installation commanders in mobilizing deploying, reintegration training and demobilization of reserve component units.
- Protect the Force.

The training resources available include two [forward operating bases] FOBs that replicate the FOB environment in Afghanistan, various small arms ranges and numerous urban training areas.

One of the major missions is to train PRT prior to deployment to Afghanistan. The battalion trains twelve PRTs a year. The PRT pre-deployment timeline is shown below. The PRT leaders and primary staff begin the training cycle by conducting an in-country survey several months before reporting to Fort Bragg. The leadership arrives at Fort Bragg a month before team members to allow team building to take place before the entire team arrives. There is a reserve unit that provides a security force to reflect in-country operations.



The major PRT training tasks are listed below.

- Equipping/Readiness Processing
- Staff Training
- SECFOR Training
- Individual Warrior Skills
- Weapons Training
- Land Navigation
- Specialty Courses
- Combat Lifesaver/Drivers/Commo Training
- Ground Assault Convoy/IED Defeat/Convoy Live Fire Exercise
- Language Skills and Cultural Awareness
- Stability Operations and Support Operations (SOSO)
- Pre-deployment Leave
- End of Course Test and Re-Training
- Deployment Ceremony
- Deployment Preparation

The PRT training challenges include:

- Differences in military cultures of the various armed services.

The PRTs include personnel from all services. The in-country administrative and logistics support is provided by the US Army. Members from other branches must become knowledgeable on the US Army systems that they will use in the field.

- Assembling and replicating the required equipment for training
- Coordinating numerous outside organizations to support the required training
- Synchronization of high-priority resources
- Time available

The PRT training objective is to accomplish the following end state.

189

Training Endstate

PRTs Arrive in Theater

- ***Committed*** to the Mission, National Goals, Military Values
- ***Competent*** in Required Skills
- ***Confident*** in their ability to perform in an austere Combat Environment
- ***Cohesive*** as a Team
- ***Disciplined*** to do the Right Thing

Second Presentation:
US Army Battle Command Training Program (BCTP),
Mr. Lou Gelling

The purpose of this briefing is to provide an overview of BCTP and discuss the area I need help solving. The CSA provides the training guidance for BCTP. The following is the CSA's guidance for war fighting exercises (WFX).

CSA Guidance for WFX

"BCTP will become joint centric and remain an "engine of change" for the current and future Army ."

- **Train to doctrinal standards.**
- **Develop self-aware, adaptive leaders and ready units for full-spectrum, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental Multinational (JIIM) operations.**
- **Instrumented feedback for both formal and informal AARs will provide the necessary lessons learned for leaders, units, and the Army at large.**
- **Maximize stress on digital C4ISR systems.**
- **A rigorous fight in the COE including offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as part of modular formations against an unpredictable OPFOR.**

TRAINING ASSESSMENT -- NOT READINESS EVALUATION

The following is the BCTP mission statement. BCTP focuses on training commanders of Brigade, Divisions and Corps. Every BCT, Corps and Division headquarters participates in a BCTP before deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq. The objective is to train the Commander not the staff. Having said that, does the Commander get trained because the staff is trained or does the staff get trained because the commander is trained? Both are trained, but the objective is to train the commander.

BCTP Mission

BCTP conducts or supports combined arms training that replicates Joint-Interagency-Intergovernmental-Multinational Operations in a full spectrum Contemporary Operational Environment, at worldwide locations, in accordance with the Army Forces Generation Model, for BCTs, Divs, Corps, ASCCs, JFLCCs, and JTFs in order to create training experiences that enable the Army's Senior Battle Commanders to develop current, relevant, campaign-quality, joint and expeditionary Battle Command instincts and skills.

BCTP used to focus on opposing force (OPFOR) Soviet-based operations. It now focuses on contemporary operations environment (COE). Non-contiguous, asymmetric, effects-based, Joint, Inter-agency, International and Multinational (JIIM) focused scenarios covering full spectrum major combat operations in a predominantly classified setting.

A major challenge in conducting BCTP training is the access and inclusion of subject matter experts (SMEs) to play the US Ambassador, other country team members, UN, DoS, USAID, the Voice of America, international media, etc. BCTP hires most of these role players because they are not available from different departments and agencies in USG. BCTP always includes an Ambassador, but usually do not have the country team. The ideal solution would be to have personnel from these agencies participate in BCTP to input agency unique expertise into BCTP and take away military expertise gained in BCTP. All these agencies are busy, BCTP does get support from USAID but needs and wants the other agencies represented. The goal is to provide the commander interface with all the organizations he/she will encounter upon arriving in-country.

BCTP operations groups (OG) are tasked with creating the COE environment for the exercise based guidance. This is the OG-COE mission. The OG-OCE structure consists of 90 people with the majority of the positions being one deep.

OG-COE Mission

OG-COE ensures BCTP exercises contain the contemporary operational environment in order to effectively replicate the challenging composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences existing in full spectrum JIIM Operations, at worldwide locations, during Div, Corps, ASCC, JFLCC, and JTF exercises IOT *create training experiences that enable the Army's Senior Battle Commanders to develop current, relevant, campaign-quality, joint and expeditionary Battle Command instincts and skills*.

We put the '*conditions*' in"tasks, conditions, and standards"

The following diagram represents what the US military has been dealing with over the last couple decades. Diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) requirements. A unit can be conducting three types of operations in a relatively small area. Units in contact are involved in high intensity conflict. Units following units in contact are conducting stabilization operations. While units operating in secure areas behind the first two levels are conducting support and security operations.

Joint Operating Environment



This chart depicts the interconnected operational environment. The chart shows the military in the center. If you are from an organization around the center, then your organization would be at the center of your operational environment and others agencies would be around your agency in the center.



BCTP conducts two types of exercises. The War fighter exercise is an off-the-shelf exercise with established training objectives, all training is conducted to training standard. The MRX is built to support a specific country with specific OG-OCE.



This slide is provided as an example of how to build an exercise. The basic design includes a red, blue and white cells, COE, simulation and master scenario event lists (MSEL).



Possible asymmetric operations that one could see during a WFX. The actual WFX asymmetric operations will depend on the situation and the unit training objectives.

Possible Asymmetric Operations

PYSOP/Perception Management
- Adversary IO Themes
  - ✓ Legitimacy
  - ✓ Ethnic ties with host nation
  - ✓ US as oppressors
  - ✓ Adversary as unifiers
- Tactical PSYOPS
  - ✓ Leaflets and loudspeaker opns

Deception Operations
- Feints/Demonstrations
- RLS/RES
- IFC

Dislocated Civilians
- Human Shields
- Adversary establishes camps
- Groups moving on Avenues of Approach

Insurgent Forces
- Conduct up to PLT size operations in AO
- Insurgents independent of SHC C2

Special Purpose Forces
- Special Reconnaissance
- DA against Q36/37, C2, MLRS, Patriot,

Terrorist Operations
- Direct Action Teams target
  - ✓ Labor Unions at APOD/SPOD
  - ✓ Oil Terminals
  - ✓ Chemical Plants

Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Threaten use of chemicals to isolate BLUFOR
- Chemical Plant explosion

Electronic Warfare/Space Opns
- Satellite Imagery
- Commo/Radar Jamming

BCTP includes Information Operations. This slide is the Information team.

Training the Information Team

BCTP Exercises - set the conditions to maximize training opportunities for the information based leaders and staff.

Public Affairs

Information Operations

Civil – Military Operations

Psychological Operations

Focuses on: Doctrine, TTPs and Lessons Learned

Integrates situations from: Past, Present and Projects out for possible Future Situations

Stresses: Coord & Synch of Efforts, Situational Awareness, Predictive Analysis and Consequence Mgt / Crisis Action

In conclusion, the battlefield is a very complex environment. BCTP is trying to replicate that complex battlefield. If the environment on the battlefield changes, then we change BCTP. BCTP is in constant communication with the commanders on the battlefield, they tell us what to adjust, and BCTP makes adjustments. The commanders and staff leave BCTP better trained than when they arrived at BCTP.

Third Presentation:
US Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force (MAGTAF)
Staff Training Program (MSTP),
LtCol Ted "Fish" Sturgeon

MSTP is the US Marine Corps Commandant's training program to certify Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commanders. The MSTP is similar to, but smaller than, BCTP. This is the MSTP mission statement.

Mission

- The MAGTF Staff Training Program will provide training in MAGTF warfighting skills, within the context of a Joint Combined environment, in order to improve the warfighting skills of senior commanders and their staffs and to provide feedback into the Expeditionary Force Development System

MCO 1500.53A

MSTP is a Five-Part Exercise Model. Development of a five phase exercise takes six to seven months. Phase I is two weeks of systems training focusing on the command, control, communication and computers (C4) required to support a MEF. Phase II is a week long academic war fighting seminar building situational awareness including limited language training. Educators, SMEs and academics are brought in to do this training. Phase III is a practical exercise immersing the unit, taking them from the situational awareness to a situation using real world documents for use in Phase IV and when deploying in-theater. Phase IV is a week long exercise based on the MEF exercise objectives, training goals and on red and blue activities that occurred in the last 90 days in the area of operations the unit is being deployed into. The goal is to bring the area of operation into the Marine unit's home station in the US. The exercise consists of the total exercise theater environment. Phase V is an AAR of the exercise. We examine the areas done well, and the areas needing

improvement. The AAR is an extended learning process where a series of questions for each event are developed and the attendees develop an answer. There may be no correct answer.



These are an example of a MEF MRX exercise objectives. These objectives are based on the commanding general's exercise objectives and guidelines. Note the first objective to enhance the capability in the joint environment relates directly to pre-deployment.

- Enhance capability to plan and conduct operations in a joint, combined and interagency environment.
- Assist in preparing the MEF (FWD) staff to execute its wartime functions.
- Assist in refinement of the MEF (FWD) T/O (manning document).

MRX Lines of Operation (LOO). The point of the slide is that all the factors have impacts on other LOOs. The key thing for MSTP is to expose the commander to non- traditional economic and governance operations that will be impacted by everything he does in-theater.



After the MSTP exercise, there is a Stability and Economic Roundtable. The Roundtable is hosted by the Institute for Defense and Business, and funded by the DoD Business Transformation Agency. The Roundtable brought together members of the defense industries and military. The Defense Transformation Agency was very helpful in providing a lot of reach back capability. The forum provided a place to meet people from industry that can be contacted from in-theater to provide assistance. The US Army recently conducted a similar exercise at Fort Hood.

Fourth Presentation:
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS),
Mr. Gary Russell

First, I want to thank PKSOI for hosting this workshop and pulling together this diversified group of people from multiple agencies.

NSPD-44 is about preparing USG organizations, which includes DoD, for S&RO. These are the goals, targets of assistance placing the DoS in lead. The Secretary of State has delegated the implementation to the S/CRS. The objective is to strengthen the S&R response capability.



The main training elements of NSPD-44 are to lead USG development of strong civilian response capability. We must build new mechanics to mobilize quickly. It is more than mobilizing people—it is training and equipping them to do their assigned mission. There is a requirement for a feedback loop like that in the military. Feedback includes learning if the training philosophy was applicable and recommendations for improvement. Lessons learned must be integrated back into operations. The NSPD-44 talks about harmonizing military and civilian training efforts. Both groups must be able to train together. The challenges are that many of the USG

organizations are limited in size which reduces the ability to train with the military in all of the wide range of training events. NSPD-44 does not just address the DoS and S/CRS, it is also requires other agencies to develop internal capabilities to respond to crisis. Some agencies have historically had a domestic focus. These agencies must develop a system to backfill personnel focused on domestic missions when they deploy overseas.

This is how S/CRS is organized to implement NSDP-44. There are four working groups. The Implementation Working Group provides over arching guidance to the other three working groups. The “Prepare for S&R Operations Working Group” is responsible for developing the new mechanics to implement NSDP-44. The “Plan for S&R Operations Working Group” is looking at developing a plan framework that the “whole of government” can use to implement a plan. The “Conduct S&R Operations Working Group” is how is the IA going to work to be an integrated cohesive team in Washington working with the combatant commands to implement the plan. The “Project Coordination Team” provides administrative support to the other working groups. There are 70 interagency representatives working the NSPD-44 implementation process with a goal to present proposals to the National Security Council Deputies in March 2007. The Implementation Plan includes developing a planning framework, operational models, surge mechanisms to support mobilization, a training strategy, equipment strategy, management structure and budget and legislative requirements. The budget and legislative requirements will require Congressional approval.

NSPD Plan Development: Organizational Structure



This is the S/CRS mission. I want to emphasize the institutionalize aspect of the mission. This means developing SOPs, systems and training personnel in these systems. This will enable the USG to better operate in S&R operations.

S/CRS Mission:

- ***To lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity*** to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.

This is the S/CRS three-phased training program. Phase 1 is S&R integrated and interagency training. The green box reflects where most of the training takes place, and this is done months before deployment. The training in CRS, leadership, operations models, key structures i.e., government, democracy, economics, social services and logistics and administrative requirements. Phase 2 is pre-deployment training conducted one to six weeks before deployment. This phase focuses on the environment [one is] going into, team building, language…, security awareness, defensive driving, etc., Phase 3 in the field consisting of a reach back element from in-country. This includes technical support and could include some in-country training.

S/CRS began developing training courses before NSPD-44 was signed. The following is an overview of S/CRS courses. The five basic courses are taught at FSI at no cost and are open to government agencies.



S/CRS COURSES

TARGET AUDIENCE: General USG personnel interested in S&R; NOT necessarily personnel preparing for imminent deployment

- 5 basic courses offered quarterly at no charge to Interagency participants since December 2005: S&R overview, planning, advanced planning, operations and IA coordination; new Sector Overview course piloted December 7-8, 2006
- Total of 250 USG personnel have participated in training from DoD (JFCOM, Joint Staff, OSD), USAID, State, Justice, Commerce, Treasury, DHS, and Labor
- New courses to be delivered starting in January 2007: Tools for Early Warning and Prevention; Pre-Deployment Mission Readiness; R&S Team Leadership and Management; Resource Management for R&S

U.S. Department of State
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

S/CRS has its own in-house response corps. This is a group of ten individuals made up of FSOs and civilian service personnel who are assigned to S/CRS and ready to deploy within 48 hours. This group is undergoing S/CRS training and training from other USG and non-US government agencies. If we ever receive approval for a Civilian Reserve, these personnel will require S/CRS training.

Training Requirements for Deploying Staff

- **DoS Active Response Corps (and Standby Corps): Only standing State owned group of rapid responders**
  - **U.S. Military and multinational exercises: CA Certain Trust, Green Team**
  - **Interagency Training-DART, OTI**
  - **Fieldcraft and security training: first aid, defensive driving**
  - **Foundational and Team Training: PM Tradecraft, GSO Training, S/CRS courses, country studies, language**
  - **Leadership and team building**
  - **Mission strategy**
- **Civilian Reserve (proposed): All above training +**
  - **USG Primer: Foreign Policy Structure and Decision-Making**
  - **Interagency, IO and NGO cultures**
  - **Code of Conduct/Ethics**

U.S. Department of State
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

These are S/CRS training challenges. There is a lot of training going on, but it is not well publicized. Not all training is credited across all USG agencies. The pre-deployment training varies in the USG, [and] need to [be] standardized.

TRAINING CHALLENGES

- LOTS OF GOOD TRAINING THROUGHOUT USG BUT NOT WIDELY KNOWN
- LIMITED SLOTS AVAILABLE FOR OUTSIDE PARTICPANTS
- LIMITED TIME TO TRAIN; NOT VIEWED AS PRIORITY BY MANAGEMENT
- NOT ALL AGENCIES CREDIT TRAINING PROVIDED BY OTHERS
- TRAINING QUALITY VARIES GREATLY
- UNDERUTILIZATION OF DISTANCE LEARNING—COST-EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT

U.S. Department of State
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Fifth Presentation:
United States Agency International Development Office of Military Affairs (OMA),
Tom Baltazar

I want to tell you who OMA is and were OMA is going. There is a lot going on now in the field of S&R.

The big thing we key on right now is we are part of, and always have been part of, the national strategy. This was articulated in 2002. Development has a major part to play in national security in conjunction with DoS and DoD forming the “three D’s”.



This is the USAID regional structure. We are all over the globe in 96 countries, the majority of which we have a presence in with a USAID mission, and some of which we call non-presence countries that are managed by regional bureaus. This shows how USAID is broken down by Regional Bureau. Of course, in typical interagency policy none of these boundaries match with the geographic boundaries of [either] DoD nor DoS.



USAID has about 10 billion dollars in FY 07. This represents about 40 percent of the US Government's overseas funding. The "F" Bureau in DoS is responsible for managing all foreign assistance. USAID is still working out our relationship with "F" Bureau. We have about 2,000 direct hire personnel, read this "active duty." The majority of which are foreign service nationals and implementing partners. When you look at USAID for resources, what you are really looking for is technical assistance expertise vice funding. Most of our programs are "ear marked," which means that Congress has told USAID how to spend that money. "F" Bureau is working hard to get some relief in the "ear marking" of funds.

Most of the people you will see in the field will come from the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance.

The main mission of the OMA is to formalize USAID's relationship with DoD. How we do that is changing weekly and monthly. We are at a point where we think we understand what the major components of the relationship are going to be. What we are trying to achieve is the recognition point for DoD into USAID and vise versa. We have not

achieved that completely yet, but we are getting there. This will make it easier for DoD to have an exchange with us and again vise versa.

Planning and execution. We talked about planning yesterday. We do a lot of planning. We are in the process of reviewing each country's engagement strategies. We must get better synchronizing DoD theater engagement strategies with what USAID is doing. One of the key ways are doing this is the officer exchange program with combatant commands. We have signed memorandums of understanding with four of the combatant commanders for exchanging officers. We have exchanged officers with US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and US European Command (EUCOM). We also consider the exchange of SMEs with the run-up, what they call their road to war, as one of our key missions. What we are struggling with right now is with the large number of request for SMEs. We cannot support all the requests for training. We are working with JFCOM to prioritize the large number of requests so we are sure that we have the right people at the right place providing the right kind of expertise.

USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Office of Military Affairs (OMA)

Formalize DoD-USAID relationship

- DoD entry point / USAID outreach
- DoD/USAID planning and execution
  - Strategic, Operational, Tactical
- Officer exchange with Combatant Commands
- Subject Matter Experts
  - MRX
  - CTC
  - Home Station
  - Experimentation

USAID's role in GWOT is yet undefined. We are working on a policy that articulates explicitly what our development role is in GWOT. At the strategic level, we are also working on our roles in COIN and SSTRO, and what our role will be in the new US Africa

Command (AFRICOM) being stood up. AFRICOM will be lead by the military general officer, but its staff will be totally integrated with various components of the USG. USAID has defined what our role will be in AFRICOM.

Operationally, we have had success in the Mandera Triangle, [an] area of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. We sat down with all the players out there, Joint Task Force (JTF) Horn of Africa, representatives from the various missions out there as well as the embassies, and developed a three-year campaign plan that laid out what the engagement strategy should look like, and articulated what each of our roles and responsibilities and abilities were. What we did not do was to get the blessing of the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. So this thing is on hold right now. This was a lesson learned for me, and I got it. One of the main roles of the exchange officers is to integrate USAID's country operational plans with the respective combatant commands security operations plans. In Europe, we are about 90 percent there. We have uploaded our operational plans onto their theater management information system. As the first step to allow the planners on the DoD and DoS sides to understand what the strategic goals are for each country.

On the tactical side, one of the exciting things is we are taking a tool developed by the Office of Conflict Management for countries and we sunk that down to a tactical version that a soldier, air man, sailor or marine can carry around when given the mission to go in-theater. This a guide for them to understand and get at the root causes for the instability, and then ideas on how to program against it. We have tested the tool out with a BCT at JRTC. We are now in negotiations with them to provide them a two person team to go into Afghanistan on their next rotation so they can test it in the field. We are also working on PRT training, and think we have a pretty good idea where we want to go with PRT training.

OMA Illustrative Programming

- **Strategic:** Policy for role in GWOT, Joint Training and Education, COIN, SSTRO, AFRICOM
- **Operational:** 3-year Campaign Plan for Mandera Triangle; Exchange of officers w/ COCOMs; TSCTP; TSCMIS/COP Synchronization
- **Tactical:** Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF); Joint operations in Philippines; PRT

USAID is changing the way it does business as an agency to compete with the kinds of requirements that are out there and to address them. One of the main things we are doing is looking at the delineation of responsibilities in Washington vis-à-vis our missions in the field. Our current construct is that we have left all of the responsibility up to the missions which works in a benign environment. It is less than effective in the environments of Afghanistan and Iraq where people are overworked, understaffed and we are still giving them the responsibility of hiring and recruiting folks that are on their staff and go to PRTs. We are going to try and pull some of that back and centralize it, and then manage that for them.

Pre-deployment training is now one of our main focuses. We understand that we have a responsibility as an agency to PRTs to go into these environments. First, we must formalize and institutionalize the training. This is basically a pick-up game right now, and in some cases there is no training. We have developed a framework on where we need to go to formalize and institutionalize our training. USAID is building a new personnel specialty, the USAID term is backstop, for stabilization and governance, backstop 76. Personnel from all agencies need to understand the core competencies of other agencies. Force protection training is something we have not done very well in the past. We now have a training program conducted at Fort Jackson where the Army is training air force and navy people to operate in the field. We have graduated five people from this program, two of which are also with the DSAC. They felt the Army

provided better training than the DSAC. Cultural awareness is a key component of our training. Some of the people we hired off the street had experience in other conflicts like Bosnia, however they are not USAID people. We must train these people on USAID's organization, how we operate in conflict and SOPs. The SOPs are very different in Afghanistan from SOPs in Iraq. We have no formal training for these people. We are preparing training modules on development and reconstruction in conflict that are exportable and share them with all of the partners engaged in this activity.

We must understand what DoD is all about. Operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq are military dominated. In order for us to be successful, we must understand the military thought processes, operational procedures and military decision making process. Without this understanding, our one person on a three person PRT will not be effective. Likewise, the military must understand what USAID brings to the table. We also have to understand the DoS, in Iraq especially where the PRTs are lead by DoS personnel.

One of the key things we do not have right now is reach back. There is no formal tracking of lessons learned. USAID personnel come off a PRT rotation and go on block vacation or return to their previous job and disappear. We have to collect these peoples' PRT experience, and put the knowledge back into the training and education programs. The USAID lessons learned could also be added to the military lessons learned procedures.

Our training PRT training guidelines and principles must be relevant. To give someone going out on a PRT an overview on USG and what it looks likes is irrelevant. Likewise, a military unit going into combat is not concerned about how USAID is organized at the national level. The military unit wants to know how USAID is operating in the area of operations the military unit is deploying into. The unit needs to know who the USAID people are by name, and how the USAID system works in their area of operations so they can effect change in their perspective environments. Other guidelines and principles are that PRT must be modular, they should not reinvent the wheel during pre-deployment, be adaptable to various audiences and leverage DoD where and when appropriate.

Thank you for your time.

Sixth Presentation:
International Medical Corps (IMC),
Mr. Bill Hyde

I will begin by also thanking PKSOI. This has been a couple of excellent days.

I am representing an NGO, non-military, non-USG, non-foreign government.

The IMC has been around for over 20 years providing health care services in relief operations and emphasizing training. We try to deploy quite early into countries to catch under served communities and stop the degradation of national health care services. Meaning it is important for us to get out early and assess the condition of how things are delivered to populations. We need to see why the communities are in such a state of disrepair or collapse and see what would be a way to arrest the decline in that respect. By deploying early, we do not have a PRT six month or 365 day focus. We go early and we stay through the ups and downs of what is going on with the communities, and affect populations as needed as long as we can afford to stay and as long as the needs are there. So we are in-country through the bad and the good times as long as there is something we can be adding back with out services. We must very much keep our eye on the ball of what is going on. Must remain very flexible to adjust to the complexities of what is going on in-country so that we can continue to maintain the minimum basic level of health care. You have to keep people alive to have them participate in democracy. Health is key to the future of any country.

Our goal in all our services is self-reliance. We leverage local resources meaning doctors, nurses, mid-wives, anyone with health care specialization and hospitals. We work with these resources in trying to develop solutions. Because we are working with fragile states, we must empower them to work with or without us.

In terms of current activities for IMC, we are not that big. We are heavily involved in central and east Africa and the Middle East. We are currently involved in 23 countries with between 4,000 – 5,000 employees. A lot of the countries we work in are not new or well publicized, and some we do not think of as crisis situations, such as Katrina. We try to deploy in anticipation of future requirements, like

Somali refugees flowing back into Kenya. With this kind of a profile, we need to hire people who have experience. The operations are way too high stressed, and we do have turn over because of the stress and working in the frontline area. We do stress a lot of quick core training for new people, but a lot of the training happens on the job. Our training includes institutional indoctrination, policy, structure and administrative, [and] part of this is web related. We need to do interagency indoctrination as a means to connection with other NGOs. Through the NGO community, we have common codes of conduct, and other standards and policies we follow. A lot beyond the generic training is situational training that is situation and site specific, i.e., security, priorities of the mission, go over lessons learned before from other players in the field. We always launch people with an intended plan of action, how are they going to engage once they get out there.

We stress support services through the training and follow up to that. We actually have an emergency response unit that often goes in parallel with or to backstop people. We have a team of people we call "rovers" that are technical specialists so they work in the health fields we work in, either HIV or AIDS, water and sanitation or nutrition. We have regional directors that provide an oversight mechanism. The directors go out on a scheduled basis to monitor and backstop. One of the key evaluations focuses on the stress factor and people losing perspective in terms of what is going on in the big picture. So it is a very dramatic training environment we work in that never stops. We always launch our teams as a body system, meaning someone who has recently been in-country or a desk officer from Washington, DC will go out with a newly assigned person. We try and make this seem a seamless process [with] the new person in their place and work[ing] with them on their plan of action to get launched well. The desk officer goes out because they need to see a face, name and personality so in case things turn bad in-country, the in-country person has someone they are familiar with to call and ask assistance. It is also easier to monitor people in terms of stress.

Challenges. Since 9-11, NGOs have a problem in getting good maps. We are shut out of access to good quality maps. We obtain them through working relationships in the field. Any help you can give us before we launch or as we deploy would be helpful.

In terms or training, a goal mentioned in last year's workshop is to develop a universal calendar online that list all the training events to see what is available, what is going on and what is open source. Be helpful to know what we would be able to participate in both as facilitators and as participants.

Cross training. An idea would be to take someone out of the military and assign them to a NGO for a multi-month period to let them experience our field operating environment. Even more intriguing would be letting an NGO, with the correct clearances, be embedded in a military organization to learn more about the military. Acronyms along with so many other things we could learn from the military environment. [This would] help both sides move from theory to practice.

Another idea is to have a unit schedule to deploy make arrangements with NGOs to have people attend pre-deployment training either on or off camera rather than hiring someone to role play the NGO in the training. I think there are thousands of tips and ideas you could learn from NGOs that come from a different angle that would make you train, deploy and engage differently in-country. The NGO could not send you a "talking head," but rather someone who just completed a deployment in the area of operation.

Last, I would ask that commanders take a pause upon arriving in-theater before allocating resources to build up communities. During the pause, the commander should carry out a lot of discussions with folks on the ground and with a broad range of players. Do not just go out with the favorite son, the favorite group, the guys you were told you could trust. Rather, I suggest that you talk to a variety of NGOs, IOs, formal and informal leaders in the community, and really try and get a broad view of opinions about what the priorities are for the people before you set the priorities and start working on them. I understand there is a limiting scope on how flexibility you can be on that. It is important not to get excited to chose one person and make them our contact and start running straight ahead.

In closing please engage us because we would like to engage you.

Panel B: Questions and Answers

Question One

For BCTP and MSTP. We are still not seeing a lot of the major contractors included in the training battle space. As in the case of a PSC, the footprint would have a battalion size motor pool, a medical capability and facilities to conduct training. I think it is important to show an accurate example of contractors operating in the battle space. This is important for the commander and it is important to infuse that into development of scenarios. Can you comment?

Answer One

In BCTP we have to prioritize: [What are] we are going to focus on and have five or seven days to get it done. Some exercises with US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) have a little bit longer time. We knew that PSCs were there and protecting somebody, but did not have much interest in them.

Response to Answer One

Interesting, I get a lot of feedback when talking to commanders in the field. They would like to know more about PSCs during pre-deployment training.

Follow-up to Answer One

I have three exercises coming up in the next eight months. What is it going to cost me to have you come to one of those exercises?

Response

We will come to the exercise. It is the offer I made yesterday. Different companies have different scales. Some are big and some are smaller, I recommend you do it from an industry perspective. My company can organize that.

Question Two

Fear of NGOs working with DoD. How do we convince other NGOs that they should attend events like these, and to figure out ways we can work together and ways we can not work together?

Answer to Question Two

NGOs are like a large octopus. As a group, I do not know if we will ever meet that equilibrium. I think it comes to individual NGOs taking the baby steps and showing other NGOs it is not so scary after all, and there is a lot of value of attending military events like this. There are diehards on both the NGO and military side that will never change.

Question Three

S/CRS. When talking about this issue, we have the three "M's." We have got to have agreement on the mission, the methodology and we have to have the money in the civilian side. When you talk about deploying DoS and USAID officers, there are only 1,000 FSOs. Not all the DoS or USAID officers have the correct skills. Today, we could not support another operation like Afghanistan or Iraq. We do not have the money in the budget for S/CRS to function. I am looking for anyone, someone to make the statement that we are crawling along with insufficient resources to do the job and the mission. We simply do not have the money, and until we get that it is going to be very very difficult to do the mission.

Answer One

Do not come to BCTP because we were just cut ten percent of the FY 07 budget.

Answer Two

In the Iraq Study Report, recommendations 76-78 address building a Foreign Service Corps. The report does not say how many, and they do not just limit to DoS, but talk of other agencies building up their own surge capacity. Maybe this report will lend some momentum to the issue and convince Congress that we really need money to do this mission effectively. We need additional personnel, mechanisms and training. The Democrat control of Congress in January may provide a new dynamic. We never had a problem convincing the people on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We always had bipartisan support in the Committee. It is the Appropriations Committee that has a knee-jerk reaction to any sort of contingency fund, and it has been an uphill battle to convince them. We also had a leadership

gap in S/CRS during this year's budget process. I do not see any additional funding coming anytime soon.

Question Three

How do we transfer the lessons learned from the field into future pre-deployment training?

Answer One

Excellent question. MSTP embeds a team of trainers to go to the field to be with the MEF for several weeks after deployment. In addition, personnel from lessons learned are embedded with the MEF in the first several months of the deployment and bring back valuable data. Both these groups feed input into the next MSTP cycle.

Follow-up to Question Three

How do you assume what you learned really resonates throughout the organization?

Answer to Follow-up

My point was that in training the commander in BCTP, the staff gets trained because they have to go through all the processes and procedures to give the information to the commander to make the decisions he needs to make. We try to replicate the NGOs in-country, but there are a lot of those folks and I do not have the money to pay for each one of them to be a response cell at every one of the exercises we do. Doctors Without Borders are there and they come freely to the exercises. Maybe it is just a matter of advertising and the NGOs will show up. Complex places like Iraq are hard to replicate in a five to seven day exercise. Doing military, political and economic scenarios becomes difficult for a bunch of military guys trying to figure it all out.

Question Follow-up Two

As an NGO, I worked more with the sergeant or captain at a check point. The level or knowledge and understanding of what the NGO was doing never filtered down to that level.

Answer to Follow-up Two

Two hundred and fifty people have gone through S/CRS training in a year. It is a start. We are going to be rolling out a train the trainer program soon. I think the key point is that we need to train people from JFCOM, OSD, military, USAID, other civilian agencies in our courses so they can go back and train people in their organizations. If we have limited resources, we really need to think of cost effective ways to deliver this training.

Follow-up Comment

This is the reason we are having this workshop, because we are coming at these issues from different levels. We all need to understand the other levels that other folks are looking at this. The NGO does not care about meeting the general but they do meet the soldier every day at those check points. When putting a training program in place, we must understand what the NGO's training need is as well as the military's training need. We have all levels requiring training here, but you cannot develop a training program that fits all required training, it must be tailored We are trying to figure what the requirements are and try and prioritize them. This is an excellent discussion. We were able to identify the various levels of training required. You have to tackle the training issue one piece at a time.

Question Four

The reality of the money is absolute. Understanding at the highest level of USG and a commitment of those in the room is critical to move this program forward. USAID recently drafted a surge capacity strategy that took a look internally of the Bureau's capability to respond to these types of events. The document is in draft. That strategy will go nowhere without an understanding and commitment of the management of USAID. The question is how you convince those people who make decisions that this is important. S/CRS has struggled for two years to get money. Why is that? Their leader created the organization, I am not placing blame. Without a commitment and a real understanding of those decision makers to make this happen all our good work is just that: it is good work. The demonstrative commitment by the military side is outstanding. What we have got to do is go back and every day so that the same commitment is made on

the civilian [side]. That is where the balance needs to be struck. The reason for my passion is that I spent eight months developing this strategy, and I am not seeing the Bureau's commitment to the strategy.

Answer to Question Four

The OMA prepared a briefing for our senior leadership and is committed to this program. What we do not know now is how we are going to operationalize that commitment. There is another initiative that could potentially impact this. There is an initiative with Dr. Chu's office, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. This initiative is addressing the continuing requirement and need to provide these role players. I do not like the term "role player," rather SMEs. We are not training aids, which is what we frequently turn out to be. We do not support an exercise from concept development through execution; rather, we come into the process halfway through or at the tail end for the exercise and become "training aids," and we want to get away from that. We can provide the community with so much more than we are providing right now by being in a white cell and answering calls or requests for assistance. Dr. Chu has said he wants it to work, including transfer of resources from DoD to USAID to make this happen. There is a gap here. It is going to take a couple years to work through the legislative process that will result in a capacity building process for USAID in terms of foreign service officers and civilian servants. This current gap can only be filled by personnel service contractors, recently retired USAID people who are willing to come back on for a two to three year period and be willing to be trained and educated in this new environment. Then, provide that expertise to the community at large. That is what we are working on with Dr. Chu, and it can also be used theoretically to address this surge capacity gap that we have right now. To deploy those people not only as SMEs in the various exercises, but to further deploy them into the field with the units to provide them the expertise that they gain through this training.

Follow-up Comment to the Answer

To put this in perspective, we have an almost $500 billion a year defense budget, we are spending $6 billion a week in Iraq. To take

DoS, USAID and a few other agencies to respond to this requirement would probably take on the order of $500 million that would last five years.

Further Follow-up

DoD needs to be the strongest advocate for the resourcing we are talking about, because clearly the more effective the other agencies are, the less effort we have to put forward and the less our guys get killed, etc. I do not think DoD is strong enough for the funding. Another challenge we all face, we struggle with the ways we want things to be and the way things need to be. How we develop in conflict is different than in how we develop when not in conflict. We do not want to be in conflict and we are all hoping conflict will go away in two years and we can go back to the way things were. The Secretary of State can go back to really being in charge of the country, BCTs can go back to training at the National Training Center instead of doing all these MRXs, etc. What we see is that there is a fundamental change in the way things are in the 21st century compared to how they were in the 20th century. We all need to think and look at ways to organizationally and bureaucratically change our organizations. While we are focused on pre-deployment training, I think there are some practical things we can do for in-theater training. In Iraq, there is a COIN Center for Excellence. The leadership of every BCT that goes to Iraq has to go through the COIN Center for Excellence for a week focused specifically on their area of operations and make sure that everyone has a common approach to things. The training includes Iraq Security Forces and military guys. What it is missing are the other agencies. If the PRT, the USAID representative, and NGOs operating in that province came to part of that week's training it would give them a chance away from that province to talk some of the issues and develop a cooperative approach to some of the things that we do not have back in the states.

Chapter 4: Keynote Speaker – Mr. James Bever, USAID, Deputy Assistant Administrator

I would like to extend my thanks to PKSOI and the US Army War College for hosting this important workshop and for inviting me to speak. I would also like to thank all of the participants who have contributed their time and volunteered their thoughts on an issue of vital importance to our national security. Our success will enable us to advance the goal of a world where people of all nations, races, religions and ethnicities can pursue their lives in peace and with the hope for economic prosperity. Our task, to rapidly design and develop effective and integrated pre-deployment training programs for stability operations, is daunting. And I offer this observation as one who is accustomed to operating in threatening environments where nation building is a development task that simply takes a little longer.

There are three major challenges that must be met to rapidly design and develop effective and integrated pre-deployment training programs for stability operations.

First, is the paradigm shift over the last decade in the international political-economic environment.

Second, is the extent of our knowledge of the environment, threats and underlying root causes of today' s conflicts the most appropriate way to address them proactively and reactively?

Third, is to grow our institutions to work more effectively in partnership with one another without losing those characteristics that enable them to effectively contribute to each of the three Ds: diplomacy, development and defense.

Paradigm Shift

The United States, as a sovereign nation and as a member of the international development community, is facing new challenges in national security and violence in other parts of the world.

While the three “Ds” were valued in the immediate post World War II era, as evidenced by the creation of USAID, the balance among the three is even more important today.

Our recent experience has shown that our success is dependent upon a synchronized and integrated whole-of-government approach that draws simultaneously on all of our organizations.

Furthermore, ownership for redressing violence and terror bring about peace and stability has been globalized. Multinational and international partnerships are and will continue to be critical.

Countries where governance is either weak or non-existent, economies have failed, poverty is widespread, and the means and opportunity for violence exist, are ripe for conflict and serve as sanctuaries for terrorists and international crime.

The Road Ahead

First, we must continue to analyze the problem and refine our understanding of threat problems. If we truly define the problem, we can find the answer. But we must do this together.

Second, we must move ahead as quickly as possible in building the knowledge base we need to prepare our personnel addressing today’s complex conflicts. Part of the path ahead is doing a better job of quickly collecting and disseminating the lessons learned coming out of Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan and other conflicts, across all agencies.

Third, we need to collaborate across US agencies and in the international community to quickly develop the models and tools needed for operations that simultaneously require diplomatic, military and development skills. Without taking these steps, we run the risk of having personnel in harm’s way without the skills needed to accomplish their missions successfully.

We cannot wait to develop badly needed pre-deployment training programs for our personnel until we have a more developed knowledge base. We must organize, analyze and use the knowledge in real time to modify training, constantly upgrading as we learn. We must commit to being true “learning organizations.”

Chapter 5: Working Group Backbriefs

Guidance to Workgroups, COL Agoglia

I want to get focused in our workgroups. For the PRT workgroup: What are you doing and why and what can you do to improve?

For the Policy workgroup: What are the policies and impediments that exist here and now for training? What polices that limit training? What are policy recommendations we want to make to help shape the future training environment?

For the Humanitarian Assistance workgroup: What are your challenges? What are your needs and capabilities?

For the Civilian-military (brigade and above) workgroup: What are the things we need help with? What are we doing that is good? Where are the gaps? Where do we need some help? Where can we offer some help?

Develop products at various agencie's training and link them electronically. This allows the various organizational levels to use the same products as we train units for deployment. Think about delivery, modes and methodology in distributive learning based on requirements.

We are here to talk about pre-deployment training. You came to this workshop with, "Here is how my organization does pre-deployment training." We need you to stop thinking about how we do it, and begin start thinking about, "Here is how our organizations can do it better together." We have to see each other as professionals, rather than not engaging someone because you do not think they are professional. We need to get our folks to understand the professionalism and competencies that other organizations bring to the table. Then you can begin to work the issues.

We are all here sitting at this workshop asking for help and offering help.

Group A Humanitarian Assistance

What is state of NGO and IO coordination with military?

- Multiple institutions w/uncoordinated training currently in existence.
- Multiple objectives/end states with communities present in the field.
- Different types of Humanitarian Organizations.
    - Impact on training
    - Issue of coordination/collaboration
    - Unilateral vs. Multilateral perspective
    - Issue of who is in charge?
    - Mil interaction w/diverse NGOs and IOs

This is the current state of humanitarian assistance operations. We know that there are different objectives by the different agencies operating in support of a humanitarian assistance operations.

Different types of humanitarian operations impact on these areas.

Group A Humanitarian Assistance Pre-deployment Training Needs

- Multiple Emergencies
    - Rapid Onset Natural Disaster
    - Complex Emergencies
    - Conflict
- Need for overall generic training structure
    - Should address training needs at key levels.
    - Should be applicable to the IA.
    - Should be progressive and repetitive.

We focused on the pre-deployment training needs, and also to a slight extent on natural disaster.

There are multiple emergencies: Rapid onset natural disaster (Tsunami); Sudan is an example of a complex emergency.

There is a need for an overall training structure—some type of manageable and managed structure to put pre-deployment training together. The structure should address the training needs at the key levels. It should be applicable to the interagency process, and be progressive and repetitive through the years.

Group A Humanitarian Assistance Training Needs Course Availability Mapping Matrix

	Complex Emergency	Conflict	Natural Disaster
Senior Level	A, B, C	1, 2	G, H
Mid Level	D, E, F, A	3, 4, 5	H, M, N
Low Level	X, Y, C	6, 7, 8, 9	G, M

← Training Continuum →

We came up with this matrix. The various levels requiring training are listed in the left column. Across the top of the matrix are the different types of operations. The letters and numbers do not represent anything, except each is a training course, seminar or two week exercise. So your senior level people under complex emergency would need courses A, B and C. Your mid-level personnel would need courses D, E, F and A. The low-level personnel would need X, Y and C courses. And so on for the other types of humanitarian assistance. The training continuum is year round. This is not a case where you train right before you deploy. You cannot do all your training when responding to a rapid complex emergency. This is a repetitive cycle, so after one year, you will go through the training again, because the training is being updated. The agencies that are responsible for a particular course or seminar tracks who has received the training when and maintains the attendance and qualified database.

Group A Humanitarian Assistance Pre-deployment Training Needs

- Sponsors (S/CRS??)
  - That identifies training needs.
  - That identifies available training resources
  - That is responsible for administration of training.
- Identify Training Elements
  - Understanding who other actors are and what they do.
  - What are their missions, mandates, capabilities, and limitations?
  - Knowledge of the operating environment.
  - Clear terms of reference.
  - Cultural Awareness and Language
  - Human Rights
  - Protection
- Mandate Training

So who is going to sponsor this training matrix? We recommended S/CRS should be the sponsor. But we do not know if this is under your mandate in NSPD-44. Perhaps it is. We should look into this. If S/CRS is in charge, they should identify who the people are by category, what the courses are and what agency is responsible for providing each course. The sponsor needs to determine the cost and where the resources are going to come from. The sponsor is also responsible for the administration of the training, which does the training, [and] where is the training conducted. How do you put this together? How do you share the cost? Is the course conducted in house, or is it contracted out?

The training elements also have to be identified. This will allow the program to be focused so the sponsor knows who is doing what and why. The sponsor needs to know the operating environment. By that we mean that you have to know the operating environment in each type of emergency. The terms of reference are different in each type of emergency.

One strong recommendation is that this training must be mandated and incorporated into job descriptions, terms of reference, scope of work for contractors and required for promotion, awards and assignments. It should be a mandated part of someone's career path.

Group A Humanitarian Assistance Training Gaps

- No responsible institution or partnership. (S/CRS??)
- No standing means to consistently communicate (no clear formal channels for communication).
- No Resource Sponsor

These are the three key gaps.

We believe it is best to have transparent operations and information sharing. The example was: on board the US aircraft carrier the admiral made some classified material available to all the agencies supporting the Tsunami. After a few days, it appeared that the information was transparent.

Finally, is it is best to have the full complement of training at all levels on the matrix discussed above.

Comment on the training matrix: There must be some driving engine behind this whole process. Websites and portals are very passive in nature. You can either use them or not use them. Unless there are incentives to urge you to use them you will not use them. They must be strongly interactive or the training is going to suffer.

Group B – Policy

We looked at short term solutions and fixes that were within existing resources and constraints. And longer term vision moving from coordination to a large national security framework and creating planning, training and resources.

One general point to emphasize is that there is a lot of good work going on particularly on the civilian side in S/CRS. One of the general conclusions of the group is NSPD-44 is sufficient and provides enough guidance for now. The implementation process will become clear in the next three to six months. Currently the S&R operations are being worked at the colonel level. When and how will it be kicked up the higher level. S/CRS is almost a sub-Policy Coordinating Committee level. In the next couple months, it will be kicked up to the Policy Coordinating Committee, then a Deputies Committee and finally the Principle Committee level.

Group B Solutions: Shorter Term

- **STANDARDS:** Foundational requirements for civilian deployment
- **METHODS:** Greater use of alternative training methods
  - Reciprocal career exchange (JIACG)
  - Distributive learning & systematic reachback (JFCOM/ JKDDC JTF 101)
  - Greater Utilization of IT for training
- **TOOLS:** One site information clearing house (Center for Complex Ops)

The standards need to be established before the civilians begin their pre-deployment training. The methods recommend enhancing civilian training programs by the examples listed.

The tools are the collative system that should be used to consolidate the types of training available and making an integrated list available to all agencies involved in S&R operations. This system needs to include feedback loops so people returning from deployment can provide lessons learned back into the training structure.

Group B Solutions: Longer Term

- **POLICY:** Seek legislative authority & reforms for IA training & education
  - Civilian agency participation in DoD training
  - DoD participation in civilian agency training
  - Funding
- **LEADERSHIP:** Stronger Sec State support for S & R policy, training, & resources
  - Sec Def memo to Sec State supporting S/CRS funding
  - Supplemental funding short term
  - DoS budget long term
- **FUNDING:** Resources for civilian training and deployment "float"
  - New IA surge mechanisms
  - Civilian Reserve

Before discussing the longer term solutions it must be realized that this is not an S/CRS problem—it is a DoS problem, and a large civilian agency problem. We should not just look at S/CRS to solve all the issues. In fact, the office's title is to coordinate. The bureau provides function support, most of the power in DoS is in the regional bureaus, and how much are these bureaus involved to leverage the entire department. At this point, this has not happened yet.

Policy. Currently, BCTP does not have enough funding to pay for civilians to play SMEs. Can policy be changed to make it easier for BCTP to pay for civilian SMEs? The issue is not just exercise participation, but also involvement in scenario development. The objective is for the scenarios to have full civilian ownership and participation in their portion of the exercise.

Leadership. This is a corporate and cultural issue, it is transformational diplomacy and an institutional issue. This goes back to getting the other bureaus involved in the process. One specific recommendation was having a Secretary of Defense memorandum to the Secretary of State supporting S/CRS funding. It is hard to get the short-term funding. A supplemental shows S/CRS is not a priority in the DoS budget, [and] it raises serious structural and institutional questions.

Funding. Creating a “float”—a pool of personnel who are involved in training, travel and other categories that are not assigned to organizations. In DoD, about ten percent of the total strength is involved in training, while in DoS about one percent of the total strength is involved in training. USAID does not have a percent category like this; rather they take these people out-of-hide against no personnel authorizations. The DoS has to get other bureaus to buy into this training requirement—S/CRS cannot provide personnel to fill all the requirements from assigned personnel.

Comment on briefing. Stability operations are becoming more complex all the time, requiring units to work in an integrated environment. If the units are going to work in an integrated environment, they must train in an integrated environment. They cannot train in isolation. The integrated training must be funded because you cannot afford not to do it. Civilian agencies must understand and define what is in the training for them. The military must ask the same question—what is in the training for me to have the civilians participate? For the UN, this is now obvious, so Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is now restructuring our whole organization over the next nine months and creating integrated teams within DPKO to meet the information and support needs of integrated missions. DPKO will have one mission in New York to talk to concerning their operations, whether it is a request for political advice, mission support, logistics or personnel recruitment. If your organization can define what is in the operation for me, there are always ways to find means for the program, but our organization needs to spell that out.

Group C – Provincial Reconstruction Teams

First, it is important to note that PRTs in Afghanistan are different from PRTs in Iraq. It is important to determine what they are going to be in the future. We looked at a couple of key points on both the short- and long-term. How do we close the gap in training between the military and the civilian pre-deployment training?

First, we recognize that everyone cannot attend everyone's schools because there are a small number of personnel available in many of the civilian agencies, as is the case with the PRTs in Iraq, that include just eight justice officers. It is key to identify critical common tasks of training. This is a weakness right now. What is the basic training everyone needs?

We must figure out a way to identify people in all the agencies. This goes to the human resources discussion that we had yesterday.

Need to develop a delivery strategy. There are a number of different components and ways to do the training. The training has to be inclusive, and also relevant, not so much training people when they come back, but to capture the lessons learned. In the military there is a formal process. On the civilian side, there is not a formal system.

We need to leverage training that is in place now to use it for the next training cycle. This is short-term in term of weeks—not months. We must breakdown stovepipes. I learned about several on-going training programs in other agencies that I did not know about.

How do we build a virtual community—not just a website?

In-country training is more important in Iraq because the PRTs are not military organizations that are stood-up and deployed as it is in Afghanistan.

Group C PRT Long Term

- Institutionalize PRT Concept:
- Formalize framework/Doctrine
  - Commonly accepted
    - Purpose
    - Imperatives
    - Training Requirements
  - Assign Responsibilities for development, delivery and training
- Develop/Expand and Sustain virtual inter-agency working group

PRTs have been functioning for over a year. It is time to institutionalize the concept. The DoS document that establishes the mission, purpose and tasks for Iraq should be included in pre-deployment training for all organizations going to Iraq.

The long term tasks need to be assigned a lead agency and taken on by the lead agency.

The people in the PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq are making the system work. We must go beyond that and take ownership back in Washington, DC for specific parts of PRTs. The agencies must hold each other's feet to the fire to accomplish the assigned tasks.

At this stage of the game, there needs to be a formalized interagency working group. What we have today is an informal structure. The interagency working group needs to assign tasks to complete the

short-term tasks and assign responsibility for the long-term tasks. We do not have memorandums of understanding or SOPs that ought to be in a fly away package. We should look to technology to assist us with this process. A lot of the work can be done in Washington, DC, but at some point you have to bring in the military support bases in the field.

Comment that missed the slide: We must capitalize on some of the key people coming back from PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq and pull into the new DoS Center for Conflict Operations so they can be a mobile team that goes out to all these various places to train people. We do this very well for the BCT commanders. We need to do the same for key PRT commanders, USAID and DoS representatives so they can become SMEs to train all the other agencies. Currently, we are not completing the training cycle because we are not using these resources to improve the next cycle of training. The British have a program in which all commanders are interviewed by a retired general for about three hours to capture their lessons learned on the deployment. The retired general then writes a report based on the interview. This report is then fed back into British pre-deployment training. This is an excellent technique if you cannot afford to have an officer spend a year at a center of excellence. Individual US agencies are conducting debriefs of their personnel, but the debriefs are not available to outside agencies.

Group D – Civil-Military, Tactical and Operational

The first two slides are related. The first slide addresses the issue of having civilian personnel attend military training. The second slide talks about military training with civilian agencies.

Group D Training Gaps

Pre-Deployment Training at Joint Exercises and Combat Training Centers not realistic or fully effective due to inadequate representation of US Civilian Agencies, NGOs, & IOs

- Reason: Lack of personnel available for training & lack of awareness of opportunities
- Short-Term Solution (Lead): Publish / post military training opportunities including available funding on single website (USJFCOM-Joint Exercises). Briefings given by NGOs to deploying units early in training. Execute VTCs to gain realistic answers when civilian agency participants not available on-site (JFCOM, Combat Training Centers). Identify within civilian agencies a training coordinator (S/CRS).
- Long-Term Solution (Lead): Increase USG civilian agency strengths to equal to the number required for operations & training (TBD). Develop a policy that requires USG interagency teams to train and deploy together (TBD).

The gap on civilian personnel attending military training is the lack of civilian agency personnel being available to participate in military training. A part of the solution is publishing on a website the military training exercise schedules. JFCOM has this information available on a military website. The objective is to make the information available to civilian agencies. JFCOM can do the Joint piece, and JFCOM has visibility on the BCTP and MSTP schedule.

There are a lot of NGOs that should be involved in pre-deployment training. There needs to be a database listing the NGOs and which counties they are operating so they can be contacted to participate in pre-deployment training. If a BCT is going to multi-national division north, they need to know the NGOs operating in that specific area of operations.

The group supports expanding the use of VTCs to support pre-deployment training. We are doing VTCs already. What we need to do is expand VTC use. There is a bi-monthly VTC between BCTP

and the CFLCC three-star that provides guidance on what changes need to be incorporated into the next BCTP cycle. Others may be able to be added to that VTC to obtain updated per-deployment training guidance. BTCP then projects six months out on what changes to make in the training. The long-term issue has already been mentioned.

Question Concerning VTC

Is there a way to get the USAID mission director and the embassy involved in that VTC? We could use this to gain access for other government agencies.

Response to Question

Task: The JFCOM participant will take the task of establishing a website listing the training back to the headquarters and examine how to implement this listing of military exercises.

Follow-up Question

We also have to have access to the combat training centers' programs. These training events are not currently on the JFCOM joint exercise calendar. Once we establish a point of contact for exercises we can add other types of exercise groups to the database. The challenge is getting an agency with the web experience and resources to serve as a point of contact. Another issue is making the database open source so civilian agencies can access the data.

How do we get military representation into civilian training? The scheduling issue is the same—the military does not know the civilian training schedule. The first step is getting some military modules in civilian training. Next is publishing civilian pre-deployment opportunities then we can link up and get some military people to the civilian training and improve our overall awareness. JFCOM will analyze the civilian training and develop a recommended list of civilian courses that would benefit from military representation.

Training Gaps

Pre-Deployment Training with Civilian Agencies

- Reason: Awareness of civilian training opportunities
- Short-Term Solution (Lead): Determine civilian agency requirements for military modules in civilian courses (S/CRS). Publish / post civilian agency existing pre-deployment training with civilian agencies (S/CRS). Develop pre-deployment training requirements for attendance at civilian courses by key military personnel (USJFCOM).
- Long-Term Solution (Lead): Institutionalize military and civilian agency pre-deployment training. (Shared: FSI, TRADOC, etc.) (Examples: JSOU, S/CRS, NDU, Universities, UN courses)

Long-term is to institutionalize these recommendations into the military and civilian institutions. Listed at the bottom are some examples where there are already interagency courses being offered. There are also some civilian universities that are offering courses in this field.

Comments on civilian training. The issue is to institutionalize this process because currently is it is done on a “who do you know” basis.

The US Army is reviewing its fellowship program and is examining inviting other agencies to participate.

The last couple years, we had the reverse at USAID—we had a US Marine assigned to USAID for one year that participated in several operations. There is not one this year because of other operational requirements.

Training Gaps

Existence of Different Cultures Among Organizations/ Agencies Results in Incomplete Understanding of Objectives/Roles/Capabilities/Limitations (Pre-Deployment)

- Reason: Lack of Common Education and Training Among Organizations/ Agencies
- Short-Term Solution (Lead): Add training modules to pre-deployment training concerning the roles and perspectives of other organizations (JFCOM Academics, BCTP Seminar, S/CRS Training, etc.) Utilize distributed learning. (Examples: NDU IA training modules and Joint Knowledge Development Distribution Capability *www.jkddcjmo.org, JIACG courses)*
- Long-Term Solution (Lead): Add modules to professional education programs to expand practitioners' understanding (TRADOC, State Department). Develop career paths that encourage tours of duty across other military and civilian organizations; support with legislation as required (TBD).

The best way to get at the cultural differences is to continue to expand on what we are doing. We are doing some of this already. JFCOM has an academic portion in their exercise. BCTP has a seminar. MSPT has a similar program. S/CRS has their training program. We can provide training modules that can assist in making all those organizations aware.

We also want to use distributive learning. The issue here is knowing what is already available. National Defense University (NDU) has three interagency training modules available. JFCOM's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) has a "joint task force 101" course that contains 15 modules that goes through basic staff functions in a JTF. These may be a good source for civilian agencies to learn about the military. Comment on the JTF modules: They are targeted at military. OMA will get a set and see if they are general enough for a civilian use.

Long-term is adding to education programs and career paths.

Training Gaps

Lack of Common Understanding of Development Environment Among SSTRO Participants (In Country)

- Reason: Inadequate awareness on the ground & lack of information sharing among organizations
- Short-Term Solution: Establish an in-country forum (e.g., Development Conference) for integrating efforts across civilian and military organizations, and processes for sharing information with incoming personnel in common training sessions (US Embassy)
- Long-Term Solution: Interagency assessment teams train together for deployment on short notice to areas with emerging crises (S/CRS). Programs are established for IA teams to brief decision makers and assist training incoming organizations/personnel (S/CRS).

This slide focuses on in-country training. Because of the offset rotation cycles of units deploying, it is impossible to conduct all training during pre-deployment. One way is to establish an in-country forum, like a development conference, and bring all the stakeholders in and discuss procedures and objectives. With those kinds of things, you could bring more understanding to the entire group.

Have a capability to share information with incoming personnel. This may be different by country. We recommend that the embassy's take on that mission.

Training Gaps

Lack of Common Understanding of the Battlespace and Operations in Austere Environments

- Reason: Lack of Organizational Structure and Coordination Procedures
- Short-Term Solution (Lead): Educate military/civilian players on roles/functions/coordination procedures of organizations (e.g., Mil Command and Control, Personal Security Contractors) (JFCOM Academics, BCTP Seminars, S/CRS Training, International Peace Operations Association). Replicate military/government/private sector entities in exercises (JFCOM, BCTP, MSTP, etc.). Convene Contractor /NGO/USAID workshop (USJFCOM)
- Long-Term Solution (Lead): Incorporate METT-TCC (C-Contractors) into Planning Processes (TBD). Establish an organization/school that develops common understanding among interagency.

This slide gets at the lack of understanding on the sides of both the civilian and military of who is operating in the area of operations: What agencies and organizations are in-country? It is important that the security companies and military understand policies and procedures. JFCOM will take this on to get this training into our seminars and training. The second piece of this is that the training must be replicated in exercises

Finally, is to have a workshop to pull together these various agencies. I am not sure we know the scope of the problem. There are contractors everywhere. I am not sure how they all fit.

Comment

If you are going to do a conference, make a video of the training and use that in other training.

There is a long-term need to look at the long-term doctrinal change for METT-TCC (contractors)

There needs to be a school that develops a common understanding among interagency. Two to three day course where organizations can brief about their organizations.

Group E – Civil-Military, Strategic

Our workgroup had three themes. Policy (even though there is a policy working group), integration and modeling.

Group E Issue: Policy

- Discussion
  - Army boots on the ground-PRT 365 days
  - Awareness of different time cycles
  - Standard baseline training created
  - Examination to apply UN integrated training service (DPKO) model to interagency
  - Foreign disclosure issues
  - Host Nation (HN) Security Force recognition issues

On the bottom two [bullets]. There is concern about foreign disclosure issues—US policy precludes authority to share much information. Information has to be too closely held. We had a discussion about impact of working together in terms of interagency operations. We also discussed in some detail the issue of host nation (HN) security force recognition. The end goal is to recognize a HN security force. Discussion on how to have a common recognition or association and engagement with it.

Group Issue: Policy

- Recommendation
  - S/CRS coordinate implementation of Interagency baseline training
  - All participating agencies are responsible for providing baseline training
  - Amend regulations to integrate baseline training into grants/contracts
  - Modify US foreign disclosure policy
  - Joint Center for International Security Forces Assistance (JCISFA) can assist in HN Security Force recognition
  - DoS be resourced to conduct pre-deployment training
  - ID organization to be clearing house for S&R training resources
  - DoD advocate that all agencies be resourced for their NSPD 44 responsibilities

Recommendations:

- To modify US foreign disclosure policies. This is a very demanding recommendation. The intent is to begin looking at ways to make the policy less restrictive so more and more information could be shared.
- The JCISFA could assist in defining and helping people recognize the HN security force.
- DoS should be resourced to conduct more pre-deployment training. There was good discussion on this. We felt that the issue needed to be captured again. DoS has the responsibility but lacks the funding to conduct adequate training.
- Felt is was good to identify an organization or group of organizations to act as a focal point to be a clearing house on S&R training resources so we all know where to go for a repository and single source for S&R somewhere. Again, we wanted to capture this issue for the record.
- That DoD strongly advocate, because they are the largest organization involved in the process, all agencies to get money and resources to meet the obligation. If S/CRS does not have the resources to carry out NSPD-44, we are all going to lose in this effort.

Group E Issue: Integration

- Discussion
  - Need to ID available interagency/international training resources (they are finite)
  - Lack of understanding and appreciation of others
  - Training and code of conduct of contract personnel is inconsistent
  - Lack of interagency integration in mission execution
- Recommendation
  - ID in-country training opportunities
  - Train to reduce xenophobia before pre-deployment training
  - Outsourcing organization responsible for including in contract training requirements and standards of conduct
  - Emphasize integrated training for key audiences

Remember, our working group is very diversified as far civilian and military members.

We discussed the need to identify available interagency and international training resources. We want to capture this point so that action is taken to do identify these resources.

There is a general lack of understanding of what all agencies involved are doing. Sometimes, we become self-focused: our mission is first, our country first, therefore other players last. We felt this is important so that we keep more open minds in terms of recognition of other organizations' positions.

We discussed with the diversity of organizations involved training of contract personnel is inconsistent across the board. All organizations are not all following the same procedures. We talked about specific incidents were one incident could spoil the work of all supporting an operation.

A lack of interagency integration in mission execution. We agree that integration in pre-deployment training is important. Once the operation is launched, individual organizations tend to go off on their own missions.

Recommendations:

- Identify in-country training opportunities. A single site for a full list of training.
- Train to reduce xenophobia before pre-deployment training. We talked a lot about this issue. How subconsciously more than conspicuously, this is a real problem. In a lot of people's minds, they deploy without being properly prepared to recognize other positions and other people enough. It is important to insure people keep an open mind and keep an open opinion.
- Outsourcing training must include code of conduct. In essence, contractors must be held to task for behavior of people in terms of code of conduct. We all recognize how remarkably complicated issue this is, with contracts written and work being done by a third party. The discussion was that contractors can be held to task in terms of future contracting and associations rather than taking action on individual situations.

- Integrated training for key audiences. Again talking on an integration level, there are people at common levels across agency and organization structures that have a common purpose that need more emphasis during both pre- and post-deployment training. We need to concentrate more on giving integrated training so those people can work more efficiently together.

Group E Issue: Responsive Model

- Discussion
  - Agency specific terminology; others unaware
  - US security sector reform not comprehensive
  - Ensure multinational force sensitive to HN population attitude and beliefs toward the intervention

- Recommendation
  - Create a “wikipedia” for R&S lexicon “populated” by people working in R&S
  - Seek common approach to security sector reform
  - Train and educate multinational force to seek an understanding HN population attitudes and beliefs

In terms of a responsive model or framework, we are talking about a very dynamic field in pre-deployment, and in the field that is consistently changing we still need some framework to capture the basics so that we are all on the same sheet of music and have what we need to do our training.

Right now, we have too much agency-specific terminology that others do not understand even if they mean the same thing. We are using different terms, and sometimes do not understand what the other person is saying.

The US security reform was not comprehensive. From a social science perspective, how to be aware of the recipient population or public where we are intervening. What are their opinions and belief system about us as the interveners? Can their perspective be a part of our training? Not just culture, but also geography and region. In what context are we intervening? We often do not spot and realize that the people we are helping are viewing us in their own ways and perspectives, and reacting to our intervention in a particular

way. We see the people's reaction and interpreting that which either reinforces what we are doing by our own interpretation, or have us go in a different direction. So it is very important for us to cut through all these things we are laying on top of them and go back and be sensitive to their actual original attitude, beliefs and situations looking at us. Looking at us through their eyes.

Recommendations. Look at terminology and create an electronic dictionary for R&S like "wikipedia." Populate the dictionary by all of us working to provide input and acting as a gate keeper. This would provide a common location for terms and definition for all agencies. The database grows and changes all the time, but anyone coming into work in S&R for the first time would have a single location to go to learn about S&R terminology. "Wikipedia" is a dictionary of topical material that grows and grows all the time. Anyone can post additional information to the dictionary.

Comment One

There is work being done at DoS with DoD to establish a "Wikipedia" type system. The tool will be given to "Gateway" who will own and operate the system. This effort is in the discussion phase. We hope to have a concept paper ready by early January 2007. This information will be open source on line for everyone to access.

Comment Two

This workshop is going to capture these recommendations and assign lead agencies to work on the recommendations.

Chapter 6: Develop an Action Plan, Moderated by COL John Agoglia and Dr. Janine Davidson

Question

Who here would be interested in participating in a workgroup whose input would feed into DoD Directive 3000.5 and NSPD-44 implementation? The reason I asked the question is that as part of the process in working with PKSOI and folks from OSD Stability Operations we have been asked to co-chair the training sub-working group in the NSPD-44 implementation process. So that you understand our goal here is to put together an action plan that will, in fact, feed both of those implementation plans. We plan to hold folks' feet to the fire to produce, [but] we cannot hold you accountable. We are going to discuss here what are some program tasks that we can collaboratively work on, and who are some individuals or organizations willing to take the lead for those so that we can start to move forward and feed this into those implementation programs. This is what we are after.



The purpose of this slide is to get our heads around what is happening on the road to deployment in all our different agencies and organizations. This is not intended to be all inclusive, rather a "food for thought" slide. For instance, every one of our organizations is charged with organizing [and] equipping the individuals that go out on these operations. The first column, individual skills and development, these activities happened in different lines. If you hire a private contractor, we assume they are trained when hired. At the unit and collective training level, you do the same thing. There are several lines. We are basing the slide off the bottom line—the military line. When a military unit gets a mission to deploy, they schedule various training. The point here is that there is an opportunity to cross-train between the different lines. Where can we feed in and cross-train different types of organizations all going down their individual roads to deployment? The other part is the nodes (the question mark circle on the chart). As an example, the PRT members deploying may not meet everyone until they arrive in-theater. There was a question [about] why the PRTs members did not meet before they deployed into theater. This may not be best, because members from different organizations on some of the PRTs are not on the same rotational schedule. Continuity of the personnel on different rotations is important to capture. Where should the PRT link-up mode be? Maybe there should be more than one PRT link-up node. In-theater, all organizations should be operating together. We will talk about how to do some cross-training in-theater. Where is the post-deployment node to get together and share knowledge? How do we do a lessons learned process? Then how does each of us, individually, go back into our organizations and feed those lessons back into an integrated system. The military already as an automatic feedback system for taking lessons learned and feeding them back into the beginning of the cycle to assist the next units deploying. How do we replicate that system at the interagency level? This is a visional aid to assist in our discussion.

Question on PRTs

Did the replacement PRT commander have any idea on the type and level of training the previous, outgoing PRT had? The previous PRT commander's knowledge about other organizations cuts across all those lines.

Answer

In some cases, the in-place team members have detailed knowledge about the various support agencies and regional knowledge on the area of operation. Currently, the incoming PRT commanders (are identified three to four months in advance) and the outgoing commanders are in contact with their replacements.

Comment

On the military line, the individual training is well-established and followed. For individuals on the other lines, it may well be all on the job training. The question is, should individuals come together with their counterparts before arriving in-theater?

Everyone does need to meet in-theater, in the case of the PRT, so that everyone can learn what the operational requirements are to operate effectively. Even though they may be technical experts, they need to know the local terrain and how they will interact with their commander. The nature of the organization deploying to theater needs to linkup at different levels, i.e., the governance would linkup with the commander of the BCT and the NGO may linkup with the sergeant on the ground. Some organizations may gain more at linking up with the military at a lower-level in their training, i.e., at JRTC rather than at a BCTP.

In the PRT context, the left-seat/right-seat, the most important thing about it is that you have the opportunity to meet with the local leaders. When local leaders are used to work with someone who is replaced, it is very difficult to slip into a new relationship without any introduction.

The linkup point should be in the pre-deployment column. The question is, where and when is the linkup done in pre-deployment. There also has to be a linkup point in-theater. The pre-deployment linkup is something that clearly has to be defined, and how we do that. We need to work our way through this.

Comment

There two types of deployments. One group that goes through training and deploys together. The other group is on a rolling deployment schedule just because of the diversified organizations

we come from and their own internal posting cycle: Four, six and twelve month tours. Therefore, what we must do is pick-up different people who are in different deployment processes along the same route. The first and second linkup points are someplace in the organization's process, though. The post-deployment node is not a place that all the organizations come through; rather an integrated collection system to capture lessons learned that are shared with all involved in the operation.

Comments

JFCOM does a corps level exercise that BCTP supports. This might be a point to the corps level linkup in pre-deployment.

People get confused about COIN. There are three places to get COIN [training]. There is a COIN academy in Taji, Iraq, there is a COIN center at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, and there is a COIN seminar at BCTP. The units are usually receiving COIN three times for a deployment.



What we did with this chart was to try and get at the broad overarching end state. Then, what are the specific objectives with pre-deployment training? The third layer is "programs." This may not be the right term to call these—maybe "initiatives" that we would look at. Under the "initiatives," what are some tasks to look at to get us to the objectives. Our thinking here was I do not want to spend a lot of time looking at the end states. Rather, take this home and give us feedback afterwards. What is key here is the inclusiveness of all the participants in our processes and procedures so that we can influence each other's training, planning and execution. That is what we believe we are after. I want to focus in on the blocks in the center of the chart.

In the first column, is what we think we heard people say is we want to "Leverage and Link." How can we leverage what currently exists and link the on-going efforts together?

In the second column, is "Expand Lessons Learned." We must have a feedback mechanism.

In the third column, we want to "Improve Current Efforts." This is different than the items in column one. What can we do to leverage other programs to improve your specific training programs? Each agency is responsible for their own programs. What can we do to help you to improve your specific program? For example, BCTP, one of the things that came out of this workshop is that IPOA is willing to visit and see how to inject contractors in BCTP scenarios, and the same for JFCOM exercises.

The fourth column, are "New Initiatives." I see the first three columns feeding the current pre-deployment requirements, dealing with people who are training now. We must improve training we are giving now to units in the pre-deployment cycle. The fourth column focuses in on the future. How do we shape the environment for the future to improve?

In terms of some of the pieces: An example in lessons learned here are a list of different lessons learned that all of us can tap into. What I propose here is that USAID draft a proposal and put it in front of the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines and let the Services look at the proposal. The Service lesson learned centers: we need help in developing a lessons learned process for USAID that will feed into USAID pre-deployment training. S/CRS wants to participate in

this effort. The Lessons Learned Centers are: US Army Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS, the USMC Center at Quantico, VA, The Joint Center at Norfolk, VA, the US Navy Center at Newport, RI and the US Air Force Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, in Montgomery, AL.

Would RTI be willing to explore the possibility to take the lead on some in-country training?

JFCOM is willing to examine the possibility of starting the process of pulling together a master list of training across the services currently going on. Request all attendees sit down and draw up a list of on-going training and exercises and feed that to COL White at PKSOI, so PKSOI can start making a consolidated list of on-going training. There are other efforts to develop a list of training beginning in other agencies. After the master training list is compiled, the training needs to be prioritized so that agencies with limited personnel will know which exercises have priority. The NGO side needs to provide input into this process.

The organization of Afghan PRTs is changed so that they are now commanded by other nations. USAID is beginning to provide personnel to these new organizations. There is quarterly PRT training conducted at the Marshall Center. This group needs to be informed about that process and be involved.

The French also have established a cultural training center that trained 25,000 personnel last year. This training is going to be opened up to everybody in Europe next year when Turkey becomes the lead nation.

Currently, there is no relationship between the different Afghan PRTs. In January, the current Afghan PRT structure is going to be modified. This will be a huge multi-national and NATO effort. Identified European Union and NATO points of contact to provide information to JFCOM concerning on-going European efforts on PRTs. FORSCOM has the US lead for PRTs. For NATO, it is a national responsibility to train PRTs.

FORSCOM trains about a 1,000 people a year. NATO trains about 3,000 people a year. Some people have raised the issue of developing training standards for individuals that are fed into the pre-deployment process. What we are talking about is a certification process for individuals who are able to go to a BCTP event. There has been discussion on coming up with a certification based on the

LOOs. These would be training modules that need to be completed before an individual is certified for deployment. As an example, a module on rules of law for each level: strategic, operational and tactical. The idea is to standardize between the military and civilian side of the force.

Is this already being done in some agencies? At USAID, we are certainly working towards this concept. This is the goal to understand the core training requirements and standardize the training and then build the training modules around the core requirements. It is not just setting standards for courses—it is also determining what the requirements are that individuals have to fill before they deploy. We need to know what skills and knowledge one needs to fill a position. How do people from various agencies, including contractors, get certified after completing the module training? Training conducted by other organizations must be recognized by the organization one is "assigned." This is part of the NSPD-44 process, S/CRS is working this issue.

The UN has training modules available to all member states that are universal for all peacekeepers. The UN has training certification for certain categories of personnel. The UN recognizes the training centers that provide the training using our modules and to our standards. The UN continues to revise and improve these training modules. The NSPD-44 process should be able to certify these UN courses for our deployment requirements, just like what is done with George Mason University courses. As part of the certification process, these courses should be certified for use for military promotion and for credit in private education.

We would like BCTP to examine working with S/CRS so that the S/CRS coursework developed for their training could be sent to BCTP and incorporated into BCTP training.

This would also be a great forum for interagency training.

Scenario development is another piece that may be able to be used by several organizations. The national strategy and objective development for S/CRS training could be provided to BCTP and MSTP to be included in BCTP and MSTP scenarios. We may be able to develop a list of points of contact that would be willing to review scenarios being developed to insure their area of expertise is being

reflected correctly in the scenario. There is an electronic list of joint MSELs available for exercise development.

Who issues directives for the USG on training requirements? How do we get pre-deployment training into that system? DoDD 3000.05 has a training piece, but, in order to do that, we work with Personnel and Readiness. They are the DoD point of contact for education and training. Dr. Chu, on the OSD-side, is officially in charge of education and training and with interagency community beyond DoD.

IPOA is going to talk to BCTP and MSTP and coordinate contractor input into these training programs.

We can do a lot of this coordination electronically. The intent is not go meet on a monthly basis to do this collaborative work.

In conclusion, the NSPD-44 process is developing a civilian-military team structure. This is a group in Washington, DC that puts together the policy guidance. Then, there is a planning structure that would go forward in-country and collaborate plans with a combatant commander or a Joint force headquarters who is giving that mission. There will also be an ACT in the structure that goes into country. The ACT either goes in where there is a country team, or no country team. If there is no country team, then the ACT builds the country team, or it is embedded with the ambassador. The ACT will form the national structure, the regional structure or the local structure. So a lot of what we do in terms of training is going to be driven by the structures in-country, and where one expects to operate. These structures are being staffed across the USG. Attendees need to get the information on these new teams to study the impact.

Annex A: Agenda

Integrated Civilian Military Pre-Development Training Workshop Agenda

Tuesday, 12 December 2006

1600-1800 Registration, *Letort View Community Club (LVCC)*

1800-2000 Ice Breaker with Optional Dinner, *LVCC*

Wednesday, 13 December 2006

0730-0800 Late Registration, *First Floor Collins Hall*

0730-0830 Breakfast, *Ardennes Room*

0820-0830 Admin Remarks, COL White, *Ardennes Room*

0845-0900 Welcome Remarks, COL Agoglia, *Normandy Room*

0900-0930 Opening Remarks, Mark Asquino, Deputy Coordinator S/CRS, *Normandy Room*

0930-0940 Break

0940-1130 Panel A Operational Experiences, Moderated by Dr. Davidson

- COL Dave Gray BDE CDR served in Iraq
- Henry Ensher, S/CRS
- Mark Lonsdale, Hart Security
- Michael Schulz, IFRC
- James Schmitt, Armor Group America
- Phil Gary, USAID

1130-1145 Group Photo, Collins Hall Stairs

1145-1300 Lunch with Speaker, *Ardennes Room*

- 1230-1250 Nick Dowling, Training Local Political Engagement, *Ardennes Room*

1300-1530 Breakouts, 18th Infantry Rooms, Second Floor

- Humanitarian Assistance, Group A, Roy Williams
- Policy, Group B, LtCol Greg Hermsmeyer
- Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Group C, COL Mike Moon
- CIV-MIL, Group D, COL John Kardos
- CIV-MIL, Group E, Mary Ann Zimmerman

1530-1730 Back briefs, Dr. Davidson moderates, Normandy Room

1800-UTC Dinner, Keynote Speaker, *LVCC*

- 1800-1900 Arrive/Social
- 1915-1945 Keynote by James Bever
- 2000 – Until completed Dinner

Thursday, 14 December 2006

0800-1030 Panel B, Practioners, Moderated by COL Jackson, Normandy Room

- LTC Matz, 1st Army
- Lou Gelling, BCTP
- LTC Sturgeon, MSTP
- Gary Russell, S/CRS
- Tom Baltazar, USAID/OMA
- Bill Hyde, IMC

1030-1045 Break

1045-1330 Breakouts with working lunch, Ardennes Room

1345-1445 Back briefs, moderated by COL Jackson, Normandy Room

1445-1500 Break

1500-1600 Develop Roadmap, COL Agoglia and Dr. Davidson, Normandy Room

1600-1630 Closing remarks, COL Agoglia, *Normandy Room*

Annex B: Participants

Grade	First Name	Last Name	Organization
Mr.	John	Acree	USAID/DCHA/OFDA
Colonel	John	Agoglia	PKSOI
Mr.	Chris	Aller	FORSCOM G3
LTC	Harley	Alves	United Nations
Major	Jennifer	Anthis	Security Cooperation Education & Training Center
Dr.	Chiyuki	Aoi	Aoyama Gakuin University
Ms.	Merrie	Archer	S/CRS
Mr.	Mark	Asquino	Department of State
Major	Jay	Bachar	G-3 SSTR
Col (Ret)	Thomas	Baltazar	USAID/OMA
LTC	Brent	Bankus	OGD
Dr.	Mark	Baskin	SUNY CID
Mr.	Gregory	Bates	IDS International
Colonel	Thomas	Belote	PKSOI
Mr.	James	Bever	USAID
Ms.	Kathleen	Bikus	USAID-OMA
LTC	Don	Bohn	PKSOI
LTC	James	Boozell	HQDA, DAMO-SSO
CDR	Elizabeth	Breza	NOMI Det Naval Expeditionary Medical Training Institute
Ms.	Elena	Brineman	USAID
Mr.	Richard	Byess	USAID/OMA
LTC	Dwayne	Carman	National Training Center
Ms.	Molly	Clark	Cornell University
Ms.	Beth	Cole	US Institute of Peace
Mr.	Steven	Collins	Defense Language Institute
Colonel	Tim	Cornett	PKSOI
CAPT	Lee	Cornforth	Navy Medicine Manpower, Personnel Training and Education Command
Mr.	Mark	Cramer	Institute for Defense & Business
Colonel	Andrew	Cuthbert	HQ TRADOC
Dr.	Janine	Davidson	OSD/Stability Operations
Mr.	Marvin	Decker	CALL
LTC	Jerry	DeJarnett	First Army
Mr.	Kevin	Delmour	COE
Colonel	Mark	Dewhurst	PKSOI
Colonel	Celestino	Di Pace	Commander NATO CIMIC GROUP SOUTH
Col	Daniel	Donohue	MSTP

Grade	First Name	Last Name	Organization
Dr.	Robin	Dorff	Creative Associates International, Inc.
Mr.	Nick	Dowling	IDS International
Colonel	Monte	Dunard	Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
Mr.	Stein	Ellingsen	DPKO/United Nations
Mr.	Henry	Ensher	Foreign Service Institute - Department of State
Mr.	Mike	Esper	PKSOI
Mr.	Steve	Florich	Ops Grp JRTC
Mr.	Larry	Forster	Blackwater USA
Major	Michael	Froess	Canadian Forces PSTC
Mr.	Philip	Gary	RTI
Mr.	Louis	Gelling	BCTP, CAC-T
Colonel	David	Gerard	JCS J7
Mr.	Saul	Godinez	Joint Warfighting Center, JFCOM
Lieutenant Colonel	Lynda	Granfield	Dept of State-INR/HIU
Colonel	David	Gray	1 BCT/101 ABN (AASLT)
Colonel	James	Greer	JCISFA
Colonel	Robert	Grymes	Joint Warfighting Center
Colonel	Dave	Harlan	PKSOI
Mr.	Chip	Hauss	Search for Common Ground
LTC	Greg	Hermsmeyer	OSD Stab Ops
Mr.	Rich	Hoffman	Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR)
LTC	Patrick	Hogan	Joint Multi-National Readiness Center
Major	James	Huffman	Ops Grp JRTC
Mr.	William	Hyde	International Medical Corps (IMC)
Ms.	Debbie	Jackson	DCHA/OMA
Colonel	Don	Jackson	PKSOI
Colonel	John	Kardos	PKSOI
Mr.	Richard	Keller	OSD-Policy (TIM2)
Mr.	Scott	Kofmehl	State Department
Mr.	Andres	Kruesi	International Committee of the Red Cross
Ms.	Jessica	Kruvant-Wilson	Creative Associates International Inc.
Dr.	Andrew	Leith	ICAF
Mr.	Mark	Lonsdale	HART USA
Colonel	Pete	Mansoor	COIN Center
Ms.	Erin	Masly	NDU/ITEA
Mr.	Paul	Mason	SUNY CID
LTC	Leonard	Matz	1-310th IN (TS), 189th IN BDE
Ms.	Kathleen	McInnis	Office of Secretary of Defense (Policy) - Stability Operations

Grade	First Name	Last Name	Organization
Mr.	Jeff	McNary	PKSOI
Ms.	Michaela	Meehan	USAID, Washington
Dr.	Sarah	Meharg	Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
LTC	Mike	Moon	PKSOI
Mr.	Jonathan	Morgenstein	USIP
CDR	Betsy	Myhre	Navy BUMED
Mr.	Doug	Nash	MAGTF Staff Training Program
Dr.	Laura	Neack	Miami University (Ohio)
Mr.	John	Otte	CCMR
CAPT	Claire	Pagliara	USNS COMFORT
Mr.	Harry	Phillips	PKSOI
Mr.	Mike	Pryce	European Command, J-5 Plans, Stability Plans
Mr.	Tony	Pryor	International Resources Group
Mr.	G.A.	Redding	Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)
Colonel	Angelo	Repetto	SCUOLA DI APPLICAZIONE-POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS ITALIAN ARMY
Mr.	Hank	Richmond	OUSD-P/TIM2 TASK FORCE
Mr.	Carlton	Rosengrant	OSD Readiness and Training
Mr.	Gary	Russel	S/CRS
Mr.	Sean	Ryan	JCISFA
Mr.	John	Sandrock	ANSER
Mr.	Jim	Schmitt	ArmorGroup
Dr.	Tammy	Schultz	PKSOI
Mr.	Michael	Schulz	IFRC
Colonel	Robert	Shaw	Asymmetric Warfare Group
Ms.	Judith	Sheehan	Peace Operations Training Center, Bosnia and Herzegovina
LTC	John	Stepansky	PKSOI
Mr.	James	Stephenson	
LtCol	Arthur	Sturgeon	USMC, MSTP
Dr.	Lowry	Taylor	Dept of State-INR/HIU
Mr.	Tom	Ulmer	Camber Corporation
BG	Keith	Walker	HQDA G-35
Colonel	Pat	White	PKSOI
Mr.	Roy	Williams	CHC
Mr.	Gerry	Williams	Navy Operational Medical Lessons Learned Center
Mr.	Aaron	Williams	RTI International
Colonel	Simon	Wolsey	DAMO-SSO
Ms.	Brenda	Wyler	Army G3/5 DAMO-SSO
Ms.	Mary Ann	Zimmerman	S/CRS

Annex C: Briefing Slides

13 FEBRUARY 2006

COLONEL DAVE GRAY

Agenda

- ♣ Understand the Environment
- ♣ Training to Defeat Insurgency
- ♣ Insights

Understand the Environment (Three Dimensional Chess)

- Intellectual Prep
  - Regional Issues/ Foreign Influence

- Cultural Awareness
  - Tribalism/ Political Parties



- IPB
  - Geographic Environment



Training to Defeat Insurgency

- Urban Staff Ride
  - Nashville Civilian Agencies
  - Security and Reconstruction focused
- Command Post Exercises
- BCT FTXs / JRTC MRE
  - COIN STXs
  - Interagency Role Players
- MiTT Academy

Insights

- Command Vision
  - Keep Strategic Objectives in forefront
  - Impartiality- Maintain Dynamic Balance
    - Deter Ethnic/Sectarian Violence
- Fight the Enemy, not the plan
  - Don't fixate on battlespace/troop to task
- Unifying Themes
  - Vertical/horizontal integration-Interagency Cooperation!
  - ISF Development, Kurdish Encroachment, Sunni Insurgency
- SOI Hierarchy Division of labor
  - Recognize Mom vs. Pop Tactics by SOIs across LOOs
- Unity of Effort
  - Common Vision working towards one endstate

INITIAL FOCUS ON MOVEMENT TO POST

KBR/FDC FORWARD MODEL

- No training/consultation program
- No specific reception/orientation
- Personnel movement had military focus

IRAQ SUPPORT UNIT MODEL

- Civilianization of Process – Iraq Support Unit Model
- Gradual development of Training Course – DSAC (Security + Culture/Policy/History)
- Establishment of Check-In Procedure in Iraq

CONTINUED ISSUES OF MOVEMENT TO FIELD POST

- Current Status
- Selection of Personnel through standard personnel processes
- Continued Use of Contracting Procedures:
  - 3161
  - Limited non-career appointments
  - Commercial contracts.

POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS

- Customized training/Expansion of DSAC
- Established Round of Consultations for Reachback purposes
- PRT Course

MARK LONSDALE

USG/DOD CONTRACTING

Phase IV Operations
Stabilization & Reconstruction
Security Sector Reform

Mark V. Lonsdale
Director of Training & Studies

Training Objectives

1. To proved an introduction to Armed Contractors in the Battle Space

2. To begin the process of developing SOPs & pre-deployment briefs that will facilitate interaction between the US Military and Security Contractors.

Mark V. Lonsdale

- VP & Director US Operations, **HART Security USA** www.hartsecurity.com
- Director of Training & Studies – **STTU (Specialized Tactical Training Unit)** www.STTU.com
- IPOA Standards Committee
- Pre-deployment Instructor
  - US & Coalition Military

Pre-Deployment Training for:

- US Army – SF
- USA – Military Intelligence
- USMC – Force Recon
- USMC – Scout-Snipers
- USAF – C-SAR
- USAF – Counter Intelligence
- Coalition SOC

5th SF Group – Advanced Urban Ops

04-08 DEC 06

Pre 9-11
Kosovo & Balkans

UNMIK

Post 9-11
pre-deployment training



Advisory -
General Dostum
2002 / 2003

Forward Deployed CI
Training – Bagram
2003

Tajii Military Training Base 2004

220 Mortar & Rocket Attacks in a 90 day period

FACT

Professional security contractors experienced in reconstruction security, convoy escort, protective details, and FOB security are a critical component of current and future Phase 4 S&R / SSR operations and US military Force Protection

"One Team – One Fight"

Over 500 contractors killed in Iraq since 2003

METT-TC

Army operational doctrine (FM 3-0) describes the integrated operational environment as factors of:

- Mission
- Enemy
- Terrain & Weather
- Troops
- Time available
- Civil Considerations (added 2001)
  - **(Need to add Armed Contractor Considerations)**

But which battle operating system engages the "C"?

Who is responsible for Civil Military Operations (CMO)?

Major Security Contractors

- DynCorp
- Blackwater USA
- Triple Canopy
- Armor Group
- HART Security
- Olive Security
- Global Risk
- MPRI
- Erinys
- EOD-T
- CRG
- Kroll

SECURITY TASKS:

- Convoy Escort (CET)
- FOB Security
- PSDs – Tier 1
- PSDs – Reconstruction
- Security – Power Infrastructure
- Security Sector Reform
  - Police & Military Training
- Air Support
- Intelligence

DOD Contractors

- Working in direct support of DOD operations.
- Serving functions traditionally handled by the military.
- Governed by rules laid down by the DOD, CPA, DOS, and US Ambassadors (RSO).
- Answerable to US law.

PSC Contracting Issues:

1. Qualification of the Company / Provider
2. Individual Standards
3. Vetting of Personnel
4. Company Registration & Insurances
5. Code of Conduct
6. Weapons Policies
7. ROE & Force Escalation / De-escalation
8. Identification – ID Cards / Uniforms
9. Tracking & Communications
10. OPSEC
11. Accountability

Who are these armed contractor?

1. Former US & coalition military
2. High percentage of former US and UK SF personnel
3. Former senior NCOs, Warrants & Officers
4. Mature & Experienced
5. Highly motivated & professional
6. Former SF Medics (18D), communications (18E) , EOD & K9 specialists
7. High percentage of Law Enforcement SWAT officers

Who are these armed contractor?

Former US Special Forces who defeated AQT in 2001 return to Afghanistan in 2002 as civilian security contractors.

Same men – same high standards.

PSC Code of Conduct

1. Professional Appearance & Standards
2. Highest Standards of Personal & Professional Behaviour
3. Respect for International Laws, Conventions & Human Rights
4. Respect for Local Laws
5. Respect of local Custom & Culture
6. No Drugs or Drunkenness
7. No Proselytizing

But all Armed Contractors are not equal in experienced & training

Tier One PSD Teams for US & Iraqi VIPs -
Mostly former US & UK SOF

PSD for CMATT General Eaton –
Both Contractors & Military

Tajii Security Mentors –
UK & USSF supervising
Iraqi Rafidan Security

Hart Iraqi PSD / CET Team – 2005

Low Profile Iraqi PSD Teams – Baghdad 2005

Variety of PSC CET Vehicles

Unofficial Security Contractor Uniform

- 511 Tactical Pants (khaki)
- Polo Shirts (navy or black)
- Desert boots (tan)
- Body Armor – Predator (Khaki or Black)
- Ball Caps
- Primary Weapon – M4 or AK
- Handgun – Glock or Beretta

Authorized Weapons?
M-72, M-203, SVD?

Weapons & Equipment

- Prefer Western weapons (M4)
- Often utilize local weapons (AK)
- Machineguns on Convoy Escort & FOB Security
- MoI Registration

Heavy Weapons essential to current security operations
PKS & PKM

FOB Access & ID Cards

- Who gets DOD CAC cards?
- MNF-I Cards?
- ISAF (Afghanistan)
- Registered Security Companies and Guards with MOI
- Weapons cards – DOD, MOI, CMATT, etc

Blue on White Incidents

BIG increase during OIF2/3 Swap-out



Over 90% (of known incidents) during daylight



27% approaching Checkpoints
36% following Convoys



Kabul 22NOV06

- **NARRATIVE:** According to reports, a US Military convoy which was traveling to Kabul from Bagram opened fire on a contractors vehicle which was reported to be traveling too close to the convoy. As a result the driver of the contractors vehicle lost control and steered the vehicle into a local shop as military forces continued to fire at the vehicle. As a result one doctor and a civilian were killed and four others sustained injuries. The wounded were transferred to military hospital for treatment.

- **ASSESSMENT:** This is not the first incident of this nature that has occurred in Kabul city. A number of CF/ISAF shooting has taken place in different parts of the city as the victims have not complied or heeded to ISAF/CF warnings and protocols.
- **ADVISORY:** Advise clients to remind their drivers to approach Check Posts with extreme care and to refrain from acting or driving in a manner that may be mistaken for "suspicious behavior". Maintain a safe distance from convoys or any military type vehicle.

Vehicle Visual Identification needs to be standardized & briefed to troops.

- Approaching
  - Convoys
  - Vehicle Check Points (VCP)
  - FOB Access Points
- Flags
- Panels
- Plaques
- Light Signals

Tracking & Communications

- PSD & CET Teams move through several US military AOs each day
- PCO / ROC / LMCC Coordination
- Track 24
- QRFs
- Direct Communications with AO TOC
  - DOD Iraq vs ISAF
- Challenges of Radio communications
  - Range, Compatibility, Frequencies, etc

CAS-EVAC Challenges

- Casualty Evacuation from an accident or IED attack
- Access to medical care at in-theatre US military base? (ie, Anaconda)
- Eligibility for medical evacuation to Germany?
- Relationship between US military and civilian's insurance provider?

INTELLIGENCE

- Military Focus: Finding & Killing the Enemy
- Need for greater access into the Human Terrain:
  - Local Populace
  - Power Structures
  - Informants
- Populations are Centers of Gravity
- PSCs have access into the Local Populace

WAY FORWARD

DOD could:

1. Set minimum personnel standards for armed contractors
2. Require pre-deployment training
3. Standardize Identification
4. Facilitate Communications
5. Blue Force Tracking (*transmit only*)
6. Set ROE
7. Demand Accountability
8. Supply pre-deployment briefs on PSCs for Headquarters Staff & Ground Troops

Questions?

Mark V. Lonsdale
Cell (703) 992-4777
MVLonsdale@aol.com

JAMES SCHMITT (Slides not shown at Workshop)

Security, Stabilization, Transition, Reconstruction, and Peace Operations Training Workshop

ARMORGROUP

Pre-deployment Standards, Training, and Coordination: Industry Initiatives to help United States Peacekeeping, Reconstruction, and Contingency Response Operations succeed through the use of private sector partners.

Sponsored by the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

James Schmitt
jschmitt@armorgroupamerica.com

Vice President
ArmorGroup North America

Center for Strategic Leadership
Carlisle Barracks
December 13th, 2006

Security, Stabilization, Transition, Reconstruction, and Peace Operations Training Workshop

ARMORGROUP

ArmorGroup is a leading international provider of defensive Protective Security Services, Security Training, Security Sector Reform, Humanitarian Mine Action, and Security Consultancy services.



We have over 9,000 employees, with offices in 38 countries, and publicly traded. ArmorGroup is 25 years old; in the last three years we deployed to 160+ countries.

ArmorGroup provides support on every continent save one

Strong ethical and regulatory structures

- Clearly defined, formal ethics policy and code of conduct in place
- ISO 9001:2000 accredited
- Routinely consulted by both US DoD and UK MoD concerning industry standards
- Regulated as publicly traded company
- Rigorous vetting and recruitment process: skills and character

Prestigious client base

- US Department of State, US Department of Defense, other government agencies
- Multinational corporations (Fortune 200's)
- Multinational organizations (UN, EU, NATO, World Bank)

Transparency, high standards, and well established reputation

Security, Stabilization, Transition, Reconstruction, and Peace Operations Training Workshop

ARMORGROUP

Challenges..and how the industry is responding

Among private security firms there has been no common standard...this is changing

- recruiting
- training
- code of ethics
- standards of service
- type of services provided
- operating envelope (what a firm will - and will not - do)
- level of transparency

The International Peace Operations Association (www.ipoaonline.org) is a non-profit trade association whose mission is:

- to promote high operational and ethical standards of firms
- to engage in a constructive dialogue with policy-makers about the growing and positive contribution of these firms to the enhancement of international peace, development, and human security
- to inform the concerned public about the activities and role of the industry

Industry standards must be developed with oversight and enforcement

Projected Industry Trend	Impact on Private Sector Pre-Deployment Training	Programatic Risk	Mitigation Strategy
Increased focus on stability support programs for the spectrum of Peacekeeping, Reconstruction, and Contingency Response environments. Expanded role of stability support operations to Security Sector Reform (i.e. Police Reform). Increase in use of strategic partnerships to further USG stability objectives.	Increasing integration for supporting Private Security Companies, Design and Build, Logistics, and development NGO's Pre-deployment training must be calibrated to both threat AND complexity based scenarios Private sector providers will require access to a wide-range of training expertise (hard/soft skills)	Increase in rapid response Contingency Operations (AFCAP, LOGCAP, WWPS, HERC, IDP) generate increasing need for the pre-validation of a private sector provider's capability USG strategic requirements	• Increased Interagency coordination at the contract/procurement level - alignment • Pre-validation of Private Sector Firms • Extension of USG strategic capability • Enduring private sector firms must seek and demonstrate transparency
Increasing need for professional standards and coordinating procedures for PSC's and other service providers.	Low regulatory framework still allows minimal barriers to entry and varied performance standards in a period of increasing demand	• High operational risk • Blue on Blue incidents • Undermines USG strategic regional stability objectives • Must be inclusive beyond PCS's...NGO's, et	Short of formal national and international regulatory statutes, industry trade groups (IPOA) representing PSC's, NGO, and Logistic firms can serve as focal point to drive change
Increased USG engagement on private sector standards, training, accountability, and coordination in USG Peace Support operations. Interagency (DoD, DoS, USAID) coordination mechanism for private sector providers during service delivery phase.	• Private sector engagement occurs at force pre-deployment training • Proscribed coordination and performance standards codified in SOW's • Coordination mechanism can range from highly structured (MNF-I ROC) to less so, but always inclusive and formal	•Non-inclusion of PSCs and other providers at force pre-deployment sustains current situation, presenting operational risk to both provider and DoD alike • PSC's only = not a full solution - training and coordination must include other private sector providers alike	• CTC's, Private Sector Facilities, Unit Home Station • Most effective pre-deployment training likely driven by industry based solution, rather than single company solution • "Lessons learned" from on-going coordination mechanism fed back to pre-deployment training

www.ipoaonline.org

ARMORGROUP

Regional stability is enhanced through the delivery of training and best practices at the local level

ArmorGroup has many years expertise in supporting Security Sector Reform initiatives and post-conflict reconstruction in different scenarios and environments around the world, working in partnership with governments and international peace and security organizations.

Training local guard force candidates, Kenya 2006

Police mentoring in Iraq

ArmorGroup's police mentoring teams have worked with the Iraqi National Police to introduce a number of new ground-breaking initiatives such as:

- building the country's first juvenile detention centre;
- creating Iraq's first national forensics department; and
- developing a sustainable community policing strategy.

Camp Ghassan, Armor Group's Training Facility, Iraq 2006

Security Sector Reform and local training

ARMORGROUP

The industry focus

Assist Peacekeeping, Reconstruction, and Contingency Response Operations succeed by providing the proven capabilities of the private sector

Three conclusions as this focus relates to training

One: IPOA to codify industry-wide standards and a code of conduct to assist DoD, DoS, USAID, and Multinational Organizations select suitable private sector providers. These standards and procedures must be developed in coordination with USG stakeholders.

Two: Prepare deploying forces to better understand operating procedures and standards for private security and other private sector providers.

Three: Create a forward deployed coordination mechanism that can be implemented across the spectrum of USG Reconstruction and Contingency Response Operations. Capture ongoing "lessons learned" and use to continually refine industry standards, coordination procedures, and pre-deployment training for deploying forces.

Training must be based on codified standards and procedures - must be inclusive

14 FEBRUARY PRESENTATIONS

LTC LEONARD MATZ

189th Infantry Brigade (TSB Bragg)
December 2006

Agenda

- 189th Infantry Brigade Overview
- Provincial Reconstruction Team Training

189th Infantry Brigade Overview

189th Infantry Brigade Mission

189th Infantry Brigade increases the operational readiness of Reserve Component units through pre- and post-mobilization training assistance, readiness assessments, evaluations and support. On order, assists installation commanders in mobilizing, deploying, reintegration training and demobilization of Reserve Component units.

Mission Essential Task List

- Provide pre- and post-mobilization training assistance, readiness assessments, evaluations and support to RC units
- Conduct global war on terrorism (GWOT) training IAW USCENTCOM, CFLCC, and FORSCOM training guidance.
- Assist installation commanders in mobilizing, deploying, reintegration training and demobilization of RC units
- Protect the Force

189th Infantry Brigade



Training Resources

- Two Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)
  FOB Patriot (1600 pax) & FOB Latham (600 pax)
- Outstanding Small Arms Ranges
- Numerous Urban Training Areas
- Ground Assault Convoy Live Fire Range
- Outstanding Garrison Support Unit (GSU) & Installation support

OEF 07-09
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Training

Mission

189th Infantry Brigade prepares twelve Provincial Reconstruction Teams to enable the legitimacy of the central government of Afghanistan from 03 January 2007 to o/a 26 March 2007 at Fort Bragg, NC in order to create enduring security and stability in the Afghan provinces.

PRT Pre-Deployment Timeline



Time Available

SECFOR & PRT LDR/Staff Specific Tasks

o/a 10 JAN | ~ 25 – 30 days | *o/a 10 FEB*

PRT / OEF Tasks

o/a 10 FEB | ~ 30 – 40 days | *o/a 21 MAR*

Training Directives

- FORSCOM PRT Training Guidance dated 6 Mar 06
- FORSCOM OEF Training Guidance dated 8 Aug 06
- CENTCOM RFF 663 dated 06 Jul 06
- 1A Theater Immersion Strategy

Major Training Tasks

- Equipping/Readiness Processing
- Staff Training
- SECFOR Training
- Individual Warrior Skills
- Weapons Training
- Land Navigation
- Specialty Courses
- Combat Lifesaver/Drivers/Commo Training
- Ground Assault Convoy/IED Defeat/Convoy Live Fire Exercise
- Language Skills and Cultural Awareness
- Stability Operations and Support Operations (SOSO)
- Pre-deployment Leave
- End of Course Test and Re-Training
- Deployment Ceremony
- Deployment Preparation

Training Challenges

- Different military cultures of the Services
- Assembling/replicating the required equipment for training
- Coordinating numerous outside organizations to support the required training
- Synchronization of high-priority resources
- Time available

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Training Endstate

PRTs Arrive in Theater

- ***Committed*** to the Mission, National Goals, Military Values
- ***Competent*** in Required Skills
- ***Confident*** in their ability to perform in an austere Combat Environment
- ***Cohesive*** as a Team
- ***Disciplined*** to do the Right Thing

189

Questions

CSA Guidance for WFX

"BCTP will become joint centric and remain an "engine of change" for the current and future Army ."

- Train to doctrinal standards.
- Develop self-aware, adaptive leaders and ready units for full-spectrum, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental Multinational (JIIM) operations.
- Instrumented feedback for both formal and informal AARs will provide the necessary lessons learned for leaders, units, and the Army at large.
- Maximize stress on digital C4ISR systems.
- A rigorous fight in the COE including offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as part of modular formations against an unpredictable OPFOR.

TRAINING ASSESSMENT -- NOT READINESS EVALUATION

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BCTP Mission

BCTP conducts or supports combined arms training that replicates Joint-Interagency-Intergovernmental-Multinational Operations in a full spectrum Contemporary Operational Environment, at worldwide locations, in accordance with the Army Forces Generation Model, for BCTs, Divs, Corps, ASCCs, JFLCCs, and JTFs in order to create training experiences that enable the Army's Senior Battle Commanders to develop current, relevant, campaign-quality, joint and expeditionary Battle Command instincts and skills.

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Battle Command Training Program

Initial Approach	Now
• OPFOR Soviet-based, contiguous, symmetric, attrition-based, Army-focused scenarios	• COE, non-contiguous, asymmetric, effects-based, JIIM-focused scenarios
• Deliberate staff-centric MDMP	• Accelerated Commander-centric MDMP
• Doctrinal focused workshops	• Mission-focused workshops/seminars (COIN, IED Defeat, Detainee OPs, JPRA, UO)
• High Intensity Conflict (kinetic simulations)	• Full Spectrum Major Combat Operations (kinetic, non-kinetic, simulations with supporting MSEL)
• Predominantly unclassified, Analog, Army-focused exercises	• Predominantly classified, Digital (ABCS, UAV, ACTF), Joint-integrated exercises with JFCOM

Asymmetric Operations

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SME/Role Player Positions

- US embassy
  - ✓ Ambassador
  - ✓ Other country team members
- United Nations
- US state department
- USAID
- Voice of America
- Members of Congress
- International media
- Humanitarian relief organizations
  - ✓ Examples: UNHCR, ICRC, IFRC,WHO

U.S. Embassy-Iraq

CMOC Meeting

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OG-COE Mission

OG-COE ensures BCTP exercises contain the contemporary operational environment in order to effectively replicate the challenging composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences existing in full spectrum JIIM Operations, at worldwide locations, during Div, Corps, ASCC, JFLCC, and JTF exercises IOT *create training experiences that enable the Army's Senior Battle Commanders to develop current, relevant, campaign-quality, joint and expeditionary Battle Command instincts and skills*.

We put the '*conditions*' in"tasks, conditions, and standards"

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7

OG COE Structure

HEADQUARTERS
Located in 610 Kearney Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

TOTAL MIL	31
TOTAL DAC	4
TOTAL CONT	60
TOTAL	95



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Joint Operating Environment



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Scenario Design/Execution Philosophy

Develop a scenario that:

- Replicates the COE, through a detailed road to war, that covers all the variables of PMESII. Do more than just focus on the "M".
- Provide the BLUEFOR commander Battle Command Challenges across all of PMESII and a Tempo that stresses Current Ops, Future OPS & Future plans…simultaneously.
- Accomplishes the training audiences training objectives, but we can do more than that…We are a CTC.

Execute vigorously by:

- Attack BLUFOR Center of gravity, directly or indirectly, to prevent accomplishment of his mission. Fight as asymmetrically as we can.
- Fight IAW FM 7-100 series, but do not be restrained. Rip tactics from Today's headlines in all of the PMESII.
- Develop and execute Storylines that exercise the full spectrum, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment where, Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability (JLCCTC) can't stimulate it.
- Align Decisive action with AAR schedule

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The Interconnected Operational Environment



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Figure II-6, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 SEP 06

OG-COE During WFX & MRX



Warfighter Exercise (WFX)

- Division/Corps every 18 months
- Observe CSA guidance
- OPFOR based strictly off of FM 7-100
- Operational Environment is Notional

Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX)

- Units scheduled to deploy
- Prepare unit for expected fight
- OPFOR replicates expected enemy force
- Operational Environment is an actual AO

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Replicating the COE





Possible Asymmetric Operations

PYSOP/Perception Management
- Adversary IO Themes
  - ✓ Legitimacy
  - ✓ Ethnic ties with host nation
  - ✓ US as oppressors
  - ✓ Adversary as unifiers
- Tactical PSYOPS
  - ✓ Leaflets and loudspeaker opns

Terrorist Operations
- Direct Action Teams target
  - ✓ Labor Unions at APOD/SPOD
  - ✓ Oil Terminals
  - ✓ Chemical Plants

Special Purpose Forces
- Special Reconnaissance
- DA against Q36/37, C2, MLRS, Patriot,

Deception Operations
- Feints/Demonstrations
- RLS/RES
- IFC

Insurgent Forces
- Conduct up to PLT size operations in AO
- Insurgents independent of SHC C2

Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Threaten use of chemicals to isolate BLUFOR
- Chemical Plant explosion

Dislocated Civilians
- Human Shields
- Adversary establishes camps
- Groups moving on Avenues of Approach

Electronic Warfare/Space Opns
- Satellite Imagery
- Commo/Radar Jamming

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OPFOR Elements of Power

ENDS

Long range—Increase the State's regional power by political annexation of Atropian territory south of the Kura River.

Immediate—Protect ethnic Arianans by displacing Atropians and resettling ethnic Arianans into disputed areas.

MEANS

Diplomatic-Political
- Gain international legitimacy for protection of Arianan minority in Atropia
- Enhance Minarian-Arianan cooperation
- Deny US access to regional PODs
- Set conditions for long-term political annexation of Atropian territory south of Kura River.

Information
- Fragment US-Led Coalition
- Exploit regional anti-US sentiment
- Foster anti-war sentiment in US

Military
- Neutralize the Atropian military
- Enable resettlement of ethnic Arianans and Atropians
- Preserve Arianan 1st tier forces IOT remain a regional military power

Economic
- Reduce Atropian economic capabilities in region IOT enhance Arianan regional economic power
- Change Atropian demographics in contested region south of Kura river to Arainian majority IOT eventually establish political control

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Training the Information Team

BCTP Exercises - set the conditions to maximize training opportunities for the information based leaders and staff.

Public Affairs

Information Operations

Civil – Military Operations

Psychological Operations

Focuses on: Doctrine, TTPs and Lessons Learned

Integrates situations from: Past, Present and Projects out for possible Future Situations

Stresses: Coord & Synch of Efforts, Situational Awareness, Predictive Analysis and Consequence Mgt / Crisis Action

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


Asymmetrical Operations
Radio Stations: Civil radio stations
Intent: Support Arianan IO campaign, incite civilians to riot & join militias
Local Residents: Replicate Civil Populace
Intent: Limiting Reporting on BLUE
Displaced Civilians: 250 w & w/o Veh
Intent: Limited reporting on BLUE and disrupt BLUE movement
Residents
FLD HOSP
MONGOOSE
Forced DC Moves
Displaced Civilians
Hospitals
Riots
EPW Camps
Terrorist/IED: Attack US and Atropians
Intent: Cause commitment of MPs from rear
Hospitals: Civil & Mil Hospitals
Intent: Disrupt US maneuver and cause MPs to support/escort wounded
FLD HOSP
Industrial HAZMAT: Infrastructure ATKs
Intent: Create humanitarian crisis and riots IOT cause commitment of MPs
EPW Camps: Captured Atropian Soldiers
Intent: Shape US maneuver IAW OPFOR plan
Riots: Residents Riot
Intent: Occupy BLUE MPs with civilian riots
Forced DC Moves: DCs moved O/O
Intent: Shape US maneuver IAW OPFOR plan


THE COE
TARANTULA
MONGOOSE
COBRA
units Defending
units in hide
deception

LTCOL TED "FISH" STURGEON

MSTP Exercise Design Brief

LtCol Ted "Fish" Sturgeon
MSTP Operations

This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED

Training the First to Fight!

061213

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Purpose

MSTP

- Provide the following information:
  - MSTP Mission and Organization
  - MSTP 5 Phase Exercise Design Model
  - II MEF (FWD) Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) Example

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Mission

MSTP

- The MAGTF Staff Training Program will provide training in MAGTF warfighting skills, within the context of a Joint and Combined environment, in order to improve the warfighting skills of senior commanders and their staffs and to provide feedback into the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS)

MCO 1500.53A

MSTP Organization

MSTP

MSTP Personnel Staffing
(On/Hand)

Active Duty Officers	Active Duty Enlisted	Individual Augment	IMA Det
21	8	4	39

Other Service	Retire/Retain	Govt Service	Contractors	Senior Mentor
2	1	7	72	6

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MSTP Five-Part Exercise Model

MSTP



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MEF MRX Exercise Objectives

MSTP

- Enhance capability to plan and conduct operations in a joint, combined and interagency environment.
- Assist in preparing the MEF (FWD) staff to execute its wartime functions.
- Assist in refinement of the MEF (FWD) T/O (manning document).

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MEF MRX Exercise Objectives

MSTP

- Orient Commanders and staffs on the Iraqi Theater of Operations with an emphasis on familiarization with theater procedures, terrain, and friendly, enemy, and nonaligned forces and capabilities.
  - Familiarize the MEF (FWD) staff with planned key events of the campaign plan.
  - Educate the MEF (FWD) staff on the complexities of integrating assigned ISF units in operations as well as coordinating with adjacent ISF units.
  - **Educate and familiarize the MEF (FWD) staff with the five lines of operation**
    - **Governance**
    - **Economic development**
    - **Communicating**
    - **Security**
    - **Transition**
  - Familiarize the MEF (FWD) staff with Daily Battle Rhythm and operations in theater.

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MEF MRX Training Goals

MSTP

- Command and control MEF (FWD) units in a joint, combined and interagency environment.
- Develop and employ a MEF (FWD) operational assessment process.
- Plan and conduct operations across the battlespace, emphasizing MEF (FWD) support to Iraqi security, governance, and economic development.
- Control operationally significant areas in the area of operations; to include assisting IZ government and local governments in controlling operationally significant areas.
- Continue to develop ISF and continue transition of battlespace and security responsibilities to the ISF.

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MEF MRX Training Goals

MSTP

- Prepare commanders and staffs to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in a joint, combined and interagency environment.
- Plan and execute engagement with provincial, regional, and local key leaders.
- Provide protection/security for key government/civil infrastructure, critical installations, & lines of communication.
- Plan and execute civil military operations (CMO) with NGOs, U.S. government agencies, and the Iraqi government.
- Plan and conduct Information Operations (IO).

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MEF MRX Training Goals

MSTP

- Conduct integrated operations with Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other governmental agencies.
- Plan and conduct sustainment operations for MEF (FWD) and ISF units throughout the Area of Operations (AO) using organic, contractor, and Iraqi civilian contracted support.
- Control and coordinate movement throughout the AO; to include MEF (FWD) units transiting through ISF controlled battlespace.
- Plan and conduct public affairs in support of MEF (FWD) and ISF operations.
- Plan and conduct fires.

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Phase I: C4 MTT

MSTP

C2 Systems / Applications (Classes / Practical Application / Demonstration)	Information Technology (Classes & Practical Application)
GCCS / IOS V1 (Class / Prac App)	Intro to Networking
IOS V2 (Class / Prac App)	Internetworking Cisco Switches
AFATDS (Class / Demo)	Internetworking Cisco Routers
TBMCS (Class / Demo)	Windows 2003 Server
C2PC (Class / Prac App)	Microsoft Active Directory
JADOCS (Class / Prac App)	Exchange Server
Information Workspace (Class / Demo)	Practical Application
• C4 / Information Management Seminar	
• Command Post of the Future (CPOF) Operator & System Administrator Training (Facilitated by U.S. Army CPOF Program Manager) • MISTC Integration	

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Phase II: Warfighting Seminar

MSTP

DAY 1

COIN PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS	1.5 HRS
OIF 05-07 OVERVIEW:	1.5 HRS
ISF OVERVIEW:	2.5 HRS
ECONOMIC DEV PLAN OVERVIEW:	1.5 HRS

DAY 2

CMO/GOVERNANCE:	1.5 HRS
INTEL /CULTURAL IPB:	1.5 HRS
LAW OF WAR:	1.5 HRS
INTERAGENCY OPNS:	1.0 HRS
SOF INTEGRATION:	1.0 HRS

DAY 3

JWAC:	1.0 HRS
MAGTF FIRES:	1.0 HRS
INFORMATION OPNS/PA:	1.5 HRS
AVIATION PLANNING:	1.0 HRS
COUNTER IED:	1.5 HRS
JPRA:	1.0 HRS

DAY 4

NEGOTIATIONS:	1.0 HRS
LOGISTICS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS:	1.5 HRS
CPOF BRIEF:	0.5 HRS
DETAINEE OPERATIONS:	1.5 HRS
LINES OF OPERATION:	1.0 HRS
ASSESSMENT:	1.5 HRS

DAY 5 | CBAE | MA | RED CELL | COA DEV | COA WAR GAME | COA COMP/DSN | ORDERS DEV | TRANSITION

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Phase III: OPT / Orders Process

MSTP

Planning Book:
- Based on theater reference documents
- Allows MEF FWD to plan for MRX and real world operations
- Contains MEF FWD Force List & MNF-W Area of Operations

OPT / PPA:
- Start point: MEF directed exercise timeframe
  - Refined MAGTF organizational structure
    - Detailed MEF FWD Task organization and force lay down within MNF-W AO
    - MEF FWD and MSC steady state operations
    - ISF status (command relationships, partnering…)
    - MEF FWD CONOPs along MNC-I Lines of Operation

OPORD:
- Base order and designated annexes
- MEF FWD and MSC orders for MRX and real world planned operations
  - Identify subordinate commands writing orders
  - Identify deliverables from other agencies

MRX:
- STARTEX: MEF directed exercise timeframe
- Mission rehearsal of the steady state orders produced during the OPT / PPA
  - Refinement of COC operations and battle drills
  - OPT planning for projected future event (e.g. ISF battlespace, Overwatch to Al Asad)

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Phase IV: MRX Scenario

MSTP

- Based on MEF FWD Exercise Objectives and Training Goals
- Creates a plausible and credible context
- Consists of the total exercise Theater Environment
  - Strategic setting
  - Economic, Political, Religious, Military background
  - Usually a Road to Crisis, but this exercise involves an existing crisis
  - Intelligence estimates and summaries
  - OPFOR campaign plan
  - Orders, plans, directives
  - Modeling & Simulation and MSEL injects
  - Red and Blue Steady States (Snap shot in time from theater to replicate via Modeling & Simulation the same look and feel as real world reporting)

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MRX Lines of Operation

MSTP

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MRX Story Lines

MSTP

- Governance/Economic Development Storylines:
  - Contaminated Water Supply
    - ISF tie-in
  - Al Anbar Economic Conference
    - PRT / PRDC / GOI roles and responsibilities
    - AQ mayor
      - Cement / Phosphate Plants (AO Denver)
      - Western Al Anbar Railroad
      - AQ POE
  - Irrigation Project-Canal clearing
    - ISF tie-in (AO Raleigh)
  - Funding
    - Steady state MSELs
    - BBCCWGs (RAB & JARB)
- Transition Storylines:
- Iraqi Army (IA)
- Iraqi Police (IP)
- Department of Border Enforcement (DBE)
- Areas covered for each:
  - Operations
  - Pay
  - Leave
  - Equipment
  - Manning
  - TRA
  - FDO

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Economic & Governance LOOs

MSTP

- Stressed the importance of Economics and Governance LOOs
- Incorporated Role Players and PMESSI Cell from BCTP
- Scripted CMO MSEL scenario events in support of CG MRX exercise objectives and training goals
- Exercised CMO at RCT/BCT level
- Established weekly VTC dialogue with PRT in Ramadi
- Established the Al Anbar Economic Council Meeting with Provincial Governor, PRT, USAID, NGO Directors
- Followed the MRX with the Stability & Reconstruction Roundtable

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Stability & Economic Roundtable

MSTP

- **Dates: 1-2 Nov 06**
- **Location: Chapel Hill, NC**
- **Funded by: Department of Defense Business Transformation Agency**
- **Hosted by: Institute for Defense and Business (IDB)**
- **Training Objectives:**
  - **Build upon the successful efforts of I MEF FWD**
  - **Assess economic line of operation strategies, practices, and progress to date**
  - **Present the Al Anbar Province USAID Economic Development Plan**
  - **Share lessons learned with II MEF FWD CGs/Staffs prior to deployment**
  - **Identify regulatory, administrative, and financial impediments to effective prosecution of the economic line of operation**
  - **Present the II MEF FWD CGs/Staffs with information on the Iraqi Economy as well as economic approaches to economic development employing available support from the military, government, business, NGOs, PVOs, USAID, etc.**
  - **Establish inter-agency relationships with key officials and organizations**
  - **Develop specific action plans and re-define current plans**
  - **Establish reach back mechanisms for enabling support**

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MRX Story Lines

MSTP

- Security Storylines:
  - OPFOR Steady State
  - Tier 1 bridge & Log Convoys
  - T&FF training camp
  - Smuggling: Syrian / Saudi Border DBE tie-in
  - HVIs
    - MNC-I (SOF)
    - MNF-W
  - Quick Reaction Forces, W & E w/PR
  - IED Defeat Events
    - Convoy attacks
    - IED Factory
  - Multiple Personnel Recovery Events
  - Blue Steady State
    - Airspace management
    - Funding issues
    - Bridging / Road Repair
- Communicating Storylines:
- Info Ops
  - Proactive
- Public Affairs
  - F2F interviews
    - CG
    - DCGs
    - RCT Cdrs
    - MLG Cdr
    - ACE Cdr
    - Principal Staff Officers

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H&AHQ Role / ROE

MSTP

- H&AHQ simulated by GO Mentor and IMA Det (Reserve Officers augmented by Active Duty/Civilian members)
- H&AHQ **simulates** MNC-I Higher Headquarters
- MEF FWD MRX 06 H&AHQ Manning:
  - 31 IMA Det members, 1 Senior Mentor, 29 Contractors
  - 12 Air Force augments
  - 17 other augments
- H&AHQ Staff conducts research and guides training audience to the Planning Book and other resources for correct staff actions
- MEF FWD FWD and MNC-I provide LNOs to the H&AHQ Staff
- MRX Planning Book is key reference document

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MRX External Augmentation

MSTP

- AOG (USAF) 12
- USASMDC ARST 3
- SOCOM 4
- SOCJFCOM 2
- NSW 12
- CIA 1
- JFCOM 3
- SCETC 1
- TF MP 1
- Army Corps 14
- Army ID 5
- JPA / Media 1
- US Army PSYOP 4
- JPRA 3
- US Army BCTP 12
- BCTP Role Players 11
- TECOM 1
- NCR 1

Total Augmentation: 91

21

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Exercise Design Example

MSTP



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Phase V: AAR Example

MSTP

- **Event:** MNC-I FRAGO 07-010 tasked MNF-W to conduct a raid on an IED factory in Husaybah

- **Questions:**
  - What lessons were learned regarding integration of mission planning and fires between elements of MNF-W and the ISF?
  - How do we shape the information environment to enhance success in the CIED effort (predict / prevent / attack / investigate)?

Questions

MSTP

The road to success is always under construction!
WWW.MSTP.QUANTICO.USMC.MIL

GARY RUSSELL

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Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Preparing USG personnel for S&R Operations

Gary Russell
Deputy Director, Response Strategy and Resource Management
S/CRS
Integrated Civilian-Military Pre-Deployment Training Workshop
PKSOI
December 12-14, 2006

AGENDA

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- NSPD-44 MANDATE
- S/CRS TRAINING CYCLE
- CURRENT S/CRS TRAINING FOR S&R
- PREPARING THE RESPONDERS
- TRAINING CHALLENGES

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NSPD-44

Goal: "To promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance"

Targets of assistance: "foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife"

Implementation: Led by Secretary of State and delegated to S/CRS

NSPD-44
Management of Interagency Efforts
Concerning Reconstruction & Stabilization
December 7, 2005

UNCLASSIFIED

MAIN TRAINING ELEMENTS OF NSPD--44

- Lead USG development of strong civilian response capability
- Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations
- Harmonize military and civilian efforts
- Other agencies develop internal capabilities to respond to crises

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NSPD Plan Development: Organizational Structure



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NSPD—44
INTER-AGENCY PARTICIPATION, TIMELINE & DELIVERABLES

- 70+ Inter-Agency Representatives Participating
- Timeline:
  --July 20: Deputies NSPD Implementation Plan
  --Sept. 11: IA groups launched
  --March 2007: PCC review of IA proposals
- Deliverables:
  --Planning Framework
  --Operational Models
  --New Surge Mechanisms
  --Training Strategy
  --Equipment Strategy
  --Management Structure
  --Budget and Legislative Requirements

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S/CRS Mission:

- ***To lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity*** to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.

U.S. Department of State
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

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Stabilization & Reconstruction Deployment Training Elements/Cycle

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

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

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S/CRS COURSES

TARGET AUDIENCE: General USG personnel interested in S&R; NOT necessarily personnel preparing for imminent deployment

- 5 basic courses offered quarterly at no charge to Interagency participants since December 2005: S&R overview, planning, advanced planning, operations and IA coordination; new Sector Overview course piloted December 7-8, 2006

- Total of 250 USG personnel have participated in training from DoD (JFCOM, Joint Staff, OSD), USAID, State, Justice, Commerce, Treasury, DHS, and Labor

- New courses to be delivered starting in January 2007: Tools for Early Warning and Prevention; Pre-Deployment Mission Readiness; R&S Team Leadership and Management; Resource Management for R&S

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Training Requirements for Deploying Staff

- **DoS Active Response Corps (and Standby Corps): Only standing State owned group of rapid responders**
  - **U.S. Military and multinational exercises: CA Certain Trust, Green Team**
  - **Interagency Training-DART, OTI**
  - **Fieldcraft and security training: first aid, defensive driving**
  - **Foundational and Team Training: PM Tradecraft, GSO Training, S/CRS courses, country studies, language**
  - **Leadership and team building**
  - **Mission strategy**
- **Civilian Reserve (proposed): All above training +**
  - **USG Primer: Foreign Policy Structure and Decision-Making**
  - **Interagency, IO and NGO cultures**
  - **Code of Conduct/Ethics**

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CIVIL AFFAIRS CERTAIN TRUST
NOVEMBER 2006

PCRU
HEAT TRAINING
NOVEMBER 2006

TRAINING CHALLENGES

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- LOTS OF GOOD TRAINING THROUGHOUT USG BUT NOT WIDELY KNOWN
- LIMITED SLOTS AVAILABLE FOR OUTSIDE PARTICPANTS
- LIMITED TIME TO TRAIN; NOT VIEWED AS PRIORITY BY MANAGEMENT
- NOT ALL AGENCIES CREDIT TRAINING PROVIDED BY OTHERS
- TRAINING QUALITY VARIES GREATLY
- UNDERUTILIZATION OF DISTANCE LEARNING—COST-EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT

QUESTIONS???

For additional information, contact:

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

SA-3 Suite 7100

Main: 202-663-0323/0324;Fax 202-663-0327

www.crs.state.gov

TOM BALTAZAR

Interagency Training and Education

PKSOI Workshop on SSTR Training
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
December 13, 2006

Agenda

- Who We Are
- What We Do
- Pre-Deployment Training Initiatives

USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

USAID and National Security: The Third "D"

3Ds
Diplomacy
Defense
Development



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

U.S. Agency for International Development Regional Bureau Structure



Staff and Resources



Budget: FY 2007 budget request approximately $10 Billion – or 40% of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA)

A source of funding for development projects, but a more important source of development & technical expertise

USAID Org Chart



DCHA Organization



Office of Military Affairs (OMA)

Formalize DoD-USAID relationship

- DoD entry point / USAID outreach
- DoD/USAID planning and execution
  - Strategic, Operational, Tactical
- Officer exchange with Combatant Commands
- Subject Matter Experts
  - MRX
  - CTC
  - Home Station
  - Experimentation

OMA Illustrative Programming

- **Strategic:** Policy for role in GWOT, Joint Training and Education, COIN, SSTRO, AFRICOM
- **Operational:** 3-year Campaign Plan for Mandera Triangle; Exchange of officers w/ COCOMs; TSCTP; TSCMIS/COP Synchronization
- **Tactical:** Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF); Joint operations in Philippines; PRT

Changing the Way We Do Business

- Mission Responsibility vs. Washington Support
  - Push/Pull
- Mentorship vs. Pre-Deployment Training and Education
  - Time On Station
- Non-conflict vs. Development in Conflict
  - Adapted skill sets
  - Multiple Levels of Proficiency
- Explicit Role of Development in National Security
  - DoDD 3000.05
  - GWOT
  - COIN

★ Development in conflict is NOT "Development as Usual"

Pre-deployment Training

- Formalized and Institutionalized
  - Developed Framework (PRT and Mission Personnel)
  - Backstop 76: Crisis, Stabilization and Governance
  - Conflict Assessment and Management Toolkit
- Core Competencies:
  - Roles of Development, Diplomatic, and Defense Professionals in Conflict
  - Force Protection
    - DSAC, Blue-to-Green
    - Cultural Awareness
  - USAID
    - Organization and SOP in Iraq or Afghanistan
    - Conflict Assessment and Programming (Handbook)
    - Development and Reconstruction in Conflict

Pre-deployment Training (Cont'd)

  - DoD
    - Military Organization and Structure (country specific)
    - Military Decision Making Process
    - CERP
  - DoS
    - Organization and Structure
    - SOP
- Provide SME to military and other civilian training
  - Pre-deployment Training
- Reachback
- Lessons Learned
  - Retain 30 Days Upon Return
  - Feedback Into Training

Guidelines and Principles

- **Relevant**
- **Modular**
- **Seminar and Distributive**
- **Don't Reinvent the Wheel**
- **Adaptable to Various Audiences**
- **Leverage DoD Where/When Appropriate**
- **Key on Transferable Skills**
  - Interagency (National Security University, FSI, CCO, etc.)

Initiatives

- Standing Up of Pre-Deployment Training in USAID
- Blue-to-Green Training
- TCAF: Assessment and Programming for Conflict Mitigation
- Support to Military Pre-Deployment Training and Exercises
- Cultural Mapping (FSNs, Implementing Partners)
- Developing Joint Training and Education Program with USD/P&R
- Adapting Development Interventions and Tools to Conflict Situations

Contact Us
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington DC
Ronald Reagan Building
• (202) 712-5040

Annex D: National Security Presidential Directive 44

7007

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 7, 2005

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization

Introduction

The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.

Policy

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and

market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

Responsibilities of the Department of State

Need for Coordinated U.S. Efforts. To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.

Coordination. The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.

To achieve the objectives of this directive, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the following functions and may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization ("Coordinator") to assist the Secretary to:

(1) Develop and approve strategies, with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, for reconstruction and stabilization activities directed towards foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife;
(2) Ensure program and policy coordination among Departments and Agencies of the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, and other relevant assistance laws, as well as section 408 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and related Agencies and Appropriations Act, 2005, with respect to such states;
(3) Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts for those states and regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate;
(4) Provide United States Government decision makers with detailed options for an integrated United States Government response in connection with specific reconstruction and stabilization operations including to recommend when to establish a limited-time PCC-level group to focus on a country or region facing major reconstruction and stabilization challenges;
(5) Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases; develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine;
(6) Coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities and preventative strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities with capabilities that can contribute to such efforts provided that the Secretary of the Treasury shall lead coordination with the international financial institutions and multilateral financing bodies and shall facilitate the Secretary of State's stabilization and reconstruction work with respect to these institutions and bodies;
(7) As appropriate, work with people and organizations, including in expatriate and foreign communities, with relevant ties, expertise, or knowledge related to countries

in which the United States may conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities;

(8) Develop strategies to build partnership security capacity abroad and seek to maximize nongovernmental and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization activities;

(9) Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities; analyze, formulate, and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities to respond quickly and effectively;

(10) Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations;

(11) Resolve relevant policy, program, and funding disputes among United States Government Departments and Agencies with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, related to reconstruction and stabilization consistent with the Office of Management and Budget's budgetary and policy coordination functions; and

(12) When necessary, identify appropriate issues for resolution or action through the NSC interagency process in accordance with NSPD-1. Such issues would include the establishment of a PCC-level group as described in sub-paragraph (4) above.

Responsibilities of Other Executive Departments and Agencies

To enable the Secretary of State to carry out the responsibilities in this directive and to support stabilization and reconstruction activities and requirements with necessary resources, Executive Departments and Agencies whose programs and personnel may be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges will:

(1) Coordinate with S/CRS during budget formulation for relevant reconstruction and stabilization activities prior to submission to OMB and the Congress or as required to coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities;

(2) Identify, develop, and provide the Coordinator with relevant information on capabilities and assets;

(3) Identify and develop internal capabilities for planning and for resource and program management that can be mobilized in response to crises;

(4) Identify within each agency current and former civilian employees skilled in crisis response, including employees employed by contract, and establish under each agency's authorities mechanisms to reassign or reemploy skilled

personnel (including by contract) and mobilize associated resources rapidly in response to crises;

(5) Assist in identifying situations of concern, developing action and contingency plans, responding to crises that occur, assessing lessons learned, and undertaking other efforts and initiatives to ensure a coordinated U.S. response and effective international reconstruction and stabilization efforts;

(6) Designate appropriate senior United States Government officials and government experts as points of contact to participate in relevant task forces, planning processes, gaming exercises, training, after action reviews, and other essential tasks; and

(7) Make available personnel on a non-reimbursable basis, as appropriate and feasible, to work as part of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and develop plans for additional personnel exchanges, as appropriate, across departments and agencies to increase interoperability for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Coordination between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.

Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be re-designated as transitions are required.

Policy Coordination Committee

I hereby establish a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The PCC will be chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a designated member of the NSC staff. The PCC shall include representatives in accordance with NSPD-1.

Nothing in this directive shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals. In addition, this Directive is not intended to, and does not: (1) affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces of the United States; (2) affect the DNI's and D/CIA's authorities under title 50 of US Code; (3) affect the authority of the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance under Section 493 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; and, (4) create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, entities, instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

This directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 56, May 20, 1997, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations."

Annex E: Department of Defense Directive 3000.05

Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 3000.05

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations

References: (a) Sections 113 and 153 of title 10, United States Code
(b) Strategic Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2006-2011, March 2004[1]
(c) DoD Directive 1322.18, "Military Training," September 3, 2004
(d) DoD Directive 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements," June 30, 1998

1. PURPOSE

This Directive:

1.1. Provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop. Future DoD policy will address these areas and provide guidance on the security, transition, and reconstruction operations components of SSTR operations and DoD's role in each.

1.2. Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (a) and the guidance and responsibilities assigned in reference (b).

1.3. Supersedes any conflicting portions of existing DoD issuances. Such instances shall be identified to the office of primary responsibility for this Directive as listed at web site *http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives*.

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all

[1] The Strategic Planning Guidance is classified. For access to the document contact the Director, Executive Services, refer to document control number OSD 75774-04.

other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Stability Operations. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

3.2. Military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. Stability operations tasks include helping:

4.3.1. Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment;

4.3.2. Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and

4.3.3. Develop representative governmental institutions.

4.4. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations. Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations (hereafter referred to as "International Organizations"), U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations (hereafter referred to as "NGOs"), and private sector individuals and for-profit companies (hereafter referred to as "Private Sector").

4.5. Military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool. The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams.

4.5.1. Their functions shall include ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

4.5.2. Participation in such teams shall be open to representatives from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector with relevant skills and expertise.

4.6. Assistance and advice shall be provided to and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.

4.7. The Department of Defense shall develop greater means to help build other countries' security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere.

4.8. Military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be:

4.8.1. Exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed (i.e., tested by use of exercise opposition role playing) with other U.S. Departments and Agencies.

4.8.2. Integrated with U.S. Government plans for stabilization and reconstruction and developed when lawful and consistent with security requirements and the Secretary of Defense's guidance, in coordination with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

4.9. The Department of Defense shall support indigenous persons or groups – political, religious, educational, and media – promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy, who oppose extremism and the murder of civilians.

4.10. DoD intelligence efforts shall be designed to provide the optimal mix of capabilities to meet stability operations requirements, taking into account other priorities.

4.11. Stability operations skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels.

4.12. Information shall be shared with U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and the members of the Private Sector supporting stability operations, consistent with legal requirements.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.1.1. Develop stability operations policy options for the Secretary of Defense.

5.1.2. Coordinate DoD relations with the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (hereafter referred to as "S/CRS") or any successor organization.

5.1.3. Represent the Secretary of Defense in discussions on stability operations policy and strategy with other U.S. Departments and Agencies, including S/CRS, foreign governments, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.1.4. Identify DoD-wide stability operations capabilities and recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense.

5.1.5. Submit a semiannual stability operations report to the Secretary of Defense, developed in coordination with responsible DoD Components. This report shall:

5.1.5.1. Identify tasks necessary to ensure the Department of Defense implements the responsibilities prescribed in this Directive; and

5.1.5.2. Evaluate the Department of Defense's progress in implementing this Directive using the measures of effectiveness directed herein.

5.1.6. Develop a list of countries and areas with the potential for U.S. military engagement in stability operations in consultation with relevant DoD Components and U.S. Departments and Agencies. This list shall be submitted semiannually to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.1.7. Ensure stability operations are incorporated into the strategic policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans the Secretary of Defense provides to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to Section 153 of reference (a).

5.1.8. Create a stability operations center to coordinate stability operations research, education and training, and lessons-learned.

5.1.9. Develop a process to facilitate information sharing for stability operations among the DoD Components, and relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector while adequately protecting classified information and intelligence sources and methods, in coordination with relevant DoD and non-DoD entities (such as the Director of National Intelligence).

5.1.10. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.1.6. through 5.1.9.

5.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) shall:

5.2.1. Ensure DoD intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are developed to support stability operations, in coordination with relevant U.S. Government intelligence entities and DoD Components.

5.2.2. Ensure the availability of suitable intelligence and counterintelligence resources for stability operations, including the ability to rapidly stimulate intelligence gathering and assign appropriately skilled intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to such missions.

5.2.3. Support the Combatant Commanders' development of intelligence support plans and intelligence campaign plans, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.2.4. Ensure intelligence career paths attract and retain the quantity and quality of skilled intelligence personnel required for stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).

5.2.5. Coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the relevant Combatant Commanders, and members of the U.S. intelligence community to ensure the effective use and employment of intelligence activities and resources in stability operations.

5.2.6. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.2.1. through 5.2.5., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall:

5.3.1. Identify personnel and training requirements for stability operations and evaluate DoD progress in developing forces to meet those requirements, according to DoD Directive 1322.18 (reference (c)).

5.3.2. Develop a joint and combined stability operation training policy that promotes interoperability with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security

forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.3.3. Develop methods to recruit, select, and assign current and former DoD personnel with relevant skills for service in stability operations assignments, and recommend necessary changes to laws, authorities, and regulations related thereto.

5.3.4. Develop opportunities for DoD personnel to contribute or develop stability operations skills by:

5.3.4.1. Undertaking tours of duty in other U.S. Departments and Agencies, International Organizations, and NGOs;

5.3.4.2. Participating in non-DoD education and training programs relevant to stability operations; and

5.3.4.3. Learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including long-term immersion in foreign societies.

5.3.5. Develop opportunities for personnel from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International Organizations, and NGOs to participate, as appropriate, in DoD training related to stability operations.

5.3.6. Identify personnel with skills required to support intelligence campaign plans, in coordination with the USD(I) and the Combatant Commanders.

5.3.7. Ensure DoD medical personnel and capabilities are prepared to meet military and civilian health requirements in stability operations.

5.3.8. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.3.1. through 5.3.7., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) shall:

5.4.1. Ensure research, development, and acquisition programs provide the Department of Defense with robust stability operations capabilities compatible with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, and International Organizations.

5.4.2. Streamline acquisition processes for science, technology, and products used in stability operations by encouraging acquisition planning and the training of DoD personnel in rapid acquisition processes.

5.4.3. Ensure stability operations capabilities are a key focus of the Defense Science and Technology planning, programming, and budgeting process, including the ability to identify pre-

conflict indicators of instability and collect information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships, and non-military security forces.

5.4.4. Ensure logistics support policies, procedures, and products are in place to support stability operations.

5.4.5. Identify technologies available through the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, and off-the-shelf Private Sector programs that could bolster U.S. stability operations capabilities and direct those technologies into rapid demonstration, experimentation, and fielding.

5.4.6. Ensure oversight of contracts in stability operations and ensure U.S. commanders deployed in foreign countries are able to secure contract support rapidly.

5.4.7. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.4.1. through 5.4.6., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.5. The Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller shall:

5.5.1. Ensure the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process addresses resource requirements for stability operations

5.5.2. Institutionalize procedures to achieve rapid distribution of funding, goods, and services, with appropriate accountability safeguards, by U.S. commanders deployed in foreign countries in support of stability operations.

5.5.3. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.5.1. and 5.5.2., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.6. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs shall:

5.6.1. Ensure Defense Information School activities support stability operations training and education for DoD public affairs professionals.

5.6.2. Design and articulate DoD visual information requirements to support stability operations.

5.6.3. Ensure American Forces Information Service activities support stability operations.

5.6.4. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.6.1. through 5.6.3., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration shall:

5.7.1. Ensure effective information exchange and communications among the DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector involved in stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(AT&L).

5.7.2. Develop processes that shorten the acquisition period for communications capabilities, including in-country indigenous capabilities, in coordination with the USD(AT&L).

5.7.3. Assist the USD(AT&L) in nominating science and technologies for information exchange and communications that support stability operations into rapid demonstration, experiment, and fielding.

5.7.4. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.7.1. through 5.7.3., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.8. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.8.1. Identify stability operations capabilities and assess their development.

5.8.2. Develop stability operations joint doctrine in consultation with relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.8.3. Support the USD(P) and appropriate U.S. Departments and Agencies through participation in U.S. Government and multinational stability operations planning processes.

5.8.4. Provide annual training guidance that addresses stability operations capabilities and analyze training results.

5.8.5. Develop curricula at joint military education and individual training venues for the conduct and support of stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

5.8.6. Ensure instructors and students from other U.S. Departments and Agencies are able to attend DoD schools to receive or provide instruction on stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P&R).

5.8.7. Ensure that U.S. Armed Forces have the training, structure, processes, and doctrine necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

5.8.8. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.8.1. through 5.8.7. and report on force readiness for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P).

5.9. The Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.9.1. Designate an appropriate military officer as the Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations to ensure proper emphasis is given to preparing for stability operations. The Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations shall:

5.9.1.1. Identify stability operations requirements.

5.9.1.2. Incorporate stability operations into military training, exercises, and planning, including intelligence campaign plans and intelligence support plans.

5.9.1.3. Engage relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercising, as appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(P).

5.9.2. Conduct intelligence campaign planning for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(I). These intelligence campaign plans shall be tested and shall include, at a minimum:

5.9.2.1. Information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships, non-military security forces, infrastructure, sanitation and health structure, munitions facilities, border controls, and customs processes.

5.9.2.2. Requirements for the order of battle, open source data, and numbers of personnel with appropriate language and cultural skills and proficiency levels.

5.9.2.3. Means to meet these requirements by specifying particular national and DoD intelligence capabilities.

5.9.3. Submit stability operations ideas and issues to Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), for further exploration as part of the joint experimentation program.

5.9.4. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.9.1. through 5.9.3., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.10. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.10.1. Explore new stability operations concepts and capabilities as part of the joint concept development and experimentation program, in coordination with the USD(P) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.10.2. Develop organizational and operational concepts for the military-civilian teams described in paragraph 4.5. including their composition, manning, and sourcing, in coordination with relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.10.3. Establish, design, and conduct experiments to identify innovative ideas for stability operations, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(P), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.10.4. Support Combatant Commander stability operations training and ensure forces assigned to USJFCOM are trained for stability operations.

5.10.5. Gather and disseminate lessons-learned from stability operations.

5.10.6. Participate in the Defense Science and Technology planning process to ensure stability operations requirements are supported by Defense Technology Objectives and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). Recommend sponsors for ACTDs as appropriate.

5.10.7. Participate in the Defense Operational Test and Evaluation planning process to ensure stability operations requirements are supported by Joint Test and Evaluations (JT&Es) programs. Recommend sponsors for JT&Es as appropriate.

5.10.8. Develop Joint Public Affairs capabilities for stability operations.

5.10.9. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.10.1. through 5.10.8., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.11. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(P), shall each:

5.11.1. Appoint a senior officer to lead stability operations initiatives.

5.11.2. Develop stability operations capabilities.

5.11.3. Ensure curricula in individual and unit training programs and service schools prepare personnel for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P&R) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.11.4. Ensure Foreign Area Officer, Enlisted Regional Specialist, Civil Affairs, Military Police, Engineer, and Psychological Operations programs develop the quantity and quality of personnel needed for stability operations.

5.11.5. Support stability operations joint concept development, experimentation, and capability development.

5.11.6. Ensure research, development, and acquisition programs address stability operations capabilities and are integrated, in coordination with the USD(AT&L).

5.11.7. Support interagency requests for personnel and assistance to bolster the capabilities of U.S. Departments and Agencies to prepare for and conduct stability operations as appropriate, in coordination with the USD(P).

5.11.8. Ensure Public Affairs programs effectively support stability operations.

5.11.9. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.11.1. through 5.11.8., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.12. The Heads of the DoD Components with responsibilities assigned in this Directive shall provide semiannual reports to the USD(P) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the relevant measures of effectiveness identified in this Directive.

6. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

The reporting requirements in this Directive have been assigned a Report Control Symbol DD-POL(SA)2207 according to DoD 8910.1-M (reference (d)).

7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

Gordon England ACTING

Annex F: Acronyms

ACT	Advanced Civilian Team
AAR	After Action Review
AFRICOM	US Africa Command
APOD	Air port of debarkation
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CFLCC	Coalitional (or Combined) Force Land Component Commander
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMO	Civil Military Operations
COE	Contemporary Operational Environment
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
C2	Command and Control
C4	Command, Control, Communication and Computers
DART	Disaster Assistance Team
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSAC	Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Course
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
EUCOM	US European Command
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOB	Forward operating base
FORSCOM	US Forces Command
FSI	Foreign Services Institute
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FTX	Field training exercise
GWOT	Global war on terrorism
HN	Host nation
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crest Societies
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMC	International Medical Corps
IO	International organization
IPB	Intelligence preparation of the battlefield

IPOA	International Peace Operations Association
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Forces Assistance
JFCOM	US Joint Forces Command
JFLCC	Joint Forces Land Component Command
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental Multinational
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JSOU	US Joint Special Operations University
JTF	Joint Task Force
LNO	Liaison officers
LOOs	Lines of Operation
MAGTF	US Marine Air Ground Task Force
MCDA	Military and Civilian Defense Assets
MEF	US Marine Expeditionary Force
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MiTT	Military Training Team
MNF	Multi-national force
MRX	Mission Rehearsal Exercise
MSEL	Master Scenario Event List
MSTP	US Marine Corps MAGTAF Staff Training Program
NDU	National Defense University
NGO	Non-government organization
NSPD-44	National Security Presidential Directive-44
OG	Operations group
OG-COE	Operations group – Contemporary operational environment
OMA	USAID Office of Military Affairs
OPFOR	Opposing forces
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense
OPSEC	Operational Security
PKSOI	Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	Private Security Company
PSYOPS	Physiological operations
PS&RO	Peacekeeping, Stability and Reconstruction Operations
R&SO	Reconstruction and Stability Operations
RTI	Research Triangle Institute
S/CRS	DoS Office of Coordination for Reconstruction and Stability
SF	Special Forces
SME	Subject matter expert
SOCOM	US Special Operations Command
SOP	Standard operating procedures
SOSO	Stability Operations and Support Operations
SPOD	Seaport of debarkation
S&R	Stability and Reconstruction
SSTRO	Security, Stabilization, Transition, Reconstruction Operations
STX	Situational Training Exercise

TCAF	Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework
UCMJ	Uniformed Code of Military Justice
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VTC	Video teleconference
WFX	War Fighting Exercise