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Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges

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About the Programs

IPA's Security–Development Nexus Program aims to contribute to a better understanding of the linkages between security and development strategies in conflict management. Through its research projects, conferences and publications, the program seeks to make concrete recommendations to the UN system and the broader international community for more effective strategies, policies and programs in achieving sustainable peace and development.

WSP International (formerly the War-torn Societies Project) contributes to the recovery and strengthening of societies emerging from conflict by bringing together a diverse group of local actors to set priorities, build consensus and formulate responses to the needs identified, underpinned by participatory action research. This process is supported by bilateral and multilateral agencies.

The Peacebuilding Forum is a year-long process initiated by WSP International which examines the critical relationship between internal and external actors as they respond to the challenges of consolidating peace and rebuilding in countries after war. Experience has shown that sustainable peace requires the legitimacy that only local responsibility and ownership can bring. The recommendations put forward by the Forum thus seek to define a better balance between external partnerships and national ownership of peacebuilding strategies and activities.

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Executive Summary

- A full decade after it became a high-profile international commitment, post-conflict peacebuilding remains a fragile undertaking with mixed results. While there is little doubt that peacebuilding will continue to require international attention, the lessons of the last ten years do not add up to a successful record.
- Along with preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, peacebuilding was identified as one of a series of instruments in the UN's toolkit to respond to conflicts at the end of the Cold War. Originally, peacebuilding referred to action to identify and support structures to consolidate peace in *post-conflict countries* in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. In the 1990s the concept became more expansive, combining conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. Today, peacebuilding is no longer an exact term; it often needs the qualifier "post-conflict" peacebuilding to refer primarily to the non-military or civilian dimensions of international efforts to support countries emerging from conflict—even though it might accompany or succeed military operations. Despite over ten years of practice, there is no commonly agreed post-conflict peacebuilding policy or doctrine.
- Many international actors responded to the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding by creating designated units, new policy instruments and special funding mechanisms. While these innovations were important, they did not translate into significant policy changes, institutional reforms or funding arrangements. Even though many agencies within the UN system and in donor governments are now involved in post-conflict activities, peacebuilding remains an institutional orphan without a home. It straddles different departments, agencies and units.
- During the 1990s, peacebuilding was seen as an international necessity and responsibility. It represented a collective commitment by the United Nations and other international actors to redress sources of violent conflicts in conflict-torn societies while preparing the grounds for sustainable peace and development. Grounded in "liberal internationalism," peacebuilding was seen as going beyond state centric conceptions of *realpolitik* or the interests of any single country, bloc or entity even though national interests of member states inevitably influenced the nature of the international response.
- In the course of its implementation, post-conflict peacebuilding ran into multiple political, institutional and operational challenges. Many of these were a function of the difficulties of rebuilding societies torn apart by war. Others derived from the built-in limitations, contradictions, shortcomings and failures of international policies and institutions. Nonetheless, international peacebuilding expanded in significant ways. There is a growing body of knowledge about its basic principles and operational prerequisites. There even is an impressive catalogue of lessons learned (as well as lessons spurned). Yet the results of over ten years of peacebuilding policy and practice have been ad hoc, tentative and uneven.
- One of the persistent obstacles to more effective peacebuilding outcomes is the chronic inability of international actors to adapt their assistance to the political dynamics of the war-torn societies they seek to support. The internal-external disconnect manifests itself at the conceptual, policy, operational and institutional levels. Unless significant modifications are made to the existing models of collaboration between internal and external actors by addressing the politics of peacebuilding, international efforts will continue to fall short of their declared goals of enabling war-torn societies to get on the path to sustainable peace and development.
- More fundamentally, the favorable international environment within which peacebuilding flourished in the 1990s has changed dramatically after 9/11 and the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The post-Cold War international consensus has largely dissipated—leaving in

its place a deeply divided international community which does not have the appropriate institutions or the necessary political will to forge a new consensus about international priorities. It is increasingly recognized that *An Agenda for Peace*, *An Agenda for Development* and the Millennium Development Goals (which collectively defined the aspirations of the post-Cold War international community) no longer remain at the nucleus of the UN system. The UN itself falls short of representing the collective will of the international community.

- Since 9/11, peacebuilding has increasingly been taken over by a new discourse on “nation-building,” “regime change,” and “stabilization and reconstruction,” which is predicated on the necessity of securing the stability of weak or failing states to avoid the negative external fallout from state failure. Such a formulation, driven primarily by external concerns, is likely to undermine the basic premise of peacebuilding that peace, security and stability cannot be imposed from the outside but need to be nurtured internally through patient, flexible, responsive strategies that are in tune with domestic political realities.
- The persistence of intra-state and civil conflicts in different regions, the breakdown of peace processes, the relapse of a number of countries into violent conflict, and the emergence of new conflicts ensure that the demand for post-conflict peacebuilding will continue unabated in the coming years and decades—despite its multiple shortcomings and weaknesses. As an organization of member states, the United Nations cannot afford to ignore the national security interests of its powerful member states which have come to the forefront of the international agenda since 9/11. Nor can it ignore its responsibility to the needs of its most vulnerable members, including post-conflict countries.
- Great expectations are placed on the forthcoming report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which has been tasked by the UN Secretary-General to propose ways of enhancing multilateral efforts to address global problems. It is anticipated that the Panel will urge the UN to renew its commitment to conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding, combining the UN’s twin agendas for peace and development. If UN member states agree that peacebuilding is too important an enterprise to give up, they face a dual challenge. They need to learn from and further improve upon the innovative but modest gains made to date. Equally important, they need to resist the slippery slope of allowing post-conflict peacebuilding to be replaced by the post 9/11 stabilization agenda of certain powerful states.

I. Introduction

The Cartigny meeting of the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) in late 1994 raised a question that had been gaining attention since the end of the Cold War: How can external actors, working collectively, best assist countries emerging from violent conflict and war? Throughout the Cold War, the United Nations and the broader international community had confined their efforts in conflict contexts primarily to humanitarian relief, peacemaking and peacekeeping activities. They were not prepared to deal with the multiple and complex challenges of post-conflict reconstruction as various violent conflicts wound down in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Namibia, Nicaragua, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique were harbingers of a new era whereby external actors would be asked to play active roles in assisting countries emerging from conflict.

Participants to the Cartigny meeting identified a catalogue of issues requiring serious attention and pointed to the “dearth of data and research on the whole peace-rehabilitation-development continuum.”¹ A decade after the Cartigny meeting, post-conflict peacebuilding has become an international growth industry. More than a dozen international peace operations have been mounted since Namibia. The number and range of external actors involved in post-conflict peacebuilding have increased manifold. The literature on peacebuilding has grown exponentially.² The field of post-conflict peacebuilding has come very far both in theory and in practice in the last decade.

Yet the record of peacebuilding is at best mixed, and two nagging questions confront analysts and practitioners alike: Why is it that after more than ten years of practice, the international peacebuilding project is still experimental, amorphous and tenuous in nature? And how can the knowledge and experience gained to date be better put to use to achieve more effective peacebuilding outcomes?

This study is designed to address these questions at a macro or systemic level as part of the Peacebuilding

Forum launched by WSP International. Other studies commissioned by the Peacebuilding Forum focus more specifically on thematic or country-level answers. It is hoped that, collectively, they will lead to a better understanding of the persistent systemic, political, institutional and operational obstacles that confront post-conflict peacebuilding and suggest ways of overcoming them.

The paper has two inter-related theses. The first is that international peacebuilding has several inherent weaknesses that do not lend themselves to easy solutions. One of these, which also is the core concern of the WSP International/IPA Peacebuilding Forum Conference, is the perennial difficulty faced by external actors in aligning their efforts and interests to the domestic political realities of the war-torn societies they seek to support. The second thesis is that while peacebuilding policies and practices have advanced significantly in the last decade, the environment within which peacebuilding flourished in the 1990s has dramatically changed after 9/11. Thus, the advances that were achieved during a brief and experimental decade did not have a chance to be consolidated sufficiently before they were overtaken by other international priorities.

As the paper demonstrates, addressing complex political, institutional, policy or operational challenges in an international environment favorable to post-conflict peacebuilding is difficult enough. Addressing them in an international environment characterized by deep cleavages, lack of consensus on the threats to international peace and security, and ongoing wars involving major states presents overwhelming challenges to the entire peacebuilding project. The paper argues that there is considerable room for the United Nations and the international community at large to improve peacebuilding policy and practice. However, it also warns that the post-conflict peacebuilding project is at risk of being overtaken by other agendas which have emerged in the post 9/11 environment, including the attempt to conflate peacebuilding with the narrowly-cast national security agendas of powerful member states.

II. The Emergence of Peacebuilding

The term peacebuilding entered the international lexicon in 1992 when UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined it in *An Agenda for Peace* as post-conflict “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.”³ Since then, peacebuilding has become a catchall concept, encompassing multiple (and at times contradictory) perspectives and agendas. It is indiscriminately used to refer to preventive diplomacy, preventive development, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.⁴

This paper focuses on the original definition of peacebuilding.⁵ More specifically, *it examines non-military interventions by external actors to help war-torn societies not only to avoid a relapse into conflict, but more importantly, to establish the conditions for sustainable peace.* The time frame for the peacebuilding interventions covered in this paper is not confined to the immediate, short-term, post-conflict peace operations to consolidate the peace or the early reconstruction efforts of the early post-war years. Rather, post-conflict peacebuilding encompasses the full range of non-military commitments undertaken by the international community to assist countries to achieve self-sustaining peace and socio-economic development. Despite its deliberate narrow focus, the paper traces the gradual broadening of the concept of peacebuilding by key international actors and its implications for peacebuilding practice.⁶

While the term peacebuilding is relatively new, external assistance for post-war rebuilding goes back to the reconstruction of post-World War II Europe and Japan. What was new in Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s formulation, and what caught the world’s attention, was a realization that the end of the Cold War opened new possibilities for international action.⁷ Traditionally, states intervened in the affairs of other states as part of their foreign policy. Where *realpolitik* permitted, intervention was undisguised and forceful. Where *realpolitik* blocked action, the United Nations and other multilateral institutions were paralyzed to act collectively.

The promise of the new peacebuilding agenda was that the international community would intervene collectively—as a “third party”—to help resolve violent conflicts and civil wars, and that external actors would actively support the process of rebuilding in the affected countries without the shadow of Cold War politics or to suit the narrow national interests of individual states. In other words, what was being promised was unlike earlier generations of imperialist, colonialist, or other self-serving external interventions even though in an international system based on states, it was recognized that state interests shaped their international policies.

The impetus for peacebuilding came from multiple sources but found its strongest expression at the United Nations. Throughout the 1990s, the UN provided both the rationale and the operational principles for post-conflict peacebuilding.⁸ *An Agenda for Peace* introduced post-conflict peacebuilding as one of a series of tools at the UN’s disposal alongside preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Distinguishing between these tools, it stated: “Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”⁹

An Agenda for Peace stimulated significant new thinking and policy development within and outside the UN. The 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, for example, noted the linkages between conflict prevention and peacebuilding: “Demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development can be as valuable in preventing conflict

as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred.” It also acknowledged that implementing peacebuilding could be complicated—requiring “integrated action and delicate dealings between the United Nations and the parties to the conflict in respect of which peacebuilding activities are to be undertaken.”¹⁰

The Supplement distinguished between the UN’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding roles: “Most of the activities that together constitute peace-building fall within the mandates of the various programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system with responsibilities in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields. In a country ruined by war, resumption of such activities may initially have to be entrusted to, or at least coordinated by, a multifunctional peace-keeping operation, but as that operation succeeds in restoring normal conditions, the programmes, funds, offices and agencies can re-establish themselves and gradually take over responsibility from the peace-keepers, with the resident coordinator in due course assuming the coordination functions temporarily entrusted to the special representative of the Secretary-General.”¹¹

An Agenda for Peace, its *Supplement*, and *An Agenda for Development* informed the UN’s approach to peacebuilding throughout the 1990s. However, practice quickly outpaced policy. For much of the 1990s, the UN responded to peacebuilding primarily as an extension of its peacekeeping operations as many UN programs and agencies became involved in a variety of civilian activities. After 1989, there were more than a dozen UN peace operations with civilian components. In the complex conflicts of the 1990s where the boundaries between war making and peace making were blurred, peacekeeping and peacebuilding became closely interlinked.¹²

By August 2000, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (otherwise known as the Brahimi Report) fully acknowledged these linkages. Accordingly, the Panel recommended various specific peacebuilding tools and strategies in peace operations, including the adoption of quick impact projects (QIPs), the creation of a fund for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), the adoption of a “doctrinal

shift” away from international civilian policing to “rule of law teams” in complex peace operations, the establishment of a pilot Peacebuilding Unit, and regularized funding for the Electoral Affairs Division.¹³

In calling for an action plan to implement the Brahimi Report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged better synchronization of effort: “The plan must help to identify the ways in which different parts of the system might properly work together to devise country-specific peace-building strategies and to implement them together, in the context of the country team. Arrangements for peacebuilding must be coherent, flexible and field-driven, mobilizing all relevant resources of the United Nations system and other international actors in support of national initiatives, and building or reorienting ongoing activities so that they contribute to peace. What is required is a headquarters capacity to provide those resources necessary for the country team to propose specific strategies and see them through. This capacity must help to identify best practices and lessons to be learned from within the system, provide knowledge of discussions and debates on peace-building from external institutions and organizations and formulate system-wide guidelines and generic methodologies.”¹⁴

As the number of crises on the Security Council’s agenda increased, the Council as well as the Secretary-General began to acknowledge the limitations of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. As a result, they began to turn to conflict prevention to complement the UN’s broader peacebuilding agenda. By early 2001, conflict prevention and peacebuilding were being used interchangeably at the UN.¹⁵

In short, between 1992–2001, the UN moved from a linear view of the transition from war to peace in the post-Cold War era to an integrated approach to conflict prevention, conflict management, and peacebuilding. It came to view peacebuilding as requiring the full range of its capacities (military, political, humanitarian, human rights, and socio-economic) at the policy and operational levels. The UN also realized that peacebuilding involved the active engagement of many external actors with multiple mandates and capacities. As the Security Council

gradually assumed an expanded role beyond immediate crisis management, the UN's peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions became increasingly intertwined.¹⁶ As Sir Brian Urquhart recently noted: "In the twentieth century war was pronounced, belatedly, to be too important to be left to the generals; in the twenty-first century peace, prosperity, and security have already turned out to be much too complex to be left to the politicians. In a dangerous, high-speed, information-logged, globalized world, disastrously divided between the prosperous and the impoverished, the old distinctions between war and peace, civil and military, national and international, private and public, have become increasingly blurred."¹⁷ Peacebuilding came to capture the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of the challenges facing the United Nations.

III. Normative Underpinnings of Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding was part of a larger, activist post-Cold War international agenda.¹⁸ Throughout the 1990s, there was a gradual elaboration of an expanded normative framework for international affairs under the UN umbrella. In the early part of the decade, a series of international conferences sought to generate a global agenda on issues ranging from population and sustainable development to human rights and gender. These conferences served to underline the importance of multilateral approaches to addressing global problems and affirmed the role of the United Nations as an important instrument of global governance. The Millennium Declaration was a culmination of these processes and provided a global plan of action to deal with the world's most persistent problems.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the Security Council saw an expansion of the issues brought before it as threats to international peace and security. These included human rights abuses, protection of civilians in war, small arms, and the role of natural resources in armed conflict—issues that had traditionally been viewed as falling within the sovereign domain of member states. Breaking away from its tradition of dealing with individual crises, the Council passed a number of thematic resolutions on human rights, small arms, and children and armed

conflict. Subsequent Council resolutions were drafted to take into account these international commitments. In line with its new interest in human security, the Security Council devoted an increasing proportion of its work to crises in Africa.²⁰

In tandem with developments at the United Nations, several governmental and non-governmental actors championed various issues that came to be subsumed under the new "human security" agenda. The campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, to regulate small arms and light weapons, and to establish an international criminal court were part of the emerging international commitment to human security. The landmines campaign and the call for an international criminal court led to new international treaties.

Alongside these advances, the 1990s witnessed intense (albeit localized) conflicts and humanitarian crises which led to growing international appeals for "humanitarian intervention" in sovereign states, causing considerable unease among the UN's member states. Although the United Nations refrained from dealing with it formally, the report published by the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) entitled *Responsibility to Protect* was ground breaking in offering a normative framework for humanitarian interventions.²¹

The injunction against intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states came under even greater pressure as conflict prevention emerged as a new international priority. Collectively, conflict prevention, humanitarian interventions, and post-conflict peacebuilding became parts of an activist international agenda. Over the course of the 1990s, the conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding agendas came to be seen as two sides of the same coin, especially in countries that had already experienced conflict. Given the exceptionally high rate of recidivism of countries that had experienced conflict, post-conflict peacebuilding became a strategy for conflict prevention.

It was argued that fundamental "re-engineering" of conflict prone societies was essential to prevent their

relapse into conflict. External actors began to develop a peacebuilding template and a package of standard remedies to be applied in different contexts. Security needed to be established through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants as well as through security sector reform. Political consolidation required national dialogues, early elections, the expansion of political rights, and the establishment of rule of law. Economic reconstruction involved reforms for speedy recovery and rehabilitation. International strategies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding increasingly converged, becoming part of what has come to be known as “liberal internationalism.”²²

The international approach to peacebuilding and conflict prevention is grounded in the concept of “liberal peace” which derives from a long tradition of Western liberal theory and practice.²³ The liberal peace thesis views political and economic liberalization as effective antidotes to violent conflicts. Thus, promotion of human rights, democracy, elections, constitutionalism, rule of law, property rights, good governance, and neo-liberal economics have become part and parcel of the international peacebuilding strategy.²⁴ Liberal internationalism is interventionist in nature. Going beyond assisting individual countries emerging from war, it promotes a normative agenda. This, of course, stands in stark contrast with the widely declared principle that peacebuilding ultimately requires the establishment of a non-violent political authority which can legitimately guide a country’s post-conflict reconstruction on its own terms. The shortcomings of international peacebuilding will be discussed in Section VII. Nonetheless, it needs to be recognized that this normative framework has firmly underpinned peacebuilding practice since the 1990s.

IV. International Responses to Peacebuilding

In the last decade, many external actors became actively involved in post-conflict peacebuilding. The following review will focus on approaches by governments and inter-governmental actors to underscore the highly political nature of peacebuilding interventions.

In any society emerging from conflict, the establishment of a legitimate political authority that can provide security, avoid a relapse into violent conflict and undertake longer-term socio-economic reconstruction efforts lies at the heart of peacebuilding. Other initiatives at the societal or micro-level are important components that can complement but not substitute for the need for a political strategy for peacebuilding on the part of external actors.²⁵

Yet, the picture of international peacebuilding strategies pursued throughout the 1990s is one of ad hoc, piecemeal, and fragmented responses by a multitude of actors without an overall political framework or an institutional base. Many crises in the last decade involved combined humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. While humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts had institutional homes, peacebuilding was (and still remains) an institutional orphan.²⁶ Straddling the various political, military and development agencies and departments in international organizations and donor governments, peacebuilding found temporary and tenuous shelter under the roof of development agencies.²⁷

Given the great variation in the approaches of different governments and international organizations, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive and accurate picture of the evolution of international peacebuilding policy and practice across the full spectrum of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies involved in post-conflict peacebuilding. The discussion below briefly highlights three important areas that illustrate external responses to peacebuilding: institutional innovations, policy development, and resource mobilization.

Institutional Innovations

In the early 1990s, post-conflict reconstruction was seen as a temporary stage in the unilinear transition from war to peace and considered as part of the “relief-to-development” continuum. Thus, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-torn societies became a subspecialty within the broader development agenda.²⁸ The expectation was that international responses to conflicts would be sequential in nature, with various actors playing different roles in assisting in the transi-

tion from war to peace. The special needs of societies emerging from conflict were seen to require hybrid approaches drawn from the flexible, rapid and responsive strategies of humanitarian operations, and the long-term vision of development assistance. As then Vice President of External Affairs of the World Bank (and current administrator of UNDP) Mark Malloch Brown indicated: “Post-conflict development is something that defies the exact boundaries of traditional forms of assistance: it is neither sustainable development nor is it humanitarian response.”²⁹

Viewing peacebuilding as a temporary phase, development agencies initially responded by creating specialized and designated units to address the institutional and programming void between humanitarian assistance and development aid.³⁰ These units had narrowly defined responsibilities and designated budgets to address immediate and short-term priorities. Nonetheless, they were instrumental in designing and implementing new “peacebuilding” programs, projects and activities that fell outside conventional humanitarian or development assistance. De-mining, DDR, election monitoring, and civilian policing became new areas of programming for development actors.

For example, USAID created the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in 1994. The mandate of OTI was to support the triple transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, from violent conflict to peace and from political crisis to stability. It sought to serve as a catalyst for political change by seizing on windows of opportunity to shape conditions on the ground. Similarly, in the UK the Department for International Development (DFID) created the Conflict and Human Affairs Department (CHAD) in 1997 to help reduce the incidence and impact of violent conflicts and to promote effective responses for conflict prevention, conflict management, and humanitarian assistance. CHAD was mandated with developing policy and providing advice and support in non-conventional areas for development assistance.

Several smaller countries also played an important role in pioneering novel institutional and policy initiatives. For example, in Canada, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and Diane Marleau, Minister for International Cooperation, announced the Canadian

Peacebuilding Initiative in October 1996, which defined peacebuilding as a short-term activity, “a life-line” thrown to countries emerging from conflict. As a result, a Peacebuilding Fund was created (to be jointly managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian aid agency, CIDA) to serve as a catalyst to stimulate local sustainable initiatives toward peace while strengthening Canadian capacities to support peacebuilding. CIDA created its Peacebuilding Unit with its counterpart Peacebuilding Program in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the lead on peacebuilding through its Directorate of Crisis Management and Humanitarian Assistance (DCH), which was established in 1996. DCH sought to dismantle the compartmentalization of emergency relief and the political aspects of crisis management, and to integrate various policy options—political, humanitarian, developmental, economic, and military—into a coherent response to crises, potential violent conflicts and post-conflict peacebuilding. To ensure such integration, the Directorate reported to both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation.

In tandem with changes in donor capitals, inter-governmental organizations responded to the challenge of post-conflict peacebuilding by seeking new directions from their governing boards to initiate new programming and create designated units. In 1995, UNDP established its Emergency Response Division (ERD) and allocated five percent of its core budget to assist countries in special development situations. The World Bank created its Post-Conflict Unit in July 1997. In other words, there was a gradual recognition that post-conflict peacebuilding required special attention within conventional development agencies with primary responsibility for socio-economic development, but without the expertise or mandates for the critical political and security dimensions of peacebuilding.

Confined largely to small, designated units and an equally small cadre of dedicated staff, peacebuilding basically remained outside the mainstream of the operations of development agencies. Despite repeated commitments to “mainstreaming” peacebuilding,

development agencies found it difficult to integrate peacebuilding into their core mandates. While many agencies gained a better understanding of the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding, their capacity to translate those into their operations were severely constrained by institutional politics, human resource shortages, and competing priorities. Inconsistent policy directions at the governmental level also constrained the role of post-conflict peacebuilding units.

Policy Development

Creating designated units with special mandates for conflict management enabled governments and agencies to respond to immediate needs for transitional assistance. But these ad hoc responses could not serve as a substitute for clear policy development which required multi-dimensional responses.

Mirroring the policy evolution at the United Nations, throughout the 1990s, many governments expanded their definition of peacebuilding in light of domestic policy imperatives, institutional considerations, and the complexity of conflict dynamics on the ground. Conflict management, conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding gradually became interchangeable policy priorities. The merging of multiple agendas greatly militated against clear policy formulation. As a result, despite over ten years of practice in working in post-conflict countries, governments that are actively engaged in peacebuilding still do not have clear, consistent, and well-articulated policies on post-conflict peacebuilding. Instead, there are general calls for “policy coherence” across issue areas, pleas for “whole-of-government” approaches, and increased mechanisms for policy coordination. These, however, do not add up to a strategic peacebuilding doctrine or policy framework.

For example, the recently completed *Utstein Evaluation Study of Peacebuilding* by Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK (which constitute the Utstein-4 countries) offers the following conclusion:

“Apart from the shared goals, two common strands emerge from the summaries of policy evolution [in the four countries]... The first is that no U4 country

has what any of the research teams was prepared to characterize without reservation as ‘a policy’ on peacebuilding—in three cases the policies were deduced from a variety of sources, and in the fourth a policy (or a strategy) is in draft form. The second is that in the U4 as in other donor countries, a major role in peacebuilding is played by the part of the government responsible for development cooperation.”³¹

Despite the lack of a clear peacebuilding policy or doctrine, donor governments undertook many initiatives both individually and collectively throughout the 1990s. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) played a critical role in documenting individual donor innovations and spearheaded collective responses.³² The DAC considered the issue of conflict, peace and development cooperation at a High Level Meeting in May 1995, which set up the Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. The Task Force completed its *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* in 1997. The Guidelines offered a useful conceptual framework for donors’ work on conflict, and offered practical and operational approaches to development cooperation in conflict situations. However, reflecting policy challenges in capitals, the OECD DAC situated post-conflict peacebuilding within a larger policy framework linking conflict and development. The DAC Guidelines were elaborated in 2001 to address conflict prevention and today constitute a robust and comprehensive framework for donor approaches to conflict.³³ Perhaps the most significant contribution of the Guidelines to peacebuilding doctrine is its emphasis on the need for coherence across donor policies, including trade, finance, investments, foreign affairs, defense and development cooperation.

Paralleling the work of the OECD DAC, a network of the conflict, transition and emergency units of multilateral and bilateral organizations has been in existence since 1997. Bringing together more than thirty units with operational responsibilities for post-conflict peacebuilding, the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Network has sought to strengthen peacebuilding practice and inter-agency collaboration in applying the DAC guidelines. However, as its name indicates, the group also had to extend its

mandate to include conflict prevention in line with changing policy priorities. The CPR Donors' Network has served to promote operational coordination, knowledge-sharing, improved effectiveness and innovation of CPR programming, the development of practical tools and lessons learned as well as their application in the field.³⁴

Resource Mobilization

One of the important yardsticks for gauging the international commitment to post-conflict peacebuilding is the scale of financial resources mobilized across agencies, governments and international organizations. Paradoxically, in an area where quantification is technically possible, there is insufficient and highly fragmented information about the total costs of post-conflict peacebuilding in the last decade. Part of the difficulty derives from the fact that governments and agencies define peacebuilding differently. Moreover, with multiple departments and agencies involved in post-conflict peacebuilding, it is difficult to reconstruct the aggregate financial burdens of peacebuilding. On the other hand, in integrated peacekeeping-peacebuilding missions where more accurate figures are available, disaggregating between military and civilian costs of international assistance has proved to be problematic.³⁵

One rough method of calculating total expenditures on peacebuilding would be to tally up the cost of designated peacebuilding projects as a portion of development assistance in specific countries. Indeed, the *Utstein Evaluation Studies* attempt to trace financial allocations for peacebuilding. Even then, definitional issues militate against gaining an accurate understanding of financial commitments at the level of the donor or the recipient countries.³⁶ It is clear, however, that there is a significant gap between policy commitments, programming innovations and the financial resources available for post-conflict peacebuilding.³⁷ Some governments (like Norway) responded to this challenge by identifying resources for transitional assistance beyond long-term development assistance and short-term humanitarian aid. Other governments created special funding facilities. These include the Office of Transition Initiative (OTI) at USAID, the Stability Fund in the Netherlands, and the

Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Program in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Canadian CIDA respectively. Still other governments, like the UK, pooled resources from across government departments for the expanded peacebuilding agenda. More recently, individual governments have been receptive to pooling their resources for post-conflict reconstruction under Trust Funds.³⁸

Equally important has been the changing response of the World Bank and the IMF to investing in post-conflict reconstruction. Both the World Bank and IMF were reluctant latecomers to post-conflict peacebuilding. Ironically, the World Bank was initially created in 1944 to serve as a bank for reconstruction. Over time it defined its role primarily as a development agency, even when it occasionally found itself working in post-conflict countries, and undertook infrastructure reconstruction projects. Clinging to its formal mandate that precludes it from playing a "political" role, the World Bank was hesitant to get involved in peacebuilding. Nonetheless, the Bank could not remain immune to the international peacebuilding agenda. The Bank's lending in post-conflict countries rose significantly in the 1990s, providing support for the provision of social safety nets, coordination of aid, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, mine clearance, reintegration of displaced populations, and rehabilitation of infrastructure.³⁹ In July 1997, the Bank created a Post Conflict Unit. Subsequently renamed the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, the CPR Unit has participated as an observer on the DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development and the CPR Network. The Bank has also developed its own conflict analysis framework for screening Bank projects, and has actively sought CPR Network support to advance peacebuilding more broadly in the Bank's economically inclined agenda.

The IMF was even more hesitant than the Bank in getting involved in post-conflict reconstruction. Given its fairly surgical and short-term interventions to stabilize balance of payments problems, the IMF did not consider itself well placed to engage in post-conflict peacebuilding. However, in 1995 the IMF introduced a new financing instrument for post-conflict countries and has been providing technical assistance through expertise and aid to its members in

several areas, including institution building.⁴⁰ Importantly, a representative from the IMF has attended the DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development and the CPR Network routinely and actively engaged in its deliberations.⁴¹

V. Operational Principles of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

The previous review sought to demonstrate that key bilateral and multilateral actors approached post-conflict peacebuilding from multiple perspectives without a common definition or “doctrine” of peacebuilding. Nonetheless, peacebuilding interventions since the early 1990s have begun to exhibit certain common characteristics with the result that practice has come to substitute for doctrine.⁴²

A review of practice throughout the 1990s reveals a set of operational principles that can be said to constitute a shared “post-conflict peacebuilding paradigm.” These are worth highlighting:

- **Peacebuilding is a Multi-Dimensional Enterprise with Several Pillars:** While various actors define these pillars differently, there is consensus that peacebuilding has political, social, economic, security and legal dimensions, each of which requires attention. Distinguishing it from conventional development, peacebuilding is understood to be a highly political project involving the creation of a legitimate political authority that can avoid the resurgence of violence.
- **Security is Key:** Establishing security is considered the pre-requisite for post-conflict peacebuilding.
- **Hierarchy of Priorities:** While peacebuilding is a multi-faceted process requiring holistic approaches, it needs to be guided by a hierarchy of priorities established in response to the specific needs and political dynamics in a given context. Establishing such a hierarchy requires an overall political strategy.
- **Ownership:** The people of the war-torn society must own the reconstruction process. They must

actively be involved in setting the agenda and leading the process, which is a highly political process complicated by the deep wounds of the conflict.

- **External Actors:** Given the fragility of societies emerging from war, support from external actors is critical for post-conflict reconstruction. Yet, external assistance is never neutral. External actors come to post-conflict peacebuilding with multiple agendas and motivations—which are not necessarily compatible with or driven by the political realities on the ground. Proper mechanisms need to be established to ensure that external and internal actors work within a coherent strategy, establish priorities, and mobilize the necessary resources.
- **Capacity Building:** A commitment to local capacity building from the earliest stages is vital for sustainability.
- **Time Element:** Time has two dimensions in post-conflict reconstruction. Timely, opportunistic and quick-impact interventions are critical in influencing peacebuilding outcomes. However, reconstruction itself is a long-term process, that may take a generation to bear fruit. Rapid response is necessary but not sufficient for success.
- **Funding:** Adequate, predictable and flexible funding is essential to support post-conflict reconstruction. Appropriate funding mechanisms are indispensable to have impact on the ground in a timely manner.
- **Response Levels:** Post-conflict reconstruction involves appropriate responses at the local, national, regional and international levels.
- **Accountability:** Given the high stakes in post-conflict environments, the commitment to “do no harm” while supporting peacebuilding is an essential principle.⁴³

The growing consensus on these operational principles attests to the fact that post-conflict peacebuilding has evolved significantly as a field of practice in the last

decade—with impressive learning and adaptation on the part of key actors. Underpinning these principles is the explicit recognition that external actors need to play an important but primarily catalytic role in post-conflict peacebuilding, which is a long-term, homegrown and political process.

While recognizing the need to anchor their efforts in the target countries, throughout the 1990s external actors invested their energies, activities and resources in enhancing their own guidelines, capacities, operations, and institutional arrangements as well as compiling serial lessons learned from their operations. How has this collective learning translated into peacebuilding outcomes on the ground? What have been the results of more than a decade of experimentation, learning, and practice in post-conflict peacebuilding?

VI. From Practice to Results: Reviewing the Record

Four important trends need to be considered in reviewing the record of post-conflict peacebuilding. First, although the number of violent conflicts has been on a downward trend since the end of the Cold War, there is strong evidence of recidivism in many post-conflict countries, as witnessed in Eritrea-Ethiopia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Haiti.⁴⁴ Longitudinal research undertaken by Collier and colleagues indicate that there is almost a forty-four percent risk of a country reaching the end of a conflict to return to conflict within five years.⁴⁵

Second, the end of war does not necessarily translate into peacebuilding. In numerous countries where peace agreements have held without a relapse into conflict beyond the critical period, the structural factors lying at the source of the original conflict remain unaddressed and continue to fester. From Cambodia and Guatemala to East Timor, serious issues related to land tenure, property rights, rule of law, political participation and transitional justice continue to pose serious challenges to peace consolidation and peacebuilding. Conflict prevention literature points to these structural factors as potential seeds of future wars.⁴⁶ In other post-conflict countries such as El

Salvador or South Africa where political violence has been curtailed, there is strong evidence of the mutation of political violence into criminal and common violence. In other cases, such as the West African region with multiple conflict-torn countries, the curtailment of violence in one country has had “ballooning effects” as violence has been exported to neighboring countries. In other words, the end of the political violence has not led to peacebuilding.

Third, even in cases where peace has held beyond the initial post-conflict phase as in Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Kosovo, the need for the continued presence of international peacekeepers has shed serious doubt about the long-term viability of the post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in these contexts.

Fourth, if peacebuilding is designed to bridge the transition from humanitarian relief to a country’s return to a conventional development trajectory, the unchanging status of most post-conflict countries at the bottom rungs of various development indices cannot be ignored. These trends are not encouraging in terms of the longer term prospects of countries emerging from conflict. However, they do not necessarily provide the basis for assessing the success of international peacebuilding efforts. For that, there is need for evaluation of external peacebuilding interventions.

Evaluating Peacebuilding

Rigorous, systematic and comparative peacebuilding evaluations at the country level remain an underdeveloped area.⁴⁷

There are good reasons why it is difficult to evaluate peacebuilding, which is a long-term process that does not readily lend itself to causal analysis.⁴⁸ Moreover, there is little consensus about the definition or the ultimate goals of peacebuilding with the result that analysts differ amongst themselves in evaluating peacebuilding outcomes. In the absence of a reliable body of peacebuilding evaluations at the country level, the following review is based upon two complementary bodies of literature. The first is the broader academic literature dealing with civil wars, conflict resolution, peacemaking, peace implementation, and post-conflict

reconstruction. The second is the operational evaluations undertaken or commissioned by external actors of their own peacebuilding programs, projects and activities.⁴⁹ Although these two bodies of work employ different methodologies and approaches, when viewed together, they provide useful insights into the peacebuilding efforts since the 1990s.

The academic literature is both diverse and open-ended. Researchers approach peacebuilding from divergent perspectives. Many analysts focus more on the peacemaking, peace implementation and early post-conflict phases where the international role is more dominant and the policy implications for international actors in greater demand. There are fewer studies employing a longer-term perspective on post-conflict peacebuilding and fewer cases of longer-term peacebuilding to study.

Despite the definitional and methodological variations among them, there is a critical mass of country-based research, which allows some comparative perspective on what the international community has attempted in the last decade and a comparative assessment of outcomes. Some researchers take a minimalist approach in evaluating peacebuilding, defining it as the avoidance of a return to violence; others adopt a maximalist approach by searching for evidence of structural transformation of the economic, social and political factors that had led to war in the first place. Still others take an instrumentalist approach by identifying promising short-term changes underpinning the peace, which can contribute to more sustainable societal transformation in the long run. However, there is no common framework that allows for a systematic examination of the different dimensions of peacebuilding: political, security, economic and psychosocial. Most studies grapple with the problem of how to account for environmental factors (such as the existence of spoilers, the role of regional neighbors, and the nature of war economies) that heavily affect peacebuilding outcomes while assessing the impact of external interventions. There is no easy solution to this challenge.

Research Findings

In the absence of a common evaluation framework, this paper draws upon findings from several multi-country studies to compare their assessment of

peacebuilding outcomes based primarily on the political/security aspects of peacebuilding. The shortcomings of the economic benefits of peacebuilding in terms of a return to a sustainable development course is easier to ascertain through a comparative review of the development indicators of post-conflict countries and is therefore not covered below. However, it is also recognized that many conflict-torn countries originally start with very low development indicators. Thus, the vicious cycle between conflict and underdevelopment remains a perennial issue.

One of the most comprehensive studies of international peacebuilding is the seminal work by Doyle and Sambanis entitled “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis.” Using an extensive data set of 124 post-World War II civil wars, the study examines a range of international interventions ranging from monitoring missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In other words, like many other similar studies, it does not differentiate between the peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding roles of the international actors. The study finds that multilateral enforcement operations are usually successful in ending the violence and that there is a positive correlation between UN peacekeeping operations and democratization processes after civil wars. However, even using their lenient criteria of success in terms of war termination, many post-Cold War civil wars covered by Doyle and Sambanis are considered failures.⁵⁰

Taking a narrower definition of peacebuilding, in his recent book entitled *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, Roland Paris examined eleven case studies. Focusing narrowly on two dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding (namely political and economic liberalization), Paris sought to identify whether political and economic liberalization strategies promoted by the international community contributed in any discernible way to the resurgence of fighting or to ameliorating the conditions that had led to war. His conclusion is that the record is quite mixed: “In most of the eleven cases, the process of political liberalization, or economic liberalization, or both, produced destabilizing side effects that worked against the

consolidation of peace. In some countries, liberalization exacerbated societal tensions; and in others it reproduced traditional sources of violence. The approach to peacebuilding that prevailed in the 1990s was, it seems, based on overtly optimistic assumptions about the effects of democratization and marketization in the immediate aftermath of civil war.”⁵¹

Similarly, in a forthcoming study entitled *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq*, a sequel to their earlier study entitled *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, James Dobbins and colleagues reviewed sixteen cases of “nation-building” since 1945.⁵² In their study, “nation-building” corresponds to the UN’s terminology for combined peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations. They define it as the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin rapid and fundamental societal transformation. In other words, “nation-building” involves multi-dimensional peace operations, including civilian tasks such as stabilizing the security environment, building the state’s military and police forces, overseeing humanitarian relief efforts, providing administrative support to government ministries, overseeing a transition to democracy, and improving economic growth and stability.⁵³

Defining success broadly as the ability to establish a stable and enduring democratic political system, these two companion studies examined several quantitative and qualitative indicators of success in the selected countries. These included the number of combat-related casualties suffered by the mission, return rates of refugees and internally displaced persons, type of political system that evolved, and economic growth rates. On the two key criteria—of enduring peace and democratic development—the study concludes that among the sixteen cases studied in their comparative studies of UN- and US-led nation-building operations, five are not at peace today.⁵⁴ The authors recognize that objective judgments are more difficult on democratic development; however, using Freedom House and University of Maryland Polity Project ratings, they conclude that eleven out of sixteen cases studied remain democratic.⁵⁵

Thus, using the relatively macro-level criteria of a holding peace and transition to competitive politics,

the conclusions from these multi-country studies demonstrate that peacebuilding has a mixed track record.

These findings parallel the results of a study by Michael Lund which provides a useful summary of the conclusions drawn by six different sets of studies on the effectiveness of international efforts in building peace in seventeen post-conflict countries.⁵⁶ According to Lund:

“Though they differ in rating some of the missions, these several studies sort out successes from failures quite consistently. Except for a few like Cambodia where differing interpretations are given, there is considerable agreement about those countries where some minimum notion of negative peace has been achieved and where it has not. Post-conflict peacebuilding has produced positive results in some places, but as many or more have been ‘failures.’ Thus, peacebuilding effectiveness in terms of the absence of violence is not a yes or no matter. Quite different outcomes resulted from different cases, and success and failure each showed some gradations. That the overall picture is quite mixed, even on the most uncontested peacebuilding criterion of ending the threat of major violence, is an important finding.”⁵⁷

Combined with the longer-term trends outlined above, the conclusions of these comparative case studies are sobering and point to a need to examine the factors that have militated against effective peacebuilding outcomes.

VII. Challenges to Effective Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

The existing body of literature sheds light on two sets of questions to explain the mixed record of international peacebuilding. The first deals with the policies, strategies, and approaches employed by external actors to determine whether these were appropriate to the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding. In other words: *Did the international community do the right thing?* The second relates to the effective implementation of international policies, strategies and

approaches. In other words: *Did the international community do peacebuilding right?*

These are different sets of issues and need corrective action at different levels. Nonetheless, they both impact upon the effectiveness of peacebuilding as demonstrated by policy relevant research. Academic studies generally examine broader systemic or political factors while operational evaluations tend to focus on implementation issues.

Systemic and Structural Issues

Research on conflict and peacebuilding reveals that although the international community places great importance on “getting it right” at the country level, there are important political and systemic issues that affect peacebuilding outcomes. Five such issues deserve particular attention.

International peacebuilding, despite its lofty aspirations, is a political undertaking which is ultimately dependent upon the political will and commitment of national governments. Thus, the first determining factor is inevitably the level and nature of support provided by member states.⁵⁸

The second relates to the difficulty of “de-linking” post-conflict reconstruction in any given country from its regional environment. Regional conflict formations and their implications for post-conflict peacebuilding have become one of the most promising areas of policy research. It is increasingly recognized that focusing narrowly on country-level peacebuilding efforts is unlikely to yield significant changes in peacebuilding outcomes—especially in regions where conflicts have interlocking political, security and economic dynamics. Yet, international approaches to peacebuilding remain almost exclusively at the country level.⁵⁹

A third systemic issue relates to the availability and deployment of necessary financial resources for post-conflict reconstruction in a timely manner. This is a difficult policy area since it requires a radical re-thinking of existing funding sources and mechanisms for post-conflict reconstruction.⁶⁰ As mentioned above, multilateral and bilateral donors have initiated innovative ways of dealing with the funding challenge

through designated post-conflict peacebuilding funding mechanisms, Conflict Pools, and multi-donor trust funds.⁶¹ However, with the exception of strategically important countries (such as Bosnia), analysts note the inadequacy of both the absolute amounts of aid as well as the mechanisms through which aid is disbursed.⁶² A strong body of research demonstrates that without timely, sustained, and well-targeted resources, external support to post-conflict peacebuilding is unlikely to make a significant difference on the ground.⁶³ While high levels of aid are not a guarantee of success, the inadequacy of aid condemns post-conflict peacebuilding efforts to tinkering on the margins.⁶⁴

A fourth systemic issue relates to the viability of country-based peacebuilding strategies de-linked from broader trends in a globalized world economy. For example, there is growing evidence that the failure to address international trade in conflict goods helps to sustain criminal economic networks in post-conflict contexts, thereby significantly reducing the impact of in-country peacebuilding strategies.⁶⁵ Similarly, the steady global trade in small arms and light weapons compounds the difficulties of country-based DDR strategies. Analysts note that international support for post-conflict peacebuilding needs to be strengthened through greater coherence across various policy areas at the global level. These include trade, aid, private investment, disarmament and arms control, human rights and natural resource management.⁶⁶ Bilateral and multilateral donors increasingly recognize the interconnections between different policies and have begun to call for “linked-up” or “whole-of-government” strategies such as the three Ds (defense, diplomacy, development) in Canada, the Utstein principles, and Sweden’s recently-released “Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development.”

Finally, institutional architecture issues affect the success of peacebuilding. As already noted, there are diverse actors at the governmental and inter-governmental levels involved in peacebuilding without an effective mechanism for better alignment of their collective efforts. Despite its pioneering role in promoting peacebuilding, the United Nations remains poorly organized to deal with the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding. The relations between the

Security Council and ECOSOC (the UN's key organs with responsibility for security and socio-economic issues respectively), are dysfunctional and counter-productive.⁶⁷ Similarly, notwithstanding many efforts at internal re-organization, the three departments within the UN Secretariat—DPA, DPKO and OCHA—face ongoing difficulties coordinating their respective peacebuilding operations. The creation of the Executive Committee for Peace and Security (ECPS) is a step in the right direction. However, it does not go far enough in promoting policy coherence and coordination within the UN family, including the UN's various funds and programs and the Bretton Woods institutions—each of which has a different governing board and mandate.⁶⁸

Policy Orthodoxy

The suitability of externally promoted policies for post-conflict peacebuilding has attracted considerable research attention. As noted, peacebuilding has a liberal normative orientation. When applied to post-conflict contexts, the peacebuilding “template” has come to include concrete programs and projects such as civil society promotion, multi-party elections, constitutionalism, rule of law, human and minority rights, gender equality, good governance through transparency and accountability, economic liberalization, and security sector reform. These policies are considered as part of an overall package that is coherent and mutually reinforcing. There is growing evidence that a liberal peacebuilding package might be fundamentally ill suited for post-conflict contexts.⁶⁹

The most radical critics of the liberal peacebuilding agenda challenge the assumption that civil wars and political violence are an aberration which can be redressed through the use of appropriate tools and instruments. These analysts see contemporary civil wars as natural products of aggressive globalization, which simultaneously creates wealth and stability for some and instability and violence for others in an interconnected global system.⁷⁰ Although quite uncompromising, this analysis deserves consideration at a time when civil wars are rarely confined within states, and the role of transnational networks in promoting and perpetuating local wars is increasingly recognized.

Other analysts challenge the appropriateness of liberal strategies in dealing specifically with the needs of post-conflict countries. There are different strands to this line of criticism. For example, a seminal study by James Boyce and colleagues on post-conflict economic strategies in El Salvador demonstrated that conventional economic reform packages are inappropriate and counterproductive in post conflict contexts. Boyce and colleagues argued that during the post-conflict transition, the goals of economic policy cannot be limited to macroeconomic stabilization and conventional structural adjustment—which are the mainstay of liberal economic policy. Instead, economic policy must also promote the adjustment toward peace. These require policies that mobilize resources for the peace process and financing the immediate costs of peace while addressing the longer-term relationship among economic growth, income distribution, and the consolidation of peace.⁷¹

This early study has been reinforced by a major research project undertaken by the Development Research Group at the World Bank on the economic costs and consequences of civil wars. In a recent book entitled *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, Paul Collier and colleagues argue that well-chosen policies can reduce the global incidence of civil war, provided that they are appropriate to different conflict contexts and take country-specific characteristics into account.⁷² They propose different economic strategies for four different types of conflict contexts: conflict prevention in successful developers; marginalized countries at peace; ending conflicts and reducing post-conflict risks. Noting that post-conflict countries are a small but a particularly difficult subset, they maintain that the international community can significantly reduce the risk of renewed conflict in these countries by implementing a set of policies that are relatively “straightforward to implement.” These include more targeted strategies for economic growth, better sequencing of development assistance, and greater integration of economic policies with political and military strategies (including disarmament and demobilization, engagement of diasporas, political reform and external military presence.) Their study supports the liberal economic reform agenda, but

argues that in post conflict contexts the scope for rapid reforms requires that it be limited to two or three policies with rapid payoffs. It further suggests that the relative importance of macroeconomic, social and structural reform is quite different in post-conflict settings, with social policy taking precedence over macroeconomic policy.⁷³

The policy recommendations promoted by Collier and colleagues have been strongly opposed on various grounds. The most persistent criticism is that this body of research reduces civil wars and conflicts to their essential economic elements, which are then found to be amenable to policy fixes by international actors. While this is true, Collier's powerful critique of conventional macroeconomic policies in post-conflict contexts merits recognition. Indeed, early research by de Soto and del Castillo warned precisely against the counterproductive disconnect between the conventional macro economic policies pursued by the Bretton Woods institutions and the political strategies promoted by the UN in El Salvador.⁷⁴

Overall, economic policies for post-conflict peacebuilding remain poorly understood and designed. Theories of economic development, dating to the decolonization period of the early 1950s and 1960s, are largely out-of-step with the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era. The contradictions between the reform and reconstruction agendas are not sufficiently acknowledged, with the result that reform strategies are promoted without close attention to the challenges of reconstruction.⁷⁵ Based on a growing understanding of the economic dynamics of contemporary civil wars, there is a new wave of studies that are beginning to examine alternative economic and social policies for post-conflict peacebuilding. These focus on such issues as employment, livelihoods and social policies targeted to special groups including economic spoilers, returnees and displaced populations and de-mobilized soldiers.⁷⁶

Despite its shortcomings, economic liberalism remains the dominant paradigm for international peacebuilding assistance. However, the creation of the Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) project at the World Bank, the recognition of "difficult partnerships" by the

OECD DAC, and the numerous countries-at-risk studies produced by donor agencies are important steps in reshaping donor policies.⁷⁷ One of the few studies that focuses primarily on the role of national actors (communities, the private sectors and states) in contributing to broad based, anti-poverty recovery and growth after conflict is Tony Addison's book entitled *From Conflict to Recovery in Africa*.⁷⁸

The uneasy fit between externally driven policies and fragile conditions in post-conflict countries becomes even sharper when examining external support for political liberalization. There is a rich and growing literature on democracy assistance.⁷⁹ These studies point to several important features of donor-driven democracy assistance programs, which have direct peacebuilding implications. Donor programs in democracy assistance are generally skewed in favor of boiler plate favorites such as elections, human rights promotion and media development—which do not necessarily correspond to local needs. Moreover, the donor preference for time-bound projects is at odds with the need for building and nurturing sustainable domestic political processes. Evaluation studies increasingly demonstrate that the success of democratization processes in post-conflict societies depends more on domestic/regional factors (such as political power structures, socio-economic conditions, historical experiences, leadership and regional neighborhood) than on donor-led democracy assistance models. Some analysts also note that donor pressure for democratization in post-conflict countries risk jeopardizing fragile peace processes and thus pose serious threats to peacebuilding.⁸⁰

In his aforementioned book, Paris makes a similar argument. According to Paris, economic and political liberalization are particularly ill suited and counter-productive in post-conflict peacebuilding since they promote economic and political competition at a difficult and fragile phase. Instead, Paris recommends a gradual and controlled peacebuilding strategy, which he calls "Institutionalization Before Liberalization." Along with a growing body of literature on state-building, Paris supports the establishment of domestic institutions that are capable of managing the transition from war while avoiding the destabilizing effects of democratization and marketization.⁸¹

The critique of donor approaches to economic and political liberalization is echoed in other studies that examine discrete aspects of the post-conflict governance programs promoted by the international community in other areas such as security sector reform and rule of law. These studies draw attention to the tensions and contradictions that exist between different policy prescriptions, as well as the inability of external actors to tailor these to concrete contexts. It is argued that external actors follow a narrow template that is often divorced from domestic political realities. While there is little consensus among analysts about the most appropriate policy options, there is strong agreement that ultimately local political processes and institutions should play an important role in shaping the design, implementation and outcomes of policy choices.⁸²

Policy Implementation

The above review drew attention to some of the built-in contradictions and limitations of current international approaches to peacebuilding. The effectiveness of peacebuilding policies also depends greatly on their implementation. The United Nations, donor governments, regional organizations, international NGOs and other international actors have individually and collectively started to document “Policy Guidelines,” “Lessons Learned,” and “Best Practices” in peacebuilding. These include sectoral studies on key components of the new peacebuilding agenda such as peace implementation and peace enforcement; truth and reconciliation; gender and peacebuilding; governance and participation. They also include operational lessons on inter-agency collaboration and coordination, institutional and individual skills development and training, new funding mechanisms, timing of interventions and exit strategies.⁸³

These evaluation studies provide valuable lessons on implementation of peacebuilding programs and projects across agencies and contexts. These generally relate to the design, delivery and monitoring of peacebuilding on the part of external actors.⁸⁴ Many commissioned studies are internally-focused—seeking ways of improving the performance of client agencies themselves through internal improvements related to recruitment, training, deployment of funds, program

design and management, and monitoring and evaluation.⁸⁵ Among these studies, a series of papers produced by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University for the June 2004 meeting in Copenhagen on Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities deserves special attention.⁸⁶ These papers not only examine the nagging problems in the civilian dimensions of peacebuilding practice by external actors, but they provide practical and far-reaching recommendations for improving the capacities of international actors.

Although salutary, the continued focus of external actors on their own activities, capacities and mechanisms tends to overshadow the more pressing need to strengthen the capacities of domestic actors. Ultimately, the transfer of power, resources and capacities to local actors defines the effectiveness of peacebuilding on the ground. Indeed, many evaluation studies readily acknowledge this but shy away from offering ways of addressing it. Basically, there are several persistent problems in the implementation of peacebuilding policies and programs:

- Donors channel their support in the form of time-bound projects without a strategic framework and long-term commitment to peacebuilding.
- Despite lip service paid to local ownership, there is a disconnect between external priorities and programs and national processes and priorities.
- External actors consistently neglect institution and capacity building, which are recognized as central to peacebuilding.
- In the absence of a strategic peacebuilding framework, external interventions are uncoordinated, fragmented, and incoherent.

In a nutshell, external actors approach peacebuilding as a short-term, time-bound, project-based enterprise, even while acknowledging that peacebuilding is a long-term, home-grown, multi-dimensional process. As one study notes: “Although the quick fix might be unavoidable in humanitarian assistance, it should not be applied in peace-building. The dominant approach to peace-building should therefore be re-examined and

reframed. This entails coming up with a framework that fosters not only local ownership but builds on local capacities, and takes a more process-oriented approach to create endogenous political capacity to cope with future violent conflict. Furthermore, it asks for priority setting of certain programmes under the guidance of a clear peace-building strategy.”⁸⁷

It concludes: “This void in international policy making asks for a systematic assessment of international assistance to post-conflict societies in order to identify the critical factors that contribute to the success of institutions that help to foster sustainable peace. Such factors may include the role of local and external actors and the question of ownership of the peace process, the commitment of local stakeholders to the establishment of political arrangements for managing conflicting interests and the presence of well-organized civil society and independent media organizations that can serve as ‘watchdogs’ for the behaviour of local, regional and national (governmental) institutions.”⁸⁸

VIII.Challenges to Consolidating Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

The above analysis highlighted the multiple problems that continue to bedevil peacebuilding more than a decade since its inception. These derive largely from the policy, institutional, operational and resource issues specific to the design and implementation of peacebuilding assistance. However, peacebuilding faces another set of challenges related to the broader international context, which also deserves serious attention.

International peacebuilding emerged at a special point in history when the ending of bloc politics created opportunities for multilateral cooperation to address violent conflicts around the world. Although never divorced from state interests, peacebuilding represented a collective international project. It is not evident that the international commitment to the expanded peacebuilding project will outlive the serious political cleavages and challenges that have emerged on the international stage in the wake of 9/11, and especially after the war in Iraq.

The international commitment to post-conflict peacebuilding is under threat from three main sources. The first relates to the heightened urgency of security threats posed by terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the new arms race among states. When confronted with “hard” threats to their national interests, states inevitably re-order their priorities, diplomatic energies and financial resources. To the extent that certain conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq are seen as national security issues, they will continue to attract external assistance motivated largely by the geo-strategic and security interests of powerful external actors. Other peacebuilding needs, as in the Sudan, Burundi and the DRC, are therefore relegated to “second tier” international concerns-attracting limited political attention and resources despite their urgency and gravity.

There is a second, and in the long run perhaps more corrosive, threat to the entire international peacebuilding enterprise. Post-conflict peacebuilding rested on the premise that physical security, political stability, social reconciliation, and economic reconstruction are integrated elements of a domestically owned enterprise in which external actors need to play a supportive role. The necessity of internal ownership was firmly accepted by international actors, although this paper demonstrated the serious shortcomings in achieving that goal.

Since 9/11, peacebuilding has been conflated with a new discourse of “nation-building,” “regime change,” and “stabilization and reconstruction” which is predicated on the necessity of forcefully securing the stability of weak or failing states to avoid the negative fall-out from state failure. Such a formulation, driven primarily by external concerns, is likely to undermine the basic agreement that peace, security and stability cannot be imposed from outside but need to be nurtured internally through patient, flexible, responsive strategies that are in tune with domestic realities.

The post 9/11 “stabilization” agenda is cast in the same terms as the peacebuilding agenda of the early 1990s, with a call for holistic, joined-up approaches to avoid state failure and state collapse. However, the drivers of the stabilization agenda are the national security

interests of dominant external actors—regionally or internationally.⁸⁹ The peacebuilding interventions of the 1990s, which were largely motivated by humanitarian impulses, will be seen to have prepared the ground for external interventions in sovereign states—albeit for a different agenda. This is bound to create a backlash against international peacebuilding when it is most needed. Recent debates on the Darfur crisis and the peace process in the Sudan have revealed the heightened political sensitivities among the UN’s member states.

In light of its overwhelming power and its policies in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States remains the critical player in this regard although other countries including Russia, have also embraced it for their own purposes. Given the nature of the US political system, there are divergent views on both the nature of the new stabilization agenda and on how best to implement it. These are reflected in the mushrooming academic and policy literature in the field.⁹⁰ A recent study usefully distinguishes between three “generations” of the American approach to post conflict reconstruction: Post-World War II Occupations; Post-Cold War Humanitarian Interventions; and Post-9/11 Interventions in an Era of Global Terrorism and WMD. The study goes on to argue that “Iraq is the case that could define the newest generation of nation building. The situation on the ground and how the Bush administration responds to it will determine whether this effort becomes a real post-conflict reconstruction effort or else becomes a counter insurgency strategy that uses post-conflict reconstruction tools” [emphasis added].⁹¹

Indeed, whatever the actual label, the externally driven nature of the “stabilization and reconstruction” agenda would almost certainly require policy tools, instruments and approaches that are sufficiently different from the multilateral “peacebuilding paradigm” described in this paper.

A final threat to the peacebuilding agenda arises from the deep political divisions that have emerged within the international community following the US-led war on terrorism and the war in Iraq. These divisions are

not simply ideological, developmental or geographic in nature. They cut across multiple divides, and undermine ongoing efforts to define a common and collective framework for international action in the early years of the 21st century. Within the Security Council, at the General Assembly, within regional organizations, and even among allies, there are deep differences as to what constitutes the top priorities for the international community and how to address them. The establishment of the Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is indicative of the uncertainties at the international level. The “international compact” (articulated in the Millennium Declaration, *An Agenda for Peace* and *An Agenda for Development*) that was endorsed at the end of the Cold War seems to have lost its hold. There is currently no comparable substitute to give direction or cohesion to the efforts of the international community to address the multiple threats and challenges that lie ahead.

The United Nations, which represents the collective international will, is in need of reform. However, reform efforts have run into major obstacles. Great expectations are placed in the High Level Panel to propose recommendations to reform the international system to respond to new of global threats and challenges. It is unlikely, however, that the Panel’s recommendations will be acceptable to both the powerful members of the UN as well as to the majority of its members. It is anticipated that the Panel will identify post-conflict peacebuilding as a key priority due to its contributions to international peace and security. Even then, it is not certain that the international community can garner the political will and the resources to address it effectively given the current composition of the Security Council and the General Assembly as well as the UN’s chronic shortage of resources for post-conflict peacebuilding without the involvement of the key bilateral and multilateral donors. The aforementioned political cleavages in the international community are already beginning to reflect themselves in the priorities and operations of the main bilateral and multilateral donors with the risk of the “securitization” of development aid.

IX. Conclusion

The persistence of intra-state and civil conflicts in different regions (especially in Africa), the breakdown of peace processes and the relapse of a number of countries into violent conflict (such as in Sri Lanka and Colombia), and the emergence of new conflicts ensure that post-conflict peacebuilding will continue to require international assistance in the coming years and decades despite its multiple shortcomings and weaknesses. If the United Nations and other external actors who were in the forefront of post-conflict peacebuilding of the 1990s decide that peacebuilding is too important an enterprise to give up, they face a dual challenge. They need to

learn from and further improve upon the innovative but modest gains made to date in peacebuilding policy and practice. They also need to stop the slippery slope of providing an easy cover for the unilateralist impulses of powerful members of the UN family by subordinating international peacebuilding to the post-9/11 agenda of stabilization and reconstruction. As some of the most vulnerable members of the international community, conflict-affected countries depend upon multi-dimensional international assistance to achieve their simultaneous need for security and development. The principles for effective peacebuilding are now sufficiently established to enable the next decade of peacebuilding to yield better results—provided there is the necessary political will.

Endnotes

¹ *After the Conflict: A review of selected sources on rebuilding war-torn societies*, which was undertaken by Patricia Weiss Fagen as part of WSP, provided an inventory of the state of knowledge at the time. The literature was relatively limited and Weiss Fagen usefully grouped key resources into several broad categories: a) general works, b) international organizational capacities, c) reforming security structures, d) political rebuilding, e) economic rebuilding, and f) social rebuilding, local empowerment and capacity building.

² In May 2002, a joint project team from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) produced a detailed *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework*. It provided a comprehensive inventory of tasks that external actors face in assisting countries emerging from conflict. Drawing from a rich body of literature and experience gained in the intervening years, the joint CSIS/AUSA framework laid out a “universe of options” that confront international peacebuilders on four fronts: security; justice and reconciliation; social and economic well-being; and governance and participation. The tasks falling under each “pillar” of reconstruction were organized into three phases: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability—each phase requiring a different mix of policies and strategies. Although not a road map to post-conflict reconstruction, the depth and breadth of the issues covered by the CSIS/AUSA framework are impressive. See <<http://www.csis.org/isp.pcr/framework.pdf>>.

³ United Nations, *An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc A/48/935 (6 May 1994).

⁴ Charles Call, “The Problem of Peacebuilding: How UN Thinking Has Evolved in Recent Years,” draft paper prepared for DPA, 27 August 2004.

⁵ In an earlier paper entitled “Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development” (IPA Reports, Dec. 2003), I have argued in favor of the expanded definition of peacebuilding since a sequential approach to peace no longer holds true.

⁶ *Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding: National Report on Germany* (Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, 2003).

⁷ During the Cold War, the international community was so polarized that there was little room for collective, non-partisan international action on issues dealing with peace and security. Moreover, the artificial division between security and development issues ensured that international development community did not engage in peace and security issues while the political and security actors avoided direct involvement in the socio-economic affairs of war-prone or war-affected states. In other words, during the Cold War, post-conflict peacebuilding (involving active political engagement in the socio-economic reconstruction of sovereign states) did not exist as an international project.

⁸ The applicability of the peacebuilding model of the 1990s to Afghanistan and Iraq is not universally accepted. Some analysts argue that these countries represent only more difficult cases of peacebuilding. Others consider them *sui generis* because of the preceding military action in both cases and the fact that the international role is not that of a disinterested “third party.” Whatever the final verdict, the terms of the debate have changed significantly since 9/11 as peacebuilding is equated with regime change, stabilization, state building and nation building as instruments of foreign policies of certain states.

⁹ In the case of international wars, *An Agenda for Peace* called for confidence building measures, joint programs, cultural and educational projects, and noted: “... the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions. ... Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence.” United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992)*, UN Doc A/47/277-S/2411 (17 June 1992).

¹⁰ The *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* reviewed two kinds of post-conflict peacebuilding: when it is linked to a multifunctional peacekeeping operation, and when it is undertaken without any peacekeeping operation being deployed. It argued that the first situation is the easier to manage, since the UN already has an entree. Yet it warned that the “timing and modalities of the departure

of the peace-keeping operation and the transfer of its peace-building functions to others must therefore be carefully managed.” In turning to the more difficult situation when peace-building activities are needed in a country where the UN has no peacemaking or peace-keeping mandate, the *Supplement* outlined a dual role for the UN: through its economic, social and humanitarian agencies and programs and under the purview of the UN resident coordinator; and through political action at the level of UN Headquarters. United Nations, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, UN Doc A/50/60-S/1995/1 (3 January 1995).

¹¹ The *Supplement* added that in such cases, it may be necessary to arrange the transfer of decision-making responsibility from the Security Council (which had authorized the mandate and deployment of peacekeepers) to the General Assembly or other inter-governmental bodies with responsibility for the civilian peacebuilding activities that would continue.

¹² Call, “The Problem of Peacebuilding: How UN Thinking Has Evolved in Recent Years.”

¹³ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*, UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809 (21 August 2000).

¹⁴ United Nations, *Review of Technical Cooperation in the United Nations (Report of the Secretary-General)*, 19 September 2003, UN Doc A/58/382 (19 September 2003).

¹⁵ See the United Nations, UN Doc S/PRST/2001/5: “The Security Council recognizes that peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wider range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.”

¹⁶ See Call, “The Problem of Peacebuilding: How UN Thinking Has Evolved in Recent Years.” Given its narrow focus on post-conflict peacebuilding, this paper does not examine the combined peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding role of the UN in its multi-dimensional peace operations. However, the multilateral approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding under the UN umbrella provide the framework within which peacebuilding policy and practice since the 1990s will be reviewed.

¹⁷ Brian Urquhart, “The Good General,” *New York Review of Books* 51, no. 14 (September 23, 2004).

¹⁸ For a thoughtful and comprehensive history of the creation of the post-World War II international normative and legal order, see Ralakrishnan Rajagopal, *International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹⁹ For a list of these conferences and the Millennium Declaration, see <www.un.org>.

²⁰ David M. Malone, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

²¹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001).

²² Roland Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Michael Lund, “Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions,” in *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Reflections on the State of Building Ten Years After The Agenda for Peace* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, January 2003).

²³ Paris, *At War’s End*; James Dobbins et al., *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq*, vol. 2 of Rand’s *History of Nation-Building* (RAND National Defense Research Institute, forthcoming 2005).

²⁴ A review of key policy documents by OECD DAC, the European Union, the United Nations, and other bilateral and multilateral organizations reveals a shared analysis that peace, development, human rights, and democracy are interlinked, and need to be pursued in tandem. These values are promoted and advanced not only as universally valid and desirable goals, but also as key elements of an international conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda. Collectively, they constitute a normative framework for international action.

²⁵ For a compelling case on the political dimension of peacebuilding, see Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar, with Karin Wermester, eds., *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). For an equally compelling argument on the role of non-governmental actors, see John Prendergast and Emily Plumb, "Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to Peacebuilding," in Stedman, et. al, eds., *Ending Civil Wars*.

²⁶ Within the UN system, DPA has been designated the focal point for peacebuilding. However, the Peacebuilding Unit within DPA which was recommended by the Brahimi Panel never came to life due to the opposition of certain UN member states.

²⁷ During the Cold War, aid agencies had generally been linked to departments of foreign affairs and served as operational arms of their governments' foreign policies. Nonetheless, aid programs were administered by development professionals with considerable latitude in the design and delivery of humanitarian and socio-economic aid programs. Official aid agencies were generally averse to dealing with political and security issues. Where there was conflict, they sought to minimize the impact of conflict on their programming but avoided dealing directly with conflict issues. When they could not continue their work in conflict, they interrupted their development programming and provided humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance was intended to be short term and limited in nature, while development aid was designed to support a longer-term strategy for socio-economic development through consultations with recipient governments. Neither of these forms of assistance was appropriate for post-conflict rebuilding which required new types of programming—such as providing public security, consolidating political stability, promoting psycho-social reconciliation and initiating socio-economic rehabilitation—to meet immediate needs within a politically fragile context.

²⁸ The development enterprise is, itself, the outgrowth of security concerns after World War II when the emergence of new states threat was seen to raise the stakes vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. Development was seen as an instrument to prevent the slide of developing countries into the Soviet orbit.

²⁹ World Bank Report of the Paris Meeting, available at <www.worldbank.org>.

³⁰ The evolution of donor responses to the peacebuilding agenda needs to be understood within the context of the official aid system that influences its constituent agencies. Official development assistance is highly decentralized, guided largely by the priorities of donor governments, permanently under-resourced, and slow to change. Yet it is also highly responsive to peer influence. Innovations by individual members as well as multilateral institutions have strong demonstration effects. This was indeed the case with post-conflict peacebuilding where the work of a few key agencies and the OECD DAC had multiplier effects throughout the international donor community.

³¹ GTZ, *Joint Utstein Study*.

³² The OECD DAC is the coordinating body for bilateral development donors with the aim of improving the effectiveness of development cooperation. It is a standard and norm setting body rather than an operational actor. Nonetheless, since its standards are considered binding by member states, OECD DAC has traditionally played an important role in influencing donor policies and behavior.

³³ OECD, *DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (2001), and *DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction* (2001). Although the DAC Task Force has since been discontinued, its successor, the Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) Network of the DAC, continues work on four related policy areas: security sector reform, mainstreaming conflict prevention, responding to crisis country needs, and regional conflict dynamics.

³⁴ Canadian International Development Agency, *Compendium of Operational Frameworks for Peace Building and Donor Coordination* (Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction [CPR Peacebuilding Network]). The *Compendium* encompasses diverse practice areas such as gender and peacebuilding, security sector reform, transitional justice, child soldiers, peace and conflict impact assessment, and media and peacebuilding. See <www.cprnet.net>.

³⁵ Shepard Forman and Dirk Salomons, "Meeting Essential Needs in Societies Emerging from Conflict," paper prepared for the Brookings Roundtable on the Relief to Development Gap (New York: Center on International Cooperation, n.d.); Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

³⁶ OECD, "Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice," High Level Meeting, 15-16 April 2004.

³⁷ James K Boyce, "The International Financial Institutions: Postconflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Capacities," prepared for the meeting on *Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management*, Copenhagen, 8-9 June 2004. Forman and Patrick, *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery*. James Boyce, *Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars* (Oxford University Press, 2002)

³⁸ Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, "Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations," Working Paper No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, 2003). Shepard Forman, Stewart Patrick, and Dirk Salomons, "Recovering from Conflict: Strategy for An International Response," in *Paying For Essentials Policy Paper Series* (New York: New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2001).

³⁹ World Bank, *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, 2003).

⁴⁰ International Monetary Fund (IMF) website at <www.imf.org>. A recent IMF Working Paper from the Policy Development and Review Department called "Economic Performance Over the Conflict Cycle," prepared by Nicholas Staines, shows that the Fund is engaging more actively on this issue. The paper finds "a significant shift in the economic characteristics of civil conflicts during the 1990s. Conflicts have become shorter but with more severe contractions and a stronger recovery of growth. ...The stance of macroeconomic policy was an important factor while the underlying "conflict process" remained unchanged.

⁴¹ For a quick review of the role of IFIs, see James Boyce, "The International Financial Institutions," a paper prepared for CIC for the Copenhagen Meeting, June 2004.

⁴² GTZ, *Joint Utstein Study*.

⁴³ For selected documents, see: Robert C. Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic International Studies, 2004); *WSP Bossey Statement* at <www.wsp-international.org>; OECD, *DAC Guidelines*; United Nations, *Draft Plan of Action on Peacebuilding*, 6 April 2001.

⁴⁴ Nils Peter Gleditch et al., "Armed Conflict 1964-2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637; Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2003).

⁴⁵ Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003).

⁴⁶ The work of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and IPA's Conflict Prevention Program provide ample evidence of this.

⁴⁷ Ken Menkhaus, "Impact Assessment in Post-Conflict Peace-Building: The State of the Art," a paper prepared for the War-Torn Societies Project-International (April 2003); GTZ, *Joint Utstein Study*; Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play* (Ulster: INCORE International Conflict Research, 2002); Chr. Michelsen Institute, *After War: Reconciliation and Democratization: Lessons Learned*. Summary Report (Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2000).

⁴⁸ For a rigorous examination of evaluation issues with a focus on peace implementation, see George Downs and Stephen John Stedman's chapter in Stedman et al., eds., *Ending Civil Wars*.

⁴⁹ Several donor countries, most notably the Utstein-4 including Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK as well as Sweden, have started to undertake country-level evaluation of their peacebuilding programs. These evaluation studies assess the effectiveness of the programs and projects of the donor country rather than their impact on the ground. For a useful review of evaluation studies, see: Swedish Sida Evaluation 00/37 entitled “Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peace Building: State of the Art/Annotated Bibliography.”

⁵⁰ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 94: 779.

⁵¹ Paris, *At War's End*, includes Angola, Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, Bosnia, Croatia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Namibia and Mozambique. Paris also reviewed three other cases (Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone) which were launched after 1998. His assessment of these operations, as well as in Afghanistan, is also fairly negative although on different grounds.

⁵² The case studies included Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq for the US led “nation-building” projects and Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone and East Timor for the UN-led missions.

⁵³ Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.xxi.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.xxiii.

⁵⁶ The cases covered included Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Cyprus, Eastern Slavonia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. Michael Lund, “Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions,” in *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Reflections on the State of Building Ten Years After The Agenda for Peace* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, January 2003).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.30-31.

⁵⁸ Stedman, et al., eds., *Ending Civil Wars*, makes the most convincing case about the importance of political will.

⁵⁹ Chandra Sriram and Zoe Nielsen, eds., *Exploring Subregional Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); Michael Pugh and W.P.S. Sidhu, *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Necla Tschirgi, “A Regional Conflict Approach to Peacebuilding,” *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* (1:1, 2002).

⁶⁰ Forman and Patrick, *Good Intentions*; Forman and Salomons, *Meeting Essential Needs*.

⁶¹ Uwe Kievelitz et al., “Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, August 2004).

⁶² Stephen John Stedman et al., eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

⁶³ Forman and Patrick, *Good Intentions*; Dirk Salomons and Dennis Dijkzeul, “The Conjurers’ Hat: Financing United Nations Peacebuilding in Operations Directed by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General” (Oslo: Fafo Institute of Applied Social Science and Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2001); Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*; Boyce, “*Strengthening the UN’s Capacity*.”

⁶⁴ Susan L.Woodward, “Peace Operations: the Civilian Dimension: Accounting for UNDP and the UN Specialized Agencies,” prepared for the New York University Center on International Cooperation meeting on *Strengthening the UN’s Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management*, Copenhagen, 8-9 June 2004.

⁶⁵ IPA's Economic Agendas in Civil Wars Project (EACW) generated a rich body of research on conflict trade which is accessible at <www.ipacademy.org/programs>. Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*.

⁶⁶ OECD, *DAC Guidelines*.

⁶⁷ Malone, *The UN Security Council*.

⁶⁸ For an insightful account, see Michele Griffin, "The Helmet and the Hoe: Linkages Between United Nations Development Assistance and Conflict Management," *Global Governance* 9:2, 2003.

⁶⁹ Simon Chesterman in *You, the People* raises the question as to whether it is possible to establish the conditions for legitimate and sustainable national governance through a period of benevolent foreign autocracy which defines societal norms and values.

⁷⁰ M. Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (New York: Zed Books, 2001); Alejandro Bendaña, "Critical Assessments from the South," in *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Reflections on the State of Building Ten Years After The Agenda for Peace* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, January 2003).

⁷¹ James K. Boyce, *Economic Policy for Building Peace: The Lessons of El Salvador* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).

⁷² Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Alvaro De Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding," *Foreign Affairs* 94 (spring 1994): 69-93

⁷⁵ Tony Addison, "From Conflict to Reconstruction," Discussion Paper No 2001/16 (UNU: WIDER, June 2001).

⁷⁶ Eugenia Date-Bah, ed., *Jobs After War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle*. (Geneva: ILO, September 2003). Boyce, "The International Financial Institutions."

⁷⁷ There is, however, is a growing appreciation by various agencies of the need to ground economic policies in local realities. For example, a recent World Bank commissioned study by Salvatore Schiavo-Campo entitled "Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations" notes that the first lesson of experience for aid in post conflict situations is "the imperative of assuring robust linkages between the aid and the rebuilding of local institutions, and the core challenge of balancing immediate reconstruction priorities with long-term institutional development." Similarly, a recent World Bank publication entitled "Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations" argues that a multilateral needs assessment should be seen as a "complex analytical process led by the national authorities and supported by the international community and carried out by multilateral agencies on their behalf, with the closest possible collaboration of national stakeholders and civil society."

⁷⁸ Tony Addison, ed., *From Conflict to Recovery in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁷⁹ Karen Von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Krishna Kumar, ed., *Post-Conflict Elections, Democratization & International Assistance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Bertrand Badie, *The Imported State: The Westernization of Political Order*, translated by Claudia Royal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

⁸⁰ See for example, Jeroen de Zeeuw, "Projects Do Not Create Institutions: The Record of Democracy Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies," a paper prepared for the UNU/WIDER Conference on Making Peace Work, June 2004.

⁸¹ Paris, *At War's End*.

⁸² See, for example: Sunil Bastian and Robin Luckham, *Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-torn Societies* (London: Zed Books, 2003); Von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*; William G. O'Neill, "International Human Rights Assistance" (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, July 2003); Benjamin Reilly, "International Electoral Assistance" (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, June 2003); Ross Howard, "International Media Assistance" (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, June 2003).

⁸³ Swedish Sida Evaluation Studies; Clingendael Evaluation Studies.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Susan Woodward notes that "The entire corpus of learning about how to leave behind a functioning state and consolidate peace is in conflict with decisions taken with little or no relation to developments at the country level." Susan Woodward, "Peace Operations: the Civilian Dimension: Accounting for UNDP and the UN Specialized Agencies," p.13.

⁸⁶ See the papers prepared by CIC for the Copenhagen Conference: Boyce, "The International Financial Institutions"; Durch, "Strengthening the UN Capacity"; Forman, "Building Civilian Capacity"; Peter V. Jakobsen, "The Emerging EU Civilian Crisis Management Capacity"; Woodward, "Peace Operations."

⁸⁷ De Zeeuw, "Projects Do Not Create Institutions."

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ For a concise statement of the links between weak states and US National Security, see Center for Global Development, *On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2004).

⁹⁰ Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building*; Dobbins et al., *UN's Role in Nation Building*; Orr, *Winning the Peace*; Center for Global Development, *On the Brink*.

⁹¹ Orr, *Winning the Peace*, p.7.

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