

Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2000



Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen



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*Peacekeeping Operations:
Global Patterns of Intervention
and Success, 1948–2000*

Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen

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Authors: Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen

Editor: Birger Heldt

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Introduction

To what extent have the United Nations (UN) and regional actors attempted to manage interstate disputes? Haas (1987: 8–9, 24) reports that approximately two-thirds of the 319 disputes during the 40-year period 1945–1984 were managed by either the UN or regional organisations, with varying degrees of success.¹ 137 of the disputes were managed by the UN, while regional organisations managed 86 disputes. Of these 223 disputes, 22 were referred to the UN as well as regional organisations, while three of the disputes were managed by two regional organisations. This pattern may reflect a lack of interest on the part of both the international community and the parties to conflicts in resolving the disputes. It is meanwhile unclear how many disputes were referred to either the UN or regional organisations, without reaching the organisations' agendas. The study also finds that the UN—with the exception of the five-year period 1971–1975—was more likely to manage the more serious disputes. This pattern may be explained by a proclivity of regional organisations to refer the most serious disputes to the UN or that the parties in serious disputes preferred to involve the UN rather than regional organisations. Nonetheless, this makes it reasonable to expect that the UN should have a lower dispute-management success rate than regional organisations.

A similar pattern is found in a dataset compiled by Bercovitch (1999), which contains data on 295 interstate conflicts in the 51-year period 1945–1995 and shows that the UN attempted to manage 30% of the conflicts and regional organisations 23%.² The UN and regional organisations together attempted to manage 9% of the conflicts. As in the study by Haas, Bercovitch found that the UN is more active than regional organisations in conflict management, although these two categories of actors are overall less involved in management efforts.

Peacekeeping is one of the innovations of the international system for dealing with conflicts between (interstate) and within (intrastate) states and constitutes a subset of the conflict- or dispute-management efforts discussed above. Such operations may be carried out by the UN but also by other actors, since the UN Charter encourages peace initiatives by state actors, such as regional intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) or coalitions of states. More specifically, Articles 33, 37, 52 and 54 of the UN Charter stress that regional arrangements or agencies should “make every effort” for the pacific settlement of disputes, provided that “their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” The Charter also states that the “Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council” and that when such arrangements have failed a dispute may be referred to the UN Security Council. While not stated in the Charter, such a referral may result in the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation.³ Moreover, regional organisations cannot on their own take enforcement action (Art. 53). In other words, the Charter constitutes the only source of the legitimisation of peace enforcement action.

One common perception is that the amount of peacekeeping efforts are presently at an all-time high. Another common perception is that peacekeeping has on a global scale developed in the direction of “regionalization”, i.e., regional IGOs, sub-regional IGOs, or regional ad-hoc coalitions of states have in recent years taken on an increasingly larger peacekeeping role as compared to the UN. From this claim follows other claims, such as an increased need for coordination and cooperation between UN and regional actors, and for providing support to increase the peacekeeping capacity of regions.

Although it is a topical discussion issue, little is actually known of how non-UN-led operations compare with UN-led operations. This report offers a descriptive account and birds-eye view of global patterns of peacekeeping for the 53-year period 1948–2000. Thereby it puts today’s pattern of peacekeeping in some perspective and compares peacekeeping in different organisational frameworks—within and outside the UN. Focusing on patterns in terms of number, size, location, and type of conflict, it identifies not only trends, but also similarities as well as differences between peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN and those conducted by non-UN actors. It also summarises available evidence on success rates and offers some conclusions on the significance of the organisational framework for international action.

Section 2 of the report defines and identifies all peacekeeping operations in the period 1948–2000. Sections 3 to 6 present comparisons between UN and non-UN operations with regard to the number, size, geographic location, and success rates of operations. Some concluding reflections are offered in section 7.

Defining and Identifying Peacekeeping Operations

While it is easy to define “UN peacekeeping operation” ostensibly by pointing to the UN’s official list of peacekeeping operations, a conceptual definition is necessary in order also to identify non-UN-led operations. Rather than presenting an extensive conceptual analysis, this study is based on a common understanding of “peacekeeping operation” as not a matter of enforcement, but largely as a confidence-building measure that addresses distrust between parties to a dispute (e.g., Diehl, 1987; Werner, 1999). To illustrate this, consider the following quotation from Doyle & Sambanis (1999: 19):

[The UN] can create and needs to create transparency. The factions may be reconciled but they don’t fully trust each other. The international peacebuilding role consists of monitoring and investigating in order to increase trust so that the parties can believe that the piece of paper they signed has operational significance.

This is also reflected in the study by Stedman & Rotchild (1996: 18–19), who stress the importance of confidence-building for the implementation of peace accords. The term refers partly to “tests of commitment, supported by third-party verification of compliance.” The importance of confidence-building arises because, since “fear is high and trust low among antagonists, parties may fail to carry out their commitments in the belief that the adversary will take advantage of them.” (p. 20). Moreover, “by supplying information, monitoring and verifying compliance, and interpreting reluctance to meet obligations, [the UN] can clarify motives and reduce uncertainty about actor preferences and behaviour.” (p. 22). The core function of peacekeeping operations is thus conflict management that focuses on the classic security dilemma by

increasing the amount of information the parties have about each other's preferences and behaviour. The information is thought to influence beliefs, trust and consequently behaviour. In a sense, a peacekeeping operation is simply an early-warning sensor or information device.

Apart from the function of confidence-building, it is also commonly asserted that peacekeeping is/should be characterised by consent of the conflict parties, neutrality towards the conflict parties, use of force in self-defence only, and limited military capabilities (Diehl, 1994: 4–13). These conceptual properties may be somewhat problematic. To begin with, if limited military capability is required, then so-called robust (large and well-armed) peacekeeping operations (examples of which include many old as well as recent UN peacekeeping operations) would not constitute peacekeeping operations. The issue of neutrality and impartiality, connected with the requirement of use of force in self-defence only, has become a topical discussion in recent years (cf. Donald, 2002). The issue is not whether peacekeepers should be neutral (i.e., not having an agenda favouring any of the conflict parties) to the conflicts parties, but whether they should be passive or impartial when one of the parties violates a peace agreement or commits human rights violations. In Rwanda it may be said that the UN operation was neutral and impartial, while in, e.g., Bosnia the UN operation(-s) was(were) neutral but not impartial. What appears to define peacekeeping is thus not impartiality or self-defence, but rather neutrality.

Another issue concerns what core functions the concept entails. Existing categorisations of operations offer clues in this regard. In line with the main literature Diehl (1994: 9-10) suggests three core functions: monitoring of ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones or interposition, and the maintenance of law and order (in intrastate conflicts). What is often referred to as “traditional” peacekeeping operations involves separation of the conflict parties, monitoring of ceasefires, and maintaining buffer zones (cf. Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Durch, 1993, 1997; Diehl, 1994) with the consent of the parties. UN peacekeeping operations have in recent years been deployed in intrastate conflicts and have there been given additional tasks such as humanitarian support, election monitoring, and training of local police.⁴ Such operations are commonly referred to as “multidimensional” or “second generation” operations (Ibid.). Another category is “peace enforcement” operations, which are not based on consent and are deployed to create—rather than maintain—peace (Ibid.). Still another—but rather rare—category can be called “conflict prevention” operations, in that they are deployed prior to the anticipated outbreak of armed conflict. Although peacekeeping operations differ in many respects, they share basic tasks that are included in the “traditional” understanding of the term, namely, separation of the conflict parties, ceasefire monitoring, and control of buffer zones. Hence, all operations deal with security issues and may or may not involve additional tasks, such as

peace enforcement or, for instance, humanitarian tasks. In line with this, a “peace-keeping operation” is defined as a third-party state intervention that:

- involves the deployment of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in a target state;
- is, according to the mandate (as specified in multilateral agreements, peace agreements, or resolutions of the UN or regional organisations), established for the purpose of separating conflict parties, monitoring ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones, and taking responsibility for the security situation (among other things) between formerly, potentially, or presently warring parties; and
- is neutral towards the conflict parties, but not necessarily impartial towards their behaviour.

Peacekeeping operations during 1948–2000 are presented in the Appendix. It should be stressed that the non-UN operations may or may not have been supported by UN Security Council resolutions. This definition has few implications for UN-led operations (only UNAVEM I does not meet the definition [see Appendix]) while many so-called “peace-building missions” of, for instance, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the UN are excluded. As an example, the Kosovo Verification Mission is excluded because only civilian personnel were deployed. It also excludes operations such as the present and large multinational force in Iraq as well as ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. In the former case it was not a neutral force interpositioned between two or more identified warring parties, but an occupation force much like *Operation Uphold Democracy* in Haiti 1994–1995 (see Appendix); in the latter case, the operation was not an interposition force with the above described tasks, but tasked to assist in maintaining security in Kabul.⁵

Number of Peacekeeping Operations

There are large similarities in the number of operations carried out by the UN and those by non-UN actors. First, there were 12 ongoing non-UN operations as of December 2000, while the UN was carrying out 15 operations. Second, from June 1948 to December 2000 non-UN actors initiated 53 operations—the same number as for the UN. The historically novel experience of international peacekeeping is thus now widespread, and some countries, such as Sweden, cite participation in international peacekeeping operations as a rationale for maintaining their military defence at a certain level of manpower. Third, as illustrated by Figure I, the number of UN-led and non-UN-led operations follows a similar pattern over time.


Data for the period up to the end of the Cold War, around 1990, do not show dramatic shifts in absolute numbers, which are low. The number of UN operations started to increase in 1988, while the increase in operations carried out by other actors began in 1992. From 1991 the number of UN operations also appears to be more stable than the number of non-UN operations. Another observation is that, while the total number of both types of operations is almost identical for the period under study, Figure I shows that there were more UN operations at almost every point in time. Calculations show that during the period an average of six UN operations were active in any given month, while the corresponding figure for non-UN operations is 4.5. The similar total number but different monthly average of ongoing operations can only be explained by a longer average duration of UN operations.

Figure I suggests that UN operations have set a path for other actors. The UN carried out the first operations, and it initiated the large increase in peacekeeping operations in

the latter part of the period. Moreover, there are more ongoing UN operations than non-UN operations at almost every point in time. Overall, this suggests that the UN has had a certain primacy in that it may inspire or induce other actors to carry out peacekeeping. In this interpretation the UN leads rather than lags behind the trend. There is thus limited evidence of regionalisation until December 2000. The number of non-UN-led operations was higher only during the mid-1950s, late 1960s and early 1970s, but has since then up until the late 1990s never exceeded the number of UN operations. It may be conjectured in an ad-hoc manner that the reason is that the UN's peacekeeping capacity was temporarily overstretched rather than that conflict parties avoided the UN in favour of regional actors. In the early 1950s, the UN had no peacekeeping capacity, and its first "real" peacekeeping operation UNEF I was deployed in 1956.⁶ It may thus not appear surprising to note that non-UN-led operations outnumbered UN operations. As the UN increased its capacity and expertise it regained its supremacy. An opposite explanation may be useful to understand the increase of non-UN operations during the 1990s: Europe's recently increased capacity and willingness for dealing with threats to the region's peace and security. A large part of the non-UN operations in recent years consists of operations deployed by the EU, the OSCE and NATO. As such, Europe's ability and desire to deal with regional security is now unsurpassed by any other region.

Nevertheless, in absolute numbers, the incidence of non-UN-led operations has risen sharply since the early 1990s. Burden-sharing may be a useful concept for understanding

FIGURE I: Number of peacekeeping operations, 1948-2000



the pattern, as it means that burdens are shared regardless of their size and regardless of the UN's and regional actors' peacekeeping abilities. Overall, this appears to have been the case. The trend for the three-year period 2001–2003 is one of a relative increase in non-UN operations (Dwan & Wiharta, 2004; Wiharta, 2003; Dwan, Papworth & Wiharta, 2002), and as of December 2003 the UN was conducting 13 operations, which is some 30% lower than the number of non-UN operations (cf. Dwan & Wiharta, 2004). UN operations now lag behind rather than lead the trend. It remains to be seen whether this snapshot from December 2003 is part of a long-term trend of regionalisation, or whether it is yet another temporary deviation from the pattern of UN dominance that has applied almost all the time since 1948.

If we assume, just as indicated by the UN Charter, that regional actors initially attempt to manage conflicts, and when they fail the conflicts are referred to the UN, then what does this pattern of peacekeeping indicate? It may indicate the degree to which regional actors have been able to meet the demand for peacekeeping. In this interpretation, regional actors had a more sufficient ability during the mid-1950, late 1960s and early 1970s, as very few cases were handled by the UN. On the other hand, regional actors' capacity turned out to be highly insufficient during the 1990s, as more and more cases were handled by the UN even though regional actors carried out more operations than ever before. The increasing amount of regional peacekeeping operations thus hides that regional actors were less able than ever before to meet the demand for peacekeeping. This is a contra-intuitive conclusion, as it suggests that the demand for peacekeeping in absolute terms has increasingly outstripped the global regional peacekeeping ability, and forced regional actors to increasingly rely on the UN. Rather than diminished, the UN's role in conflict management has thus increased in absolute terms. A limitation with this interpretation is that the UN's peacekeeping efforts also reflect the amount of willingness and resources it has at its disposal, which in turn can be assumed to not meet demand at every moment in time. This means that the amount of UN operations tends to underestimate the true need for UN interventions and the inability of regional actors to meet the demand for peacekeeping. From this follows that it is in fact hazardous to infer from Figure I when demand for UN peacekeeping has been at its peak, although one can infer the minimum amount of demand at every moment in time.


Interstate Conflicts

While the analysis at the aggregate level showed large similarities, an analysis of data disaggregated into operations deployed in intra- and interstate conflicts reveals a number of differences. First, the UN deployed 17 operations in interstate conflicts; the corresponding figure for non-UN actors is 15. This is less than a third of the total number of operations. Second, for the period of study the monthly average number of UN operations is 4.1; the corresponding figure for non-UN operations is 2.5. This

means that UN-led operations in interstate conflicts were on average deployed about 50% longer than non-UN operations. Third, Figure II shows an upward trend over time in the number of UN operations, while the opposite trend applies to non-UN operations. Peacekeeping in interstate conflicts was regionalised during 1953–1973, but since then there has been a move towards greater reliance on the UN while the number of non-UN operations has been constant for the past 30 years. By December 2000 the UN carried out eight operations in interstate conflicts; the corresponding figure for non-UN operations is two. The figures for December 2003 are identical (cf. Dwan & Wiharta, 2004) and they are representative of 2001–2003 (Ibid.; Wiharta, 2003; Dwan, Papworth & Wiharta, 2002). There is thus a trend towards greater reliance on UN peacekeeping in interstate conflicts, the amount of which has declined sharply.

A final observation is that there is only a weak relationship between the number of operations carried out by non-UN actors and those conducted by the UN. This means that whereas UN operations have a primacy, the UN does not inspire a trend in, or set a path for, the management of interstate conflicts. Rather, the two actors’ patterns of peacekeeping are independent of each other. This observation leads us to an interesting insight: whatever set of factors that motivates/allows the UN to intervene is not the same as those that motivate regional actors to intervene. Had the set of factors been identical, then the two actors’ patterns of peacekeeping would have been similar. Consequently, we cannot understand why regional actors deploy peacekeepers by using the same models that we use for analysing why the UN deploys peacekeepers.

FIGURE II: Number of peacekeeping operations, interstate conflicts 1948-2000




Intrastate Conflict

The UN deployed 37 operations in intrastate conflicts, while non-UN actors deployed 39 during 1948–2000. This is more than twice the number of interstate operations. In terms of the monthly average, both types of actors deployed 1.9 operations during the period. This means that, in contrast to operations in interstate conflicts, UN and non-UN operations in intrastate conflict are very similar in terms of number and duration. Figure III shows that UN operations occur in two blocks of time. The first block, from 1960 to 1974, involved only a few operations. The second block, from 1989 and onwards, consisted of a large number of operations. A similar pattern applies to non-UN operations; as in the case of UN operations, their numbers increased at the end of the 1980s. For earlier periods, however, no such similarities can be discerned.

It is possible to observe a trend towards greater reliance on non-UN operations since the mid-1990s: over the five-year period 1996–2000 non-UN operations outnumbered UN operations by some 50%. Here, then, is evidence of a global trend not only towards more non-UN operations, but also towards regionalisation. As of December 2003 the UN was conducting eight intrastate operations, which is again some 50% lower than the number of non-UN operations (cf. Dwan & Wiharta, 2004). A cursory inspection of the three years 2001–2003 suggests that this is indeed part of a larger pattern that has by now been characteristic for almost a decade (Ibid.; Wiharta, 2003; Dwan, Papworth & Wiharta, 2002). Note also that non-UN operations dominated from the mid-1970s

FIGURE III: Number of peacekeeping operations, intrastate conflicts 1948-2000



to the early 1980s. This means that the claim that peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts is *now* experiencing a large change or transition towards regionalisation is inaccurate, as today's pattern has existed for almost a decade, and regionalisation occurred for the first time 30 years ago. Today's pattern is therefore not unique and it remains to be seen whether it proves more durable than the previous stint of regionalisation.

It was earlier noted, that the demand for peacekeeping in absolute terms has increasingly come to outstrip the global regional ability, and forced regional actors to increasingly rely on the UN. Rather than diminished, the UN's role in conflict management increased in absolute terms. While this appears in particular true for interstate peacekeeping, it is a less accurate description for intrastate peacekeeping. Before the 1990s there were few cases of intrastate peacekeeping that were not managed by regional actors. In fact, there were very few of those operations at all. As the number of non-UN-led operations surged in the 1990s so did also UN-led operations. Non-UN operations were at an all-time high during the 1990s, but so were also the number of UN operations. This means that whereas intrastate peacekeeping was indeed by then regionalised, regional actors were less able than before to meet the demand for peacekeeping. In fact, the 1990s was the era when the UN had in absolute numbers become more indispensable than ever before.

One puzzle is why regionalisation is now at hand for intrastate operations but not for interstate operations. A possible explanation that applies in particular to 2000–2003 is Europe's recently increased capacity and willingness for dealing with threats to the region's peace and security, as mentioned in the previous section. Moreover, during the mid-1990s NATO took over a large part of the UN's peacekeeping role in the Balkans. Another puzzle is why earlier incidents of regionalisation not only occurred but also were short-lived for in particular interstate operations. It appears less easy to identify a similarly apparent explanation for that pattern. There is also another interesting pattern: in interstate conflicts, states prefer overall to involve the UN and shun neighbouring states, but are more willing to engage neighbouring states when there is an intrastate conflict. An alternative interpretation is that neighbouring states are more willing to take on intrastate than interstate conflicts.

Patterns of Peacekeeping and Armed Conflict

An interesting question is whether the trend in peacekeeping is associated with the global conflict trend. Figure IV is based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP; see Gleditsch *et al.*, 2002) and shows trends in low-intensity conflicts and wars in the 56-year period 1946–2001. A comparison between Figure IV and Figure I suggests that, to the extent that any relationship exists, it is weak. Nevertheless, for several reasons this absence of a strong relationship may not be surprising. First, peacekeeping operations are deployed before anticipated armed conflicts, as well


FIGURE IV: Number and intensity of armed conflicts, 1948-2000



as during and after conflicts. The pattern of *ongoing* armed conflicts should therefore not be closely related to the pattern of peacekeeping. A second reason is that some intrastate conflicts are the object of a series of operations: an extreme example is the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina. A third reason is that in many intrastate conflicts one party emerges as militarily victorious, and there is thus no need for a peacekeeping operation to assist in the implementation of a peace agreement. Fourth, some intrastate conflicts are terminated through a deal with a non-governmental party that is too weak to control territory. There is, consequently, no need for a third-party interposition or intervention force.

A comparison of Figures II and III shows that there has been a shift in the attention of the international community as a whole. For both types of actors, engagement in intrastate conflict is now predominant (as is intrastate conflict over interstate conflict). Before the late 1980s, peacekeepers were most often sent to interstate conflicts. Figure V, based on UCDP data (Gleditsch *et al.*, 2002), shows that intrastate conflicts have been more common throughout the period, and that the gap between the two types of conflicts has increased almost continuously during the period, with a sharp increase in the gap starting in the mid-1960s. Hence, whereas the number of intrastate conflicts relative to the number of interstate conflicts has always been greater, and the gap between them has increased over the past 35 years, the international promotion of intrastate peace has only recently become more common than the promotion of interstate peace.

FIGURE V: Number and type of armed conflicts, 1948-2000



The question of the conditions under which peacekeeping operations are established has been discussed from many perspectives.⁷ Some scholars stress the major powers’ interests, and in this tradition it has been claimed that UN operations are established in countries where the permanent members of the UN Security Council have national interests. A related approach highlights “imperialistic motives” in that UN operations are alleged to be deployed in countries where the major powers have interests in raw materials. Still other approaches emphasise the importance of an interest in establishing democratic regimes. Another major strand of thought claims that it is not outside countries’ interests that are important, but rather the needs—in terms of war casualties and conflict durability—of the war-torn countries, and thus altruism rather than egoism on the part of the great powers. Still other approaches are based on the claimed importance of, e.g., a “CNN effect”, the presence of a peace agreement, the type of conflict, and the number of warring parties.

While such competing claims and hypotheses are common, there has been little research on the extent to which they are accurate in general or whether they apply only to individual cases. A rare exception is Gilligan & Stedman (2003), who examine the conditions under which the UN establishes peacekeeping operations in civil wars. The study thus excludes operations that are launched in advance of anticipated civil wars, and does not include non-UN-led operations. For civil wars that were active after 1988, the study finds a positive relationship between on the one hand civil war

duration and number of casualties, and on the other hand the probability of a UN operation. This finding supports the argument that it is need rather than great power interests that conditions UN decisions. The UN does thus not avoid serious (in terms of casualties) or intractable (in terms of duration) conflicts, but rather focuses on them. The study also reports that neither conflict type, level of democracy in the war-torn country, its population size nor its colonial history has any impact, while war-torn countries' military strength is inversely related to the probability of a UN operation. Moreover, and all else equal, the UN is least prone to establish operations in Asia, followed by Africa, and most prone to establish operations in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America in mentioned order.

An intriguing element of this set of findings is the regional differences: the finding that something about some regions makes them more or less likely to allow/require the UN to establish peacekeeping operations. What is it about these regions that may explain this pattern? Gilligan & Stedman (2003) offer a series of speculations on this matter. A possible explanation is differences in the presence of elaborate regional interstate organisations. Europe and the Americas have strong regional organisations (International Peace Academy, 2002) with strong mandates, while Africa has a weaker organisational structure with many sub-regional organisations and Asia has virtually none (Ibid.). The relationship between low-level UN activity in operations and weak regional organisation may appear puzzling, but it may to some extent reflect that regional consensus and pressure are required for the UN Security Council to be able and willing to establish peacekeeping operations, or even for a conflict to reach the UN agenda.

*Size of Peacekeeping Operations*⁸

One measure of peacekeeping activity is the monthly number of operations, discussed above. An alternative measure is the monthly number of deployed peacekeepers. Does such an alternative measure generate different conclusions regarding regionalisation and trends during the 53-year period 1948–2000? The monthly average number of UN peacekeeping personnel (military observers, civilian police, and military troops) for the period is more than 12,800. This gives a total of about 675,000 personnel years since June 1948. For non-UN operations, the monthly average of peacekeeping personnel for the period is slightly higher, at around 14,400, resulting in a total of about 759,000 personnel years since June 1948. This means that more than 1.4 million personnel years have been devoted to international peacekeeping. What we are here seeing is burden-sharing, which was also our conclusion when focusing on the number of operations (chapter 3, first section).

Figure VI, which presents the monthly number of UN peacekeepers, shows that there were short spells of expansion before the 1990s. From 1948 to 1956 very few peacekeepers—and only military observers—were deployed. This changed after the 1956 Suez crisis, which led to the deployment of UNEF I. UNEF I is commonly regarded as the first “real” peacekeeping operation, as it was composed of troops rather than only military observers and was of a considerable size. The number of UN peacekeepers increased sharply in 1960 with the Congo (Leopoldville) operation that lasted until 1964. By 1967, the number of UN personnel had returned to the level of 10 years earlier. Over the period 1967–1973 no significant changes occurred. A fourth phase can be discerned—1973–1991—in which the number of UN peacekeepers doubled to

about 10,000, and 1991–1998 constitutes a fifth phase. After the Cold War, the engagement of the UN in peacekeeping reached the unprecedented high point of almost 78,000 personnel in July 1993. The increase is mainly due to the large operations in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. The graph shows that a sixth phase began in early 1999, with an increase in the number of peacekeepers. The 1990s is characterised by dramatic changes in terms of deployed personnel.

FIGURE VI: Size of peacekeeping operations, 1948-2000




Figure VI also shows the monthly number of non-UN peacekeepers. The first non-UN peacekeeping operation was deployed between North and South Korea in 1953, and it is still ongoing. The two peaks, involving some 10,000–15,000 peacekeepers in the mid-1960s, are accounted for by the British operation in Cyprus before the deployment of UNFICYP and the operation in the Dominican Republic. Another peak of more than 30,000 peacekeepers during the late 1970s and early 1980s relates to the Arab League’s intervention in Lebanon. The peak in the late 1980s of nearly 60,000 peacekeepers reflects the Indian peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka, while the numbers for the second half of the 1990s are mostly due to the operations led by NATO in Bosnia and Hercegovina and in Kosovo.


The figure show that in terms of fielded personnel the UN dominated until the mid-1970s, while there is no consistent pattern for the rest of the century: non-UN operations dominated from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, and during the late 1980s; the UN dominated during the mid-1980s and the first half of the 1990s, after which

non-UN actors dominated during the rest of the decade, but the gap between UN and non-UN operations had by December 2003 decreased (cf. Dwan & Wiharta, 2004). It is thus not possible to discern a gradual change towards greater or less reliance on UN peacekeeping, but rather an on-off pattern in this regard. Figure VI also suggests that there is little, if any, association over time between the resources that the UN and non-UN actors have utilised for peacekeeping. Apparently, this measure of peacekeeping activity suggests that what one actor is doing does not influence the other. The measure thus leads to other conclusions on trends and regionalisation than when using the monthly number of operations as an indicator of activity.

Interstate Conflicts

A disaggregation of the pattern in intra- and interstate conflicts provides additional insights. For UN operations in interstate conflicts, the average monthly number of peacekeepers is more than 5,900 for the period; the corresponding figure for non-UN interstate operations is less than 1,400. Historically, then, interstate peacekeeping has been de-regionalised. Figure VII shows stability and step-wise changes over time in the number of UN peacekeepers in interstate conflicts. Until 1956 the monthly size of operations was in the low hundreds, from 1956 to 1967 the level was stable at around 5,000 peacekeepers, between 1967 and 1973 it was again in the low hundreds, while from 1973 it was stable at around 10,000. The trend is one of comparatively more

FIGURE VII: Size of peacekeeping operations, interstate conflict 1948-2000




UN peacekeepers. The number of non-UN peacekeepers is characterised by an even greater degree of stability over time, as shown in the same figure. Between 1953 and 1982, the number slowly decreased from almost 2,000 to less than 100. In 1982, the number of non-UN peacekeepers temporarily rose because of the MNF II operation in Lebanon, after which it was around 2,000 for the remainder of the century. By December 2003 the UN deployed more than 8,000 peacekeepers; the corresponding figure for non-UN actors is a little less than 2,000, basically in line with the pattern of the past 10–20 years (cf. Dwan & Wiharta, 2004).

Choice of measurement does not have any major impact on conclusions on trends and regionalisation (compare Figure II and Figure VI). The overall picture is one of a greater involvement of the UN as compared to non-UN actors in peacekeeping in interstate conflicts. This conclusion was also reached when focusing on the monthly number of operations, discussed in the previous chapter (second section).

Intrastate Conflicts

The pattern of the monthly number of non-UN peacekeepers in intrastate conflicts is more discontinuous and involves higher peaks. For long periods of time there were in fact no regional operations. In Figure VIII the first peak, in 1963, refers to the British peacekeeping force on Cyprus, while the second peak, some two years later, represents the operation in the Dominican Republic. The operations in Lebanon and

FIGURE VIII: Size of peacekeeping operations, intrastate conflict 1948-2000



Sri Lanka account for the third peak, in the second half of the 1970s, and the fourth peak, in the late 1980s, respectively. A final peak, or perhaps series of peaks, occurred in 1992–2000, at one stage in 1999 reaching a figure of more than 100,000 personnel. The monthly average number of personnel was 13,100.

The monthly number of UN peacekeepers is characterised by volatility. One surge occurred in connection with the large operation in Congo (Leopoldville), which deployed about 20,000 personnel, succeeded by the smaller operation on Cyprus in 1964. From late 1974 to early 1989 there were in fact no UN intrastate peacekeeping operations at all, as the Cyprus operation became an interstate operation after the invasion by Turkey in 1974. A minor peak in 1989 reflects the UNTAG operation in Namibia, and a surge in 1992 is due to the simultaneous operations in Cambodia, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. A final surge, initiated in 1998, had by 2000 reached a peak of about 30,000. The monthly average number of peacekeeping personnel was 6,900.

Apart from the early 1990s, the overall picture is one of a larger involvement of non-UN actors in intrastate conflicts as compared to the UN: non-UN actors have overall deployed more peacekeeping personnel than the UN, as well as more personnel in absolute numbers. With regard to the monthly number of peacekeepers, this was the case from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, during the late 1980s, and during the second half of the 1990s. However, judging from Dwan & Wiharta (2004), the gap had by December 2003 virtually closed. Thus, in terms of the number of deployed personnel there was no evidence of regionalisation by December 2003, but evidence rather of another change towards more UN involvement and less non-UN involvement. Meanwhile, in terms of the number of operations, regionalisation is discernible. This means that, depending on the measure used (the number of deployed personnel or the number of ongoing operations), different conclusions may be drawn as to whether and when peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts has been regionalised, and regarding long-term trends (compare Figure III and Figure VIII).

Geographic Distribution of Peacekeeping Operations

After a descriptive analysis at the global level using different measures, it may be revealing to carry out an analysis at the regional level. Hence, it may be asked whether regionalisation—to the extent it has occurred—is a regional rather than a global phenomenon.

Table I on the following page shows the total number of peacekeeping operations from June 1948 to December 2000, while Table II presents the average monthly number of peacekeeping operations per region and conflict type, by actor and for the same period. Table I shows that the UN deployed nine operations in the Middle East, eight in Asia, 18 in Africa, 11 in Europe, and eight in the Americas. Regionalised peacekeeping characterises some regions, but in different ways. The most conspicuous pattern is that in the Americas the UN has been entrusted to address intrastate conflicts, while regional actors have addressed interstate conflicts; in the Middle East the UN has dealt only with interstate conflicts, while regional actors have addressed both intrastate and interstate conflicts. In Africa the UN and regional actors have been equally active, a weak opposite trend can be observed for Europe and Asia.

The radically different intervention patterns in the Americas and the Middle East raise the question of how they may be explained. A closer look at the Middle East suggests that all the intrastate operations basically concerned the same conflict and area. Three of the operations were deployed in Lebanon, and the fourth one in Jordan. The conflicts were also interconnected. It may therefore not be surprising that one actor, having initiated peacekeeping, ends up handling all subsequent peace operations. Similarly, of the UN's nine operations, five were interconnected by being related to

the Arab–Israeli conflict, while two were related to Iraq. A similar pattern applies to interstate operations in the Americas. Four out of five operations took place in Central America, and three of the conflicts involved Honduras. Moreover, El Salvador and Nicaragua were involved in two conflicts each, and two of the conflicts were between the same parties. Again, this pattern of interconnectedness is similar to the one in the Middle East, and may offer an explanation for the intervention pattern: having initiated peacekeeping, for some reason the same actor tends to end up handling all subsequent peace operations in interconnected conflicts. Europe shows a similar pattern of clustering, in that eight of the UN’s operations concern the conflicts of the Balkans. Similar, though less extreme, instances of clustering of operations and peacekeepers can be found in other regions.

Table I. Number of ongoing peacekeeping operations, by actor and conflict, 1948 to 2000

Region	UN operations		Non-UN operations	
	<i>Interstate</i>	<i>Intrastate</i>	<i>Interstate</i>	<i>Intrastate</i>
Africa	3	15	3	14
Asia	3	5	6	7
Americas	0	8	5	1
Europe ⁹	2	9	0	13
Middle East ¹⁰	9	0	4	4
All regions	17	37	15	39

Let us now consider another measure of peacekeeping activity, where not only the number of operations but also their duration are taken into account. This offers a more nuanced picture. Table II shows a pattern similar to that in Table I for the Americas and a somewhat weaker pattern for the Middle East. For Africa, the UN is more involved, while for Europe and Asia the overall picture is unchanged. Apparently, the choice of measure makes no major difference. Moreover, in terms of the monthly average number of ongoing operations per region, Table II shows that the UN was most active in the Middle East, conducting on average 2.5 operations every month during the period of study. It was about half as active in Asia and Europe, about one-third as active in the Americas, and about one-ninth as active in Africa. The differences between the monthly average of ongoing UN operations per region, and the absolute number of UN operations per region, are a result of the difference in mission duration. Apparently, as of December 2000, among the interstate operations the ones in Africa were of the shortest duration, while the few ones in Asia, followed by the many ones in the Middle East, were of the longest duration. An opposite picture applies to intrastate

cases: operations in the Americas (closely followed by Asia) had the shortest duration, while operations in Europe (closely followed by Africa) had the longest duration.

Table II. Monthly average number of ongoing peacekeeping operations, by actor and conflict, June 1948 to December 2000

Region	UN operations		Non-UN operations	
	<i>Interstate</i>	<i>Intrastate</i>	<i>Interstate</i>	<i>Intrastate</i>
Africa	0.04	0.76	0.01	0.45
Asia	1	0.18	1.91	0.28
Americas	0	0.24	0.22	0.03
Europe ¹¹	0.60	0.69	0	1.01
Middle East ¹²	2.52	0	0.39	0.15
All regions	4.16	1.87	2.53	1.92

Non-UN actors were most active in Asia: on average there were 2.2 ongoing operations in Asia every month. On the other hand, these actors were half as active in Europe, one-fourth as active in the Middle East and Africa, and one-ninth as active in the Americas. As regards the numbers of peacekeeping operations per region, 17 operations were deployed in Africa, 13 in Asia and Europe, seven in the Middle East, and six in the Americas. Thus, non-UN operations are more common than UN operations in Asia, whereas the number of operations is roughly equal in other regions. Still, these figures show that Africa is, again, the region with the shortest peacekeeping operations (in this case, non-UN-led), while Asia has the longest operations (although this is mainly due to the operation between North and South Korea, which has been active since 1953). However, the intervention patterns (in terms of mission duration) are roughly similar for the Americas, but rather different for the Middle East and Europe. It is interesting to note that the actors have very similar intervention patterns (in terms of mission duration) in some regions but not in others. The tables also show that the UN and non-UN actors have allocated the same attention (in terms of average monthly number of ongoing operations) only to the Americas, while other regions show important differences.

Success Rates of Peacekeeping Operations

A question that carries important policy implications for the ongoing debate on whether the UN or regional actors should be entrusted with peacekeeping concerns success rates. More specifically, and in contrast to what is implied by the UN Charter, it is often suggested that non-UN-led operations are more—or less—likely to succeed than UN-led operations.¹³ For instance, non-UN operations are often regarded as superior because of, e.g., local knowledge, assumed affinity with the warring parties, and more linguistically and culturally homogenous forces. Still these sets of arguments can be disputed. As for the alleged benefits of UN operations, it is sometimes suggested that conflict parties are less likely to regard regional peacekeepers as neutral and trustworthy because of perceived vested interests that follow from regional links to the conflict. The empirical evidence in favour of such suggestions tends to be fragmentary, consisting of bits and pieces of case study specific evidence. However, such information does not provide the full picture that allows us to draw general inferences on comparative success rates. What is needed is a broader approach to data gathering.

Several research designs may be used to assess comparative success rate. One approach is to study all post-war cases, and examine if the durability/stability of post-war peace is higher (lower) for UN-led operations in comparison to non-UN-led operations. The suggested design addresses the research question “is there a relationship between peacekeeping operations and peace?” A second design could examine the question “under what conditions are peacekeeping operations successful?” Hence, some operations were successful, while others were not, and this variation across cases requires an explanation. The design would thus try to account for variation in success

across peacekeeping operations by examining whether type of mission makes any difference. As such it answers one important question (“Under what conditions are peacekeeping operations successful?”), but can at the same time not answer another important question (“Is there a relationship between peacekeeping operations and peace?”). A drawback with the first mentioned research design is that the many peacekeeping operations deployed in advance of expected wars, or deployed during ongoing conflicts, are excluded from the analysis. If we want to evaluate comparative success rates, it is preferable to include all peacekeeping operations in the analysis, and this can be done with the second research design. There are no large systematic comparative empirical studies that have used the first research design, and there is only one study relating to the second research design, to be presented below.

The concept of “success” in the context of peacekeeping is contested and has several meanings.¹⁴ It has been discussed whether a short- or long-term perspective should be used, whether resource limitations or even the recalcitrance of the conflict parties should be considered, and whether mandate fulfilment, facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment, limitation of casualties, war proneness during deployment, or even the establishment of democracy should be used as criterion. Here, “success” is used in the sense of “absence of war during deployment”, as this is the main—but certainly not the only—goal of peacekeeping operations. It is also related to Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter that are used to legitimise peace operations and focus on threats to peace and security. Absence of violence is also the prime issue mentioned in the aforementioned peacekeeping literature’s approach to the concept of peacekeeping. Other goals—such as addressing the underlying causes of the conflicts and wars—are not only the object of political and civilian missions and initiatives, they can also be more successfully pursued if war has been avoided.

It is often claimed that peacekeeping operations should be deployed where there is a peace to keep. But as illustrated in Table III, peacekeeping operations in intra-state conflicts often find themselves deployed where there is no peace to keep, either because peace has not yet been established, or because peace has broken down during the course of the operation. In terms of percentage of mission months involving ongoing civil war, the two types of operations’ historical war proneness are substantially identical; the picture is similar for interstate conflict, in that the corresponding figures are substantially identical. Thus, there have been ongoing civil wars more than 1/4 of the time when intrastate peacekeeping operations have been deployed, but virtually never during interstate peacekeeping.¹⁵

Table III. Proportion of peacekeeping operations deployment months with ongoing interstate or intrastate war, June 1948 to December 2000

Conflict type	UN-led operations	Non-UN-led operations
Intrastate	26%	28%
Interstate	1.5%	0.7%

Source: Heldt 2004.

Apart from the proportion of months involving ongoing war, it is also useful to examine how many times the UN or non-UN operations are exposed to failed peace involving transitions from peace to war, and how often war is turned into peace. Ideally, transitions from peace to civil war should never take place, while transitions from war to peace should be common. Transitions from civil war to peace have occurred 10 times during UN operations, while transitions from peace to civil war occurred three times; there were four transitions from civil war to peace, and none from peace to civil war, for non-UN operations (Heldt, 2004). This finding may appear to favour non-UN-led operations in that they have never experienced a relapse into civil war. On the other hand, non-UN-led operations have been less prone than UN operations to be associated with transitions from ongoing civil war to peace during deployment, even though the proportion of months involving ongoing war is identical. In terms of transitions between civil war and peace, the evidence in favour of any actor is once again inconclusive.

The fact that UN-led and non-UN-led peacekeeping are overall and substantially equally successful during deployment appears to suggest that the two types of operations are indeed substitutable. However, the figures do not take into account the degree of difficulty faced by these peacekeepers. These success rates may therefore reflect either the effectiveness of different types of operations, or different degrees of difficulties. Implicit in such an argument is the plausible assumption that not all cases are equally war prone. For instance, it is sometimes claimed that the most difficult cases are referred to the UN, and if this is correct, then the equal success rates appear to favour the UN.

Let us assume that it is always easier to manage conflicts before war has erupted. Indeed, and as noted earlier, Haas (1987) reports that during the 40-year period 1945–1984, the UN was not only more likely to attempt to manage interstate disputes, but was also—with the exception of the five-year period 1971–1975—more likely to be entrusted to manage the more serious disputes. A similar picture is at hand for peacekeeping, as UN-led operations are less likely to have been deployed to forestall armed conflict, and consequently more likely to have been deployed during and after wars. Of the UN's 37 intrastate operations, only seven were deployed where civil war had

not recently taken place (Heldt, 2004). The corresponding figure for the 39 non-UN-led operations is 14 (Ibid.). For UN-led operations in interstate conflicts, the figures are six out of 17 (Ibid.), while for non-UN-led operations, the figures are 13 out of 15 (Ibid.). Regional actors are thus much more likely to deploy conflict prevention operations than the UN. One interpretation is that it just shows that regional actors initially try to manage conflicts, and if they fail the conflicts are thereafter referred to the UN Security Council, just as suggested by the UN Charter. As time goes by and the conflict reaches the UN, it is more likely to have developed into war. Whatever the interpretation, the data suggest that the UN's peacekeeping operations do tend to be entrusted with more of the difficult cases, but are meanwhile not less successful. This suggests that UN operations are in fact more likely to succeed.

The only large-scale comparative empirical study that has attempted to control for degree of mission difficulty finds no robust evidence of a difference in success rates (with regard to absence of war) that applies without restrictions throughout time (1948–2000) and across space (all regions of the world) (cf. Heldt, 2004). This means in concrete terms that knowledge of whether an operation is UN- or non-UN-led does not assist us in predicting its success. While some regions for reasons of military resources and capabilities are in a better position than others to take on peacekeeping tasks, non-UN-led operations have *overall* not been less successful than UN operations. Nevertheless, if, and as mentioned above, peacekeeping operations are foremost confidence-building measures where physical presence rather than war fighting is essential, then issues of military resources and capabilities, or even command and control, are not of major importance. The policy implication of these admittedly first-cut findings is that if the goal is to stop violence, then UN-led efforts to address international peace and security can continue to co-exist with non-UN-led efforts. The UN Charter has got it right in that sense.

The conclusion of co-existence raises the question of how the division of labour should be designed. One can envision a division of labour between UN-led and non-UN-led peacekeeping operations in three ways: the UN takes on some mission, regional organisation and coalitions of the willing take on other missions; UN-led and non-UN-led operations coexist within one conflict and divide the tasks among themselves; the UN takes on some types of mission (e.g., multidimensional operations) whereas regional actors focus on traditional peacekeeping operations. The first option has been in existence for more than 50 years, and it appears overall to have worked well. Over history the second option has been practised at a few occasions. However, there is no broad empirical evidence to settle the question of how this division of labour should be designed, or even whether it should be generally promoted. Also, the third option is already partly existing, in that regional actors with a few exceptions have carried out traditional or peace enforcement operations in intrastate conflicts, while the UN has been comparatively much more prone to carry out multidimensional operations.

A possible and partial reason for this regional focus on traditional peacekeeping is the lack of training and capacity for more complex missions, or perhaps foremost lack of financial resources to carry out long-term and extensive tasks with elements of nation-building. Another possibly contributing reason is that non-UN operations have been more likely to deploy in advance of armed conflicts, and this means that there is a lower need for multidimensional operations involving tasks bordering on nation-building of war ravaged societies. This suggests that this kind of division of labour will continue to exist for the foreseeable future.

Concluding Reflections

This study has presented a bird's-eye view of some aspects of the empirical landscape of peacekeeping operations carried out by UN and non-UN actors in the period 1948–2000. The empirical patterns are interesting, thought-provoking and clarifying. They constitute the first-ever summary and comparison of the past decades of peacekeeping activities of both the UN and non-UN actors. They also generate a series of questions for further research and contribute to the ongoing policy-oriented debate on peacekeeping operations.

One finding is that non-UN actors have been surprisingly active in peacekeeping during the period of study. In terms of number of operations and personnel, their activities are fully comparable to the UN's efforts. At the aggregate level there is a strong relationship over time between the number of ongoing peacekeeping operations carried out by UN and non-UN actors, and an even stronger one for these actors' operations in intrastate conflicts, while virtually none exists for deployment in interstate conflicts. The UN's peacekeeping operations are in general of longer duration than non-UN actors' operations, but that is accounted for an equal duration in intrastate conflict, and of more than double duration in interstate conflicts. It is puzzling why there is such a stark difference between activities in interstate versus intrastate conflict.

The patterns mean that burden-sharing (implying a positive relationship) may be a broadly suitable description of the UN's and regional actors' total peacekeeping efforts during 1948–2000. Burden-sharing may also be a suitable concept for

describing patterns of peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts. For interstate conflicts, neither burden-sharing nor free-riding (implying a negative relationship), but rather independence characterises the past over 50 years of peacekeeping. These observations apply to the global level. Across regions, however, there is a great deal of variation in these regards.

The validity of the claim of a global trend towards regionalisation of peacekeeping depends on the type of conflict and how peacekeeping activity is measured. First, in terms of number of operations, there has been a gradual move towards greater reliance on UN peacekeeping in interstate conflicts. Second, in terms of the number of deployed peacekeepers the picture is, again, one of a greater involvement of the UN than of non-UN actors in interstate conflicts, and there is no evidence of an increasing number of non-UN peacekeepers in interstate conflicts.

The pattern of peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts is different: there is evidence of a global trend not only towards more non-UN operations, but also towards regionalisation. However, the claim that peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts is *presently* experiencing a dramatic transition towards regionalisation is inaccurate, as today's pattern has existed for almost a decade. In terms of the number of deployed peacekeepers, during the second half of the 1990s the overall picture was one of a greater involvement of non-UN actors as compared to the UN in peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts: non-UN actors deployed more peacekeeping personnel than the UN. However, by December 2003 there was virtually no difference. Thus, on the basis of the number of deployed personnel as of December 2003, there is no evidence of regionalisation of operations in intrastate conflict. This means that, depending on the measure used (the number of deployed personnel or the number of ongoing peacekeeping operations), different conclusions may be drawn as to whether regionalisation has occurred. The claim that regionalisation is on the rise is therefore partly undermined, but we may still conclude that non-UN actors' peacekeeping activities in intrastate conflicts have been historically high for the past almost 10 years.

Another observation is that non-UN operations have historically, with a few recent exceptions, carried out traditional first-generation security-oriented operations with a focus on interpositioning and monitoring, while the UN (starting with UNTAG in 1989) has carried out a series of complex second-generation or multidimensional operations that, in addition, have tasks that touch upon nation-building or post-conflict reconstruction. As previously suggested, a possible and partial explanation for this regional focus on traditional peacekeeping may be the lack of training and capacity for more complex missions. This suggests that a proactive approach to training may be most fruitful: instead of reactively trying to meet the present training needs, it may be wise to engage proactively in training activities since this could facilitate the initiation of more regional second-generation operations. However, international support for capacity-building for regional peace operations requires that there is a recipient, i.e.,

a regional or sub-regional IGO rather than ad hoc coalitions of states. As such, some regions are more suitable candidates for international support for capacity-building. Moreover, the outlook for forging strong, security-oriented IGOs in some regions may for a series of reasons not be positive in the short term. This in turn implies that some regions may be unlikely to develop the capacity and skills for second-generation types of peacekeeping operations. This constitutes yet another reason for expecting that the UN will continue to play a dominant role in such types of operations.

Stronger regional IGOs may not only contribute to more regional operations, but also be a precondition for standardising peacekeeping training and for improving coordination and cooperation within regions as well as between regions and the UN. Considering the large amount of UN-led as well as non-UN-led operations, the need and value of coordination and cooperation may be large at least in some regions. Indeed, the absence of coordination and cooperation, and standardised training, may constitute part of the explanation for why UN-led and non-UN-led operations seldom coexist within one conflict and divide the tasks among themselves. Since such IGOs are absent in some regions, the outlook for achieving these goals at the global level may be poor. This constitutes yet another reason for expecting that the past patterns of peacekeeping will also be the pattern of future peacekeeping.

UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1948-2000

Peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN were identified through the UN website for peacekeeping operations and the standard work *The Blue Helmets* (1996). All relevant UN Security Council resolutions were examined to determine whether each peacekeeping operation thus identified fulfilled this study's definition with regard to tasks. This in-depth examination led to the exclusion of UNAVEM I since it did not interposition itself between the warring parties; its purpose was instead to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. ONUCA was established partly to monitor an entire region (with regard to the implementation of the Esquipulas II Agreement, that specified the cessation of direct and indirect aid to irregular forces) and partly to monitor the demobilisation of the Contras in Nicaragua. Only the part of the mission (April–July 1990) that refers to Nicaragua is included. UNFICYP (from the war of 1974), UNYOM, UNOGIL, UNGOMAP and UNIFIL are all treated as interstate operations. UNFICYP addresses conflict or tension between two state actors from the war of 1974, before which it focused on the domestic situation. While there existed an intrastate conflict in Northern Yemen, UNYOM addressed tension between Northern Yemen and Saudi Arabia. UNIFIL was established to address tension between Lebanon and Israel; it was not formally established to address the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. UNOGIL addressed the tension and monitored the border between Lebanon and Syria; it was not mandated to intervene in the Lebanese intrastate conflict although it may have had implications for that conflict. Finally, while UNGOMAP monitored the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, it also monitored the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to ensure mutual non-intervention and non-interference. It is therefore treated as an operation in an interstate conflict. The remaining interstate operations are UNASOG, UNDOF, UNEF I, UNEF II, UNIIMOG, UNIKOM, UNIPOM, UNMOGIP, UNMOP, UNMEE, UNOMUR, and UNTSO. All other operations are intrastate operations. The full names and the dates of UN operations are found below.

Peacekeeping operations carried out by non-UN actors were identified through case studies. A large number of primary and secondary sources¹⁶ were consulted. In some cases secondary sources used the term “peacekeeping,” but a closer examination often revealed that the sources were either inaccurate or that they used a definition of “peacekeeping operation” that is different from the one applied here. The definition means that many so-called “peace-building missions” of, for instance, the OSCE and the UN are excluded. Names and dates of non-UN operations are presented below.

Finally, a comprehensive list of the cases which were excluded, and the reason for their exclusion, is presented last in this appendix.

UN-led Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2000

Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), May 1965–October 1966.

United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), January–May 1997.

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), April 1998–February 2000.

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), April 1991–.

United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), December 1997–March 2000.

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), July 1997–February 1999.

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), December 1999–.

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), July 1960–June 1964.

United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), November 1989–January 1992. The dates refer to the entire life-span of the operation. For reasons specified at p. 37, only the period April–July 1990 is included in the analysis of this report.

United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), December 1992–December 1994.

United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), July 1991–April 1995.

United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), October 1991–March 1992.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), October 1993–March 1996.

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), October 1999–.

United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG), May–June 1994.

United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), January 1989–June 1991. For reasons specified at p. 37, while this is officially called a peacekeeping operation, it is excluded from the analysis in the report.

United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), May 1991–February 1995.

United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), February 1995–June 1997.

- United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), March 1995–January 1996.
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), June 1974–.
- First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), November 1956–June 1967.
- Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), October 1973–July 1979.
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), March 1964–.
- United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), April 1988–March 1990.
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), March 1978–.
- United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), August 1988–February 1991.
- United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), April 1991–.
- United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), September 1965–March 1966.
- United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), December 1995–.
- United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), September 1993–June 1996.
- United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), June 1999–.
- United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), January 1949–.
- United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), January 1996–.
- United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), December 1994–May 2000.
- United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), June–December 1958.
- United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), July 2000–.
- United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), Augusti 1993–.
- United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), September 1993–September 1997.
- United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), July 1998–October 1999
- United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR), June 1993–September 1994.
- United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), April 1992–March 1993.
- United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), March 1993– March 1995.
- United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), March 1995–February 1999.
- United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), March 1992–December 1995.

United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG), January 1998–October 1998.

United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea [West Irian] (UNSF), October 1962–April 1963.

United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), July 1996–July 1997.

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), March 1992–September 1993.

United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), January 1996–January 1998.

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), October 1999–.

United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), April 1989–March 1990.

United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), August–November 1997.

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), June 1948–.

United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), July 1963–September 1964.

Non-UN-led Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2000

Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), October/November 1976–July 1982. Addressed intrastate conflict in Lebanon.

Arab League Military Observers in Yemen, October 1972. Addressed interstate conflict between North Yemen and South Yemen.

Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission (ACOM), August. 1970. Addressed intrastate conflict by monitoring the withdrawal of PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) from Jordan.

Bamako Ceasefire Commission, October 1963–April 1964. Addressed interstate conflict between Algeria and Morocco.

Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), May 1998–. Addressed intrastate conflict in Bougainville.

Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), December 1997–April 1998. Addressed intrastate conflict in Bougainville.

British Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, December 1963–March 1964. Addressed intrastate conflict in Cyprus.

Chad I, March 1979–June 1979. Addressed intrastate conflict in Chad.

Chad II (Inter-African Force), January 1980–March 1980. Addressed intrastate conflict in Chad.

Chad III, November 1981–June 1982. Addressed intrastate conflict in Chad.

- CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPKF)/CIS Tajikistan Buffer Force, March 1993–September 2000. Addressed intrastate conflict in Tajikistan.
- CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia (CISPKF or CPKF)/Collective Peacemaking Force (CPFOR), June 1994–. Addressed intrastate conflict in Georgia.
- Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF), December 1979–March 1980. Addressed intrastate conflict in Zimbabwe.
- Commonwealth Multinational Police Assistance Group (CMPAG), February 2000–June 2000. Addressed intrastate conflict at the Solomon Islands.
- Commonwealth Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group (CMMPMG), October 1999–January 2000. Addressed intrastate conflict at the Solomon Islands.
- Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group – Liberia (ECOMOG–Liberia), August 1990–October 1999. Addressed intrastate conflict in Liberia.
- Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group – Guinea Bissau (ECOMOG–Guinea Bissau), December 1998–June 1999. Addressed intrastate conflict in Guinea Bissau.
- Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group – Sierra Leone (ECOMOG–Sierra Leone), October 1997–May 2000. Addressed intrastate conflict in Sierra Leone.
- Implementation Force (IFOR), December 1995–December 1996. Addressed intrastate conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina.
- Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), July 1987–March 1990. Addressed intrastate conflict between Sri Lanka and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).
- Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), February 1997–April 1998. Addressed intrastate conflict in the Central African Republic.
- International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS), January 1973–May 1974. Addressed interstate conflict between North Vietnam and South Vietnam.
- International Commission for Supervision and Control–Cambodia (ICC–Cambodia), August 1954–January 1970. Addressed interstate conflict between North Vietnam and Cambodia.
- International Commission for Supervision and Control–Laos, I (ICC–Laos I), August 1954–July 1958. Addressed interstate conflict between North Vietnam and Laos.
- International Commission for Supervision and Control–Laos, II (ICC–Laos II), May 1962–December 1975. Addressed interstate conflict between North Vietnam and Laos.

- International Commission for Supervision and Control–Vietnam (ICC–Vietnam), August 1954–January 1973. Addressed interstate conflict between North Vietnam and South Vietnam.
- International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), September 1999–February 2000. Addressed intrastate conflict in East Timor.
- International Peace Monitoring Team for the Solomon Islands (IPMT), November 2000–. Addressed intrastate conflict at the Solomon Islands.
- Kosovo Force (KFOR), June 1999–. Addressed intrastate conflict in Kosovo.
- Mission of Military Observers Ecuador–Peru (MOMEP), March 1995–June 1999. Addressed interstate conflict between Peru and Ecuador.
- Moldova Joint Force/Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force, July 1992–. Addressed intrastate conflict in Moldova.
- Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), April 1982–. Addressed interstate conflict between Israel and Egypt.
- Multinational Force I (MNF I), August 1982–September 1982. Deployed in Lebanon, addressed interstate conflict between Israel and Syria.
- Multinational Force II (MNF II), September 1982–March 1984. Deployed in Lebanon, this mission had interstate (Israel vs. Syria) as well as intrastate (PLO vs. various groups; various groups vs. various groups) conflict tasks.
- Neutral Nations’ Supervisory Commission for Korea (NNSC), August 1953–. Addressed interstate conflict between North Korea and South Korea.
- OAS Committee of Military Experts (Advisors), OAS Military Observers Group, May 1957–June 1957. Addressed interstate conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua.
- OAS Committee of Military Experts (Observers), January 1955–February 1955. Addressed interstate conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua.
- OAS Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), May 1965–September 1966. Addressed intrastate conflict in the Dominican Republic.
- OAS Military Observers I, July 1969–July 1971. Addressed interstate conflict between Honduras and El Salvador.
- OAS Military Observers II, August 1976–August 1981. Addressed interstate conflict between Honduras and El Salvador.
- OAU Military Observer Team (MOT), April 1991–September 1991. Addressed intrastate conflict in Rwanda.
- OAU Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I), September 1991–July 1992. Addressed intrastate conflict in Rwanda.
- OAU Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II), August 1992–November 1993. Addressed intrastate conflict in Rwanda.

- OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB), February 1994–July 1996. Addressed intrastate conflict in Burundi.
- OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC), November 1997–May 1999. Addressed intrastate conflict in the Comoros.
- OAU Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, September 1999–November 2000. OAU observers were part of the “Joint Military Commission” that was formed by the belligerent parties. Addressed intrastate conflict.
- Observer Commission from the states of Non-Aggression and Defense Aid Agreement (ANAD) and Benin, January 1986. Addressed interstate conflict between Mali and Burkina Faso.
- OSCE Mission to Bosnia–Hercegovina, December 1995–. Addressed intrastate conflict.
- OSCE Mission to Croatia, June 1998–October 2000. This operation existed prior to June 1998, but it is only from this date that the operation was mandated with security tasks.
- OSCE Mission to Georgia, March 1994–. Addressed intrastate conflict. This operation existed prior to March 1994, but it is only from this date that the operation was mandated with security tasks.
- OSCE Mission to Moldova, April 1993–. Addressed intrastate conflict.
- Russian Abkhazia Peacekeeping Operation, November/December 1993–May/June 1994. Addressed intrastate conflict.
- Somali Military Observer Team, October 1972–November 1972. Addressed interstate conflict between Uganda and Tanzania.
- South Ossetia Joint Force, July 1992–. Addresses intrastate conflict.
- Stabilisation Force (SFOR), December. 1996–. Addressed intrastate conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina.
- Symbolic (Token) Arab Security Force (ASF), June 1976–October 1976. Addressed intrastate conflict in Lebanon.

Examples of Excluded Non-UN Cases

- A series of Joint Commissions related to the Angolan conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s. None of the commissions involved deployment of third party military troops/observers and/or civilian police.
- Arab League Force, 1961–1963. According to the mandate, this was not an interposition force, but a protective force in support of Kuwait against Iraq.
- Arab League, 1980. The Arab League formed a military commission to supervise ceasefire and withdrawal of troops between North Yemen and South Yemen. No evidence of deployed personnel. The commission lasted only one day.

- Ceasefire Commission, 1981. No evidence that military observers were deployed to the area of conflict between Peru and Ecuador. Military observers were based in Lima and Quito and took occasional trips to the conflict areas.
- European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM), 1991–2000. Was mandated to report to EU about events in the Western Balkans. The operations had no security functions.
- European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), 2000–. EUMM took over after ECMM and was given the same tasks.
- French force in Djibouti, 1992. The force was not mandated with any peacekeeping tasks (as defined above), but only to provide humanitarian and sanitary support to civilians in rebel held territory.
- Inter-African Force, 1978–1979. Not an interposition force, but a coalition of African states aiming to support the government of Zaire against armed rebels. The force took over after Belgian and French paratroopers left the conflict area.
- International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICAH), 2000–. Deployed in Haiti, MICAH took over after MICIVIH. As the name indicates, this was not a peacekeeping operation.
- International Observer Group Mission (IOGM), 1990. Deployed in Bougainville, included only civilian personnel and only mandated to observe peace talks.
- International Observer Team, 1968–1970. Deployed in Nigeria to investigate human rights violation.
- International Observers Team (IOT), 1990. Deployed in Bougainville, lasted six days, included only civilian personnel.
- International Support and Verification Commission of the OAS (CIAV), 1990–1997. Deployed in Nicaragua, CIAV was never responsible for interposition or security questions. Such tasks were handled by the UN peacekeeping operation ONUCA. CIAV assisted during the disarmament process in 1990, but only had a humanitarian role. After this process was complete the mandate changed.
- Joint Commission, 1992. Deployed in Mali, was a commission with representatives from the government and Tuareg groups that had agreed to a truce. Thus, there were no third-party personnel.
- Joint Military Commission in Yemen, 1994. Addressed intrastate conflict in Yemen. The commission included military attaches and representatives of several countries, but did not carry out any peacekeeping tasks.
- Joint Military Committee, 1953–1954. Deployed in Burma to help evacuate remnants (almost 7,000) of Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) located in Burma–Thailand border area to Taiwan.

- Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 1994–1996. Was mandated to monitor the border between Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina so that the sanctions were not violated.
- Monitoring–Observer Force in Uganda. According to a peace agreement in late 1985, a peacekeeping force would be established in Uganda. While some observers were deployed in December fighting never stopped, and thus the agreement was never implemented before it became redundant. Moreover, before the agreement could be implemented, the NRA (National Resistance Army) toppled the government in January 1986, and thus made the agreement redundant.
- Multinational Protection Force (MPF), 1997. Deployed in Albania “to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organizations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.” Thus, this is not an interposition force that deals with security issues between warring parties.
- OAS Special Commission in Suriname, 1992. Deployed in Suriname, the Commission did not involve deployment of troops, military observers, or civilian police responsible for security, observation of cease-fire, etc. Instead, Surinamese government forces/police had this responsibility, while the Special Commission observed whether they carried out this task.
- OAU Mediation Commission, 1974. Deployed between Mali–Upper Volta, but military observers were never able to fully deploy, as they were not allowed into Mali.
- OAU, 1964. No evidence that the OAU contributed with military observers to the joint commission formed between Ethiopia and Somalia.
- OAU, 1991–. Deployed in Western Sahara–Morocco, OAU observers were occupied with assisting in compiling the list of voters.
- OAU, 1998–. No OAU military troops/observers and/or civilian police deployed between Ethiopia–Eritrea.
- Operation Turquoise, 1994. This French operation was not mandated to carry out peacekeeping in Rwanda. It was instead given purely humanitarian tasks.
- Operation Uphold Democracy, 1994–1995. This was a UN authorised intervention force aiming at installing a democratically elected government in Haiti. It was also not a neutral interposition force.
- OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE–KVM), 1998–1999. All personnel were civilian.
- OSCE. Most of the OSCE’s field missions are peace-building mission and are thus excluded from the list.

- Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), 1998–1999. Deployed in Lesotho. While sometimes denoted “peacekeeping operation,” this was an intervention force dominated by South Africa that sided with the government to reinstall order after a military uprising against the government. In 1999 Operation Maluti was established, but this is the name of an effort (dominated by the South African military) to professionalise the armed forces of Lesotho.
- Sinai Field Mission (SFM), 1975–1982. Commissioned by a third party state (the U.S.), a private contractor handled a series of different types of sensors that were placed between Egypt and Israel; aerial reconnaissance was carried out by the third party that did not deploy any peacekeepers on the ground. Since only missions with direct involvement by at least one third party state, involving deployed troops, military observers, or civilian police are included, this mission is excluded.
- South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPKF), 1994. Deployed in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. The issue was whether SPKF carried out task number “3” in its mandate, that is, whether SPKF really carried out peacekeeping (deployment in order to interposition themselves between the parties in the zones of fighting) rather than acting as a security force for a conference (conference security). Sources show that the tasks never extended beyond the conference venue.
- The International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), 1994, 1997–. Deployed in Hebron, it did not contain military troops, military observers, or civilian police. Moreover, was not mandated to observe cease-fire, be responsible for the security situation, or even to act as an interposition force.
- United Task Force (UNITAF), 1992–1993. Deployed in Somalia, was not mandated to carry out peacekeeping. Was instead given the task of ensuring the distribution of humanitarian aid.
- UN–OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), 1993–2000. Deployed in Haiti, this was a peace-building operation without any peacekeeping tasks.
- Western European Union Demining Assistance Mission (WEUDAM), 1999–. Deployed in Croatia, this operation was restricted to demining.
- WEU Police Contingent in Mostar/WEU Unified Police Force in Mostar, 1994–1996. Deployed in Mostar, was mandated to assist in police training, but was not an intervention force that had the responsibility to address security issues by itself.

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1. By “dispute” is meant: “A specific grievance between two or more states about a distinct subject involving an allegation that a provision of the Charter or a major resolution of an authoritative United Nations organ has been violated. The subjects typically involve accusations of aggression of armed attack, claims to seizure of territory, intervention in a civil war, the violation of human rights, and the demand for independence.” (Haas, 1987: 8).
2. By “conflict” is meant: “An organised and continuous militarized conflict, or a demonstration of intention to use military force involving at least one state.” (Bercovitch, 1999: 5).
3. For a detailed analysis, see McCoubrey & White (1996) and McCoubrey & Morris (2000).
4. See Diehl *et al.* (1998) for a categorisation of the functions of peacekeeping operations.
5. There are alternative lists of “peacekeeping operations” that rely on a broader definition. SIPRI Yearbook has in recent years presented a list of “multilateral peace missions” that includes a broader set of military and political interventions, most of which are excluded from this report.
6. The full name and dates of this and other peacekeeping operations mentioned in the study are provided in the Appendix.
7. See Gilligan & Stedman (2003) for a critical review of literature.
8. For data sources and notes, see Heldt & Wallensteen (2003).
9. UNFICYP is counted twice, as it was an intrastate peacekeeping operation until 1974, after which it became an interstate operation. UNAVEM I is excluded for reasons presented in the Appendix.
10. MNF II is counted twice, as it was an intrastate as well as an interstate peacekeeping operation.
11. See endnote 9.
12. See endnote 10.
13. See Heldt (2004) for a review of theories and empirical findings.

14. On this topic, see Bratt (1996), Druckman & Stern (1997), Diehl (1994), Doyle & Sambanis (2000), Heldt (2002), and Johansen (1994).
15. This pattern raises the question of whether intrastate peacekeeping operations are inherently less likely to succeed. Heldt (2002) reviews theories and findings on this issue, and finds no robust evidence in favour of any difference. The reason for the large difference in success rate appears rather to be that many intrastate peacekeeping operations have historically been deployed in ongoing wars, while interstate operations always deploy after violence has been stopped. Intrastate operations are thus exposed to more difficult settings in which they have to act, but they are not inherently less likely to succeed.
16. The list of sources is too long to cite here but is available on request.

To what extent have the United Nations (UN) and regional actors attempted to manage disputes through peacekeeping operations? Has peacekeeping become regionalised? Which actor has historically been more successful? Questions like these are topical and carry large policy implications for the present debate on peacekeeping operations. Building on recently compiled data, this report offers a descriptive account and bird's-eye view of global peacekeeping for the 53-year period 1948–2000. It puts today's pattern of peacekeeping in perspective and compares peacekeeping in different organisational frameworks – within and outside the UN. Focusing on deployment in terms of number, size, location, and type of conflict, it identifies trends. This reveals in turn similarities as well as differences between peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN and those conducted by non-UN actors. This report also summarises available evidence on success rates and offers some conclusions on the significance of the organisational framework for international action.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS: Birger Heldt is Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, and research adviser at the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Peter Wallensteen is Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden.

COVER: A Danish soldier in UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) keeps watch over the hills (1990). Photo courtesy of the United Nations, Department of Information (UN/DPI Photo 157782C).

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FOLKE BERNADOTTE ACADEMY

Sandövägen 1
S-872 64 Sandöverken
Sweden
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