



Joint Operations Planning

Joint Warfare Publication 5-00

JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 5-00

JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING

Joint Warfare Publication 5-00 (JWP 5-00), March 2004 Edition,
is promulgated
as directed by the Chiefs of Staff



Director General
Joint Doctrine and Concepts

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

1. This information is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate.
2. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to a recipient Government for defence purposes only. It may be disclosed only within the Defence Department of a recipient Government, except as otherwise authorised by the MOD.
3. This information may be subject to privately owned rights.

AUTHORISATION

The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre (JDCC) is responsible for publishing Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs) and maintaining a hierarchy of such publications. Users wishing to quote JWPs as reference material in other work should confirm with the JDCC Doctrine Editor whether the particular publication and amendment state remains extant. Comments on factual accuracy or proposals for amendment should also be directed to the Doctrine Editor at:

The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre
Ministry of Defence
Shrivenham
SWINDON
Wilts SN6 8RF

Telephone number: 01793 314216/7
Facsimile number: 01793 314232
E-Mail: doctrine@jdcc.mod.uk

DISTRIBUTION

Distribution of JWPs is managed by DSDC(L), Mwrwg Road, Llangennech, Llanelli, Carmarthenshire, SA14 8YP. Requests for issue of this publication, or amendments to its distribution, should be referred to DSDC(L). All other JDCC publications including a regularly updated CD '*Joint Doctrine Disk*' (containing both JWPs and Allied Joint Publications (AJPs)) can also be demanded from DSDC(L).

Telephone number: 01554 822368
Facsimile: 01554 822350

All publications (including drafts) are available for viewing/download at dNet:
<http://chots.mod.uk/jointwar/index.htm>

PREFACE

1. **Purpose.** JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*' is about campaign planning in deployed multinational and national Joint Operations.¹ It describes how planning activities and processes are integrated and co-ordinated to support decision-making and the production of plans, orders and directives. JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*' flows directly from JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*' and together with JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*', is the UK authority for the conduct of deployed joint operations. It is aimed primarily at those responsible for the planning of operations, specifically Chief of Staff (COS) Joint Task Force Headquarters and his staff, but also component Headquarters COS, the Permanent Joint Headquarters Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) J5 and their staffs. It will be of considerable use to those involved in the Defence Crisis Management Organisation and is a key document in the delivery of joint command and staff training.
2. **Structure.** JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*' comprises 3 chapters:
 - a. **Chapter 1 – Crisis Planning at the Strategic Level.** The purpose of Chapter 1 is to explain Strategic level planning in sufficient detail in order to provide a context for Operational level planning.
 - b. **Chapter 2 – The Fundamentals of Operational Design.** The purpose of Chapter 2 is to convey an understanding of the theory of operational planning. It begins with a brief description of campaigning, before concentrating on a detailed examination of the intellectual tools and processes that make up operational design.
 - c. **Chapter 3 – Planning at the Operational Level.** The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe how the theory of campaign planning is applied in practice, including the integration and co-ordination of multinational, component and joint planning considerations, in order to understand the construction, monitoring and evolution of the campaign plan.

LINKAGES

3. **Multinational Doctrine.** JWP 5-00 is consistent with the ideas contained in the following publications, however, where they occur, significant differences are explained.

¹ Joint Operations are the synergistic effect of tactical activities in a campaign set at the operational level. Joint Operations fuse a range of single-Service capabilities, are multi-agency in character and are normally conducted within an alliance or coalition framework.

a. **NATO Doctrine.** Allied Joint publications; AJP-01(B) '*Allied Joint Doctrine*', AJP-3 '*Allied Joint Operations*' and NATO's BI/SC '*Guidelines for Operational Planning*' (GOP).

b. **US Doctrine.** JP 5-0, JP 5-00.1 & JP 5-00.2.

4. **National Joint Doctrine.** The capstone publications IJWP 1-00 '*Joint Personnel Administration*', JWP 2-00 '*Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*', JWP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*' and JWP 6-00 '*Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint Operations*' explain the detailed planning process in these key functional areas.

JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING

CONTENTS

Title Page	i
Authorisation and Distribution	ii
Preface	iii
Contents	v
Joint Warfare Publications	vii
Record of Amendments	viii

Chapter 1 Crisis Planning at the Strategic Level

Types of Planning	1-1
The Defence Crisis Management Organisation	1-4
Crisis Management Groups	1-9
The Strategic Crisis Planning Process	1-12
Multinational Operations	1-14
Annex A – UK Advance Planning	
Annex B – The NATO Planning Process	
Annex C – The EU Planning Process	
Annex D – US Strategic Planning	
Annex E – Multinational Command and Control Model with UK as a Participating Nation	
Annex F – Multinational Command and Control Model with UK as the Framework Nation	
Annex G – Strategic Planning Development Flow Chart	

Chapter 2 The Fundamentals of Operational Design

An Overview of Campaigning	2-1
Operational Design	2-12
The Operational Estimate	2-19
Planning During the Campaign	2-28
Annex A – The Operational Estimate	
Annex B – Schematics	
Appendix B1 – Option 1 – Defining the Art of the Possible	
Appendix B2 – Option 2 – Fixing Effects in Time and Space	
Appendix B3 – Campaign Planning Concepts	
Appendix B4 – Campaign Planning Process Schematics	

Annex C – Wargaming	
Annex D – Risk Analysis Process	
Annex E – Campaign Effectiveness Analysis	
Appendix E1 – Producing and Running a Measures of Effectiveness Assessment Sheet	
Appendix E2 – Producing and Running a Campaign Effectiveness Analysis Schematic	
Appendix E3 – Example Campaign Effectiveness Analysis Schematic	

Chapter 3 Planning at the Operational Level

Initial Planning Activities	3-1
Joint Task Force Headquarters Planning Process	3-5
Assessing the Campaign	3-15
Key Planning Considerations	3-16
Annex A – The Joint Planning Process	
Annex B – Outline CDS Planning Guidance to the Joint Commander	
Annex C – Outline CDS Directive to the Joint Commander	
Annex D – Outline Joint Commander’s Mission Directive	
Annex E – Joint Task Force Commander’s Planning Guidance	
Annex F – A Hierarchy of Operational Paperwork	
Annex G – Campaign Directive Template	
Annex H – Force Instruction Document Template	

Glossary of Terms and Definitions

Glossary of Abbreviations

JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS

The successful prosecution of joint operations requires a clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

Interim Joint Warfare Publications (IJWPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened timescale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive ‘parent’ publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is explained in a current Joint Service DCI.²

² DCI GEN 91 2003.

CHAPTER 1 – CRISIS PLANNING AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

The purpose of Chapter 1 is to explain Strategic level crisis planning in sufficient detail to provide a context for Operational level planning.

Section I –Types of Planning

Section II –The Defence Crisis Management Organisation

Section III – Crisis Management Groups

Section IV – Strategic Crisis Planning Process

Section V – Multinational Operations

SECTION I – TYPES OF PLANNING

“Planning is an unnatural process; it is far more fun to do something. The nicest thing about not planning is that failure comes as a complete surprise, rather than being preceded by a period of worry and depression”

Sir John Harvey-Jones

Introduction

101. Planning is a function of command at all levels and is a prerequisite for the successful conduct of military operations. It is an activity of the mind that is guided by a process. Planning is the process of determining a course of action to take, what the course of action is intended to achieve, the manner in which the course of action is to be prosecuted and the resources that will be required to facilitate that prosecution.

102. The levels of war are explained in JWP 0-01 ‘*British Defence Doctrine*’ (BDD) and expanded in JDP 01 ‘*Joint Operations*’. Understanding the interaction of these levels is key to how command and control is exercised at the operational level. However, by setting levels, it might be assumed that discrete activity happens in each, when actually there is significant overlap, to the extent that tactical level activity will have strategic and operational consequence and effect, and *vice versa*. Thus joint planning is a complex process that increasingly requires the timely co-ordination of activities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level political strategy is designed to lay down or direct a set of national or multinational goals in support of policy objectives. One of the characteristics of planning at the strategic level is the need for an effective political/military interface to ensure co-ordination of the various instruments of national power in pursuit of national objectives. Military strategy is the means by which the military parameters are worked out to meet the

political goals. In broad terms 3 things have to be established at this strategic level: ends, ways and means. As BDD articulates, this is the essence of planning at the strategic level.

103. The UK is likely to commit forces to military operations in 3 broad circumstances: national operations, multinational operations as the Framework¹ or Lead Nation² and multinational operations as a participating/contributing nation. Government direction will be translated by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) through the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) into the criteria for the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)³ and his staff to develop and execute a campaign plan in order to achieve national and/or multinational goals. For the JTFC and his staff to achieve this, they must understand the interaction between the different levels of war and the responsibilities of the respective organisations for the planning and conduct of national and multinational operations.

104. For the JTFC and his staff deployed on national operations, guidance and direction will come directly from the PJHQ. In Allied, Multinational or Coalition operations there will be additional channels with which the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) will have to deal. This publication outlines the planning process and structure to guide personnel working at the operational level through their likely roles. It is not intended to be a prescriptive process that has to be followed slavishly and it will require adaptation depending on the situation.

Advance Planning⁴

105. Advance planning is conducted with the intent of addressing future security risks. Military strategic planning is initiated following recognition of a situation that may warrant a response by UK Armed Forces. During peacetime the Government and the MOD monitor world events and in certain circumstances direct that contingency plans be developed in case the UK has to exercise a military option. The MOD's Operational Tasking Group⁵ (OTG) agrees on the priorities for planning and

¹ Defined in JWP 3-00 (based on AJP-3) as 'Forces designated under 'framework nation' arrangements are commanded by an officer from the framework nation. A significant proportion of the staff and headquarters support will also come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation and also its staff procedures. However in practice, once command and staff teams are established, procedures may evolve to incorporate best practice from amongst the contributing nations.'

² Defined in JWP 3-00 (based on AJP-3) as 'One nation assuming lead responsibility for the planning and execution of an operation, particularly retaining ownership of the Campaign Plan and Info Ops. The JTFC, staff, command, control, Communications and Information Systems (CIS) structure, doctrine and logistic co-ordination of the force will be provided by one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force under a National Contingent Commander (NCC), with liaison officers (LOs), and might even fulfil some staff positions in the lead nation's staff.'

³ May be a National Contingent Commander (NCC) in certain circumstances.

⁴ Advance Planning is defined here as the activity 'conducted principally in peacetime to develop plans for contingencies identified by strategic planning assumptions. Advance planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and can form the basis for Crisis Response Planning.' *Formerly known as Deliberate Planning.*

⁵ Comprises Policy Director, CDI, CJO under the chairmanship of DCDS(C).

intelligence collection, focusing on those areas of potential or developing situations that are most likely to affect the UK's interests. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in turn, through the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)), directs the PJHQ to develop a range of contingency plans, the aim being to reduce the time required for the production of a detailed campaign plan in the event of a crisis occurring. The 3 types of contingency plan⁶ used nationally are:

- a. **Joint Planning Guides.** Joint Planning Guides (JPGs) comprise generic planning data for a particular country, region or theatre. JPGs may also provide generic advice for a particular type of operation, such as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) or Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations (HDRO). For further details see Annex 1A.
- b. **Joint Contingency Plans.** Joint Contingency Plans (JCPs) are prepared in response to CDS Planning Guidance. In addition to the planning data contained in JPGs, JCPs contain specific information on the military capabilities required and their deployment options, including readiness states where appropriate, and are written in response to specific planning guidance. For further details see Annex 1A.
- c. **Joint Operation Plans.** Joint Operation Plans (JOPs) are plans for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as the basis for an Operation Order (OPORD), and as such can be considered as embryonic campaign plans. In addition to a plan for the deployment of forces, a JOP will contain a concept of operations. JOPs are the most developed level of advance plan, consequently, only those contingencies that are assessed as highly likely to develop into an operation will lead to the production of a JOP.

Crisis Response Planning⁷

106. If the situation is such that the UK will be involved militarily and the lead times are short, the MOD will adopt its crisis planning role. A crisis is an unstable period or one of extreme trouble or danger. No two crises are identical and each needs to be dealt with in the most appropriate manner in order to restore stability. Crisis management⁸ is the process of trying to resolve a crisis before it becomes armed conflict while planning for this eventuality. This process may be able to utilise plans that have been developed under contingency planning process or may have to start afresh.

⁶ Covered in more detail in CDS 17/98: '*Contingency Planning Procedures for Joint, Combined and Multinational Operations*'.

⁷ Crisis Response Planning is defined as the activity 'based on current events and conducted in time sensitive situations.' Essentially, unforeseen events for which there may be no specific Contingency Plan (although it could also be based upon an existing JPG, JCP or JOP). *Formerly known as Crisis Action Planning.*

⁸ See also BDD (2nd Edition), Chapter 6.

107. Crisis response includes a broad range of events from the provision of Military Aid to the Civilian Authorities (MACA), evacuation, humanitarian/disaster relief operations in support of NATO, EU, UN or coalition operations, intervention and, ultimately, the transition to war.

108. The aim of the UK's national crisis planning system is to provide a balanced and timely response to any situation that may occur and is covered in the remainder of this chapter. In reality, the process is unlikely to be as straightforward as described and for simplicity, no account is taken of the iterative nature of planning in a volatile situation. The command and control arrangements and procedures are flexible and are readily adaptable to accord with events and other circumstances, including the requirements of the UK's participation in multinational operations.

SECTION II – THE DEFENCE CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION

109. **Political Control and Direction.** Ministers exercise control and direction of crisis management at the highest level, either individually or in committee. At the strategic level the Cabinet controls all the means at the Government's disposal to resolve crises - diplomatic, economic and military - of which large-scale conflict tends to be the final resort. Crises may be handled by the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC)⁹ of the Cabinet, or by a special Cabinet committee set up to co-ordinate the work of all the Government Departments involved. There is no single template for crisis resolution and ultimately Ministers will decide as to the most effective approach to tackling a particular crisis. The level of engagement of other government departments (OGDs) will vary depending on the nature of the crisis. National intelligence assessments, including strategic warning, are co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office.

110. **The Defence Crisis Management Organisation.** The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) is a virtual organisation, formed from existing MOD departments¹⁰ and PJHQ who are supported by the single-Service commands, Director Special Forces (DSF) and the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO). It exists in order to provide the Government with military advice and, in return, receives political direction as the basis for a military operation. It serves as the MOD's collective body for the overall management and resolution of crisis, including the higher direction of operations. In major crises, when appropriate, the DCMO will provide the strategic level military liaison with OGDs, allies and coalition partners as well as with organisations such as the UN.

⁹ CDS attends the DOPC.

¹⁰ Different departments will be involved depending on the situation – see paragraph 114 for further details.

111. **Chief of the Defence Staff and Chiefs of Staff.** CDS, as the principal military adviser to the Government, will attend meetings of the Cabinet or its sub-committees as required and will draw on the advice provided by the single-Service Chiefs of Staff (COS) and senior civil servants through the forum of the COS Committee.¹¹ The COS Committee will meet as frequently as a situation demands, but a minor crisis may be discussed as part of a routine weekly meeting of the Committee. The Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), as senior advisor on defence policy, attends the meetings, as does a senior official from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to ensure proper co-ordination with this key OGD. Others in attendance may include Deputy Chiefs of the Defence Staff, the Policy Director, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), Chief of Defence Logistics (CDL) or Assistant Chief of Defence (Logistic Operations) (ACDS (Log Ops)) and representatives from OGDs.

112. **The Key Players.** DCDS(C) plays a central role in aiding CDS and the COS by drawing together the advice of the various staffs on likely options to resolve particular crises. The DCMO acts as the conduit for all briefings up to Ministers and for the dissemination of strategic direction through the PJHQ to the JTFC and Component Commanders (CCs). It is managed by DCDS(C) in his role as Director of Operations (DOps), with his civilian counterpart, the Policy Director, providing policy advice. The primary roles of DCDS(C), the Policy Director, CDI, CJO and ACDS (Log Ops) are complementary:

a. **Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments).** DCDS(C) provides military direction for the potential or actual commitment of UK Forces in peacetime, crisis, operations and exercises, supporting CDS' role as principal advisor to the Government.

(1) **Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations).** The Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) (ACDS(Ops)) is DCDS(C)'s deputy and is responsible for potential and current operations, co-ordinating military strategic advice and the orchestration of crisis teams. Day-to-day management of a crisis will be delegated to ACDS (Ops), together with Director General Operational Policy (DG Op Pol.)

(2) **Director General Operational Policy.** DG Op Pol is responsible for policy advice to the DCMO organisation as a whole and to DCDS(C) and ACDS(Ops) in particular.

¹¹ The COS Committee is chaired by CDS and is the MOD's principal crisis management committee aimed at providing CDS advice to take to Ministers.

b. **The Policy Director.** The Policy Director contributes to formulation of the Government's security policy and develops and adapts the defence strategy and policy that best safeguard UK national interests.

c. **Chief of Defence Intelligence.** CDI provides the central focus for the collation, fusion and dissemination of operational and crisis-related intelligence and warnings requirements in support of Ministers, Chiefs of Staff and the MOD's Operational and Commitments Staffs.

d. **Chief of Joint Operations.** CJO works closely with DCDS(C) and the Policy Director. Together, they will formulate, and where necessary, review defence policy and higher-level strategy in relation to the actual or potential commitment of UK Forces in crisis or war. CJO is responsible, when directed by CDS, for the planning and execution of joint, potentially joint and UK-led multinational operations and, as the Joint Commander (Jt Comd), for exercising Operational Command (OPCOM) of UK forces assigned to national, combined and multinational operations led by others.

e. **Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations).** ACDS (Log Ops) is responsible to DCDS(C) for providing timely, co-ordinated and effective strategic logistic and movement input to the DCMO. This could be negotiating airlift with allies or dealing with sustainability.

113. **Defence Crisis Management Centre.** The Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) in Whitehall is the focal point for the DCMO and OGDs. Within its high-security environment, the Centre provides briefing facilities, working spaces for crisis management teams, living accommodation and secure communications including video conferencing (VTC). A small permanent staff maintains and develops the facilities and co-ordinates activities in times of crisis. Working in the DCMC is the Chief of Defence Staff's Duty Officer (CDSDO) who monitors world events around the clock using the news media, diplomatic and intelligence sources.

114. **The MOD Policy and Commitments Staff.** The MOD policy and commitments staffs are organised in 4 main group areas (see Figure 1.1) so that they are better tailored to tackle crisis management. Many tasks will cut across defined boundaries and will require 'Task Forces' bringing together staff from many areas (though rarely on a full-time basis). In essence there are 4 primary directorates that deal with any given crisis, drawing on expertise from across the MOD and OGDs. In outline they are as follows:

a. **Strategic Planning Directorate.** The strategic planning directorate provides the MOD 'J5' function by looking ahead at emerging crises. On guidance from the OTG (see paragraph 105), and following advice from the regional policy staffs, the directorate will lead and co-ordinate the Strategic

Planning Groups (SPGs) (see paragraph 119), providing direction, advice, expertise and corporate knowledge for the military strategic planning process. It will liaise and co-ordinate closely with the MOD policy staffs and OGDs in order to inform the political/military debate at all levels.

b. **Joint Commitments Directorate.** The Joint Commitments Directorate provides the MOD 'J3 Away' function for deployed operations by monitoring developments in existing and emerging commitments. The Directorate provides the principal staff for the Current Commitments Team to inform and manage military contingencies. It is also responsible for directing and managing the Force Generation process. Within the Directorate there are 'environmental cells' providing single-Service expertise.

c. **United Kingdom Directorate.** The UK directorate concentrates on Northern Ireland issues, MACA, Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and homeland defence and security. It fulfils the MOD 'J3 Home' function and provides staff and expertise in order to inform and manage military and civil contingencies, including Counter-Terrorism (CT) world-wide, in conjunction with Secretariat (Home and Special Forces).

d. **Directorate of Joint Capability.** The Directorate of Joint Capability's (D Jt Cap) role is to evaluate, arbitrate and advise on the delivery of current and future integrated capability in order to enable the UK to plan, prepare and execute joint and combined operations.




Figure 1.1 - The MOD Commitments and Policy Staff – Main Group Areas

115. **The Permanent Joint Headquarters.** The PJHQ, as an integral part of the DCMO, plays a key role in the decision-making process. It is responsible for the planning and execution of joint operations and for the provision of military advice. Close contact is maintained with the Supporting Commands to ensure that single-Service views are woven into overall advice.




Figure 1.2 – DCMO Relationships

116. **Supporting Commands.** The 3 single-Service Commanders in Chief (CinCs) (CINCFLEET, CINCLAND and CINCSTC) together with CDL and DSF are responsible for providing the forces for joint and multinational operations. While these forces are placed under the OPCOM of the nominated Jt Comd (normally CJO), the CinCs are considered to be acting in a supporting capacity and are thus referred to as Supporting Commands.

SECTION III – CRISIS MANAGEMENT GROUPS

117. **Monitoring World Events.** The DCMO, in particular the Strategic Planning Directorate, monitors key world events continuously, taking inputs from OGDs, the various directorates and the intelligence services. The DCMO morning brief allows an interchange of information and views between representatives and assists DCDS(C) in deciding whether to form a Current Operations Group (COG), chaired by himself as DOps, to study an emerging crisis in detail. The DCMO morning brief is attended by selected staffs from MOD and the PJHQ, as well as representatives from the FCO, Department for International Development (DFID) and the Cabinet Office (CO). The purpose of the brief is to ensure a common understanding of regional events and their significance to the UK. An intelligence assessment is given for each region followed by an update and analysis of political or operational events.

118. **Current Operations Group.** The COG is chaired by the DOps and selected staffs attend. The COG will assess the severity of a crisis and consider options for intervention and initial briefings to CDS and the COS Committee. The need for strategic direction from the Cabinet is discussed and, even at this early stage, the desired strategic end-state (even though it may not always be easy to define the end-state in a rapidly evolving situation). Although this is likely to be a very early stage in the crisis, the FCO, DFID and CO are also invited to attend in order to form a common appreciation of events. The COG will decide on the need to move to the next stage of crisis management - the formation of a SPG, if one has not already been formed, together with a Current Commitments Team (CCT) dedicated to handling the operational problems.

119. **The Strategic Planning Group.** The SPG takes a long-term view and assesses the crisis to identify and evaluate military strategic options. It provides military advice for the National (and if necessary Alliance) political process before or after a crisis and assists the DOps and the PJHQ on addressing or resolving military strategic issues. The SPG's remit extends to forward planning and consideration of 'end-states' or military objectives. It seeks to define the UK's national intent and political objectives, the international community's probable options and intent, the desirable and acceptable end-states, the resource implications, constraints, likely contributions from Government Departments and the likely reaction of allies. The FCO should take the lead in developing UK intent but the MOD's role is to assist the

Political Strategic Analysis (PSA) process (see paragraph 127). OGDs (primarily DFID) will contribute as necessary. The work will contain many hypotheses at the start and so must remain a 'living' process and be continually reviewed. The process produces assessments of the diplomatic, military and economic options open to the British Government. Effectively, the SPG fulfills the J5 role for the MOD in crisis, and its members (at Assistant Director (AD)(OF5 equivalent) level) are drawn from the strategic planning and defence relations directorates, the capability directorates, logistics and legal departments; there is also representation from PJHQ J5 and from OGDs. On behalf of CDS the SPG produces CDS Planning Guidance, which will be issued to the Jt Comd.

120. **Current Commitments Team.** The team formed at MOD to handle the day-to-day operational issues during crisis is the CCT.¹² This is formed from relevant staff drawn across the MOD and will almost always include regional, capability, intelligence, logistics and movements staff. The CCT will handle current operational issues and issues surrounding the deployment, action and recovery of forces and in doing so will liaise with OGDs. The CCT thus in effect fulfils the J3 role for the MOD. The role of the CCT is to co-ordinate all the strategic level advice from within the DCMO, OGDs and allies as a basis for providing sound and timely military advice to CDS, PUS and Ministers. As such, the CCT will develop the CDS Directive and prepare both Ministerial Submissions and responses to Parliamentary Questions. The team is usually small, only 8-10 people. A 2* lead is possible but a 1* or AD (OF5 equivalent) lead would be more usual. If required, other specialists will support the CCT and give advice in such areas as medical support, activation of reserve forces and legal issues.

121. **Permanent Joint Headquarters Contingency Planning Team.** When the CCT forms in MOD, a Contingency Planning Team (CPT) forms at the PJHQ,¹³ although if the situation is fast moving, the CPT may form before the CCT in order to maximise planning time. In any case, the CCT and CPT work as a single entity aided by the medium of VTC. Together with the SPG, they produce the initial advice on the crisis for CDS who in turn briefs Ministers and, when invited, the Cabinet. If the Government decide that UK intervention is likely, they will call for detailed planning. The SPG will draft the CDS Planning Guidance to CJO based on the political direction given by Government. The product of the planning process is the Military Strategic Estimate (MSE) (see paragraph 129), written by the CCT and the CPT. The MSE will detail the military options including the implications for UK and the likely costs.

122. **Joint Force Headquarters Situational Awareness Group.** In parallel with the CPT, the JFHQ will establish a Situational Awareness Group (SAG), led by an SO1 and drawing representation from across the JFHQ. The SAG will both monitor

¹² See paragraph 114(b).

¹³ The CPT will also have JFHQ representation.

the situation and inform operational planning and deployment preparation, and hence JFHQ's involvement. An early decision that may be taken is whether to deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) from the PJHQ/JFHQ. The composition of the OLRT will vary but it is likely to draw on some members of the SAG.

123. **Permanent Joint Headquarters Operations Team.** At an appropriate point, the PJHQ stands up an Operations Team (OT). Once CDS's Directive is issued, the CPT, on behalf of CJO and in conjunction with the OT, issues a Jt Comd's Mission Directive to the JTFC.

Strategic Planning Group Relationships

124. **Strategic Planning Group/Other Government Departments.** The SPG maintains close links with OGDs. These links are formalised in SPG meetings, COGs and Whitehall Steering Group meetings but considerable ad hoc liaison is achieved informally during routine staff discussions.

125. **Strategic Planning Group/Current Operations Group.** The SPG Leader is always a member of the COG and contributes to the agenda. Other members of the SPG are also present at COGs, albeit as capability directors or specialists rather than as SPG members. The CO and OGDs are also invited to COGs.

126. **Strategic Planning Group/Current Commitments Team.** The SPG's remit does not include any requirement for active involvement in the co-ordination of current operations, which is the scope of the CCT. In the early stages of the crisis, the SPG is committed to developing plans and then refining them in conjunction with PJHQ-J5 as events unfold. The SPG/CCT secretariat has the responsibility of raising submissions to Ministers (through DG Op Pol) on matters requiring their decision or attention. The presence of an SPG member, ideally at SO1 level, within the CCT is helpful in order to ensure that current operations remain in accord with strategic aims and to help the team to co-ordinate production of the CDS Directive. The SPG/CCT and COG when activated take-over the role of the Military Information Operations Co-ordination Group (MIOCG) that converts the News Release Groups (NRG) themes into tasks and provides high level co-ordination within Information Operations activities.¹⁴ As the crisis develops, the SPG member also provides forward planning insights to the CCT.

127. The relationship between elements of the planning group and the functions and outputs of each element are shown at Table 1.3.

¹⁴ For further details see JWP 3-80 'Information Operations' paragraph 111.

Group	Function	Output
MOD COG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provide DCDS(C) with appropriate expert advice including OGDs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provide initial briefing to CDS and COS. ▪ Decide on formation of SPG/CCT.
MOD SPG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political Strategic Analysis. ▪ Forward planning (MOD J5). ▪ Liaison with OGDs on future issues. ▪ Interaction with PJHQ. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CDS Planning Guidance.
MOD CCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Monitoring of current ops and issues (MOD J3). ▪ Close liaison with PJHQ. ▪ Liaison with OGDs on current issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Military Strategic Estimate. ▪ CDS Directive. ▪ Ministerial Submissions.
PJHQ CPT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Close liaison with MOD (primarily through the CCT). ▪ Detailed Contingency Planning (J5 Lead). ▪ Assist with MSE. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Jt Comds Planning Directive.
PJHQ OT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Expanded CPT (J3 Lead). ▪ Run current Ops for CJO. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Jt Comds Mission Directive (in conjunction with CPT).
JFHQ SAG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Monitor the development of crisis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Initial and deployment planning.

Table 1.3 - Planning Group Relationships

SECTION IV – THE STRATEGIC CRISIS PLANNING PROCESS

128. **Political Strategic Analysis.** National strategy is the responsibility of the CO rather than MOD. In crisis management, the MOD looks to the CO to articulate the national intent or position, and any objectives that might lend themselves to being achieved by military means. The CO's advice becomes the starting point for a process that is best described as the Political Strategic Analysis. Sometimes referred to as the Pol/Mil Estimate (though it is not recognisable as an estimate), the PSA is an iterative process that may not be led by any one Department (i.e. CO, FCO or MOD) but is where options and factors are discussed across government. Ideally, as a potential crisis appears, PSA will include as a minimum:

- a. An assessment of the situation.
- b. Options open to the international community.

- c. Options open to HMG, including diplomatic, military and economic lines of activity.

129. **Chief of Defence Staff's Planning Guidance.** Once agreement on the principle of UK involvement has been reached, CDS will issue Planning Guidance to CJO based on the results of the PSA. The PJHQ will have contributed actively to the higher level analysis and is closely involved in the formulation of the Planning Guidance. The Planning Guidance is accepted as the authority to deploy an OLRT from JFHQ.¹⁵ The relevant Supporting Commands will also receive a copy of this Guidance.¹⁶ In the early stages of a crisis, MOD may be unable to give definitive guidance. The Planning Guidance, therefore, may be based solely on assumptions. Forces may not be assigned, and it is unlikely that a mission will be given in the Planning Guidance, but the inclusion of the Supporting Commands in the distribution will inform them of the planning activity taking place within the DCMO and enables them to respond rapidly to any requests for information. It is accepted that Planning Guidance may evolve, but in order for the PJHQ to move forward without frequently requesting updates of strategic guidance, the Planning Guidance should clearly state:

- a. Planning assumptions (agreed in conjunction with the FCO and DFID where appropriate).
- b. The potential strategic and military-strategic objectives.
- c. The likely desired strategic end-state.
- d. The assumptions employed at the strategic level; this is necessary to ensure that effort is not wasted by PJHQ in re-exploring possibilities already discounted.
- e. The constraints within which the work should be accomplished.

130. **Military Strategic Estimate.** On receipt of the CDS Planning Guidance, the SPG and CCT, in conjunction with the PJHQ, conduct the MSE. This process provides the detail required to assess the military feasibility of the courses of action that will subsequently be submitted to Ministers for approval. The PJHQ may also 'test' courses of action through an illustrative campaign plan and operational analysis (OA). This allows the PJHQ to anticipate how events might unfold, what forces might be required, what casualties might result, financial costs, and the prospects of success or failure. The MSE will be constantly re-visited, (and alternative courses of action developed) particularly in multinational operations where the UK may not have the lead in planning an operation. The combination of the SPG's strategic outline and the

¹⁵ See paragraph 307 for further details.

¹⁶ Planning guidance may also be issued to provide options as to whether or not, and to what degree, the UK should get involved in a developing crisis.

operational detail added by the CCT, and the PJHQ, is the MSE which is briefed to the Secretary of State through the COS Committee.

131. **Chief of Defence Staff's Directive.** Armed with the output of the MSE, the Secretary of State and CDS are well placed to advise the Government on the military consequences of a decision to commit British Forces to an operation. Once the Prime Minister has decided to do so, and there may be political and legal constraints on his ability to act, CDS gives detailed strategic direction by means of the CDS Directive. The instinct to wait for complete information needs to be avoided and CDS may decide to issue a draft Directive on a limited distribution. This will allow key factors to be disseminated, and subordinates to continue timely planning on the best information available. The CCT drafts the CDS Directive. It will detail the UK objectives, the desired end-state and any constraints applied by the Cabinet. Where possible details of the forces and resources that can be assigned, designation of the Joint Operations Area (JOA), the anticipated duration of the campaign with guidance on sustainability, the legal position and ROE will also be included. Alternatively CDS may decide to delegate the issue of certain sections of the Directive, for example Co-ordinating Instructions and Service and Administrative Support. These would then be issued separately. Command arrangements, including the appointment of the JTFC and co-ordination with DSF, the Supporting Commands, Allies, Host Nations, International Organisations and agencies will also be established. CJO uses the CDS Directive to give operational direction in the form of the Jt Comd's Mission Directive to the JTFC, who in turn will conduct his own operational estimate and produce a campaign plan, hence the usefulness of early exposure to CDS's direction.

132. **The Joint Commander's Mission Directive.** Within PJHQ, once Ministerial permission has been granted and the CDS's Directive is received, the CPT in conjunction with the OT will draft the Jt Comd's Mission Directive to the JTFC, which is the executive document from which he draws his authority to carry out the operation. The Jt Comd's Mission Directive articulates the military strategic direction given in the CDS Directive and the desired operational end-state. It includes a mission statement, commander's intent, outline concept of operations (CONOPS) and guidance on the composition, deployment, sustainment and recovery of the joint task force. The need for timely dissemination of direction from the Jt Comd to the JTFC may demand the issue of a draft Jt Comd's Mission Directive.

SECTION V – MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

133. A multinational operation may be carried out within an established alliance framework, or increasingly, through the formation of a coalition. Coalition operations will normally be facilitated by the selection of a Lead Nation. In many cases there

will be a recognised international organisation or entity (e.g. the United Nations (UN)) that provides a mandate and oversight for the coalition activity being considered.¹⁷

134. Role of the MOD in Multinational Operations. When the UK is considering whether to contribute to a multinational operation, MOD will initially be the prime focus for advice on the level of UK's intended military commitment and the UK's military objectives. Liaison and military direction at the strategic level for OGDs, allies and other nations will also be addressed by the MOD.

135. Role of the Permanent Joint Headquarters in Multinational Operations. In multinational operations (not NATO Article 5) CDS would direct that OPCOM of UK Forces be delegated to a nominated UK Jt Comd, who may further delegate OPCON, TACOM and TACON to a UK or multinational commander, depending on the nature and composition of the coalition and the circumstances of the conflict.

a. **UK-led Operations.** If the UK is the framework/lead nation, the PJHQ will form the nucleus of the multinational HQ exercising OPCOM, augmented as necessary by staff from other participating nations. The UK will also provide staff to form the nucleus of the deployed multinational JTFHQ which exercises OPCON.¹⁸

b. **Non UK-led operations.** If the UK is not the framework/lead nation, the PJHQ will act as UK Co-ordinator of Supporting Command Functions (CSCF).¹⁹ As such, it will co-ordinate the activities of the single-Services in deploying, sustaining, and recovering UK forces assigned to the operation. It may also provide staff to the multinational HQ.

Strategic Planning – In NATO Operations

136. If the crisis response is to be led by NATO, the generic process described is the same. However, timing becomes critical in order to match NATO's decision-making procedures. The SPG makes MOD's contributions to the NATO planning processes (described in Annex 1B) which do not replace national procedures, although the DCMO may need to accelerate its own process if it is to influence the North Atlantic Council²⁰ (NAC) debate before the ACTWARN²¹ is issued.

¹⁷ See JWP 3-00, Chapter 1.

¹⁸ See JWP 3-00, Chapter 2. Usually under model B arrangements.

¹⁹ 'When appointed by CDS as UK Co-ordinator of Supporting Command Functions (CSCF) for a particular operation, CJO is to assume responsibility for co-ordinating the deployment, sustainment and recovery of assigned UK forces, and is accordingly granted Co-ordinating Authority between all UK Commands. CJO will, in these circumstances, be the primary national point of contact at the operational HQ level for dealing with NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) or their equivalent. Co-ordinating authority does not by itself carry any command authority, or affect the responsibilities of the Supporting Commands to the UK COS.' (JWP 0-01.1)

²⁰ NAC is the highest level of NATO decision-making.

²¹ Activation Warning – see paragraph 1B15.

137. Ideally, the DCMO should also have conducted illustrative campaign planning in order to comment on NATO's OPLAN authoritatively. In addition, it is vital that the UK limits of participation in an operation are decided before NATO enters the FORCEPREP²² stage of military preparations. By keeping abreast of NATO's planning procedures, the UK will be able to deploy as soon as the ACTORD²³ is declared.

138. In ideal circumstances MOD has the responsibility for the liaison with NATO HQ,²⁴ and the PJHQ has responsibility for liaison and co-ordination with both NATO Supreme Allied Command Operations (SACO), and supported UK forces/HQs. For NATO-led operations, the DCMO is expected both to respond to and proactively support the NATO planning process. The high political profile of some operations may require MOD to become involved in some of the detailed planning functions normally carried out by PJHQ. This may blur the division of responsibility between MOD/PJHQ established for national operations, hence the requirement for the role of CSCF to be clearly defined for each specific operation.

Strategic Planning – In EU Operations

139. If the EU, rather than NATO, takes primacy for a particular operation, the two potential models that would be adopted would result in the following implications:

- a. **EU-Led Operation with Recourse to NATO Assets and Capabilities.** If the EU were to call upon NATO assets and capabilities to respond to a crisis, the DCMO relationship with the EU would be similar to the NATO model. NATO's Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) (in SACO - J5) would provide planning support at the request of the EU, and the principal planning staff in the active phase. Deputy SACO (DSACO)²⁵ would be the likely choice to fulfil the functions normally performed by SACO for NATO led operations. The dual hatted UKMILREP would form the link with both NATO HQ and the EU.
- b. **EU-Led Operation without Recourse to NATO Assets.** If NATO assets were not to be employed, one nation could be selected to provide the framework nation.²⁶ This might involve the PJHQ at Northwood or another national HQ forming an Operation HQ (OHQ). If another HQ were chosen, some PJHQ staff and additional augmentees would deploy to that location.

²² Force Preparation – see paragraph 1B20.

²³ Activation Order – see paragraph 1B23.

²⁴ Normally via UKMILREP.

²⁵ Also referred to as DSACEUR.

²⁶ Framework Nation is defined by the EU as 'A Member State or a group of Member States that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control'.

The JFHQ could also be the core of a deployed Multinational Force Headquarters (MNFHQ).

Strategic Planning – In US Led Operations

140. The UK recognises that in committing forces to future contingencies it will often operate within a US-led coalition, particularly at large scale. Therefore, it is important to understand how the US planning process differs from our own. The command structure, which was established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, does not mirror the UK's (see Figure 1.4). The President of the USA is, by statute, the Commander in Chief of all US forces and together with the Secretary of Defense (known as the Sec Def) they form the National Command Authority (NCA). The Combatant Commands (COCOMs),²⁷ who broadly equate to the PJHQ, tend to have a more direct link with the NCA than is reflected in the UK system.

141. The Goldwater-Nichols Act stated that the operational chain of command runs from the President and the Sec Def to the combatant commanders. The act also stated that the President 'may direct' that communications between the NCA and the combatant commanders be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS,²⁸ the Joint Staffs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) advise the NCA in a similar way to how the MOD advise the Secretary of State for Defence.




Figure 1.4 - Comparison of outline UK and US Command Structures

²⁷ See paragraph 1D7.

²⁸ The broad equivalent of CDS in the UK.

142. The UK national process for planning in such circumstances is likely to be very similar to that of a NATO or non-UK led operation. The MOD and the DCMO will remain the focus for national planning, linked very much to the British Defence Staff in Washington (BDS(W)) and the US Joint Staffs, with the PJHQ probably deploying a small staff to assist the relevant COCOM in the US. It is, however, highly likely that a Senior British Military Adviser (SBMA) or a National Contingent Commander (NCC) would be deployed to assist the COCOM in developing options for UK involvement.

Strategic Planning – In UN and Other Multinational Operations

143. **United Nations.** The UN command and control (C2) structures will vary depending on the nature and scale of operations. The UN does not normally form Operational HQs and instead forms Theatre/Force HQs as required from amongst contributing nations. A brief explanation of the role and organisation of the UN is provided in JWP 3-50 '*The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*'. For operations conducted under the auspices of the UN, the military Force Commander will operate in support of the civilian Head of Mission (HoM), normally a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). In certain uncomplicated operations, the Force Commander may be appointed HoM. The HoM has a planning staff, which is responsible for developing a CONOPS. This should reflect international consensus on such issues as force profile and ROE, and should be continually reviewed against mission objectives and the changing situation on the ground.

144. **Other Multinational Operations.** The command structures associated with the UK acting as both a contributing nation and as framework/lead nation in multinational operations (including those conducted in support of a UN mandate) are represented diagrammatically at Annexes 1E and 1F respectively. Further detail on such C2 arrangements can be found in JWP 3-50.

145. **Co-operative Operations.** Recent experience has highlighted a category of operations outside the scope of purely national or multinational operations, in which UK forces may deploy on a national basis alongside other national contingents that then agree to deconflict, or even co-operate, outside the framework of a multinational command structure. These co-operative operations are most likely to occur during NEOs where each nation has individual national imperatives, objectives and responsibilities. UK involvement in co-operative operations will invariably demand the appointment of a JTFC with a JTFHQ as detailed earlier in this chapter. Close in-theatre liaison between national forces is clearly essential.

ANNEX 1A – UK ADVANCE PLANNING

1A1. **Joint Planning Guides.** The requirement for a Joint Planning Guide (JPG) can be identified by MOD HQ, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), the Supporting Commands or other government departments (OGDs) and communicated to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) via the Operational Tasking Group (OTG). If, after direction from the OTG, CJO considers the subject or region suitable for a JPG, he will issue instructions to the PJHQ Plans Division (J5) to compile the JPG following the procedure below:

- a. CJO issues planning direction to ACOS J5 outlining the planning parameters for the JPG; the likely objectives, timelines and any political or military constraints.
- b. A Contingency Planning Team (CPT) is formed under J5 lead normally at DACOS/SO1 level, with representation from all the relevant Divisions at the PJHQ together with any specialists from other military headquarters or outside agencies.
- c. If it is a regional JPG, a reconnaissance is organised to the region, in co-operation with the British military representative in theatre, if one exists, and/or a Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO). The size and exact composition of the reconnaissance team will depend on the number and size of the countries to be visited and on local advice on any sensitivities on parties of visiting military. Although not specifically covert, JPG reconnaissance is normally carried out in as discreet a way as possible and with the smallest practicable team.
- d. On completion of the reconnaissance, the CPT produces a draft JPG which is then circulated to all interested parties including OGDs, the Supporting Commands and relevant Embassies/High Commissions, via the Consular Division of the FCO.
- e. Once any comments have been incorporated, the JPG is allocated a number and added to the list of contingency plans maintained at the PJHQ. The schedule for the review of a JPG will be decided by CJO.

1A2. **Joint Contingency Plans.** A proposal to compile a Joint Contingency Plan (JCP) may be generated by MOD HQ, the PJHQ or the Supporting Commands, but in order to target planning staffs effectively, compilation of a JCP will only commence on receipt of Planning Guidance from the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)) on behalf of CDS. The procedure for the production of a JCP is:

- a. DCDS(C), with advice from the OTG as appropriate, issues Planning Guidance to CJO to compile the JCP. The Planning Guidance will contain, as a minimum, the military strategic objective(s), the timeline for planning and any political, military or resource constraints. The Planning Guidance also serves as a warning order to the Supporting Commands that planning is taking place and gives the scope of the planning.
 - b. A CPT is formed under J5 lead normally at DACOS/SO1 level, with representation from all the relevant Divisions at the PJHQ together with any specialists from other military headquarters or outside agencies.
 - c. The PJHQ, in concert with the Supporting Commands and/or other outside agencies as appropriate, conducts such reconnaissance that may be required to support the estimate.
 - d. A military strategic estimate is conducted by the CPT at the PJHQ, with inputs from MOD HQ, Supporting Commands and other specialist staffs, including OGDs as appropriate. The output of the estimate will be a draft JCP, and possibly submissions for further guidance from MOD HQ.
 - e. The draft JCP is circulated to all relevant authorities for comment.
- 1A3. Depending on the level and scope of the intended operation, the final JCP may be submitted to the COS Committee. It will then be approved by DCDS(C) on behalf of CDS. The JCP is then issued to all relevant authorities and added to the list of joint contingency plans maintained by the PJHQ. The schedule for review of JCPs will be decided by the MOD.

ANNEX 1B – THE NATO PLANNING PROCESS

NATO Organisations

1B1. Command of NATO forces is vested in one European-based Strategic level Commander, the Supreme Allied Commander Operations (SACO),¹ who holds all of the operational responsibilities formerly held by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

1B2. A functional strategic-level Commander, now known as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), is based in the USA. SACT's role is primarily to transform NATO military structures, forces, capabilities, and doctrine in order to improve the military effectiveness of the Alliance. This is achieved by conducting strategic level operational analysis in close co-operation with SACO to identify and prioritise the type and scale of future capability and interoperability requirements and to inform the NATO Defence Planning Process.

1B3. Alignment of the Strategic level Commanders' operational and functional responsibilities ensures that both Strategic Commands (SCs) have the necessary authority to perform their distinct tasks, while maintaining complementary roles and being mutually supporting.

The Operational Structure

1B4. **General Outline.** From an operational perspective, there is no fundamental difference between the architecture of a military command and control structure for an Article 5 operation or a non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation (NA5CRO). Both will be met by a combination of NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS) command and control (C2) deployable and static capabilities which will be optimised to meet the challenges of a specific mission. The operational C2 structure (see Figure 1B.1) has 3 levels of command, with NCS HQ at the strategic and operational level and NCS HQ and NFS HQ (Land Component Commander and Maritime Component Commander only) at the tactical level. The operational structure of the NCS is composed of permanently established integrated HQs, widely distributed geographically and commonly funded.

¹ Although renamed the original nomenclature SHAPE/SACEUR will remain to avoid rewriting legal documents/SOFAs etc. However SHAPE (which is now the HQ for ACO, rather than ACE) now stands for Supreme HQ Allied Personnel in Europe.




Figure 1B.1 – Allied Command Operations

1B5. Strategic Level. At the strategic level, Allied Joint Forces are employed within a political-military framework agreed by the Military Committee (MC) and endorsed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance. SACO assumes overall command of the operation at the strategic level and exercises his responsibilities from his HQ in Mons, Belgium. He issues military strategic direction to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) – known in NATO as the Joint Force Commander (JFC). SACO is responsible for the preparation and conduct of all operations, including routine operational activities and other non-operational tasks as appropriate. SACO also co-ordinates multinational support and the reinforcement and designation of supported/supporting commands, including issuing military strategic direction to the operational level of command. In addition, SACO has a requirement for access to, or control over some functional entities and NATO agencies/bodies. He also exercises command and control of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force Command and has direct links with future capabilities/entities developed under the Prague Capabilities Commitment. SACO will provide, if required, an Operational Headquarters capability for EU-led operations from within his HQ.

1B6. Operational Level. During an operation the designated operational level commander exercises his responsibilities through a joint HQ that, depending on the characteristics of the operation (e.g. type, size, duration, level of jointness, location of the Joint Operation Area (JOA), etc.), is either static or deployed as a CJTF HQ.

- a. **Headquarters at the Operational Level.** The Alliance has 3 operational level standing joint HQs: 2 JFC HQs and a 3rd more limited Joint HQ. These HQs are appropriately sized, manned and able to conduct three Major Joint Operations² (MJO) during the initial stage and also, with the exception of the 3rd Joint HQ, during the sustainment stages. The 3 Joint HQs allow for the implementation of the CJTF Tailored Capability (TC): the ability

² The definition of an MJO is provided in MCM-131-02, MC Input to MG 2002, 25 Oct 02.

to conduct two concurrent CJTF operations, one commanded by a sea-based CJTF HQ for the initial stage of an MJO and one commanded by a land-based CJTF HQ for the initial and sustainment stages. In the context of NATO-EU arrangements, the Alliance will offer to the EU the requested C2 elements (including CJTF HQ capabilities) needed for an EU led operation at the required level of command.

(1) **Joint Force Commander Headquarters.** Each of the 2 JFC HQs has the capability of conducting an MJO, or an operation larger than MJO in the initial stage, from their static location. In addition, either one of the 2 JFCs can provide the land based CJTF HQ, drawing from one set of deployable equipment. JFC HQ NORTH is based in Brunssum, Netherlands and JFC HQ SOUTH is based in Naples, Italy.

(2) **Joint Headquarters.** The 3rd Joint HQ has the capability of commanding an MJO as a sea-based CJTF HQ. It is not suited to run operations from its static location or to sustain itself beyond the initial stage. This Joint HQ is located in Lisbon, Portugal but the command platform is currently provided by the US and operates out of Norfolk, Virginia (VA). When the sea-based CJTF HQ is deployed, the Joint HQ's remaining ability is limited to routine functions.

b. **Links to Component Commands.** The 2 JFC HQs have subordinated land, maritime and air component HQs. To fulfil operational requirements, the component commands (CC) could be tasked by SACO to provide a C2 capability under the command of any of the three joint commanders.

1B7. **Component Command Level.** At this level, battles and engagements are planned and executed within an overall campaign. In principle, the operation dictates the type of command and formation deployed. The CC HQs provide the environment-specific expertise for the Joint (Force) Commanders at the operational level, as well as operational level environment specific advice on joint operational planning and execution. JFCCs exercise their responsibilities from static or deployed HQ, depending on the characteristics and requirements of the operation.

a. **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** The NCS has 2 Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) HQs: LANDNORTH at Heidelberg, Germany and LANDSOUTH at Izmir, Turkey. The JFLCC HQs within the NCS normally deploy only to command one land operation larger than an MJO³ in the initial stage, whilst drawing on the same set of deployable commonly funded equipment. The High-readiness Force (Land) HRF(L) HQs from the NFS are normally employed as JFLCC HQs in MJOs.

³ For Land operations larger than MJO must be understood as larger than corps size.

b. **Joint Force Air Component Commander.** The NCS has 2 static Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) HQs: AIRNORTH at Ramstein, Germany and AIRSOUTH at Naples. Both JFACC HQs have the capability to command simultaneously the air component of an MJO from their static locations and between them provide one deployable JFACC HQ. To fulfil their functions these HQs are supported by 6 Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs) (4 static and 2 deployable).

c. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The NCS has 2 static Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) HQs: NAVNORTH at Northwood, UK and NAVSOUTH at Naples. Both JFMCC HQs have the capability to command the maritime component from their static location and, in addition, activities in support of joint campaigns outside the JOA. Deployed C2 capabilities at component level for maritime operations will normally be provided by High Readiness Force (Maritime) (HRF(M)) HQs for an MJO, or HQ STRIKFORSOUTH for larger than MJO, as deployed JFMCC HQs. To fulfil their functions, NCS JFMCC HQs are supported by specialised entities for C2 of submarine operations and C2 of maritime air operations.

NATO Planning Categories

1B8. While the broad principles of NATO planning are similar to the UK's operational planning process, there are differences in terminology and the initiation and approval process. Details of NATO Planning are found in MC 133/3.⁴ Planning in NATO will be conducted at a number of levels and hence the plans explained below will be developed at all levels of the NATO military command structure. The highest level plans are those developed at the strategic command level. Beneath these will be plans conducted at the subordinate level. Within NATO there are 2 planning categories, Advance Planning and Crisis Response Planning. A broad comparison of the terms used in UK and NATO planning is at Figure 1B.2.

⁴ Development of AJP-5 is currently under consideration by the International Military Staff.

Activity	UK	NATO
Contingency Planning	Joint Planning Guides	Contingency Plan (COP)
	Joint Contingency Plans	Standing Defence Plans (SDP)
Crisis Planning	Political Strategic Analysis	Political Military Estimate (PME)
	Military Strategic Estimate (MSE)	Military Estimate
	Operational Estimate	
	Campaign Plan	Operation Plan (OPLAN)
		Supporting Plans (SUPLANs)
Directives	CDS's Planning Guidance	
	CDS's Directive	NAC Initiating Directive
	Jt Comd's Mission Directive	
		Execution Directive

Figure 1B.2 - Comparison of Terms Used in UK and NATO Planning Process⁵

1B9. **Advance Planning.** Advance planning is conducted with a view to preparing the Alliance to deal with possible future security risks, either Article 5 or non-Article 5 and, calls for 2 distinct types of plan. These are:

- a. **Contingency Plan (Article 5 and Non-Article 5).** A COP is designed to cater for a possible future security risk, either Article 5 or non-Article 5. Direction for the production of a COP would follow a periodic Defence Requirement Review that takes account of changes in the security environment and developments in defence planning. A COP would be based on a number of planning assumptions and as such would be insufficiently developed to allow immediate execution.
- b. **Standing Defence Plan.** An SDP is designed to cater for a long term, short/no notice Article 5 potential security risk. The requirement for a commander to have a developed SDP will normally be identified in his Terms of Reference (TORs). An SDP needs to be a fully developed plan capable of execution. By their nature, SDPs will create a framework to assist in the identification of future force structures and capabilities and will be modified in response to changing situations.

1B10. **Crisis Response Planning.** Crisis response planning is conducted in response to an actual or developing crisis, both Article 5 or non-Article 5, and calls for the development of an operational plan.

⁵ This diagram is provided to assist the reader in understanding the use of different terminology used in the UK's and NATO's planning systems. It is not intended to imply identical staffing processes.

- a. **Operation Plan.** An OPLAN is designed to counter an actual or developing crisis, both Article 5 and non-Article 5. If a crisis was foreseen the OPLAN may be developed from an appropriate COP. An OPLAN is a detailed and comprehensive plan capable of execution, which has forces assigned and all the necessary preparations undertaken for successful execution of the assigned mission. OPLANs are endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC.
- b. **Supporting Plans.** Depending on the complexity of an operational plan (COP/SDP/OPLAN) there may be the need to develop a series of SUPLANs.

NATO Planning Responsibilities

1B11. Within NATO's operational planning system there is a clear division of responsibility for initiation, development, approval, execution and cancellation of operational plans. These responsibilities are divided between the NAC or Defence Planning Committee (DPC), as appropriate, MC, SACO and Subordinate NATO Commanders within the NATO military command structure. Specifically the division of responsibilities for crisis response planning is as follows:

- a. **North Atlantic Council.** The NAC, as the senior political authority within the Alliance is responsible for the initiation and approval of all operational plans developed in response to actual or developing crises. In the course of the Politico-Military Estimate (PME), the NAC will select one or more Military Response Options (MROs). Should the NAC decide on the requirement for military intervention, it will issue a NAC Initiating Directive (political guidance) to initiate detailed operational planning. The NAC is also responsible for issuing a NAC Force Activation Directive and a NAC Execution Directive.
- b. **Military Committee.** The MC is responsible during the planning process for assisting the NAC in its deliberations concerning the initiation of OPLAN development. Following this the MC will submit potential MROs to the NAC for its consideration. Should the NAC decide on a requirement for military intervention, the MC is responsible for translating NAC political guidance into strategic military direction to SACO. The MC is also responsible for endorsing a CONOPS/OPLAN prior to it being forwarded to the NAC for approval.
- c. **Supreme Allied Commander Operations.** SACO is responsible, when directed by the NAC, for assisting in the further development or refinement of potential MROs during the PME process. Should the NAC decide on the requirement for military intervention, SACO is responsible for the development of a strategic-level OPLAN and, where appropriate, the

development of any necessary SUPLANs. When the OPLAN is complete it is forwarded through the MC to the NAC for approval. SACO is also responsible for force activation and deployment procedures when directed by the NAC.

d. **Subordinate NATO Commanders.** Subordinate NATO Commanders⁶ are responsible, when so tasked by the appropriate Initiating Authority, for the development of subordinate-level OPLANs and, where appropriate, the development of any SUPLANs.

1B12. **Operation Plan Execution.** In order to execute an OPLAN it is necessary to activate and deploy the forces required by the OPLAN. Force activation is the responsibility of SACO and is initiated by a NAC Force Activation Directive.

1B13. **NATO Estimate Process.** NATO employs an Estimate process that is similar to that used for UK national planning. This involves mission analysis followed by the identification of various courses of action (CoAs). Once a preferred CoA is selected a CONOPS is then developed. The CONOPS provides a clear and concise statement of how the military commander intends to accomplish the assigned mission, including the desired military end-state, and is forwarded to the initiating/superior authority for approval. A CONOPS would normally consist of a situation overview, a mission statement, an outline concept for execution, including the commander's intent, conduct of operations and force and capability requirements, an outline service support concept and key C2 arrangements.

NATO Force Activation Process

1B14. **North Atlantic Council Force Activation Directive.** The first step in the force activation process is the issue by the NAC of the Force Activation Directive, which direct appropriate SCs to initiate force activation. The earliest point at which the NAC can issue the Force Activation Directive is coincident with CONOPS approval.

1B15. **Strategic Commander Activation Warning.** The NATO Force Activation Process is shown at Figure 1B.3. Upon receipt of the Force Activation Directive, SACO commences the formal force activation process by means of the Activation Warning (ACTWARN) message, together with the Provisional Statement of Requirement (SOR). The ACTWARN informs NATO Regional commanders and nations that a force is required; it outlines the mission and identifies key dates. The Provisional SOR provides nations with an indication of the type and scale of forces and capabilities required. Nations should respond to the Provisional SOR with informal force offers. These offers provide SACO with an early indication of the

⁶ Such as JFC HQ North, West or South.

probable formal offers, prior to the Force Generation Conference. Following release of the ACTWARN, formal negotiations commence between SACO and nations.

1B16. Strategic Commander Force Generation Conference. Having received the nations informal force offers, in response to the Provisional SOR, SACO calls a Force Generation Conference, with all potential Troop Contributing Nations. The output of the Force Generation Conference is the Draft SOR, which reflects nations force offers and details the proposed force package for the operation.

1B17. Strategic Commander Activation Request. Following the development of the Draft SOR, the SCs issue the Activation Request (ACTREQ) message to nations. The ACTREQ requests nations formally to commit to the force package in the Draft SOR.

1B18. Nations Force Preparation Message. Upon receipt of the ACTREQ, nations provide the SC with a Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) message, which is the formal commitment of national contributions to the draft SOR force package. Nations also use FORCEPREP messages to state national caveats (geographic, logistic, time related, ROE, command status etc) on the employment of their force contributions.

1B19. Strategic Commander Activation of Pre-deployment. If the NAC has earlier authorised the pre-deployment of Enabling Forces SACO may request nations to deploy forces to NATO-assigned staging areas by issuing an Activation of Pre-deployment (ACTPRED) message.

1B20. North Atlantic Council Execution Directive. Once the OPLAN is endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC, the NAC can issue its Execution Directive to initiate mission execution.

1B21. Strategic Commander Activation Order. Upon receipt of the NAC's Execution Directive, the SC issues the Activation Order (ACTORD) message for the operation to all participating nations, which initiates release of national forces and the release of necessary NATO common funding.

1B22. Transfer of Authority. To ensure the properly co-ordinated deployment of forces in theatre, nations should authorise Transfer of Authority (TOA) of all forces on arrival. The issue of the SC ACTORD initiates release of national forces. In cases where the NAC may have authorised the earlier pre-deployment of Enabling Forces, the issue of the SC ACTPRED initiates release of these Enabling Forces and TOA to the SC, as well as authorising their deployment.




Figure 1B.3 - NATO OPLAN Development and Activation Process

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ANNEX 1C – THE EU PLANNING PROCESS

1C1. The EU has established the capacity to take decisions and to launch and then to conduct EU led military operations.¹ EU-led military Crisis Management Operations (CMO) are operations decided upon by the Council of the EU, which also exercises the overall responsibility for their conduct. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), under the delegated authority of the Council, exercises the political control and strategic direction of EU-led military CMOs.

1C2. Operations undertaken by the EU may involve a range of instruments at its disposal, including diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and civil, as well as military, and therefore the need for co-ordination at every level is paramount. The EU may already be engaged in areas where national or coalition military operations are being considered. Alternatively the EU may become engaged either militarily or in other ways in crises where the UK has a strategic interest. Increasingly, EU considerations have to be taken into account.

1C3. The permanent military components are the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Their roles are:

a. **The EU Military Committee.** The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework. The EUMC provides military advice and recommendations to the PSC. The Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) acts as the primary Point of Contact (POC) for the Operation Commander (Op Cdr)² during the EU's military operations.

b. **The EU Military Staff.** The EUMS provides early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces. This includes developing military strategic options and the preparation of military directives to the Op Cdr for the EUMC.

1C4. The EU will consider an emerging crisis and will consult with others, especially NATO, to examine what options there might be. The military dimension to any crisis will be examined by the EUMC, drawing on the expertise of the EUMS. At an appropriate juncture, following the development of a Crisis Management Concept, the Council will approve a general political assessment and a cohesive set of options.

¹ Based on the Petersberg tasks: 'Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' (Article 17-2 TEU).

² This is the title that the EU have assigned to the officer performing the role broadly equivalent to UK's of Joint Commander.

This allows the EUMC to issue a Military Strategic Option Directive³ to the Director General of the EUMS (DGEUMS), formally inviting him to draw up one or a series of military strategic options (MSO).

1C5. Once the Council has adopted a decision to take action, including selection of a MSO, the Council appoints an Op Cdr and designates a chain of command, which could result in the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) becoming an Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The selection of the Force HQ (FHQ)⁴ may occur simultaneously or, if alternatives are available, await the consideration and recommendation of the Op Cdr. The most likely C2 template will be based on a framework nation⁵ model, and although UK might provide both OHQ and FHQ, other C2 combinations are envisaged. If the HQs are provided by another nation, the UK would provide personnel to fill posts in either the OHQ or FHQ.

1C6. Following the Council decision to take action, the EUMC will issue an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) to the Op Cdr which directs him to begin operational planning. This results in the generation of a CONOPS and OPLAN, and ultimately the generation, direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery of a joint force. This process is more 'linear' than in NATO, which can conduct operational planning in parallel at various levels; this is principally due to the decision not to establish a permanent EU command structure that would duplicate that of NATO. Efforts to streamline the process, for example, by early designation of an Op Cdr and OHQ, can be expected.

1C7. Although the exact C2 arrangements for any EU-led military CMO are mission-dependent and will require case by case analysis, the chain of command for EU-led military CMOs will encompass three levels of command, as outlined in Figure 1C.1.

³ These terms differ from NATO terminology since the EU structures and way of handling crises are different from NATO. Wherever possible, however, NATO terminology has been adopted.

⁴ Equates to the UK's Joint Task Force HQ.

⁵ The EU working definition of a Framework Nation is 'a Member State or a group of Member States that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control. The Framework Nation provides the OpCdr/OHQ and the core of the military chain of command, together with its Staff support, the CIS and logistic framework, and contributes with a significant amount of assets and capabilities to the operation. Although EU concepts and procedures remain applicable, procedures may also reflect those of the Framework Nation'.




Figure 1C.1 - EU C2 Arrangements

1C8. During the early stages of the crisis and consideration of MSOs, the Defence Crisis Management Centre will function as normal in its national capacity. EU crisis management procedures, however, envisage the need for the EUMS to draw on operational planning expertise (i.e. planning staff from either EU Member States and/or NATO). For the UK this may come from a variety of national sources: Defence Relations Directorates, intelligence, logistic or Communications and Information Systems (CIS) staffs as well as operational planners from the PJHQ.

1C9. Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) activity would principally focus on UK's response to the emerging crisis, while maintaining an oversight under Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) of any additional planning support given to the EUMS as requested. DCMO links with Brussels will follow a similar pattern to that of NATO. The United Kingdom Military Representative (UKMILREP) attends both NATO's Military Committee (MC) and the EUMC. His one-star deputy (DUKMILREP/EU) and staff attend the various EUMC and Working Group meetings and would continue to perform this function during a crisis. As planning progresses, the options for the command and control of an EU-led operation would become clearer.

1C10. CDS will appoint a Joint Commander (Jt Comd) if UK national forces are deployed. The decision to appoint an Op Cdr will take into account the role of CJO in concurrent operations, the availability of alternative commanders (possibly drawn from the 4-star JCG), and the staff required to support a national contingent. It is at

this point that the roles and tasks of CJO and the PJHQ split along EU and national lines and three options may be considered:

- a. Op Cdr and Jt Comd.
- b. Op Cdr only, with CDS selecting another Jt Comd.
- c. Jt Comd only, with CDS selecting another Op Cdr.

1C11. For all EU operations, it is envisaged that the PJHQ would retain OPCOM or OPCON of deployed UK forces. If designated an EU OHQ, with an initial core staff from the PJHQ to carry out this function, the Op Cdr would command multinational joint forces as designated under Transfer of Authority arrangements (e.g. OPCON). In any event, the PJHQ may require augmentation to carry out both EU and national staffwork separately.

1C12. If the UK provides the JFHQ as the core element of the EU FHQ, the designated Force Commander will answer to the EU Op Cdr, whether UK or not. In the latter case, a decision will need to be taken about the provision of a National Contingent Commander for the national link to the PJHQ. Where the UK provides the OHQ, then it is responsible for the provision of communications to the FHQ. Similarly, where JFHQ provides the framework of an EU FHQ, it has the responsibility for provision of communications down to the Component Commanders.

1C13. The EU's strategic planning processes will continue to evolve as they mature, as the Petersberg Tasks are further developed, and as a consequence of Treaty changes. As they do so UK will need to consider adjusting or adapting its crisis management arrangements accordingly.

ANNEX 1D – US STRATEGIC PLANNING

US Planning Organisations

1D1. **US National Organisations.** As established in the United States (US) Constitution, the ultimate authority and responsibility for national defence lies with the President. The National Security Council (NSC) directs the formulation of National security policy and strategy; the NSC has 4 statutory members: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Sec Def). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency serve as statutory advisers. Supporting these are the senior officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the individual Services, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the combatant commanders,¹ and a number of agencies with unique defence responsibilities.

1D2. **Department of Defense.** The supporting participants in the Department of Defense (DOD) - the individual Services, combatant commands, and defence agencies - provide their advice and recommendations through the Secretary of Defence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

1D3. **Contingency Planning Guidance.** The Sec Def has a statutory requirement to provide the CJCS with written guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans. The Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) provides this guidance and directs the CJCS to develop plans to carry out specific missions. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prepares the CPG and co-ordinates it with the CJCS and other DOD components before the Sec Def submits it to the President for approval. The closest equivalent in UK terms is the advance planning process (see paragraph 105), where the OTG agrees priorities for the planning of Joint Planning Guides (JPGs), Joint Contingency Plans and Joint Operation Plans.

1D4. **Joint Planning and Execution Community.** The headquarters, commands and agencies involved in the planning for mobilization, training, movement, reception, employment, support and sustainment of forces assigned to a theatre of operations are collectively termed the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC consists of the CJCS and other members of the JCS, the Joint and single-Service Staffs, the combatant commands (including their component, sub-unified commands and joint task forces) and Defence agencies.

¹ A Combatant Command (COCOM) is defined as ‘a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.’ Combatant command provides full authority to organise and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. (JP 1-02 ‘Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’).

1D5. **Joint Strategic Planning System.** The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is one of the primary means by which the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities required by US law. The JSPS is a flexible and interactive system intended to provide strategic guidance for use in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and as such is the nearest thing to the UK's Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) process.

1D6. **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.** The JOPES is the principal DOD system for translating policy decisions into operational plans and orders. It includes a set of publications, an operational planning process and an automated data processing (ADP) support system which assist in the development of deliberate plans (i.e. operation plans (OPLANs)), operation plans in concept format (i.e. concept plans (CONPLANs)) and operation orders (OPORD). JOPES consists of deliberate and crisis action planning processes and emphasises joint planning for deterrence and effective transition to operations through rapid co-ordination and implementation of plans. There is no real comparison with the UK system since JOPES encompasses both US strategic and operational level planning.

1D7. **Combatant Commands.** The US organises its forces under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) into combatant commands.² The commanders of these commands exercise combatant command (COCOM) of assigned forces; COCOM is the authority to perform those functions of command involving the organisation of forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives and direction to all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Although not formally part of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the UCP supports joint strategic planning by establishing the missions, responsibilities and force structures of the combatant commanders, delineating their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) and specifies functional responsibilities for the functional combatant commanders. The UCP is prepared by the Sec Def and approved by the President with the advice and assistance of the CJCS.

1D8. **Combatant Command J5.** The J5 develops and co-ordinates plans and policies for military instruments of power in support of US national, diplomatic, and economic policies, regional strategy, strategic and contingency plans, theatre force structure, and warfighting requirements pertaining to the combatant command's AOR. In UK terms this equates to the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) J5 cell. In a similar vein to the UK, the role of the combatant command J5, on behalf of the Commander, is:

- a. Planning guidance to the subordinate headquarters or Joint Task Force Headquarters J5 through the Operations Planning Team (OPT). The OPT is

² Currently SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, JFCOM, STRATCOM, SOCOM and TRANSCOM.

activated upon receipt of any pending crisis or activity that may involve military forces within the combatant command's AOR.

- b. Co-ordinate for interagency and non-governmental and international organisations liaison officer (LO) representation for the Joint Task Force (JTF).
- c. Co-ordinate with the Sec Def and CJCS for guidance and planning data related to JTF transition or termination.
- d. Co-ordinates multinational forces points of contact.
- e. Co-ordinates United Nations (UN) related issues.

1D9. **Combatant Command Operations Planning Team.**³ The US OPT conducts a similar function to that of the UK CPT in PJHQ. The US OPT enhances the Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process by establishing a planning element at the combatant command level with component participation. The OPT normally falls under the staff supervision of the combatant command J3. Upon designation of a JTF, a deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC),⁴ from the combatant command, is deployed and will augment the JTF planning cell. Additionally, upon designation as a JTF, the J-5 will often send a J5 LO to participate in the combatant command OPT.

1D10. **Combatant Command Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell.**⁵ The combatant commander will provide the DJTFAC as a staff augmentation package within 24 hours of the designation of a Service component HQ as a JTF to facilitate joint planning and execution efforts.

1D11. **Combatant Command Crisis Action Team.** The combatant command Crisis Action Team (CAT), normally led by J3, serves as the primary focal point for the synchronisation of effort across the combatant command staff during crisis action. When activated, the combatant command CAT begins 7 days-per-week, 24-hours-per-day coverage from the combatant command joint operations centre.

Types of US Planning

1D12. **Deliberate Planning.** US Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and in this respect is similar to UK advance planning (see paragraph 105). It currently is accomplished in five stages: initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans. The process relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military

³ Not all combatant commands use the term OPT, some refer to it as the Operations Planning Element (OPE) or Joint Planning Group (JPG).

⁴ To be replaced by Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters.

⁵ The US is going away from DJTFACs and is in the process of implementing Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (SJFHQ).

circumstances that will/may exist when the plan is implemented. Deliberate planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. Deliberate plans are prepared under joint procedures and in prescribed formats as an OPLAN, CONPLAN with or without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD),⁶ or functional plan.

- a. **OPLAN.** An OPLAN is a complete and detailed operation plan containing a full description of the concept of operations and all required annexes with associated appendixes. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to execute the plan. An OPLAN can be used as the basis of a campaign plan (if required) and then developed into an OPORD.
- b. **CONPLAN.** A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the Commander of a combatant commands Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes either required by the JSCP or deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning.
- c. **CONPLAN with Time-phased Force and Deployment Data.** A CONPLAN with TPFDD⁷ is the same as a CONPLAN except that it contains more detailed planning for the deployment of forces.
- d. **Functional Plans.** Functional plans involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment. These plans are traditionally developed for specific functions or discrete tasks (e.g. nuclear weapon recovery or evacuation) but may also be developed to address functional operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or counter-drug operations.

1D13. **Crisis Action Planning.** CAP is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies – what the UK calls crisis planning. CAP follows prescribed procedures, but remains flexible and responsive to changing events.

- a. **Crisis Action Planning Process.** CAP is executed within a framework of 6 phases as illustrated in Figure 1D.1. These 6 phases integrate the workings of the President of the United States, the Sec Def and the JPEC into a single process. The process provides for the identification of a potential requirement for military response, the assessment of the requirement and formulation of strategy, the development of feasible courses of action (CoAs)

⁶ The process is currently under review.

⁷ TPFDD is a computer database used to identify types of forces and actual units required to support an OPLAN or OPORD. Additionally, TPFDD contains estimates for logistics support and designates ports for loading and unloading. It can also establish the sequence for moving the forces and support into the AOO. (User's Guide for JOPES).

by the supported commander, the selection of a CoA by the President and Sec Def and, when directed, implementation of the approved CoA by the supported commander. The phases are as follows:

- (1) **Situation Development.** The focus of this phase of crisis action planning is on the combatant commander in whose area the event occurs and who will be responsible for the execution of any military response.
- (2) **Crisis Assessment.** During the crisis assessment phase of crisis action planning, the President and Sec Def, the CJCS, and the other members of the JCS analyse the situation and determine whether a military option should be prepared.
- (3) **Course of Action Development.** The CoA development phase of crisis action planning implements the President and Sec Def decision or CJCS planning directive to develop military options.
- (4) **Course of Action Selection.** The focus of the CoA selection phase is on the selection of a CoA by the President and Sec Def and the initiation of execution planning.
- (5) **Execution Planning.** The President and Sec Def approved CoA is transformed into an OPORD during the execution planning phase of crisis action planning.
- (6) **Execution.** The execution phase begins when the President and Sec Def decide to execute a military option in response to the crisis.





Figure 1D.1 - 6 Phases of Crisis Action Planning and Key Documents

1D14. **US Campaign Planning.** US doctrine defines a campaign ‘as a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space’.⁸ Combatant commanders translate national strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theatre campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theatre strategic objectives. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. This is the means by which combatant commanders give the President and Sec Def and the CJCS information needed for co-ordination at the national level. Subordinate campaign plans may also be created by joint task forces commands if required. Tasking for strategic requirements or major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions and are not normally completed until after the President and Sec Def selects the CoA during CAP.


⁸ US JP 5-0 ‘*Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*’.

ANNEX 1E – ILLUSTRATIVE TEMPLATE OF MULTINATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS WITH UK AS A PARTICIPATING NATION




(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ANNEX 1F – ILLUSTRATIVE TEMPLATE OF MULTINATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS WITH UK AS THE FRAMEWORK NATION



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ANNEX 1G - STRATEGIC PLANNING DEVELOPMENT FLOWCHART



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

CHAPTER 2 – THE FUNDAMENTALS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

The purpose of Chapter 2 is to convey an understanding of the theory of operational planning. It begins with a brief description of campaigning, before concentrating on a detailed examination of the intellectual concepts and processes that make up operational design.

Section I – An Overview of Campaigning

Section II – Operational Design

Section III – The Operational Estimate

Section IV – Planning During the Campaign

SECTION I – AN OVERVIEW OF CAMPAIGNING

“I will not on any account be drawn away from first principles; that it is for commanders to make plans and give decisions, and staffs then to work out the details of those plans; on no account will I have a plan forced on me by a planning staff.”

Field Marshal Montgomery

The Operational Level Framework

201. **The Manoeuvrist Approach.** The Manoeuvrist Approach is a key tenet of the British approach to the conduct of operations, and is shared by many allies as well as other potential partners. From the Manoeuvrist Approach 4 key aspects of the operational level can be derived, which considered together, form a framework for operations; in this sense the framework is concerned with both ‘*doing*’ and ‘*visualising*’. They are: SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT and EXPLOIT (SAPE). As a construct they help to illustrate how major operations, battles and engagements relate to one another, within the overall campaign. But they must not be viewed as sequential or separate and distinct phases, the key being to maintain a clear focus on success, balancing the need to be bold and decisive with the constraints and limitations of operations. Implicit in this approach is the need to fully understand the nature of the problem, a key pre-condition to successful operational design.

202. **SHAPE the Operational Environment.** Erode the will and resolve of adversary military and political decision-makers, in combination with other strategic activities, to ‘*create the picture of defeat in the mind of the adversary*’.¹ To attack the will of his opponent, the commander should create the *perception* in the mind of the

¹ Richard Simkin, ‘*Race to the Swift*’.

adversary - and his political masters - that achieving their aim is unlikely without significant loss of political credibility and resources. In doing so, the commander should weaken the resolve of the adversary commander to continue, thus making the cohesion of his force more vulnerable to attack. Threatening him, or appearing to threaten him, throughout his depth, and never allowing him to feel secure anywhere, can seriously undermine or shatter his will. Simultaneously, and acting within the wider political context, the legitimacy and justification for the use of force should be conveyed in order to build and maintain support for own actions in home and other audiences. The difficulties of doing this should not be underestimated and illustrate the importance of a *true* understanding of the nature of the problem. Of key importance in this are:

- a. **Information Operations.** Information Operations (Info Ops) can focus on wearing down the adversary's will, for instance by exploiting internal differences (cultural, ethnic, religious and economic), by fostering mistrust or lack of confidence between levels of command, and by degrading the adversary command and control infrastructure. The defensive aspects of Info Ops can promote the cohesion of friendly forces.
- b. **Media Operations.** The commander should ensure that he impresses his message on the media and strives to mould the opinion of the neighbouring countries, the host nation and civilian population to be at least sympathetic to the declared end-state.

203. **ATTACK the Adversary's Will and Cohesion.**² The focus must be (if necessary wrest and then) to maintain the initiative. Every effort should be made to avoid fighting the adversary on his own terms - his strengths must be made irrelevant. The qualities that promote cohesion are also those, which if attacked, destroy it. By manoeuvring to surprise the adversary, by using firepower selectively to attack that which underpins his cohesion (e.g. critical Command and Control (C2) systems and vital logistic and industrial facilities), and harmonising these with attacks on his will to continue the struggle, his cohesion can be broken apart and shattered to the point where he is defeated or neutralised. However, the commander should consider the manner in which that defeat is achieved. A resolute adversary may consider it worth resisting in a piecemeal manner, prolonging the struggle in the hope of a failure of will by his opponent. Particular problems will arise when confronting an adversary that has the ability both to fight cohesively - as an armed, organised body - and then to change into a more diffuse, loosely structured organisation. When facing such a force, defeating the adversary's will may well be more important than attacking his cohesion. Therefore, it is important to view attacks on the adversary's will and cohesion as

² In a situation where there is no clear adversary, such as a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), this might be the object of the mission, i.e. the thing which provides the greatest resistance to the mission, and in that sense is 'Affect' rather than 'Attack' and so will not be focussed on cohesion but on ensuring 3rd parties do not hinder the progress of the mission.

complementary activities which require to be addressed simultaneously, not as discrete or sequential issues. Cohesion is attacked through:

a. **Synchronisation of Firepower and Manoeuvre.** Although they can achieve a significant effect on their own, the synchronised use of firepower and manoeuvre has devastating potential. Firepower destroys, neutralises, suppresses and demoralises. It is delivered by a range of platforms and can achieve both lethal and non-lethal effects. Firepower provides the violent, destructive force that amplifies the effects of other means of attacking cohesion. Firepower effects are the sum of volume, accuracy, lethality, suddenness and unpredictability, and these are magnified by synchronising joint firepower³ in time and space. The effects of firepower must be exploited by manoeuvre if the results are to be more than transitory. Operational manoeuvre seeks to place the adversary at a disadvantage and may be physical or conceptual in nature. In the physical sense, the psychological effect may be so great as to render fighting unnecessary. In the conceptual sense, manoeuvre pressure may be applied in such a way so as to present the adversary with a choice of unattractive options that force him to concede. While historically manoeuvre has been defined as the combination of mobility and firepower, it might be better viewed now as a combination of mobility and effect.

b. **Tempo and Simultaneity.** Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity of operations, *relative* to the adversary. Tempo comprises 3 elements, speed of decision, speed of execution and speed of transition from one activity to the next. Greater tempo will overload the adversary's decision-making process at critical levels and is likely to cause paralysis, inaction and a breakdown of resistance to the point where he loses the cohesion needed to continue the fight. Simultaneity seeks to overload the adversary commander by attacking or threatening him from so many angles at once that he is denied the ability to concentrate on one problem at a time, or even establish priorities between them. He faces menacing dilemmas about how and where to react, he is torn in different directions and even if he is not paralysed, he finds it hard to respond coherently. Simultaneity should be seen through the eyes of the adversary and its use judged by the effect on his cohesion. If the effect of simultaneity and tempo is repeated concurrently against a number of levels of command, a cumulative effect on cohesion is felt throughout the adversary force. By using the full gamut of friendly capabilities, the adversary's problems are compounded, his response to one form of attack either making him vulnerable to another or exacerbating a different problem.

³ A joint approach to firepower will ensure the greatest effect. For example, the persistent nature of land based firepower is dependent on a sizeable logistic effort to move ammunition, especially artillery natures, whereas air platforms lack the persistence of ground systems but have greater reach, are more flexible and less reliant on mobile logistics.

c. **Surprise.** Surprise is built on speed, security and deception and is fundamental to the shattering of an adversary's cohesion. As with tempo, time is the key factor. It is not essential that the adversary is taken unaware but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively. Absolute surprise may totally paralyse the adversary, but partial surprise will also degrade his reaction. Surprise involves identifying, creating and exploiting opportunities, which may be fleeting. It means doing the unexpected or reacting in an unexpected manner, playing on the adversary's perceptions and expectations.

d. **Asymmetric Warfare.** Few aggressors would take on a state of superior military strength according to established rules. Rather they would seek ways to negate advantage and undermine a superior opponent's will, credibility and influence. There are 3 potential areas of asymmetry in warfare: the asymmetric nature of an opponent himself (i.e. he is difficult to identify and target, or even negotiate with), the asymmetric nature of an opponent's ideals or culture (which are at variance to one's own beliefs, priorities and moral constraints) and the asymmetric methods that an opponent may employ to counter a qualitative and quantitative advantage. Exploiting an opponent's weakness is fundamental to success, just as the identification of the weaknesses that an opponent would wish to target is crucial to countering the asymmetric threat (i.e. PROTECT).

204. **PROTECT the Cohesion of the Force.** At the same time as attacking the adversary's cohesion, that which provides the 'glue' for the JTF must be protected. This is applicable to national and multinational operations although multinational operations, particularly those comprising ad hoc coalitions, pose a particular challenge. Contributing nations may have differing agendas and provide forces with varied degrees of fighting power, including different doctrine and incompatible equipment. Personalities and political influence are likely to have a disproportionate effect on the cohesion of a multinational force.

a. **Maintenance of Morale.** Having identified a friendly force's critical vulnerabilities, either by the intelligence process or as a result of physical attack, the adversary will make every effort to attack weaknesses, to reduce morale and thus erode cohesion. In multinational operations, the adversary may try to inflict disproportionate casualties on one particular nation's forces, or exploit religious or cultural differences. The commander should attempt to mask these vulnerabilities and focus the force on the maintenance of the aim, whilst ensuring a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to Force Protection, based upon risk management and a measured assessment of the threat.

b. **Unity of Purpose.** The effective employment of military forces requires them to be directed relentlessly towards the achievement of a common aim or

mission. The commander plays a key role in focusing his command on achieving the mission and generating a common sense of purpose. Within multinational operations, individual goals and interests will need to be harmonised to ensure a common purpose, and consensus will need to be maintained to ensure political and military cohesion.

205. **EXPLOIT the Situation by Direct or Indirect Means.** The commander should be prepared to exploit opportunities to achieve a better position relative to the prevailing circumstances or the adversary. This involves identifying or creating opportunities, having or obtaining the means and will to exploit them, and achieving a higher tempo relative to the adversary.

a. The use of manoeuvre and offensive action is fundamental to seizing and holding the initiative, which is the key to being able to exploit opportunities. Mission Command allows Component Commanders (CCs) or subordinates to exploit opportunities that present themselves providing they are within the overall intent.

b. The ability to do this successfully relies on continuous planning, including accurate risk analysis and management. Both subjective and objective risk analysis is required and intuition has a role to play here. The commander should promote a culture that is aware of risk rather than one that is averse to risk. This approach requires that commanders at all levels are able to identify those areas where significant risk lies and then choose to accept, avoid or mitigate against them. The commander that analyses, assesses and actively manages risk is frequently able to seize opportunities and take bold decisions. Key events or effects are identified in each phase of the course of action (CoA) that is judged to be: of significant operational concern; could provide a potential opportunity for exploitation; or of unknown quantity whose outcome could be significant.

Operational Art

206. Operational Art provides the linkage between tactical success and the strategic end-state; it is the skilful execution of the operational level of command. Operational Art is how the Operational Commander translates the objectives which are given to him into a design for operations that leads, ultimately, to the actions necessary to achieve a set of conditions. The UK defines Operational Art as *‘the orchestration of all military activities involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result’*.⁴ In short *‘it determines where, when and for what purpose forces will conduct operations’*.⁵ Synonymous with these is the

⁴ JDP 01 *‘Joint Operations’*, paragraph 321.

⁵ AJP-01(B) *‘Allied Joint Doctrine’*, Chapter 2.

requirement of a commander to have a full understanding of the problem including, and usually most importantly, the adversary, as well as the ability to visualise the tactical activities that collectively will provide a solution. The latter hinges on an understanding of force capabilities and the effect of tactical actions not just on the adversary but also on the Alliance or coalition of which the joint force will normally be a part.

207. Thus Operational Art demands creative and innovative thought to find broad solutions to operational problems, solutions that might be described as ‘Operational Ideas’. These Operational Ideas are, in effect, the output of Operational Art and are the source of the Commander’s Intent and subsequent Concept of Operations. They represent the basis of the Campaign Plan and are further refined by the process of Operational Design. As such they are the domain of the commander and the foundation of a command led staff system. Operational Ideas are best expressed in terms of the application of the manoeuvrist approach at the operational level: SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT and EXPLOIT. There are three inter-linked concepts that are especially useful in the formulation of Operational Ideas: Centre of Gravity (CoG), Campaign Fulcrum and the Decisive Act.

208. **Centre of Gravity.** The CoG is defined by NATO as that *‘characteristic(s), capability(ies), or locality(ies) from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight’*.⁶ Correct identification of the CoG may be less easy than the concise definition suggests. To find the CoG in any particular situation we should look for the thing that acts to hold an entire system or structure together. At the strategic level, the CoG will often be an abstraction such as the adversary’s public support or perhaps the strength of political purpose. Thus even if the CoG is discernible it may not be accessible at the strategic level through the military line of operation alone, but only in combination with others (such as diplomatic and economic). Consequently, a military campaign plan at the operational level is constructed so that, when it succeeds, it will have helped to establish the conditions to attack and eliminate or make ineffective the identified strategic CoG. At the operational level a CoG will often be something physical that can be attacked; the key is to find some element of the adversary’s system upon which his plans must depend. The identification of the CoG is achieved by analysing where the adversary derives his strength through critical capabilities (what it can do to us), critical requirements (what it needs) and critical vulnerabilities (those vulnerable to attack) – this is illustrated at Figure 2.1 and is developed further in Section II of this Chapter.

⁶ AAP-6.




Figure 2.1 - Identification of a Centre of Gravity

209. **Campaign Fulcrum.** There is a stage in every campaign where one side starts winning and the other starts losing. Although notoriously difficult to identify (let alone predict) there is nevertheless value in attempting to determine when this is likely to happen. Identifying an opponent's Campaign Fulcrum may be a pivotal moment in a campaign, as this is the moment when exploitation of the situation is vital if the advantage is to be pressed home and the friendly end-state achieved. If correctly predicted then it is possible to exploit this event fully or, if about to happen to your own side, try to mitigate against it. It can be caused by a wide variety of factors varying from the availability or provision of resources, a series of tactical reverses or a change in political context.

210. **The Decisive Act.** Linked to the idea of campaign fulcrum is an associated concept, that of the decisive act or the decisive operation. In Clausewitzian terms this was the idea of a single, decisive battle: "*the theory of war tries to discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point*". Although battles and engagements are now viewed as stepping stones towards a higher goal, it is still important to try to find something, or a series of linked events, that will be decisive within a campaign, that which causes an opponent to forever lose the initiative, and the sequence of actions that, together, will bring this about; in other words *shaping* operations leading to a *decisive* operation.

Operational Design

211. **The Principal Elements of Operational Design.** Operational Design is a process that further develops and refines Operational Ideas. 3 things together comprise the principal elements of Operational Design, the Operational Estimate, the Campaign Planning Concepts (CPCs) and the Campaign Plan. The Campaign Plan, which articulates the operational level commander's overall scheme for operations, results from the Operational Estimate and is largely constructed using a number of theoretical building blocks collectively known as the CPCs.

212. **The Operational Estimate.** The Operational Estimate is a logical military problem solving process which is applied in uncertain and dynamic environments against shifting, competing or ill defined goals, often in high stake, time-pressured situations. It combines objective analysis with the power of intuition and its output is the *decision* about which CoA to take. Guided by the commander, the Operational Estimate is a mechanism to draw together a vast amount of information for thorough analysis, in order to allow the development of feasible CoAs and the subsequent translation of a selected option into a winning plan. It is essentially, a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action.

a. The Estimate process is central to the formulation of the Campaign Plan and the subsequent modification of operation orders and directives. The term 'Operational Estimate' is used to describe the process carried out by the operational level commander and his staff. All other estimates, either environmental or functional, at the operational or tactical level, should be designed to contribute to the Operational Estimate.

b. There are 6 steps to the Operational Estimate. Each step and its purpose are shown in Table 2.2. Further detail is in Section III.

Step	Purpose
Step 1 – Review of the Situation (Geo-strategic Analysis).	The purpose of Step 1 is to ensure that the whole staff have a common understanding of the background and underlying causes of the problem, and have a firm grip of all parties' political objectives.
Step 2 – Identify and Analyse the Problem (the Mission and the Object).	The purpose of Step 2 is to gain a clear understanding of the problem that has been set.
Step 3 – Formulation of Potential CoAs by the Commander.	The purpose of Step 3 is to focus staff effort on informed factor analysis in order to establish the art of the possible.

Step	Purpose
Step 4 – Development and Validation of CoAs.	The purpose of Step 4 is to create detailed and workable CoAs that can be tested for likelihood of success.
Step 5 – CoA Evaluation.	The purpose of Step 5 is to present sufficient detail to the Comd to allow him to select a winning concept.
Step 6 – Commander’s Decision and Development of the Plan.	The purpose of Step 6 is to turn the winning concept into a workable plan.

Table 2.2 – Steps of the Estimate

213. **The Campaign Planning Concepts.** The CPCs are used to build the framework within which operations take place and can be seen as a bridge between Operational Art and Operational Design – more campaigning concepts than simply planning tools. In addition, they assist commanders and staffs in both visualising how the campaign might unfold and in managing the development of operations. They can be used individually, although they are all closely related, and are best used as part of a set; it is for the commander to decide their utility in the prevailing circumstances. The CPCs, which are explained in detail in Section II, are:

- a. End-state.
- b. CoG.
- c. Decisive Points (DPs).
- d. Lines of Operation.
- e. Sequencing and Phases.
- f. Contingency Planning.
- g. Culminating Point.
- h. Operational Pause.

214. **The Campaign Plan.** A campaign is defined as ‘*a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.*’⁷ The Campaign Plan, the practical expression of Operational Art, conveys the operational level commander’s vision for how he sees the operation unfolding and is translated into actionable detail by operations orders and directives. It is essential in conveying

⁷ JWP 0-0.1.1 ‘United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’.

the crucial common understanding of the Commander's Intent and his overall Scheme of Manoeuvre across the force. As a minimum it should clearly set out:

- a. The overall effect desired, relative to the adversary.
- b. The relationship between key objectives and the end-state.
- c. The key objectives, their relative importance, and the sequence in which they are to be achieved in order to unlock the CoG and achieve the operational end-state.
- d. How success will be measured. What conditions should be achieved before the operational end-state can be said to be achieved. How does this relate to the strategic goal?
- e. The assignment of forces and resources and the necessary command and control arrangements.

215. **Operational Management.** Operational Management seeks to achieve the greatest possible synergy through integration, co-ordination and synchronisation of joint activities. These activities do not happen by chance and getting them to work in harmony is largely the responsibility of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) staff, led by the Chief of Staff and assisted by the other senior staff. The common thread that binds them together is planning. Planning and operations are part of a continuous process. Planning flows into execution, the outcome of which creates the conditions for subsequent planning; both are inter-dependent and rely heavily on the drive of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC). Planning shapes the execution of the Campaign Plan but likewise the ongoing results of execution will cause the JTFC to have to review, adapt and modify the plan.⁸ For further detail on Operational Management refer to JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*'.

Campaigning – An Overview

216. Figure 2.3 depicts the relationship between Operational Art, Operational Design and Operational Management as the three main subsets of Campaigning, highlighting the pivotal role played by the JTFC in 'energising the circuits' within a Joint Task Force. As the top part of the diagram shows, the CPCs, although relevant across the campaign planning process, have particular utility in certain areas. In this sense the CPCs can be seen as a bridge between Operational Art and Operational Design; more *campaigning concepts* than simply *planning tools*.

217. The key highlights to draw from the diagram for each of the Campaigning subsets are:

⁸ Vice Adm Vernon Clark USN, "*We plan because synergy does not happen by itself. Synchronisation does not happen by accident. For synchronisation, co-ordination and integration to take place, planning is required*".

- a. **Operational Art.** CoG Analysis and Campaign Fulcrum and the Decisive Act are particularly pertinent to the identification of what is going to be decisive; the essence of Operational Art.
- b. **Operational Design.** Operational Design is used to lay out the way in which the operation might unfold. Lines of Operation and DPs map out the common threads and stepping stones required to unlock the adversary CoG, while Sequencing, Contingency Planning (Branches and Sequels) and Operational Pauses are ways of structuring the application of resources to ensure that force is concentrated at the right time and place.
- c. **Operational Management.** Operational Management is essentially the enactment of a series of control measures to ensure the campaign plan remains on track.

218. It is the central role of the commander that is critical. To succeed the commander should ensure that the power of the whole – the campaign – is greater than the sum of its parts. To do this the operational level commander should be able to visualise the tactical activity that makes up his campaign plan, asking himself:

- a. Will/might the action achieve, or does the action have the possibility of achieving, a decision that materially alters the situation in terms of the overall campaign?
- b. Might the action achieve a decision that materially assists directly in realising strategic goals?
- c. Does the plan take account of the political dimension?
- d. What effect does the action seek to achieve? Effects can be:
 - (1) Intended/Unintended.
 - (2) Desired/Un-desired.
 - (3) Positive/Negative.
 - (4) Expected/Unexpected.
 - (5) Kinetic/Cognitive.
 - (6) Instantaneous/Delayed.
 - (7) Localised/Distributed.
 - (8) Permanent/Temporary.

(9) A combination of (1) to (8).




Figure 2.3 - An Overview of Campaigning

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL DESIGN

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable”

Dwight D Eisenhower

The Campaign Planning Concepts

219. In seeking to construct his campaign plan, the commander will design his plan around a number of building blocks that will help him visualise how the campaign will unfold. These building blocks provide a framework for thinking at the operational

level of command and thus have a utility whatever the nature of the conflict. In broad terms CPCs serve 3 purposes:

- a. To focus effort in the Operational Estimate.
- b. To help describe in campaign plans and directives what needs to be achieved and how these activities interrelate.
- c. To assist in monitoring the execution of a campaign or major operation.

End-state

220. The end-state is defined in the UK as ‘*that state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable or satisfactory terms*’.⁹ At the strategic level the end-state will invariably be political and will be described by a series of political objectives that provide the criteria by which achievement of the end-state may be measured. However, at the strategic level, identifying a fixed and enduring end-state is not always possible. Directly linked to the strategic end-state will be the military end-state at the operational level. Identification of the military end-state, or defining what will constitute success, is crucial to the planning and conduct of the campaign. It is necessary to ensure that both the strategic and operational level commanders are of one mind on this issue, on what military conditions constitute success. One means to assist this is the development of criteria for success which may be articulated as operational objectives.

221. The end-state is a crucial element of any plan; without it there is no focus to which campaign planning can be directed. The operational/military end-state is derived from direction or an order from the higher authority (normally the Chief of the Defence Staff’s (CDS) directive), thus there is a relationship between objectives and end-state. All activities and operations should be judged against their relevance to achieving the end-state; where no convincing relationship can be found, the activity should not be conducted.

Centre of Gravity Analysis

222. Paragraph 208 introduced the concept of a CoG and the fact that there is likely to be one at both the strategic and operational levels. The CoG is that aspect of the adversary’s overall capability which, if attacked and eliminated, will lead either to his inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peace through negotiations. Therefore the defeat of an adversary’s CoG is the key to achieving our own end-state. The identification of an adversary’s CoG is arrived at from a combination of intelligence input and military judgement. At the strategic level, the Intelligence Services will play

⁹ JWP 0-01.1.

a major role in identifying the adversary's strategic CoG. At the operational level, the J2 staffs ideally conduct an intelligence estimate and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) to inform the commander and his staff of likely operational CoGs, although its final determination will be a combination of a number of different sources. The initial analysis of the adversary's CoG requires constant re-appraisal both during the planning and execution phases of an operation, as does the protection of friendly CoGs.

223. Just as a commander needs to assess his adversary's CoG and to consider the most effective way of attacking it, so too must he be clear about his own CoG. The commander should review the enemy's means of attacking his own CoG and take the appropriate measures to protect it. Whatever the adversary - and friendly - CoG at the operational level they should, once identified, be the focus of the campaign plan. It goes without saying that the selection of the CoG is critical to the overall success of the campaign. The identification of the CoG and its analysis is a key part of the operational estimate process and as such is an iterative process requiring constant review.

224. At the operational level, the first step is to identify the adversary's key strength from which he derives his '*freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight*',¹⁰ his CoG. It should be clear *why* it is a CoG and what it can *do* that makes it a CoG. This is known as Critical Capability. As an example, it is a CoG because it can *defeat* our defences, or *block* our attack. Once this is clear the next step is to examine what it – the CoG – needs to *achieve* that Critical Capability; in other words Critical Requirements. These Critical Requirements are defined in the same way as objectives, for example, assembling enough merchant shipping to get into theatre, achieving air superiority or retaining superior combat power. These Critical Requirements are then examined to determine if there are in some way incomplete, or missing, or vulnerable. These become the Critical Vulnerabilities, the things that can be exploited in order to bring down an adversary's CoG. Critical Vulnerabilities can be intrinsic weaknesses, external vulnerabilities that might prevent a CoG from ever getting to the battle, or the vulnerabilities of other forces relied on by the CoG. They may be technical, geographic or cognitive, and often will present only fleeting opportunities for attack.

225. **Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix.** These four elements are brought together into a matrix (see Table 2.4) and, although a sequence has been described, it can be approached in a number of ways. The **entire matrix** is used to define the CoG to ensure that the underpinning logic as to why a CoG has been chosen is clear, and illustrate which elements of it are vulnerable to attack.

¹⁰ JWP 0-01.1.

CoG ANALYSIS MATRIX	
1 – CoG <i>(A focal point from which the enemy draws strength.)</i>	2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITIES <i>(That which makes it a CoG.)</i>
3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS <i>(That which it needs to be effective as a CoG.)</i>	4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES <i>(How can I attack these CRs – in what ways are they exposed? Some CVs will hard to target.)</i>
<i>Adversary CoG - Exploit Critical Vulnerabilities.</i> <i>Own CoG – Achieve Critical Requirements; Protect Critical Vulnerabilities.</i>	

Table 2.4 - CoG Analysis Matrix

CoG Analysis will inform the selection of DPs, objectives and component missions and tasks or even Lines of Op. An example CoG analysis is shown at Table 2.5

Example. Country A has a strong army but a very weak navy. Her adversary, Country B, has a very strong navy that the commander of Country A has identified as its key strength and CoG. In his view what makes the navy the adversary's CoG is its ability to control sea lines of communication of other nations and therefore dominate those nations: ie the Critical Capability. However, in order to operate effectively, Country B needs to retain ports for shelter, logistics, repair etc: a CR. The CV of the ports is their susceptibility to land attack. In short the Country B CoG is their navy (key strength) and the way of neutralising their CoG is to attack the ports, which are vulnerable to such attack (key weakness).

CoG ANALYSIS MATRIX	
1 – Country B CoG	2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITIES
The Navy	Dominate sea LoC of other surrounding nations and therefore enforce domination of those nations.
3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS	4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES
Retain ports for shelter, logistics and repair.	Vulnerability of ports to land attack.

Table 2.5 - CoG Analysis Matrix

226. **Identifying a Centre of Gravity – a Possible Checklist.** This approach provides commanders and staffs with a useable and useful concept for looking at both adversary and own CoGs that is logical and not counter-intuitive. At the strategic level the CoG may be some moral aspect, such as a leader, popular will, an Alliance (with Alliance cohesion as a possible CR or CV), or it could be something physical,

such as the armed forces. At the operational level it is more likely to be something physical, something real that can be attacked, an ability to project power into theatre or the ability to command. The key is to find some element of the adversary's military system, upon which his plans should depend, which in the first instance may only be identified as a number of capabilities. In due course and after analysis it may then be able to determine the CoG. In identifying own and adversary CoGs the following considerations may be of use:

- a. **It is something that hurts.** This means that it is a force, or someone or something that controls a force. It is not a rail network, nor a port, nor an ability to do something. Those may be Critical Requirements or Critical Capabilities.
- b. **It resists the achievement of an end-state.** It is a CoG because of what it can *do*. It comes from the adversarial nature of conflict and is only relevant in the context of the conflict. What makes it important is the manner and extent to which it imposes itself on an adversary.
- c. **Its defeat, destruction or neutralisation will lead to an adversary's defeat.** The connection between attacking an adversary's CoG and the effect it will have on the desired outcome should be clear; if I defeat his or eliminate his CoG, will it lead inevitably to the achievement of my end-state?
- d. **It contributes to the achievement of the strategic CoG.** There should be a clear relationship between strategic and operational CoGs but not in an obvious physical sense. They will be conceptually distinct but the linkages and inter relationships should be examined.

Decisive Points

227. While it may be possible to defeat the adversary's CoG by direct attack, it is more likely that a series of co-ordinated actions will be required. Such actions are described as DPs.¹¹ A DP is therefore best described as an effect, the successful outcome of which is a precondition to unlocking the enemy's CoG. They need not necessarily constitute a battle or physical engagement, nor need they have a geographical relevance; they may be the elimination or denial of a capability, or an achievement such as obliging an adversary to engage in formal negotiations. The key is the effect that the actions have on the adversary and must be measurable. The acid test of a DP is that its removal from a campaign plan in the planning phase would prejudice the overall coherence of the plan and, during the execution, failure to

¹¹ AAP-6 defines a DP as '*A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment*'. The NATO definition tends to contradict UK usage of DPs and the UK interpretation of this definition is outlined in paragraph 227.

achieve a DP would threaten the plan's viability. When creating DPs, planners should always:

- a. Define them in terms of their effect on the adversary, the environment or friendly forces.
- b. Ensure the extent of their fulfilment can be measured.
- c. Articulate clearly the purpose of each DP.

228. **Joint Objectives.** In a similar way that strategic and operational end-states can be described in terms of strategic or operational objectives, a DP may be broken down into a series of Joint Objectives (JOs). By analysing¹² the effect that is to be achieved by a given DP it is usually possible to identify a number of JOs. These are a set of measurable activities that contribute to the achievement of a DP and involve assets or resources of one or more component.

Lines of Operation

229. Lines of operation are planning tools that establish the inter-relationship, in time and space, between DPs and the CoG and are usually functional or environmental in nature. Lines of operation are the link between DPs in time and space on the path to the CoG, forming a critical path to the CoG.

230. Although individual environmental lines of operation, such as an 'air line of operation', can be valid, functional lines such as 'protection of Lines of Communication' will often be more effective.¹³ Such functional lines will link DPs that involve several environments, exploiting the different strengths of those environments. Lines of operation also may continue beyond the achievement of the operational CoG in order to reach the strategic end-state. There may be occasions where some lines of operation will go through the operational CoG and continue beyond, as in certain operations, even after defeat of the operational CoG, actions need to be continued to achieve the operational end-state.

Sequencing and Phases

231. Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the adversary's CoG. Once the overall sequencing of the operation has been determined, the commander may choose to divide his campaign into phases. The conditions that should be satisfied for the start and end of each phase should be clearly defined and care should be taken to maintain tempo between phases.

¹² See paragraph 316 for more detail on DP analysis.

¹³ JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*', Chapter 2 describes a number of Operations Support Activities, such as Info Ops, which will often have their own line of operation. See also paragraph 326.

232. Sequencing is the logical arrangement of DPs in terms of time, space and resources. Although simultaneous action on all lines of operation may be ideal, lack of resources usually forces the commander to sequence his actions and apportion the force accordingly; alternatively a commander may choose to sequence his actions in order to reduce the risks to an acceptable level. For example, he may have sufficient resources to move his land component into the Joint Operations Area (JOA) at the same time as establishing sea control and air superiority, but he may deem the risk to the sea and air transports to be too high and thus conduct the tasks sequentially.

233. Once this sequence has been determined, the commander may wish to divide his campaign into phases. A phase is a discrete and identifiable activity along all military lines of operation, usually having time or space dimensions, that allows for the reorganisation and redirection of forces as part of the superior commander's intent. This process can assist the commander in thinking through the entire campaign logically and in terms of available forces, resources and time. Where an operation genuinely depends on the conclusion of a preceding operation or requires a major change in task organisation, phasing can be a useful tool. However, the aim in phasing a campaign should be to maintain continuity and tempo and great care should be taken to avoid unnecessary operational pauses. Sequencing and phases are not immutable. They provide the framework upon which further planning can take place, but the need for flexibility remains important.

Contingency Planning

234. Contingency planning is the process by which options are built into the plan to take into account possible opportunities or reverses. Commanders should ensure that appropriate options are incorporated into their plans to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing circumstances and to allow them to keep the initiative despite the actions of the adversary. Careful consideration of the 'what ifs' associated with each phase will greatly enhance the flexibility of the campaign plan. Alternative plans within a particular phase should be considered (branches) and planning conducted for possible outcomes of a phase (sequels). Branches and sequels are developed both during initial campaign planning and during the conduct of the campaign. Broadly, branches and sequels can be defined as follows:

- a. **Branches.** Branches are options within a particular phase or alternative plans, available to the commander to anticipate opportunities or reverses, and provide him with the flexibility to retain the initiative.
- b. **Sequels.** Sequels provide options for the next phase. One of the sequels to the current phase may simply be the next pre-planned phase. However, to ensure that the phased campaign can proceed even in the face of setbacks, prudent planners will prepare several options for subsequent and other phases.

Thus, once a sequel is chosen and undertaken it will become the next phase in the campaign.

Culminating Point

235. An operation or battle reaches its culminating point¹⁴ when the current operation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. Put simply, and in warfighting terms, it is the point at which an attacking force can no longer sustain an offensive and switches to the defensive. There are many factors that may contribute or directly result in an operation or battle reaching its culminating point; however, identification of such a point is extremely difficult. Equally important, however, is the need to recognise when one's own culminating point is approaching. When a commander identifies a possible friendly culminating point he may order an operational pause or reassign resources (e.g. reserve) to prevent culmination. It is easier to identify those occasions in military history when culminating points have not been recognised, because of the resulting disastrous effects, than those where they have been correctly identified and avoided.

Operational Pause

236. It is sometimes necessary to pause on one line of operation in order to concentrate activity on another. Ideally, the operational pause¹⁴ should be planned in order to retain the initiative and minimise any loss of tempo. Implicit in the term 'pause' is maintenance of the ability to re-activate the line of operation in order to, if necessary, regain and maintain the initiative on that line. This will require identification and allocation of additional resources within the campaign plan.

237. An unplanned operational pause may be needed as result of unforeseen circumstances such as: a change in the nature of the campaign, an operation reaching the end of its sustainability, or terrain and climate compelling a halt. Whether planned or not, it is crucial that the commander maintains the initiative on other lines of operation.

SECTION III – THE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE

Estimate Process

238. Any organisation should have a decision-making tool to establish what ways and means are to be employed to achieve its desired ends. The method employed should match the situation in which it is going to be used and in the UK Armed Forces this is the estimate process. In business there are various decision-making tools, but

¹⁴ Defined in JWP 0-01.1.

all are broadly similar. Furthermore, they utilise the same basic questions or stages as in the military:

- a. **Objective Clarified.** What situation am I currently in; what is the nature of my predicament; what are the aims and objectives of my opponent likely to be?
- b. **Problems Identified.** What am I being asked to or need to achieve and what constraints are there on my actions?
- c. **All Choices Listed.** What resources do I have available to me and what are those available to my opponent?
- d. **Consequences Considered and Evaluated.** What alternative CoAs do I have?
- e. **Decision Made.** Which is the alternative that is most likely to lead to success?

239. **Understanding the Complete Problem.** The operational level commander (and his staff) must be able ‘*to grasp quickly the essentials of a military problem*’¹⁵ in order to establish what is required to achieve the task. The problem is of prime importance and is composed of 2 parts; the assigned *mission* and the *object* of that mission. The object is the thing on which the mission bears or which provides the greatest resistance to that mission, and will often, but not always, be the adversary’s military forces. The result of analysis of mission and object, early on in the planning process, is a greater understanding of the problem being faced and, as a consequence, the ability to identify potential CoAs for achieving success. By early consideration of the complete problem the result is focused factor evaluation that is more likely to produce a winning course of action.

240. **Establishing the Art of the Possible.** A thorough understanding of the problem establishes a logical and credible basis for a commander to give rational and constructive direction to the staff, without in any way constraining further refinement of the problem, or initiative at lower levels. Thus the staff can then concentrate on establishing the art of the possible. An analysis of the complete problem will produce viable CoAs at an early stage in the process, which can then be developed and validated by the staff using specifically identified factors in more detail.

241. **The Operational Estimate.** The Operational Estimate has already been introduced in paragraph 212. It comprises 6 steps:

- a. Step 1: Review of Situation (Geo-strategic Analysis).

¹⁵ Conduct of War, 1950, Chapter 1.

- b. Step 2: Identify and Analyse the Problem.
- c. Step 3: Formulation of Potential CoAs by the Commander.
- d. Step 4: Development and Validation of CoAs.
- e. Step 5: CoA Evaluation.
- f. Step 6: Commander's Decision.

The estimate process, which is revisited throughout a campaign to ensure that the ramifications of any changes are properly considered, is central to the formulation of a joint or multinational Campaign Plan. The joint estimate format is outlined in Annex 2A. The steps of the estimate are described in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

Step 1 - Review of Situation

242. There are two parts to Step 1. The aim of the first is to gain an understanding of the background to the crisis and of the second, to analyse the current situation. At the outset of a potential crisis, as much background information as possible relevant to the situation will start to be amassed, such as that provided by the Defence Intelligence Staff and Permanent Joint Headquarters J2 staffs.¹⁶ This geo-strategic analysis should include the politico-diplomatic short and long-term causes of the conflict. It should consider the political influences including public will and cultural issues, competing demands for resources, and the political, economic and legal constraints. Also included should be international interests, positions of international organisations (IO) neutral to the conflict and other competing or distracting international situations. Much of the information will, by necessity, be replicated in subordinate estimates to help focus on strategic goals and CoGs of all sides.

¹⁶ Additional information will be provided by other staffs, such as the CIMIC staff who will conduct stakeholder analysis to assess which civil actors will have an influence. See IJWP 3-90 '*Civil-Military Co-operation*' (CIMC) Chapter 4, Section III.




Figure 2.7 - Step 1 - Review of the Situation (Geostrategic Analysis)

Step 2 - Identify and Analyse the Problem

243. **Step 2a - Mission Analysis.** The planning process begins with the conduct of mission analysis which should be led personally by the JTFC, assisted by his Joint Command Group (JCG). Upon receipt of the higher level direction (CDS and Jt Comd Directives), the JTFC and his staff should first analyse the mission to determine precisely what is to be accomplished, to ascertain what has to be done and why. This should include the determination of any implied tasks or preconditions (such as political imperatives which have pre-eminence over all else) which should be satisfied in order to accomplish the overall mission, as well as the impact of time on the execution of the mission. The mission analysis should consider how the other instruments of power, diplomatic and economic, will be used to support the strategic objectives and should determine the inter-relationship of these with the military instrument.

244. **Step 2b - Initial Object Analysis.** Where there is an adversary (and in some operations such as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) there may not be), he is almost invariably the object of the mission – he is **part of the problem**, as explained earlier. Moreover, he is subject to the same factors, constraints and freedoms as we are – the environment, political influences, his own capabilities and doctrine, the dictates of time, space and resources, and he will also be trying to achieve surprise and maintain his own security. If the JTFC's purpose is to unhinge the enemy plan and thereby inflict defeat, J2 staffs should first assess what that plan might be, based on an analysis of these influences from the enemy's perspective. In other words, the focused construction of our own plan should be based on a review of the enemy's likely CoAs at or near the *outset* of the estimate process.

245. **Joint Task Force Commander's Focus.** For the JTFC, this stage of the estimate should allow him to focus on 3 of the campaign planning concepts, the operational end-state, CoG and DPs. The JTFC will invariably be given the desired operational end-state in the Jt Comd's Mission Directive. Additionally the Directive should articulate the strategic objectives that need to be completed for achievement of the strategic end-state. With the background knowledge gained from the review of the situation, the JTFC may at this stage be able to predict the likely adversary and friendly CoGs and begin the process of determining the DPs that will lead him towards the adversary's CoG, whilst protecting his own. This may assist in focusing staff effort later. However, the correct identification of the CoG, and the DPs that lead to it, is so vital to the successful planning and conduct of the campaign that they should not be confirmed until all factors in the estimate have been thoroughly examined.

246. **Iterative Process.** Either part of the problem – the task and the object – may be considered first but the two should be considered as being linked. If they are completed separately then steps 2a and 2b should be considered together before moving on to the next stage. For instance whilst the staff may analyse potential enemy and friendly CoGs, and identify critical vulnerabilities as part of step 2b, it is the JTFC who decides which CoG(s) to attack, and how to exploit critical vulnerabilities. The key is ensuring the object of the mission is identified (it is not always going to be the enemy) and to then to decide how that object bears on the mission. The **process of defining the problem should also be considered to be iterative**, since no problem ever remains static.




Figure 2.8 - Step 2 - Identify and Analyse the Problem

Step 3 - Formulation of Potential Courses of Action by the Commander

247. Following completion of Step 2 the JTFC should be satisfied that a thorough analysis of both parts of the problem has been completed. Step 3 should commence with the commander issuing guidance to his staff, to allow them to continue with the planning process in a much more focused way. This guidance may take many forms: outline CoAs; an outline of the JTFC's intent; critical staff checks to be conducted; key details to enable work to progress; or simply a series of focused questions. It is during Step 3 that the JTFC takes stock of the considerable amount of information gathered by his staff and of the ideas that will have come to him during initial analysis. The complete understanding of the problem he has gained from earlier Steps, coupled with the application of his experience and judgement, will allow the JTFC to formulate potential CoAs in his mind,¹⁷ albeit in embryonic form. The CoAs are most likely to be linked to earlier deductions of adversary CoGs. Either there are several possible CoGs, in which case the approach to each one respectively represents a possible CoA, or, there is one clear CoG, and attacking its different critical vulnerabilities – perhaps in different combinations – represent possible CoAs. There will be a number of areas where critical information gaps remain and a number of important questions remain in his mind. These points will have to be answered by the staff before any final decisions are made. The JTFC will brigade all of these thoughts and present 2 outputs to his staff and to the CCs at the end of Step 3:

- a. **Commanders Critical Information Requirements.** Throughout Step 2 and as he develops CoAs in Step 3, the JTFC will identify items of information that are critical for the success of any plan he formulates. It may be that he requires further definition of his own mission and objectives, critical intelligence about an aspect of his adversary or further information on the resources available to him. He will frame these as Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs),¹⁸ a list of questions that should be addressed by the staff.
- b. **Commander's Planning Direction.** This is the key output from this step of the estimate and will drive the remainder of the planning effort. The JTFC should be able to identify one or more *potential* CoAs at this stage. He should communicate these ideas to his staff and the CCs, possibly using an initial Campaign Plan Schematic, Intent Schematic or Synchronisation Matrix to help in articulating the relationship between the DPs, CoGs and end-states that he has identified, and how these might be achieved in time and space. These diagrammatic concepts are explained at Annex 2B. The JTFC should also frame some direction to his staff and the CCs, as to how he wishes the

¹⁷ JDP 01, Annex 3B outlines various forms of joint manoeuvre which may prove useful when developing CoAs either at this stage or during Step 4.

¹⁸ See JWP 2-00 'Intelligence Support to Joint Operations', Chapter 2.

development of the CoAs to be approached. He may use SAPE as the framework or may use specific, focused questions to direct the staff to the issues that he feels need to be addressed. It may also be appropriate at this stage for the JTFC to issue an initiating directive (in the manner of a warning order) to the CCs, giving an outline of his initial intent. Normally this will be the first in a series of warning orders. The rest of the estimate should set about **proving the art of the possible** by the application of planning factors and confirming/maximising our understanding of both parts of the problem.




Figure 2.9 - Step 3 - Formulation of Potential CoAs by the Commander

Step 4 - Development and Validation of Courses of Action

248. The job of the staff is now to develop workable and realistic CoAs based on the JTFC's initial direction. This is again an iterative process; the staff will consult with component staffs and will receive further inputs from the JTFC as he develops his thinking following visits, discussions and briefings with superiors, CCs and other coalition partners. Validation of the CoAs will be a continuous process. The effect of possible adversary action on each one should be analysed, taking into account the adversary's likely DPs and lines of operation against the joint task force. The analysis should be sufficiently detailed to take account of the potential action of adversary forces 2 levels down. If there is sufficient time, Operational Analysis (OA) and wargaming¹⁹ techniques may be used to ensure that the analysis of the developing CoAs is thorough, and hence increase confidence in their validity. The outputs of this

¹⁹ Wargaming is explained in more detail in Annex 2C.

step are workable (i.e. validated) CoAs ready for evaluation. Each CoA should have: Concept of Operations, phases if necessary, force levels required, logistic and deployment concept, time and space issues, and recommendations for an operational level reserve. This may be summarised in the form of draft campaign plan schematics or as intent schematics. Chapter 3 explains how development and validation of CoAs is done in practice.




Figure 2.10 - Step 4 - Development and Validation of CoAs

Step 5 – Course of Action Evaluation

249. Friendly CoAs should be evaluated during this step to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each course. The aim is to provide quality analysis on which the JTFC can base his selection of the preferred CoA. Each CoA should be assessed, at very least, against the most likely and the most dangerous adversary CoAs to identify advantages and disadvantages, impact on adversary and own CoGs, possible adjustments, associated risk,²⁰ and necessary contingency plans. Ideally, each CoA is compared against CoA comparators; these might be the Principles of War, SAPE or the commander's own set of questions.²¹ Again, such a comparison will allow the relative merits of each CoA to be identified against a common framework.

250. If time is available, the CoAs may be wargamed for comparison, in order to judge which CoA is most likely to be successful. The risk associated with each CoA,

²⁰ Assessment of risk is discussed in Section IV.

²¹ The commander may have indicated during Step 3 which comparators he wishes to be used.

together with its potential benefits, should be highlighted during this process. Again if time is available, and the facility exists, each CoA may be exposed to OA; specialist staff with supporting IT and software can ensure a detailed and coherent analysis has been undertaken. If time is short, or the nature or level of operation does not lend itself to wargaming, then some other method of critical comparison, such as a mission rehearsal,²² may be used to confirm that the CoAs provide the desired balance between the 4 functions of the operational level (i.e. SAPE). The analysis concludes with the revalidation of suitability, adequacy and feasibility of each course, determines what additional requirements exist, makes required modifications and lists the advantages and disadvantages of each CoA. The comparative process may inform the Joint Effects Meeting (JEM), not only the Joint Fires aspects of kinetic targeting, but also Info Ops, Media Operations (Media Ops) and Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC).

251. The most likely output of this step in the process will be a presentation to the JTFC (CCs may be present) by senior staff, the aim being to present the staff's findings to the commander. The presentation should contain sufficient detail to allow the commander to make an informed decision: including an illustration of how each CoA fares against the CoA comparators set by him and against likely adversary CoAs; the results of any risk assessment of the CoAs; and the results of any wargaming or OA that has taken place.




Figure 2.11 - Step 5 - CoA Evaluation

Step 6 - The Commander's Decision and Development of the Plan

252. The Commander's Decision is the logical result of the estimate. Having evaluated the workable CoAs, the JTFC is in a position to decide which CoA is most

²² This is a 'desk-top' rehearsal where the participants get a feel for the part they have to play in the whole, as well as understand the impact of their actions on others. These rehearsals require the close participation of a multi-discipline 'Red Team' who will consider events from the adversary's perspective. See JWP 3-00 'Joint Operations Execution' Chapter 2 for further detail.

likely to be successful. He may select elements of different courses and merge them to form one CoA. Once the commander has made his selection, he should then give his direction to the staff for the development of the Campaign Plan and the associated products, as well as any Contingency Plans that are to be worked up. He should write the Concept of Operations (at the very least the Commander's Intent) and the Component Mission Statements himself.

253. Following this, the staff goes about developing the plan; the detailed coordination and control of activities to achieve the synchronisation upon which the CoA is based. The selected CoA should be translated into a concise statement of the Commander's Decision - **What** the joint force is to do, explaining as appropriate the elements of **When, Where, and Why**. For the JTFC, this decision is reflected and promulgated in his concept of operations, planning guidance and mission directives and subsequent orders to CCs. After he has made his decision, the commander will also have to consult his superior commander. It is here that the preparatory work and briefing he will have engaged in previously (particularly during Step 4) will help avoid the senior commander feeling surprised by the choice of plan.




Figure 2.12 - Step 6 - The Commander's Decision and Developing the Plan

SECTION IV – PLANNING DURING THE CAMPAIGN

Planning Guidance

254. Following the process described earlier in this chapter, the JTFC will select the appropriate CoA that he believes will best achieve the desired operational end-state.

Once decided, he will issue planning guidance to enable his CCs and their staffs to complete their own estimates and plans. His guidance should include a statement of the mission, his outline concept of operations and provisional mission statements for his CCs.²³ It is only once the CCs have completed their own estimates and discussed them with the JTFC that he will be able to sequence the activities of his subordinates and produce an overall co-ordinated Campaign Plan. Thus the planning needs to be a collaborative and iterative process, albeit one driven by the JTFC, if it is to be effective, and this principle should be applied throughout the whole campaign.

Campaign Plan

255. The Campaign Plan is, in effect, the cornerstone of successful campaigning. It sets out the military conditions that constitute success in relation to the strategic goal, the sequence of events most likely to produce the operational end-state and the resources required. The Campaign Plan will be expressed in a Campaign Directive that should follow the 5 main headings from the NATO Orders format: Situation, Mission, Execution, Logistic/Service Support and Command and Signal. However, the content of each of these paragraphs will need to reflect the information available from the political and military strategic guidance, the operational estimate, the campaign planning concepts and discussions with CCs.

256. A possible format for a campaign directive is set out in Chapter 3. In addition a number of schematics may be included with the directive to help illustrate the plan, such as a campaign plan schematic,²⁴ a DP matrix and a synchronisation matrix.²⁵ A Campaign Plan should:

- a. Include a Statement of JTFC's intent, desired end-state, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort.
- b. Provide lines of operation and assignment of resources (including prioritisation and apportionment) for the achievement of strategic objectives. This provides the basis for all subordinate planning by CCs.
- c. Set out how unity of effort will be achieved between maritime, land, air, SF and logistic forces, and with OGDs, non-governmental organisations, or IOs, as required.
- d. Set out the adversary's operational CoG and provide direction to defeat it.
- e. Set out the friendly operational CoG and provide direction for its protection.

²³ A framework for JTFC Planning Guidance is outlined in Chapter 3.

²⁴ See Annex 2B.

²⁵ See Appendix 2B2.

- f. Define command relationships and determine the allocation of CIS assets.
- g. Determine the optimum sequence for the phases of a campaign.

257. **Concept of Operations.** After the mission, this represents the most important element of the campaign plan. Clarity is key, as the CCs will only be able to fully support the plan and act purposefully if they understand the commander's mind. The JTFC should personally write his concept of operations since it forms the essence of the Campaign Plan. In setting out this vision to his subordinate commanders, staff and supporting agencies, the JTFC also informs them of the likely nature and scope of supporting plans. The concept of operations will also serve to advise the Jt Comd and CDS of the JTFC's intentions, giving them an opportunity to concur and, if necessary, obtain political approval for execution of those intentions. The concept will include the commander's intent, scheme of manoeuvre and his main effort.

a. **Commander's Intent.** The commander's intent should focus on the overall effect the joint task force is to have on the adversary. It should be a concise and precise statement of how the commander intends to achieve the operational end-state by defeating the adversary's CoG, and should not be a synopsis of the operation. In effect it provides the driving logic behind the whole campaign plan.

b. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** The scheme of manoeuvre describes how the JTFC sees the components of the force operating within the overall campaign plan and should give foundation to the mission statements that are subsequently issued to the CCs. The JTFC should explain where, when and how the joint force will achieve its purpose in relation to the adversary, in order that CCs understand what their particular role is in the overall plan and the effect they are to achieve.

c. **Main Effort.** Main Effort is the concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, in order to bring about a decision. It is the principal method by which a commander makes his overall intent clear to his subordinates and will usually be supported by the allocation of resources in order to give substance to that which he considers crucial to the success of his mission.²⁶ By articulating a Main Effort, subordinate commanders are able to take timely and independent action in fast-moving and changeable operations, thereby contributing to tempo. A CC may have a different Main Effort within his component so long as it is directly contributing to the achievement of the higher commander's Main Effort.

²⁶ Or the adjustment of boundaries, changes to priorities for combat support or logistics, or the use of second echelon forces or reserves.

258. **Mission Statement.** The JTFC will assign missions to each of his CCs and should ideally write them personally. These will be based on his own mission statement contained in the Jt Comd's Directive. A mission is defined as '*a clear, concise statement of the **task** of the command and its **purpose***'.²⁷ There are 3 broad types of mission statement: single task; multiple task; and (usually for reserves) a list of tasks. Both single task and multiple task mission statements must have a unifying purpose (i.e. the 'in order to'). These should fall logically out of the concept of operations. The unifying purposes of his subordinates' missions should, when collectively achieved, enable the JTFC to achieve his own mission. This is a useful coherency check for the missions and purposes given to subordinates within the aim of the overall campaign. The following is a possible check list to be utilised when constructing mission statements:

- a. Do they contain a task and purpose?
- b. Do the sum of the purposes add up to the scheme of manoeuvre?
- c. Do they fall logically out of the concept of operations?
- d. Do they bear out mission analysis by subordinates?
- e. Do they reflect the extent to which subordinates are to be given freedom of action?
- f. Do subordinates have the resources to carry out their missions?
- g. Above all, are they unequivocal, precisely expressed and do they use defined language?²⁸

259. **Missions for Reserves.** The JTFC should distinguish between true reserves and echelon forces. Echelon forces are those that, while they may not be committed initially, have an integral role within the plan, and will therefore be given a mission. True reserves, on the other hand, are forces uncommitted in the plan, but retained for the unforeseen to exploit unexpected success or guard against setbacks. They should be given planning tasks/options, rather than a mission within the plan. However, if committed they must be given a specific mission.

Orders Groups

260. It is not usual for a JTFC to routinely give orders in the way a tactical commander might. However, the JTFC may feel that personal contact is required to initiate actions following circulation of the Campaign Directive. At some stage,

²⁷ AAP-6.

²⁸ Such as those defined in JWP 0-01.1, e.g. Assault, attack, block, capture, defeat, defend, delay, deny, destroy, dislocate, disrupt, guard, hold, neutralise, screen, secure, seize or withdraw.

usually during force build-up, he may identify an appropriate opportunity at which to hold an initial orders group, using it to set a baseline of likely missions and tasks for his CCs. The direction and guidance that a JTFC provides to CCs should include as a minimum:

- a. A review of the situation.
- b. A mission statement and his concept of operations encompassing his intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort.
- c. Details of the logistic and administrative resources allocated to accomplish the mission.
- d. The Rules of Engagement profile and key measures at that time, noting that modification may follow in due course.
- e. C2 arrangements, including a clear chain of command, the delegation of authority and the allocation of personnel, agencies or elements that will enable subordinate commanders to accomplish the mission. This should include an unequivocal statement on the relationship between a supported and supporting commander, and the supporting commander's responsibilities.

Planning for Change

261. **Estimate Review.** No plan, however well prepared, will survive first major contact with an adversary without requiring revision. It evolves into a continuous and concurrent process of review against progress, military and political developments, new information and new guidance. Throughout the campaign, a forward planning staff (normally the J5 team) will be required to constantly revise and devise plans for the future. Such revision may be relatively simple in nature, others extremely complex, particularly when there are numerous nations and agencies contributing to a multinational effort. The estimate will have been produced in the formative stages of the campaign, and will have undergone continuous re-evaluation and assessment. The importance of this cannot be over emphasised. Situations change, intelligence reports reveal factors that may not have been considered, assets assumed to be available become unavailable or the adversary has done something unexpected. All these changes need to be applied against the deductions made in the original estimate to ascertain the impact of these changes on the plan. As well as re-working the estimate on a regular basis, the JTFHQ will be monitoring the progress and success of the campaign; methods of Campaign Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) are explained later in the Chapter. CEA will highlight opportunities to be capitalised upon and setbacks to be recovered from. Such occasions will most likely lead to adjustments to the sequencing and phasing and occasionally will present opportunities for exploitation.

262. **Exploiting Opportunities.** The flair and imagination of the JTFC, coupled with a profound understanding of his own and adversary's forces, will be key attributes in the successful waging of a campaign. The JTFC should encourage initiative within his planners such that opportunities to exploit are not overlooked or ruled out because they did not feature in the original plan. Exploiting the situation is all about recognising the opportunities to do so when they arise, and by having the agility to react (for example by undertaking a rapid and decisive early deployment to pre-empt escalation). The staff will monitor the progress of the campaign, watching for, among other things, exploitation opportunities. Falling out from the monitoring process will be other opportunities on which to capitalise as well as options for recovery from setbacks. These are most likely to be in the form of adjustments to the sequencing and phasing, opening up new contingencies or the decision to utilise reserves in order to reinforce success. The force that succeeds will generally be the one that is better at exploiting opportunities. To do so successfully requires:

- a. The ability to spot opportunities or create them.
- b. Possession of the means and will to exploit an opportunity.
- c. Use of offensive action, which will invariably be fundamental to seizing and holding the initiative.
- d. A higher tempo, which will assist in creating opportunities to exploit.
- e. The ability to manoeuvre, as this is key to seizing and maintaining the initiative.

Staff Structure

263. To respond to the planning modifications that will arise as the campaign unfolds, there is a need to allocate staff effort (co-ordinated by the Joint Force Planning Group into 3 broad areas, current operations J3 (sometimes referred to as J3/3), current plans (J3/5) and future plans (J5). The relationship between these areas is shown in Figure 2.13. These activities will continue throughout the campaign and will in many instances be iterative.




Figure 2.13 – JTFHQ Plans and Operations Synchronisation

264. The JTFC will need to decide how far ahead his planners need to work at different stages of the campaign. This will affect how the JTFHQ is organised and what routine (Campaign Rhythm – covered in JWP 3-00) it develops and will impact profoundly on the manner in which the CCs conduct their operations. The JTFC will also have to transition his force psychologically, from an essentially static posture prior to the commencement of operations, to the inherently dynamic situation that prevails during operations themselves.

Assessing Risk

265. Military operations by their nature involve varying degrees of risk. As BDD states: *‘by its very nature, military activity is about confronting risk and managing it. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk; the military profession is not one for those who are risk averse.’* This awareness of risk requires that commanders are able to identify those areas where significant risk lies and then choose to accept or avoid them. The commander who calculates and accepts risk is frequently able to seize opportunities and take bold decisions. Those decisions will not necessarily lead to success but will, even in the case of failure, leave sufficient resources to cope with the unforeseen setbacks. It is the JTFC’s responsibility to provide primary risk guidance to his CCs. The treatment of risk, its assessment and management is explained at Annex 2D.

Campaign Effectiveness Analysis

266. **The Requirement for Measurement of Success.** Measurement of success is an aspect of military operations that is so fundamental it should be foremost in the mind of every commander. Whatever the nature of the campaign, the JTFC will need to have a means of assessing the progress of operations against the plan and actual events as they occur. It is the role of the JTFC to ensure that a monitoring process is rigorously conducted and that his staff does not get distracted by tactical level events and so lose sight of the operational end-state.

267. **Measuring Success.** The process for understanding success across the overall campaign is CEA. CEA is defined as the ‘*Analysis conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical level to monitor and assess the cumulative effects of military actions with respect to centres of gravity in order to achieve the overall campaign end-state*’.²⁹ The aim of CEA is to take a broad view of the campaign and determine if the required effects as envisaged in the campaign plan are being achieved. This monitoring is much wider than observing whether an individual target has been destroyed (i.e. Battle Damage Assessment) (BDA)). It will include analysis of all available information³⁰ in order to determine whether the adversary is actually, or showing indications of, reacting in the way that was intended at that stage in the operation. CEA is particularly relevant in activities where the emphasis is on changing the attitudes of the protagonists rather than on the physical destruction of the adversary. It is conducted across the tactical, operational and strategic levels:

- a. The tactical level analysis begins with BDA, which fulfils the target and weaponry part of the tactical level assessment. To this is added local or in-theatre intelligence, to assess the wider effects of an attack or operation. This enables a CC to assess the progress of his own plan to know whether it is on schedule to meet objectives of the campaign plan.
- b. At the operational level, CEA incorporates the operational level effects on both sides, derived from tactical and operational level intelligence, to inform the JTFC’s decisions. As a J5 led process in the JTFHQ, CEA directly informs the 3 main Boards,³¹ the JCB, JFPG, and the JEM.
- c. The strategic level assessment, which will incorporate national intelligence (including monitoring of international media and other measures of adversary impact) and political input to look for that level of effect on both sides but also provides guidance for high level decisions on national and military strategy.

²⁹ JWP 0-01.1.

³⁰ Including Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), HUMINT, ESM/SIGINT, diplomatic and media reporting, and reports from units in contact with the adversary.

³¹ Covered in JWP 3-00.

268. **Reinforcement of Planning Assumptions.** One of the most important aspects to come out of this process at all levels will be the confirmation, or otherwise, that the correct adversary CoG and associated CVs have been selected in planning. This will be a principal task for J2 as the campaign unfolds and attacks on selected critical vulnerabilities begin to take effect. Although changing the CoG should not be undertaken lightly, commanders should be alert to the possibility that new critical vulnerabilities may become apparent during the execution of the campaign, or that previously identified critical vulnerabilities have now become too well protected to exploit.


269. CEA is a J5-led process that directly informs the 3 main Boards, the JCB, JFPG and the JEM. The acid test for CEA, whatever methodology is applied, is that it should assist the JTFC in making 3 decisions:

- a. **Apportionment Decision.** CEA should assess the likelihood of achieving individual DPs and so inform the JTFC's apportionment of effort between CCs.
- b. **Contingency Planning.** CEA should be able to gauge whether the campaign plan is on track and so identify the need for contingency plans, in the form of branches and sequels.
- c. **Confirming Adversary Centre of Gravity.** CEA should confirm that the correct CoG(s) and associated CVs have been selected. The JTFC should be alert to the possibility that new CVs may be exposed, or that previously identified CVs may be too well protected to be attacked. Thus CoG analysis should be an iterative process for J5 and the CoG(s) should be reviewed periodically at the JFPG and JCB.

270. A suggested detailed methodology is at Annex 2E.

ANNEX 2A – THE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE

STEP 1 - REVIEW OF SITUATION (GEO-STRATEGIC ANALYSIS)



The purpose of Step 1 is to ensure that the whole staff have a common understanding of the background and the underlying causes of the problem, and have a firm grip of both sides' political objectives.

STEP 2 - IDENTIFY AND ANALYSE THE PROBLEM (THE MISSION AND THE OBJECT)

MISSION: (Verbatim mission statement from Jt Comd or list of initial tasks from Planning Guidance.)

Question/Factor	Consideration	Task/Constraint
<p>Step 2a - Mission Analysis</p> <p>Ques 1 - What is the Intention of my Superior Comd(s) and what is my role in his plan?</p> <p>Ques 2 - What are my Specified and Implied Tasks?</p> <p>Ques 3 - What freedoms do I have and what constraints am I subject to?</p> <p>Ques 4 - Has the situation changed and if so how does it affect the plan?</p>	<p>(Step 2a is done by the Comd himself (perhaps with Component Commanders and key senior staff), using the standard four questions to identify and understand purpose, key tasks, constraints, freedoms (time, space, resources, ROE) and politics. Implied tasks are deduced from analysing mission specified tasks and other tasks contained elsewhere in the Directive/Orders.</p>	

<p>Step 2b - Initial Object Analysis</p> <p>Enemy (most dangerous and most likely CoA)</p> <p>Yourself</p> <p>The Dispute</p> <p>The Terrain</p>	<p><i>(The thing(s) that provides greatest resistance to the mission or that on which the mission bears. Normally the enemy or warring factions but may also be terrain (all 3 dimensions). The Comd may provide some guidance here but the work is done by the staff. Tools which may be used are CoG analysis and JIPB. The aim is to understand the constraints and freedoms the enemy is subject to and to produce an initial view of his likely CoAs (most dangerous and most likely). As well as potential setbacks, consideration should be given as to how the JTF could exploit any success.)</i></p>	<p><i>(It may be possible to identify DPs, LoO, ME, supporting/ supported relationships, initial sequencing and phases. An attempt should be made to define operational level CoGs by identifying the thing which resists the achievement of own end-state the most (en CoG) and that which if lost would prevent you winning (own CoG). An initial view of the Concentration of Force/ Economy of Effort balance may emerge as well as areas of risk.)</i></p>
---	--	---

CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS	
<p>1 - CoG</p> <p><i>A strength.</i></p>	<p>2 - CRITICAL CAPABILITIES</p> <p><i>That which makes it a CoG.</i></p>
<p>3 - CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS</p> <p><i>That which it needs to be effective as a CoG.</i></p>	<p>4 - CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES</p> <p><i>Through which a CoG can be attacked or neutralised.</i></p>
<p>Exploit en CVs. Fulfil own CRs, Protect own CVs</p>	

(One of the most important tasks for the Comd is to identify what is going to be decisive and what shaping ops will be required to create the conditions for decisive success. A decisive op is aimed at disrupting the en's system and will cause his defeat. Identifying the decisive op comes from CoG analysis. A CoG will invariably be a strength, but it will have critical vulnerabilities, and its neutralisation will lead to the achievement of the end-state.)


The purpose of Step 2 is to gain a clear understanding of the problem that has been set.

STEP 3 - FORMULATION OF POTENTIAL CoAs BY THE COMD

There are 3 outputs to Step 3:	
CCIRs:	<i>(Information which is critical for success, and which the JTFC may not have access to.)</i>
Clarification:	<i>(Issues on which the Superior Comd needs to provide more guidance or clarification.)</i>
Comd's Planning Direction:	<i>(This the key output and drives the rest of the Estimate. The Comd may be able to identify one or a number of potential CoAs, depending on whether a clear CoG has been identified. If there are a number of CoG contenders there will be a potential CoA to deal with each. An initial Campaign Plan Schematic or Intent Schematic may help in articulating the relationship between DPs, CoGs and end-states and how these might be achieved in time and space. The Comd may use SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT, EXPLOIT to frame his guidance to the staff and other CCs and to act as comparators for the evaluation of each CoA. Or he may use specific questions: Where might the campaign fulcrum be? How can I hit him where it hurts most? How can I best surprise him? How can I regain the initiative? How and where can I be decisive? How can I improve my tempo? What are the risks (are they risks or gambles)? How can OA be used to examine force ratios (both quantitative and qualitative)? How to best integrate and co-ordinate with civil actors? What are the conditions for campaign termination and transition?)</i>

The purpose of Step 3 is to focus staff effort on informed factor analysis in order to establish the art of the possible.

STEP 4 - DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF CoAs



The purpose of Step 4 is to create detailed and workable CoAs that they can be tested for likelihood of success.

STEP 5 - CoA EVALUATION

CoA 1	Mission Comd's Intent Scheme of Manoeuvre Main Effort End-state DPs, JOs and LoOs Component Missions and Tasks Confirm/adjust CoGs
--------------	---

(Each CoA is compared/wargamed against CoA comparators (Principles of War, SAPE or the Comd's own set of questions) to judge the impact on CoGs/end-states and adversary CoAs (at least most likely and most dangerous) to identify adjustments, quantify risk and establish contingency plans.)

CoA 2	Mission Comd's Intent Scheme of Manoeuvre Main Effort End-state DPs, JOs and LoOs Component Missions and Tasks Confirm/adjust CoGs
--------------	---

The purpose of Step 5 is to present sufficient detail to the Comd to allow him to select a winning concept.

STEP 6 - COMD'S DECISION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

Comd's Selection and Final Guidance: <i>(Once the Comd has selected the option which he believes is most likely to be successful (and at least cost), he will then give his direction to the staff for the development of the necessary product (Campaign Plan, OPLAN, DSO, Synchronisation Matrix etc), as well as any Contingency Plans which are to be worked up. He should write the Concept of Ops (but at the least the Comd's Intent) and the Component Mission Statements himself. Wargaming can continue to further refine details of the Task Org, and following orders with subordinate comds and key staff.)</i>

The purpose of Step 6 is to turn the winning concept into a workable plan.

ANNEX 2B - SCHEMATICS

Intent Schematic

2B1. Regardless of the plan selected by the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), it is essential he communicates his intent to his subordinate commanders so they have the right context in which to prosecute their tactical actions in order to gain the winning advantage. A tool commonly used to portray the required effects is the Intent Schematic (see Figure 2B.1). This can take the form of either a matrix or a geographical representation drawn up to show where and when he wishes various effects to happen. Although not prescriptive, clipped expressions are usually used, using words such as: prevent, stabilise, contain, deter, coerce, disrupt, defeat and destroy.¹




Figure 2B.1 - Intent Schematic

Campaign Plan Synchronisation Matrix

2B2. A synchronisation matrix is reasonably easy to utilise and allows the commander to clarify what he is seeking to achieve by defining Decisive Points (DPs) and/or objectives in terms of effects and resources. For the staff the important consideration is now to capture in time and space the best capabilities to achieve a

¹ See JDP 01 'Joint Operations', Chapter 1 for a full explanation of the 8 Strategic Effects.

joint objective, i.e. to undertake the art of the possible, in order to comply with the commander's overall campaign plan.

2B3. A JTFC can use a synchronisation matrix to assist in constructing a campaign plan in several ways and these are:

- a. **OPTION 1 – Defining the Art of the Possible.** This involves using the matrix to show any specified timelines and then show the availability of resources at any given time. It allows the JTFC to visualise when certain key actions can be carried out and thus begins to shape the lines of operation and DPs. This option tends to be used in the early stages of the planning process. An example of such a matrix is at Appendix 2B1.
- b. **OPTION 2 – Fixing Effects in Time and Space.** This involves using the matrix to show when an effect can be carried out and helps visualise the benefits of carrying out one effect before another – basically defining the structure of the road map that will finally become the campaign plan. An example of such a matrix is at Appendix 2B2.

Campaign Planning Schematics

2B4. **Campaign Planning Concepts.** See Appendix 2B3.


2B5. **Campaign Planning Process Schematics.** See Appendix 2B4.

APPENDIX 2B1 - OPTION 1 – DEFINING THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE

	WEEK 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
ACTIVITY /DPs	DEFEND SECURE INFO OPS	SEA CONTROL	SECURE PODS DETERRENCE	COERCION	DECISIVE OPS				
ENEMY	DEFEND ATTACK		CAPABILITY						
AIR	DEPLOY OAS			CAS and AI					
MARITIME	EMBARGO	ISTAR GBAD	CONTROL OF THE AIR						
AMPHIB		MEU	MEF						
LAND		GDAY	GBAD	BDE ARRIVE					
LOGISTICS	ENABLERS								


(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX 2B2 – OPTION 2 – FIXING EFFECTS IN TIME AND SPACE



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX 2B3 - CAMPAIGN PLANNING CONCEPTS



1. Decisive Points are sequenced in time and space on Lines of Operation. They are the key to unlocking the CoG, and without their completion the CoG cannot be defeated or neutralised. This sequencing can be assisted by Phases.
2. Lines of Operation can be environmental or functional or a mixture of both. They should not be decided until the Decisive Points have been derived and the critical path identified.
3. Operational Pauses may be introduced where necessary. Momentum must be maintained elsewhere.
4. Culmination Point is reached when an operation or battle can just be maintained but not developed to any great advantage.
5. Branches are contingency plans which can be introduced to Lines of Operation whenever necessary, and are continuously refined as the campaign develops.
6. Sequels are contingency plans introduced when phases are not completed as planned.


7. The adversary CoG at the operational level is that which most resists the end-state. Without the neutralisation or destruction of the adversary's CoG, the end-state cannot be reached. Activity, necessary to finally achieve the end-state conditions, may take place after its destruction or neutralisation, but this will not be decisive or critical. It may be useful to show own CoG as it is the thing that needs protecting most, and is therefore that which the adversary is likely to direct his efforts against.
8. The end-state provides the focus for campaign planning and all activities should be judged against their relevance to its achievement. The operational end-state will usually be given by the Military Strategic Authority and may be a list of objectives or a statement. It needs analysis in order to identify measurable conditions which together indicate that the end-state has been achieved.
9. It may be useful to include a line showing key events. These might be the deadline for compliance with a UN resolution, the date an adversary 2nd Echelon force might be ready for combat, the estimated time for the completion of mobilisation, or the holding of the first free and fair elections.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX 2B4 – CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS SCHEMATICS

LEGEND:
 DP - Decisive Point CoA - Course of Action SUP - Supported
 CoG - Centre of Gravity F - Functional line of operation

Step 1. Sketch outline view on completion of analysis of the problem




Confirms:
End State(s)


Potential:
CoGs
DPs
Lines of operation

May Include:
CCIRs
Planning assumptions
Points of clarification
JTFC's direction/guidance


Step 2. Develop views during formulation of potential CoAs



Step 3. Refine views during development and validation of CoAs



Step 4. Complete view in development of the plan



DPs may be added and some lines of operation may extend beyond enemy operational CoG

As shown above, one technique for illustrating Main Effort is to show supported/supporting components. Other techniques include 'Main Effort' beside the applicable line of operation (or portion of) or by showing converging lines of operation onto a Main Effort.

ANNEX 2C – WARGAMING

2C1. Wargaming is a method used to visualise the ebb and flow of the campaign or an operation. Wargaming is simply a tool to assist the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and his staff in the operational planning process; it is not done as an end in itself. By definition adversarial, it demonstrates potential outcomes when two opposing courses of action (CoAs) are superimposed in time and space. It can range from informal discussions round a map to the use of sophisticated computer programmes. In essence, wargaming provides the conditions for:

- a. The assessment and comparison of friendly CoAs against enemy CoAs.
- b. The refinement and development of the chosen plan.
- c. Commanders and staff to be able to visualise the plan.
- d. The prediction of time, consumption and attrition.
- e. The reduction of uncertainty and risk.

2C2. Wargaming can graphically demonstrate the flow of battle, potential flaws in a plan, the need for contingency planning, and identify battlespace synchronisation issues. Also, prior to operations, wargaming can be used to inform commanders and staffs. Furthermore, because wargaming brings together a wide cross-section of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and Component staffs, it enhances knowledge of the plan and enables a clearer understanding of Commander's intent, co-ordinating instructions and potential areas of risk.

2C3. Wargaming will be used as part of the JTFC's estimate process whenever appropriate, in order to better ensure that the limited resources are used in the most efficient and effective manner and to highlight issues for further analysis. The amount of effort devoted to wargaming will be dependent on the priority assigned by the JTFC and the time available to conduct the process. At the very least the selected CoA should be wargamed to ensure that the forces are co-ordinated and synchronised against assessed enemy action. Wargaming should permit analysis of actions in time and space from a perspective of operational phases, Decisive Points (DPs) or timelines.

2C4. It must be remembered that wargaming is a visualisation, not a prediction and should not be used to over-constrain the components. Similarly, it is a firm principle that a solution or prediction derived from wargaming must only be accepted or applied under conditions of sound military judgement. That said, wargaming can pay a substantial dividend directly proportional to the amount of time and creative energy invested in it.

Wargaming Methodology

2C5. **Methodology.** The JTFC/COS will decide where in the planning process he wishes to use wargaming. There are four obvious stages when wargaming may contribute:

- a. When developing CoAs prior to their evaluation (Step 4 of the Estimate).
- b. When evaluating CoAs prior to the Decision Brief (Step 5 of the Estimate).
- c. To refine a selected CoA before the production of operational paperwork.
- d. To rehearse the selected CoA prior to execution.

2C6. **Course of Action Development.** Wargaming can be used to provide early visualisation of an embryonic CoA. When used in support of CoA Development, wargaming will complement IPB products and can help provide deductions within the estimate factors, particularly correlation of forces/relative strengths, time and space, sequencing and troops to task. It can help quantify the art of the possible and discard impractical CoAs early in the process. Finally, wargaming will help to ensure that CoA are distinct and not merely variants of the same scheme of manoeuvre.

2C7. **Course of Action Evaluation.** Wargaming in support of CoA Evaluation compares each friendly CoA against each enemy CoA to produce a selection recommendation; as such it demands considerable time. Here, wargaming exposes the strengths and weaknesses of each friendly CoA against the JTFC's decision criteria. Wargaming results are then included in the Decision Brief.

2C8. **Course of Action Refinement.** Once the JTFC has selected his CoA, wargaming can contribute to its refinement, including identifying the JTFC's Decision Points. In addition, wargaming will assist in the production of co-ordinating instructions such as the Synchronisation Matrix, Battlespace Co-ordination Measures, as well as potential tasks and readiness for the Operational Reserve. Thus, wargaming will directly inform the Campaign Directive, Force Instructions Document, and OPORDs. Wargaming, at this juncture, is also used to identify Branches and Sequels and develop them into CONPLANS. It is to this stage of the planning process that wargaming can contribute most and where its use should be preferentially considered.

2C9. **Course of Action Rehearsal.** Once orders are issued a mission rehearsal should be conducted if time allows. Where possible this should include the JTFC himself, his Component Commanders, and key staff. It will wargame the plan in detail, ensuring that the JTFC's intent is clearly understood by all and expose any

unforeseen implications of one Component's actions on another. Effectively, this is a verbal rehearsal where the participants get a feel for the part they have to play and understand the impact their actions will have on others. The rehearsal requires the close participation of a multi-disciplined 'Red Team', who will consider events from the perspective of the adversary. The output can be a detailed list of actions, called a Mission Essential Checklist, and sequences (such as tactical inload) coherent with the synchronisation matrix and detailing the go/no go criteria for discrete operations.

Participants

2C10. The staff detailed below have a specified role in the wargame procedure:

- | | | |
|----|-----------------|--|
| a. | SO1 J5 | Chairman/referee |
| b. | SO2 J5 | Secretary |
| c. | SO1 J2 | Assessment of enemy/opposition actions |
| d. | SO2 J2 | Play the role of Red forces |
| e. | J3 Environments | Friendly force actions |

2C11. Depending on what is being wargamed, the following additional participants may also be included: JTFC, COS, POLAD, J1/J4, J6, J3 Ops Sp, Ops Coord and Component LOs.

Approach to Wargaming

2C12. The more practice a wargaming team has, the faster they are capable of producing both quantity and quality of results. When first introduced to a JTFHQ, wargaming may appear to be a slow and cumbersome process; identifying and maintaining a pool of trained wargamers within the JFHQ will pay dividends both in speed and in quality and should be a matter of priority. The players are expected to use their experience, knowledge and common sense to strive for the best possible result for the side they represent, whilst remaining realistic. The wargame must demonstrate possible enemy actions and the fact that he may not act/react as we anticipate, should also be expected. The wargame is a staff tool; it is not a prediction or guarantee of outcome.

Conducting the Wargame

2C13. **Step 1 – Select the Event to be Wargamed.** The first task is to identify the focus for the wargame: the Critical Event. One method is to list known key Decisive

Points (DPs) and Decision Points,¹ and select the event(s) on which the success of the plan is most likely to hinge. The Critical Event is often where the JTFC believes his plan to hold most risk, either due to its vulnerability to enemy action or perhaps the complexity of inter-Component co-ordination. Its selection will be guided by the JTFC. The opposing CoA, usually the enemy's Most Likely or Most Dangerous, will also be selected.

2C14. **Step 2 – Decide the Structure of the Wargame.**

- a. **Step 2a - Determine the Time Available.** The COS will identify the time available within the battle procedure for the wargame and direct the Chief Controller accordingly.
- b. **Step 2b - Select the Technique and Format of the Game.** Following this direction, the Chief Controller will select the wargame technique to be used (Concurrent, Sequential or Single DP), the number of Game Turns possible within the time allocated and thus the length of each Turn. In addition, he will specify the Start Time for the wargame.
- c. **Step 2c - Choose the Method to Record and Display Game Results.** The output of the wargame may be captured as a narrative, a worksheet or Record Sheet, or as a synchronisation matrix, the timescale of which is determined by the length of the Game Turns. These will be populated by data from Turn-In Cards, produced by Players and Participants to capture their contributions to the Game including any speaking part.
- d. **Step 2d - Identify the Players.** The scale of the wargame will determine the level of Player and Participant, this being dependent on which stage of the planning process that wargaming is being employed in.

Step 3 – Gather the Tools, Materials and Data

2C15. The wargaming area should be formally arranged, with seats designated for Players, usually with the Blue Team on one side and the Red Team on the other, with an additional seating area made available for other Participants. The Chief Controller will direct the assembly of appropriate aids by the wargaming team.

Step 4 – Brief Staff to Allow Preparation

2C16. The Chief Controller's pre-brief will be key to enabling the necessary preparation by Players and Participants. It should cover:

- a. The method and format of the Game.

¹ Decision Points identify (in time and space) decisions that the commander must make to ensure timely execution of his plan including the effective and efficient synchronisation of resources.

- b. Timings for the Game (including breaks).
- c. Player appointments and other Participants.
- d. Aids required and responsibilities for their preparation.
- e. Recording system, wargame output, and responsibilities.
- f. Final Staff products and responsibility for their delivery.
- g. Wargame rules.
- h. J2 Review and Update (as required).
- i. J5 Review and Update (as required).

Step 5 – Game the Courses of Action and Assess Results

2C17. **Step 5a – Review.** The Controller opens with a review² of the strategic guidance, the JTFC’s direction³, any assumptions, and the conduct of the wargame (type, real and representative timings, Critical Events etc). Players then confirm that their forces have been set-up⁴ on the Bird Table or Cloth Model⁵ in accordance with their scheme of manoeuvre and deployment plans as at the Game Start Time.

2C18. **Step 5b – Wargame 1 (En Courses of Action ‘X’ vs Friendly Courses of Action ‘Y’).**

- a. **Opposing Force Start-State.** The Red Team opens with a short explanation of the enemy strategic and operational intent and the enemy forces capable of influence within that Game Turn. The detailed scheme of manoeuvre should be left for the Game Turn itself.
- b. **Blue Force Start-State.** Components followed by key Force capabilities (Engrs, Tgts, Info Ops, with CIMIC, Media, FP/NBC as necessary) open with a short explanation of their intent, TASKORG, opening dispositions and known Decision Points.
- c. **Game Turn 1.**
 - (1) **Action.** The side holding the initiative, which is designated by the Controller, describes the intended activities of its forces including missions, tasks, and co-ordinating measures, within the time period

² The depth of this scene-setter will be dependent on what was covered during the pre-brief, to whom and how long ago.

³ During CoA Development, this is likely to be a review of the Msn Analysis guidance; during CoA Evaluation, it will be the JTFC’s Decision Criteria; during CoA Refinement and Rehearsal, it will be the JTFC’s intent.

⁴ Should be done before the start of the wargame.

⁵ In due course this may be done electronically, i.e. with the advent of a Joint Operational Picture.

specified for that Game Turn.⁶ Players, having spoken will move the pertinent units.

(2) **Reaction.** The side without the initiative then describes its reaction whilst moving the pertinent forces. The requirement to plan Branches is most often *identified* within the reaction sequence.

(3) **Counter-Reaction.** The side with the initiative describes his counter-action. This sequence is where branches are most often *developed*.

(4) **Remainder of Players.** Other players analyse the Game Turn within their area of expertise, providing comment including Turn-in Cards as appropriate.

(5) **Judgement.** Based on the different actions, attrition is applied and Players agree to the new unit locations and strengths to be used in the next Game Turn. Operational Analysis should inform this process, and the Controller's judgement is final should there be any disagreement. Although the most likely outcome should be accepted, a possible worst case should also be examined if the outcome is to influence subsequent actions or decisions.

(6) **Recording.** Capturing data, decisions, co- ordination or synchronisation instructions and subordinate missions/tasks and groupings is essential to extract full benefit from the wargame. If recording is done faithfully, portions of the OPORDS can be written before the planning process is complete. The Controller should continually assess the feasibility of the CoA and begin to compile its advantages and disadvantages. Specifically the following must be done:

(a) **All Players and Participants.** Key issues and points should be submitted as they arise to the J5 and J3 Ops Coord recorders using Turn-in Cards.

(b) **J5.** Using the Turn-in Cards, the J5 Recorder will compile the Wargame Record Sheet. In particular, J5 will note any Branches or Sequels that have been identified, any amendments or additions to the DSM, any change to Component TASKORG, or the composition, tasks, location, and NTM for the operational reserve. He should also note sequencing issues and areas of particular risk.

⁶ The wargaming team should consider missions and tasks one level down and assets/actions 2 levels down.

(c) **J3 Ops Coord.** The J3 Ops Coord Recorder should consider the accuracy of time and space considerations, and co-ordination measures. He should capture amendments to the Synchronisation Matrix accordingly. In addition, J3 Ops Coord will record CCIRs and RFIs as they emerge; these will later drive an adjustment of the intelligence collection plan by J2.

d. **Game Turn 2.** The wargame continues through as many turns as required for the outcome to become sufficiently clear. When completed the Controller summarises the results.

2C19. **Step 5c – Wargame 2 (En COA ‘X’ vs Friendly COA ‘Z’).** If necessary, forces should be relocated and start states identified for the next set of CoAs. The same cycle as previously described should be followed and the drawing of premature conclusions should be avoided.

2C20. **Step 5d – Wrap-Up.** At the wrap-up of the wargame, the Controller/COS will highlight the key points and issues that have arisen. Following this, JTFHQ Staff will produce appropriate deliverables such as:

- a. Wargame Record Sheet – J5.
- b. Synchronisation Matrix and Operational Timelines - J3 Ops Coord.
- c. Campaign Schematics - J5.
- d. Information Requirements (CCIR/RFIs) - J3 Ops Coord.
- e. Intelligence Collection Plan - J2.
- f. TASKORG and DOA - J3 Ops Coord.
- g. CoA Evaluation Sheet for the JTFC’s CoA selection decision brief – J5.
- h. Operational paperwork (Campaign Directive, FID, OPORDS, FRAGOS) articulating Component Missions, Tasks and Coordinating Instructions - J3/J5.
- i. Decision Support Matrix (DSM) - J5.
- j. Risk Register and CONPLANS (Branches & Sequels) - J5.
- k. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) Assessment Sheet - J5.

Wargaming During Compressed Battle Procedure

2C21. When operating under a compressed battle procedure, the JTFC/COS plays a critical role. He should attend the wargame to provide guidance, reject unwanted concepts, and assist in keeping the staff focussed. If the JTFC is present during the wargaming of multiple CoAs, it is likely that he will rapidly identify which CoA he favours. Additionally, reducing the number of participating personnel to a select group (Controller, J2, J5 and environments) will speed the wargame but with a corresponding drop in the value to the entire staff.

ANNEX 2D – RISK ANALYSIS PROCESS

Risk in the Military Environment

‘There is one certainty in relation to warfare – there is no such thing as a casualty or risk free conflict. Military operations by their nature involve varying degrees of risk. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk; the military profession is not one for those who are risk averse.’¹

2D1. **Military Risk.** Risk is defined as ‘the chance, in quantitative terms, of a defined hazard occurring. It therefore combines a probabilistic measure of the occurrence of the primary event(s) with a measure of the consequences of that/those event(s)’.² Military risk is the ability to go beyond the normal planning process to identify and quantify expected outcomes, and to pursue those that maximise military advantage without prejudicing the overall military position. The level of risk is often related to potential gain, so commanders must, in so far as they are able, weigh the estimated cost against the end-state. The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) uses his judgement to balance the requirement for mission success with the inherent risks. Military commanders have always practised risk management in military decision-making; however, the approach to risk management and degree of success vary widely depending on the level of training and experience. The operational planning process is inherently a methodology that identifies and manages risk.

2D2. **Risk in Multinational Operations.** In Multinational operations the assessment of risk becomes even more difficult. Each nation will determine how its troops are employed normally based upon their acceptable levels of risk. Ultimately the JTFC makes the final selection of measures, which are then included in the Operation Order. The implementation of some measures may not be force-wide; the threat, as well as the measures adopted, particularly in more benign environments, may not be uniform and may be subject to frequent review and change. As with the estimate process, risk assessment is a continual process. As the situation changes or new intelligence is received, measures will be reviewed and adapted to the new situation. As part of mission command, subordinate commanders should also be directed to conduct local reviews, although the overall co-ordination should remain under the control of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ).

Risk Management

2D3. Risk management is the process whereby decisions are made to accept a known or assessed risk and/or the implementation of actions to reduce the

¹ JWP 0-01 ‘British Defence Doctrine’ (BDD) (2nd Edition).

² British Standard 4778 1991 (Part 3, Section 3.2).

consequences or probability of occurrence of a defined hazard. Risk management is not an issue that can be addressed separately or in isolation. The key is to assess total risk i.e. risks need to be seen both individually and collectively. For instance, an action or activity at the tactical level may be deemed to have minimal impact but at the political level it may have huge implications. Even though the likelihood of occurrence may be small, measures of mitigation might need to be put in place. Conversely an impact required at the political level may demand greater risk to be taken at a lower level.

Risk Assessment

2D4. In the risk assessment process, the JTFC uses the selected course of action (CoA) to identify and quantify those actions by his own force, those of the adversary or environmental factors that will incur misfortune or create opportunity. Risk assessment is based on a combination of the likelihood of exposure to the hazard with the potential severity of the outcome. It must be seen as a decision-making tool that can increase operational effectiveness by anticipating hazards and reducing the potential for loss to acceptable levels, thereby increasing the probability of a successful outcome to the mission. Ultimately it is the JTFC's decision to accept risk, based upon whether the benefits outweigh the cost.

2D5. A risk analysis flow chart is shown in Figure 2D.1. Two courses of staffing action, one abbreviated and one optimal, are selected depending on the time available. The abbreviated version mitigates against probable misfortune and is entirely adversary focused. The optimal analysis aims, in a parallel staffing process, to minimise reverses while optimising opportunities. In both, the staff draw on existing support tools for instance: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), wargaming, Operational Analysis (OA), Decision Support Matrix (DSM) and 'what ifting'. Since these high level staff tools are usually only available at JTFHQ and Component Commander (CC) level, it is generally accepted that formal risk analysis takes place at the operational level. However, it will also be conducted less formally at the tactical level using any aids available. The output of the staffing effort is a series of proposals put to the JTFC for his decision.




Figure 2D.1 – Risk Analysis Flow Chart

2D6. The JTFC, based on his earlier guidance to his staff on key events or effects he wished to achieve, will:

- a. Dismiss the staff finding as unlikely.
- b. Staff the proposal further.
- c. Prepare and issue contingency plans as a result of the staffwork.
- d. Change the existing plan as the work has identified a fundamental flaw.

2D7. The staff should examine risk during Step 5 (CoA Development) in the Operational Estimate. By producing a risk assessment that is as accurate and comprehensive as possible, an initial set of measures can be produced which address the actual risk or threat. The proposed measures must be judged and balanced against the Commander's mission and operational requirements, with the emphasis on risk management.

2D8. Therefore any potential risk must be assessed in terms of its *likelihood* and its *impact* utilising a matrix such as that at Figure 2D.2. By scoring these it is possible to give weighting to any risk that is identified, then measures can be put in place to mitigate or reduce the impact. At the operational level those activities or CoAs with a high scoring will either require further analysis/development to avoid unnecessary risk taking or alternatively, if it is deemed essential in achievement of the mission, referral to the Jt Comd. Ultimately, however, it is a commander's decision to accept risk and to manage the consequences.

		Likelihood				
		Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
		A	B	C	D	E
Very High	I	E	E	H	H	M
High	II	E	H	M	M	M
Medium	III	H	M	M	L	L
Low	IV	M	M	L	L	L
Very Low	V	M	L	L	L	L

Risk Tolerance Line. **E** Extremely High Risk; Mission likely to fail. **H** High Risk; Inability to accomplish all parts of the mission. **M** Moderate Risk; Mission accomplishment likely but possibility of reduced capability. **L** Low Risk; Little or no impact on accomplishment of the mission.

Fig 2D.2 - Risk Assessment Matrix

2D9. The assessment of risk is an integral part of the estimate process, not only in the commander's comparison and selection of CoAs, but throughout, as factors are considered. While this ensures that risk will be considered in all operations, the acceptable threshold is likely to vary with the political situation or type of operation. For example, in Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and similar operations, there may be political imperatives that require the risk to UK forces to be reduced to a greater extent than would be normally acceptable in war. However, no matter what the operation, risk management is not risk elimination. Casualties, deliberate or accidental, are a reality of military operations and the desire to avoid them totally may well impact adversely on the achievement of the mission; the commander must always balance the risk required within the context of the campaign end-state. In summary, the estimate process identifies the risk, which is then assessed in terms of likelihood and impact before control measures are then developed to mitigate, where possible, the risk. Notwithstanding any mitigation, there will inevitably be residual risk that remains, even after the control measures have been applied.

2D10. **Compromise and Risk.** Good planning is an exercise in compromise. Resource allocation is the JTFC's decision and is where the biggest compromises are to be found. The JTFC should recognise what has been compromised and move it away from discovery. Risk is closely linked to compromise; such risk is taken when required in pursuit of operational aims, or when the consequences can be borne. In this sense one can often recover from a risk but not from a gamble, but the pay-off from a gamble is likely to be much greater. Risk is about threats to the plan and the actual and perceived vulnerabilities to that threat. The JTFC's view of, and reaction to, these threats will be based on his experience and judgement, as well as detailed input from the staff. Ultimately, it is the JTFC who will make the final decision on the levels of risk associated with his plan, but he cannot consider such risk in isolation. Any military action will have potential political, economic, environmental and humanitarian consequences; what may be a low risk option for the military may be high risk elsewhere.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ANNEX 2E – CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

Guiding Principles

2E1. There are 4 guiding principles that should guide Campaign Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) methodology:

- a. Information feeding CEA should describe the realities of the tactical actions being conducted by Component Commanders (CCs), and their effects.
- b. The process must be as objective as possible whilst allowing military judgement by both Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and CCs.
- c. CEA must not tell the JTFC what he already knows; it must offer him the Staff's analysis.
- d. CEA must not become a tortuous and mechanistic process; it must remain a tool to assist the commander in making decisions.

The Campaign Effectiveness Analysis Process

2E2. There are broadly 2 methodologies that can be used, though the second method tends to be the preferred option.

- a. **By Decisive Point.** The campaign schematic serves as a means to impart clarity to the JTFC's operational design - a tool to visualise the campaign in its entirety. It thus offers one framework against which to conduct CEA, by assessing and predicting accomplishment of each Decisive Point (DP).
- b. **By Operational Objective.** Here, progress is judged against the Operational Objectives that comprise the operational end-state, these often being satisfied by the success of individual Lines of Operation. This second method is favoured as it provides higher level analysis,¹ across the longer-range objectives of the campaign, and therefore more appropriate to the operational level commander. In addition, the schematic output is usually easier for the Boards to assimilate.

2E3. **A Four Step Process.** In general, all CEA methodologies comprise 4 stages:

- a. Derivation of Tasks/Success Criteria.
- b. Definition of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).

¹ Whereas analysis by DP presents the pitfall of embroilment in tactical activity.

- c. Collection and analysis of Evidences.²
- d. Presentation of the Staff's analysis to inform the JTFC's decision-making process.

2E4. **The Measures of Effectiveness Assessment Sheet.** The Measures of Effectiveness Assessment Sheet (MAS) is the principal tool used to conduct the first two steps of CEA and so provides the 'engine' behind any schematic representation of the Staff's analysis in the final Step. An example MAS is at Appendix 2E1. The Force Instruction Document (FID) will direct how frequently Components should submit their MAS, this periodicity being determined by that of the Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB).

2E5. **Step 1 – Derivation of Success Criteria.** Attempting to judge progress directly against a DP or Operational Objective is likely to introduce unwarranted subjectivity. This is overcome by identifying the constituent Success Criteria of each DP/Operational Objective.

- a. **Missions and Tasks.** An obvious source of Success Criteria are friendly force missions and tasks, both specified and implied. At the top-level, J5/J3 derive Component missions and tasks through DP Analysis when drafting Operation Orders (OPORDs): these offer potential Input or 1st Tier Success Criteria. A 2nd Tier will emerge from the Components own mission analysis, which may provide a mechanism for a more objective assessment of 1st Tier Criteria. At each level, the inputting agency has the authority to direct the development of lower tier success criteria. However, it must be borne in mind that the burden this places on subordinate units will quickly become counter-productive.
- b. **Additional Desired Effects.** Additional Success Criteria will need to be framed to reflect effects not directly captured by tactical missions and tasks. These may include effects from operational tools, such as kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, as well as indirect effects from Component tactical actions. These may be termed Output Criteria and will be particularly pertinent to the more intangible DPs/Operational Objectives.

2E6. **Step 2 – Definition of Measures of Effectiveness.** Once Success Criteria have been identified, the key to their assessment lies in the definition of MOE for which Evidences can be sought. As the CEA process aims to impart a degree of objectivity into the assessment of campaign success, MOE should have their foundation in some tangible, and therefore measurable, gauge of success, whilst accepting that this will be achievable to varying degrees for each Success Criteria.

² Taken from US terminology, pieces of information indicating success or failure in the achievement of any of the defined success criteria are known as 'evidences'.

MOE are often best defined by the agency that will be tasked to measure specific Success Criterion.³ This ensures MOE that are more relevant, more measurable, and more serviceable by collection assets, at any given moment.

2E7. **Step 3 – Collection and Analysis of Evidences.** CEA aims to take a broad view of the campaign and determine if the effects articulated in the campaign plan are being achieved. This monitoring is necessarily much wider than observing whether an individual target has been destroyed or a specific engagement won. It will include analysis of Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), HUMINT, ESM/SIGINT, diplomatic and media reporting, as well as reports from units in contact with the enemy. Furthermore CEA merges inputs from tactical, operational and strategic levels. Responsibility for the collection of evidences for Success Criterion is indicated on the MAS disseminated in the FID. The key column in the MAS is headed ‘Status’.

a. **Assessment of Current Status.** The agencies annotated in the boxes in the ‘Sources of Cfm’ columns are responsible for providing an assessment of the degree to which Success Criteria have been achieved to date, using MOE they have implicitly defined. The assessment is expressed using the 5-colour grading system⁴ at Table 2E.1. The inputting agency should overlay their colour grading with a succinct justification, most often by a statement of the determining MOE. Success Criteria are likely to be measured by the Component to whom the mission/task applies, this being fed by assessments from subordinate units as necessary. Criteria will fall to the agency best placed to identify and grade the effect. That may be a Component, or within the JTFHQ such as J2 and J3 Ops Sp, who will incorporate strategic feeds from agencies such as PJHQ, DNEWS, DIS etc.

COLOUR KEY	
Not assessed	White
Mission Success (80-100% achievement)	Dark Green
Significant Success (60-80% achievement)	Light Green
Partial Success (40-60% achievement)	Amber
Minimum Success (20-40% achievement)	Orange
Insignificant Success (0-20% achievement)	Red

Table 2E.1 – Success Criteria

³ Past methodologies have seen MOE defined by the JTFHQ with centralised collation of evidences and subsequent assessment. This potentially places an unmanageable burden on JFHQ staff, results in MOE that are not measurable or applicable at that point in time, and divorces the assessment from the tactical commander.

⁴ Five colours are used since the traditional ‘traffic-light’ three-colour scheme tends to yield a grading of ‘Amber’ for most criteria, nearly all of the time. Furthermore, the definitions of the various colour gradings are generic, rather than bespoke to each success criteria, which simplifies the presentation of the assessment to the Boards.

b. **Overall Status.** In the column headed ‘Overall Status’, the inputting agency should use the arrow descriptor below to indicate the likelihood of achievement of the Success Criteria over a specified time period. This is normally specified as 3 days, allowing an informed decision to be made on targeting priorities and apportionment. This projection should be grounded in sound military judgement based on the MOE. It includes analysis of how enemy action may pre-empt continued progress towards achievement of the Success Criteria. If warranted, a supplementary recommendation should be entered in the box.

FUTURE PREDICTION (D+?)	Improve	↑
COLOUR INDICATES LIKELY	No Change	□
	Worsen	↓

c. **Collation and Recommendations.** J5 collate the MAS submitted by each Component and formulate aggregate assessments for each DP or operational objective. Having completed the grading, J5 will draft recommendations to the Boards. These may include revised priorities for the commander’s guidance,⁵ a redistribution of resources including an amended air apportionment recommendation, a change in sequencing, the development of contingency plans, or a re-evaluation of our own or the enemy COG and CVs.

d. **Campaign Objectives Assessment Board.** Where this final analysis proves particularly complex, or contentious, or when major adjustment of operational activity is being considered, J5 may convene a Campaign Objectives Assessment Board.

2E8. **Step 4 – Presentation of Analysis.** The presentation of analysis will be dependant on the methodology used.

a. **By Decisive Point.** Colour-coded grading is used to shade the DPs on a CEA Schematic based on the campaign schematic. An example is at Appendix 2E2.

b. **By Operational Objective.** An alternative method utilises the same 5-colour-coding scheme to express the overall assessment of each operational objective, but depicted as a sliding bar scale. An example is at Appendix 2E3.

⁵ The key output of the JCB that then drives both Joint Force Planning Group (JFPG) and Joint Effects Meeting (JEM).

APPENDIX 2E1 - PRODUCING AND RUNNING A MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

J3 should confirm the success criteria with the JTFC and the measurement details with the Components that will be supported or supporting in achieving the DP. If branches or sequels are identified during the Campaign, the DPs should be added to the Measures of Campaign Effectiveness (MCE) Schematic and success criteria and measurement details devised for the Measures of Effectiveness Assessment Sheet (MAS).

DP/ OO	EFFECT	PURPOSE	SUCCESS CRITERIA	MEASUREMENT DETAILS	SOURCES OF CFM	STATUS		
						Individual	Overall	C/O ¹
DP No.	DP Object from Campaign Plan DP Matrix.	DP Purpose from Campaign Plan DP Matrix.	Text outlining the overall success criteria for the DP. Produced by J3 and agreed by JTFC. These may be largely termed Input or 1 st Tier Criteria. A 2 nd Tier will emerge from the Components own mission analysis, which may provide a mechanism for a more objective assessment of 1 st Tier Criteria.	Individual measurement details.	Identify the sources that will provide the info to determine the level of achievement of each measurement.	A score is determined for each measurement using the colour key below.	The overall status for the DP is based on applying judgment of the aggregate score for the DP. ²	O
				The sum of the Individual Measurements should equal the Success Criteria.				O
				The measurements can be either subjective or objective. Objective is based on physical activity such as X CVs sunk from their total of Y. Subjective may be the ability to secure an SPOD.				O

COLOUR KEY	
Not assessed	White
Mission Success (80-100% achievement)	Dark Green
Significant Success (60-80% achievement)	Light Green
Partial Success (40-60% achievement)	Amber
Minimum Success (20-40% achievement)	Orange
Insignificant Success (0-20% achievement)	Red


OVERALL STATUS	
Colour indicates likely grading.	  

¹ Insert C = Completed task no further action required. or O = Ongoing requirement throughout the Campaign (this is represented as hatch colour on the MCE Schematic).

² The overall score for each DP feeds the MCE Schematic.


(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX 2E2 – PRODUCING AND RUNNING A CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS SCHEMATIC



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX 2E3 – EXAMPLE CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS SCHEMATIC BY OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

CHAPTER 3 – PLANNING AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe how the theory of campaign planning is applied in practice, including the integration and co-ordination of multinational, component and joint planning considerations, in order to understand the construction, monitoring and evolution of the campaign plan.

Section I – Initial Planning Activities

Section II – JTFHQ Planning Process

Section III – Assessing the Campaign

Section IV – Key Planning Considerations

SECTION I – INITIAL PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Defence Crisis Management Organisation Led Planning

301. Planning is conducted at all levels,¹ and staffs at each level need to be aware of the relevance of their contribution and that of others, both up and down the chain of command, to both the planning and execution of operations. The amount of detailed analysis undertaken during planning will depend largely on the time available. In some cases there may be time for thorough Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and responsive updating of the estimate in order to create the best plan. In others time will be short and the process may have to be truncated. In all cases, the principle should be for the planning process to generate a decision that gives subordinate commanders sufficient direction and enough time to conduct their own planning and orders processes.

302. Planning and decision-making at the strategic level will almost always be influenced by factors other than military. At the early stages of a crisis, strategic direction may not be as forthcoming as the military might wish due to the need to consider all the various options and influences involved.

303. Based on initial planning by the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO), the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) (and the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS)) will offer military advice to Ministers. If Ministers decide to proceed further and require military courses of action to be developed in detail, CDS will supplement any earlier guidance by issuing Planning Guidance to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO). The format for the CDS Planning Guidance is at Annex 3B.

¹ A schematic of the overall Joint Planning Process is at Annex 3A.

304. For the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and his staff, operational level planning should begin with an understanding of the strategic intent and objectives. The CDS Directive,² issued to the Joint Commander (Jt Comd), will state the military strategic objectives, the desired strategic and military end-states and constraints to be applied to operational planning. Also included will be details of the forces and resources to be assigned, designation of the Theatre of Operations (TOO),³ the anticipated duration of the campaign with guidance on sustainability, the legal position and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Command arrangements, including the appointment of the JTFC and co-ordination with the Director Special Forces (DSF), the Front Line Commands (FLCs), the Chief of Defence Logistics, allies, Host Nations (HN), international organisations (IO) and agencies will also be established. In some cases CDS's Directive may give full authority to proceed with military action; in other circumstances it may permit only overt or covert preparations prior to a Ministerial decision to act.

305. The Jt Comd, who exercises Operational Command (OPCOM), will issue a Mission Directive⁴ to the JTFC that expands on the direction in CDS's Directive. The Jt Comd is responsible for giving further direction and advising the JTFC as necessary and, through the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) J3-led Operations Team (OT), deploying, sustaining and recovering the force and monitoring and reporting to CDS on the progress of the campaign. The Jt Comd's Mission Directive will give the assessed strategic Centres of Gravity (CoGs),⁵ the operational end-state and his concept of operations for the deployment, sustainment and recovery of the joint force. The JTFC is then in a position to start his campaign planning, determining how the operational objectives are to be achieved by his Component Commanders (CC). He formulates a campaign plan and issues a campaign directive giving his CCs missions, allocating resources, setting priorities, directing events and integrating and sequencing the activities of the joint force as required.

Permanent Joint Headquarters Led Planning

306. It is impossible to prescribe a generic planning timeline but a sequence of events can be identified. The Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) will be fully involved in the process at the early stage and when the JTFC is nominated will adapt to form the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ).⁶

307. **Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.**⁷ The role of the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) is to give expert advice on

² An example is at Annex 3C. See JWP 3-00 'Joint Operations Execution', Chapter 1.

³ The JOA will be defined by the Jt Comd in consultation with the JTFC.

⁴ An example is at Annex 3D.

⁵ It may also give assessed Operational CoGs.

⁶ See JWP 3-00, paragraph 211 for further detail on different types of JTFHQ.

⁷ Additional detail is covered in JWP 3-00, paragraph 307.

contingency planning and operational issues, ranging from force composition through logistics to command and control and communications. It will be important that the Supporting Commands judged likely to contribute forces produce detailed checklists to ensure that the OLRT members elicit sufficient detail to inform the operational planning process. Whilst ideally there should be discrete reconnaissance deployments at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical), with each informing the next, pressures of time and practical constraints imposed by the HN may dictate that the different levels of reconnaissance be conducted concurrently. In this case, the team leader may need to give considerable direction to the team as it is unlikely that a formal Planning Directive will have been issued at this stage of a potential operation. Experience has shown that the early despatch of an OLRT to a potential theatre of operations is vital if the MOD (and cross-governmental) decision-making process is to work effectively. Any reconnaissance should make maximum use of Military Intelligence Liaison Officers (MILO) (if deployed), UK military training teams (if applicable), Embassy or High Commission staffs and other in-country sources such as IOs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international commercial organisations.

308. **Pre-deployment Planning.** Before deployment the planning process will happen at 3 levels.

a. **Strategic Planning.** The Supporting Commands will send representatives to sit on the PJHQ Contingency Planning Team (CPT) to inform the planning process and obtain early visibility of likely requirements. If it is clear that a particular component HQ will be involved then representatives from that component may also be co-opted. The Joint Commander's Directive formally initiates the JTFHQ planning process.

b. **Operational Level Planning.** Early JFHQ planning will involve staff working alongside members of the PJHQ CPT and the establishment of a Situational Awareness Group (SAG) in order to monitor the situation and also to facilitate concurrent operational planning. Additionally a deployment cell will be established within the JFHQ to plan the deployment of the HQ and any augmentees. Possibly before, but more usually following the appointment of a JTFC, liaison from potential component HQs will be drawn into the planning process within the JFHQ. Once a JTFHQ is formed it is likely that formal liaison officers (LOs) from the components will be required to deploy to the JTFHQ for the remainder of the operation. Planning Guidance will be issued to components within 24 hours of the receipt of a Jt Comd's Directive. A Campaign Plan will be issued once the Estimate process is complete, which may well be after the deployment has begun.

c. **Tactical Planning.** Components are likely to be carrying out their estimate process in parallel with the JTFHQ planning. The JTFC is likely to

want to be backbriefed on component's Mission Analysis and draft directives or Operation Plans (OPLANs) prior to their dissemination.

309. **Deployment Planning.** Planning for the deployment of the force will need to commence at the earliest opportunity in order to identify any constraints, establish the broad deployment timeline and enable lead times for civilian charter to be met. This planning may occur prior to any political or military decision to commit forces and, as a result, may remain discrete until a formal announcement. The PJHQ will have the lead throughout the deployment, although the JTFHQ will shape much of the planning to ensure that it meets the JTFC's intent. The planning and deployment is an iterative process consisting of a number of mutually dependent stages and is described in JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*', Chapter 3.

Joint Task Force Headquarters Initial Planning Process

310. Whilst the process that has been described in the preceding paragraphs is led primarily by the PJHQ staff, there will be simultaneous planning activities taking place within the JFHQ/JTFHQ. The aim of the JTFC and his staff is to develop the Jt Comd's Directive into a campaign plan. As this is developed there will be factors which will influence, and in many circumstances govern, the nature of the deployment planning. In the ideal world the campaign plan should be completed before the deployment planning begins. The reality, however, is that they will tend to be developed simultaneously.

311. The sequence of events in compiling the campaign plan is as follows:

a. The JFHQ/JTFHQ Staff will be represented on the PJHQ CPT from the outset of the strategic planning process in order to keep the JTFC informed on the progress of planning and to inject the JTFC's views into the planning process at the strategic level. Using information from the CPT, the JTFC will begin to formulate his planning guidance to his staff and to the component commanders. A format for the JTFC's Planning Guidance is at Annex 3E.

b. If there is time and the situation warrants it, the JTFC and/or members of the JTFHQ staff may conduct a reconnaissance to theatre, normally as part of the OLRT. The exact nature, size and duration of the reconnaissance will vary according to the precise political and military circumstances at the time. The leader of the reconnaissance, whether the JTFC or one of his staff, will receive a directive from the Jt Comd outlining the aim of the reconnaissance and any constraints, i.e. duration, limits on movement and liaison authority.

c. Having received the JTFC's planning guidance, the JTFHQ conducts the operational estimate in conjunction with the PJHQ CPT and the Component Commanders using the procedure described in Chapter 2. Although the

strategic and operational estimates are separate processes, there should be a continual flow of information between these two activities to ensure that the most recent information and assumptions are available to all planning teams. This is most easily achieved by the use of common communication and information systems (CIS) and regular 2-way briefing by the JTFHQ Staff member on the PJHQ CPT. The output of the operational estimate will be a series of courses of action (CoAs), one of which will be selected as the basis for the campaign plan.

SECTION II – JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS PLANNING PROCESS

312. **Structures.** The JTFHQ will be structured⁸ dependent upon a variety of factors such as the scale of the operation and whether or not it is operating as part of a Coalition or Multinational force. No matter what the size or shape of the JTFHQ it should be organised to provide an integrated and managed process for the movement of plans from the formulation stage, through development and evolution, to the execution stage. In other words it should be able to fuse campaign planning and campaign execution. To achieve this the JTFHQ uses the 3-branch configuration described below:

- a. **J5 Future Plans.** The core of this branch will be provided by the J5 staff but with augmentation from intelligence (J5/2) and logistics (J5/4) and others as required. The primary role of this branch is to *formulate* the plans that will be handed over to the J3/5 branch.
- b. **J3/5 Current Plans.** The environmental J3 SO1s (Maritime, Land and Air) provide the central core of the J3/5 branch. The J3/5 role is to *develop* and refine the plans that were formulated by the J5 branch.
- c. **J3 Current Operations.** J3 branch (sometimes referred to as J3/3) is formed around the J3 SO2s and is co-ordinated by SO1 J3 Ops Coord. The role of the J3 branch is to *execute* the plans that have been formulated and then developed by the J5 and J3/5 branches.

⁸ For a more detailed description of JTFHQ structure see JWP 3-00, Chapter 2, Section II.




Figure 3.1 - JTF Plans and Operations Synchronisation

313. Planning Groups.

a. **Joint Command Group.** The Joint Command Group (JCG) meets infrequently. Core membership of the JCG is JTFC, Chief of Staff (COS), Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS), Political Advisor (POLAD) and Legal Advisor (LEGAD). It may grow depending on the size of the JTFHQ to include Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACOS) or lead functional staff officers from J1, J4, J5, J3 Ops Sp and J8. J2 and J6 together with other Staff Divisions, the Components and any Coalition partners participate as required (the latter 2 normally via Video Teleconferencing (VTC)). SO2 J5 is normally the Secretary. The role of the JCG is to prioritise the planning effort and provide direction and guidance as required. In the estimate process the JCG primary function is to conduct the mission analysis and assist in the formulation of CoAs.

b. **Joint Force Planning Group.**⁹ The Joint Force Planning Group (JFPG) is the daily planning working group chaired by the COS. The aim of the JFPG

⁹ See paragraph 321 for a more detailed description of the JFPG.

is to refine the development of the campaign plan, using Campaign Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) (see paragraph 325), and is attended by all heads of department, with specialist advisors as necessary. The meeting is divided into 2 separate parts straddling both the J3 and J5 areas of planning responsibility and will ultimately inform the Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB).¹⁰

c. **Joint Planning Group.** The Joint Planning Group (JPG) is the principal working level planning group for the JTFHQ. The JPG encompasses all Staff Divisions and Component planners and LOs. It works under the direction of J5. The primary function of the JPG is to conduct initial object analysis, assist with CoA formulation and development and ultimately production of the Campaign Plan. Additionally it contributes to the production of OPLANs, Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) and CEA.

d. **Operational Planning Teams.** Following the end of the JFPG, Operational Planning Teams (OPTs) can form to staff discrete aspects of the campaign and will report back to the COS with their recommendations. The OPTs are small groups focused on specific planning issues and will therefore have membership that is tailored to meet the specific issue. The most common employment of OPT is to transition an OPLAN into an OPORD (including the production of Warning Orders (WngOs) and Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs)). Thus there may be a number of OPTs running simultaneously.

The Joint Task Force Headquarters Operational Estimate

314. The estimate in outline has been described in Chapter 2. This chapter explains how the process is likely to be conducted. It is important to note that, although the JTFC ‘owns’ the estimate, the Component Commands (CCs) will have significant input. Concurrency in JTFHQ and component planning is essential, particularly if sufficient tempo is to be generated. Concurrency is achieved through:

- a. Liaison and communication.
- b. The continuous exchange of information between planning staffs in all HQs throughout the planning process.
- c. Prompt issuance of Planning Guidance.

315. **Time Appreciation.** The COS may conduct his time appreciation alone or with a small planning group. He should consider any deadlines that have been set by the DCMO or which are implicit. In addition to allowing planning time for the Components he may wish to consider deployment deadlines, the need for an OLRT or

¹⁰ See JWP 3-00, paragraph 352 for further detail on the JCB and other boards.

forward HQ to depart or other issues. The COS may wish to alter the template allocation of staff responsibilities and to issue direction to ensure that the type of end product envisaged is capable of being generated in the time available.

316. **The Operational Planning Process.** The operational planning process is focused around the estimate process but also revolves around the daily routine of meetings,¹¹ principally the JFPG. Whilst the estimate is chiefly seen as being applicable during initial operational design, it should also be utilised for ‘lower level’ planning cycles when producing CONPLANs and OPORDs. The process however, must never become mechanistic, stifling intuition or military judgement. The estimate construct should be viewed as a hand-rail to guide the staff in an ordered, logical analysis resulting in a coherent plan for action.

a. **Step 1 - Review of the Situation.** The aim of Step 1 is to gain a common understanding of the background to the crisis and to analyse the current situation. The J2 staff should ideally have completed the intelligence estimate and made a start on the JIPB prior to the start of the operational estimate. Thus they should be in a position to brief the remainder of the JTFHQ staff on the background to the conflict and if possible the adversary’s assessed political and military intent and objectives. The geostrategic analysis should take account of the adversary’s historical, economic, ethnic and religious influences but focusing on the current situation, including leadership, morale and cohesion, in order to assist the JTFC (and staff) identify potential CoGs.

b. **Step 2a - Mission Analysis.** The mission analysis is a command-led process driven by the JTFC but assisted by the JCG. As the JCG’s secretary, the SO2 J5 should provide members with a hard copy of the necessary information extracted from both CDS’s and the Jt Comd’s Directives. The output from the mission analysis will include the JTFC’s guidance for CoA formulation, in the form of a WngO, which should be issued to CCs as early as possible in order that they and their staffs can initiate their own component level planning. CC representation is encouraged at this stage, so that an understanding of the JTFC’s intent can be disseminated to component planning teams with the guidance. The output to the Staff additionally includes a summary of the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), his Requests for Information (RFIs), staff checks, staff tasks, constraints and any points for clarification. Although some component tasks may be identified during the operational level estimate most will flow from the Decisive Points identified later.

¹¹ Described in JWP 3-00, Chapter 3.

c. **Step 2b - Initial Object Analysis.** The JPG should initiate their initial object analysis in parallel with the JCG conducting the mission analysis. This can be achieved by examining generic issues to identify broad order freedoms and constraints that will shape operational design. This consideration may include such factors as assessing the enemy's most dangerous and likely CoAs, CoG analysis, comparing relative capabilities and deployment timelines, forces availability, ROE, and the environment. Thereafter, the JCG will guide the JPG's evaluation by identifying a number of focused questions. These are questions, the answers to which will directly inform the formulation of CoAs by defining the art of the possible. The process is directed by J3 Ops Coord who will present the JPG's output, including a consolidated back brief, to orientate the JCG before CoA Formulation. Ops Coord will also co-ordinate the staffing of RFIs, monitor the progress of staff tasks and confirm that points for clarification have been passed upwards.

(1) **Centre of Gravity Analysis.** CoG analysis may be completed by either or both the JCG and the JPG. The CoGs nominated by the Jt Comd, along with other candidates identified by the JTFHQ, are analysed, using the method outlined in Chapter 2. This logic traces Critical Capabilities (CCs), Critical Requirements (CRs) and hence Critical Vulnerabilities (CVs). At least Own and Adversary CoGs,¹² at both the Strategic and Operational level, are analysed. The final selection of CoGs is a command function, this being a balance between which of the CoGs the JTFC assesses as most vulnerable to attack, and which offer the most significant pay-off. It is key for J5 to draw conclusions from the CVs to inform CoA Formulation: what ways and means can the JTF apply to protect our own CoGs and attack those of the enemy?

d. **Step 3 - Course of Action Formulation.** CoA formulation is a key output and will drive the remainder of the estimate. Following guidance from the JTFC, ideally in the form of an intent schematic and a number of specific questions, the JCG will assess possible CoAs. This will broadly outline CoAs in terms of the JTFC's intent, including operational end-state and objectives,¹³ potential Lines of Operation, Decisive Points (DPs) and any input that may emerge from the JTFC's recce and consultation with CCs. An initial Campaign Plan Schematic (see Figure 3.2) or Synchronisation matrix may assist here in articulating the relationship between DPs, CoGs and end-states. CoAs should be distinguishable by differences in their schematics reflecting the different ways in which they bring about a decision. However, not all DPs may as yet be identifiable, and it may not be possible to sequence or clearly define Lines of Operation for some of those that

¹² In a multinational environment it may prove advantageous to examine CoGs for all participants in the crisis.

¹³ Operational objectives are often derived from the Military Objectives articulated in the CDS/Jt Comds Directives.

have. Notwithstanding, some DPs are frequently common to all CoAs, allowing them to be depicted in a single schematic as in Figure 3.2. This initial articulation of DPs¹⁴ may be generic, such as ‘enable inload of troops into theatre in order to...’. The next Step will deduce detail.




Figure 3.2 - CoA Formulation Schematic

e. **Step 4 - Course of Action Development.** The staff will apply relevant factors to produce workable and realistic CoAs, i.e. define the art of the possible. This will be done by using teams that are drawn from across the JTFHQ (with input from CCs) but led by a J3 environmental SO1. Here DPs will be confirmed, sequenced and phased according to resource and time constraints/freedoms. Additionally, the CoA development teams must analyse each DP to draw out the component tasks and purposes or Joint Objectives (JOs). In turn this analysis will then form the basis for the Joint Effects Meeting (JEM) process,¹⁵ wargaming and CEA. Further guidance may come from the JTFC at this stage, emerging from his recce or consultations. It is quite possible that analysis done earlier on in the process will need to be revisited, further factors considered and new information fed in. Staff checks that were identified during Step 2 will be considered by the JPG and the

¹⁴ DPs should be expressed as the effect to be achieved.

¹⁵ See JWP 3-00, Chapter 3 for a detailed description of the JEM process.

answers to these questions will assist in developing the CoAs by defining the art of the possible. The work should focus on the effect the JTFC wishes to achieve on the adversary and producing a winning concept that can be developed into a workable plan. Each CoA should include a Concept of Ops (Intent, Scheme of Manoeuvre, Main Effort, end-state) and specify the Supporting and Supported relationships between Components for each DP. Developed CoAs should have identified the forces required¹⁶ and then their DOA as part of the deployment and logistic concept, which includes the initial bed-down plan and logistic architecture. Any time and space issues should be highlighted and recommendations made for the operational level reserve (size, shape, location and NTM). CoAs should also present a clear proposal as to the necessary command and control (C2) arrangements. The Campaign schematic should reflect any additional DPs, the CoA having being sequenced and phased as resources and time dictate. Developed CoAs should then be validated against the Political Intent, Higher Commanders Intent, Operational Assumptions, Enemy CoAs and Risk. Again the production of schematics and matrixes are useful in portraying the details of each CoA.

f. **Step 5 - Course of Action Evaluation.** Next, each friendly CoA is evaluated against the most probable and most dangerous enemy or threat CoA. The comparative advantages and disadvantages identified then inform the JTFC's selection at his decision brief. Whilst the JCG are developing the CoAs, the JCG will determine criteria for their evaluation, which J5 will convey to the CoA Development Teams. Although bespoke to that Campaign, measures such as risk, tempo, and the degree to which enemy CVs are attacked and our own protected, are commonly included. Led by J5, the leaders of the CoA Development Teams analyse the CoAs to populate an evaluation matrix and score the various boxes¹⁷ to identify the key attributes of each CoA.

g. **Step 6 - Course of Action Selection.** The CoA Evaluation Team, under J5, will brief the JTFC for him to select a CoA. Once the decision is made then it will be briefed to the wider Staff and another WngO issued to Components by the J3 staff. When time allows, Operational Analysis (OA) and wargaming may contribute to this process.

317. **Wargaming.** Whenever time allows, the selected CoA will be refined using wargaming (as described in Chapter 2). Wargaming should not be viewed as an unwelcome intrusion that competes for valuable staff planning time but as an

¹⁶ If over and above the forces assigned in the Jt Comd's Directive, this will require staffing a request back to the OT to amend the Joint Force Element Table (JFET).

¹⁷ Scoring is nominally done using a '++' (very advantageous) though '0' (neutral) to '--' (very disadvantageous) system along with a single sentence of explanation, so avoiding the mechanistic selection encouraged by a numerical score and weighting system. Boxes scored either '++' or '--' are then easily identified as the key determinants to inform the JTFC's selection decision.

interactive simulation to help the JTFC, his CCs, and their Staffs accelerate the decision-making process and production of staff work. In particular, this tool will identify synchronisation and co-ordination issues. The amount of effort devoted to wargaming will be dependent on the priority assigned by the JTFC and the time available to conduct the process. At the very least the selected CoA should be wargamed to ensure that the forces are co-ordinated and synchronised against assessed enemy action. The role of SO1 J5, as chairman, is to limit the number of responses to a manageable level and to keep the process from becoming bogged down in debate. If enemy CoAs are being wargamed, J2 will take the lead for the enemy without explaining the plan prior to it unfolding during game play.

318. **Decision Support Matrix.** The JTFHQ Staff have a responsibility to identify the JTFC's key decision points, and to satisfy the CCIRs¹⁸ that will allow him to make those decisions in a timely manner. The initial development of the Decision Support Matrix (DSM) will be J5 led, but ownership may transfer to J3/5 if the timelines lie within their responsibility. The format for the operational DSM¹⁹ may well use mapping of the JOA to indicate the geographical focus for the DP and outline any CONOP, but will overlay other essential detail such as the CCIRs. Alternatively a tabular format may be used as shown in Table 3.3.

DECISION POINT	FRIENDLY CRITERIA (FFIR)	ENEMY CRITERIA	ACTIONS	RISK
 TBM Suppression. <i>(Supported Comd: JFACC)</i>	TMD assets in place (ADC). Strike assets available (JFACC). ISR assets available. (J2 CC). JPR available (JFSFCC). Initial SOF capability available (JFSFCC).	Adversary launches or threatens to launch a TBM (PIR 1.4, 1.6, 1.7).	Commit ISR platforms North of Line BULL. Assume TACOM of strategic ISR assets (2 x Nimrod R1). Insert SF. Authorise AI strikes against launchers. Authorise SF DA against TEL prior to A-Day.	Of Acting: Adversary hide launchers, mobile production sites. Telegraphs JTFC's intent to adversary. Of Not Acting: Embroilment of 3 rd party states. Increased threat to APOD/SPODs.

Table 3.3 - Example of a Tabular Decision Support Matrix

¹⁸ The JTFC's CCIRs ('What does the comd need to know in a specific situation to make a particular decision in a timely manner?') comprise three strands: Priority Information Requirements (PIR) - information about the enemy; Friendly Force Info Reqts (FFIR) - information about the capabilities of own or adjacent friendly units that the JTFC needs to know; and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) - information on friendly forces that must be denied to the enemy.

¹⁹ It will almost certainly be different from the tactical level template that evolves from IPB, as operational decisions will seldom be so geographically focused.

Articulating the Joint Task Force Commander's Design for the Campaign

319. **A Hierarchy of Operational Paperwork.** Where the Campaign appears relatively straightforward, or is envisaged to be of comparatively short duration, a campaign plan may be produced guided by the format outlined in Chapter 2. Where a campaign is obviously complex or likely to be protracted, it will not be possible to articulate the detail of its later stages, particularly Component missions or tasks, at the outset. In these circumstances a hierarchy of operational paperwork is employed, as depicted at Annex 3F.

a. **Campaign Directive and Force Instruction Document.** The Campaign Plan is, in effect, the cornerstone of successful campaigning and will be expressed in a Campaign Directive that should follow the 5 NATO Orders format headings. The Campaign Directive (see Annex 3G) will include the Strategic direction for the Campaign, and the JTFC direction on its design. Central to this document is the Campaign schematic. The Supported/ Supporting relationship between Components should be clearly articulated for each DP. The second document is the Force Instruction Document (FID) (see Annex 3H) which presents the enduring supplementary instructions and supporting information ('annexes') from across all Staff Branches. J5 will lead on the production of the Campaign Directive and co-ordinate the JPG in the production of the FID.

b. **Operational Plans, Operational Orders and Fragmentary Orders.** Once the Campaign Plan is complete and the Campaign Directive issued it is then possible to break the whole campaign down in to separate operations (which may be conducted within a single phase or overlap several phases). As the detailed design of various operations are defined, OPLANs will be written by J5 to outline the envisaged CONOPs including the JTFC's intent and potentially draft Component mission statements. Such operations may be individual DPs, groups of DPs related in purpose, or indeed complete Lines of Operation or Phases. If they are derived from single DPs it is done by breaking down each DP into JOs – DP analysis as shown in Figure 3.4.




Figure 3.4 – Joint Objectives

c. OPLANs may both substitute for a WngO to the Components and provide the basis for an OPORD. OPORDs will include detailed coordinating instructions and are owned by J3/5 and usually co-ordinated by J3 Ops Coord. Alternatively, a number of CoAs may be identified for such segments of the Campaign. In this case, OPLANs will formulate CoAs allowing J3/5 to conduct CoA Development and Evaluation before recommending selection to the JTFC, the decision being reflected in the OPORD directing execution. To keep pace with the changing operational environment, adjustments to issued OPORDs are made through FRAGOs, drafted and issued by J3/5 or J3 depending on the timeframe for their execution.

d. **Contingency Plans.** As opposed to operations within the Campaign that the JTFC foresees conducting as part of his overall operational design (the subject of OPLANs), opportunities, reversals or simply uncertainty will demand the formulation and development of Branches and/or Sequels. The detail of these is captured in CONPLANs, written by the JPG under J5, which will be issued to Components to direct tactical planning. As with OPLANs, CONPLANs may be handed-off to a J3/5 OPT for development into OPORDs. Both CEA and the JTFC's intuitive assessment of the progress of operations against the campaign plan will clearly identify priorities for contingency planning. This identifies events that would present operational level risk, judges the probability of their occurrence, gives a generic impact statement, grades their impact on the CVs of Own Strategic and Operational CoGs (Low, Medium or High), establishes Indicators and Warnings (I&W)/Priority Information Requirements (PIR), identifies possible prevention and mitigation measures, and finally concludes what actions should be taken including appropriate contingency planning.

SECTION III – ASSESSING THE CAMPAIGN

320. As the Campaign progresses, its overall design will be reviewed and revised direction given. A number of mediums exist to do this in addition to operational paperwork, including the daily VTC, the JFPG, the JEM, and the JCB.²⁰

The Joint Force Planning Group

321. Throughout a campaign the JFPG is the focus for planning issues within the JTFHQ. It assesses the progress of the campaign in general, confirms the commander's priorities and objectives, and directs the development of additional plans that are required. The results of the JFPG provide the prioritisation required as the start point for the JEM and the JCB.

322. The JFPG will usually focus new planning on the period 48hrs ahead and beyond. This will include the development of branches and sequels for the Campaign plan, the production of CONPLANS, OPLANS and the force redeployment plan. Component input will initially be provided via the component liaison officer. Throughout this process in addition to the regular meetings, ad hoc Force Planning Teams may convene which will require additional component staff. If appropriate a component HQ may host meetings which JTFHQ will attend.

323. The aim of the JFPG is to ensure the continuing development and synchronisation of the plan. During this meeting progress against the campaign plan will be scrutinised using CEA. From this will come direction on any changes or contingency planning that can be undertaken to capitalise on favourable developments or to offset setbacks in the campaign. It ensures that component planning is conducted in accordance with extant JTFC's guidance and that the prioritised target lists nominated by the components are aligned to these objectives. It is thus inextricably linked to the Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle. The formal output of the meeting is updated draft JTFC's guidance to be endorsed at the next JCB for the period 48-72 hours ahead.

Campaign Effective Analysis

324. The aim of CEA, as outlined in Chapter 2, is to take a broad view of the campaign, in consultation with the components, and determine if the required effects as envisaged in the campaign plan are being achieved. Measurement of success will be foremost in the JTFC's mind. He should be able to stand back from the detailed conduct of operations and take time to think, look ahead, identify emerging trends, see opportunities and detect looming threats.

²⁰ Described in JWP 3-00, Chapter 3.

325. **Campaign Effectiveness Analysis and Decision-making.** CEA is based on reports from J3 and intelligence input from J2, who in turn will receive and collate reports from other agencies and Media Ops. J5 map J2's products against the Campaign Plan to assess which objectives have been achieved, and which require further action. J3, in conjunction with J2 and J5, determine which actions are appropriate, or if a change of plan (including change of CoG) is required. The CEA process as it applies at the operational level is described further at Annex 2E. The key, however, to CEA is that it should assist the JTFC in making 3 decisions:

- a. **Apportionment Decision.** CEA should assess the likelihood of achieving individual DPs in the near future and so inform the JTFC's apportionment of resources between Components.
- b. **Undertake Contingency Planning.** CEA should judge whether the campaign plan is on track and so identify the need for Branches and Sequels.
- c. **Confirming Enemy Centres of Gravity.** CEA should confirm, or otherwise, that the correct adversarial CoG and associated CVs have been selected and are being attacked. Although changing the CoG should not be done lightly, commanders should be alert to the possibility that new CVs may be exposed, or that previously identified CVs may become too well protected to attack. Thus, CoG analysis should be an iterative process for J5/J2, and it may be useful to periodically review the choice of CoG at the JFPG/JCB.

SECTION IV – KEY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Joint Enabling and Operations Support Activities²¹

326. There are 2 broad groups of enabling and operational support activities that underpin Joint Operations. Both groups are so important as to have a profound influence across and throughout the campaign that warrant consideration during all planning stages. Their relevance will, however, vary dependent upon the nature of the operation. They cannot be delivered in isolation by a component through supported/supporting arrangements and therefore should be planned and co-ordinated at the operational level.

- a. **Joint Enablers.** Joint Enablers are a group of activities which, while fundamentally important, can best be viewed as not having an end unto themselves in the sense they are unlikely to be discrete lines of operation on the path to the achievement of the end-state. Rather, their principal purpose is to enable other activities to take place.

²¹ For a more detailed description of these activities see JWP 3-00, Annexes 2D and 2E.

b. **Operations Support Activities.** Operations Support activities though have an end unto themselves, in that they are capabilities or techniques that are likely to be essential to the achievement of the end-state and will usually, though not always, form specific lines of operation. They are underpinned by the Joint Enablers. See Figure 3.5.




Figure 3.5 - The Joint Enabling Activities and Operations Support Activities

Note: Each activity will usually have a specific staff focus or branch in a JTFHQ (supported by bespoke doctrine), the operations support grouping being gathered in under the J3 Ops Support Branch.

Multinational Planning

327. Planning for joint operations will often be conducted within the context of treaty or alliance planning for multinational operations. The doctrine for planning within NATO is contained in the NATO publication 'Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning'. For non-NATO nations guidance for planning for multinational operations is described in the Multinational Interoperability Council's (MIC's) Coalition Building Guide (CBG). Normally, CJO will be appointed as the Co-ordinator of Supporting Command Functions (CSCF) and will ensure that the multinational objectives and campaign plan complement UK national objectives and are feasible within UK military capabilities. Within the UK national planning process, the same procedures for planning the C2, deployment, sustainment and recovery of the UK contingent will be applied as in national operations.²²

328. There are a number of LOs from other nations based at the PJHQ, with reciprocal UK LOs based abroad, who are able to provide valuable links with their national military planning headquarters at the early stages of multinational planning. It may be necessary to organise multinational planning meetings, either in person or by videoconference, to co-ordinate plans.

Integrated Operational Planning

329. **Joint Task Force Headquarters Liaison with Components.** Optimum co-ordination of maritime, land, air, SF and logistic forces is only achieved when each CC is involved in all stages of operational planning. The provision of CIS, VTC and LOs to the JTFHQ are designed to enable this. The aim is to ensure that throughout the planning process each CC knows the aims, intentions and capabilities of the other Components, and also understands the impact of his actions on them. Each Component has evolved its own way of conducting its tactical business and these differences are accentuated cross-nation.²³

330. **The Liaison Link Between Components.** In addition to the liaison link up to the JTFHQ, the liaison web between all Components is vitally important. Inter-Component Co-ordination and Liaison Staff Teams (ICCLs) act as the principal method of co-ordination and in ensuring critical information is rapidly assessed and disseminated up and down the Chain of Command. They also have an essential role to play in their host Component's plans and execution, particularly regarding the synchronisation and co-ordination of overall Component activity.²⁴

²² See JWP 3-00, Annex 1A for more detail on multinational considerations.

²³ An operational level guide to the contribution made by the 5 components, and their C2, is to be found in JWP 3-00, Annex 1C.

²⁴ See JWP 3-00, Chapter 2, Section V and Annex 1C.

331. **Interagency Co-ordination.** Increasingly, military operations should be co-ordinated and harmonised with those of other agencies, including NGOs, the ICRC and other parts of the Red Cross movement, donors, regional organisations and IOs. The onset of operations usually acts as a catalyst for very loose self-regulatory mechanisms to be established and at present this is generally the best that can be achieved. Although this will be command led, within the JTFHQ the POLAD, CIMIC staff and a representative from the Department for International Development (DFID) will assume a central advisory role in ensuring the activities of the JTF are co-ordinated with the efforts of the civil organisations. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), for instance, will normally establish a humanitarian coordination centre in any major humanitarian crisis. Both UN agencies and NGOs usually attend coordination meetings hosted by OCHA but there may be additional NGO forum where leaders of the main agencies in theatre address common issues. Dealing with these humanitarian organisations needs to be done with care as most will not wish to be co-ordinated by the military and will resent any suggestion of this. Additionally each organisation must be treated as separate requiring individual approaches, rather than as a bloc. The objective should be to open a dialogue, to listen to their perspective on the situation, to ask advice and to gain other general information.²⁵ Many of these organisations may have been present on the ground for many years and have intimate knowledge of the country.

Maritime Operations²⁶

332. Maritime power provides the JTFC with an enduring and flexible fighting capacity that can be employed from the open ocean or in the littoral environment, in benign to combat conditions. The maritime contribution to joint operations consists principally of Sea Control, Sea Denial and Maritime Force Projection, supported by maritime Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities and Sea-Based Logistics.²⁷

333. In planning terms there are typically 7 stages of the maritime contribution to a joint operation: identification of a crisis, force generation, deployment, sea control operations, maritime force projection, sustainment of operations and withdrawal. In reality these stages will not be easily distinguishable nor will they necessarily coincide with the *phases* of a specific campaign plan.

- a. **Identification of a Crisis.** Maritime forces operating in international waters can gather a wide variety of useful intelligence and provide a significant surveillance capability. Information gathered in this way is sometimes the

²⁵ See IJWP 3-90 'Civil-Military Co-operation' (CIMIC) for further guidance on Inter Agency Co-ordination.

²⁶ BR 1806 'British Maritime Doctrine' provides high-level UK maritime environmental doctrine and is complemented by the capstone source of Allied maritime doctrine, AJP-3.1 'Allied Joint Maritime Operations'.

²⁷ See JWP 3-00, Annex 1C for further detail.

only reliable source of evidence and, as such, is a critical element in identification and assessment of a crisis.

b. **Force Generation.** The size and composition of the maritime forces required will be shaped by a number of factors such as political objectives, level of threat, force availability and readiness together with the time available to respond. The potential duration of the campaign, the need to sustain or increase force levels, and logistic support requirements throughout the campaign will also have a profound influence on force generation.

c. **Deployment.** Co-ordination of the deployment will require detailed planning, close liaison with diplomatic posts, other civil authorities, Allied military authorities and probably foreign government agencies. The routing of forces must be carefully considered to ensure their security. If the threat to shipping is sufficiently great, protection will require sea control methods.

d. **Sea Control Operations.** Wherever the freedom of action of the maritime force is challenged and, in particular, as it approaches the area of operations, there will be a requirement to establish levels of sea control that will be sufficient to ensure its protection and to enable subsequent operations. Without sea control, the ability of maritime forces to manoeuvre, concentrate for offensive action, apply *leverage*, project force ashore, and deny the same to an opponent, will be adversely constrained. Sea control is synonymous with dominance of the maritime battlespace, which allows the force's strengths to be used to advantage, while at the same time, protecting its combat power.

e. **Maritime Force Projection Operations.** With the establishment of appropriate levels of sea control, maritime forces are able to project force ashore and may be employed in a number of ways, including Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), amphibious operations (see below), maritime air support, and surface and sub-surface land attack. A robust C2 system that, in the case of amphibious operations must be capable of deploying ashore, gathering intelligence, concentrating combat power, and generating influence over the battlespace, are critical functions for power projection operations. Co-ordination and *synchronization* with land and air operations will be required.

f. **Sustainment of Operations.** Once the focus of an intervention campaign moves ashore, the emphasis of maritime force operations will shift from being enabling to being supportive. In particular, the focus will be on enhancing land operations by intelligent application of maritime power, in particular its ability to enhance manoeuvre and apply force where it is least expected. Additional tasks are likely to be protection and logistic support, protection of units using the sea lines of communication, protection of the

maritime flank and of logistic support to forces ashore and afloat. The logistic support provided to other components may include sea basing of bulk stocks, medical support, a limited maintenance capability, personnel movement and temporary accommodation.

g. **Recovery/Redeployment.** The recovery and/or redeployment of forces at the end of a successful campaign will need to be planned as carefully as the deployment to the area of operations. Indeed there may be the added complication of recovering unusable equipment and a political requirement for a speedy extraction and return. Moreover, if conditions for success have not been achieved, and an amphibious withdrawal is to be made in the face of continuing or escalating conflict, it will be even more problematical. There may be a need to increase combat power ashore to stabilise the situation before withdrawal can take place. C2 will be difficult and fragmented. A JTFHQ (Afloat) may provide the most secure and capable communications to assist in this respect, and there will be a requirement to provide protection and logistics, including medical support, both for the maritime forces supporting the withdrawal and for the forces being withdrawn. Protection of a withdrawal, like a landing, requires the establishment of necessary levels of sea control.

Amphibious Operations

334. Amphibious operations are an important part of maritime power projection,²⁸ which seek to use the littoral as an operational manoeuvre space from which sea-based Joint Amphibious forces can threaten, or apply and sustain force ashore. An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from sea by naval and landing force (LF) embarked in ships or craft, with the principle purpose of projecting the LF ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile.²⁹

Amphibious operations are complex joint operations which see an amphibious task force (ATF) seeking to manoeuvre into a position of advantage in the littoral in respect to the enemy, from which force can be threatened or applied ashore. There are 4 types of amphibious operations: Amphibious Assault, Amphibious Raid, Amphibious Withdrawal and Amphibious Demonstrations.

335. **Amphibious Planning Considerations.** The complexities of littoral operations may dictate the establishment of an Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) and the establishment of an Amphibious Component Commander (AMPHIB CC). Irrespective of whether these are implemented, a specialist amphibious planner should be included in the JFPG if amphibious operations are being planned. Whether this is achieved or not, planners will need to:

²⁸ Maritime power projection comprises Maritime Strike and littoral manoeuvre.

²⁹ ATP 8(B), Volume 1.

- a. Integrate amphibious operations into the overall campaign plan.
- b. Balance the requirements of surprise with preparation of the battlespace.
- c. Optimise the landed force for desired effect, noting that where possible sustainment of the LF should be sea-based.
- d. Develop clear options for the ATF on termination of the amphibious operation.

Land Operations

336. Success in land operations is historically associated with 4 factors: surprise, shock, control of air and the aggressive use of ground reconnaissance.³⁰ Of those surprise and shock bring about the adversary's defeat. Control of the air and the aggressive use of ground reconnaissance set the conditions for shock and surprise, and allow the exploitation of local tactical success to be translated into victory at the operational level. Where shock and surprise are not obtained, an attritional struggle is likely to result. However, the outcome of land combat is fundamentally unpredictable in advance; thus any and every local success should be exploited within the JTFC's intent.

337. **Time and Effect.** At the operational level, land force operations can be characterised as a balance between time and effect, both in terms of deployment to theatre and operations within theatre. It may be possible to move a small force to the point of employment very rapidly. That may create considerable surprise. However, balanced all-arms forces capable of sustained combat are resource-intensive and numerous; and hence take time to deploy.

338. **Logistics.** In simple terms the larger and heavier the force the greater the logistic demand. Artillery ammunition, a primary contributor to the shocking effect of land forces, typically constitutes 85-90% of the demand of a heavy armoured force. Furthermore, the demand physically moves with the force. The further it moves from its logistics bases, the greater the effort required to move supplies to the point of consumption.

339. **Vulnerabilities.** Land forces present several vulnerabilities. Light forces are highly vulnerable to indirect fire and air attack, unless well dispersed or given time to dig in. Armoured forces provide better protection, but remain particularly vulnerable when moving in column. Land logistics follows land lines of communications – such as Main Supply Routes – which allow control, but also present a vulnerability. Logistic stocks are vulnerable to both attack and contamination. Force protection measures can mitigate but never remove such vulnerabilities.

³⁰ Details are given in Army Doctrine Publication 'Land Operations'.

340. **Risk.** Much of land operations are therefore a balance of risk. Bold, offensive operations threaten to shock and surprise the adversary; convincing him he is beaten, and creating opportunities for exploitation. Conversely they expose the attacker to retaliation, to attrition and possibly defeat.

341. **Approach to Planning.** The land component commander should not attempt to plan the conduct of the land element of a campaign in detail. He should seek to shock and surprise the adversary and exploit the results. Those results are unpredictable: Moltke the Elder's dictum that no plan survives with certainty beyond the first contact with the adversary still holds true. Such unpredictability has implications well beyond the Land Component. For example, target location, identity and even the requirement for CAS and AI will change frequently within a 72-hour air planning cycle. In addition, it is easy for a headquarters to be seduced into over-planning, and to come to believe in the products of its planning. Plans and orders are just that; in land combat, they are not predictors of the outcome.

Air Operations³¹

342. The air power characteristics of reach, ubiquity, speed of response and flexibility provided by the Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) give the joint force a potent capability. It is these very broad capabilities that require not only a good understanding of their employment attributes but also a different, more centralised planning philosophy to maximise air power's impact across the whole of the joint battlespace. Air power:

- a. Usually, encompasses forces drawn from all three Services and from other nations who share a very high degree of interoperability.
- b. Is concerned with effective exploitation of air power assets.
- c. Is supported by national and commercial resources.
- d. Is influenced by, and in turn influences, the land, sea and space environments.

343. **The Air Contribution to Joint Operations.** A combat commander in his own right, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) may not be an air force commander but will be the officer who has the capability to plan, task and control joint air operations. Dependent on the scale of the operation, the JFACC will vary from a 2* at medium scales of effort to an OF-5 for minor operations.³² The nominated JFACC will need an equipped and trained staff and this is usually the UK JFACHQ, a standing cadre of air C2 experts based at HQ Strike Command (STC), ready to provide

³¹ The UK doctrinal authority for joint air operations is JWP 3-30 '*Joint Air Operations*'. AP 3000 describes British Air Power Doctrine whilst JFACHQ CONOPS describe the JFACHQ processes in detail.

³² JFAC CONOPS initial issue.

the core of a deployable air component HQ. As well as providing experts on the processes and execution of air power, the JFACHQ staff will be fully conversant with the 5 basic core air power missions:³³ Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Air Defence, Anti-Surface Force Operations, Air Transport and Combat Support Air Operations.

344. **The Air Planning Process.** The air planning process consists of 2 main elements, the air estimate and the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP). The air estimate process is central to production of the JAOP, whose purpose is to direct the employment of units at the tactical level to achieve the campaign objectives determined at the operational level. From the JFACC's Air Estimate is derived the JAOP from which in turn daily Air Operations Directives (AODs) are developed. The overall air operation plan is a complex interaction of decision-action cycles inside and outside the JFACHQ that influence the tempo of the joint campaign. The principal air control mechanism is the ATO supported by the associated Air Co-ordination Order (ACO). The cycle can be anything from 48 hours (UK JFACHQ SOP) to 96 hours (for large-scale operations). Often deemed to be overly long and inflexible, much confusion and misunderstanding surrounds the ATO cycle. The ATO and the ACO represent a single day's snapshot of the long-term plan and should, therefore, reflect the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP), the current situation, the JTFC/Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC's) latest guidance, and the immediate needs of the other components. It is critical that the JAOP is aligned to the JTFC's Campaign Plan and is fully co-ordinated with the other components through proper representation at the JCB.³⁴ Heavy emphasis is placed on liaison staffs to represent their respective commanders at the various stages of the cycle. The ATO captures in one single document all air activity down to the lower tactical level by detailing units to tasks and targets. Such in-depth deliberate centralised planning best enables the effective and efficient delivery of air power. Air forces are not held in reserve so flexibility, responsiveness and the unexpected are dealt with using other techniques that allow modifications to tasking to be made at any stage of the process, even including airborne re-tasking.³⁵

Special Forces Operations³⁶

345. **Employment.** United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) have a key role in delivering the winning concept and can deliver decisive effect at both the strategic and operational level. Their key roles remain Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Offensive Action and Support and Influence. SF operations are by their nature complex and potentially high risk but can offer disproportional gains if appropriately tasked and

³³ Developed in detail in AP3000 (3rd Edition) '*British Air Power Doctrine*'.

³⁴ See JWP 3-00, Chapter 3.

³⁵ Improved data-links will further enhance airborne responsiveness sensor to shooter and consequently better enable Time Sensitive Targeting.

³⁶ See JWP 3-40 '*Special Forces Operations*' (Restricted UK Eyes Only) for more details on employment of SF.

employed. UKSF tasks at the operational level will be in direct support of the JTFC's main effort. Once the decision to assign SF has been made in principle, Comd SF will develop a SF Annex for inclusion in CDS Directive to the Jt Comd. This will normally include the overall concept for use of SF, the allocation of SF force levels, a Command, Control and Communications (C3) plan for the use of SF and any restrictions on their use.

346. **Command and Control.** UKSF will normally be commanded at the highest appropriate level in order to ensure that they are used to best effect. UKSF should be given orders in the form of a broad but unambiguous directive that ensures the precise application of force while allowing UKSF maximum freedom of action. OPCOM of assigned SF will normally be delegated to the Jt Comd and exercised on his behalf by the DSF in his capacity as Comd SF. OPCON will normally be delegated to the JTFC when SF tasks fall within his JOA. In turn, the JTFC would normally delegate TACOM of SF to the Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC). Control of SF operations will be exercised through the chain of command by use of dedicated and secure SF communications facilities.

347. **Intelligence.** SF require access to the highest levels of intelligence both to ensure operational success and to avoid conflict, confusion or dangerous overlap with other agencies. SF representatives should have access to senior intelligence co-ordinating staff and, through them, to all intelligence sources at whatever level of command is being exercised.

348. **United Kingdom Special Forces Planning Considerations.** For a campaign likely to involve UKSF, it is important that they are involved in the earliest stages of planning so that they can provide advice and expertise. This may result in the need for early decision making and often rapid deployment. Operations Security (OPSEC) is vital to UKSF to ensure the effectiveness, survivability and at times the psychological impact of their operations. The principle of 'need to know' should be rigorously applied to the conduct of UKSF operations.

Logistics³⁷

349. The range and complexity of an operation will dictate the need, or otherwise, for a Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC), however a joint approach to logistics provides the best opportunity of achieving flexibility and balanced support with limited UK logistic assets thinly spread between the Services. Fundamentally, a JFLogC provides a means of co-ordinating logistic activity into and within the JOA. A JFLogC is a C2 headquarters, based on an existing framework HQ charged with executing the Joint Logistic Plan on behalf of the JTFC to achieve maximum logistic

³⁷ The UK doctrinal authority for Joint Logistics operations is JWP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*'.

efficiency in common areas for all components, in order to optimise the logistic footprint and guarantee logistic capability in the JOA.

350. **Joint Force Logistic Component Planning.** Where practical the Joint Force Logistic Component Commander (JFLogCC) will have been consulted before or during the operational level estimate. Following a similar form of logistic estimate appropriate at the joint tactical (component) level, he and his staff will consider the practical issues of meeting the JTFC's remit. The JFLogC input to the wider planning process and the scope for joint logistic activity and co-ordination will be determined by the nature of the operation.

351. **Sustainability Statement.** The output of the logistic planning process is a Sustainability Statement that should be issued as part of the Campaign Directive. A Sustainability Statement confirms the overall logistic resources available and, if not given before, provides the authority for the release and commitment of finance and materiel. The more accurate the analysis during the initial estimate and planning stages, the better will be the operational sustainability baseline. Sustainability statements fulfil two purposes crucial to mission success. First, the Statement is the commander's direction to staff planners and resource allocators on what needs to be delivered. Secondly, it defines the level of resources made available to the campaign from the finite quantities made available through Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) and Host-nation Support (HNS) action.

352. **Modification.** Statements will normally be modified in the light of experience as the campaign progresses and individual operations or phases within the campaign may require their own statement (at the tactical level being a part of formal orders). Long manufacturing lead times and the momentum of the initial Statement may make significant short notice changes in direction difficult to accommodate. Time spent on careful analysis and prediction is invariably well spent; it may not always be available.

353. **Production.** Production of the Statement is an integral part of the operational planning sequence. Whilst the JTFC need not know the detail of how to construct a Statement, he should be broadly aware of the process and factors by which it is obtained. Statements will normally include:

- a. Theatre climatic, environmental, topographical and human factors which influence logistic requirements.
- b. The mission essential equipment and availability requirements.
- c. The level of self-sustainment required in theatre.
- d. The expected duration of the operation.

- e. The anticipated battlespace daily usage, with the anticipated high and low levels of utilisation of materiel.
- f. The predicted casualty rate for men, either from battle or disease and non-battle injuries, and equipment.

354. **UK Logistics within a Multinational Context.** When undertaking logistic planning the default is to consider how the UK will support its deployed force elements alone. Indeed, in most multinational operations, even alliance operations, it is always assumed that logistic support is a national responsibility. However, pragmatism dictates that opportunities to exploit economies of scale will soon materialise, particularly as a multinational operation containing many nations would be correspondingly logistically excessive. Contributions to multinational logistics could be standardised, perhaps by following NATO models, but are more likely to be ad hoc. For this reason, it is one of the key considerations at early force provider meetings for the JTF DCOS or the JFLogCC if he has been chosen, to seek maximum opportunity to find economies and reduce duplication.³⁸ The commander of the JFLogC/National Support Element will need to determine precise logistic command relationships externally with coalition partners, internally between the UK components, as well as with any deployed contractors.

Operational Level Reserves

355. In general, an operational level reserve is used by a commander to make a decisive contribution to an operation or respond to unexpected developments by the enemy. It gives the commander the means to seize or regain the initiative, exploit success or counter success by the enemy. The JTFC may find difficulty in maintaining a truly uncommitted operational level reserve. Whichever way he decides to configure his reserve, planning options should be issued in advance so that the fastest and most effective response can be achieved; he should also consider how to form a fresh reserve once his original reserve is committed.

356. In considering the establishment and committal of the Operational Level Reserve, the following questions should be addressed:

- a. Do you really need a reserve? Can you afford it?
- b. What effect do you want to achieve by its use? What size does it need to be and what capabilities does it require? Do not think of it necessarily in a conventional sense.
- c. Where does it need to be placed (consider each element separately)? In which environment is it most likely to be used?

³⁸ Without compromising lead or framework nation status.

- d. Under what conditions will it require moving so as to be ready for employment (e.g. a significant change in the weather)?
- e. How long does it take to launch (in total or in part)? At which level should it be kept?
- f. How to conceal its location and movement from the enemy?

357. **Maritime Reserves.** In a maritime environment, it is likely that all maritime units will be engaged in either pro-active (power projection, sea denial, blockade) or reactive (screening, protecting) operations; consequently, with the exception of units temporarily re-deployed to a port/anchorage for activities such as maintenance, no unit will be left 'uncommitted'. However, maritime forces (particularly amphibious forces) retain the flexibility to switch location and task at relatively short notice, retaining the initiative in other ways, for example through surprise or by distracting the enemy with assets such as submarines, aircraft or minefields. Replacements for battle damaged units or additional forces would be found either from the UK or by re-deploying units already at sea.

358. **Land Reserves.** Land Forces change their posture, task and location in the same manner as maritime and air forces but not at the same speed unless they are transported by sea or air. Land reserves should ideally consist of uncommitted force elements. The deployment of the reserve should be decisive; when and how to commit the reserve is likely to be one of the commander's most important decisions. A land reserve is held to respond to unexpected developments, and to exploit the success of forces in contact with the enemy in order to maintain operational tempo and exploit opportunities.

359. **Air Reserves.** Air forces provide significant potential to affect the course of a campaign. The inherent flexibility of air forces to change posture quickly and effectively allows powerful reserve elements to be generated at short notice, without necessarily having to retain air assets uncommitted. Air reserves can be provided in one of 3 ways:

- a. An uncommitted force can be introduced into the battle to increase combat power (this is rare although SACEUR held nuclear reserve air forces during the Cold War).
- b. Committed forces can be switched from other tasks.
- c. Air operations can be intentionally constrained to less than full sortie capacity so that the ability to surge is maintained and to deny the adversary intelligence on attrition suffered.

Termination or Transition Activities³⁹

360. The termination of operations or their transition is a difficult and complex issue for which there is no clear set of rules or accepted practice. It is a critical area that requires early consideration by the JTFC, and a great deal of discussion and consultation with superiors. ‘Campaign Termination’ is not intended to convey an idea of traditional ‘victory’ with the formal signing of a cease-fire. Instead it seeks to focus on what happens when the operational end-state has been achieved, how to preserve that which has been gained and how to make it enduring. As the operational end-state will very likely be achieved well before the strategic end-state is realised, a follow on force will inevitably be required. Therefore, within Campaign Termination will be the need to transition from one part of the campaign to another. The overarching objectives of any campaign are invariably political, so there is a danger of a military ‘victory’ being undone through failure to achieve the desired political end-state.


361. The JTFC should take account of likely termination or transition activities in the campaign planning process and develop a plan to accomplish these activities as the campaign progresses. He will be advised of his minimum obligations by his legal staff, but some of the following responsibilities (by no means an exhaustive list) should be planned for:

- a. Negotiating the instrument of surrender.
- b. Receiving surrender of forces.
- c. Handling of prisoners.
- d. Capture and handling of high ranking political and military leaders.
- e. War crimes investigation.
- f. Post Conflict Reconstruction.
- g. Transition to Civil Authorities including the composition of any interim administration, the timetable for transition and the milestones involved.
- h. Post-conflict breakdown in law and order.
- i. Large civilian population movements.

³⁹ For greater detail on Campaign Termination and Transition see JWP 3-00, Chapter 3, Section V.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ANNEX 3A – THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS



KEY

- AML -Augmentee Manning List
- CC-Component Commander
- CCT -Current Commitment Team
- CPT-Contingency Planning Team
- DOA -Desired Order of Arrival
- OT-Operations Team

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ANNEX 3B – OUTLINE CDS PLANNING GUIDANCE TO THE JOINT COMMANDER

FROM: MODUK
TO: CINCFLEET
HQ LAND
HQ STC
PJHQUK
INFO: BRITMILREPS AS REQUIRED

SIC: ADA/IAE/I9*

FOR CINCS AND CJO FROM CDS

OP *****

PLANNING DIRECTIVE

1. **SITUATION.** (Brief description of current pol/mil situation; e.g. Following an invasion of ***** mainland by ***** forces on (DTG) and at the request of the government of ***** , HMG has decided that UK forces will take the necessary measures to defend *****.)
2. **OBJECTIVES.** (If known, state the pol/mil objectives; e.g. The UK's objective is to restore the sovereignty, and thereby promote peace and stability in the region. Should diplomatic efforts to achieve this fail, HMG is prepared to contemplate the use of force, with the objective of restoring the status quo ante and avoid a permanent military presence in the region. The military objective is to deploy and sustain UK forces assigned to the operation to oppose any further aggression and incursion by the ***** armed forces. The longer term military objective is to be ready, if necessary, to achieve the withdrawal of ***** forces from ***** by force.)
3. **DIRECTION.**
 - A. YOU ARE TO WORK WITH MOD HQ CCT TO PREPARE A MILITARY STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FOR...
 - B. IN CONSULTATION WITH MOD HQ AND THE CINCS, YOU ARE TO RECOMMEND:

(1) WHAT, IF ANY, IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FORCES SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO MOVE TO THE LIKELY AREA OF OPERATIONS. (OPCOM arrangements of these forces to be considered prior to the issue of the CDS Directive.)

(2) THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER (JTFC).

(3) THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE JOINT FORCE.

C. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS TO FOLLOW.

4. **CONSTRAINTS.** (If known.) THE FOLLOWING CONSTRAINTS WILL APPLY IN PLANNING FOR THIS OPERATION:

A. **POLITICAL** (If known.)

B. **MILITARY** (Including Theatre of Operations if possible.)

C. **OTHER** (This could include time, forces available, authority to liaise/co-operate with allies etc.)

5. **STATEMENT OF LOGISTIC CAPABILITY.** (If known) e.g. You should plan on sustaining a 6 month operation with minimal reinforcement or resupply from the UK for the first 30 days. The Force is to train for 10 days and to conduct combat operations for up to 30 days at NATO SPG rates. Plan on availability of critical logistic assets as follows: i.e. ammunition, E&MAs for A vehicles, B vehicles and avn, ORP etc.)

6. **IMPACT ON THE JOINT RAPID REACTION FORCES POOL.** (This section records the MOD HQ decision on the replenishment of the JRRF pool and adjustments in readiness of JRRF elements remaining available in the pool.)

7. **COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**

A. **COMMAND.** CDS HAS CONFIRMED **** (CJO or 4* as appropriate) APPOINTMENT AS JT COMD (or Jt Comd designate) AND THE PJHQ AS JHQ (or JHQ designate) FOR THIS OPERATION (potential operation). JT COMD IS TO EXERCISE COMMAND FROM PJHQ.

B. **REPORTING.** YOU ARE TO SUBMIT AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF YOUR ESTIMATE AND PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION BY (DTG).

C. **CODEWORD/SIC.** THE CODEWORD FOR THIS OPERATION (potential operation) is *****. SIC I9* IS TO BE USED ON ALL TRAFFIC RELATING TO THIS OPERATION (potential operation).

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ANNEX 3C – OUTLINE CDS DIRECTIVE TO THE JOINT COMMANDER

CONFIDENTIAL OR SECRET WHEN COMPLETED

CDS/NN/YY [*CDS Registry*]

OP XXXXX [*CDSDO*]

CDS DIRECTIVE TO THE JOINT COMMANDER (JT COMD)

Note: The requirement to issue CDS direction at an early stage is paramount. This may require an issue of a draft CDS Directive, which will be superseded by the formal Directive when appropriate.

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE (If Applicable)

FROM CDS FOR JT COMD

REFERENCE(S): (If Applicable)

- A. EG ROEAUTH DTG
- B. EG PLANNING GUIDANCE DTG

1. SITUATION.

Include a brief political/military statement of the current situation and the task.

2. **APPOINTMENT.** *E.g. You are appointed Jt Comd for Op XXXXX and you are to exercise Operational Command (OPCOM) of UK Forces assigned to the operation from PJHQ Northwood. Within your Theatre of Operations, you are responsible to me for the conduct of operations of all assigned UK Naval, Land and Air Forces, including their intelligence, logistics, communications, administrative, and medical support.*

3. **HMG'S STRATEGY.** *HMG's strategy is to*

4. **HMG'S OBJECTIVES.** *HMG's objectives are as follows:*

a. **POLITICAL OBJECTIVE(S).**

b. **MILITARY OBJECTIVE(S).** *e.g. In parallel, to deploy and sustain UK forces assigned to OP XXXXX.*

- c. **STRATEGIC END-STATE.** *e.g. To restore the sovereign integrity of Country A.*
5. **DIRECTION.** *I shall provide strategic direction for operations through DCDS(C).*
6. **TASK ORGANISATION.** *UK Forces assigned to this operation are detailed at Annex A.*
7. **EXECUTION.** *e.g. In your capacity as Jt Comd, you are to:*
 - a. *Prepare and implement plans to deploy and sustain UK assigned forces in your Theatre of Operations.*
 - b. *Consult MOD prior to any changes to force levels or to any major re-deployments.*
 - c. *Advise me on the command and control arrangements for UK Forces (Including the appointment of a JTFC if not covered in the Planning Directive).*
 - d. *Propose the roulement and manning policy of forces assigned to you, in consultation with MOD, for endorsement by Chiefs of Staff.*
 - e. *Review NTM of assigned reinforcement, augmentation, and reserve forces, and make recommendations. Consider the inclusion of a Mobilisation Annex to include call-out of reserves (legal, media plan, employer support) and wider mobilisation issues – OGDs, health service support, surge from industry industrial mobilisation, chartered ships and aircraft from trade and enablers.*
 - f. *Liaise closely with the CINCs whose forces are assigned to you.*
 - g. *Prepare recovery plans and make recommendations on timing of withdrawal.*
 - h. *Prepare contingency plans covering, for example, emergency protection, reinforcement, and withdrawal.*
 - i. *Contribute more generally to the DCMO decision-making process, and to the briefing of Ministers, particularly on matters of Political, Parliamentary and Media interest.*
 - j. **(If Applicable)** *Ensure that there is close Co-operation between the NCC and the Headquarters of (Multinational Partners).*

- k. *(If Applicable) Liaise closely with (Multinational Partners) on the employment of UK assigned forces and on the co-ordination of combined forces operations.*
- l. *(If Applicable) Co-operate fully with multinational partners and Host Nations.*
8. **CONSTRAINTS.** *You are to ensure that military action by UK assigned forces is in accordance with international and domestic law. The legal and political constraints as they apply to specific military actions are articulated in the ROE profile at Annex B.*
9. **THE FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS:** *e.g.*
- a. *Your Theatre of Operations is (State geographic boundary).*
- b. *You are to clear any deployment outside your Theatre of Operations, including those necessary to sustain LOCs, with MOD.*
- c. *You should plan for the operation to last for up to 6 months (Note: Unless instructed otherwise, plan on 6 months).*
10. **CO-ORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.** *In order to generate tempo CDS may decide to delegate the issue of the Co-ordinating Instructions, Service and Administrative Support and Annexes. These would then be issued at later date.*
- a. **POLITICAL AND LEGAL.**
- b. **INTELLIGENCE.** *The Intelligence Directive is at Annex C.*
- c. **TARGETING.**
- d. **CIMIC.**
- e. **INFORMATION OPERATIONS.**
- (1) **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS).** (If Applicable)
- (2) **MILITARY DECEPTION.** (If Applicable)
- (3) **OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC).** (If Applicable)
- (4) **PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION.** (If Applicable)
- f. **ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW).** (If Applicable)

Further details of these elements are in Annex D.

- g. **FORCE PROTECTION.**
 - h. **NBC DEFENSIVE POSTURE.** (If Applicable)
 - i. **CALL-OUT AND DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVE FORCES** (If Applicable)
 - j. **DEPLOYMENT OF CIVILIANS.** (If Applicable)
 - k. **MEDIA POLICY.** You are to follow the P Info policy at Annex E.
 - l. **WELFARE AND PERSONNEL.** (If Applicable) PW AND DETAINEES. (If Applicable)
 - m. **CASUALTY POLICY.** (If Applicable)
 - n. **REPATRIATION OF THE DEAD.** (If Applicable)
 - o. **FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND HNS.**
11. **SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT.**
- a. **LOGISTIC PLANNING.** *You are responsible for the sustainment of all UK Forces deployed in connection with Op XXXXX. Your sustainability plan is to take account of the logistic needs of the assigned forces and is to be provided from the resources allocated and authorised in Annex F.*
 - b. **SUSTAINABILITY.** *The outline sustainability statement is at Appendix 1 to Annex F.*
 - c. **LOGISTIC DIRECTIVE.** *The logistic directive for Op XXXXX is at Annex F. It details responsibilities for the logistic support aspects of the operation and includes the allocation of logistic resources. The logistics directive may need to include the process of regeneration of equipment and stocks to war level.*
 - d. **MOVEMENT.** *You are responsible for the deployment of UK assigned forces to theatre, their resupply, CASEVAC, roulement, and for their subsequent recovery. You are to co-ordinate your plans with single-Service Commands and with MOD.*
 - e. **MEDICAL.**

12. **COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**

- a. **NATIONAL COMMAND.** *All UK Forces remain under National Command.*
- b. **FULL COMMAND.** *CINCs retain Full Command of all forces assigned. DSF retains Full Command of all assigned SF Forces.*
- c. **OPERATIONAL COMMAND.** *You are to exercise OPCOM of UK assigned Naval, Land, and Air Forces.*
- d. **OPERATIONAL CONTROL.** *You may delegate Operational Control (OPCON) of UK assigned forces in theatre to the JTFC, once the JTFHQ is established. OPCON of submarines will remain with CTF311.*
- e. **ALLIED/COALITION COMMAND AND CONTROL.** (If Applicable)
- f. **INFORMATION AND REPORTING.**
- g. **CODEWORD.** *The codeword for this operation is XXXXX. Its meaning is (Classification).*
- h. **SIGNALS.** *All message traffic on Op XXXXX is to bear the SIC I9X, in addition to subject SICs.*
- i. **CIS.** *CIS responsibilities are at Annex G.*

DTG Z

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

[Original Signed]

AUTHENTICATED
DOps

ANNEXES:

- A. TASK ORGANISATION.
- B. ROE DIRECTIVE.
- C. INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE.
- D. INFO OPS DIRECTIVE.
- E. MEDIA OPERATIONS.
- F. LOGISTICS DIRECTIVE.
- G. CIS RESPONSIBILITIES.
- H. TARGETING DIRECTIVE (NOTAL).

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ANNEX 3D – OUTLINE JOINT COMMANDER’S MISSION DIRECTIVE

Note: The requirement to issue CDS direction at an early stage is paramount. This may require an issue of a draft CDS Directive, which will be superseded by the formal Directive when appropriate.

ISSUED BY: Jt Comd

ISSUED TO: JTFC

Reference:

A.

BACKGROUND

1. **Situation.**

STRATEGIC ISSUES

2. **Strategic End-state and Objectives.**

3. **Assessed Strategic Centre of Gravity.**

4. **Assumptions.**

5. **Related Operations.**

APPOINTMENT

6. *You are appointed*

JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

7. **Operations.**

8. **Intelligence.**

a. *Your Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR) is [].*

b. *Your Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) is [].*

FORCES ASSIGNED

9. *Task Organisation is at Annex A.*

MISSION

10. **Mission.**

JOINT COMMANDER'S OUTLINE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

11. **Commander's Intent.**

12. **Concept.** *(To include phases, as appropriate, covering deployment, sustainment and recovery.)*

13. **Constraints.**

a. **Political.** *ROE will be promulgated by signal.*

b. **Military.**

CO-ORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. *In order to generate tempo Jt Comd may decide to delegate the issue of the Co-ordinating Instructions, Service and Administrative Support and Annexes. These would then be issued at later date*

14. **Timings.**

15. **Intelligence.** *CDI will retain overall direction of Defence Intelligence. The Intelligence Directive is at provided in the enclosed Reference Document.*

16. **Information Operations.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

17. **Force Protection.** *(Including NBC).*

18. **Targeting.** *See Targeting Directive in enclosed Reference Document.*

19. **Media Operations.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

20. **Finance.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

21. **Legal Status.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

22. **Escape and Evasion and Conduct after Capture Instructions.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

23. **CIMIC.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

LOGISTICS

24. **Logistics Directive.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

25. **Deployment Plan.**

26. **Medical.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

27. **Personnel and Administration.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

30. **Command.**

a. **Full Command.**

b. **Operational Command.**

c. **Operational Control.**

31. **Reporting.**

a. **Post Operational Reporting.**

b. **Debrief of Commanders and Key Staff.**

c. **Lessons Identified.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

32. **Liaison.**

33. **Codeword/SIC.**

34. **CIS Plan.** *See enclosed Reference Document.*

Typical Sections for Reference Document and lead Division:¹

1. Task Organization. (J5)
2. ROE (distributed by signal). (ROE/Tgts)
3. Intelligence Directive. (J2)
4. Targeting Directive (Issued separately – limited distribution). (ROE/Tgts)
5. Info Ops. (J3 Ops Sp)
6. NBC. (Ops Sp NBC)
7. Media Operations Plan. (J9 Media)
8. Political and Legal. (J9 Legal)
9. Personnel and Administration. (J1 Ops)
10. Lessons Identified. (J3)
11. Financial Instruction. (J8)
12. Incident Reporting. (OT)
13. Escape and Evasion and Conduct after Capture Instructions. (J3)
14. Logistics Directive. (J4)
15. Medical Directive. (J4 Med)
16. CIS Directive. (J6)
17. CIMIC.

¹It is current practice to provide supporting instructions and information to the Jt Comd's Mission Directive in an enclosed Reference Document. In the past this would have been provided in a series of Annexes to the Directive. This simplifies the staffing process and focuses the Jt Comd's Directive on the key points for the JTFC. The Reference Document is signed out by PJHQ ACOS J5 to avoid the need, following minor changes, for the entire Directive to be referred back to the Jt Comd for authorisation.

ANNEX 3E – JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER’S PLANNING GUIDANCE

3E1. The Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC) planning guidance to his Component Commanders (CCs) should be issued as soon as possible in order that CCs and their staffs can conduct their own specific estimates. These estimates will be conducted at the tactical level and focus primarily on the component’s own environmental area. The JTFC needs to strike a balance between providing mission/planning guidance too early, before he has had an opportunity to conduct his own detailed mission analysis and estimate, and too late which will preclude the CCs from influencing the overall balance of the Campaign Plan once they have conducted their estimates. All this will inevitably conflict with the political and strategic need to ‘get things done’.

3E2. The content of the JTFC’s planning guidance will depend on a wide variety of factors including: what guidance the JTFC has received; how much the JTFC wishes, and is able, to include his CCs within his own early deliberations and planning; the critical timings for the deployment and execution of the campaign; and the overall size and capability of the force. The JTFC should not issue planning guidance before he has at least conducted his own mission analysis. Thereafter, the more detailed information he can give his subordinates from which they can plan the better. He should, wherever possible, include his given mission statement, critical constraints and limitations and key timings. However, guidance on the outline Concept of Operations, including thoughts on the initial Main Effort and CC’s possible missions or tasks, will most likely have to await deliberation of the whole estimate (unless the Concept of operations is absolutely clear-cut). Such considerations may indicate perhaps 2 or 3 courses of action (CoA) for development, each with a different Concept of Operations. Detailed guidance to CCs will follow the JTFC’s decision on the selection of a CoA.


3E3. The JTFC’s outline guidance shown in the table below does not include information on the political situation, military strategic guidance or detailed information on adversary and friendly forces which the CCs will need on a continual basis. The JTFC and his staff must judge what level of information to pass to the CCs and their staffs, and how often this information needs to be updated. The key is to generate a 2-way flow between the JTFC and his CCs.

3E4. In tabular form this guidance might appear as:

Content	Remarks
JTFC's Mission Statement.	This allows CCs to set their planning within the overall context of the JTFC's mission.
JTFC's Concept of Operations.	This could be in outline only, depending on the depth of the JTFC's mission analysis and estimate.
a. Intent.	This reinforces the part the component will play in the overall plan. It should set out the desired end-state if applicable and if not yet known by the CCs. It is vital that any planning conducted by CCs and their staff must be within the overall context of the JTFC's campaign plan. From his mission analysis he should be able to inform his CCs of the possible adversary CoG, his own CoG and the decisive points in order to attack and defend these respectively.
b. Scheme of Manoeuvre.	It is probable that the JTFC's campaign will be conducted in phases. CCs should be guided as to the order of phases and which are likely to be conducted concurrently and which consecutively. The supported CC and supporting CCs should be identified by phase.
c. Main Effort.	The Main Effort may alter by phase. It may only be possible to identify the Main Effort for the early phases of the campaign at this stage.
Planning Guidance to Each Component. a. Phase 1. Supported or Supporting Component. (1) Mission. (2) Tasks.	
b. Phase 2. Supported or Supporting Component. (1) Mission. (2) Tasks.	
c. Phase 3. (etc.)	
Critical Limitations or Constraints.	These may be assumptions at this stage.
Key Timings.	

Table 3E.1 – Joint Task Force Commander's Planning Guidance

ANNEX 3F – A HIERARCHY OF OPERATIONAL PAPERWORK



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ANNEX 3G – CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE TEMPLATE

JFHQ/????

See Distribution

[date]

OP [XXXX] – CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE

References:

- A. CDS/??? dated ?? (UK CDS's Directive to Jt Comd).
- B. D/PJHQ/? dated ?? (Jt Comd's Directive to JTFC Op XXXX).
- C. OPORD 0001/?. *[Include whichever OPORDS/WngOs are to be issued concurrently.]*
- D. JFHQ/XXXX dated XXXX (Force Instructions Document (FID) for Op XXXX). *[If issued in parallel; more often it is to fol.]*
- E. INTSUM 00?/??.
- F. *[Mapping as appropriate.]*

Time Zone Used Throughout this Directive: [ZULU]

Forces Assigned. Annex A *[This is written to include forces assigned to the JTFC, and may therefore exclude strategic forces such as SF and SSGN, and will arrange those forces by initial Component TASKORG rather than by capability provider (Front Line Command) as is done in the Jt Comd's annex.]*

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY [J5 to complete]

1. This Campaign Directive will be supported by the Force Instructions Document (FID), which contains supplementary instructions and supporting information. Together, these capstone documents set the operational framework of the Campaign. Within this construct, Operations Orders (OPORDS) will address discrete parts of the Campaign as outlined in Ref C. The issue of Contingency Plans (CONPLANS), and the subsequent Component planning, will accommodate potential reverses and opportunities.

SITUATION

- 2. **Geo-Strategic Background.** [J5 to complete]
- 3. **Enemy Forces.** [J52 to complete]

- a. **Current Posture.** *[Strategically: incl political landscape. Operationally: incl ORBAT and Dispositions - this may be included in OPORD 001 or a separate INTSUM and simply referenced here.]*
- b. **Assessed Strategic Intent.**
- c. **Assessed Operational Intent.** *[Enemy op CoAs - can be described in a table (as below) or using free text format. If lengthy, may wish to include as an annex with only ‘Most Likely CoA’ outlined in main body. If already issued as an INTSUM/WngO 1, simply reference here.]*

	CoA A – Most Likely	CoA B – Least Likely	CoA C – Most Dangerous
Outline Concept			
Desired Enemy Operational End-state			
Land			
Maritime			
Air			
Time & Space			
I&W			

- d. **Assessed [En] CoGs.**
 - (1) **Strategic.** ‘?’ *[Detail CCs, CRs, & CVs as appropriate if not at Annex B.]*
 - (2) **Operational.** ‘?’ *[Detail CCs, CRs, & CVs as appropriate if not at Annex B.]*

4. **Friendly Forces. [J5 to complete]**

- a. **Strategic Context.** *HMG’s overall strategy is to*
- b. **UK Strategic Objectives.**
 - (1) **Political Objectives.**
 - (a) ?
 - (b) ?

- (2) **Military Objectives.**
 - (a) ?
 - (b) ?
- c. **UK Strategic End-state.** ?
- d. **Centres of Gravity (CoG).**
 - (1) **Strategic.**
 - (a) **UK.** ‘?’ [*Detail CCs, CRs, & CVs as appropriate if not at Annex B.*]
 - (b) **Coalition Partner.** ‘?’ [*Detail CCs, CRs, & CVs as appropriate if not at Annex B.*]
 - (2) **Operational.** (CoG Analysis is at Annex A.)
 - (a) **UK.** ‘?’ [*Detail CCs, CRs, & CVs as appropriate if not at Annex B.*]
 - (b) **Coalition Partner.** ‘?’ [*Detail CCs, CRs, & CVs as appropriate if not at Annex B.*]
- 5. **Other High Level Organisations.** [*‘Flanks’ such as stance/reaction of UN/NATO/EU/OSCE, regional organisations (such as ECOWAS, SADC, Peninsula Shield Force etc), IOs/NGOs etc.*]
- 6. **Assumptions.** [J5 to complete]
 - a. UK forces will be deployed for up to [?] months.
- 7. **Limitations and Constraints.** [J5 to complete – *to include those imposed by Higher and those drawn from JTFC’s Estimate*]
 - a. **Joint Operations Area (JOA).** Depicted at Annex C. Defined as *the land, sea and air space of ...*

MISSION [J5 to complete]

- 8. The [C]JTF is to:
 - a. ?;

b. ?;

In order to

EXECUTION [J5 to complete]

9. Concept of Operations.

a. **JTFC's Intent.** My intent is

b. **Lines of Operation (LoO).** The *[En]* operational CoG will be unlocked through the synergy of *[?]* LoO:

(1) ?

(2) ?

c. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** The Campaign Schematic is at Annex ???. The Campaign envisages *[?]* Decisive Points (DPs) conducted over *[?]* phases:

(1) **Phase 1 – [Description].**

(a) **DP 1 – Task & Purpose.** This will be achieved once/by ...
[From initial DP analysis: articulate the 'scheme of manoeuvre' for the DP: by component, what effect(s) their tactical activity is to achieve, in relation to each other, in time and space, and by function. Specify the Supported Commander].

(b) **DP 2 – Task & Purpose.** This will be achieved once/by ...
[From initial DP analysis: articulate the 'scheme of manoeuvre' for the DP: by component, what effect(s) their tactical activity is to achieve, in relation to each other, in time and space, and by function. Specify the Supported Commander].

(c) **Phase I End-state.** This will be realised when ...

(2) **Phase 2 – [Description].**

(a) **DP [?] – Task & Purpose.** This will be achieved once/by ...
[From initial DP analysis: articulate the 'scheme of manoeuvre' for the DP: by component, what effect(s) their tactical activity is to achieve, in relation to each other, in time and space, and by function. Specify the Supported Commander].

(b) **DP [?]** – **Task & Purpose.** This will be achieved once/by ...
[From initial DP analysis: articulate the ‘scheme of manoeuvre’ for the DP: by component, what effect(s) their tactical activity is to achieve, in relation to each other, in time and space, and by function. Specify the Supported Commander].

(c) **Phase II End-state.** This Phase will end once ...

(3) **Phase 3** – *[Description].*

(a) **DP [?]** – **Task & Purpose.** This will be achieved once/by ...
[From initial DP analysis: articulate the ‘scheme of manoeuvre’ for the DP: by component, what effect(s) their tactical activity is to achieve, in relation to each other, in time and space, and by function. Specify the Supported Commander].

(b) **DP [?]** – **Task & Purpose.** This will be achieved once/by ...
[From initial DP analysis: articulate the ‘scheme of manoeuvre’ for the DP: by component, what effect(s) their tactical activity is to achieve, in relation to each other, in time and space, and by function. Specify the Supported Commander].

(c) **Phase II End-state.** This will be defined by achievement of the Operational End-state.

e. **Branches and Sequels (as at time of issue).**

(1) **CONPLAN 003/02.** *[Describe CONPLANS to cover opportunities and reverses within Phase 1, and options for Phase 2 onwards; for example: ‘Should [En] achieve significant success (reversal preventing achievement of DPs 13 and/or 18), CONPLAN 003/02 will direct ...’.]*

10. **Co-ordinating and Supplementary Instructions.**

a. **Operational Level Reserve.** **[J5 to complete** – this may be extracted into OPORD 001] [Units, Notice To Deploy/Move, location, committal authority; potential options if known although more likely to be OPORD 001/??.] As the Campaign develops, adjustment in the size and provision of the Operational Reserve will be directed by the JTFC.

b. **OPORDS.** **[J5 to complete]**

(1) **OPORD 001/??** *[Describe scope of any Orders issued in parallel and those the COS has directed will be issued shortly.]*

- c. **Intelligence. [J2 to complete]** Further detail, including Areas of Intelligence Interest and Responsibility, is at Section 2 to the FID.
- d. **Information Operations (Info Ops).** *[General description including capabilities and objectives.]* Further detail, including PSYOPS, is at Annex A to Section 3 of the FID.
- e. **Media Operations.** *[General description of presence/interest/angles.]* Further detail including the Lines to Take is at Annex B to Section 3 of the FID.
- f. **CIMIC.** *[General description including priorities.]* Further detail is at Annex C to Section 3 of the FID.
- g. **Targeting. [J3 Tgts to complete]** Targeting is to be conducted in accordance with the Targeting Directive at Section 4 of the FID. This includes the procedures for collation of BDA.
- h. **Engineer. [SO2 Engr/Force Engr Cell to complete]** *[General description including priorities.]* Further detail is at Section 5 of the FID.
- i. **Force Protection. [J3 Ops Coord to complete]** Further detail, including NBC, and Combat Identification [J3M, L, A to complete], is at Section 6 of the FID.
- j. **Legal. [J9 LEGAD to complete]** Further detail is at Section 9 of the FID.
- (1) *Use of Force.*
 - (2) *Status of Deployed Personnel.*
 - (3) *Jurisdiction.*
 - (4) *Liability.*
 - (5) *Prisoners of War (PW) and Detainees.*
- k. **Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR), Conduct After Capture (CAC), and Escape and Evasion (E&E).** [J3 Ops Coord to complete] Procedures and policy are detailed at Section 10 of the FID.

- l. **Campaign Effectiveness Analysis (CEA).** [J5 to complete] The procedures for CEA, which will be conducted in collaboration with Components, are at Section 11 of the FID.
- m. **Battlespace Management (BSM).** [J3 Ops Coord to complete] Further detail is at Section 12 of the FID.
- n. **Deployment of Civilians.**
- o. **Visitors.**

SERVICE SUPPORT [J1/4 to dictate para headings and complete – reference relevant Annexes of Section 6 of the FID]

- 11. **Logistic Scheme of Manoeuvre.** *[Note that there should not be a separate logistic intent but that this should be encompassed in the Comd's intent above]*
- 12. **Logistic Main Effort.**
- 13. **Deployment.**
- 14. **RSOI.**
- 15. **Sustainment.**
- 16. **ICLS.**
- 17. **Personnel, Administration, Honours and Awards.**
- 18. **Medical.**
- 19. **Financial Accounting.** Your financial accounting instruction is at Annex I to Section 6 of the FID.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- 20. **Appointments and Locations.** [J5 to complete]
 - a. **Jt Comd.** The Jt Comd will be [CJO] who will exercise command from the [PJHQ].

- b. **JTFC.** The JTFC will be *[name]*. Command the Force from a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) located in ..., which will include LNOs from
 - c. **JFMCC.** The JFMCC will be *[name]*. The JFMCHQ will be established at *[location]*.
 - d. **JFLCC.** The JFLCC will be *[name]*. The JFLCHQ will be established at *[location]*.
 - e. **JFACC.** The JFACC will be *[name]*. The JFACHQ will be established at *[location]*.
 - f. **JFSFCC.** The JFSFCC will be *[name]*. The JFSFCHQ will be established at *[location]*.
 - g. **JFLogCC.** The JFLogCC will be *[name]*. The JFLogCHQ will be established at *[location]*.
 - h. **Force Troops.**
21. **Alternate JTFC/JTFHQ.** **[J5 to complete]** *Appointment (name)/HQ*
22. **Command & Control (C2).** **[J5 to complete]** An overview of the Force C2 arrangements, along with the detail of Component C2, is at Annex E.
- a. **Jt Comd.** *[CJO]* will exercise OPCOM of all assigned UK forces less ...
 - b. **JTFC.** The JTFC will exercise OPCON of all assigned UK forces less *[SSN and Strategic SATCOM (TACON)]*.
 - c. **JFMCC.** *[Detail command arrangements, e.g. I delegate TACOM of the forces at para ? to Annex A to the MCC/MCC is to exercise TACOM over the assets listed at ...]*
 - d. **JFLCC.** *[Detail command arrangements]*
 - e. **JFACC.** *[Detail command arrangements]*
 - f. **JFSFCC.** *[Detail command arrangements]*
 - g. **JFLogCC.** *[Detail command arrangements]*

- h. **Force Troops.** *[Detail command arrangements for JHC and Jt NBC Regt]*
23. **Alliance, Coalition and National Responsibilities and Relationships.** **[J5 to complete]** *[Incl national command issues and responsibilities (NCC/COMBRITFOR)].*
24. **Liaison.** **[J6 to complete]**
25. **Communications and Information Systems (CIS).** **[J6 to complete]** Further detail, including the JCEI and EMCON, is at Section 8 of the FID.
26. **Codeword/SIC.** **[J5 to complete]** *The codeword for this operation is XXXX. This codeword is RESTRICTED; however, its meaning is SECRET. SIC ??? is to be used on all signals relating to Op XXXX.*

Acknowledge:

[NAME]
[rank]
JTFC

Authenticate:

[NAME]
[rank]
COS

Annexes:

- A. Forces Assigned to JTFC.
- B. Own and Enemy Operational Centre of Gravity (CoG) Analysis.
- C. Joint Operations Area (JOA).
- D. Campaign Schematic.
- E. C2.

Distribution:

External:

Action:

JFMCC

JFLCC

JFACC

JFSFCC

JFLogC

Force Troops - Jt NBC Regt

- JHC

Information:

MOD - Op XXXX SPG Leader

- Op XXXX CCT Leader

PJHQ - Op XXXX OT Leader

- Op XXXX CPT Leader

- Crisis Role ??

Sec/CINC FLEET

MA/CINC LAND

PSO/CINC STC

[US COMBATANT COMMAND HQ]

[HN MIL HQs]

Internal:

Information:

All staff

Electronic File

File

Signed Original

ANNEX 3H – FORCE INSTRUCTION DOCUMENT TEMPLATE

FORCE INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT (FID)

JFHQ/XXXX

SEE DISTRIBUTION

[DATE]

OP XXXX – FORCE INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT

Reference:

A. JFHQ/XXXX dated XXXX (Joint Task Force Commander's Campaign Directive to the Component Commanders for Op XXXX).

1. This document provides supplementary instructions and supporting information to the Joint Task Force Commander's Campaign Directive to the Component Commanders for Op XXXX (Reference A). It will be subject to reviews and updates, as required, in order to ensure that all Components receive the appropriate instructions and information required to fulfil their responsibilities.

2. Notwithstanding the information within the attached Sections, future Operations Orders (OPORDs) will be stand-alone documents and will be issued as the Joint Force Commander deems appropriate to direct the Components in their execution of the Campaign.

[Original Signed]

[NAME]

[Rank]

COS

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

CONTENTS of FID

Section	Subject	Where Issued¹	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
LM	Cover Note, Contents and Distribution.	-	-	-	-
1.	Task Organisation.		A. Maritime C2. B. Land C2. C. Air C2. D. Logistics C2.		-
2.	Intelligence.		A. Operational IPB. B. Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP).		1. PJHQ Int & Security Management Plan (ISMP).
3.	Information Campaign.		A. Information Operations. B. Media Operations. C. CIMIC.	1. Info Ops Themes. 2. EW. 3. PSYOPS. 4. OPSEC. 1. CIMIC Guidance.	-
4.	Targeting Directive.				
5.	Theatre Engineer Directive.		A. Engineer Intelligence. B. Geographic Support.	1. UK GEO Structure. 2. Authorised Mapping. 3. Standard Digital Geographic Dataset	

¹ Such as 'Attached; Not To Be Issued; To Follow; LIMDIS.'

Section	Subject	Where Issued ¹	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
			C. EOD Policy. D. Infrastructure Support. E. Engineer Logistics.	Matrix. 4. GEO Task Requisition Form. 5. GEO SITREP Format. 1. Infrastructure Management Policy Statement (IMPS). 1. Engr Unit Operational UINs.	
6.	Force Protection.		A. NBC Defence. B. Combat Identification.		
7.	Logistics.		A. Division of Logistic Responsibilities. B. Logistic CONOPS Schematic. C. Strategic Mounting Instruction. D. J1 (Pers). E. J4 Medical. F. Sustainability Statement. G. Priority Progression	1. Medical Force Protection Issues. 2. Med Log Schematic. 3. MEDSITREP Format.	

Section	Subject	Where Issued ¹	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
			Instruction. H. International Co-operative Logistic Support. I. J8 (Finance). J. Logistic CIS Instruction. K. In-Transit Visibility Instruction. L. LOGASSESSREP.	1. Weekly Log Sustainability SITREP.	
8.	Communications Information Systems (CIS).		A. Apportionment of Key CIS Responsibilities. B. Force EMCON Policy. C. JFCIS – Reports and Returns (R2). D. CND Incident Reporting Procedure.	1. J6 ASSESSREP.	
9.	Legal.		A. ROE Profile. B. ROE Zone Map.		
10.	Escape and Evasion, Conduct After Capture, and Joint Personnel Recovery.				
11.	Campaign effectiveness Analysis (CEA).		A. Measures of Effectiveness Assessment Sheet (MAS).		

Section	Subject	Where Issued¹	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
12.	Battlespace Management (BSM).				
13.	Special Forces.				
14.	Lessons Identified.		A. Format for reporting Lessons Identified.		
15.	Spare.				
16.	Spare.				

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The primary references for the terms and their definitions used in this Glossary are indicated in parentheses.¹ New terms and/or definitions introduced by this publication are annotated as '*New Term*' or '*New Definition*'. While every effort has been made to rationalise terminology and remove ambiguity or duplication, implicit in the Ratification of JWP 5-00 is 'UK agreement' to the Terminology and to its future incorporation into JWP 0-01.1 '*The United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*'. Where appropriate, new terms and their definitions will be submitted by the UK Terminology Co-ordinator as candidates for incorporation in AAP-6 '*The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*' under the NATO Terminology programme.

Advance Planning

Advance Planning is the activity conducted principally in peacetime to develop plans for contingencies identified by strategic planning assumptions. Advance planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and can form the basis for Crisis Response Planning. *New Definition formerly Deliberate Planning.* (JWP 5-00)

Agency

A distinct non-military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of the campaign. (JWP 0-01.1)

Area of operations

An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. (AAP-6)

Area of Operations

1. At the operational level, the geographical area defined by the operational level commander within his JOA in which a commander designated by him (usually a component commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations.
2. At the tactical level, a geographical area, defined by lateral and rear boundaries, which is assigned to a commander by a higher commander. Within these boundaries the commander has authority to conduct operations in order to execute his mission. (JWP 0-01.1)

¹ JWP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine*', JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*', JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*', JWP 0-01.1 '*The United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*', AAP-6 '*The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*'.

Area of Responsibility

1. The geographical area assigned to each NATO strategic command and to each regional command of Strategic Command Europe.
2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. (AAP-6)

Campaign

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-6)

Campaign Effectiveness Analysis

Analysis conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical level to monitor and assess the cumulative effects of military actions with respect to centres of gravity in order to achieve the overall campaign end-state. (JWP 0-01.1)

Centre of Gravity

Characteristic(s), capability(ies), or locality(ies) from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derive its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP-6)

Combatant Command

A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (US JP 1-02)

Command

The authority vested in an individual for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces. (AAP-6)

Commander's Intent

A concise expression of the purpose of the campaign or operation, the desired results and how operations will progress towards the desired end-state. At the tactical level, the commander's intent should be focused on the effect that he wishes to achieve on the enemy. (JWP 0-01.1)

Components

Force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander. (JWP 0-01.1)

Contingents

Force elements of one nation grouped under one or more multinational component commanders subordinate to the Joint Task Force Commander. *New Term* (JWP 3-00)

Co-ordinating Authority

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for co-ordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he should refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (AAP-6)

Co-ordinator of Supporting Command Functions

When appointed by CDS as UK Co-ordinator of Supporting Functions (CSCF) for a particular operation, CJO is to assume responsibility for co-ordinating the deployment, sustainment and recovery of assigned UK forces, and is accordingly granted Co-ordinating Authority between all UK Commands. CJO will, in these circumstances, be primary national point of contact at the operational HQ level for dealings with NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) or their equivalents. Co-ordinating authority does not in itself carry any command authority, or affect the responsibility of the Supporting Commands to the UK COS. (JWP 0-01.1)

Crisis Response Planning

Crisis Response Planning is an activity based on current events and conducted in time sensitive situations. Essentially, unforeseen events for which there may be no specific Contingency Plan (although it could also be based upon an existing Joint Planning Guide, Joint Contingency Plan or Joint Operation Plan). *New definition formerly known as Crisis Action Planning.* (JWP 5-00)

Culminating Point

An operation reaches its culminating point when current operations can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. (JWP 0-01.1)

Deception

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (AAP-6)

Decisive Point²

A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment. (AAP-6)

Directive

A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. (AAP-6)

End-state

1. That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable or satisfactory terms. The end-state should be established prior to execution. (JWP 0-01.1)
2. The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6)

Establishing Authority

The Establishing Authority is the authority that defines the support relationship between the Supported and Supporting Commander. The Establishing Authority should issue directives indicating the purpose in terms of the desired effect to be achieved and the scope of the action to be taken. *New Definition.* (JWP 3-00)

Force Protection

All measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. (JWP 0-01.1)³

Forward Mounting Base

A base (also deployed operating base) established within the operational area, to support operations at forward operating bases. It will be resourced to a greater level than a forward operating base, including C2, logistics and administration support elements. (JWP 0-01.1)

Framework Nation

Forces designed under 'framework nation' arrangements are commanded by an officer from the framework nation. A significant proportion of the staff and headquarters support will also come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation and also its staff procedures. However in practice, once command and staff teams are established, procedures may evolve to incorporate best practice from amongst the contributing nations. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

² The NATO definition tends to contradict UK usage of DPs and the UK interpretation of this definition is outlined in paragraph 227.

³ This definition has been submitted for consideration under the NATO Terminology programme.

Framework Nation - EU

A Member State or a group of Member States that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control. The Framework Nation provides the OpCdr/OHQ and the core of the military chain of command, together with its Staff support, the CIS and logistic framework, and contributes with a significant amount of assets and capabilities to the operation. Although EU concepts and procedures remain applicable, procedures may also reflect those of the Framework Nation.’ *EU working definition.*

Full Command

The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Note: The term ‘command’, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control. (AAP-6)

Fully Integrated Forces

Fully integrated forces are based on a ‘proportional shares’ basis with national components and a fully integrated headquarters, and often-fixed⁴ infrastructure. Under these arrangements commanders tend to be appointed on either a rotational or *quid pro quo* basis. *New Definition.* (JWP 3-00)

Information Campaign

Co-ordinated information output of all Government activity undertaken to influence decision-makers in support of policy objectives, while protecting one’s own decision-makers. (JWP 0-01.1)

Information Operations

Co-ordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion and decision making ability, including his information, information based processes and systems while protecting one’s own decision-makers and decision making processes. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. (AAP-6)

Joint Commander

The Joint Commander, appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployments, sustainment and recovery. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Co-ordination Board

The Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB) is an operation synchronisation meeting used to promulgate the JTFC's guidance and objectives to component commanders. It is his method of ensuring unity of effort. The board will review the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List (JIPTL) to ensure that it reflects the JTFC's Campaign Plan and is in line with HMG objectives. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Effects Meeting

The Joint Effects Meeting is a staffing board whose role is to ensure the Joint Fires Process (which includes targeting) takes full account of the JTFC's prioritised objectives within the overall campaign plan. It is also responsible for the co-ordination and de-confliction of JTFC controlled assets. It will produce the daily Target Nomination List from the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List for later approval by the Joint Co-ordination Board. *New Definition.* (JWP 3-00)

Joint Force

A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational control or command. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Force Planning Group

The Joint Force Planning Group, attended by the Joint Task Force Commander and normally chaired by his COS, is the forum where progress against the Campaign Plan is analysed and measured. From this assessment will come direction on contingency planning that can be undertaken to capitalise on favourable developments or indeed help to offset or overcome setbacks. *New Definition.* (JWP 5-00)

Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List

A prioritised list of targets, approved by the Joint Force Commander and maintained by a joint task force, which includes the Component Commanders' requirements. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Integrated Target List

A list of strategic and operational targets, co-ordinated by the PJHQ, to meet the Joint Commander's objectives. (JWP 0-1.1)

Joint Operations Area

An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Operations Area

A temporary area defined by a NATO strategic or regional commander, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. Note: It is defined in co ordination with nations and approved by the North Atlantic Council or the Military Committee as appropriate, in accordance with NATO's Operational Planning Architecture. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission-specific and may overlap areas of responsibility. (AAP-6)

Joint Task Force Commander

The operational commander of a nominated joint force. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Headquarters

A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the operational level by a Joint Task Force Commander. (JWP 0-01.1)

Lead Nation

A Lead Nation is one which assumes lead responsibility for the planning and execution of an operation, particularly retaining ownership of the Campaign Plan and Information Operations. The Joint Task Force Commander, staff, command, control, Communications and Information Systems structure, doctrine and logistic co-ordination of the force will be provided by one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force under a National Contingent Commander, with liaison officers, and might even fulfil some staff positions in the lead nation's staff. *New Definition.* (JWP 3-00)

Line of Operation

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity. (AAP-6)

Main Effort

A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. (JWP 0-01.1)

Multinational

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. (JWP 0-01.1)

Operation

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP-6)

Operational Art

1. The orchestration of all military activities involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result. (JDP 01)
2. The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (AJP-01(B))

Operational Pause

A periodic pause in operations while initiative is retained the in other ways. (JWP 0-01.1)

Other Operations

Other Operations are those that are conducted in situations other than war; it replaces 'Operations Other Than War' to reflect the need for similar combat capabilities in situations short of warfighting. (JWP 0-01.1)

Sequencing

The arrangement of activities within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy's Centre of Gravity. (JWP 0-01.1)

Supported Commander

A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6)

Supported Commander

A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher authority. (JWP 0-01.1)

Supporting Commander

A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (AAP-6)

Supporting Commander

A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan. (JWP 0-01.1)

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACA	Airspace Control Authority
ACM	Airspace Control Measure
ACO	Airspace Control/Co-ordination Order
ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
AI	Air Interdiction
AOO	Area of Operation
AOA	Amphibious Objective Area
AOD	Air Operations Directive
AOCC (M) (L)	Air Operations Co-ordination Centre (Maritime) (Land)
ALEST	Airlift Equivalent Short Ton
APOD	Air Port of Debarkation
APOE	Air Port of Embarkation
ASSESSREP	Assessment Report
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
ATO	Air Tasking Order
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BDD	British Defence Doctrine
BSM	Battlespace Management
C2	Command and Control
C3	Command and Control and Communications
CAO	Combat Air Operations
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CAS	Close Air Support
CATF	Commander, Amphibious Task force
CBG	Coalition Building Guide
CC(s)	Component Commander(s)
CCIRM	Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
CCIS	Command Control and Information System
CCT	Current Commitments Team
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CEA	Campaign Effectiveness Analysis
CinCs	Commanders-in-Chief
CINCFLEET	Commander in Chief Fleet
CINCLAND	Commander in Chief Land
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief Strike

CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIRs	Commanders Information Requirements
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJO	Chief of Joint Operations
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CLF	Combined Landing Force
CMO	Crisis Management Operation
CO	Cabinet Office
CoA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Command
CoG	Centre of Gravity
Combat ID	Combat Identification
COMSEC	Communications Security
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COP	Contingency Plan
COS	Chief of Staff/Chiefs of Staff
CPC	Campaign Planning Concept
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance
CPT	Contingency Planning Team
CSCF	Co-ordinator of Supporting Command Functions
CT	Counter Terrorism
CWC	Composite Warfare Commander
DCDS(C)	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments)
DCMC	Defence Crisis Management Centre
DCMO	Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DDP	Detailed Deployment Plan
DFID	Department for International Development
DIS	Defence Intelligence Staff
DLO	Defence Logistics Organisation
DOA	Desired Order of Arrival
DOAST	Desired Order of Arrival Staff Table
DOB	Deployment/Deployed Operating Base
DOD	Desired Order of Departure
DOPC	Defence and Overseas Policy Committee
DP	Decisive Point
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
DSF	Director Special Forces
DTIO	Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations
DTMA	Defence Transport and Movement Agency

ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EMS	Electromagnetic Spectrum
EOB	Electronic Order of Battle
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPM	Electronic Protective Measures
ESM	Electronic Warfare Support Measures
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EW	Electronic Warfare
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FET	Force Element Table
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FLC	Front Line Command
FMB	Forward Mounting Base
FN	Framework Nation
FP	Force Protection
FSA	Fire Support Area
GAT	Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting
HDRO	Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host-nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
ICCL	Inter-Component Coordination and Liaison
ID	Identification
IER	Information Exchange Requirement
IM	Information Management
IMD	Initiating Military Directive
IMP	Information Management Plan/Procedures
IMS	Integrated Mission Support
Info Ops	Information Operations
IO	International Organisation
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace/Battlefield
IR	Intelligence Requirements
IS	Information Systems
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

JACC	Joint Airspace Control Centre/Cell
JAOC	Joint Air Operations Centre
JAOP	Joint Air Operations Plan
JCB	Joint Co-ordination Board
JCG	Joint Command Group
JCP	Joint Contingency Plan
JDOA	Joint Desired Order of Arrival
JEM	Joint Effects Meeting
JFAC(C)	Joint Force Air Component (Commander)
JFAmphC(C)	Joint Force Amphibious Component (Commander)
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFET	Joint Force Element Table
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JFLC(C)	Joint Force Land Component (Commander)
JFLogC(C)	Joint Force Logistics Component (Commander)
JFMC(C)	Joint Force Maritime Component (Commander)
JFPG	Joint Force Planning Group
JFSFC(C)	Joint Force Special Forces Component (Commander)
JHC	Joint Helicopter Command
JIPB	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
JIPTL	Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List
JITL	Joint Integrated Target List
JLP	Joint Logistics Plan
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JOP	Joint Operation Plan
JOPA	Joint Operations Personnel Administration
JOPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JOPES	Joint Planning Operation and Execution System
JPG	Joint Planning Guide
JRRF	Joint Rapid Reaction Force
JSOR	Joint Statement of Requirement
Jt Comd	Joint Commander
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
JTL	Joint Target List
LCC	Land Component Commander
LEGAD	Legal Advisor
LF	Landing Force
LIMs	Length in Metres
LO	Liaison Officer

LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOC	Lines of Communication
LoO	Lines of Operation
MA	Military Assistant
MACA	Military Aid to the Civilian Authorities
MACP	Military Aid to the Civil Power
MAS	Measures of Effectiveness Assessment Sheet
MC	Military Committee
MCC	Maritime Component Commander
MCE	Maritime Co-ordination Element
MCE	Measurement of Campaign Effectiveness
Media Ops	Media Operations
MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
MIOCG	Military Information Operations Co-ordination Group
MJO	Major Joint Operation
MNFHQ	Multinational Force Headquarters
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOD TB	Ministry of Defence Targeting Board
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSE	Military Strategic Estimate
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NCCHQ	National Contingent Commander's Headquarters
NCS	NATO Command Structure
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
NFA	No Fire Areas
NFL	No Fire Lines
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NLO	National Liaison Officer
NMA	NATO Military Authority
NSA	NATO Standardisation Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSE	National Support Element
OA	Operational Analysis
OAS	Offensive Air Support
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHQ	Operational Headquarters

OGD	Other Government Departments
OLRT	Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPINTEL	Operational Intelligence
OPSEC	Operations Security
Ops Sp	Operations Support
ORBAT	Order of Battle
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSD	Office of the Secretary of State for Defense (US)
OT	Operations Team
OTC	Officer in Tactical Command
OTG	Operational Tasking Group
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
POLAD	Political/Policy Advisor
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PW	Prisoners of War
PWC	Principle Warfare Commander
RDD	Required Delivery Date
RFI	Request for Information
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
SA	Situational Awareness
SACO	Supreme Allied Commander Operations
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SAG	Situational Awareness Group
SAPE	Shape, Attack, Protect and Exploit
SBMA	Senior British Military Advisor
Sec Def	Secretary of Defense (US)
SPOD	Sea Port of Disembarkation
SPOE	Sea Ports of Embarkation
SC	Strategic Commander
SF	Special Forces
SITREP	Situation Report
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOR	Statement of Requirement
SPG	Strategic Planning Group
SR	Surveillance and Reconnaissance

TACOM	Tactical Command
TACON	Tactical Control
Target ID	Target Identification
TBMD	Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
TG	Task Group
TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TMD	Theatre Missile Defence
TNL	Target Nomination List
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TOO	Theatre of Operations
TST	Time Sensitive Targets
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UK DSG	UK Defence Strategic Guidance
UN	United Nations
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence staff
VTC	Video Teleconference
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WME	Weapons of Mass Effect

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)