

MILITARY-STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

The Armed Forces are used to

Prevent the emergence or re-emergence of armed conflicts.

Subdue conflicts and prevent the spreading of conflicts to the vicinity of Sweden or to Swedish territory.

Protect, in close co-operation with civilian authorities, the territory and people of Sweden against non-military security threats..

Defend Sweden against an armed attack, whatever form it might take, wherever it takes place.


Adaptability and civil-military co-operation are the two central prerequisites for the Government authorities to act freely with regard to choosing means and methods in future situations of crisis and armed conflict. This implies that the availability of military resources will be adapted to the prevailing security environment. It also implies that forms for co-operation and the carrying-out of operations between the Armed Forces and civil authorities and other civil actors must be further developed.

ARMED FORCES
Headquarters


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FOREWORD

Developments in security policy since the end of the Cold War and changes in military geography, in the area close to Sweden and elsewhere, have brought many changes in their wake for the Swedish Armed Forces. For defence planning, this has signified an endeavour to create a theoretical basis for the activities of the Armed Forces which is broader than in our previous operational planning. As a result the Armed Forces now publishes a military-strategic doctrine for the first time. Doctrine for joint operations as well as for land, air and maritime operations will be added during the period up to 2004. The doctrine of the Armed Forces is to provide guidance and understanding of how the combat forces are to be used today and over the next few years.

Military-strategic doctrine is aimed at conveying a common approach, including common terminology, for the use of military means and ways. It conveys the message regarding the way in which we use military means – the manoeuvrist approach. In order to achieve the greatest possible effect, given our resources and values, the manoeuvrist approach has to form the basis for the actions of the Armed Forces in all military operations, but also be applied flexibly by every individual in every situation.

Military-strategic doctrine is aimed at the central command of the Armed Forces, tactical commands, military districts, Armed Forces colleges and other total defence system authorities. The doctrine additionally provides a basis for dialogues with the Government Offices.

A process aimed at changing our strategic culture is starting with the establishment of military-strategic doctrine. The change means that our activity from now on will be more clearly based on military science. I am convinced that Military-Strategic Doctrine will provide support for the development of other doctrine and for all forms of defence planning.

Johan Hederstedt
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Doctrine – definition

Military doctrine is:

"A formal expression of the knowledge and notions which constitute the most important basis for military action".

The term doctrine originates in the Latin words *doctri'na* and *do'ceo*, which mean instruction, learning, subject of teaching and instruct, teach respectively.¹ In Swedish, the word 'doktrin' (doctrine) can have several meanings: science, learning, knowledge, instruction or theory intended for practical application in a particular area.² In modern Swedish the term doctrine is generally used in the sense of established theory or norms which constitute a basis for action, particularly in political and military matters.³

The security-policy and military applications of the term doctrine differ between countries. According to one tradition, doctrine should be a brief general declaration in the form of guidelines for security-policy action. Doctrine may also be a description of political, economic, technological and military factors for the formation and use of military forces, primarily at strategic level. A stricter military tradition gives doctrine the significance of collective military knowledge which constitutes the basis for action.

Within the Armed Forces, the term military doctrine relates to a selection of knowledge and notions which form the basis of activity in military defence. Military doctrine derives its authority from knowledge⁴ in the form of science and proven experience. Given the dynamics and uncertainty which characterise human activity in general and warfare in particular, however, we also have to be able to act on the basis of uncertain knowledge, referred to here as notions. This is reflected both in the Armed Forces' definition and application of doctrine.

¹ *Nationalencyklopedin* (NE), Bra Böcker, Höganäs 1991.

² *Svenska Akademiens ordbok, Part 7*, Lund 1925.

³ *Svenska Akademiens ordlista över svenska språket*, (SAOL), Stockholm 1998.

⁴ For definition of knowledge, see e.g. *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Macmillan and Iac Press, 1972, page 345ff, and *Svensk ordbok, Nordstedts*, 1999: "a justified and true belief" and "specified notion of a (particular) circumstance or objective situation" respectively.

Swedish military doctrine is thus a formal expression of the knowledge and notions which constitute the most important basis for military action. The formal expression consists in the Armed Forces identifying and documenting certain knowledge and certain notions.

Military-strategic doctrine – purpose

Military-strategic doctrine is aimed at explaining and conveying a common approach, including common terminology, to the use of military means and ways.

The directions given in the Armed Forces doctrines are of a general and overall nature, in contrast to directives, orders, guidelines and other specific directions which are given in connection with a particular operation or other activity.

Military-strategic doctrine is intended to provide understanding and guidance in operations and exercises aswell as in force development.

Military studies for professional competence

Culture is based on individuals not learning everything through their own experience. In a similar way, professional know-how in the Armed Forces is based to a great extent on the knowledge and experience of others being utilised and relevant conclusions for the future being drawn. Studies of military theory and practice are therefore an important prerequisite for understanding military power in general, with its opportunities and limitations, but also for identifying and handling the requirements which the Armed Forces may have to face in the near future.


Warfare has throughout the ages made great demands on adaptation through rational consideration and individual assessment. The most important motive for military studies is therefore not to find practical guidance in every individual situation. Military studies and development of doctrine shall promote a professional competence encompassing both an ability to apply and to develop military strategies. Such competence can only be based on individual understanding.

"The task of theory is to promote the intellect of the aspirant commander; or rather assist him in his self-promotion. It is therefore not to follow him onto the battlefield."

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, page 103.

Military-strategic doctrine and its relationship with other doctrines ⁵

Military-strategic doctrine is a Swedish military doctrine and overrides other national military doctrines. Our participation in multinational operations within the framework of the UN, NATO and European crisis management entails certain harmonisation with multinational doctrine, primarily NATO's *Allied Joint Doctrine* (AJP-01).



/Military-strategic doctrine in relation to other doctrine documents ⁶

Vision and doctrine

Doctrines are concerned with how combat forces are to be used and developed today and over the next few years. Future concepts and visions describe how the Armed Forces should be developed in the long term (10-20 years). Doctrine thus in general has a shorter time perspective than these. As doctrine and vision diverge in time perspectives, there may be differing interpretations of certain terminology.

Doctrine, future concepts and visions have different roles and have to be developed in interaction with one another over the course of time. Parts of the doctrine therefore constitute a basis for the development of future concepts and visions. Conversely, doctrines have to take account of directions for the development of the Armed Forces in the long term.

⁵ At present, the Swedish *Joint Military Doctrine. Peace Support Operations* (JMDPSO) and *Försvarmaktens grundsyn ledning* (The Supreme Commander's Directive on Command) are also included in the Swedish hierarchy of doctrine. The intention is for these to be incorporated into other doctrines in the long term.

⁶ Names of doctrines subordinate to Military-Strategic Doctrine are decided upon in conjunction with the establishment of the doctrine concerned.

Doctrine development – driving forces and institutional factors

Doctrine development is a constantly ongoing process. Factors which determine the validity of the doctrines of the Armed Forces have to be continuously monitored, analysed and, in the case of decisive changes, influence the contents of doctrines.

The most important driving forces behind changes are

- national interests and political directives
- access to resources
- military-geographic circumstances
- military threats and risks
- developments in society
- technological development
- social and cultural factors
- lessons learned from operations, exercises and development.

These driving forces or factors have differing degrees of stability. Shifts for example in politics and military dispositions can take place suddenly, while changes in society and culture generally take a long time.

Doctrine development which promotes professional competence is safeguarded by the necessary conditions being created in the regular activity of the Armed Forces. The following institutional factors have historically proved important for successful doctrine development:⁷

- Constant work on military-strategic, operational and tactical ideas about how military power can be used in future conflicts. It is particularly important during uncertainty to tackle new military-strategic, operational or tactical problems which may demand changed competence.
- Promotion of independent thinking and acting as well as creation of incentives for individuals to devote themselves to the development of military strategy, operational art and tactics.
- Fostering of an active and open professional discussion.
- Establishing of institutions for doctrine development.

⁷ See e.g. Rolf, Bertil: *Militär kompetens – traditioners förnyelse 1500-1940 (Military competence – renewal of traditions 1500-1940)*. Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, Nora 1998, pages 403-405; Murray, W and Millet, A.R (ed.): *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, page 405ff and *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1998, 80ff.

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CHAPTER 2 – NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFLICT

Battle between wills

Conflicts are characterised by two or more parties attempting to impose their will on one another. The purpose of combat is to break the will of the adversary for continued confrontation. The aim is to attain a decision by creating and exploiting a situation which entails a sufficient degree of dissolution of morale in the adversary, so that the latter is forced to accept the terms one wishes to impose on him. More generally, it is possible to speak of the art of perceiving and mastering an interaction between wills which makes use of means of power to decide a mutual conflict.

A conflict need not always be destructive. In some cases, a conflict may contribute to creating changes which benefit all the parties. A conflict in the best case between parties can be resolved or minimised by a peaceful approach. If dissatisfaction persists, however, a chain of increasingly intensified events may lead to a change-over point where communication and understanding between the parties cease and where a peaceful resolution no longer seems possible. The conflict consequently becomes more and more destructive, and force or the threat of force may decide differences of opinion.

Nature of conflict

At the same time as war and the nature of conflicts are constantly changing, some closely related and interacting factors remain which constitute the nature of war and conflict: *the human factor, complexity, uncertainty, friction, and time.*

The human factor

Conflicts are characterised by the dynamics in human interaction, with all its potential for bold actions and creativity, but also for disorder and uncertainty. The prospects for handling the uncertainty and disorder of conflict can be improved by utilising human ability for awareness, judgement, creativity and initiative. These qualities are decisive in being able to seize and utilise opportunities which can lead to superiority.

The choice of ways and means to attain a decision in a conflict depends on factors which usually converge in the adversary's psychology. The ability of the adversary to resist is determined among other things by his strength of will and the resources available to him. The parties will try to assess each others' ability to resist. Unlike the resources, strength of will cannot be calculated.



Pressens bild

People bear responsibility

The outcome of every conflict ultimately depends on human ability to perceive and assess situations and to take decisions and act. The head of military strategy for the Falklands operation, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, studies a map of the area of operations together with his closest staff, ten days after the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982

It can only be estimated against the background of the strength of motive, which is further complicated if the adversary has not declared any clear and comprehensible motive, or if there is a hidden motive. An estimate of how far the adversary is prepared to go can be obtained on the basis of the perceived motive or the force, or threat of force, which has taken place.

Humans are the most important asset of society. They are the source of both success and failure. People exposed to stress may display irrational behaviour, for example by taking incorrect decisions at a critical stage in a conflict, which may lead to fatal consequences for all parties involved. Lack of training, practice, experience or information may also become decisive and limiting factors which result in failure. These factors cannot be offset for example by advanced technology and should instead be linked to the capabilities of the individual.



Pressens bild

Acting under stress

American marine helping a wounded comrade under fire in Vietnam, 1966

Complexity

Complexity is a consequence of internal and external factors which affect the course of events, but also of the dynamics of human action. Complexity becomes greater when the number of simultaneous events increases and if they have repercussions at several levels of warfare. Events may be relatively simple, but the result of the interaction of the parties in the conflict rapidly becomes complex, difficult to predict and uncontrollable. This is reinforced if new actors are added.

The media and their reporting may affect the course and outcome of the conflict. The media document the state and development of the conflict, but may also, more or less unconsciously, be utilised by different actors. Information is a means in warfare which can be used, for example, to cause popular opinion to adopt a position on the conflict. In the long run, this may affect both political and military freedom of action. The media are therefore an actor contributing to the complexity of the conflict.



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Complexity of conflict

Complexity increases when several actors influence the situation at the same time. Riots in Jerusalem in December 2000

Uncertainty

Absolute certainty is made impossible by the nature of war and conflict. The dynamics in the action of the parties, the complexity of the conflict and unforeseen events constantly generate the uncertainty often referred to as the *fog of war*. As the fog of war can never be entirely dispelled, willingness and ability are required to be able to take decisions and act in times of uncertainty and under chaotic conditions. The uncertainty can be reduced, among other things through active information gathering. Knowledge and understanding are, however, a result of people giving information a sufficiently certain and correct meaning. Not just sufficient quantities of information but also ability and time to interpret the information are required for this purpose. Something unpredictable which cannot be planned away nevertheless persists. This element of unpredictability, friction, is an inescapable part of reality and can arise entirely by surprise during military operations.



Bildarchiv preussischer kulturbesitz

The fog of war

The German advance on the Eastern Front, despite initial successes, was characterised by great uncertainty at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. A German armoured unit during the advance on Moscow, October 1941

Friction

Friction can be described as unforeseen events which, wholly or partially, disrupt the desired or expected course of events. People, materiel and environmental factors can all contribute to friction arising. This can be exemplified by individuals who become ill, conceal important information or take irrational decisions due to fatigue. Other examples are materiel which disintegrates, spare parts which do not fit or adverse weather which makes it difficult for combat forces to manoeuvre. Friction often results in the whole situation having to be re-assessed and new alternatives for action being drawn up.



TRH Pictures

Friction

The American landing on Okinawa was expected to be easy but developed into an extremely difficult and bloody operation with a large element of friction. One of those responsible, the commander of the 6th Marine Division, on Okinawa in April 1945

Time

In a conflict, there is often a wish to forestall the adversary by rapid action to achieve surprise or shock. An actor can be favoured by a time-gaining strategy. Delaying the course of events increases the possibility of involving other parties, but also of considerations with regard to different alternatives for action. There is also a struggle for time within the organisation of the party concerned.

Information which is gathered and the knowledge extracted from it perishable. There is always a risk that the knowledge on which a decision is based has become too old. An adversary or third party may already be on the way to taking new steps which create new circumstances for the development of the conflict.

The view taken of time may differ between different cultures. In some cultures, time is viewed as a resource which can be exploited to compensate for inferiority in personnel or materiel. For others, time is an item constantly in short supply.



TRH Pictures

Time and information

The hunt for an up-to-date basis for decisions is constantly in progress in a conflict. One of the air defence centres of the U.S. Air Force during the Kuwait War in 1991

Characteristics of conflict

Increased globalisation – increased national vulnerability

Globalisation in the form of increased exchange between countries, for example of people, goods and services as well as of capital and information, means both advantages and disadvantages for society. Exchange between countries increases opportunities for development in different areas. It also leads to increased, mutual dependence and increased vulnerability. Globalisation also means that states have new cross-border problems to deal with, for example movements of peoples, diseases and organised crime.

The development of information technology contributes to globalisation. Its availability and expanded area of application means that various actors have acquired increased ways of attaining their aims via the Internet and other channels. The technology allows for increased opportunities for both communication and impact. Factors favouring opportunities for action are that the technology does not need to be demanding on resources with regard to personnel and materiel and that geographical distance and borders no longer pose such large obstacles as they used to do. One and the same actor can additionally attack several geographically separated targets within a short time. Taken together, this means that the selection of potential actors is wider than it used to be. The actors can work together in global networks, regardless of national borders, to attain their common goals. National affiliation and geographical location are therefore growing less significant.

To prevent socially important functions from being manipulated, intercepted or knocked out, it is no longer sufficient to have guarded geographical borders. There is a need for high-grade security systems which can protect national assets against intrusion through information technology.

Development of society

Constant development is taking place in society with regard to values, political will, structures, actors, technology and external and internal relations. Changes in society may have both positive and negative effects. Many processes in society have become increasingly centralised, leading to increased vulnerability. There is also lower tolerance and preparedness for disruptions to infrastructure and supply due to the high standard of living today. The economic growth which has marked our society has led to an increased demand for electrical, telecommunications and IT services.

Socially important infrastructure is made up of the fundamental systems essential for society to function and directly or indirectly used by most members of society. Mention can be made here of the distribution of radio and television, transport and goods distribution systems, financial transaction systems and supply of heating and water. It also includes the information systems which tie many users together in joint databases or joint control and monitoring systems.

Observations of and experience gained in conflicts show that force is directed against socially important functions as well as against military units, civilian population and international aid organisations. The motive for focusing on civilian targets may be that it entails greater damage both physically and psychologically, but also because these targets are easier to reach and more vulnerable to various types of attacks. In addition, it may be easier to impose one's demands when popular opinion has a lower tolerance of threats to or direct imposition of force on civilians.

A national aspect of this is that demands are made for society to have built-in resistance to various types of attacks. Co-operation between authorities increases the opportunities to minimise, resist or counter attacks directed against functions of society.

Causes of conflict

A conflict may have a complex combination of causes, particularly if several actors are involved. The stated cause need not necessarily represent the actual root of the conflict, and different actors need not perceive the conflict in the same way. In addition, the conflict may change over the course of time and take on a different character.

Tangible and intangible assets may represent the targets which constitute the basis for the origin of the conflict. Examples of fundamental causes of conflict may be a struggle for power, a struggle over financial assets, a struggle for territory and ideological or religious conviction. Triggering factors may be a flow of refugees, disasters or discrimination against minority groups.

The link between conflicts and financial interests is very often strong. Without financial support, conflicts generally do not become protracted. There may be groups who have seen the opportunity to profit from the conflict and then actively work against a solution to the conflict.



TRH Pictures

Famine as a factor triggering conflict
American hand-out of food in Somalia, 1992

Threats, disasters and accidents

Behind a threat there is generally an actor with resources and will. Threats are determined among other things by the adversary's available means of coercion and methods. The actor himself constitutes a factor which contributes to increasing the complexity of the conflict, for example by using all means to counteract attempts to settle the conflict. An actor may be state-sponsored or non-state-supported. The nature of threats and the choice of methods may therefore differ.



Pressens bild

Vulnerable society

Parts of the financial district of London in ruins after the bomb attack in April 1993

During conflicts, an actor may threaten or carry out operations with conventional weapons or non-conventional weapons, for example NBC agents.⁸ The choice of means and methods is governed by the actor's resources and will. An actor with weak resources may choose to use non-conventional weapons, for example biological warfare agents, to achieve great effect with limited resources in terms of personnel and material.

Society may also face a broad range of threats without any underlying actor. Examples of such events which affect society to a limited extent may be severe blizzards, floods, violent storms and limited disruption to socially important infrastructure. At first it may be difficult to obtain an overview of the effects and consequences of such accidents. An event which from the start is experienced as less serious may at a later stage develop into something which has consequences for the whole of society.

⁸ NBC agents: nuclear, biological and chemical warfare agents.

When society faces situations which are so serious that the whole of society or the nation is put into a state of crisis, there can be said to be severe strain. This may have severe repercussions at several levels in society and cause lasting harm for example to functions of society, the environment or humans. Exceptional resources may be required to cope with such events. Examples of serious events which may lead to severe strains for society are nuclear accidents with radioactive fallout, chemical accidents, the large-scale spread of epidemics, larger flows of refugees and severe disruption to socially important infrastructure.



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Vulnerable society
French aid workers in Turkey after an earthquake, August 1999

Another aspect of this problem is that something perceived as an accident or disaster may actually have an underlying actor.

Actors and purposes

The struggle between different actors may be based on an endeavour to conquer or preserve tangible and intangible assets. This may ultimately be expressed in force or the threat of force. In many cases an actor, at an

early stage, may openly declare his aim. In other cases there may be a concealed aim which the actor does not want to reveal too early due to a risk of further actors becoming involved in the conflict.

A factor which contributes to increased complexity and dynamics in a conflict is that as well as regular forces in an area of operations there may be irregular forces.

Regular forces are the military and police forces which organisationally form part of the governing power in a state or a state-like unit. The forces have to be under commanding officers, nationally or multinationally, who are responsible for their subordinates, and they have to be subjected to an internal disciplinary system.

Irregular forces are forces which in organisational and legal terms do not form part of the governing power in a state or state-like unit. Examples of such forces may be certain guerrilla groups, militia units, free forces, protection corps, partisan units, terrorists, criminal organisations or mercenaries.

As well as the actors who actively use force or the threat of force in a conflict, there may be other active or passive actors. Examples of other active actors may be the governmental and non-governmental, usually civilian, organisations which act in an area of conflict to support the population. Passive actors may be the population in the area of conflict and civilians who are affected by the conflict in nearby areas.

Asymmetry – a state of imbalance between parties

The term asymmetry denotes a state of imbalance in a relationship between two or more parties. Asymmetrical conditions in warfare may mean both threats and opportunities. It is often not possible to predict what type of asymmetry may arise or be created. It is also difficult to predict what consequences the asymmetry will have for the planned action alternatives or for the military units. Assessments of our own strength and weakness and that of a potential aggressor may, however, indicate what type of asymmetry may arise or be created and what consequences can be expected. It is also important to note that asymmetry may be a transient state.

Asymmetry may arise with respect to the parties' resources. A highly developed technological party or a party with numerical superiority may encounter a less developed technological party or a party with numerical inferiority. In a situation of this type, the party with weaker resources has the option of choosing alternative methods of attack to compensate for the imbalance. This means that the weaker party can attempt to eliminate the negative asymmetry viewed from his side for example by using IT attack or propaganda.



Hasan Jamali, Pressens bild

Alternative method of attack

The damaged American destroyer USS Cole after a terrorist attack in Aden, October 2000. The attack was carried out with a smaller vessel loaded with explosives

Another important aspect of asymmetry is that on the basis of different systems of values a moral imbalance may arise between the parties of a conflict. This may limit the opportunities for action for a party with the aspiration to comply with international law when he meets a party with lower aspirations in this respect. Examples of this are using child soldiers or utilising the civilian population as hostages or as a shield against the other party.

One type of asymmetry may relate to the legitimacy existing among the parties in the conflict. In the case of conflicts within states, for example, or if a nation is attacked by non-state-supported actors there is asymmetry in that the governing power unlike the adversary has legitimacy. The one side formally represents the state through representation in international and diplomatic and economic links with other states. If the adversary lacks political legitimacy, he is not formally equal.

Levels of conflict

A state of conflict can generally be ascribed a level of conflict. The levels are classified according to intensity of exercise of force and spread. The boundaries between the levels are diffuse and difficult to describe. A situation may rapidly escalate, which means that the conflict takes on a new appearance and a new character. It is nevertheless important to divide conflicts into levels so that a link can be made with applicable regulations⁹ on the exercise of force.

Peace

Conflicts also occur in peace-time but can often be resolved by non-military means for example through negotiations. A country may occasionally have a permanently ongoing conflict as part of the normal picture. The normal picture of a nation should be interpreted on the basis of the nation's specific conditions. Not until normal preparedness is departed from, for example if the continuous conflict is suddenly stepped up, can the situation be said to deviate from the normal picture. A state of peace can, however, rapidly change over to a state of crisis or war if threats are made.

A crisis can be described as a political development of events with possible adverse implications for society. The term crisis covers a state of hostilities or disagreements between parties but also a state generated by events not initiated by actors, such as natural disasters and accidents. Both military and non-military means can be applied to solve crises.

Armed conflict

The armed conflict is characterised by threats of or open exercise of force. Non-military means may continue to be used as part of the armed conflict, for example diplomatic or economic means. The boundary between armed conflict and war is diffuse, but war is the ultimate form of armed conflict.

⁹ See Chapter 4. Legal and political basis for the use of military means.

War

War in an international law sense denotes an armed struggle which starts regardless of the aim of the struggle. In this context, the term war primarily has a legal technical significance and denotes the actual and legal situation which arises when two or more states are engaged in open hostilities with each other "by organised force of weapons". In everyday language, war is often described as an unlimited conflict where national survival is at stake and where large parts of the resources of society are involved.

Dynamics of conflict

Conflicts can emerge quickly and often with an unexpected course. The conflict can therefore be compared to a living organism which responds to external signals and requires energy for locomotion. It can vary in intensity and extent and rapidly change character. It is therefore difficult to predict the conflicts of tomorrow. There is also a risk of basing oneself to too great an extent on the conflicts of yesterday and uncertain ideas about the future.

Escalation

Escalation can take place when the issue of conflict becomes more central for the actors or when new opportunities arise. The motive behind an escalation is difficult to predict but is strongly linked to what is at stake in the conflict. The escalation of the conflict does not follow an even growth curve. Nor does the escalation have any measurable pre-determined size, but it often leads step by step to increasingly extensive threats and force. Examples of escalation are quantitative and qualitative intensification of threats and force or the intensification of the issue of conflict by spread to other levels, actors and areas. The former is referred to as *vertical* escalation and the latter as *horizontal*.

Stalemate

A stalemate can be described as the situation where the political or military positions of the actors are locked tight and their conflict behaviour towards each other is unchanged. Stalemates may arise if the parties have learnt each other's military and political moves or the personnel, political, organisational or materiel resources of both sides are used up or tied up.

De-escalation

De-escalation, by analogy to escalation, can take place vertically and horizontally in a gradual fading or reduction of the conflict. This is because the will or ability of the parties to continue the struggle has weakened. The parties may find that the sacrifices are disproportionate to the aims. Domestic formation of opinion or third-party coercion are examples of factors which may influence the will to fight.



Eric Müller, Pressens bild

Return to peace

The peace agreement on the former Yugoslavia was signed in Dayton on 14 December 1995 following coercion from a third party (from left: Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic', Bosnia and Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic', Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher)

An important condition to be met for de-escalation is communication between the parties. The endeavour is to create opportunities for a return to normal conditions through a mutual agreement, without threats or exercise of force. The driving forces which promote escalation can very often make de-escalation difficult.

The conditions underlying battle

Conflict is a struggle between wills where the purpose is to make an adversary accept given conditions. The use of force is the ultimate means in this battle, but the use of force has to be in accordance with applicable regulations.

The nature of the conflict is made up of some timeless factors which are independent of where, when and how the conflict unfolds. At the same time, there are conditions underlying the conflict which may change over time, such as actors, aspiration and will to fight as well as means and methods. It is therefore difficult to predict when and where new conflicts will arise and how they will be manifested.

The uncertainty does not, however, mean that preparations are unnecessary or have to be based on generic scenarios. The future conflict should be regarded as a struggle against an actual adversary, rather than a notional one, with actual capability and relevant strategies¹⁰.

"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle."

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, page 32.

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¹⁰ See Chapter 6. Strategy and levels of war.

CHAPTER 3 – THE INSTRUMENTS OF SECURITY-POLICY

At the strategic level, available diplomatic, economic and military resources among others represent the means that a state or multinational organisation such as the UN, NATO or the EU employs to attain its security-policy goals. For both individual states and multinational organisations, the action is based on a strategy for how the various means co-ordinated are to be developed and utilised.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy, within the framework of political action, can be utilised to prevent potential conflicts or settle ongoing ones. The power of diplomacy to influence is the result of several factors: legitimacy to negotiate, ability to create and maintain good relations with potential co-operating partners and ability to convince with good arguments.

Economic means

Economic support can be used for the purpose of preventing conflict in order to eliminate fundamental causes of conflicts such as widespread poverty, social injustices and inadequate human and democratic rights. Economic resources can be utilised to provide humanitarian aid in areas of crisis and conflict and contribute to infrastructural and political reconstruction. Another way is to exert economic pressure on an actor by imposing sanctions.

Military means

The Armed Forces represent Sweden's military means of power. The application of military power follows from the need to employ force or the threat of force in a situation to attain established goals in a conflict. Military means of power are the ultimate political instrument to adopt when other security-policy means have failed to protect vital national interests. In international crisis management, military operations are initiated by the international community in collaboration with other means to prevent, mitigate or prevent the spread of conflict.

Force or the threat of force is the means to attain the goal of putting the adversary in a situation which convinces him that it is better to end the conflict on our terms than to continue with it. Force is principally manifested in armed combat. The Armed Forces are therefore primarily developed, organised, trained and equipped to carry out armed combat.

Multifunctional operations

Most present-day conflicts require operations with different parts of the range of means on offer, known as multifunctional operations. These are largely associated with complex conflicts¹¹ and are often linked to humanitarian disasters. Successful management of such conflicts makes particular demands on a long-term perspective and a comprehensive view which comprises diplomatic, economic, military, civilian and humanitarian elements. Conflict-solving, reconciliation, confidence-building measures and institutional aid are essential components in attaining a lasting solution.

The mutual relationship between different components in a multifunctional operation varies during the various phases of the conflict, but also between different types of conflicts. Co-ordination, firstly between military and civil operations and secondly between operations and information measures, is therefore important. Diplomatic efforts not linked to military options for action, for example, may prove fruitless. Co-ordination between different non-governmental actors in the field is also important.

¹¹ These conflicts have their origin for example in political, ethnic, religious, ideological, social or economic conditions.

Purpose of using military power



Peter Liander, Försvarets bildbyrå

Restraining through readiness for action

A pair of JAS 39 A Gripen aircraft with weapon load

Restrain

The ability to carry out armed combat and knowledge of this in the world around prevents or subdues conflicts and ultimately deters from war. The effect is achieved by convincing the adversary that the steps he intends to take will not succeed or are not worth the sacrifice. The organisation and activity of the Armed Forces are therefore an important component in restraining an adversary from using military means and force to attain his aims. The ability to carry out armed combat is maintained through both national and international activity in the form of training, exercise, preparedness measures and by utilising the experience from operations carried out.



Andreas Karlsson, Försvarets bildbyrå

Restraining through capability

The Dutch minehunter Haarlem M 853 attached to HMS Utö A 261 and HMS Sleipner for bunkering during the multinational mine-clearance operation MCOPLAT 2000

Hinder

Military means of power can also be used with force or the threat of force to actively prevent an adversary utilising resources or carrying out activity. An adversary can be made to desist from intentions and withdraw or discontinue activity in progress if combat forces are deployed and actively used in a particular area without directly seeking armed combat, or by taking emergency measures. Deployment and the presence of military means of power may, however, lead to escalation as it may be perceived as an evidently hostile action.



Jørgen Welter, Försvarets bildbyrå

Hindering through control

Swedish post from BA 05 prevents contraventions of the Dayton agreement in Bosnia, 1996

Disorganise

Another purpose of using military means of power may be to break up the co-ordination and morale in the adversary's organisation and in so doing reduce efficiency and the will to carry out operations. This may be achieved among other things by systematically engaging functions which are important for co-ordination.

Destroy

The most tangible way of using military means of power is to break down the adversary's ability to carry out activity by systematically inflicting losses on him in material and personnel.



US Air Force

Physical destruction

"The Road of Death" after the Allies' aerial engagement during the Kuwait War, 1991

Arenas of military power

Military means can be applied for activity on land, in the air, on and beneath the surface of the sea and in the information and electromagnetic wavelength range. Many military operations take place simultaneously in a co-ordinated manner on more than one or all of these arenas.

Arenas to operate in:

- Land arena
- Naval arena
- Air arena
- Information arena

Land arena

The land arena comprises all land surfaces and the combat compartments found close to the ground.

Within the land arena you find the population and most of the world's production capacity. Combat forces acting in other arenas are dependent on the land arena among other things for basing. The land arena is characterised by environmental factors such as terrain obstacles, weather, infrastructure, possible physical destruction and the secondary effects of war, for example flows of refugees, crime and epidemics.



Pal Sommelius, Pressens bild

Secondary effects of war
Swedish UN force assisting refugees in Tuzla, July 1995

Naval arena

The maritime arena comprises the sea, on and beneath the sea surface, the air close to the sea surface and the areas containing boundary areas between land and water, for examples areas at the open coast, around islands, in archipelagos and at river deltas.

The sea is characterised by its significance as a dominant transport route for goods and people and the possibility of utilising its wealth of resources. All countries today can be said to be directly or indirectly dependent on

sea transport for their supplies. Sea routes are also of great significance for the ability to project power or transport military personnel and materiel. It is not possible to occupy a sea area in the same way as the territory of a country. Seas and sea territories are difficult to control as vessels can act free from the practical and political limits which obstruct movements on land. The principal environmental factors are weather and hydrography.

Air arena

The air arena comprises the airspace above the earth's surface as well as space.

The airspace above the earth's surface is characterised by offering an environment which is transparent and free of physical obstacles. The possibility of utilising airspace as a basis for effects on the other arenas is unique, as it can be used for rapid movements and provide an overview of large areas on land, at sea and in the air. Airspace also permits resources to be mobilised quickly in new directions. In comparison with other arenas, the options for continued presence in the air arena are limited. With the development of surveillance, navigation and monitoring satellites, space has also become part of the air arena.

Information arena

The information arena comprises information technology systems and the electromagnetic wavelength, as well as a psychological sphere which in principle is limitless.

Access to correct and usable information is one of the most important requirements to be met if it is to be possible to direct and carry out operations. A characteristic feature of the information arena is the ability to disseminate information and access to the electromagnetic spectrum. Information can be disseminated verbally, through the distribution of printed texts or through the electromagnetic wavelength range to be finally refined at the recipient into knowledge and understanding. In a corresponding way, the arena can also be utilised to manipulate or eliminate critical information. The information arena, regardless of external circumstances, is therefore a factor which affects activities in other arenas.

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CHAPTER 4 – LEGAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY MEANS

The Armed Forces have to comply with national and international rules governing the use of force and coercion by the authorities – *legal foundations*. Action by the authorities in exercising force and coercion also has to be in accordance with the government’s political considerations – *political foundations*.

Legal foundations

International law

At the international level, the use of military means of power is primarily governed by the international law of the UN Charter, the laws of war and rules relating to human rights.

UN Charter

Article 2:4 of the UN Charter prohibits states from threatening or using force in their international relations. The significance of the prohibition of force has been specified in the United Nations declaration on the principles of international law¹² concerning friendly relations and co-operation between states in accordance with the United Nations Charter.¹³ The prohibition of force includes offensive war and military occupation, the threat or use of force to violate the international boundaries of another state and means of force to resolve international disputes.

The UN Charter contains two exceptions to the general prohibition of force: the right to use force in self-defence in the event of armed attack and the right to use force following a decision by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter.

The right of self-defence is enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter.

¹² *General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV)*, 1970.

¹³ Relates to what is known as the "Friendly Relations Declaration".

Pressens bild



UN Headquarters in New York

The right to use force in self-defence is limited by principles of necessity, proportionality and immediacy and may only be resorted to in the event of armed attack. *Armed attack* in Article 51 of the Charter does not relate to every form of armed force. To be classified as armed attack, the force must have been on a relatively large scale and of a high intensity and have occasioned extensive effects. A minor border violation or individual bombardment does not generally fulfil the requirements for sufficient scope and effect to constitute armed attack within the meaning of the UN Charter.

The UN Charter does not, however, pose any obstacle to states asserting their territory by military means, for example against border violations, provided the use of force is not directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state or in any other manner is inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.

Article 2:4 of the UN Charter KONTROLL M OFFICIELL FN-stadga, ENGELSK Vers

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

Article 51 of the UN Charter

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security..."

Chapter VII of the UN Charter

Article 41

"The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."

Article 42

"Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."

Laws of war

The laws of war, *jus in bello*, contain international-law rules relating to armed conflicts between and within states. The laws govern the forms in which war and armed conflicts may be waged. Most of the laws of war are related to international armed conflicts. Only a limited number of treaties relate to armed conflicts within states. It should be noted, however, that international law at present is undergoing rapid development, so that humanitarian rules to an ever greater extent are regarded as also being equitably applicable to internal armed conflicts.

The key rules of international law are contained in the following conventions (including additional protocols):

- *1907 Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land (including regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land)*
- *1949 Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field (First Geneva Convention)*
- *1949 Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea (Second Geneva Convention)*
- *1949 Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (Third Geneva Convention)*
- *1949 Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war (Fourth Geneva Convention)*
- *1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict; with additional protocol (the Culture Convention)*
- *1977 Additional Protocol relating to the protection of the victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I)*
- *1980 Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be unnecessarily injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, together with Protocols I, II, III and IV (Convention on Conventional Weapons)*

The most important principles in the laws of war include

- *the principle of distinction*: the requirement that a distinction must be made between civilians or civilian property, combatants and military objects
- *the principle of proportionality*: the duty to avoid disproportionate losses in civilians and civilian property

- *the precautionary principle*: the duty to take precautionary measures to minimise losses in civilians and civilian property
- *prohibition of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury*: the duty not to inflict excessive or unnecessary injury on the enemy's combatants
- *the principle of humanity*: the requirement to care for the sick and injured as well as prisoners of war in your custody.

It is important to note that the laws of war do not comment on whether a war or armed conflict is legal or not, and that neither are the rules intended to affect the outcome of the war. Nothing in the laws of war may be interpreted as justifying or approving an act of aggression or other force which is inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The laws of war instead aim to ensure that the hostilities are directed against targets of military significance. The laws of war consequently complement and reinforce many of the principles underlying modern warfare, partly by contributing to military means not being used against persons, places and objects which lack military significance. The laws of war are intended to reduce abuse and human suffering in connection with warfare, to the benefit of both servicemen and civilians.

Human rights

Human rights are enshrined in international treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, and in international custom. The fundamental human rights include the right to life, prohibition of torture and other cruelty and humiliating treatment and the prohibition of summary deprivation of liberty.

Human rights entail international restrictions on the right of states to exercise public power over individuals, both in peace-time and in war and armed conflict. States cannot abolish fundamental human rights even in war or armed conflict. In war and armed conflict, fundamental human rights, like the laws of war, safeguard life and health for people who do not play an active part in the hostilities. Human rights and the laws of war can therefore be said to have a common area of contact where both systems of rules look after the same interests.

In all application of power directed against individuals, the Armed Forces have to observe what follows from human rights.

OSCE Code of Conduct Chapter 7 Section 30

"Each participating State will instruct its armed forces personnel in international humanitarian law, rules, conventions and commitments governing armed conflict and will ensure that such personnel are aware that they are individually accountable under national and international law for their actions."

National law

The powers of Parliament and the Government in war are regulated in detail in the Swedish Constitution. There are clear provisions relating to how the defence forces may be deployed if Sweden is subjected to an armed attack. The term *armed attack* has a special constitutional significance here. If the Government decides that war is prevailing, this has a number of far-reaching legal effects, for example through a number of provisions on granting of powers becoming applicable.

Chapter 10 Article 9 of the Swedish Constitution

"The Government may commit the country's armed forces, or any part of them, to battle in order to repel an armed attack upon the Realm. Swedish armed forces may otherwise be committed to battle or sent to another country only if

1. *the Parliament has assented thereto,*
2. *it is permitted under a law which sets out the prerequisites for such action;*
3. *an obligation to take such action follows from an international agreement or obligation which has been approved by the Parliament.*

No declaration of war may be made without the consent of the Parliament, except in the event of an armed attack against Sweden.

The Government may authorise the armed forces to use force in accordance with international law and custom to prevent of a violation of Swedish soil in time of peace or during a war between foreign states."

Regarding the assertion of territorial integrity in peace time and during neutrality, the Government has decided on far-reaching regulation of the tasks and powers of the Armed Forces through the Ordinance (1982:756) on Peace and Neutrality etc. (the IKFN Ordinance). The Parliament has likewise decided under what circumstances the Government may deploy the Armed Forces for international assignments. Under the Law (1992:1153) on Service of Armed Forces Abroad, the Government may, at the request of the United Nations or following a decision by the OSCE, make an armed force available for peace-keeping operations abroad. A

decision by Parliament, on the other hand, is required to make an armed force available for a peace-enforcing mission. A decision of this kind may also indicate the limits which are to apply to the mission. The Government thereafter takes a decision on the participation of the Armed Forces and the conditions to which this is subject in accordance with the decision of Parliament.

Finally a number of laws and ordinances govern how the Armed Forces are to support society in a rescue service and through military assistance with civilian activity in other respects. Provisions relating to the support with personnel and equipment which the Armed Forces often lend in connection with serious accidents, fires and floods etc. are contained in the Rescue Services Act. This Act among other things regulates the duties of state authorities and individual citizens to assist with the rescue services. In addition, the Armed Forces have to lend support to other authorities in incidents such as major accidents.

The conditions applicable to the Armed Forces having to be able to take part in such activity are otherwise governed by the Ordinance (1986:1111) on Military Involvement in Civilian Activity. The Ordinance contains provisions on when the Armed Forces are to be able to carry out transport with helicopters for authorities responsible for medical care and under what circumstances the Armed Forces may make personnel and property available to a police authority, the Coast Guard or Swedish Customs for the transporting of personnel and equipment.¹⁴

Basic elements of Swedish security and defence policy

The purpose of Swedish security and defence policy is to preserve the peace of and independence of Sweden. Our security-policy objectives are to safeguard freedom of action, in all situations and in forms which we choose for ourselves, to be able, as an individual nation and in cooperation with other actors, to develop our society. Our security policy has both national and international dimensions.

Nationally, we have to be able to counter military and other threats which directly affect Sweden. The most serious among these are armed attacks directed against the freedom and independence of our country. We also have to be able to prevent and be able to cope with situations which, without directly threatening the peace and independence of Sweden, might nevertheless signify rapid and severe deterioration in the normal functioning of society.

¹⁴ This Ordinance will probably be replaced by a new one during 2002.

Internationally we will actively promote peace and increased security in collaboration with other states. By promoting strengthened international law and by assisting towards conflict-preventing co-operation and missions, through civil and military crisis management and reconciliation and reconstruction following crises and conflicts, we can contribute to increased security in the world around and consequently also for ourselves. On the basis of a broad view of security, both dimensions of security policy can be formed in a continuous interaction between the majority of areas of policy.¹⁵

Pressens bild



The Riksdag, the Swedish Parliament
Parliament decides on our security and defence policy

*Defence policy directions*¹⁶

The end of the Cold War and international developments during the years which followed have resulted in extensive reform of Swedish defence policy. The point of departure for the process of reform is the decision of Parliament in the 1999 security-policy checkpoint and the decision to change the direction for the total defence organisation in March 2000. The process of converting the resources of the total defence organisation in accordance with the direction decided upon is in progress.

Firstly, the previous focus on repelling an invasion is being replaced by an orientation towards a modern, flexible and mobile defence. In this task force organisation, operations are to be undertaken and resources formatted on the basis of a broader range of threats.

¹⁵ Government Bills 2001/2002:10, *Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret (Continued renewal of the total defence organisation)*, pages 31, 112-113 and 1998/99:74, *Förändrad omvärld – omdanad försvar* (Changed world – reconstructed defence), pages 48-49.

¹⁶ Government Bill 2001/02.10, *Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret (Continued renewal of the total defence organisation)*, page 104.

Secondly, extensive internationalisation has been initiated with the aim of creating enhanced capability for international crisis management and peace-promoting co-operation. The units and systems which will be required in the future have to be capable of being used both to defend the country and in international operations.

A third pillar of the reform is an adaptation-based approach which is to make it possible, on the basis of fundamental defence capability and a broad base of competence, where necessary to strengthen, expand, reduce or in some other way change the total defence organisation to meet changed needs, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Fourthly, it is a matter of improving the prospects for utilising the resources in the total defence organisation in peace-time crises. The reform consists of both a phase-out phase and a development phase. The phase-out makes development possible, and it is important in this context that the phase-out takes place quickly and efficiently to ensure a high tempo in the work on reform.

*Directions for the the total defence authorities*¹⁷

The principle underlying defence policy is that we have to be able to defend the country against armed attack, assert our territorial integrity and be able to contribute internationally to peace and security. The Swedish total defence system has to have fundamental defence capability to be able to counter an armed attack on the country wherever it happens. The total defence system additionally has to allow great flexibility so that it can counter different types of threat.

The fundamental defence capability has to be organised in a way which ensures re-assuring conditions to provide a basis, if necessary, for adapting defence capability to the surrounding world developments. This means that the Armed Forces have to have both a capability to counter armed threats today and a capability following successive decisions and measures to counter more extensive attacks in the future. These constitute the main requirements to be met by Swedish defence policy. It is the capability to withstand an armed attack and threats that can jeopardise our self-determination, which is fundamental to both security and defence policy. It also has to be possible for the total defence resources to be used to an increased extent to strengthen the capability of society to withstand severe strains in peace-time.

Security in our geographical vicinity must be at the core of Swedish defence efforts. A principal objective is to prevent conflicts from spreading

¹⁷ Government Bill 2001/02.10, *Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret (Continued renewal of the total defence organisation)*, pages 112-114.

to or arising in our vicinity. If conflicts nevertheless arise, Sweden must be able to contribute to mitigating and setting aside these in co-operation with other countries. Following a request from the United Nations or a decision taken by the OSCE, the Government may decide that Sweden has to be able to make resources available. The fact that several countries in our part of Europe have not yet found their form of security policy and Sweden's militarily non-aligned position influence Swedish defence policy and the total defence organisation.

Swedish defence policy shall support security policy with regard to preserving the peace and independence of our country and the security-policy goal of safeguarding freedom of action to be able to influence our society as an individual nation and in collaboration. If there is a risk of an armed attack on our country, defence policy aims to restrain war. If we are subjected to an armed attack, this policy has failed and the aim becomes to ensure our national survival and the freedom of action required for the government authorities to be able to act in the situation which has arisen.

The international commitment in the view of the government is a key part of defence policy alongside defence against armed attack and the upholding of our territorial integrity. Our international commitments are founded on an interweaving of motives based on safeguarding our own security and associated national considerations combined with international solidarity and humanitarian concerns. An overall aim is to prevent any crises and armed conflicts from spreading to Swedish territory. Defence policy shall also contribute to the ability to prevent and cope with situations which, without directly threatening Sweden's peace and independence, might nevertheless entail rapid and severe deterioration in the normal functioning of society. The latter is not, however, a task which is solved solely with the resources of the total defence organisation, even if these resources are normally put at the disposal of the responsible bodies in society.

In cases where the preparations for severe strains and raised preparedness coincide, co-ordination must take place to ensure optimum utilisation of the resources of society. Dealing with floods, radioactive fallout, major power cuts, disruptions to important computer systems and other situations which may lead to severe strains are primarily tasks for the sector of society concerned. The orientation of society in accordance with this has been to distinguish in economic terms between that which can lead to severe strains on society in peace-time and that which has a defence-policy dimension. Government orientation on how the resources of the total defence organisation are to be capable of being utilised can be

summarised according to the following aims of defence policy. They are to

- have the effect of preventing conflict and mitigating conflict, globally and in the rest of Europe and areas adjacent to Europe, and at least with the aspiration of contributing to preventing conflict from spreading to our geographical vicinity,
- in our vicinity have the effect of preventing conflict and mitigating conflict, with the aim of preventing conflicts from spreading to Swedish territory, and if this fails countering armed aggression against our country.

In addition, the resources of the total defence organisation have to contribute to strengthening society in the event of severe strains in peace-time which may have been caused for example by floods, radioactive fallout, major power cuts and disruption to important computer systems.

Political-strategic decision-making

The Armed Forces are an authority under the Government. The Government controls the Armed Forces in war and in peace-time through government decisions. The tasks and organisation of the Armed Forces are governed by the authority's instructions. The Government decides annually on resource allocation, preparedness requirements, control and reporting back on the activities of the Armed Forces etc. in appropriation directions. In addition, there are Government decisions on various matters relating to the command of both operations and activities. An example in operational command is government decisions on the participation of the Armed Forces in international operations. Another type of decision is the appointment and placement of higher positions of command within the authority.

The principle that constitutional authority cannot be transferred has long been upheld in Sweden. In this way, Sweden rejects what is known as constitutional emergency law, according to which, when the existence of society is at stake, the state authorities can set aside the constitution and nevertheless claim to be acting lawfully. The Constitution instead contains provisions which are intended to make it possible for public bodies to act within the constitutional framework in times of crisis and war.

Generally speaking, decisions on crisis measures to a large extent can be taken under the provisions of Chapters 1-12 of the Constitution. The provisions of Chapter 8 on the delegation of powers to set standards are of particular significance. Mention should also be made of Chapter 10 Section 9¹⁸, which governs the distribution of powers between Government and Parliament, among other things with regard to authority to

¹⁸ Also discussed on page 45.

deploy the Armed Forces in combat. The Constitution also contains special provisions on war and the danger of war. There is detailed regulation in the Constitution and in other legislation, such as the Law (1992:1153) on Service of Armed Forces Abroad, of the constitutional terms under which the Government may deploy the Armed Forces. Within these limits, the Government may, on any given occasion, take decisions quickly if this proves necessary.

Experience from international operations shows that the political level in certain situations considers that it needs to issue detailed instructions for the conditions applicable to the use of force and methods of coercion. An example of instruments which can then be utilised are Rules of Engagement.¹⁹

Tasks and operational capability of the Armed Forces

The overall orientation of defence policy is aimed at creating a defence force which in comparison with the 1996 defence resolution is sharply reduced but more versatile and suited to being able to carry out several different types of operations nationally and internationally. Sweden is creating a defence system with the ability to counter various types of threat, while ability to adapt to future needs at the same time is of the greatest significance. The Ordinance (2000:55) Containing Instructions for the Armed Forces states that the Armed Forces shall have the operational capability decided upon by the Government.²⁰

The total defence resources have to be capable of being used to:

- defend Sweden against armed attack
- uphold our territorial integrity
- contribute to peace and security in the world around
- strengthen Swedish society in the case of severe strains in peace-time.

Defence concept

Swedish defence policy is based on four mutually dependent fundamental factors:

- fundamental defence capability
- international co-operation
- total defence
- national total defence service.

¹⁹ Rules of Engagement (ROE) are formulated according to need and constitute special rules for the relevant situation. The rules state the circumstances relating to, conditions for, scope of and in what way means of power may be used by military forces. This includes force, threats of force and other measures which may be perceived as provocative. For NATO definition, see AAP-6.

²⁰ The operational capabilities are stated in the annual appropriation directions to the Armed Forces.

Fundamental defence capability

The Armed Forces, together with other authorities in the total defence organisation, are to have a fundamental defence capability to be able to counter an armed attack on the country wherever it takes place. The requirement for fundamental defence capability is set in relation to the estimated threat in a given time-frame. This fundamental defence capability is made up of a national defence, where our armed forces are interoperable primarily with Western European units and staffs, organised in a way which ensures that the conditions are met for it to be possible to adapt if need be to developments in the world around us.

International co-operation

Sweden is prepared to contribute various kinds of resources in peace support operations with a mandate from the United Nations or the OSCE. This includes operations outside Swedish territory, under the command of organisations such as NATO or the EU, and operations carried out by a coalition of states. A national analysis of the motives for an international operation and the resource conditions for various types of operations underpin every decision on Swedish participation.

Total defence

Total defence is activity required to prepare Sweden for war. Under declared highest alert, total defence is all activity then undertaken in the society.²¹ Total defence consists of military activity (military defence) and civilian activity (civilian defence). The total-defence resources have been formed so that they can also be used in peace support and humanitarian operations outside Swedish territory and strengthen the capability of society to cope with severe strains on society. Military and civilian defence collaborate and support each other to accomplish the common tasks, firstly so that the tasks are accomplished well and secondly to economise on resources. The forms of co-operation and which party is to direct the joint operations are determined by the nature of the task to be accomplished.

²¹ Preparedness can be raised to strengthen the country's defence capability. KOLLA ÖVERSÄTTNING AV DESSA: *Heightened preparedness* is either *accentuated preparedness* or *maximum preparedness*.

National total defence service

National total defence service is used to provide the total defence authorities and other organisations with the necessary personnel. National total defence service applies to all Swedish citizens aged between 16 and 70 and can be fulfilled as national military service, civilian service or general liability for service. All Swedish men between the ages of 18 and 24 are obliged to undergo enrolment and be called up as and when required to perform national total defence service or civilian service. A special law makes it possible for women to volunteer for national military service and civilian service. Military service is performed in the regiments, wings, bases or field units of the Armed Forces. Military service is always initiated with a period of basic training and in certain cases may be supplemented by continued training. Some of the conscripts are given wartime postings after completing basic training in the field units of the operational organisation. If the situation demands, conscripts may be called up for service.



Peter Liander, Försvarets bildbyrå

National total defence service – part of our defence concept

Swedish conscripts guard aircraft at a Polish airbase during Strong Resolve 02

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CHAPTER 5 – MILITARY-STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The four tasks which the Armed Forces have been given by Parliament can be operationalised into four overall military-strategic objectives which should be pursued both nationally and internationally. The goals are to prevent, subdue, protect and defend.

Prevent

The Armed Forces shall have the combat capability and readiness necessary to deter an armed attack on Sweden. The costs incurred to a potential aggressor shall be greater than the possible gain. The Armed Forces therefore must safeguard the territorial integrity of Sweden already in peacetime, by detecting and repelling violations of the territory, and by maintaining a presence and conducting exercises in all of Sweden and its surrounding seas and air space.



Lennart Andersson, Försvarets bildbyrå

Preventing by showing capability

The corvette HMS Gävle contributes to showing Sweden's willingness to preserve the peace and independence of the country

The Armed Forces shall actively contribute to and prevent the emergence of armed conflicts at international level, in co-operation with other states. The Armed Forces will promote security at international level by active participation in CSBM regimes, other security building cooperation and conflict prevention and by assisting in post-conflict situations.

Subdue

As a first step this aim shall be furthered by contributions by the Armed Forces to international crisis management operations, in Europe as well as globally. This presence shall be designed to subdue the crisis and to prevent the crisis from spreading to Swedish territory. If there are indications that an armed attack on Sweden is possible, contingency measures shall be taken which forces the potential aggressor to undertake preparations and use resources disproportionate to the possible gain.



Kristofer K. S. Sandberg, Försvarets bildbyrå

Subduing by presence
Swedish soldiers on patrol in Bosnia during BA 09

Protect

The Armed Forces shall have the capacity to contribute to preventing and managing situations which would not directly threaten the peace or independence of Sweden, but which could have grave consequences for the normal functions of society. Inter alia, resources from the Armed Forces shall be possible to use to alleviate the consequences of environmental and nature disasters. The Armed Forces shall also be able to protect its facilities and information systems against non-military threats.



Lasse Sjögren, Försvarets bildbyrå

Protecting society

Collaboration between civilian and military units during the Nordic Peace 98 exercise

Defend

The Armed Forces shall have the capability to counteract threats which directly affect Sweden. Any armed attack against Sweden shall be countered. The Armed Forces shall be able to defend Sweden against acts of aggression and violations of its territory, and to protect Swedish interests. The Armed Forces shall enable Sweden to resist threats, and to counter actions which are aimed at undermining our sovereignty or key functions of society.



Sven Ake Haglund, Försvarets bildbyrå

Defending the capital city

The Armed Forces have to be able to counter an armed attack wherever it happens in the country and whatever form it might take. A unit equipped with Leopard 121 main battle tanks practises repelling an attack on air-mobile rapid-reaction forces in Stockholm

Freedom of action

The condition to be met for government – both nationally and internationally – to be able to have freedom of action with regard to the choice of resources and methods in crisis and conflict management in peace and war-time is that access to military resources in various time perspectives can be *adapted* to the prevailing situation and that forms of *co-operation* are developed. This co-operation relates to joint preparations for operations and carrying out operations between the Armed Forces and civil authorities and other civil actors.

Adaptation

Adaptation is aimed at developing the capability of the Armed Forces and other total defence system authorities in relation to changes in threat scenarios. This is essential for the right kind of military resources, in the right quantity and quality, to be available at the right place and at the right time. Adaptation is regulated partly by the Armed Forces maintaining various levels of preparedness. Adaptation includes *administrative preparedness*, *basic preparedness* (up to one year) and *long-term preparedness* as well as the planning of measures in the medium term (five years) and long term (ten years).

Co-operation

Co-operation between the Armed Forces and civil authorities or other civil parties is termed civil-military co-operation. Such co-operation is aimed primarily at coordinating war preparations and support of military and civil operations in war, preparations for and carrying out operations in peace-time and times of crisis and preparations for and support of international and multinational operations.

CHAPTER 6 – STRATEGY AND LEVELS OF WARFARE

Strategy – definition

The term *strategy* can be traced back to Ancient Greece and is derived from the words *strato's* and *a'go*, which mean 'army' and 'lead' respectively.²²

Strategy is often regarded as both science and art. Strategic science can be said to organise knowledge, while the art relates to application in thinking and action.²³

In modern Swedish, strategy means "the art or method of waging war; well-planned procedure"²⁴ or "long-term, overall procedure; specifically in military context (the study of) warfare in general".²⁵

The Swedish Armed Forces define strategy as:

"Plan or approach in the form of ends, ways and means for how available resources should be developed, deployed or used to attain superior purposes".

The term strategy has a general meaning and may relate to various activities or purposes. There are specialised strategies for different means of power, for example diplomatic, economic or military means. In the same way, military strategy may relate to activity in a specific warfare arena. Strategies can also be formulated for individual weapon systems or technologies and for certain operations or conflicts. In addition, it is possible to differentiate strategies which relate to preparations for warfare and those which relate to the direct use of military forces.

²² *Nationalencyklopedin* (NE). Bra Böcker, Höganäs 1995.

²³ Carl von Clausewitz differentiated between knowledge and skills. Science, according to C., only covers knowledge, which must be converted into skill, that is to say the art. By art, C. meant the way the commander thinks and acts. Compare with linguistic meaning: of art "any special, indispensable skill". See *Svensk ordbok*, 3rd Edition. Norstedts, Stockholm 1999.

²⁴ *Svenska Akademiens ordlista över svenska språket* (SAOL). Svenska Akademien, Stockholm 1998.

²⁵ *Svensk ordbok*, Third Edition. Norstedts, Stockholm 1999.

Every national warfare or security strategy constitutes a hierarchy of differing but mutually influencing strategies. There is no clear answer to the question what is to be included in warfare or security strategies. What is important is that relevant aspects of security are dealt with, including political, economic and military factors. Different strategies must also be co-ordinated through a chain of ends, ways and means between and at the respective level of activity.

Three aspects are fundamental to a national security strategy:

- Every part of the strategy contains actors. If their interests are not allowed to influence strategy, it is incomplete and there is a risk that, in the short or long term, it will lead to defeat.
- There are options for substitution between different parts and capabilities in the strategy.
- Some fundamental capability must be achieved in all parts of the strategy – otherwise the strategy should be reconsidered.

Conflicts can be won despite weak political leadership, inadequate popular support or out-dated military organisation and hardware. However, no part of the security strategy can be entirely ignored. Without political objectives, all other strategy lacks meaning.

Development of the concept of strategy

Strategy as art of war

Many theoreticians and practitioners have contributed to the development of strategy and the concept of strategy. The results have largely been a product of the times the strategists were living in. Changing political, economic, social, technology and military circumstances have dictated development. The noun *stratego's* become established around 500 BC, then referring to the ten generals – *stratego'i* in the plural – who exercised command in the army and navy of Athens. The art of directing an army gradually came to be known as strategy or *strategi'a*. *Strategi'a* exclusively related to war and described how wars were to be conducted at the highest level. Over the course of time, strategy developed to also cover preparations and planning for warfare. After the Greek period of greatness, however, the term strategy disappeared as a synonym of the art of war and did not reappear until the end of the 18th Century.

Strategy and tactics

The first modern descriptions of strategy and tactics followed through Carl von Clausewitz's work *On War*, from 1832. Clausewitz placed strategy in a hierarchy where ends and means are clearly kept apart. Strategy was also related to tactics, which was considered to be subordinate. According to Clausewitz, tactics is the 'science of the use of the armed forces in engagements', while strategy is the 'science of the use of engagements to attain the object of the war'.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)
Prussian general and military theorist



Strategy and politics

A clear deficiency in early definitions of strategy was that they exclusively related to military means and war. One of the things that distinguish Clausewitz from the majority of thinkers during the 19th Century is his understanding of the primacy of politics. The boundary between military and political responsibility was, however, still unclear. The next natural steps were therefore to further clarify the overriding role of politics and to expand the concept of strategy to situations other than war.

The best known modern definition of military strategy was formulated by the British military theorist Basil H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970): "Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy." According to Liddell Hart, military strategy was subordinate to a higher and more extensive strategy, *grand strategy*, aiming to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, not just the military ones, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy. *Grand strategy* is the preserve of political decision-makers.

In Sweden, we have generally only used the term strategy in military contexts. Our national security strategy is usually referred to as "security policy" or "security and defence policy".

Dimensions of strategy

A common mistake is to look at the dimensions of strategy too narrowly. An early example of the opposite is the Chinese collection *The seven military classics*, in which the strategist Sun Zi's insights into the art of war from the 6th Century BC are the best known. Besides strictly military preparations for and the conduct of combat, Sun Zi among other things described the relationship of military command to politics and economics.

A later thinker who occupies a middle position in terms of both time and theory is Nicolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). Machiavelli emphasised that political institutions should be organised to create advantageous conditions for the military and that new economic and social conditions necessitated the citizens being involved in the defence of the country.

With his *trinity of war* – the people, the commander and the army as well as the government - Carl von Clausewitz more systematically identified the interests or pillars on which warfare and theories about it had to rest. Inspired among others by Clausewitz, modern thinkers such as Sir Michael Howard and Colin S. Gray have proposed other divisions. Howard has summarised the strategic factors which have played against each other over the last 200 years of warfare in four dimensions: *socio-political dimension*, *technological dimension*, *logistical dimension* and *operational dimension*. Gray has proposed as many as seventeen dimensions, divided into three categories: *people and politics* (people, society, culture, politics and ethics), *war preparations KOLLA* (economics and logistics, organisation, military administration, information and intelligence, strategic doctrine and theory KOLLA , technology) and *warfare* (military operations, command, geography, friction, the adversary and time).



Pressens bild

A society armed for war

Soviet SS-25 nuclear weapon on parade in Red Square in Moscow

Clausewitz's, Howard's and Gray's various characterisations together provide a good picture of the complexity and factual contents of national security strategies.

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Strategic culture

Military-strategic doctrine is an expression of our *strategic culture*. The term culture here relates to ideas and patterns of action²⁶ or forms in which a group organises common matters.²⁷ The strategic culture can be summarised in three categories: *pattern of action*, *professional identity* and *position*, which all affect the formulation of strategies.

Pattern of action is an expression of actual practice, that is to say how we usually apply military strategy. The professional identity of the armed forces among other things comprises our common perception of the role and tasks of military defence and the way in which it works. Position means the military, political and economic position of Sweden and its Armed Forces, in relation to the world around us.

The strategies of nations and their armed forces are greatly affected by the strategic culture. Large and small states apply different methods of warfare due to their differing capacities. Coastal nations and land-locked countries naturally choose to emphasise land and naval combat capability differently. Countries with an all-volunteer force generally have a higher capability to accomplish certain tasks, such as rapidly carrying out operations abroad and in peace-time, than countries whose defence is based entirely on conscription. Defence based on conscription may, however, mean a higher potential capability in the military due to diversity, persistence and popular support. Countries or non-state actors with large economic and other resources have better prospects of achieving success by advantage in equipment than poor actors. The latter are more dependent on skillful use of their limited resources.

The strategic culture is governed by political, economic, ideological, geographical and social factors, which have developed over a long period. When these external conditions change, sometimes rapidly, changes can and must, however, take place in our strategic culture and consequently in our doctrine.

²⁶ Gray, 1999, page 132.

²⁷ *Svensk ordbok*, Norstedts, 1999.

Strategic culture, from defence against invasion to flexible defence

Sweden's military strategy has long been determined by its geographical position between strong military powers. This led to the emergence of a policy of non-alignment in peace-time aiming at neutrality in war from the start of the 19th Century, which attained its final form during the Cold War. The threat sometimes came from the west and south, but most often from the east and Russia, later the Soviet Union.

The basis of Sweden's military strategy changed with the end of the Cold War. The threat of a large-scale invasion disappeared and was replaced by a broader spectrum of threats. The diminished direct threat to Sweden has given us greater freedom of action and increased opportunities to co-operate militarily with others. The task of contributing actively to international peace and security has attained greater importance than previously. Together with a wider range of threats, this constitutes the basis for the re-orientation of the Armed Forces towards a smaller but in some respects more advanced defence which can adapt its capability flexibly. The result will be a highly mobile and flexible task force organisation able to handle a variety of tasks.

Because of external political, economic and military changes, Sweden, like many other European countries, is thus acquiring a new position relative to the world around, another pattern of action and a gradually changing view of the role and tasks of military defence and how it works.



Peter Liander, Försvarets bildbyrå

Task force organisation in international co-operation

The Swedish Air Force Rapid Reaction Unit SWAFRAP practising for future operations together with a German airborne unit. Strong Resolve 02

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
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Policy and doctrine

Policy and doctrine together express the military strategy of the Armed Forces. Doctrine is the general part, while policy is specific. Policy constitutes action or an approach based on principles,²⁸ which through directives, orders, guidelines or other specific orientations indicates ends, ways and means for carrying out a certain operation or other activity. Policy thus among other things expresses specific levels of aspiration and relationships of responsibility.

The success of each strategy depends on circumstances unique to the situation concerned. Political expressions of will, availability of resources, geographical location, institutional factors and not least the action of the adversary change constantly, and have a strong bearing on the choices of aims, means and methods which are required. This often leads to a change of policy and may also affect doctrines. When a change takes place in doctrine or policy, our military strategy also changes.



The relationship between strategy, doctrine and policy

Strategic process

The requirements for constant adaptation of military action have led to the development of strategies having to be seen as a process. The most tangible expression of strategic process is operational planning, which constantly results in new plans to direct operations. These plans are formulated through an assessment which among other things comprises an analysis of the task, review of the situation and identification of own and opposing forces. Based on the assessment, a decision is then taken on the ends, ways and means. Development of doctrine is performed through an assessment of the same factors.²⁹ The strategic process in both cases has to convey an idea of how tasks are to be fulfilled and an understanding of the assignment and its purpose. Unlike policy, however, doctrine is not a plan but a description of an approach.

²⁸ SAOL, 1998.

²⁹ See Chapter 1.

Levels of warfare

The conduct of military activity can be divided into four levels: *political-strategic*, *military-strategic*, *operational* and *tactical levels*. This involves personnel from the top political leadership to individual servicemen on the front line in conflict environments. There are no clearly defined boundaries between the levels, and they often overlap. These levels make up a hierarchy in which ends, ways and means are co-ordinated and where activity at strategic level directs activities at lower levels. It is the planned effect of the warfare, that is to say the purpose of the activity, which ultimately decides at what level a unit acts.

Political-strategic level

Political strategy comprises the co-ordination of the available means of security policy of a nation or an alliance – diplomatic, economic, military and other – in order to satisfy national or common interests, that is to say attain the political-strategic aims. The political strategy defines the strategic objectives which the government and parliament wish to achieve and lays down, without regulating in detail, which means and methods are to be used and limitations on the use of means indicated. The formulation of political strategy is exclusively reserved for the political-strategic level, regardless of whether the government decides on a national operation or, together with other governments, in a security organisation or in a temporary coalition, decides on a multinational operation.



Sven Erik Sjöberg, Pressens bild

Strategic co-ordination

Swedish political and military leadership after the Soviet submarine U-137 ran aground in Gäsefjärden, November 1981 (from left: foreign minister Ola Ullsten, defence minister Torsten Gustavsson, prime minister Torbjörn Fälldin and Supreme Commander Lennart Ljung)

Military-strategic level

Military strategy comprises the co-ordination of military means of power, nationally or multinationally, within one or more theatres of war, in order to attain the strategic objectives. At the level of military strategy, the objectives are clarified on the basis of the overall political purposes and what military resources and methods are to be used. The Supreme Commander is responsible for the government's needs for military means being fulfilled. This entails the availability of combat forces with the right capability within given time limits.

Operational level

Operational art comprises the co-ordination of tactical activity in larger operations within an area of operations. The objectives are clarified at the operational level on the basis of the superiormilitary strategic objectives and how allocated means, in the form of combat forces, are to be utilised and co-ordinated in different types of larger, primarily joint, operations. Operational art thus constitutes the link between the military-strategic objectives and the tactical units which are to conduct operations within designated areas of operation.

Tactical level

Tactics comprises the co-ordination of tactical activity within individual battles and smaller operations. At the tactical level, the objectives are clarified on the basis of the superior operational objectives and how tactical units – individually or with other tactical units – are to be utilised and co-ordinated in various operations. It is ultimately by combat forces achieving tactical decisions and objectives on the battlefield that operational and finally strategic objectives can be put into effect.

Warfare level	Activity	Organisation
Political-strategic level	Co-ordination of all available political means (diplomatic, economic, military etc.)	Government <i>North Atlantic Council (NAC)</i> European Council (EC)
Military-strategic level	Co-ordination of military means of power at national or multinational level, within one or more theatres of war	Headquarters (HKV) <i>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)</i> <i>Operational Headquarters (OHQ)</i> ³⁰
Operational level	Co-ordination of tactical activity in larger operations in an area of operations	Joint Operations Staff (OPIL) <i>Regional Command (RC)</i> <i>Combined Joint Task Force HQ (CJTF HQ)</i> <i>Force Headquarters (FHQ)</i> ³¹
Tactical level	Co-ordination of tactical activity in individual battles and smaller operations	Tactical commands Corps Divisions Military district

Relationship between levels of warfare and levels of command

Interaction between levels of warfare

A fundamental requirement to be met for successful strategy is to create synergistic effects, that is to say co-ordinate activities at lower levels so that results at higher levels are greater than the sum of the separate contributions of the lower levels. The task at each level of warfare is to make a balanced choice of ends, ways and means to fulfil an superior purpose. The differences between the levels of warfare principally relate to degree of abstraction and detail and time circumstances.

At the same time, the levels are closely bound together through the hierarchy of aims, means and methods. Overlaps are inevitable owing to the complexity and dynamics of the conflict. These will, however, vary – sometimes there is said to be a "concertina effect".

A large-scale and protracted conflict involving many actors and simultaneous operations generally leads to strategic, operational and tactical purposes being distinguished from one another. The command of combat forces is facilitated under such circumstances by the delegation of responsibilities and powers.

³⁰ EU military headquarters.

³¹ EU's operational staff.


Operations with special operations forces or long-range precision weapons, particularly in low-level conflicts, are examples of situations where strategic, operational and tactical objectives may coincide. Compressing the levels of warfare may require higher levels to work on very short time-scales and with a high degree of detail. Tactical events having direct operational or strategic significance may thus mean that the command arrangements change.



Pressens bild

Overlapping levels of warfare

The operations in Bosnia are examples of complex political and military operations where what happens at the lowest level had direct repercussions at higher levels of warfare. The UN military commander in Bosnia, General Sir Michael Rose, in Sarajevo April 1994



Examples of shifts in the levels of warfare

The orange area represents all activity which has military-strategic purposes, but within areas 1 and 2 also activity which has a direct impact on the operational and political-strategic levels respectively. The right-hand part of the picture illustrates how the overlap between the levels of warfare may change. The strictly military-strategic activity has contracted and has almost entirely direct political-strategic or operational effect. Some operational activity also has direct political-strategic consequences

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
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CHAPTER 7 – THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

Fighting power

Physical, moral and conceptual factors

Fighting power is decisive for the ability of the Armed Forces to accomplish their tasks. Warfare capability is made up among other things of resources in the form of military forces and a willingness to use them when needed. As well as resources and willpower, knowledge and notions are required on how to utilise military means of power as effectively as possible. Fighting power is thus based on physical, moral and conceptual factors.



The pillars of warfare capability

An important part of doctrine is therefore to act as a common conceptual basis for action.

The Armed Forces' basis for action - the manoeuvrist approach - comprises principles for how moral and physical factors can best be used to attain goals in a conflict or in other situations where military means are used.

The manoeuvrist approach corresponds to the requirement to

- be able to decide conflicts to our advantage in complex dynamic situations, often under great uncertainty and time pressure, as a nation or in collaboration with others
- function across the whole scale of conflict, at all levels of warfare, and create the flexibility and vigour required to counter new threats
- agree with our social, cultural and political values.

The core military functions

Fighting power can also be described as a number of *core military functions*. These simultaneously describe areas of activity for the development of the collective capability of the Armed Forces.

In order to have an impact on the adversary in a conflict, resources must principally be available for effect, adapted to the relevant environment - on the ground, in the air, on and beneath the sea surface and in the information arena.

To be able to project and deploy the effect at the right place, we must have *mobility*. Mobility enables forces to be moved from one place to another in order to accomplish allocated tasks. In this way, forces can be formed and massed for the greatest possible effect. Mobility is also essential for protecting oneself against the actions of the adversary, for example by dispersion.

In battle, we also need to have *protection* for our resources. Only thereby can our freedom of action be preserved. Our protective measures should be both active, for example through deception or movement, and passive, for example through physical protection, stealth technology and camouflage. Protection also has a psychological dimension. Maintaining good spirit within our forces provides stronger protection against the adversary's attempts to break our will to continue to fight.

Relevant, accurate and timely information is required in conflicts on what is taking place and may take place, in order to decide where, when and in what form effect is to be deployed. The function of intelligence is intended to provide the best possible basis for our decisions.

Intelligence comprises processed and evaluated information on an adversary and areas of operation, including civilian and environmental factors. Information is also required as necessary support for the other core functions, for example regarding the environment, own situation and combat effect as well as civilian circumstances.

Effect, mobility and protection can only work effectively if there is support, for example in the form of medical care, transportation, vital supplies and maintenance. All such support is intended to ensure endurance. In a conflict, the ability for endurance often sets the limits for what it is possible to accomplish.

Finally all the above functions must be co-ordinated. One more function is therefore required - command. The objective of command is to co-ordinate human action and different resources to achieve a desired effect.

Relationship between the core military functions			
Requirement to be met to co-ordinate basic elements and other functions	Command		
Core elements of combat	Effect	Mobility	Protection
Other core functions	Intelligence	Endurance	

Key concepts ³²

Decision

All warfare is concerned with, sooner or later, reaching a decision. A decision has taken place when the aims of one of the parties involved have been fulfilled. Decisions cannot take place everywhere in a conflict but only in situations which directly or indirectly have significance for the fighting power of one side. How a decision is manifested depends on both task and level of warfare and on the nature of the conflict.

By attacking the conditions on which an adversary's fighting power depends, it can be reduced or eliminated. Warfare with the objective of destroying the adversary's forces and other physical resources is the most traditional method. At the same time, warfare directed against the adversary's morale and will-power, may be more effective and economic. Likewise, action which does not fall within the adversary's conceptual framework may be of decisive significance in a conflict.

³² Centre of gravity, decisive point, lines of operation and end-state do not have any established Swedish definitions. These terms are not used uniformly or consistently in either military theory or in western doctrine. For the time being, the NATO definitions provide the basis for application in the Armed Forces.

Centres of gravity and decisive points

Every military operation requires an assessment of when, where and how a decision can be achieved. A key concept is *the centre of gravity*, which relates to the factor or factors on which the parties in a conflict base their capability to fight.³³ This may relate to specific capabilities, or their physical, conceptual or moral prerequisites.

The adversary's centre of gravity, just like ours, depends on a number of decisive points from which the centre of gravity can be influenced.³⁴ By achieving success at these decisive points, the centre of gravity is gradually

The Maginot Line in 1940 – a centre of gravity

France's experience from the bloody war of attrition in the First World War led to a defensive doctrine, manifested by the construction of the Maginot Line. When the Second World War broke out, Germany succeeded in evading this large system of fortifications. The physical and conceptual centre of gravity in French warfare capability – a strong static defence – became irrelevant due to an action by the adversary that had not been provided for in French doctrine.



Historiska media. Lönegård och Co

Milos Jelesijevic, Pressens bild



Serbian popular will in 1999 – a centre of gravity

NATO attacks vital infrastructure with the objective of disrupting supplies to the people and consequently undermining popular support for continued fighting. Belgrade 1999

³³ "Centre of Gravity (CoG) is defined as the characteristic(s), capability(ies), or locality(ies) from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. It exists at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations. More than one CoG may exist. CoG must be identified for both opposing and friendly forces." NATO AJP-01 (B) Ratification Draft 2, para 0308.

³⁴ "Decisive point is defined as a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or in the information environment. Decisive points are the keys to unlocking CoGs and can be attacked directly as appropriate. The commander designates the most important decisive points as objectives and allocates resources to protect, control, destroy or neutralise them." Ibid.

shifted so that the adversary is put off balance. Decisive points may exist at all levels and in all functions. For command, a decisive point may for example be communication or sensors, and for effect access to fuels or ammunition. A decisive point at the strategic level may be transport capacity or popular opinion and at the tactical level freedom of action or the possibility of rest and recuperation.

Both centre of gravity and decisive points are identified and chosen in connection with every operation. As a result of several operations being carried out at the same time, there may be several centres of gravity at every level of warfare, but they are normally fewer at the military strategic level than at the operational and tactical levels.

U S Air Force



Iraqi access to airspace - a decisive point

An American F-16 aircraft upholds the no-fly zone over northern Iraq

Pressens bild




Soviet sea transport during the Cuban missile crisis - a decisive point

The U.S. Navy controls the sea route to Cuba and blocks Soviet sea transport in October 1962

Lines of operation

Operations are executed along a line of *operation* directly against a centre of gravity or via selected decisive points. A line of operation describes how the combat forces are to be utilised in time and space, where appropriate with a division into sequels and phases, usually based on the objectives of the forces. Lines of operation are not equated to physical paths of advance. Instead, they are to be viewed as courses of action.³⁵ It is also possible to use several lines of operation simultaneously, for example to achieve security for oneself in carrying out an operation or in order to disperse the adversary's forces.



Relationship between lines of operation, centre of gravity and decisive points

End-state

Final objectives and, where appropriate, partial objectives are formulated at all levels. In addition, an *end-state* can also be formulated primarily at the political-strategic, military-strategic and operational levels. The end-state may coincide with the final objective, but need not do so. The end-state describes the political and military situation which needs to exist when the objectives have been achieved and the operation can be terminated.³⁶ The end-state constitutes support for the accomplishment of tasks at lower levels.

To avoid restricting freedom of action, an end-state which is formulated at political-strategic level may be expressed in general terms. In such cases, measurable criteria of success can be developed for when the end-state can be regarded as prevailing.³⁷

³⁵ NATO Bi-SC GOP, 1999, Chapter 3, page 2.

³⁶ "End-state is defined as the stated political and/or military situation which needs to exist when an operation has been terminated on favourable terms. The end-state should be established prior to execution." NATO AJP-01 (B) Ratification Draft 2, para 0308.

³⁷ "Because the described end-state may be general or broad in nature [a requirement may exist] to set out measurable criteria that determine that the desired end-state has been achieved." NATO Bi-SC GOP, 1999, Chapter 4, page 5.

The manoeuvrist approach

The basis for action by the Armed Forces is the manoeuvrist approach. The manoeuvrist approach is the Armed Forces' conception of how will-power and resources can best be used to achieve set objectives in a conflict or other situation where military means are used.

The ideas in the manoeuvrist approach are applicable to all levels of warfare and conflict. The manoeuvrist approach is described here chiefly in the context of armed conflict. The principles and concepts emphasised are, however, general and can therefore also be applied to other situations.

The manoeuvrist approach is aimed at achieving decision by bringing about *system shock*. The basis of the manoeuvrist approach is to

- apply *the indirect approach* and exploit *critical vulnerabilities*
- constantly strive for *the initiative*, which is facilitated by *mission command*.

*System shock*³⁸

A fundamental assumption in the manoeuvrist approach is that the adversary can be overcome without its main forces needing to be defeated. Decision is to be achieved by paralysing the adversary's will to fight rather than destroying its resources. This requires us to put the adversary in something which can be likened to a state of shock, which renders him incapable of continuing to act effectively. The moral and conceptual factors of the adversary's fighting power are thus attributed greater significance than the physical factors.

On the basis of systems theory, a military conflict can be regarded as two or more complex systems in interaction.³⁹ The function of a system depends entirely on its cohesion. When co-ordination ceases in the system, system shock arises as vital functions cease to function or become irrelevant. In some cases this leads to total disintegration of the system. The adversary's organisation, cohesion and morale are therefore more important targets than the forces themselves.

³⁸ System shock is a development of the Russian idea of operational shock, Udar. Udar comes closest in meaning to strike, attack or thrust and in their operational art came to refer to putting the adversary in a condition incapable of combat through a (single) strike.

³⁹ An example of such a systems approach is military organisations as Complex Adaptive Systems. In simple terms, a complex system consists of several parts, which can each act on their own terms and at the same time change the underlying conditions for the other parts of the system. In addition, military forces are open systems which interact with an external environment and behave in a non-linear manner in that small changes may cause large decisive effects for combat.



Ullstein bild

System shock

The French Army collapsed when it encountered the Germans' Blitzkrieg in 1940

As threats and risks are difficult to predict and boundaries between conceivable tasks for the Armed Forces are blurred, it is pointless and ineffective to create unique procedures and methods for every situation and conflict. The conceptual basis for our actions must be able to cope with a wide range of tasks in many different types of conflicts. The systems approach offers a general way of looking at conflicts and military operations and consequently makes it easier to solve problems. The systems approach also has a clear role in the concept of network-based defence.⁴⁰

The indirect approach and critical vulnerabilities

All strategies are formulated under conditions which are decided by both values and access to resources. The optimum strategy is the approach which with the best economy of force brings about a decision. The manoeuvrist approach is based on it being possible, through mental and physical manoeuvre, to avoid confrontation in situations where the adversary is strong and instead systematically exploit the adversary's weaknesses. The indirect approach⁴¹ is therefore an important tool, given limitations in means and ways, for achieving strategic, operational or tactical objectives in peace-time, crisis and war.

⁴⁰ See also Chapter 10.

⁴¹ "The Indirect Approach" was launched by Sir Basil Liddell Hart 1927, as a conclusion on what winning strategy or method had been applied during the many battles and wars he had studied. NATO AJP-01(B), Ratification Draft, Sep 2000, para 0308, states as follows: "The Indirect Approach attacks opposing forces' CoG from unexpected directions or at unexpected times. The Indirect Approach seeks to exploit opposing force vulnerabilities, while avoiding their strength[...]".

The indirect approach

According to the British military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart, the aim of every strategist must be:

"... not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not in itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this"

Source: Liddell Hart, B.H. Strategy, p. 325.

The dislocation of force, to create as advantageous a situation as possible, is a fundamental part of the indirect approach. This can be followed by the disruption of the enemy's forces, either directly without battle or in conjunction with confrontation. The dislocation has to be both physical and psychological. It can be brought about physically through a manoeuvre which, for example, threatens the adversary's order of battle or limits the adversary's freedom of action. Psychologically, the dislocation is principally an effect of logical entanglement and a feeling of lost freedom of action. If opportunities for a decision are created before the adversary has re-created its capability, the decision may follow directly through system shock or continued battle with favourable conditions. The indirect approach in the physical sense has to result in the path of least resistance and in the psychological sense in the least expected path.

Indirect approach

Allied dislocation of strength by attacking "in the rear" during the Korean War. Landing behind enemy lines at Inchon in September 1950



The *direct approach* can be seen as a conceptual counterpart to the indirect approach. Whoever utilises a direct approach strives directly, or via decisive points, to attack the adversary's identified centre of gravity. In contrast to the indirect approach, the adversary's strength is not avoided systematically, but one's own forces may be forced to face the strongest sides of the adversary. In practice, most operations involve a combination of indirect and direct approach being applied. The message of the manoeuvrist approach is that the indirect approach has to be utilised where and when possible.


Technology and endurance as critical vulnerabilities

With the aid of radar reconnaissance, the allies gained new opportunities for detecting submarines both at periscope depth and at the surface. Without radar warning devices, the German submarines became easy prey, Allied flying boats engage a German submarine in the Atlantic, June 1942



For those who apply the manoeuvrist approach, it is not sufficient to identify decisive points. Massing of effect has to take place at the decisive points where the prospects of achieving a decision are also good. Points where a decision can be attained in our favour and where the adversary is weak or not expecting an attack are referred to as *critical vulnerabilities*.⁴² The key to success is to strive for a decision by exploiting these critical vulnerabilities with co-ordinated operations.

Few critical vulnerabilities can be identified in advance. Critical vulnerabilities are dynamic phenomena owing to the nature of war, and the majority of them arise during the course of combat. Neither we nor our adversary can constantly be strong everywhere. Some critical vulnerabilities are a result of our own action, that is to say our endeavour to dislocate enemy strength and exploit physical and mental manoeuvres. Critical vulnerabilities may also arise as a consequence of other factors and unforeseen events.



The indirect approach and exploitation of critical vulnerabilities which have arisen

Applying the indirect approach means consistently exploiting opportunities for success when they arise. This leads to the second principle of the manoeuvrist approach: initiative.

⁴² Compare with force vulnerabilities in the definition of indirect approach, see Note 41. Critical vulnerabilities need not be physical. Critical vulnerabilities may also be constituted by a situation, capability or moral factor. The adversary's centre of gravity may in principle be a critical vulnerability.

Initiative

The dynamics of combat constantly change the situation, and the forces must therefore be able to adapt to new developments of events through flexibility and creativity. A necessary condition to be able to exploit the development of events to our advantage is to gain, and if necessary regain, the initiative.

The relationship between the manoeuvrist approach and initiative can be described by what is known as the *OODA-loop*: Observe – Orient – Decide – Act. A common expression is "getting inside the adversary's OODA-loop", which describes a condition where the adversary "lags behind" and is forced to respond to our actions. Initiative is fundamentally concerned with taking actions which make the adversary's actions irrelevant. This can be done by us running through the decision cycle faster, but also by detecting changes in the environment in a better way than the adversary, assessing these in relation to strategic, operational and tactical objectives, making decisions and acting.

In dynamic environments, defects always exist in the *mental model* of reality. Our capability relative to the adversary to continuously observe external events and adapt the model of reality, or in other words, maintain a correct combat plan and understanding of the situation, is therefore of decisive significance.

The term *command superiority* is used to describe the situation where we, in a given situation, *overall* observe, orient, decide and act better than the adversary. It means that the measures taken by the adversary for each decision cycle gradually become more irrelevant because they come too late or are inadequate. All measures or events which improve our ability to observe, orient, decide or act and adversely affect the adversary's capability in these respects contributes to the possibility of attaining command superiority.

If we succeed in gaining command superiority, the adversary has lost the initiative and consequently its freedom of action. Command superiority is, however, a temporary situation, and it is difficult to know when it has been achieved. We must therefore never cease in our endeavour to gain command superiority.

The manoeuvrist approach requires more than single initiatives. *Constant initiatives* are strived for from our side so that the adversary rarely or never has a chance to exploit its strength. By taking initiatives at all levels and directing co-ordinated efforts against critical vulnerabilities, the adversary continuously risks defeat. This requires an atmosphere which stimulates the will to take initiatives and minimises circumstances which limit or inhibit individual action.

The OODA loop

The OODA loop (OODA = *Observe, Orient, Decide, Act*), as a model for taking decisions, was developed following studies of air operations during the Korean War, where the American F-86 aircraft won more than 90 per cent of all air combat against Russian-built Mig-15 aircraft, despite the fact that the latter could climb, accelerate and turn faster. An American Air Force colonel, John Boyd, showed that the explanation lay in the fact that the F-86s firstly gave the pilot better opportunities for observation and secondly had more effective rudder systems, which allowed for much faster changes of attitude than the adversary's aircraft. By adapting tactics, the American pilots systematically forced their adversaries into a series of manoeuvres in which the enemy pilots for every manoeuvre – and OODA-loop – were increasingly out-classed and eventually could be decisively engaged.

Boyd emphasised that *mental models* of reality with necessity are incomplete because they are based on changeable observations. Errors also arise in our observations as our questions are based on incomplete models. Maintaining a correct understanding of the situation, according to Boyd, therefore necessitates making assessments from a point of view which is not covered by a current model of reality. Every *creation* of correct models of the surroundings therefore necessitates *destruction* of previous models. Superiority can consequently be achieved by attacking the adversary's capability for the destruction and creation of mental models.

Sources:

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By never allowing the initiative to be lost, other than temporarily, the adversary can be put in a state of constant reaction and parrying. Ultimately, very limited but well-directed operations can lead to the adversary being paralysed by dissolving the link between measures taken and reality. System shock has thus been achieved.



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Constant initiatives

The Finnish successes during the Second World War were largely due to the fact that they compensated for their numerical inferiority with constant and creative action

Initiative and offensive need not be the same. In many cases it is not possible to attain a decision, for example because of large differences in strength. It may actually become necessary to manoeuvre to avoid the adversary altogether. The initiative may therefore involve defensive action in some respects and offensive action in others. An important option for the weaker party is to change ends, ways or means to attain a more advantageous position.

An important part is measures aimed at the adversary's capability to observe, orient and decide, for example by deception or command and control warfare. By giving the adversary incorrect information or denying him access to certain information, we can affect his capability to both observe and orient.

The ability of the adversary to take decisions which reach the forces in time can be reduced by engaging communications and information

systems. Mastering command and control warfare is thus an important component of the manoeuvrist approach, both to reduce the command and control capability of the adversary and to protect one's own, including confidence in the command and control system. This in turn necessitates having a robust and flexible command and control system.



Engberg, Pressens bild

Decisive initiative

Israeli counter-attack across the Suez Canal during the 1973 war

Because of the dynamics in all combat, contradictions are an integral part of the logic of strategy: doing the unexpected may be the best way to success. A fundamental requirement is to generate both the tempo required⁴³ and creative solutions to strategic, operational or tactical problems. Constant initiatives everywhere and unexpected actions from one's own side are not just the most effective way of attaining an effect against the adversary. It is also effective protection against the measures taken by the adversary, in that it makes it more difficult to predict our dispositions and actions. The manoeuvrist approach presupposes a method of command which promotes such action.

⁴³ "Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the opposition, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of a joint force to make the transition from one operational posture to another." NATO AJP-01 (B) Ratification Draft 2, para 0308. This relates to both tempo in decision-making and in operations and mobility.

Mission command

The command method of the Swedish Armed Forces is *mission command*. In mission command, the commander formulates a task, allocates resources, and restrains and constrains if necessary, but as far as possible leaves execution to his subordinates. Co-ordination is ensured by the intent of the commander and the purpose and significance of the mission being clearly conveyed. Mission command requires a philosophy of command which features initiative, independent decision-making, individual responsibility and mutual trust between commander and personnel. In addition, mission command requires a high level of training and good discipline. Each commander has to encourage and give scope for the action of commanders and other subordinates below him.

Both the manoeuvrist approach and the nature of war demand great flexibility at all levels in the chain of command. Military units are forced to act in complex dynamic situations, often under great uncertainty and time-pressure. An ability to act under chaotic conditions increases the prospects of attaining command superiority. Waiting for complete information before making decisions in such situations may lead to the initiative being lost.⁴⁴ Decentralised command therefore best promotes our war-fighting.

The manoeuvrist approach entails a high tempo. This necessitates commanders at all levels being able to exploit opportunities and critical vulnerabilities which arise. It is also necessary to be able to solve unforeseen problems and ensure that activity continues despite friction or a temporary shortage of information and orders. Decentralised decision-making additionally means that the resources and different competencies of the organisation generally can be utilised more effectively.

The requirement of flexibility is sometimes opposed by the requirement to co-ordinate operations. Detailed control may need to be applied within the framework of mission command.⁴⁵ The requirement of co-ordination is ensured, however, primarily through a fundamentally common awareness of the situation and the purpose of the mission being conveyed. If necessary, additional co-ordination takes place through rules of action or other detailed control.

The number of situations in which detailed control from higher levels improves co-ordination is, however, small and these situations have to be measured against the superior flexibility which follows from consistent application of mission command. This flexibility can never be created selectively or by orders.

⁴⁴ The notion of optimum decision-making as ordered and analytical is often incorrect. It does not work in complex and uncertain situations with high pressure of time, where the surroundings are too changeable and the requirements for flexibility are high. Modern research shows that what is referred to as naturalistic or intuitive decision-making dominates among successful commanders in such situations, which in turn makes great demands on an up-to-date assessment of the situation.

⁴⁵ Examples of such situations are when specific action or special co-ordination of deployed units is required, for example when there is a risk of friendly fire. Detailed orders which entail immediate implementation, may also need to be issued, principally at tactical level. Experience of international operations shows that both the political and highest military levels in some situations consider themselves to need detailed control of the situation. An example of instruments which higher levels may utilise are rules of engagement (ROE).

The initiative in Vares, central Bosnia-Herzegovina, in October 1993.

"The 8th Company of Nordbat 2 had been deployed in Vares for about a week when Croat extremists took over command of the town's administration and defence. Bosnians suffered looting, were taken prisoner or were murdered. The massacre in the village of Stupni Do was discovered. The extremists had started ethnic cleansing. The pattern was reminiscent of what had taken place during the spring and summer in the Lasva Valley, with the UN as more or less passive observers.

The leader of the extremists, Ivica Rajic, demanded that the UN should remain passive and asserted that the organisation did not have a mandate to attack. The battalion was threatened with combat if it interfered. Contrary to the Croats' assumption, 8th Company was reinforced. The battalion acted and manoeuvred within the full scope of the mandate and – when the mandate was not sufficient – in accordance with the rules of international and humanitarian law. A platoon and a medical evacuation squad came under Croat fire, but this merely strengthened the battalion's resolve. The Croat action was controlled in detail and slow, while Nordbat acted with far-reaching mission command. Surprise was achieved by breaking an established pattern. Together with a rapid reaction and manoeuvring capability, this led to the battalion succeeding in "getting inside Ivica Rajic's OODA-loop". The development of events in this way slipped out of the hands of the Croat extremists.



Pressens bild

Swedish UN contingent under the command of Col. Ulf Henricsson in Vares, Bosnia, October 1993

As a result of the battalion's initiative, hundreds of lives were saved and destruction of the town was prevented. The initiative in Vares is a good example of high motivation, mission command and manoeuvring capability also being decisive in peace support operations."

Source: Ulf Henricsson, commander of BA 01.

An important characteristic of mission command is that the tasks are not solved in the same way every time, as it is up to each recipient to find the way to the goal. This supports our endeavour for creative and unexpected elements in warfare.⁴⁶ Mission command means that commanders at all levels have to accept some dynamics in the execution of operations. At the same time, those who carry out a task have responsibility to solve problems quickly and according to their own capabilities, for example when they encounter situations which the person giving the order has not been able to predict.

Consistently applied mission command is decisive in order to fully exploit the manoeuvrist approach, and to meet the requirements for both coordination and flexibility in warfare.

Command and control of operations

The command and staff procedures have to support the application of the manoeuvrist approach, that is to say create the necessary conditions for initiative and the indirect approach. Planning and execution are not distinguished from each other but take place in parallel in all operations in and in several time perspectives. This means that the principles of the manoeuvrist approach are constantly at the basis of orientation, decision and action.

All planning is aimed at gaining an understanding of the mission and its purpose and formulating a clear idea of how the task is to be solved. Planning is taking place constantly at all levels of warfare, comprising an assessment of the adversary's and one's own situation, including strengths and weaknesses, intentions and options for action as well as courses of action in time and space to achieve a decisive outcome.⁴⁷ At the same time, planning at different levels differs in character and scope. This is due to differences in tasks and their extent in time and space. The concepts of end-state, centre of gravity, decisive points and lines of operation are applicable in planning and execution at all levels of warfare. They are, however, chiefly used at the military-strategic and operational levels.

Political-strategic objectives for operations may be expressed in the form of end-states. Narrow time constraints or lack of clarity on the nature of the operation may, however, mean that the political objectives initially

⁴⁶ John Boyd spoke of initiative/harmony/variety/rapidity as the basis for forming and adapting to circumstances and for manoeuvre warfare: "They are [...] qualities that when acting together improve the ability to minimize one's own friction through initiative at the lower levels harmonized by a shared vision of single commander. To maximize the opponent's friction, one must attack with a variety of actions executed at the greatest possible rapidity".

⁴⁷ For descriptions of the responsibilities of the respective level of warfare, see Chapter 6 pages 69-70.

are unclear and instead are formulated gradually. If an end-state has not been established at the political-strategic level, this has to be done at the military-strategic level. Military-strategic objectives, like end-states, are generally formulated through dialogue between the government and the Armed Forces. In the dialogue, the Armed Forces also propose what military-strategic means and ways should be used. The overall military-strategic objectives can be summarised with the words *prevent – subdue – protect – defend*.⁴⁸ When the military-strategic aims have been clarified, these are integrated in military-strategic planning, where ways and means for execution are chosen.

In conjunction with operations, the Supreme Commander with the support of the Headquarters formulates a task, allocates resources and indicates any rules of action for the operational commander. At the operational and tactical levels, operational planning takes place on the basis of the military-strategic objectives, normally developed in an end-state. In practice, planning, including order of battle, takes place simultaneously and in a dialogue between the military-strategic, operational and tactical levels. As a result, the necessary conditions are created for a co-ordinated choice of ends, ways and means. Co-ordinated planning is essential to be able to fully apply the manoeuvrist approach during execution.

On the basis of the indirect approach, methods in the form of different types of operations are chosen at the military-strategic as well as at the operational and tactical levels. This is done by systematically searching during both planning and execution for objectives where a decision can be achieved and where the adversary is weak or is not expecting an attack. Within the framework of the manoeuvrist approach, it may be necessary in certain situations, particularly at the tactical level, for the direct approach to be applied temporarily to exploit an opportunity which has arisen or due to a lack of freedom of action.

The core of military command is the co-ordination of human action and resources of different kinds in complex, dynamic situations, often under great uncertainty and time pressure. Freedom of action therefore has to be created in the command process so that constant initiatives can be taken and critical enemy vulnerabilities which arise during execution can be exploited, as well as preventing the consequences of vulnerabilities which arise in us.

⁴⁸ See also Chapter 5 – Military-strategic objectives.

The mission, situation and the commander's intent form the basis for the execution. The necessary conditions for initiative and exploitation of critical vulnerabilities which arise are created through mission command. Dialogues should be conducted early on between commanders at all levels, to attain a common situational awareness and be able to convey clearly the meaning and purpose of the mission. To facilitate dialogue, orders if possible should be given in personal contact between commanders. Thereby, the commander who gives orders can also provide support.



Grimm, Bildarchiv preussischer Kulturbesitz

Mission command in application

The German military successes were largely due to the German method of Auftragstaktik. Here fire and manoeuvre between tanks and artillery are being co-ordinated in a German armoured division staff on the eastern front, autumn of 1942

The execution of an operation requires constant adaptation to the situation. Follow-up is therefore an important means of maintaining freedom of action and exploiting opportunities which arise while an operation is in progress. Supported by follow-up, every commander has to be prepared to decide on a changed course of action.

The opportunities for directly controlling or changing activities while an operation is in progress may, however, be limited. A well thought-through and clearly formulated plan reduces the need for detailed control. Together with mission command, it can make up for the loss of command or deficiencies in the command and control system and for the fact that no plan can entirely predict how the operation will develop.

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In-depth analysis – Manoeuvre warfare

The fundamental aspects of the manoeuvrist approach are often described using the better known term *manoeuvre warfare*, a common but sometimes also criticised element in several military doctrines. Manoeuvre warfare has been contrasted with *attrition warfare*, where the parties primarily seek to achieve victory by destroying the enemy's resources with the aid of superior fire-power, made possible by a larger industrial base and technological superiority. In a war of attrition, the enemy and its combat forces are regarded as a target to be destroyed systematically. Success is described in terms of losses of dead and wounded, conquered materiel and terrain captured. The aim of manoeuvre warfare is rather to paralyse the will of the adversary to carry on fighting.

The advocates of manoeuvre warfare often cite historical examples of successful concepts and battles where the commander has succeeded in "attacking the adversary in the rear", that is to say has applied mobile warfare with outflanking of the adversary or utilisation of the indirect approach. These examples may range from the battle at Cannae in 216 BC to Torrington's *fleet-in-being*, Napoleon's *manoeuvre sur la derrière* and the German *blitzkrieg*.

Modern theorists include William S. Lind, who in his *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* has had a great influence on both American and Western European doctrine development. Lind describes the tactics of manoeuvre warfare as "a process of combining two elements, techniques and education, through three mental 'filters' or reference points – mission-type orders, the focus of effort or *schwerpunkt*, and the search for enemy surfaces and gaps – with the object of producing a unique approach for the specific enemy, time and place". Greatly simplified, this relates to a clear formulation of objectives, decentralisation and creative manoeuvre and massing of effect – at the right time – when the adversary is least expecting an attack.

Lind's theories, like many modern doctrines, are based to a large extent on German concepts from the period before the Second World War. In actual fact manoeuvre ideas were developed simultaneously in several countries, with Mikhail Tukhachevskii (Russia, 1893-1937) and Heinz Guderian (Germany, 1888-1954) as well known advocates. In contemporary debate, these two had counterparts during the inter-war period in other countries, for example Charles De Gaulle (1890-1970) in France and George Patton (1885-1945) in the United States. All of them were clearly influenced by the British military theorists B.H. Liddell-Hart (1895-1970) and J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966). Fuller and Liddell-Hart described mobile warfare, supported by the latest technology, directed against the adversary's weaknesses. Great emphasis was placed on surprise and putting the adversary in physical and psychological imbalance. However, it was only in the Soviet Union and Germany that these ideas achieved a real breakthrough.

In Tukhachevskii's manoeuvre-oriented operational art from the 1920s and 1930s, manoeuvre warfare is described among other things using a distinct *system view* of military conflicts. The Russian theorists asserted that manoeuvre warfare was aimed at *operational shock* and breaking up the adversary's system. This was to be achieved through *fragmenting strikes* against the system, *simultaneous attacks* at the front and rear of the adversary and momentum where tempo was to be maintained to prevent the adversary's system from re-forming or re-grouping.

Modern manoeuvre warfare enjoyed a renaissance in the west during the 1970s and 1980s, chiefly expressed in the American *AirLand Battle doctrine*. Development was driven partly by a changed nuclear-weapons doctrine (*Flexible Response*) and the numerical superiority of the Eastern Block in conventional combat forces. A capability for mobile deep operations with qualitatively superior combat forces was therefore considered necessary in NATO.

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An example of operational planning, the Persian Gulf War

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. The reaction of the international community was vigorous, and a continued Iraqi offensive against Saudi Arabia and its oil fields was feared. The same day, the UN Security Council signed a resolution clearly condemning the invasion as a breach of the United Nations Charter and demanding an immediate Iraqi withdrawal. Ten resolutions were then adopted during the autumn of 1990 aimed at causing Iraq to retreat, by such means as economic sanctions and embargos, but without the desired result. At the end of November, the member states under Resolution 678 were given a mandate to "use all necessary means" to push through the previous resolutions if Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait by 15 January 1991.

On the same day as the invasion took place, the United States as an individual nation also condemned Iraq's action. The occupation of Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia were regarded as a threat to American interests, and President George Bush declared that the country's strategic goals were

- immediate, complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait,
- restoration of Kuwait's legal government,
- security and stability for Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf and
- security and protection for American citizens abroad.

Almost immediately, naval forces were dispatched to the area from the United States and its allies. Political meetings took place between the United States and Saudi Arabia to clearly highlight an American commitment to the region.

With an impending threat of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia and on the basis of the resolutions, the United States drew up plans for the use of military means to attain the stated strategic goals. One alternative was based on air attacks on selected targets in Iraq, which was rejected in view of the prevailing situation. The second, with Saudi Arabian consent, was based on grouping sufficient combat forces in the area to deter Iraq from further aggression and to be able to defend Saudi Arabia. The following military goals were established:

- Develop a defence capability in the region around the Persian Gulf sufficient to restrain Iraq from launching further attacks.
- If the deterrence fails: defend Saudi Arabia effectively.
- Organise a military and political coalition and integrate the forces of the various countries in the planning.
- Make sure that the resolutions on economic sanctions are respected.

The operation was given the name *Desert Shield*. A coalition of almost fifty UN member states was quickly formed, with the United States as the dominant player. Over the next few months a large build-up of forces took place in the area, including naval forces so that control could be maintained over the sea routes to Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with economic sanctions decided upon, as well as air and land forces to secure prospects for an increase in strength.

The Iraqi force in Kuwait increased at the same time. It soon became clear that there was also a need to plan for an offensive operation to attain the strategic objectives and to make sure that all the UN resolutions were respected. The United States therefore initiated unilateral planning for an offensive at an early stage. When the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678, the other members of the coalition were involved in the planning. The operation was given the name *Desert Storm*. As an offensive would demand more resources than were in place for the defence of Saudi Arabia, a further massive build-up of forces took place on both sides. The Iraqi forces in the Kuwait area were estimated at nearly 500,000 men, 4500 tanks and 3200 artillery pieces. The coalition consisted of 540,000 men and a large number of platforms from all types of combat forces from 31 countries.



Pressens bild

A moral centre of gravity

During the war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, the United States and the coalition identified President Saddam Hussein and his regime as essential to Iraq's fighting power, particularly with regard to the will to fight

Three principal Iraqi centres of gravity were identified in the planning for an offensive operation:

- Command capability under the Iraqi President Hussein and his regime.
- Capability for the production and use of weapons of mass destruction.
- Iraq's mechanised elite forces: *The Republican Guard*.

In addition, a series of potentially decisive vulnerabilities which could be exploited were identified:

- Centralised and hierarchical command and reluctance of Iraqi military commanders to take their own initiatives.
- Vulnerability to air attack of Iraqi ground forces, particularly with regard to logistics, due to the desert environment.
- Limited capability to carry out offensive operations at great depth and limited offensive air combat capability.
- Large differences in capability among the Iraqi forces, with only a limited number of modern units.
- Inefficient intelligence service abroad and limited insight into the fighting power of the coalition.
- Limited capability for protection against space-based systems.



US Air Force

The command function – a decisive point for Iraq's fighting power
Destroyed command post in Iraqi air defence during the 1991 Kuwait War

UN Resolution 678 and the strategic objectives were converted again into military objectives – this time for an offensive operation and with respect to the identified centres of gravity. The concept of operations entailed a co-ordinated multinational and joint operation in four main phases. First air operations were to be carried out directly and indirectly against the established centres of gravity (see previous page). Then the operation was to shift towards preparations for and execution of a ground offensive, partly by establishing supremacy in the air over Kuwait, cutting off the supply lines of the Iraqi occupation forces to the homeland, destroying the Republican Guard units and finally liberating Kuwait City. The latter was mainly to be carried out using the Arab constituents of the coalition force. The end-state was a Kuwait free of Iraqi occupation forces and sharply reduced Iraqi capability for aggression in the region.

Operational and tactical planning then took place on this basis for air, land and naval operations. At the same time, a series of measures were taken to deceive Saddam Hussein and his political and military leadership with regard to the coalition's intentions and capability. At the political-strategic level, an attempt was made among other things from the coalition side to display a mainly defensive posture. By utilising modern technical information gathering, including from space platforms, and sophisticated technical command and control warfare, the coalition succeeded in establishing superiority in access to relevant, reliable and up-to-date information on the adversary's side.



IBL Bildbyrå

A military in dissolution

Iraqi soldiers capitulate when the will to continue fighting has collapsed, February 1991

Despite intense diplomatic and economic pressure, Iraq did not show any signs of withdrawal when the time specified in Resolution 678 approached. On the morning of 17 January, air attacks were initiated with great success. The missions carried out during the operation were a combination of indirect and direct approach. Many decisive points were attacked. In order to affect Iraq's command and control capability, military command posts and sensor systems as well as ministerial buildings were destroyed. WMD capability was drastically reduced by attacks on factories, storage facilities and laboratories suspected of providing what was required. In addition, the supply of chemical and technical components to the country was cut early on, through the embargo operations. The Republican Guard and its command were attacked directly. When the ground offensive was initiated on 24 February, it only took four days of operations before the coalition could state that the Iraqi fighting forces were paralysed, fragmented and in retreat. The Iraqi military and its political and military leadership were in complete system shock.

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CHAPTER 8 – MILITARY OPERATIONS

In order to constitute an effective instrument of security policy, the Armed Forces have to have the capability to accomplish tasks throughout the spectrum of conflict from peace to war. The Armed Forces accomplish allocated tasks by conducting various kinds of military operations, unilaterally or in collaboration with other countries. The basis for flexible capability to conduct operations regardless of level of conflict is the capability to conduct armed combat.



Sven Åke Haglund, Försvarets bildbyrå



Bjarne Svensson, Försvarets bildbyrå



Ulf Hugo, Försvarets bildbyrå

Combat operations can take place against adversaries who conduct conventional military operations or utilise alternative ways and means including weapons of mass destruction or a combination of these.

Military units can also conduct operations which do not primarily include combat. These tasks often become relevant in low-level conflicts, i.e. conflicts which do not fulfil the criteria for war. This activity can be exemplified by humanitarian operations, disaster relief, peace-building actions or evacuation operations, and can be carried out during all phases of a conflict or in parallel with a war and its various phases.

Military resources can also be put at the disposal of civilian authorities to assist them in exercising their authority.

Operations

Operations are military missions carried out by armed forces' units at the military-strategic, operational and tactical level.

Joint operations

A joint operation is a military operation carried out by forces from more than one service. In a joint operation, land, sea and air operational activity and other operational functions are co-ordinated where appropriate. More detailed descriptions of operational activity and operational functions can be found in the Doctrine for Joint Operations.



Pressens bild

A joint operation

In the British recapture of the Falkland Islands, all the armed services took part in a co-ordinated joint operation. HMS Fearless launches landing craft off Port San Carlos in May 1982

Territorial activity

Territorial activity is intended, through co-operation, to co-ordinate military and civilian resources, creating the necessary conditions for conducting and supporting military and civilian operations, maintain a common situational awareness as a basis for operations and through joint planning assist in the creation of a society which can withstand severe strains and limited armed attacks.

Civil-military co-operation

Civil-military co-operation is a collective term which covers *total defence co-operation*, *inter-agency co-operation* and *Cimic (civil-military co-operation)*. Civil-military co-operation takes place at central, regional and local levels.

Total defence co-operation

Total defence co-operation relates to the collaboration which takes place between the Armed Forces, civilian authorities, organisations and civil enterprises to co-ordinate war preparations and the support of military and civilian operations under heightened preparedness and in time of war.

Cimic

Cimic is originally a NATO term conceptually linked to the Cimic function in NATO staffs.⁴⁹ This denotes the Cimic function included in a military multinational crisis management force and related tasks, activities and resources. Cimic activity comprises the contacts and co-operation with civilian actors required to support planning and conduct the military operation. The function is represented at all levels of command.

Inter-agency co-operation

Inter-agency co-operation comprises the co-operation conducted between the Armed Forces and other authorities (equivalent), local authorities or organisations, but which cannot be attributed to total-defence co-operation or Cimic. Inter-agency co-operation is intended to co-ordinate preparations for and the conduct of national and multinational operations in peace-time and times of crisis.

⁴⁹ The EU and NATO definition forms the basis for application in the Swedish Armed Forces: "The coordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO or EU Commander and civil actors, including national populations and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies". *AAP-6*.

Combined operations

In a combined operation, forces from at least two nations take part. The Swedish Armed Forces conduct operations in collaboration with other nations, principally in the context of crisis management or exercise activity. This may take place in temporarily composed coalitions, in connection with Nordic or other international crisis management, for example led by NATO or the EU.



Peter Liander, Försvarets bildbyrå

Multinational exercise

Polish Mig-29 and two AJS 37 Viggen at the Polish airbase in Powidz (Poland) during Strong Resolve 02

Because of differences in doctrine, competence, organisation and equipment, combined operations are more complicated to carry out than national ones. It is therefore important for commanders and staffs to be trained in collaboration with the armed forces of other nations.

Peace Support Operations

Peace-keeping operations

Peace-keeping operations are given a mandate by the United Nations or equivalent regional organisation (OSCE) under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Examples are monitoring of ceasefire agreements and separation zones. A peace-keeping operation is performed with the consent of the parties involved and force is only used within the framework of the right to self-defence. However, if the situation requires, peace-keeping operations with a mandate to use force in accordance with Chapter VII occur.



Kristofer K S Sandberg, Försvarets bildbyrå

Supervision of peace agreement

A train transport is supervised and safeguarded by foreign and Swedish soldiers during Operation Eagle Express. Bosnia, BA 09

Peace-enforcing operations

Peace-enforcing operations receive a mandate from the United Nations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Examples are operations to separate fighting parties by force and operations to protect humanitarian activity and civil population. A peace-enforcing operation is conducted without the consent of at least one of the parties. A peace-enforcing operation can also be conducted if there is a lack of clarity over the consent of significant actors and where these actors may oppose implementation of the mandate. The detached unit exercises force, from self-defence to combat tasks within the given mandate.

Monitoring and reporting

Military personnel may be detached individually or in groups to an area of conflict or a separation zone to monitor compliance with peace agreements, check weapon flows and report infringements of human rights. Special tasks may occur, such as monitoring the withdrawal of troops and to be the point of contact between the parties in investigations or negotiations. Such observers are unarmed and rely on their impartial status.

Preventive deployment

The deployment of an armed contingent for preventive purposes takes place with a mandate from the UN or equivalent regional organisation (OSCE) in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Preventive deployment may reduce the risk of geographical expansion of the conflict or of a conflict flaring up again.



Pressens bild

Swedish UN post

The border between Macedonia and Serbia, June 1993

Evacuation operations

Evacuation operations chiefly relate to the evacuation of civilian and unarmed military personnel (non-combatants) from crisis and war areas. Evacuation operations may also include the moving of refugees to safer areas. Evacuation operations typically occur if local civil transport resources are not available or suitable or if local authorities are unable to guarantee the safety of non-combatants.

Confidence-building measures

Confidence-building measures between states are intended to create greater predictability through transparency and knowledge of the armed forces. In this way, the risk of armed conflicts arising due to misunderstandings regarding the intentions and capacities of other actors is reduced. Examples of confidence-building measures are regular exchange of information on military forces and defence budgets, prior notification of major exercises and invitations to observe, restrictions on the size and frequency of exercises and opportunities to carry out inspections and verification visits at short notice.



Peter Liander

Confidence-building measures

The Open Skies Treaty gives the participating states the right carry out extensive reconnaissance flights over each other's territories. Before flying, sensor status is checked and approved. Here the Russian team leader and the Swedish sensor monitor are checking the log for approval of the sensors ahead of the Russian inspection flight, Uppsala 2001

Security-promoting measures

Measures aimed at strengthening long-term security in regions where differences of opinion may develop into acts of violence or in areas where environmental problems may cause accidents and human suffering are referred to as security-promoting measures. Examples are support for developing defence structures under democratic control, conducting multinational exercises within the framework of PFP, measures to develop good relations between parties in a region and mine clearance.



Håkan Nyström, Försvarets bildbyrå

Partnership for peace

The Danish fast attack craft Lommen and the corvettes HMS Stockholm and HMS Göteborg on joint exercise in the Baltic Sea during the PFP exercise Baltops in 2000

Humanitarian operations

Humanitarian operations are aimed at reducing human suffering and are carried out under conditions in which local authorities are unable or unwilling to maintain functions to ensure the survival of the population. Humanitarian operations can be carried out within the framework of a peace support operation in an area of conflict or in a crisis area without conflicts. Military means can support humanitarian operations with protection or with personnel and material resources.

Ulif Nylöf, Försvarets bildbyrå



Unloading of aid consignment

A Swedish C-130 in Rwanda

Information operations

Information operations are targeted and co-ordinated measures to support one's own political or military objectives with the intention of influencing or utilising the information or information systems of the adversary or another actor. The ultimate purpose is to influence human decision-making. Information operations can be conducted in political, economic and military contexts. The Swedish Armed Forces can firstly constitute an important component in a strategic information operation through their activities and secondly use the method to support their own activities in the context of operations.

During the conduct of information operations, perception control in various forms, offensive and defensive measures in the function of IT defence, measures in the function of electronic warfare and physical destruction of important structure are co-ordinated, depending on the situation, in order to attain a military-strategic, operational or tactical goal.

Special operations

Special operations can be conducted in or without co-operation with civil authorities to detect, prevent and deter activity which poses a threat to security.

Operations to reduce the effects of NBC events

Operations to reduce the effects of NBC events may consist in detection (identification) and decontamination in the contaminated or threatened area and rescue and clearance operations. The effects of NBC events can be prevented by training and exercise and effective warning systems.



IBL Bildbyrå

NBC agents

A British tank crew practises decontamination of its armoured vehicle

Show of strength



TRH Pictures

Show of strength

During the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s, American warships appeared in the Persian Gulf for the purpose of protecting merchant shipping

Military means can be used to support political, diplomatic and economic measures during crises. A military presence in prioritised areas sends signals to the world around about interest in developments in these areas and may also have the effect of preventing and subduing conflict.

Military assistance



Lennart Andersson, Försvarets bildbyrå

Voluntary defence in rescue service

Military units have to be able to support civil authorities in their exercise of authority. Here volunteers from the National Federation of Swedish Air Force Associations are conducting an exercise together with the municipal rescue service

Military personnel and materiel may, following a request from the responsible authority or a special decision by the government, be detailed to central, regional and local authorities to support or assist their exercise of authority. This may happen if the authorities' own resources are inadequate or if the activity is of social benefit. The support may, for instance, comprise rescue service, transport and support with individual types of equipment. Within the framework of crisis management operations and humanitarian operations outside Swedish territory, military support may also be provided to non-governmental organisations acting within an area of operations.

The involvement of the Swedish Armed Forces in civil activity is governed by the Rescue Services Act, the Ordinance on the Participation of the Armed Forces in Civil Activity and the Ordinance on Intervention by Swedish Defence Forces in the Event of Violations of Swedish Territory in Peacetime and Neutrality (IKFN Ordinance).

(See Chapter 4)

State ceremonial activity

Participating in state ceremonies is one of the tasks of the Armed Forces. Carrying out ceremonies is also part of military training. State ceremonial activity comprises, with the involvement of military music, guard duties at Stockholm and Drottningholm Palaces and parading forces and mounted escorts for state and other higher foreign visits, the state opening of Parliament, royal audiences and other formal ceremonies.



Börjessons foto

Military parade

Guard of honour from the Life Guards during a parade on the occasion of the 50th birthday of His Majesty the King

CHAPTER 9 – MILITARY MEANS

The Armed Forces

The basis for a flexible capability to be able to carrying out operations regardless of the level of conflict is the ability to conduct armed combat and that combat forces trained together, well trained and well equipped, with the ability to accomplish tasks nationally and internationally, are available in different time perspectives.



Peter Nilsson, Försvarets bildbyrå



Peter Liander, Försvarets bildbyrå



Michael Berggren, Försvarets bildbyrå

The Armed Forces have to enjoy great trust among the citizens. Trust has to be obtained by the activity being known and perceived as meaningful by the public and by the behaviour of the Armed Forces being exemplary. Respect for human value has to permeate the activities of the Armed Forces.

Our combat forces are organised in the operational organisation of the Armed Forces and supported by Armed Forces Logistics (FMLOG). The operational organisation consists of the Supreme Commander with Armed Forces Headquarters, the Joint Operations Staff with the Army, Navy and Air Force Tactical Commands, other units and the international force. The operational organisation accomplishes tasks in peace-time, crisis and war with individual units or with task forces put together according to the task to be accomplished. The task forces may include units from various types of services.

Measures are taken in the basic organisation to maintain the state of readiness required to be able to set up and support the field units and other resources needed in the operational organisation.

The increasingly prominent participation of the Swedish Armed Forces in multinational crisis management and exercise activity makes it necessary for staff officers to be able to accomplish tasks together with the staff officers of other nations and for units to be able to accomplish tasks in co-operation with the combat forces of other nations. The interoperability measures of the Armed Forces have to contribute to reducing differences for instance in procedures, languages and technical solutions. The intention is not, however, to level out all differences.

Personnel

The Armed Forces' personnel are their most important asset. The population of the country provides the basis for the recruitment of officers, reserve officers, conscripts, home guardsmen and voluntary personnel. The Armed Forces also include a large number of personnel employed as civilians, who constitute an indispensable part of the organisation. If it is to be possible to ensure that the Armed Forces are supplied with personnel in the short and long terms, there is a need for Sweden to provide a sufficient number of well educated and well trained individuals. Another condition to be met is that development opportunities in the Armed Forces attract these individuals to complete their military service or seek employment in the Armed Forces.

Equipment

The Armed Forces depend on the necessary industrial basis being present nationally or abroad to gain access to the essential supplies and combat-ready and cost-effective equipment adapted for modern warfare.

Service support

To enable them to act, all combat forces are dependent on an infrastructure with depots, bases, harbours, airfields, communications and telecommunications. The combat forces also depend on various forms of support in carrying out operations and to stock, provide in-service support for and phase out materiel and essential supplies. Support is also required in other areas, such as health and medical care and meteorology. Parts of this infrastructure are military and are administered by military authorities. In cases where it is more cost-effective or a military infrastructure is lacking, civil infrastructure and civil services are procured.

Combat forces

Two main categories of combat forces can be identified in the Armed Forces: operational task units and national protection forces. Ground, naval and aerial combat forces may occur in both categories. More detailed descriptions of the types of combat forces can be found in the doctrine for joint operations and in the tactical doctrines.

Operational task units

Operational task units are units and staffs intended to be capable of taking part in accomplishing all the tasks of the Armed Forces. The units have to have operational mobility. They also have to be adapted to be able to act in all the climatic and geographical conditions which occur in Sweden and, with some preparations, in the rest of Europe. After supplementary training of personnel and modification of equipment, missions can also be carried out in other parts of the world.



Håkan Nyström, Försvarets bildbyrå

Versatile combat forces

The operational task units have to be able to accomplish tasks within the framework of all principal tasks. Here a submarine unit with submarines of the Gotland class is being launched

National protection forces

National protection forces are units and staffs which are chiefly intended to take part in accomplishing the tasks of defending the country against armed attack, upholding territorial integrity and strengthening Swedish society in the event of severe strains. They can act in climatic and geographical conditions which occur regionally. The units are primarily territorially associated, with specific related tasks. The units lack or have limited operational mobility. They may also support the operational task forces by making preparations for and carrying out operations.



Björn Westerlund, Försvarets bildbyrå

Protection of the territory


The national protection forces play an important role in the production of socially important functions. Here ground combat units practise fighting in an urban setting

Special operations forces

Special operation forces are units with special training, equipment and skills, often geared towards being able to carry out intelligence gathering, command and control warfare, support for long-range engagement and anti-sabotage operations. Special units have to meet strict requirements for endurance and capability for concealed action in a high-risk environment.

Home Guard

The Home Guard forms part of the national protection forces. The principal tasks of the general Home Guard are to protect important objects against sabotage, surface surveillance and to support ground, naval and air operations. The Home Guard is also an important part of the disaster emergency planning of society.



Sven Åke Haglund, Försvarets bildbyrå

Naval home guard
Divers from the naval home guard

Voluntary defence organisations

The voluntary defence organisations represent an important total defence resource and are of great significance to the will for defence and to the firm rooting of total defence in society. They contribute to the preparedness of society in different areas by recruiting and training citizens on a voluntary basis for tasks in total defence. Their activities uphold or develop skills among personnel who have completed their basic training.

Some of the voluntary personnel sign agreements with the authorities concerned to serve in the event of heightened preparedness. In the Armed Forces, the voluntary defence organisations have responsibility to man positions in certain field units.

Armed Forces readiness

In order to be able to meet the requirements of government for the operational capability of the Armed Forces and the need for freedom of action with regard to military means in conflict management, the Armed Forces maintain planning and readiness to be able to take adaptation measures in different time perspectives. The implementation of readiness-raising measures in the short (up to one year), medium (five years) and long (10 years) perspectives and call-ups to field units are decided upon by the government under applicable regulations.



Ivar Blixt, Forsvarets bildbyrå

Operational preparedness

Pair of stand-by aircraft ready for take-off from Jokkmokk airbase

Unit	Availability
Units ready for operation	Immediate (hours)
Rapid reaction units	Within 2-10 days
Units detached to international force registers	Within 30-90 days
Main defence forces	Months to years
Reserve forces ⁵⁰	Several years

⁵⁰ The reserve forces are not organised in field units and consist solely of organisation-determining equipment.

Basic readiness

Basic readiness comprises mobilisation preparedness and operational preparedness, which includes preparedness in different time perspectives to be able to counter armed attack, uphold territorial integrity, assist in multinational and humanitarian operations and take part in operations to strengthen Swedish society in peace-time. Operational capability can be changed through heightened readiness in the basic organisation, selective preparedness measures such as call-ups of field units for measures to raise preparedness in units with lower preparedness. The latter may comprise call-ups of units for continued training, repair of equipment and supplementary acquisition of equipment and essential supplies.

Long-term preparedness

Long-term preparedness comprises firstly field unit production and the production of other resources in the operational organisation and secondly planning and preparedness to be able to expand or strengthen the operational organisation in the medium term. The latter may comprise measures to produce new field units with capabilities adapted to a changed threat scenario or measures to increase the quality of existing field units.

Long-term adaptation measures

Long-term adaptation measures comprise planning and preparedness in order to be able to transform the operational organisation to accomplish new tasks or provide the operational organisation with field units with new capabilities adapted to new threats and political will. This generates needs to gradually build up skill in new and untested areas and for the skill to be utilised to develop new operational and tactical concepts. This necessitates advanced research and technology development, study and trial activity, demonstrations to try out new capabilities, for example in an organisational framework, and expanded international co-operation in these areas.

CHAPTER 10 – NETWORK-BASED DEFENCE

Basis for development towards network-based defence ⁵¹

In the transition from an industrial society to an information and knowledge-based society, developments in communications and information technology have opened up opportunities for a radical change in how military forces are designed and operate. In recent years, the term *Revolution in Military Affairs* (RMA) has been used to symbolise this change and has been the object of an extensive debate, principally in the United States, but also in Sweden and rest of Europe. The development of what is referred to as a *network-based defence* is a Swedish application of these thoughts.

Developments in communications and information technology must be exploited in the shaping of future Swedish defence so that a future threat from a highly advanced aggressor can be met. Development of this kind improves the prospects of detecting an attack or the threat of an attack early on. It is also necessary to reduce vulnerability and increase security within vital infrastructure of the society. Losses of human life can also be reduced in conflicts, with regard to both military forces and civilian population.

Development towards network-based defence has to support the total defence in accomplishing its tasks. When an armed attack takes place, the network-based defence has to have rapid response capability with high precision against an aggressor. For territorial integrity, good awareness of the world around provides better prospects for a conflict-mitigating presence at the right place, at the right time and with the right set of capabilities. The ability to contribute to peace and security in the world around also can be reinforced by having mobile and interoperable units. The ability to strengthen our society and socio-economic utilisation of common resources can also be improved with a network-based defence, among other things through support in the event of sea and air rescue and environmental accidents.

⁵¹ Government Bill 2001/02:10, *Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret.*, page 129-131.

The development of today's Armed Forces towards a network-based force is natural in view of the development of society. For economic and technological reasons, a network-based defence has to be largely based on technology developed in the civilian sector and civilian infrastructure. Sweden is in a good position to accomplish this thanks to well developed communication and information technology, including world-leading industrial skills in the area. As a result of close co-operation with domestic industry and its international co-operating partners, Sweden has good prospects for creating an effective network-based defence for the future. In addition, the security policy situation at present is so favourable that it allows for a transformation of the Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces fundamentally provides a modern defence with many units and systems which fit in with the trend towards a network-based defence. The restructuring of the Armed Forces additionally provides a good basis for continued development towards more flexible utilisation of forces, chiefly through improved prospects for co-ordination.

The Revolution in Military Affairs

The "*Revolution in Military Affairs*" (RMA) talked about today originates in Soviet thinking. Based on the experience from the Vietnam, Middle East and Falklands Wars of the 1970s and early 1980s, a fundamental change in the area of military technology was identified: the powerful development of information technology and engagement systems. This was said to provide opportunities to detect and engage targets in near real-time at very long distances and with high precision. The term RMA is often used as a synonym for the development in the area of information technology which Soviet researchers and military experts identified. It was deemed possible to achieve superiority in access to information about the battlefield. The history of war shows that breakthroughs in the development of warfare generally takes place over a long period and require a combination of

- technological advances implemented in weapons and other technical systems
- new military-strategic, operational and tactical concepts
- suitable organisation.

What today is usually named RMA principally relates to a military technical revolution (MTR) which has not reached its full potential in an RMA. The consequences of the development of information technology are in fact only one of the revolutions in warfare. In Russia, two are normally mentioned: mechanised forces and nuclear weapons. Other examples which are often put forward are joint operations and submarine warfare during the First World War, strategic air warfare during the Second World War and the guerrilla warfare of the post-war period.

The Armed Forces of the United States have gone furthest in the exploitation of the present-day RMA. *Joint Vision (JV) 2010* from 1996 – now developed to *JV 2020* – is an overall vision on how the fighting forces of the United States are to be developed and utilised. The basis is modern information systems, but also precision weapons with long range, new and different types of effect and stealth technology. In addition, increased requirements for cost-effectiveness in military operations and a strategic environment with new threats and actors are anticipated. The intention behind *JV 2010* is for American technological superiority and military applications of this superiority to be utilised to bring about a substantial change in the American military and the way in which it conducts war. This spectrum ranges from peace-time operations to deterrence and the prevention of conflicts to success in war.

In order to benefit fully from technological development, the traditional military core functions have been developed into operational concepts: *dominant maneuver*, *precision engagement*, *full-dimensional protection* and *focused logistics*. The key to implementing these operational concepts is *information superiority*, in other words

the ability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information, while limiting the adversary's ability to do the same. The importance of being able to act throughout the conflict spectrum and to utilise information and convert it into action – *decision superiority* – has gradually been emphasised more strongly. The development of organisation and doctrine, relevant training and experience are also stressed to a greater degree.

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Operations and development

The network-based defence has to support our Defence Concept by increasing the efficiency of both development and application of our defence capability, facilitating international co-operation and providing increased opportunities for co-ordination within the total defence.

Development towards a network-based defence means a change from capability linked to individual platforms, for example aircraft and ships, to a future concept based on different services in the military core functions. These services have to be available in networks. In this way, different military functions can be linked together more flexibly and the collective capability can increase. This is made possible by utilising modern technology, particularly in information technology.

A fundamental idea in the network-based defence is increased capability for co-ordination. The focus is moved from the capabilities of individual sub-systems to the capability of the whole system. This requires a network approach where human action and different resources are co-ordinated flexibly. Decision-makers, information and engagement systems therefore have to be integrated into a network organisation – a network of networks at different organisational levels – so that they can be linked together and used for desired massing of effect. As a result, synergistic effects can be achieved and available resources can be utilised more effectively so that the right effect is deployed, at the right place and at the right time. Co-ordination is made easier through a robust, network-based infrastructure for the exchange of information between different units.

With a network approach, the Armed Forces are given a further opportunity to develop new capabilities as required, by creating new combinations of systems and units. An important condition to be met is that there are joint and open interfaces. Development is made easier by the fact that a successive exchange of components can take place instead of whole systems having to be replaced. This can permit rapid and cost-effective development of the Armed Forces and high adaptation capability in different time perspectives.

The network-based defence requires flexible methodology, including situation-matched command, network-based information infrastructure and highly skilled personnel. The development of methodology, organisation, personnel and technology goes hand in hand in a constantly on-going process. The development and introduction of new systems has to take place partly on the basis of an evaluation of how these can reinforce the principles of the manoeuvrist approach. Man is still at the centre, and it is man who is to apply the manoeuvrist approach in the network-based defence.

Fighting power in the network-based defence

Future combat will entail ever greater demands on the right effect being deployed at the right place and at the right time. The ability to rapidly mass effect to threaten, hamper or engage the adversary where the latter is vulnerable is decisive. Utilising all the arenas of military power provides more opportunities for reaching the adversary's weaknesses and achieving a decision. Effective co-ordination of the military core functions is therefore necessary for success.

The network-based defence has to provide opportunities for effective co-ordination. A condition which has to be met is that ways and means in the core functions concerned are developed with the support of modern technology. Development is initially focused on

- *information and situational awareness* (intelligence),
- *command and control with decision support*
- capability for *effect*.

At the same time, other core functions – *mobility, protection* and *endurance* – are developed to obtain a balanced whole with regard to fighting power and action in all the arenas of military power. Good capability in each core function and capability for good co-ordination between them will lead to both increased effectiveness and better utilisation of resources.

The development and integration of the core functions of the network-based defence are to provide better opportunities to apply the manoeuvrist approach, As a result of increased capability for co-ordination and adaptation, the indirect approach, initiative and mission command are promoted.

In the network-based defence, the normal choice of ways and means has to be joint operations with task forces designed for the specific operation. Units from all services can act in a co-ordinated manner in these rapid reaction forces. This provides greater flexibility in dynamic situations and better prospects of attaining the desired effect.

Command and control

An organisation based on networks of networks, where different units and systems can be put together and co-ordinated according to need, improves the opportunities for attaining command superiority. Decision-makers, information systems and engagement systems being linked together and available in networks may lead to a better basis for decisions. It also provides what is necessary to deploy the right effect, at the right place and at the right time. Increased utilisation of information technology in the command and control process increases capability in all phases of the decision cycle.

Information

Attaining command superiority is dependent on access to relevant, reliable and timely information. By exploiting information technology, a joint, network-based information infrastructure is developed with greatly improved prospects of collecting, processing and presenting information. Commanders and units consequently gain better, faster and more reliable access to information. Both content and presentation have to be based at the same time on different roles, that it is to say governed by task, mission environment and the distinctive features of the land, naval and air forces. The purpose is partly to create a good and fundamentally common situational awareness as the basis for effective co-ordination. The fact that relevant, reliable and timely information becomes available to more people also means that the prospects for the application of mission command are improved.

Effect

Accurate effect may signify great geographical precision, but also that the effect has been adapted to the target which is to be engaged. Adaptation may include an assessment of *type* or *composition* of effect in different time perspectives. With a network-based defence, rapid flexibility is obtained in the choice of effect and opportunities for rapid co-ordination. These capabilities are important in order to exploit critical vulnerabilities which have arisen and take the initiative. Accurate effect also permits better economy-of-force.

Mobility

In order to achieve effect on the adversary's critical vulnerabilities, we must have mobility and freedom of action which make it possible for us to reach such points without excessive resistance and before the adversary discovers and responds to our actions. A network-based defence increases the opportunities with regard to mobility as functions, systems and units can be co-ordinated more easily where they are deployed. At the same time, the need for mobility may decrease as the availability of services is less dependent on physical position and distance.

Protection

Our capability to act in the land, maritime, air and information arenas requires protection in all these arenas. A network organisation of systems and units is in itself robust. Effect is ensured through flexible linking together, even if parts of the organisation are knocked out. With mission-specific task forces, the possibility of protection against various types of effect is also increased. Good protection in the information arena necessitates good capability to wage offensive and defensive command and control warfare as well as taking IT security measures. Different command posts in addition have to have capability for physical protection against both conventional weapons and various types of weapons which utilise the electromagnetic spectrum.

Endurance

Joint operations necessitate focused, rapid and flexible support. The need is governed by the task, operational environment and the distinctive features of different types of forces. Like the other core functions, effective combat support is based on good information management. Resources and services can be effectively supplied as required by utilising modern information technology and a network-based organisation. Civilian resources will be utilised here to an increased extent.

RECOMMENDED LITERATURE


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
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Command and control vision for the network-based defence


2. Information in networks

The network-based information infrastructure consists of advanced information systems, including sensors, computer-aided processing and technical decision support. Taken together, this provides greatly improved opportunities for collecting, processing and disseminating information. The units will have systems which permit real-time communication of information and orders.



3. Co-ordination through common situational awareness

Commanders and units gain faster and more reliable access to information through the new systems as well as redundancy so that effect is possible even if parts of the networks are knocked out. Co-ordinated action is made easier by more units having a good and fundamentally common situational awareness.



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