GUIDEBOOK FOR JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDERS

10 February 2006

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FOREWORD

This instructional guidebook is designed as a quick reference tool for future commanders of coalition and joint force land component commands (C/JFLCC). The guidebook is not meant to replace joint or Service doctrine, but is intended to provide an overview of the key elements from each as well as capture the experiences by operational-level joint force land component commander as they planned and executed recent coalition and joint land operations. It also is intended to provide guidance for planning and executing major land operations amid the complexities of the coalition, joint, and interagency environments.

The efforts of C/JFLCCs seek to achieve or support strategic end states. The guidebook focuses on the C/JFLCC's warfighting and supporting roles in the coalition and joint fight. Functional joint force land components play a key role in generating and employing coalition and joint land forces that not only eliminate the will and capabilities of adversaries, but also in supporting and sustaining efforts by all key actors. Success on the land, amid the people, resources, and terrain, is a key element of achieving national policy success.

The guidebook is organized by operational-level functions and systems that the C/JFLCC must consider in establishing his command. Each chapter covers the major considerations that must be addressed in establishing and operating these functional systems to best synchronize and support the efforts of all elements of the coalition/joint land force. In addition, these considerations address how the C/JFLCC also must provide key enabling capabilities for the joint force, either in a supported/supporting relationship to other components or as the joint force commander's lead/executive agent for support and services to US and coalition elements within the designated joint land area of operations. Lastly, each section concludes with a short checklist of questions that will assist the C/JFLCC in crafting commander's guidance to the land component command staff and subordinate commands.

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CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW OF THE JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER/MULTINATIONAL FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER CONCEPT

Combatant commanders and commanders of subordinate unified commands and joint task forces have the authority to establish functional component commands to control military operations.

JP 0-2, ***Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)***

1. Roles for Functional Commands

a. **Joint force commanders (JFCs) establish functional component commands to integrate planning, reduce their span of control, and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapons systems management, component interaction, or control over the scheme of maneuver.**

(1) Functional component commanders have authority over forces or military capability made available to them as delegated by the establishing JFC.

(2) The JFC establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander--normally the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces. However, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the command and control (C2) capabilities when selecting a functional component commander.

(3) The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the establishing JFC and must not affect the command relationships between the Service component commanders and the JFC.

(4) The establishing JFC must designate the forces and/or military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationships the functional component commander will exercise. See Chapter 2, "Command and Control of Joint Land Operations," for guidance concerning C2 of joint land operations.

b. When a functional component command employs forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander's staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available.

c. When a functional component command is composed of forces from two or more Services, the functional component commander must be cognizant of the constraints imposed by

logistic factors on the capability of the forces attached or made available and the responsibilities retained by the Service component commanders.

> ***It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms which will insure victory.***
>
> **Jomini: Precis de l'Art de la Guerre**
> **1838**

2. Considerations for Forming a Joint Force Land Component

Considerations for forming a joint land force component include the following:

a. Expected duration of the mission--must be long enough to merit the increased cost of lead time; personnel and staff training; communications systems support; and impact on flexibility.

b. Anticipated requirement for simultaneous or sequential land force operations.

c. Likelihood of land forces operating adjacent to one another.

d. Possible requirement for special capabilities organic to one land force being required for use by another land force.

e. Amount, level of intensity, and requirement for coordination of other joint force component support to the land forces.

f. Anticipated participation of land forces from other nations--multinational land force operations.

g. **Desire of the establishing JFC to simplify C2 of planning and execution of joint force land operations**, particularly in the era of coordinated and concurrent multinational and interagency operations in a joint operational area.

> ***The primary object of organization is to shield people from unexpected calls upon their powers of adaptability, judgment, and decision.***
>
> **Sir Ian Hamilton**
> **The Soul and Body of an Army, iv, 1921**

3. Responsibilities for a Joint Force Land Component Commander

Although specific joint force land component commander (JFLCC) responsibilities will vary from scenario to scenario, these responsibilities normally will include the following:

a. Advising the establishing JFC on the proper employment of all land forces under control of the JFLCC.

b. Planning and coordinating joint land force operations and employing joint land forces in support of the establishing JFC's concept of operations, to include planning and executing stability and support operations as outlined in the JFC's campaign plan.

c. Issuing joint land force planning guidance.

d. Analyzing various joint land force courses of action.

e. Coordinating with other joint force functional and Service component commanders **(and any established subordinate JFCs and supporting government and nongovernmental agencies and intergovernmental organizations)** to ensure the most efficient joint land force support is provided to the establishing JFC.

f. Evaluating the effects of joint land force operations and providing this analysis to the establishing JFC to assist in the overall joint force combat assessment.

g. Focusing on operational-level functions and their span of control. This includes synchronizing movement and maneuver, organic firepower, close air support (CAS), and interdiction in support of joint land force operations. As a member of the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), the JFLCC normally designates the target priorities, effects, and timing within the assigned area of operations (AO).

h. Functioning as a supported and supporting commander as directed by the establishing JFC.

i. Establishing operational protection and combat identification standing operating procedures (SOPs) and other joint land force directives based on establishing JFC guidance.

j. Providing an assistant or deputy to the area air defense commander for land-based joint theater air and missile defense operations as determined by the establishing JFC.

k. Providing inputs to the establishing JFC-approved area air defense plan and the airspace control plan.

l. As directed by the establishing JFC, coordinating with and providing support to humanitarian support operations to relieve human suffering in the JFLCC AO, particularly intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations.

m. As directed by the establishing JFC, providing overall coordination of logistic support for all assigned/attached land forces.

n. As directed by the establishing JFC and the designated Joint Security Coordinator (JSC), be responsible for a designated joint security area (JSA). The JFLCC only should be assigned responsibility for a JSA that he has the capability to "secure."

o. When multinational land operations will be conducted, being prepared for assignment as commander of multinational (allied/coalition) land forces as shown in Paragraph 4 below.

***Expanded guidance on the responsibilities for a JFLCC may be found in JP 3-31,* Command and Control of Joint Land Operations, *and FM 3-31/MCWP 3-40.7,* Joint Land Force Component Commander Handbook (JFLCC).**

4. Multinational Force Land Component Commander Responsibilities

When US joint land forces are joined by or become part of a multinational (allied/coalition) land force, the US commander of such forces normally will be assigned the following additional tasks that will require additional capabilities:

a. Receiving and integrating multinational forces--conducting multinational reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of multinational forces and materiel.

b. Conducting mission and AO-specific training for multinational forces.

c. Validating/assessing capabilities and interoperability of multinational forces and assigning tasks and missions based on this validation/assessment. The validation/assessment of multinational forces should consider fully the rules of engagement (ROE) under which the multinational forces will operate. **Regardless of operational capacity and capabilities, ROE constraints will be a key factor in determining employment considerations.**

d. Providing additional capabilities/support to multinational forces to ensure mission requirements are met, to include sustainment, communications, transportation, and mission-specific equipment.

e. Integrating multinational forces into the overall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort, to include disclosure/sharing of intelligence, translator augmentation, and formation of disclosure and sharing cells.

f. Integrating multinational forces into AO situational awareness through liaison teams, augmentation of language capabilities, communications augmentation, and information systems integration.

5. Joint Force Land Component Theater-Wide Functions

Joint land force component theater-wide functions will vary from theater to theater and operation to operation. The capabilities to perform these theater-wide functions normally will

reside in the joint force Service components, government and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and/or host-nation (HN) resources. **Theater-wide functions normally will include at least some of the following:**

a. Movement and maneuver within the JFLCC's designated AO.

b. Land-based ISR.

c. Application of fires (to include interdiction fires) within the JFLCC's designated AO.

d. Force protection for all US land forces, designated government/nongovernmental agencies' resources, and multinational land forces.

f. Logistics, to include transportation nodes, lines of communications, main supply routes, services, etc.

g. Land-based air and missile defense within the JFLCC's designated AO.

> ***Promulgation of an order represents not over ten percent of your responsibility. The remaining ninety percent consists in assuring through personal supervision on the ground, by yourself and your staff, proper and vigorous execution.***
>
> **George S. Patton, Jr.**
> **1885-1945**

6. Joint Force Land Component Commander Establishing Directive

The establishing JFC should issue a JFLCC establishing directive that provides the following:

a. Designation of the JFLCC.

b. Specific forces and/or capabilities made available for tasking by the JFLCC.

c. The specific command authority to be exercised by the JFLCC over the forces and/or capabilities made available for tasking.

d. The purpose (mission) of the joint land force in terms of desired effect and the scope of action required.

e. Any required supported/supporting relationships relating to the JFLCC and other joint force components, subordinate joint forces, government/nongovernmental agencies, and multinational forces in the projected AO.

f. Communications systems requirements with the establishing JFC.

g. The JFLCC's designated AO.

h. A listing of any specific joint force land component theater-wide functions.

i. Specific guidance concerning the ROE, to include procedures for requesting changes to the ROE.

j. Any special guidance or instructions concerning security, force protection, antiterrorism, etc.

k. See Annex C, "Joint Force Land Component Commander Establishing Directive," for a sample JFLCC establishing directive.

A man without one scar to show on his skin, that is smooth and sleek with ease and home-keeping habits, will undertake to define the office and duties of a general.

Plutarch, 46-120 A.D.
Lives (Aemilius Paulus)

CHAPTER 2

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF JOINT LAND OPERATIONS

> ***The success of my whole project is founded on the firmness of the conduct of the officer who will command it.***
>
> **Frederick the Great**
> **"Instructions for His Generals," 1747**

1. Interface with the Joint Force Commander

a. The JFC normally will appoint a JFLCC from the Service component with the preponderance of available assets and resources, C2 capabilities, and training to staff and support a land component operation. The JFC's choice to establish a land component command will be based on an estimate of how best to achieve synergy across the joint force. Specific missions or tasks of a land-centric nature also may influence this decision. The JFLCC reports directly to the JFC and advises on the proper deployment phasing and employment of land forces assigned, attached, or provided to the JFLCC. In this dual role, the JFLCC retains responsibility to the parent Service Chief and Secretary, subject to the command authority of the JFC, for the administration of assigned or attached same-Service forces.

(1) **As specified by the JFC, the JFLCC normally will be required to oversee the training, equipping, and logistic support of other Service and coalition forces transferred or provided to the JFLCC under the establishing directive.** This should necessitate the establishment of a joint land component logistic organization to manage common use items for the JFLCC. (See Chapter 8, "Joint Land Sustainment.")

> *"The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the establishing JFC. The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC."*
>
> **JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)***

(2) "**Dual-hatting" a theater Service component commander as the JFLCC may create synergy and unity of effort across the operational systems the JFLCC will manage in the JFCs operating area.** However, such "dual-hatting" also reduces the capability of the Service component commander assigned as the JFLCC to manage other key theater-wide responsibilities. A JFC may consider assigning separate land component and Service component commanders/staffs, but this option will create an additional burden on the force provider and may create "seams" between the Service and operational land component commands. **In most cases, the theater JFLCC and staff likely will retain Service component command responsibilities and functions.**

b. **The JFLCC must ensure the JFC transfers or provides adequate forces to the JFLCC to accomplish the assigned mission.** The JFLCC's capabilities requirement must be established early in crisis action planning, but all commanders must understand that adjustments (sometimes major) will be required. **During this process, the JFLCC provides a continuously updated force estimate to the JFC in terms of capabilities required rather than requesting specific units.** Based upon the JFC's guidance, the supporting Service components will designate specific units, which are transferred (i.e., assigned, attached) or provided to the JFLCC by the JFC. After the forces are designated, the JFC plans and conducts the strategic deployment of forces. The JFLCC, like other functional component commanders, provides recommended phasing of forces to the JFC and works with the JFC and other Service component staffs to control the land force portion of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).

c. **The JFLCC must ensure the JFC delegates an adequate level of command authority** consistent with the situation and the forces transferred or provided. The JFC can delegate operational control (OPCON) of assigned or attached (transferred) forces, but in accordance with (IAW) JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, tactical control (TACON) normally is delegated over forces provided that are not formally transferred. **The command authority delegated likely will change through the phases of an operation.** A critical consideration is whether the JFLCC needs the flexibility to reorganize land component forces or can employ support relationships among subordinates to ensure mission success.

2. Command and Control Considerations

> ***I suppose dozens of operations orders have gone out in my name, but I never, throughout the war, actually wrote one myself. I always had someone who could do that better than I could. One part of the order I did, however, draft myself—the intention. It is usually the shortest of all paragraphs, but it is always the most important because it states—or it should—just what the commander intends to achieve. It is the one overriding expression of will by which everything in the order and every action by every commander and soldier in the army must be dominated. It should, therefore, be worded by the commander himself.***
>
> **Field Marshall William Slim**
> ***Defeat into Victory***

a. **Intent. The single strongest determinant of C2 success will be the degree to which the JFLCC's intent is articulated and understood throughout the land component.** No amount of communications assets or manipulation of command relationships will adequately substitute for a clear statement of commander's intent that is germane to the campaign, precisely articulated, and widely understood. The commander's intent anchors collective efforts in an increasingly complex, ambiguous or conflicting, data-rich, and fast-paced operational environment. Equally important, this intent frames the boundaries for planning and action by subordinates, thus enabling their development of intent and operational designs. Intent must address not only pending combat operations, but also what the JFLCC envisions for the complete depth of land operations that will support the success of the other components and, most

specifically, the JFC's campaign. **Therefore, early in the planning process, the JFLCC must determine the major tasks, methods, and desired end state for joint force land operations.** Further, the JFLCC must decide how it should be communicated to ensure its clarity.

b. **Coordination.** The realities of shared battlespace on the ground, and both contiguous and noncontiguous areas in the land AO, increase the need for greater coordination among joint force functional components. **Clear commander's guidance is an absolute essential to ensuring effective, close, and continuous integration of land, sea, air, and special operations within a common AO, a significant joint force multiplier.** Further, several control and coordinating measures (e.g., fire support coordination lines [FSCLs], boundaries, phase lines) are useful during land component operations. See Chapter 6, "Joint Land Movement and Maneuver," for further guidance on implementing these measures.

c. **Training and Education.** The contemporary operating environment demands an increase in leader professional development and staff training at both the operational and strategic levels—relying on a strong tactical foundation is inadequate, given the uncertainty and complexity of the environment. Trained and ready operational headquarters must be immediately available to JFCs.

d. **C2 Systems.** Information systems connectivity and flexible command relationships are essential preconditions for operational success. The JFLCC must take the lead in integrating and synchronizing all systems as a baseline for a common operational picture (COP). Information systems must be interconnected and organizations trained to use them. In this regard, digital information systems skills for both leaders and staff are absolutely essential. See Chapter 9, "Joint Land Information Superiority."

e. **Transitions.** Transitions between land operation plan phases must be completely woven into the plan and not be mere operational intersections where friction may occur. Changing command relationships, force mixes, and the participation of coalition members, other government organizations (OGAs), IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in land component operations all mandate focused, clearly defined objectives and supporting tasks. **At each phase in the land operation, command relationships will need to be revisited, and possibly realigned or reestablished.**

f. **Effects-Based Approach.** In the contemporary operating environment, effects-based planning and operations require broad application to military and nonmilitary activities. The integration and synchronization of a wide range of activities, both lethal and nonlethal, to produce desired effects is, of course, the optimum. However, all organizations and elements capable of producing these varied effects likely will not be fully integrated in a viable command architecture, nor has any architecture demonstrated that effects can be generated on a continuous basis in every theater, or in the day-to-day shaping activities in every area of responsibility (AOR). Hence, the establishment of interconnectivity and unity of effort among subordinate Service/multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs will be among the most formidable of the JFLCC's responsibilities. See Chapter 12, "Joint Land Planning," for further guidance.

g. **Command Relationships.** The JFLCC must ensure the appropriate command relationships (Figure 2-1) have been established both internally and externally to the land force to enable mission accomplishment. Command relationships between land component force commanders (i.e., US Army forces (ARFOR), US Marine Corps forces (MARFOR)); and between the JFLCC and other joint force component/element commanders (e.g., joint force air component commander (JFACC), special operations forces [SOF] operating in the AO) should be delineated in establishing directives from the JFLCC and JFC as appropriate. This is particularly important for support relationships where the purpose, effect, timing and duration, and scope of the support relationship; authority of the supported commander; and the type of support required from the supporting commander should be outlined.



Figure 2-1. Command Relationships

h. **Battle Rhythm.** The sequencing and execution of actions and events within a command headquarters that are regulated by the flow of information and decisionmaking describes its battle rhythm. Scheduled and unscheduled meetings, briefings, electronic mail, and discussions are the methods by which information is imparted to the JFLCC, the staff, and the chain of command. Left uncontrolled, this rhythm can become a source of friction that drags on decisionmaking. Conversely, by controlling the battle rhythm, the JFLCC accelerates decisionmaking and unobtrusively extends and enhances C2 over the land force. **The keys to capturing and maintaining control over the battle rhythm are simplicity and a sensitivity to the components' battle rhythms.** Simple, focused displays of information delivered in a disciplined way are necessary. Information displayed or discussed should be mission-related. Technology (e.g., teleconferencing, collaboration tools) offers a means to reduce the time

required for conducting essential C2 events. Further, the attention of the JFLCC and staff is pulled both from above, by requirements from the JFC, and from below, by the needs of Service force commanders and their staffs. JFCs need information to function properly within their own battle rhythm. The JFLCC and staff also must be sensitive to the battle rhythm of subordinate organizations. The JFLCC should establish and require adherence to norms that increase the speed of the component commanders' decisionmaking.

3. Command and Control Functions

a. The JFLCC and staff plan, direct, and coordinate movement and maneuver; ISR; fires; C2; force protection; and logistics critical to successful land operations.

b. The JFLCC must ensure the JFC provides the land component sufficient land area to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. However, in identifying the land component AO, the JFLCC should take only what is necessary as the balance will become the responsibility of the JFC or another component—more area is not better. The JFLCC normally will subdivide the land AO into contiguous or noncontiguous areas and assign each of them to a subordinate force commander. **Unassigned areas remain the JFLCC's responsibility.**

c. The JFLCC periodically performs an assessment of land operations that is forwarded to the JFC and used as input to perform a joint operation assessment. Assessments will require the establishment of a systematic approach/process, metrics, and data gathering.

d. **The JFLCC also may be designated as the JSC or as a JSC for part of the JSA by the JFC.** As such, the JFLCC establishes standards and procedures and manages the overall security of the assigned JSA in accordance with the JFC's directives, guidance, and priorities. This is a comprehensive set of responsibilities, often requiring augmentation, and always requiring clear terms of reference for all organizations operating in or transiting through the assigned JSA. Complicating the challenge, multinational partners may have different force protection capabilities and may operate under differing rules of engagement (ROE). The JFLCC may need to appoint a separate JSC and establish a JSC headquarters.

e. The JFC should designate the JFLCC as the **supported commander** within the AO responsible for the integration and synchronization of:

- Maneuver.
- Lethal and nonlethal fires.
- Interdiction.
- Maritime operations.
- Special operations.
- Stability operations with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs.

- Personnel recovery (PR) missions as assigned by the JFC's joint personnel recovery center (JPRC).

f. The JFC normally designates the JFLCC as the **supporting commander** for:

- Other components' counterair and suppression of air defense (SEAD) operations.
- JFACC seizure, control, and protection of forward airbases.
- Joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) seizure, control, and protection of forward ports.
- Joint PR missions, when tasked. The JFLCC responds to operational taskings from the JFC's JPRC.

g. The JFLCC and staff conduct coordination with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs as required to promote unity of effort. Their activities should be integrated and synchronized with land component operations where feasible.

4. Augmentation, Liaison, and Coordination

a. **Joint Manning Document (JMD) Inputs.** The JFLCC and staff must provide timely inputs regarding anticipated, required individual augmentee positions to the JFC who provides a validated JMD to the Service component commanders and the Joint Staff for review and tasking.

b. **Liaison Elements.** Joint warfighting will require extensive exchange of liaison elements at all levels. The reality of shared battlespace on the ground and the number of Service, interagency, and multinational partners increases the need for greater coordination among these entities and among functional components.

(1) **The JFLCC establishes a enabling liaison structure to facilitate support relationships and coordinate the planning and execution of land operations**. The JFLCC should select liaison officers (LNOs) appropriately senior in rank and provide them with the capability to communicate securely with the JFLCC independent of the capabilities of the headquarters to which they are dispatched. The liaison element members represent the JFLCC at various board, center, and cell meetings to include the JFC's joint planning group (JPG), information operations (IO) cell, JTCB, and the civil-military operations center (CMOC). The senior liaison officer should have the experience to provide recommendations to the assigned headquarters staff on the effective employment of the land component in any planned operation.

(2) The liaison structure should account for the existing liaison requirements from ARFOR and MARFOR components to the other joint force functional components, specifically the JFACC. Many of the liaison requirements are established in joint and Service doctrine. However, both the JFLCC and the gaining unit should identify or verify the specific requirement in terms of rank, Service, specialty, and experience. **Each liaison team should represent the**

intent and priorities of the JFLCC; not those of individual, supporting Service component commands. The various liaisons advise and coordinate with other commanders and their staffs on JFLCC plans, capabilities, and requirements.

(3) Likewise, the JFLCC should be prepared to receive and integrate other joint force component liaison teams. Liaison team integration includes reception, briefings, instruction on SOPs, directorate assignments, providing communications and computer network links and tools, and personnel support. Establishing a command reception center can facilitate this effort.

(4) The JFLCC also must be prepared to receive a variety of liaison packages from nonmilitary agencies, particularly those that will help with stability operations. For example, the US State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, will embed a package that has the capability to augment CMOC planning and provide linkages to IGOs and NGOs.

c. **Joint Force Air Component Commander. The JFACC is a key joint team member in shaping success on the land.** Consequently, the JFLCC performs the following to ensure coordination of nearly every action or operation with the JFACC:

(1) Provides a **battlefield coordination detachment (BCD)**. The BCD should have a robust information architecture, a sufficient rank structure to be effective within joint air operations center processes, and the personal trust of the JFLCC. Consideration should be given to integrating the Marine liaison officer (MARLO) normally provided to the JFACC in the BCD organization and activities.

(2) Provides an **assistant or deputy to the area air defense commander** for land-based joint theater air and missile defense operations.

(3) Requests an **air command and coordination element (ACCE)**. The ACCE provides air and space systems employment and assists with air C2, airspace management, ISR, target selection, air defense, CAS, air mobility coordination, and FSCL coordination.

(4) Provides timely and accurate priorities and requirements to **support air tasking order (ATO) development and coordination**, to include the integration and coordination of Marine tactical air.

(5) If designated as the joint security area coordinator, ensures that the **surface area requirements and priorities for the JSA** are integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are coordinated with the area air defense commander, normally the JFACC, who is responsible for defending the airspace over the operational area.

(6) Provides **counterair and SEAD support**, to include support for operations outside the AO.

(7) Based upon total joint and coalition force requirements, requests and coordinates:

- **ISR** support.
- **Space** support.
- **Joint air interdiction and CAS.** This task involves development of and prioritization of targets.

(8) Plans **joint air attacks** within the AO short of the FSCL.

(9) Complies with **airspace control authority regulations** when operating assigned, attached, or provided air assets.

d. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The JFLCC performs the following in support of or in coordination with the JFMCC, even when they are operating in noncontiguous AOs:

(1) Provides a liaison element to the JFMCC. The senior liaison officer should be sufficiently senior in rank and have the capability to communicate with the JFLCC securely. Assesses the need and coordinates the use of communication support ashore or aboard ship independent of JFMCC headquarters' equipment. A Marine Corps officer leading this liaison element is very helpful, given normal Navy-Marine Corps working relationships and knowledge of sea-based capabilities.

(2) Provides support for the seizure and holding of ports. This may involve operations outside the JFLCC's AO requiring special attention to movement and communications issues.

(3) Provides coordination for projecting sea-based capabilities and supports operations, movement, and maneuver in the JFLCC's AO.

(4) Provides force protection capabilities (principally small arms) for maritime assets transporting land component equipment. These requirements must be identified early and in coordination with the JFMCC so they can be validated by the JFC and requested of the Service provider.

e. **Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander.** Joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) missions are likely to occur in contiguous operational areas or even within the JFLCC's AO. Consequently, the JFLCC performs the following to ensure critical coordination with the JFSOCC:

(1) Provides a liaison element to the JFSOCC. The senior liaison officer should be sufficiently senior in rank and have the capability to communicate securely with the JFLCC independent of JFSOCC headquarters' equipment.

(2) Provides general direction of special operations in the AO when designated the supported commander.

(3) Provides support to special operations when designated the supporting commander, to include operations outside the JFLCC's AO.

(4) Provides support for nonconventional assisted recovery operations, when requested.

(5) Requests a **special operations command and control element (SOCCE)** when SOF are provided to support the JFLCC. The SOCCE collocates with the JFLCC staff and performs C2 or liaison functions as directed by the JFSOCC. The SOCCE also can receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the JFLCC. A TACON or support command relationship is typically established between the SOCCE (and any forces under its control) and the JFLCC, but OPCON remains with the JFSOCC.

(6) Coordinates estimates and provides support for JFSOCC communications, logistic, security, etc. support requirements to satisfy Service USC Title 10 and executive agent responsibilities.

5. Joint Force Land Component Interface with Joint Command and Other Components' Systems and Processes, Including Boards and Centers (Figure 2-2)

a. **Planning.** Provide representation in the JFC's JPG (or equivalent). Participate in the JFC's time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) development. Provide inputs into the JFC-approved joint area air defense plan and the airspace control plan.

b. **Intelligence.** Provide appropriate targeting intelligence support, including target intelligence packages, to the other joint force components and the JTCB. Provide and receive support from the theater joint intelligence center (JIC). Actively work to satisfy the JFC's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

c. **Results**

(1) Provide representation in the JFC's **JTCB and IO cell**. These representatives advocate the JFLCC's desired results/target nominations in the respective board or cell meetings (e.g., computer network attack targets). This should include participation in the JFC's campaign assessment process.

(2) Develop IO requirements and the associated measures of effectiveness (MOEs) during the planning process. **These capabilities and processes must address the entire depth of the campaign and are critical to shaping the battlespace before, during, and after operations.** MOE required to assess the effects of a range of IO activities and operations may be resource intensive (polling for example), and the related resource requirements must be introduced early for JFC validation and force provider planning.

(3) The BCD and/or Marine liaison element members will participate in the JFACC's **guidance, apportionment, and targeting (GAT) and ATO development processes**.

JFLCC INTERFACE WITH OTHER JOINT FORCE C2 MECHANISMS		
C2 MECHANISM	**ROLE / FUNCTION**	**JFLCC INTERFACE**
JFC's Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB)	Meets daily to provide broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list.	• JFLCC Representative Attends JTCB Meetings to Represent Land Component Interests. • JFLCC Targeting (or Effects) Coordination Board provides input.
JFC'S Joint Planning Group (JPG)	Meets daily or as required to conduct crisis action planning (to include course of action development and refinement), coordination of joint force operation order development, and planning for future operations (e.g., transition, termination, follow-on).	• JFLCC Representative Participates in all Planning Activities.
JFC's Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)	Provides and produces the intelligence required daily to support the JFC and staff, components, subordinate joint forces and elements, and the national intelligence community.	• JFLCC J-2 and staff maintain daily communication to provide, request, and receive intelligence products as needed.
JFC's Information Operations (IO) Cell	Meets daily or as required to integrate and synchronize IO core, supporting, and related capabilities with other elements of the operation plan.	• JFLCC Representative Participates and Coordinates with the JFLCC's JPG Representative and Other JFC Staff Members.
JFC's Joint Transportation Board (JTB)	Communicates JFC's priorities and adjudicates competing requirements for intratheater lift assets and helps resolve other issues that negatively impact the Defense Transportation System.	• JFLCC Representative Participates.
JFC's Joint Movement Center (JMC)	Coordinates the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) daily to support the concept of operations.	• JFLCC Representative Participates.
JFC's Joint Petroleum Office (JPO)	Plans and manages wholesale theater bulk petroleum support and develops the petroleum logistic support plan.	• JFLCC J-4 Coordinates and Provides Assistance on an as Needed Basis.
JFC's Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)	Coordinates CMO daily among OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs; and plays an execution role.	• JFLCC Representative Participates.
JFACC's Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting (GAT) Process Or Targeting Effects Team (TET)	Processes all potential targets to balance component priorities with the JFC's objectives. Competing concerns are priorities against available assets to produce the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), apportionment recommendations, and CAS allocation.	• Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) provides input and participates, coordinates with Marine Liaison (MARLO). • MARLO provides input and participates, coordinates with BCD.
JFACC's Air Tasking Order (ATO) Development Processes	Produces a tasking document transmitted to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies on projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces to targets and specific missions. The ATO normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions.	• Battlefield Coordination Detachment provides input and participates, coordinates with MARLO. • MARLO provides input and participates, coordinates with BCD.

Figure 2-2. JFLCC Interface with Other Joint Force C2 Mechanisms

d. **Sustainment.** Participation by the JFLCC's logistic directorate in the JFC's pertinent boards or centers is critical. **Key higher-level boards and centers are the joint transportation board and joint movement center.**

e. **Interagency Coordination**. Provide representation in the JFC's CMOC to coordinate land component CMO and other operations with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. See Annex F, "Interagency Coordination." **This is a critical step in stability operations during the "transition" phase of any theater campaign.** It requires the JFLCC's attention.

6. Joint Force Land Component Organization for Operations

a. **Forming and Integrating the Joint Force Land Component Headquarters**. The headquarters is organized according to the JFC's implementing directive that establishes the roles and responsibilities of the JFLCC, and designates the mission and forces assigned. **Normally, the staff will be built around the JFLCC's Service component staff and augmented with members of the other Service component or forces**. The JFLCC's staff should be joint with key staff billets allocated such that all Services are appropriately represented and share equitably in staffing tasks. Key here is that these new members are not simply liaisons--they are part of the JFLCC staff and ensure the synchronized execution of land operations. Forming the staff in advance, to facilitate training and exercising the integrated staff before conducting land operations, is critical to mission accomplishment.

(1) **Split Focus.** If the JFLCC retains Service component responsibilities for all assigned same-Service forces, dual hatting of the staff may burden some staff members with focus and time-management dilemmas. **The JFLCC either must obtain staff augmentation, establish a dual staff arrangement to provide exclusive focus on operational and administrative matters, or delegate all or many of the Service component-related tasks to a subordinate Service force headquarters.**

(2) **Number and Type of Directorates.** The JFLCC determines the number and type of directorates in the staff.

(a) **Traditional Arrangement. A J-staff arrangement normally is adopted** with directorates for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications systems forming the core. Optional directorates for IO; engineering; force structure, resource, and assessment; and civil-military operations can be established depending on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time-troops available and civilian (METT-TC).

(b) **Functional Arrangement. Alternately, the staff may be organized into groups that reflect operational movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, logistics, C2, and protection.** The focused efforts of the staff in these functionally organized groupings may enable the JFLCC and senior staff to maintain a more logically integrated situational awareness across the operating systems, which contributes to sound decision making. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the coalition force land component commander's staff organized by functions (Figure 2-3) that preserved the traditional organization described in the previous

subparagraph, but fused their efforts to generate a more cohesive, synchronized approach to performing the coalition operational functions. Each of these functions match those described in JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, considering that the "operational effects" section performed "operational fires" functions. See also Annex A, "JFLCC Operational Tasks by Function/Group."



Figure 2-3. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Coalition Force Land Component Headquarters

(3) **Forward Deployment**. At some point, a significant portion of the theater JFLCC headquarters (depending on technological capabilities) may forward deploy to plan, coordinate, and conduct joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; and other joint land operations in the AO. The JFLCC normally will forward deploy as soon as the forward-deployed land component staff is operational. **It is critical for the JFLCC to get forward to conduct a personal assessment and interface with as many military, diplomatic, HN, and NGO officials in the AO as possible. Early arrival of the JFLCC also assures the personal opportunity to begin training a staff composed of many new players that will be conducting operational level tasks.**

b. **Joint Force Land Component Subordinate Elements.** The JFLCC plans, controls, and coordinates the land operations of all subordinate commands and elements.

(1) **Alliance and/or coalition forces will be provided to the JFLCC for land operations.** Major concerns are command relationships/authority, unity of effort, liaison requirements, intelligence and information sharing, integration of forces, interoperability of equipment, doctrine and procedures, language and cultural factors, mission assignment, AOs, ROE, logistic readiness and capabilities, and national direction. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, provides additional guidance regarding these concerns.

(2) **Same-Service Forces.** The JFLCC normally exercises OPCON of same-Service forces through subordinate Service force commanders.

(3) **Other Service Forces.** The JFLCC may be delegated OPCON or TACON of other-Service forces. **The JFLCC and staff must understand the capabilities and limitations of other Service forces.** Marine Corps forces OPCON or TACON to the JFLCC will include Marine tactical air assets. These assets remain OPCON to the MARFOR. Consequently, **commanders should specifically address the issue of JFLCC employment/nonemployment of Marine tactical air (that is, independent functional component air operations) during planning**. Thus, the BCD and Marine liaison to the JFACC may need to be integrated. The JFLCC also must be prepared to receive and integrate the elements of a maritime pre-positioning force or the equipment of Army pre-positioned afloat stocks when attached or provided.

(4) The JFLCC must organize and train a synchronization organization (JTCB, for example) that manages a process that completely integrates a broad range of results, to include the effects from non-kinetic, and non-military sources (the interagency, NGOs, etc.). **Absolutely essential to the process is the timely application of capabilities designed to advance the objectives of the land component in concert with the other components and within the JFCs operational construct.** Assessment must be woven fully into the process with appropriate MOEs developed early in the process. **This organization, however it is named, must include expertise from across the JFLCC staff.** At the operational level, it is this organization that, in execution, sets conditions for subordinate land formations (corps, task forces, and Marine expeditionary forces) and is tightly linked to the JFC's results synchronization process and those of the other components.

(5) **Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC).** The JFLCC may employ the AAMDC to ensure that tactical defensive counterair (DCA) operations conducted by land forces are planned, coordinated, and synchronized with the joint area air defense plan.

(6) **Common-User Logistics (CUL) Coordination Organization.** The authority to direct logistics is not resident in the JFLCC's command authority over other Service forces, unless the JFC delegates directive authority to the JFLCC for a common support capability. If so designated, the JFLCC should establish a coordination organization (center or command) to manage land component CUL support.

(7) **Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC).** The JFLCC should establish a PRCC that responds to and coordinates with the JFC's JPRC and controls land component PR missions.

(8) **Other Forces and Capabilities.** It is likely that the land component will be augmented with forces, capabilities, and/or liaison from the Joint Staff, Army Material Command, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Defense Logistics Agency, and the intelligence community. **These forces and capabilities will either be provided TACON, as supporting forces, or for coordination of specialized tasks and services.**

7. Integrating Coalition Partner Forces into the Land Component

a. **Command. Based on the JFC's guidance, the JFLCC may also be designated as the coalition force land component commander (CFLCC). As such, the CFLCC will exercise specific responsibilities as assigned by the JFC for integrating each coalition partner's forces and executing and supporting multinational land operations.** The key considerations are command relationships, C2 capability (including a liaison structure), political/national restrictions to employment, sustainment, training, and incorporation in the land operations plan. **As the CFLCC, the JFLCC takes these on as added tasks that must be resourced with additional forces, funding, and sustainment; all estimated and requested up front.** The directives that establish the entire multinational force (MNF) may clarify those considerations in some detail**.**

b. **Liaison Structure.** The CFLCC should establish a MNF liaison structure with a US LNO/element/team (or MNF-LNO) provided to each coalition partner's maneuver unit commander. **This is the absolute key to integrating each coalition partner's forces into land force operations**. The MNF-LNO structure will facilitate C2 and support during the planning and execution of land operations. **The MNF-LNO structure, unlike the standard US liaison structure, may have to provide the formal communications links between the CFLCC and the coalition partners' commanders**. Dependent upon the size of the coalition partners' units, it may be necessary for their commanders to provide LNOs to the US unit (battalion, brigade, etc.) commanders or to the CFLCC.

(1) The MNF-LNO should have the means to communicate through US networks. If the coalition partners' units have organic, interoperable C2 capabilities, that can be taken into account when determining the formal C2 structure. **The size of a coalition partner's unit and its internal C2 system will determine the depth of the required MNF-LNO assets**. For example, a coalition partner's division may need MNF-LNOs down to the lowest expected maneuver unit (i.e., brigade, battalion, or company). MNF-LNO requirements must be established early in the planning process.

(2) The MNF-LNOs may need foreign language skills or interpreters. Often, because of their capabilities, SOF members have been employed in this capacity. Certain North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and other allies (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, etc.) likely will demand fewer MNF-LNO structure requirements.

c. **Command Relationships and Organization.** The command relationship of the JFC and in turn, the CFLCC, with the coalition partners' commanders will determine whether unity of command or unity of effort will guide the interaction of those commanders and the level of

integration of the coalition partners' forces. While the JFC will determine support relationships among US components, and the JFLCC can establish support relationships among US land force components, establishing support relationships with the coalition partners' commanders may be more difficult. The CFLCC commander and staff must recognize the inherent frictions associated with coalition operations and be prepared to expend additional time and energy to work through these issues--standard C2 arrangements will not be sufficient. **Political considerations/constraints, cultural differences, and military capabilities are all significant considerations and heavily influence the way the coalition partners' forces are integrated into land operations.**

(1) **Military Capabilities.** The military capabilities of the coalition partners' forces may be a deciding factor in the organizational structure of the coalition land force. Less capable units may be trained to a higher standard or assigned less difficult operational tasks with the maneuver forces. **Grouping of like-capable units (also considering political and cultural implications) and their employment as maneuver forces must be balanced against the operational risks.**

(2) **Interoperability.** Failure to ensure interoperability or reduce the associated risk presents a clear threat that all coalition commanders and the CFLCC must recognize. There are material and non-material solutions to interoperability challenges. **Generally, weapons and munitions, communications, and rations are among the basic considerations**. If the coalition land force has sufficient logistic capability, the interoperability issues may not be significant. If not, the CFLCC may have to seek logistic support through the JFC.

(3) **Operational Mobility.** The coalition land force units must be assessed for movement and maneuver capabilities. This is a more difficult challenge than interoperability because maneuver is more than transportation of troops in the combat zone. **If a coalition unit is not capable of maneuver, the CFLCC may have to employ it in another less demanding task (e.g., line of communications [LOC] security).**

d. **Subordinate Areas of Operations.** The CFLCC may subdivide the land AO among the coalition land force components (US and foreign). The CFLCC will consider METT-TC, cultural factors, organization, command relationships, and operational necessity in this task. **If a coalition land force member is from the HN, certain significant political-military considerations may apply to the assignment of subordinate AOs.** Coordination with the JFC and JFACC (who coordinate with the HN) for fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) and airspace coordination measures (ACMs) in the AO may be more difficult for the CFLCC in that situation.

e. **Synchronizing Coalition Land Force Operations.** The CFLCC must determine the ability to synchronize coalition land force operations in the AO. **The CFLCC must continuously assess whether command relationships and the capabilities of the coalition partners' forces enhance the fighting capabilities of US land forces, and whether unity of effort is being served**. However, it should be understood that some political considerations may work against unity of effort.

f. **Rules of Engagement. The CFLCC have a responsibility to ensure the coalition land force is trained and knowledgeable on the ROE**. After the initial training, subsequent ROE changes must be communicated. This is normally done through formal command channels, so the MNF-LNOs may be essential to communicating these changes. Also, some coalition partners may have their own additional ROE.

g. **Combat Identification (CID).** The CFLCC is responsible for CID procedures for US land forces and that requirement carries over to the coalition land force partners. While a number of US units may have high-technology based CID systems (e.g., Blue Force Tracker), the other coalition units probably will not have that capability. **The CFLCC must ensure CID procedures are promulgated to all coalition land force units.**

8. Joint Land Command and Control Checklist

- **Authority:** Has the JFC delegated sufficient command authority of the forces assigned, attached, or provided?

- **Area of Operations:** Has the JFC provided an adequate AO in which to conduct needed land operations? Has the AO been subdivided appropriately by phase of the land operation?

- **Forces Assigned:** Are the forces assigned, and the command relationships established, sufficient to meet all essential, specified and implied missions for the JFLCC, to include support relationships with other components?

  •• Are supported/supporting relationships and tasks clearly understood?

  •• Does everyone work for someone, i.e., are all assigned/attached/TACON elements under a subordinate command (and do not work for a staff section)?

- **Support Relationships Requirements:** Have the support requirements been communicated clearly to the supporting commanders? Can the land component provide the support required from the supported commanders?

- **JFLCC's Vision:** Has the land component's mission, commander's intent, and concept of operations been communicated clearly to the other joint force component commanders?

- **Staff Organization:** Is the staff manned and organized jointly to fulfill both land functional and Service component responsibilities and coordination tasks?

  •• Is the staff organized in a manner to best support the JFLCC--sections versus functionally?

•• Is the land component represented on JFC boards, centers, and cells as appropriate? Are sufficient boards, centers, and cells established to develop, forward, and represent the JFLCC's requirements?

•• Does the staff have "battledrills" and procedures to deal with the recurring tasks/requirements?

- **Battle Rhythm: Does it support commander decisions making?**

  •• Is it nested within that established by the JFC?

  •• Does it facilitate coordination and synchronization with that of other functional components (i.e., synchronized with their rhythms? Where are the friction points?

  •• Is there sufficient connectivity and personnel to sustain this rhythm for the duration of the operation?

- **Liaison:** Has adequate liaison been established with higher, adjacent, lower, and multinational commands; and OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs as appropriate? Is liaison sufficient from and to these headquarters?

- **Critical Information Requirements:** Have the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) been identified for each phase, branch, and sequel; and is the JFLCC prepared to satisfy the identified CCIRs?

  •• Are these CCIRs "tied" to decisions that the commander must make during the campaign?

  •• Do these information requirements support decision superiority?

  •• Does the entire staff know, understand, and focus on these requirements?

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CHAPTER 3

JOINT LAND FORCE PROJECTION

"Future force projection missions, like those throughout history, will demand well developed operational and logistical planning, force mix, appropriate sequencing into and out of a theater, and a constant requirement for soldier and unit versatility. Such missions will require leaders and units that can operate in ambiguity and have the agility to adapt and adjust. Set piece thinking does not fit force projection. All of these requirements will occur in a joint or combined environment."

General Fredrick M. Franks, Jr.
Commander, VII Corps, Gulf War

1. Introduction

Essential to success for the JFLCC is the ability to effectively plan for and execute force projection operations. **The challenge associated with force projection has expanded substantially with the increased emphasis on the use of "force package modules," designed to provide the JFC greater agility and flexibility in the flow of forces into the theater. The JFLCC will be responsible for a significant portion of the joint force projection operation in the theater, supporting the other components even as conditions are set to employ land forces.** Key points to consider in force projection planning include:

a. Prioritizing and tailoring force flow to rapidly "set the theater" for the joint force.

b. Developing force packages and capabilities that provide theater-wide support for the JFC campaign and across the range of military operations.

c. Developing force packages and anticipating requirements to support the other components across the operational functional areas.

d. Establishing who is in charge at aerial/sea ports of debarkation (A/SPODs) and disciplining the entire joint reception, staging, onward movement, integration, and training (JRSOI&T) process.

e. Ensuring force projection operations receive adequate resources and oversight--they are commander's business.

f. Recognizing the inherent joint nature of the process and fully integrate the joint and coalition members of the team as soon as possible.

g. Supporting coalition force projection operations will sometimes "trump" other operational considerations–expect that and develop branch plans to account for this possibility.

2. Force Projection Characteristics

The object of force projection is to conduct decisive operations so rapidly that the enemy is defeated before it can effectively confront US forces. That objective requires **both efficient and effective** projection of US Army and US Marine forces, as well as coalition forces. JFLCCs need to incorporate the four characteristics--precision, synchronization, speed, and relevant information, plus unity of effort, into the conduct of force projection operations across a range of operational activities that will ensure attainment of the desired strategic end state.

a. **Precision.** Units need to be on time, with the required force mix of operational and support/sustainment capabilities, and prepared for rapid integration.

b. **Synchronization.** Synchronizing air and sea flow is imperative so that unit personnel, equipment, and materiel can link-up shortly after arriving at the A/SPOD.

c. **Speed.** Units need to move through all the phases of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) at a rapid rate, but one that can accommodate their preparation operations.

d. **Relevant information.** This includes the timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies as they move from home station to points of integration in the AO.

e. **Unity of effort.** Land component formations, other components, coalition forces and, in many cases, HN commercial activity, will all be entering the AO simultaneously at the A/SPODs and along the routes to and from these sites. **There must be a single commander in charge of these operations with sufficient directive authority to control and manage the actions of all the US/coalition forces as they close into reception and staging areas**. **Equally important is identifying someone in charge of directing operations at each critical node to ensure operations there meet the JFC's and JFLCC's intent and guidance.**

3. Management of Joint Force Projection Operations

a. Management of force projection operations requires the integration of transportation terminal operations, joint RSOI (JRSOI), **movement control**, **automated data processing, satellite communications**, **and information management system enablers** that facilitate execution.

b. **Combatant Command Level. The combatant commander's intent and concept of operations sets the deployment priority**. These should define force closure and articulate the expected sequencing and timing, balance of support/sustainment versus combat power, what risks the combatant commander is willing to assume, and footprint limitations. **Combatant command level planners will work with the components and coalition forces to prioritize force flow movement. The competition for lift is extreme and JFLCCs should remain closely connected to the apportionment of lift for the land component forces.**

(1) **The supported combatant commander needs to influence the deployment process by establishing clear priorities, guidance, and intent.** Planning guidance to the component commanders and the rest of the supporting commands and Services should include:

(a) When major joint force capabilities are required IAW the JFC campaign plan.

(b) What risks the JFC will assume during force build-up operations and what mitigating factors will be used to minimize the levels of risk.

(c) What are the existing "footprint/force cap" limitations.

(d) What joint force capabilities are required in theater to begin each and successfully conclude each phase of the campaign plan.

(2) **Director of Mobility Forces.** The JFC or joint force air component commander (JFACC) **should appoint a director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR)** to function as coordinating authority for air mobility with all commands and agencies, both internal and external to the combatant command. The DIRMOBFOR normally is a senior officer who is familiar with the joint operational area and possesses an extensive background in air mobility operations. **When established, the DIRMOBFOR serves as the designated agent for all air mobility issues in the operational area**. The DIRMOBFOR may work directly for JFC, the J-3, or the JFACC based on the appointing authorities guidance. The DIRMOBFOR should have a robust liaison element embedded in the JFLCC's logistics operation.

(a) When the LCC is established, movements are usually controlled through a specific C2 node that interfaces with both the air mobility operations control center and Air Mobility Command tanker/airlift control center. The JFC-specific C2 node is the joint air operations center. **The DIRMOBFOR also is the main interface between the air operations center, joint force J-4, and theater joint movement center (JMC).**

For a description of a JMC, see Chapter 8, "Joint Force Land Component Sustainment," this handbook, and additional information in JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.

(b) The DIRMOBFOR will coordinate with USTRANSCOM for utilization of strategic airlift assets unless strategic assets are chopped to the supported combatant commander. In that case, those strategic airlift forces usually come under the tactical control to the JFACC and then can be controlled by the JFACC with the advice of the DIRMOBFOR and Air Mobility Division of the Air Operations Center.

c. **Joint Force Land Component Level.** The JFLCC's intent and concept of operations, within the context of the JFC campaign plan, sets the priority of deployment for all land forces. These will define the transportation and force closure of all US Army, US Marine Corps, and coalition units and capabilities to provide the JFLCC with the capability to conduct and/or support JFC-directed operations. JFLCC planners coordinate with the JFC planners, components, and coalition forces to prioritize JFLCC force flow.

(1) The JFLCC must plan for the **proper balance between projecting the force rapidly and projecting the correct mix of operational capabilities IAW the JFC campaign plan.**

(2) **If necessary, the JFLCC must actively seek increases in strategic lift allocation** though the supported combatant commander to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in terms of operational capabilities/combat power versus passenger/materiel requirements.

(3) The **JFLCC must work collaboratively with the other component commanders to identify joint support requirements and to work movement priorities**. The JFLCC has the broadest scope of responsibility among the components for supporting the joint force and must make a strong case for getting selected capability in theater early to more quickly enable the joint and coalition force.

4. Joint Land Force Projection Requirements and Systems

Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the continental United States (CONUS) or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater. It allows a JFC to strategically position forces and materiel to set the conditions for mission success.

a. **Management and Tracking Systems** that are available to the JFLCC are:

(1) **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).** Force projection is an integral part of JOPES. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities. It is used to **track requirements, departures, and arrivals in the scheduling and movement** subsystem of JOPES. Coalition formations do not have access to JOPES and must be managed manually with the proper liaison arrangements.

(2) **Global Command and Control System (GCCS).** GCCS is the worldwide-automated network of systems that supports JOPES. During deployment operations, parent units ensure that deploying unit data provided to GCCS databases is correct. Deployment planning tools to enhance the deployment process and accelerate TPFDD development are the Transportation Coordinators Automated Information for Movement System II and the Joint Force Requirements Generator II. **Securing accurate unit data is a perennial problem that complicates lift and deployment planning.** Although not explicitly a JFLCC responsibility, the JFLCC must work with the force providers to get the most accurate unit data possible.

b. **Stages of Force Projection.** Joint doctrine and the most recent edition of FM 3-0, *Operations*, describes force projection operations in five stages--**Mobilization, Deployment, Employment, Sustainment, and Redeployment** (See Figure 3-1). Deployment is further broken down into four phases--Phase I, **Predeployment Activities**; Phase II, **Movement to and Activities within the Ports of Embarkation**; Phase III, **Movement to Ports of Debarkation**; and Phase IV, **Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration**.



Figure 3-1. The Force Projection Process

(1) **STAGE 1: Mobilization** of forces is the process of augmenting the active forces with units and individuals from the Services' Reserve Component (RC) forces. This portion of the process is the responsibility of the force providers but the JFLCC must determine the requirements, set priorities of force flow, and determine the minimum readiness standards for the land forces. (The JFLCC could be either US Army or US Marine Corps, but regardless, the commander sets the readiness standards for deployment, in turn holding the US Army and US Marine Corps force providers responsible for meeting those standards.) **Many of the JFLCC's early-deploying support units, high-demand/low-density units and individual augmentees are in the reserves. These also are the same units that open and operate ports and provide both combat support** and combat service support to Active Component (AC) combat units. **Due to post mobilization training, processing requirements, force packaging, and transit time, RC units will normally take substantially longer to arrive in country than AC units**. JFLCCs need to plan for this deployment time-lag, request these units early (if possible), and develop branch plans to account for these later arriving RC units and capabilities.

(2) **STAGE 2: Deployment** is not administrative or logistic function--it is an essential element of Operational Movement that marshals forces in theater for decisive tactical operations in the land AO. It requires an operations lead with coordination and support from logisticians,

planners, and other support elements to successfully accomplish the deployment of forces. **It is important to remember that operational decision-makers must drive deployment decisions**. The concept of deployment must match the concept of employment of the joint force, recognizing the competing needs for limited available lift. The JFLCC's deployment plan must factor in those early requirements associated with **properly and adequately "Setting the Theater"** (communications systems, air defense coverage, sustainment stocks) as well as posturing the land force for operations that will range from high end combat to executing stability and support operations. Managing risk, identifying and deploying the proper mix of land force capability, at the right time and place must have the JFLCC's attention and personal direction. This includes addressing the operational and logistic needs of joint and coalition forces, which is extraordinarily complex.

(a) A **TPFDL serves as a point of departure in the creation of force packages.** Although recent operations have emphasized the use of individually approved force packages, **the TPFDL process is utilized** to balance the need to rapidly project forces within the constraints of available lift. The TPFDL **is both a force requirements document and a prioritized movement document**. The US Army and the US Marine Corps develop separate Service-specific/sourced TPFDLs. These two TPFDLs must be managed very closely as two separate documents based on established priorities and lift availability. **The JFLCC establishes the priority for movement of US Army and US Marine Corps units and capabilities based on the JFLCC concept of operations.** Although this makes the process more cumbersome, close coordination between the JFLCC planners and the US Army and US Marine Corps Service component force provider planners will result in a synchronized deployment process.

(b) **Force Tailoring.** Force tailoring is **the process of determining the correct mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units and capabilities** designed to provide the JFLCC with the required capabilities to conduct land operations in support of the JFC campaign plan. Force tailoring provides the JFLCC with the required operational functional capabilities to conduct operations across the range of military operations.

(c) **Force Packaging.** Force packaging is the **development of discrete groupings of units and capabilities into deployable and defendable "force packages"** based on the JFC campaign plan and, specific strategic requirements, and JFLCC operational needs. A typical "force package" will contain a mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units and capabilities designed to provide the JFC and/or JFLCC with strategic and/or operational capabilities across the range of military operations.

(d) **Request for Forces.** A request for forces (RFF) is **based upon projected mission requirements**. It is usually **derived from an existing or a recently developed TPFDL developed through intensive analysis theater requirements. The RFF serves to activate a request for capability,** alerting the chain of command and civilian leadership of a requirement to move a unit off a planning document and into theater. These RFFs are incorporated within warning orders, planning orders, and alert orders if appropriate. Approval authority rests with the Secretary of Defense.

1. **The RFF process.** The JFLCC and other components **will submit their requirements with their analysis of the operational needs over time** to the supported

combatant command for approval. The supported combatant command will forward the approved requirements to the Joint Staff (JS) for the authorization of forces. The JS will coordinate with the Services, supporting combatant commands, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), and other sourcing commands (force providers). Once coordinated with the force provider, the request is submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval, who provides authorization for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to cut deployment orders. Force providers may be from either the AC or RC. **The approval process for these RFFs can be lengthy. Early informal coordination with force providers and the Services can expedite the process. However, in the case of RC forces, force providers and the Services are limited in what they can do to alert and prepare units until they have formal notification issued by the JS.**



Figure 3-2. The Deployment Process Continuum

For a detailed description of the JOPES Process, see CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I: Planning Policies and Procedures; CJCSM 3122.03A, JOPES Volume II: Formats and Guidance, and CJCSM 3122.02B, JOPES Volume III: Crisis Action TPFDD Development and Deployment Execution.

2. **RFFs are closely reviewed at all levels.** It is essential that **JFLCCs develop an effective method/format to communicate their force requirements that facilitates the ability to be specific in what they want, why they need these forces, and when they want them. The JFLCC's RFF must include sufficient information to pass review/scrutiny at all levels of the approval process,** as well as to support the force providers as they work to source the requirements. Given the criticality of this process, **robust liaison between Service and land component staffs should be established.** For complete information and format for preparing

RFFs, refer to CJCSI 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*, w Change 1; or JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.

(e) **Transportation Closure versus Force Closure.** Transportation closure is the arrival date of specified movement requirements at an A/SPOD. Force closure is the point in time when the supported combatant commander determines there are sufficient personnel and equipment resources to carry out the assigned task.

1. The **JFLCC tracks the strategic deployment status of his allocated forces** through USTRANSCOM, the JMC, and the DIRMOBFOR. This enables the JFLCC to update the JFC on JFLCC capabilities, to anticipate the arrival of units and capabilities, and to plan for a smooth and efficient JRSOI&T process.

2. The **JFLCC must clearly determine what the readiness/preparation for combat standards are for "force closure" and assures there is a well understood reporting process** to monitor formations as they move through the process of (JRSOI). **The JFLCC tracks the status of his combat power from arrival in the A/SPOD through the completion of training and throughout the operation.**

c. **Strategic Movement to the Theater**

Strategic mobility includes air mobility, sealift, and prepositioning (PREPO) equipment, both afloat and ashore. Figure 3-3 illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of each of the three elements of strategic mobility.

(1) Arrival/departure airfield control groups (A/DACGs) need to be established at aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) to ensure that adequate ramp space, fuel, communications infrastructure, and support is allocated for air mobility operations.

(2) The integration of the intertheater and intratheater movement control systems is the joint responsibility of USTRANSCOM and the supported combatant command. **USTRANSCOM normally establishes forward elements within the theater** to coordinate intertheater transportation information with the supported combatant commander's agencies. **Given the JFLCCs responsibilities in joint force projection, it is imperative that there be close linkage between USTRANSCOM elements and the JFLCC.**

(3) The JFLCC's US Marine Corps component has a **strategic mobility officer (SMO)** and an **embarkation officer organic to their Marine air-ground task force staffs** for all deployment and redeployment operations. SMOs coordinate US Marine Corps movement requirements with the JFLCC, supported combatant command, the theater JMC, and USTRANSCOM.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the Strategic Mobility Triad	
ADVANTAGES	**DISADVANTAGES**
AIRLIFT	
* Rapid deployment of light combat and supporting units; * Flexibility of employment.	* Small sustained delivery capacity; * Airlane dependent; * Dependent on availability of major airfields; * Requires cooperation of foreign governments.
PRE-POSITIONING (Ashore)	
* Rapid deployment of heavy combat and supporting units; * Reduces movements required for deployment and redeployment.	* Lacks flexibility; * Airlift dependent; * Fixed sites may be easily targeted for attack; * Requires cooperation of foreign governments; * Finite capability.
PRE-POSITIONING (Afloat)	
* Rapid deployment of heavy combat and supporting units; * Reduces movements required for deployment; * Flexibility of employment.	* Dependent upon suitability of port facilities and debarkation locations; * Sealane dependent; Airlift dependent.
SEALIFT	
* Sustained delivery of heavy combat and supporting units and their sustainment; * Flexibility of employment.	* Seaport dependent (less Afloat Pre-positioning Force); * Sealane dependent.

Figure 3-3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the Strategic Mobility Triad

d. **Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration**

This is the fourth phase of deployment. An efficient and timely inter-theater and intra-theater movement of cargo, personnel, and information is key to **responsive force projection** and **successful theater RSOI.** A comprehensive plan for reception and onward movement requires command involvement, close joint and coalition coordination, and a degree of flexibility. The JFMCC plays a key role in directing sealift to the seaport of debarkation (SPOD) and providing operational protection of the sea lines of communications and the port areas. HN coordination and support is critical to effective JRSOI operations. There must be robust liaison between the JFLCC and the HN throughout the process. **JRSOI works only if all the necessary JRSOI resources are pre-staged and ready to receive forces**. JRSOI **support organizations** can include **US forces, HN assets, contractors, or coalition support forces**. JRSOI is the **critical link between strategic deployment and tactical employment**. To ensure that JRSOI is accomplished properly and in a timely manner, the JFLCC may consider designating which command post (CP) is responsible for the various phases. For instance, **the JFLCC's rear CP (the J-4) may be designated for overseeing reception, staging, and onward movement and the main CP (the J-3) may be designated to oversee integration**. In all cases during reception, staging, and onward movement the JFLCC needs to remember to be flexible and plan for excess capacity to handle slow downs in throughput. See Figure 3-4.



Figure 3-4. JRSO&I Concept and Planning Timeframes
(Note: Times are for illustration purposes only)

(1) **Reception.** Reception is the first segment of JRSOI, and its **main goal is to receive and track equipment and personnel from strategic lift and clear the A/SPODs as quickly as possible**. The JFLCC should not perform staging and integration processes in the A/SPODs.

(a) **Synchronizing personnel and equipment arrivals**. **Nearly all deploying personnel will enter the theater at APODs.** However, approximately 90% of the equipment will arrive at SPODs. It is imperative that the JFLCC and JFC synchronize the arrivals so that personnel are not waiting for equipment or vice versa.

(b) **Historically, it is a shortage of materials handling equipment (MHE) that poses the greatest challenge to expediently clearing the port facilities.** Commercial and coalition capabilities may reduce this challenge and should be considered during the planning phase.

(2) **Staging.** Staging **includes the assembling, temporary holding, and organizing of arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into units and forces**, and preparing them for onward movement, integration, and employment. Engineer units, HNS, and contractors are required early to establish bed down sites and other camp infrastructure. Establishing these sites is an essential element of "setting the theater" and must be a priority task to include the early deployment of these capabilities.

(a) Staging area **real estate management remains critical** to support transient units. Units require room to organize, assemble equipment, prepare to move, and eventually "line up"

to depart the staging area. The JFLCC J-3 is responsible for **assigning battlespace, to include staging areas and base camps**. Normally the JFLCC engineer or J-4 is responsible for managing the use of these areas.

(b) **Staging areas and other base camps must provide** C2, life support, supply, maintenance, transportation, and medical support.

(c) **Common-user logistic support** within the staging areas **will greatly reduce duplication of effort** and the size of the logistic footprint.

(d) It is **imperative to plan and have enough transportation**, especially heavy transportation moving into, within, and out of the staging areas, and the movement control to coordinate and monitor movement.

(3) **Onward Movement.** Onward movement is the **process of moving units and accompanying materiel from reception facilities and staging areas to tactical assembly areas** or other operating areas.

(a) Transportation for onward movement will be a major issue, and identifying the number and types of vehicles during the early stages of planning is imperative. Assets will most likely come from echelon above corps units, host-nation support (HNS), and contractors to push and support the JRSOI effort as far forward as practical.

(b) The Theater Sustainment Command's sustainment brigades are the "heart and soul" of onward movement and will be in continuous coordination with the theater JMC to support the commander's concept of operations. **It must enforce movement priorities, deconflict main supply routes, and efficiently use transportation assets.**

(c) **The JFLCC should plan that units transiting main supply routes (MSRs) will be particularly vulnerable to interdiction**. The JFLCC should consider using HN or multinational forces to protect the MSRs and minimize the resource impact to the operational units moving forward.

(d) Force tracking is important and may be one of the JFLCC's critical information requirements. The JFLCC must have a good "handle" on his combat capability and this will change daily during the JRSOI process. Movement control teams are very important in providing manual reports regarding onward movement status. **Clear reporting procedures between movement control teams and the sustainment brigades are vital.**

(4) **Integration. Integration is the synchronized transfer of mission-ready units into the JFLCC's force**. It is complete when the receiving commander establishes C2 over the arriving unit and the unit is capable of performing its assigned mission. Integration occurs incrementally as permitted by onward movement and facilities available.

(a) **One of the most significant challenges the JFLCC will face is providing units the training time and resources required to prepare for future operation IAW the JFC campaign plan and the JFLCC major operations plan.**

(b) **Integration Training.** Tactical units should continue both individual and collective training, and the JFLCC should consider conducting large-scale combined arms exercises as part of final training preparations.

> *Additional information on JRSOI can be found in JP 4-01.8,* Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.

e. **STAGE 3: Employment** is the use of forces. The JFLCC must capitalize on the strengths that each Service component and coalition land force can contribute to the fight. Likewise, these same forces have their limitations that also will dictate employment considerations. Coalition forces employment options in particular may be constrained by political considerations. Supportability also will weigh heavily in force employment considerations, as will rules of engagement limitations.

f. **STAGE 4: Sustainment** is the provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. **The US Army and US Marine Corps have varied doctrinal definitions of basic loads and calculations of expenditure rates equating to different stockage and sustainment rates**. Further, the JFLCC will be responsible to provide a high degree of sustainment support to the joint force, in particular to coalition members. **Developing an accurate estimate of these operational sustainment requirements is a major responsibility and challenge for the JFLCC and his J-4.**

g. **STAGE 5: Redeployment** is characterized by the **timely and efficient recovery, reconstitution, and relocation of forces and materiel** to their home and/or demobilization station, point of origin, or subsequent operational area. JFLCCs will have to request approval for unit redeployment from the combatant commander. The combatant commander should publish specific guidance for redeployments requested by the components, to include lead-time prior to desired departure dates. **Redeployment is not just a reversal of deployment**, and the JFLCC will again play a central role and must plan to begin redeployment well before the campaign successfully achieves the desired end state.

5. Deployment Challenges for the Joint Force Land Component Commander

a. **Intertheater Lift Constraints.** The JFLCC will most likely not get the airlift desired and will rely heavily on sealift. Although reasonably dependable, capabilities deployed via sealift move considerably slower.

b. **Limited A/SPOD Throughput.** During planning, coordinate with the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (formerly Military Traffic Management Command), which maintain throughput calculations and infrastructure assessments on many seaports throughout the world. Throughput can be expedited when vessels are loaded with formations that are task organized, as they will fight. Ensure that APODs have arrival/departure airfield control groups (A/DACGs) to process throughput; and SPODs have port support activities (US Army) and port operations groups (US Marine Corps) to process throughput at seaports.

c. **Working Maximum On Ground (MOG) Capabilities.** The overriding consideration of any airfield is MOG. Parking MOG is the number of aircraft that can fit, or be parked, on the ground. Working MOG pertains to how many parked aircraft can be worked based on available personnel, MHE, and ramp space. During planning, consider using the planning tool to model military air terminal operations--base resource and capability estimator--which can validate MOG values among other air terminal operations.

d. **Aircraft Bed-Down Limitations.** During planning the Aircraft Beddown Allocation Module can be used to match aircraft requirements to operating location limitations. It can produce solutions by core unit type code packages and operating locations.

e **Host-Nation Support Availability.** See paragraph 4 and Annex D, "Working with the Host Nation."

f. **Diplomatic Clearance Requirements.** Foreign countries have placed various restrictions and limitations on the movement of aircraft, ships, and in some cases, cargo across their boundaries. These countries have further prescribed certain procedures to be followed to acquire permission (diplomatic clearance) for aircraft, ships and cargo movement over their borders. Use DODD 4500.54G, *Department of Defense* (DOD) *Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG)*, and its classified volume to determine restrictions that apply for specific countries and procedures to follow to obtain diplomatic clearances from those countries. **Country/Diplomatic clearances should be worked through the Department of State.**

g. **Reserve Component Mobilization Training.** Supported combatant commanders have authority over mobilization plans, to include **post-mobilization training activities and deployability validation procedures** for assigned RC forces. JFLCCs should coordinate with the combatant commander as to what standards have been set.

h. **Required Equipment Modifications (e.g., Blue Force Tracker).** What new technology, capability, or modification is available to assist the JFLCC and operators enhance situational awareness, operational C2, improve over-the-horizon communications, deconflict airspace, or enhance equipment to operate more efficiently?

6. Projection Operations with Multinational Forces

a. Multinational support is a force multiplier. Many US allies and other coalition nations have capabilities or functional units similar to US capabilities. **The JFLCC should consider complementary multinational capabilities during planning.**

b. To assure coordination of force flow and prevent duplication, **the JFLCC must know what standardization agreements are in place between participating nations and what agreements still need to be negotiated**. **These coordination activities are conducted at the combatant command level but require the active involvement of the JFLCC through liaison or close staff coordination.**

c. Due to differences in doctrine, organizations, weapons, equipment, and terminology, the **JFLCC needs to ensure that standardized procedures and reporting formats are established**. Use existing procedures and reports as a starting point.

d. Normally, responsibility for logistic support (including transportation) remains with individual participating nations. However, if the US is going to provide strategic lift to multinational forces, movement requirements will have to be coordinated because movement data for other nations may not be described in logistic terms compatible with the US TPFDD management systems. Planners must **refer to the appropriate acquisition and cross-servicing agreement for each country** to determine what type of logistic support (to include intertheater and intratheater transportation) and reimbursement methods have been agreed upon. (See discussion in Chapter 8)

> ***Force does not exist for mobility but mobility for force. It is of no use to get there first unless, when the enemy arrives, you also have the most men—the greater force.***
>
> **Mahan**
> **Lessons of the War with Spain, 1899**

7. Joint Land Force Host Nation Force Projection Considerations

a. **Early planning, negotiations and emplacement of HNS is essential to reducing the time, effort, and forces required to establish JRSOI capabilities.** HN personnel and organizations can effectively perform many of the force projection functions because of their familiarity with language, local customs, terrain, transportation and communication networks, facilities, and equipment. **The scope of HNS is limited only by the availability of resources and the ability of the United States and the HN to reach agreements concerning their use.** Additional information working with the HN can be found in Annex D.

b. The JFLCC needs to know **what HNS functions and services are available** as early as possible to help reduce the amount of support to be deployed.

c. The JFLCC needs to know **what HN infrastructure is going to be shared** and at what percentage with the HN.

d. The JFLCC should establish a **single office to serve as the lead agent** to manage and coordinate all HNS; this may be the civil affairs officer or the J-4.

8. Guidance to the Staff on Joint Land Force Projection Planning and Execution

- First priority is getting the right operational capabilities into the area of operations to properly set the theater for follow-on force flow and operations--maximize HN and Service specific capabilities.

- Plan on A/SPODs that the command reasonably believes will be available and determine both their capabilities and constraints.

- Determine how much land force capability will have to be allocated to support the JFC and the other components and coalition forces.

- Coordinate with the combatant command to determine how much and what directive authority will be required to conduct JRSOI operations.

- Provide the JFLCC a recommendation as to what will be the minimum readiness levels acceptable from the US Army and US Marine Corps.

- Identify early the staging areas, base camps, and training ranges will be available from the HN for incoming forces.

- Determine and prioritize what must come by air versus what can be received via sealift.

- Determine the early estimates of sustainment requirements needed to support JRSOI.

9. Joint Land Force Projection Checklist

- **Commander's Intent:** What is the JFLCC's intent (based on the approved JFC's concept of operations) for the forces required and their deployment sequencing?

- **Forces Required:** Based on mission analysis:

  •• Tasks and Authorities: What tasks must the JFLCC accomplish for the joint force and what authorities are given by the JFC to conduct JRSOI operations?

  •• What operational requirements (US Army Service component command (ASCC) and Title X) does the JFLCC have for supporting the joint, combined, and theater-wide campaign plan?

  •• Do the JFC, component, and Service force providers know, understand, and accept the JFLCC's analysis of the forces required and their deployment sequencing?

  •• Has a force list that addresses the requirements of the entire campaign been determined and coordinated with the other components, Service commanders, and force providers?

  •• Is there correct representation at the TPFDD Conferences to communicate the JFLCC's requirements and intent?

  •• **Prepositioned Stocks:** What US Army and US Marine Corps pre-positioned stocks (Army PREPO stocks, both afloat and ashore; and maritime PREPO ship(s), respectively) are available and in what quantities?

- **Force Flow:** Has the JFLCC determined and prioritized through its components what must come by air versus what can be received via sealift? Do the priorities get the right operational capabilities into the area of operations to properly set the theater for follow-on force flow and operations, i.e., maximize HN and Service specific capabilities?

- **Setting the Theater for RSOI**: Are forces, resources, and space adequate for receiving the entire force?

  •• What staging areas, base camps, and training ranges will be available from the HN for incoming forces?

  •• What intermediate staging bases and forward operating bases are available?

  •• How many A/SPODs are available for use and what are their capabilities?

  •• Have the second and third order impacts of losing an A/SPOD been identified?

  •• How much HNS and contractor support is available, to include functions and services?

  •• What capabilities can be provided by US and HN contract support, and do conditions support the use of contractors rather than military personnel?

  •• How much of the theater opening capability is not immediately available due to RC forces?

- **Command and Control:** Is it clear that the force projection requirements are the Commander's, executed by the J-3, supported by the J-4 and the rest of the staff?

  •• How will the JFLCC receive updates on the building of combat power?

  •• Is there a commander assigned responsibility for each major port or node in the process?

  •• Is it clear to arriving units what the standards and procedures are so as to avoid "free-lancing" that will consume time and resources?

- **Integration:** What will be the minimum readiness levels acceptable from the US Army and US Marine Corps that must be met before arriving units are declared "ready for employment"?

- **Clearances:** What country clearances are necessary and when are they required? Is adequate overflight available?

- **Information**: Are the public affairs personnel prepared for reporters seeking interviews on such issues as readiness, support mechanisms for families, and the impact of deployment on local communities?

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TAB A TO CHAPTER 3

JOINT LAND FORCE PROJECTION PROCESSES AND PRACTICES

1. The Request for Forces Process

The RFF process begins with and in depth **mission analysis of the tasks specified and implied for the land component during the Campaign**. **These must also include all associated tasks through which the land component command (LCC) must support not only the land forces, but other joint, coalition and interagency elements with forces and capabilities as well**. As the following diagram (Figure 3-A-1) illustrates, the process has many complex steps where communication, tracking of changes, and deconflicting priorities are key to success:



Figure 3-A-1. The Request for Forces Process

- The RFF process begins with the identification of units and/or capabilities required by the JFLCC, JFLCC component, or JFC Component for ASCC or Title X support to accomplish JFC assigned or implied tasks

- These force requirements or capabilities are evaluated and consolidated by the JFLC C-5, approved by JFLCC and submitted to the JFC C3/C5 as a request for forces. Simultaneously, the JFLCC informs the appropriate Service and the Service force provider of the pending RFF to ensure continuity and synchronization throughout the RFF process.

- The JFC C3/C5 validates and consolidates the requests from JFC components and submits the formal RFF to the JS. Simultaneously, the JFC informs USJFCOM of the pending RFF and continuously coordinates with the JS to ensure continuity and synchronization.

- The JS submits the RFF to USJFCOM for joint force allocation through a Service force provider. The JS also coordinates the pending RFF with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

- Once the sourcing decisions are made by the appropriate Service force provider and approved by USJFCOM, the RFF is returned to the JS for submission to and decision by the Secretary of Defense.

- A decision by the Secretary of Defense to approve the RFF triggers a JS deployment order (DEPORD) to USTRANSCOM, USJFCOM, the Services, and the JFC.

- The JFC issues an order that establishes the command relationship between the deploying force and the JFLCC. This command relationship is effective following transportation closure.

- During strategic movement, the JFLCC tracks the status of the deploying unit or capability and prepares to execute JRSOI&T following transportation closure. The JFLCC issues an order that establishes the command relationship of the deploying force to the appropriate JFLC component.

- The keys to success include; early identification of the required unit or capability, unambiguous justification for the requested unit or capability, effective coordination and liaison across multiple echelons of command (joint and Service), and a joint force mindset to ensure the timely processing of the request for forces.

2. Joint Force Land Component Commander Primary Planning Challenges

The JFLCC Commander and his staff face five primary challenges during the force generation and deployment (phase of planning) process.

- **Ensuring all superior, subordinate, and supporting command echelons (Joint and Service) <u>understand</u> and <u>accept</u> JFLCC's intent for the forces required and their recommended deployment sequence.** This coordination experiences the highest levels of friction during the geographic combatant commanders force generation and TPFDL

development conferences as each component command argues for its recommended flow of forces.

- **Synchronizing the deployment sequence (flow)** of Army, Marine, and Coalition forces into the A/SPODs, through the JRSOI&T nodes, and into their tactical assembly areas or attack positions.

- **Justifying theater level enablers**. To those not familiar with the complexity of tasks that the land component accomplishes to enable tactical units as well as the joint fight, many of these units may appear to be duplications, or excess "padding." The JFLCC and his planners must be prepared to explain the distinct functions of these elements (i.e., how they are separate and distinct capabilities from those resident in tactical-level units) and justify how they enable the operational level fight by performing key preparatory and enabling tasks that allow the warfighters to focus on the tactical fight. An example would be that all engineer forces are the same--"theater" engineers that perform facilities, construction, contacting, etc., for infrastructure versus tactical "combat" engineers that support mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability for maneuver forces.

- **Justifying corps level enablers** (corps separate brigades).

- **Justifying the requirement for non-standard corps and theater level enablers**. Articulate the need for specialized capabilities, such as those needed for support to the interagency and international planning headquarters and sensitive site exploitation capabilities where weapons of mass destruction are suspected, etc.

3. Constructing Land Component Command Force Modules

In the RFF process, components submit their options for phasing and employing forces during the campaign. These forces are then approved and resourced incrementally. The following diagram provides an example of how Force Modules were utilized during OIF. Key here is that this is only a request and approval process; strategic movement must still be coordinated through USTRANSCOM.

- Under this process, the JFLC developed a series of "force modules" to enable CFLCC to "identify and defend" the forces (units and capabilities) required for the execution and sustainment of land operations.

- The rationale was to "build force packages" that contained the combat, combat support, and combat service support units and capabilities required for the execution of land operations. Each "force module" contained the units and capabilities required by the primary combat element, the gaining corps headquarters, and the theater base. See Figure 3-A-2.



Figure 3-A-2. CFLCC Force Module Construct--January 2003

4. Coalition Forces Land Component Command Preparatory Tasks

During OIF, the CFLC planned for and executed a series of "preparatory tasks" to establish theater conditions to provide an initial level of operational command and control, operational force protection, operational sustainment, and to enable the JRSOI&T of US Army, US Marine Corps, US Air Force, and coalition units. Figure 3-A-3 is a sample of the tasks planned and conducted to "set the theater" for joint success.



Figure 3-A-3. Sample CFLCC Theater Preparatory Tasks--Summer 2002

5. **Key Things the Land Component Command Plans Staff Must Tell the Commander**

- A recommended flow of JFLC forces into the AOR based on the approved or developing JFLCC concept of operations. This recommended force flow should also show the force flow of the other JFC components within the context of the JFC's campaign plan.

- Recommendations, based on joint major operations planning, on where, when, and why theater level troops are required. This includes an estimate of ASCC and Title X requirements and responsibilities if the JFLCC is also the ARFOR.

- Recommendations, based on joint major operations planning, on where, when, and why corps level troops are required.

- Recommendations on the specific capabilities the JFLCC can reasonably expect to receive from the host nation. These estimates are based on planning estimates (acquisition and cross-serving agreements and theater security cooperation estimates) of host nation capabilities balanced against host nation requirements.

- An estimate of the expected coalition contributions, when they are expected to arrive in the theater, and what theater and corps level support is required by each coalition contribution.

- Recommendations on the specific timings of the strategic deployment of the expected coalition contributions. Additionally, a running estimate of the impact of accelerating or decelerating the arrival of coalition forces upon the overall strategic deployment of JFLCC forces should be developed.

6. **Key Guidance the Joint Force Land Component Commander Must Provide to the Staff**

- A clear intent (based on an approved or developing concept of operations) for the forces required for JFLC operations and their deployment sequencing.

- Guidelines on their authority to "speak for the JFLCC" on specific force requirements and deployment sequencing during geographic combatant command force generation and TPFDD development conferences.

- Recurring guidance on where, when, and how the concept of employment will change, and where the transition points will be in the campaign so as to facilitate request and re-sequencing of forces into theater.

7. Force Generation Planning Considerations

- Develop and document the need for theater-level troops through theater security cooperation plans, host nation requirements, and geographic combatant command responsibilities and requirements.

- Matching forces required with doctrinal and non-doctrinal missions assigned to the JFLCC by the geographic combatant commander.

- Develop and constantly update the JFLCC's troop-to-task analysis. This is used as the basis for justifying the forces required to successfully accomplish the JFLCC's assigned and implied tasks.

- Theater security and cooperation plans provide the JFLCC with an opportunity to plan for or even complete unobtrusive "preparatory tasks" designed to set low-level theater conditions to enable future deployment operations. These generally fall into the broad categories of operational force protection, operational sustainment, and operational command and control.

CHAPTER 4

JOINT LAND PROTECTION

Nothing is more exhilarating than to be shot at without result.
Winston Churchill
The Malakand Field Force, 1898

1. Introduction

a. Operational force protection is a major element in land, joint, and multinational operations. The JFLCC plays a significant role in organizing and executing operational protection within the land AO. The JFC may designate the JFLCC as either the JSC or as the executive agent and force provider for many of the capabilities that protect joint forces from adversary attack. Additionally, the JFLCC plays a direct role on behalf of the JFC in coordinating support and synchronizing acceptable operations (to include positioning and movement of forces and air defenses) with the HN government. As the JFLCC controls the AO within which many of the joint and multinational forces are based, the JFLCC must plan to provide security for a significant number of JSAs. It is essential that synchronized, effective operational protection measures be established. **Operational protection is not an additional or separate function--it is an integral and essential part of joint operations.**

b. **Force Protection Defined.** "Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called **FP**." (JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*)

c. **Multidimensional in Nature.** Force protection (FP) is "full dimensional" and achieved through the tailored selection and application of **multilayered offensive and defensive measures,** working across the air, land, sea, and space environments and across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk. It is **a cyclical process, which constantly assesses** the threat and prescribes appropriate measures to reduce the vulnerabilities at risk from elements of that threat. It is not a separate staff function, but an **implicit part of the operation** plan. Lastly, **FP is a means for the JFLCC to assess and manage operational risk by** producing an accurate and comprehensive threat assessment, and developing/implementing measures that can reduce adversary capabilities to disrupt operations to an acceptable level.

d. Fundamental considerations of FP include the following:

(1) **Early Implementation of a Continuous and Balanced Threat Assessment Process.** This continuous process is based on accurate all-source intelligence, used for selecting FP measures.

(2) **Managing, Not Eliminating Risk.** The process supports the commander in **proactive decision making and balancing risk** against end states.

(3) **Synchronizing Efforts Across the Entire Force and with the Host Nation.** FP encompasses all force components, joint and multinational, within the operational area and addresses all aspects of the threat to not only coalition forces but the HN as well.

(4) **Prioritizing and Allocating Protection Assets.** The process identifies and recommends priorities for the commander's decision on what facilities should receive priority of effort in resources.

(5) **Flexibility and Responsiveness.** The FP process, policies, and measures determine the most likely/dangerous adversary actions and must also be flexible and capable of responding to a rapidly changing threat.

e. **Principal Elements.** Establishing early operational protection capabilities under a single commander is essential to success. These capabilities integrate the following:

(1) **Air and missile defense--**in conjunction with the JFACC as the area air defense commander (AADC), synchronize land component defenses against air and missile attack.

(2) **Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) defense --**protects the force and supports the HN in protecting against adversary weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack.

(3) **Antiterrorism** (AT)--to protect critical capabilities from asymmetric attack, or respond rapidly to limit the impact of attacks.

(4) **Defensive IO**--to safeguard information from adversary acquisition.

(5) **Security to operational-level forces and means--**synchronized across all joint and multinational forces in the land AO.

(6) **Personnel recovery--**support joint operations to locate and recover lost personnel.

(7) **Detainee operations--**be prepared to perform the duties of chief, detainee operations, responsible for all aspects of detainee operations to include detention facilities, joint interrogation and debriefing centers , and detainee reporting requirements within the land operational area, while ensuring the detention facilities and debriefing centers comply with applicable laws and regulations. See JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, for additional guidance.

f. Figure 4-1 provides an overview of the force protection process.



Figure 4-1. The Force Protection Process

g. **Future Force Protection Considerations.** Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect the expanding nature of traditional force protection considerations. JFLCCs and their staffs should anticipate and plan for additional security/force protection missions. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OIF demonstrate that evolving force protection and security responsibilities more closely resemble homeland security missions than traditional Department of Defense (DOD) responsibilities. Securing infrastructure and institutions (and in some cases multinational formations) create force requirements that must be identified early in the planning process to ensure successful land operations and enduring end states.

2. Air and Missile Defense

a. The **JFACC is normally designated by the JFC as the AADC** and the airspace control authority (ACA). **The JFACC is responsible for counterair**, both offensive counterair (OCA) and defensive counterair (DCA). The JFACC is specifically responsible for negation and destruction of adversary aircraft and missiles before and after launch. **As the JFLCC supplies the supporting land-based early warning and defense capabilities, to include the deputy AADC, the JFLCC normally**

develops a close working relationship, integrated operational picture, and establishes robust liaison with the JFACC.

(1) **As part of OCA, the JFLCC participates in the joint targeting process.** OCA is particularly important when an adversary has WMD and the means to deliver them. In this process, WMD and missile threats normally are designated as time-sensitive targets (TST) by the JFC. **The JFACC, in close coordination with the JFLCC, prosecutes OCA targets (especially TSTs) within the operational area, and as needed within the land component AO. The JFLCC may support OCA** by attacking TSTs or suppressing adversary air defenses with attack helicopters or Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) assets.

(2) As part of DCA, the JFACC (as the AADC) is specifically responsible for all defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate adversary air and missile systems attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment. **These operations include both active and passive air defense measures.** (See JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*)

(a) **The JFLCC participates in the JFACC/AADC area air defense plan (AADP) development to ensure adequate protection of the maneuver forces against air and missile threats.** The plan establishes an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) for the JFC that integrates all Service, multinational and HN capabilities, to include implementing identification and engagement procedures. Coordination also ensures adequate airspace control procedures and measures are established to facilitate land operations in conjunction with OCA and DCA operations within the AO.

(b) Army PATRIOT missile system assets support both the theater level, for the JFC's defended assets list (DAL), and the land component maneuver forces. **Because the PATRIOT system provides the only credible land-based theater ballistic missile defense capability, the JFLCC must ensure that the JFC's requirements are met while concurrently protecting land forces throughout deployment and maneuver.**

b. **Land component air and missile defense elements contribute toward a cohesive joint DCA** force with the other components and multinational forces as part of an IADS to provide protection of maneuver forces and critical assets.

(1) **Army Assets. The theater AAMDC is the Army organization that performs theater level air and missile defense planning integration, coordination, and execution functions** for the Army Service component or JFLCC. The AAMDC commander is usually dual-hatted, serving as the as the deputy area air defense commander (DAADC) for the JFACC/AADC, as well as the theater Army air and missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD). The DAADC ensures that Army air and missile defense contributions to the IADS is planned, coordinated, and synchronized with the AADP.

(2) **Marine Corps Assets.** The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander normally delegates authority for antiair warfare (AAW) operations to the aviation combat element (ACE) commander, who employs AAW assets in direct support of the Marine ground combat element (GCE). The ACE exercises C2 through a tactical air command center (TACC) that is responsible for planning and coordinating MAGTF air defense operations with the JFACC/AADC. **The TACC is an operational command post and depends on other elements for situational awareness; therefore, it**

is essential that the JFLCC establish early warning and air defense COP linkages with the TACC.

(a) **A sector air defense commander (SADC)** is the MAGTF air defense battle manager, under the ACE commander, who focuses on coordinating and planning tactical air defenses within the Marine area of operations. **However, when directed, the SADC can function as a regional/sector air defense command under the JFACC/AADC, to include responsibilities for integrating non-organic PATRIOT coverage/assets into the MAGTF sector of the land component AO.**

(b) The SADC is located in a sector air defense facility, which is typically collocated with a Marine tactical air operations center (TAOC). The TAOC has sensors, such as early warning radar, to detect, identify, and control the intercept of hostile air threats and is similar to a US Air Force control and reporting center (CRC).

3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Defense

a. CBRNE defense operations consist of sensing NBC hazards against friendly formations, infrastructure, and LOCs, thus shielding the force by reducing the threat, reducing friendly vulnerabilities, and avoiding hazards. Individual CBRNE defense forces are the responsibility of the individual Services and USSOCOM. **The JFC is responsible for ensuring proper placement of CBRNE defense assets in the joint operational area in advance of a crisis or conflict.** As a result, the JFC normally directs the JFLCC to lead and synchronize land protection capabilities. Additionally, while each Service has the responsibility for CBRNE defense, greater effectiveness may be realized through cross-Service operating agreements either at the DOD or strategic level. **When cross-servicing applies, the Army normally supports the other Services.** For example, the Army normally will provide nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) units to monitor and protect the JSA. The JFC may direct the joint force Army component commander to request and field chemical protection capabilities in compliance with Executive or other Service agreements.

b. **The objective of CBRNE defense coordination is to conduct a synchronized operation that maximizes the combined effects of all friendly forces while degrading adversary capabilities.** An adversary's possession of offensive CBRNE capabilities can have a profound impact on US and multinational objectives, plans, and supporting actions; therefore as the "exposed force" the JFLCC must ensure that elements are protected against these threats. This may be accomplished by deploying defensive capabilities across deployment and RSOI areas in conjunction with offensive operations.

c. **The joint force land component must be prepared to conduct sustained operations in CBRNE environments with minimal degradation.** Deployment nodes such as ports and airfields, staging bases, and logistic operations and facilities are decisive points for the adversary and are at particular risk to CBRNE attack because they are normally fixed sites.

d. The JFLCC may need to conduct defensive operations as part of pre-crisis actions taken to deter or prevent an adversary's employment of WMD. Counterforce and active defense operations are also planned to prevent or minimize the effects of adversary CBRNE attacks. Finally, passive defense and consequence management operations are planned to counter, mitigate, and manage the effects of an attack. **The JFLCC ensures all arriving units possess passive CBRNE defensive capabilities and**

are integrated into detection, early warning, and effects mitigation systems for the land component.

e. **The JFLCC plans for and integrates US and multinational defense capabilities to sustain the land operational tempo** using a deliberate process for assessing the vulnerability of US and multinational assets to CBRNE attack. The JFLCC should be prepared to offer CBRNE training to contractors and general support defensive capabilities to multinational (particularly HN) forces, if so requested.

f **Deterrence.** Adversaries may be deterred from provocative action when US forces are sufficiently and visibly organized, trained, and equipped to defeat that threat. **The JFLCC should be prepared to recommend land-related flexible deterrent CBRNE defense options to the JFC.** These options may include offensive IO, media coverage of defense capabilities, and strikes and raids against suspected CBRNE capabilities.

g. **Threat warning and control measures are integrated as a part of overall protection conditions that the JFLCC formulates for the land component.**

h. **Active CBRNE defenses** are measures to detect, divert, or destroy adversary CBRNE weapons and delivery means while they are still enroute to their targets. Simultaneously, timely tactical warning is provided of imminent attack to anticipated targets. The JFLCC may take actions to prevent adversary attacks such as:

(1) Using artillery, conventional, and SOF to detect and destroy threats.

(2) Using offensive IO to dissuade adversaries from employing CBRNE weapons.

(3) Combining operations with the HN to counter and defeat covert and clandestine delivery of CBRNE weapons by terrorist or other groups.

i. **Passive CBRNE Defense**

(1) The principles of avoidance, protection, and decontamination apply to land operations at both the operational and tactical levels. Application of these principles helps to minimize vulnerabilities, protect friendly forces, and maintain the force's operational tempo to achieve the JFC's objectives while complicating adversary targeting.

(2) In conjunction with host countries, particular emphasis should be placed on the following:

- Early warning and detection through integrated intelligence sharing with HN and coalition members

- Visible defensive preparations and training for US, coalition, and HN military forces

- Integrated protection of threatened military capabilities and facilities, to include supporting contractors, as well as civilian populations, essential infrastructures, and facilities

j. **Planning and Execution Considerations**

(1) Effective CBRNE protection begins with a realistic threat assessment of the adversary's most likely and most dangerous means of deliver against targets in the land component AO.

(2) As theater and operational level defensive capabilities are largely based in the Reserve Component, requests for forces (based on a credible threat assessment) must be forwarded early in the operational planning cycle. Theater-level support is generally furnished from Service and other functional sites throughout the joint operational area, to include the JSA. Within the JSA, the JSC normally is responsible for defense integration and assessing/ensuring Service protection capabilities are requested through Service channels and are operational when planned.

(3) **Toxic Environmental Conditions.** The risk assessment and vulnerability reduction also addresses the dangers posed by toxic materials, including radiological contamination and other environmental contamination from industrial or agricultural operations. The commander makes plans to assist the appropriate military and civil authorities to protect against, mitigate, and manage the consequences of these risks when US, HN, or other civilian populations and infrastructures are at risk.

(4) **The JFLCC also assists in determining the appropriate mix of forces to accomplish CBRNE-related conflict termination objectives.** Security and compliance forces, such as combined arms formations, military police, and combat engineers may be needed in addition to specialized intelligence, technical, and medical personnel. The JFC may place SOF in support of the JFLCC to perform civil-military operations, civil affairs activities, and psychological operations (PSYOP) tasks specifically related to CBRNE defense.

k. **Consequence Management**

(1) **The JFLCC is responsible for coordinating support for interagency essential services and activities** required to manage and mitigate damage resulting from the employment of CBRNE weapons or the release of pollution and toxic industrial materials within the operational area. These services and activities can include population evacuation, decontamination, transportation support, treatment of mass casualties, providing food, clothing, and other supplies, restoring public safety, mortuary affairs, and search and rescue.

(2) Consequence management may be required during military operations, to support friends and allies, or be required as part of military support to civil authorities within CONUS. Such activities are normally high visibility events with high local, regional, and international media interest. The scope of devastation resulting from employment of a CBRNE weapon may require responding forces to use military techniques for dealing with the situation that may be counter to civilian norms of behavior. Therefore, the JFLCC should use public affairs to proactively educate the media, and through them the public, on the necessity for some unusual actions.

4. Antiterrorism

a. **Terrorism is a factor that the commander must consider across the range of military operations.** Terrorism may include actions such as such as espionage, sabotage, vandalism, or theft. Terrorist acts not only impede military operations, but also attract significant media attention, which often magnifies the effects of such acts. Combating terrorism involves actions (including AT and counterterrorism [CT]) taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. **AT involves defensive measures** used to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts, as opposed to counterterrorism, which consists of offensive measures.

b. **Programs.** JFLCC AT programs form the foundation for an integrated, comprehensive approach to counter terrorist threats to military installations, bases, facilities, equipment, and personnel. The JFLCC must also be prepared to extend these same programs and supporting capabilities to critical HN and multinational sites to ensure continued unity of effort. The concept has two phases:

(1) **Proactive Measures.** These measures encompass the planning and resourcing of preventive measures, preparation, awareness education, and training that are usually accomplished before a terrorist incident.

(a) Each commander and staff should complete a thorough vulnerability and security estimate. This estimate is used to produce an AT defensive plan that addresses a combination of law enforcement and security assets, fortifications, sensors, obstacles, HN security forces (if applicable), unit guards, deception, and on-call support from reaction forces.

(b) The DOD FP condition (FPCON) system is the mechanism used to increase or decrease protective measures for bases and installations. **The commander of threatened facilities and personnel is responsible for selecting the appropriate response to terrorist threats.** See subparagraph 8e for further information.

(c) AT guards, patrolling, road movements, vehicle protection, and convoy, rail, sea, and air movements should be coordinated thoroughly with other components/Services and continuously reviewed and to counter the changing terrorist threat and add elements of unpredictability to the terrorist's planning.

(2) **Reactive Measures.** These measures involve the crisis management actions taken to mitigate a terrorist incident. When feasible, the HN should take the lead, with the land component in support. Responses to an incident may include the following:

(a) **Resourcing.** This involves committing local initial response resources to include available military law enforcement personnel, security force patrols or guards, and any backup units.

(b) **Augmentation.** The initial response forces may be augmented by additional law enforcement and security personnel or specially trained response forces (for example, special reaction teams, emergency services teams, Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] regional special weapons and tactics unit, hostage rescue teams, or HN tactical units).

(c) **Employing Specialized CT Forces.** Specialized FBI, DOD, or HN CT forces may be requested to address an incident.

c. **Counterterrorism.** Selected SOF units are trained to conduct a full range of CT missions. Combatant command CT forces may be tasked to support the JFLCC should an incident occur within the land AO.

d. **Intelligence and Counterintelligence.** An effective intelligence and counterintelligence program is essential to identify terrorist threats. Additionally, counterintelligence provides warning of potential terrorist attacks and provides information for counterterrorism operations.

5. Defensive Information Operations

Defensive IO integrate and coordinate policy and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information and information systems through operations security (OPSEC), PSYOP, electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), physical destruction, and physical security.

a. **Operations Security.** OPSEC identifies friendly information and subsequently analyzes friendly actions to identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. It then determines indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain, and executes measures that eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities. Thus, **OPSEC may impede and directly affect the adversary commander's decision cycle.**

b. **Psychological Operations.** These convey selected information and indicators to foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals to influence their emotions, motives, reasoning, and ultimately to influence their behavior. **Its purpose is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the JFLCC's objectives**. The JFLCC uses PSYOP to articulate the mission, intent, and combat power of his forces to appropriate foreign audiences. The JFLCC may also be tasked to conduct activities that support strategic-level PSYOP. **However, the combatant commander is the lowest echelon authorized to conduct strategic PSYOP and a JTF commander is the lowest PSYOP product approval authority.** Therefore PSYOP conducted in the land component AO is normally accomplished in support of the JFC's PSYOP objectives.

c. **Electronic Warfare. EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the adversary**.

(1) **Electromagnetic Protection** consists of **passive and active means** taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capabilities.

(2) **Electronic Warfare Support** consists of **actions to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of radiated electromagnetic energy** for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conducting future operations.

d. **Computer Network Operations.** These operations focus on protecting sensitive information from adversary interception as well as defeating their capabilities to penetrate friendly networks. Therefore digital data transfer and websites for posting/disseminating essential information may become decisive points for protecting and preserving information superiority for both adversary and friendly forces. US Strategic Command may provide assistance and support is establishing computer network operations.

(1) **Computer Network Defense.** Computer network defense (CND) consists of defensive measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction. Such measures include access controls, malicious computer code and program detection, and intrusion-detection tools. CND is enabled by information assurance.

(2) **Computer Network Exploitation.** Computer network exploitation (CNE) is an intelligence function conducted by combatant command/DOD intelligence organizations and other national intelligence agencies. CNE contributes to defensive IO.

e. **Physical Security.** Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The JFLCC synchronizes physical security measures with other IO element operations.

6. Security to Operational Forces and Means

Security includes personnel security, positional or installation security, LOC defense, information security, civil population control, handling of prisoners of war and detainees, health defense, and mine defense. JFLCC responsibilities for security are normally conducted in conjunction with designation as the JSC. Paragraph 8 provides additional guidance concerning typical JSC responsibilities.

a. **Preparing Operationally Significant Defenses.** Operational-level defenses include effective use of camouflage and military deception, emplacement and construction of barriers and obstacles that protect key facilities, ports and bases, integrating FP considerations into engineer project designs, and conducting recurring vulnerability analyses against the adversary's changing capabilities.

b. **Organization of Forces.** During the deployment and subsequent employment of forces, the JFLCC concurrently assesses existing facilities for their ability to protect forces, while assessing requirements for rapid construction of additional facilities. The land component engineer leads this effort in assessing and developing requirements, and determining the level of effort each facility requires to meet the commander's FP requirements. HN and contract capabilities that supplement engineer assets may also be required. Early needs assessments, synchronized with contracting authorities, are essential to employing these assets early. Additionally, land component engineer forces supplement tactical forces in preparing defenses and facilities. They recommend priorities and policies for barrier materials, monitor construction priorities for "hardening" facilities against attack, request and allocate military and contract construction assets, develop standards and priorities, and provide input on land component priorities to the joint civil-military engineering board. Finally, they liaise with the HN to coordinate and obtain clearance on FP construction and improvements within the land component AO.

c. **Planning and Execution Considerations.** The JFLCC controls the development of facilities, bases, and ports throughout the AO to ensure proper preparation against all forms of adversary attack. Within the battlespace, the JFLCC also coordinates subordinate command defensive engineering efforts through the use of obstacle control measures, to include designating obstacle zones, belts, and groups, as well as identifying any restrictions on the employment of mines and obstacles.

d. **Removing Significant Hazards.** Terrain conditions coupled with operationally significant hazards, such as obstacles and minefields or widespread contamination by CBRNE weapons and toxic industrial materials can severely limit friendly maneuver capabilities and options. Tracking and disseminating information on adversary and friendly mines as well as unexploded ordnance or high dud-rate areas are essential to protecting maneuver forces. The JFLCC employs organic and supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to detect operationally significant hazards. Reconnaissance and surveillance of adversary barriers, obstacles, minefields, and contaminated areas assist in determining their extent, configuration, and composition. The JFLCC provides information concerning these areas to joint/coalition forces, non-government organizations, local civilians, and the media. The JFLCC also establishes a tracking and information dissemination capability to convey this information to subordinate and interagency elements. Such operations may be assigned to the JFLCC engineer for hazard location and disposal tracking. This information also should be integrated into the overall FP process.

7. Personnel Recovery

PR is the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. **PR is the umbrella term for operations focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harm's way.** PR includes, but is not limited to, combat search and rescue, evasion and escape, and coordinating negotiated and forcible recovery options.

a. PR focuses on the military option to recover, as a result of hostile action, those captured, detained, evading, isolated, or missing in an operational area. **Joint PR involves five tasks--reporting, locating, supporting, recovering, and repatriating.** Coordination related to joint land force personnel recovery operations should be both vertical and horizontal and should be conducted continuously during all phases of an operation.

b. Recovery capabilities must be mobile, responsive, and capable of physically locating, supporting, recovering, and/or repatriating isolated personnel to friendly forces. Joint land forces must have either internal units or JFC designated assets to conduct personnel recovery.

c. **Joint Personnel Recovery Center.** In preparation for such possibilities, the JFLCC plans and anticipates such operations through coordination and synchronization with the JFC's JPRC (formerly joint search and rescue center) as the primary search and rescue facility that is suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint personnel recovery. **The JFC normally tasks the JFLCC to provide an equitable share of personnel to staff the JPRC.**

(1) **The JFLCC is responsible for planning and conducting conventional personnel recovery operations in support of land operations.** This may include establishing and operating a PRCC to coordinate all joint land component personnel recovery activities.

(2) If the JFLCC does not establish a separate PRCC, those personnel recovery activities and responsibilities normally assigned to the PRCC should be assigned to a staff section, normally the J-3.

8. Organizing for Joint Land Force Protection

a. The JFLCC determines who will have overall responsibility for FP in the land operational area. **Available options include staff elements within the JFLCC HQ or subordinate land commands.**

b. **Protection Board Process**

(1) **Force Protection Working Group.** Depending upon the threat, the JFC may establish a FP working group (FPWG). The FPWG has primary responsibility for monitoring and assessing the risk and threats to forces in the operational area and recommending control measures to protect the force. It normally convenes on a regular basis to assess and recommend required FP measures in the operational area. The organization of the FPWG may vary depending on the situation but always includes the JFLCC/JSC or their representatives. A typical agenda for a FPWG would include the following:

- Reviewing the potential threat within the operational area
- Identifying vulnerabilities
- Recommending countermeasures, FPCON levels, assessments, missions, and tasks to components
- Monitoring corrective actions
- Directing joint force vulnerability assessment teams (VATs)

(2) **Operational Force Protection Board**

(a) The JFLCC normally designates a staff office within the headquarters, usually from the J-3 or provost marshal staff section, to supervise, inspect, test, and report on the FP/AT programs. Simultaneously, the J-2 disseminates intelligence on terrorist activities to subordinate commands to ensure that FP/AT measures are appropriate to the threat. The importance the JFLCC places on these staff FP/AT functions is directly reflected in base and base cluster FP programs.

(b) **As an alternative, the JFLCC may form an operational FP board (OFPB).** The OFPB normally consists of representatives from the medical, military police, communications, civil-military, CBRNE, C2, and air defense communities. Members from major subordinate commands and multinational forces should also be included. The OFPB is normally responsible for the following:

- Recurring FP assessments
- Recommending resource allocation and priorities of effort
- Recommending priorities for FP across the joint land component AO

c. **Vulnerabilities Assessment Process**

(1) One method to ensure a comprehensive FP approach is to develop a standard vulnerabilities assessment process that uses established criteria to assess the level of protection in place at critical areas. The same criteria may also be used to compare the level of protection in place against that directed by the JFLCC. If the desired level is not sufficient, the criteria may be used to prioritize planning, preparing, executing, and assessing activities designed to provide the desired FP levels.

(2) The JFLCC may also request VAT assistance in assessing vulnerabilities. The VATs are able to assess the vulnerabilities at air and seaports of debarkation, major camps and bases for maneuver and enabling forces, communications sites, main supply routes, airfield security, and air defense sites. In addition, the VATs may assist a HN in assessing the vulnerability of HN infrastructure that the JFLCC considers operationally essential.

d. **High Value Assets and Defended Asset List**. The JFLCC analyzes his land centers of gravity and identifies those assets considered to be of high value. These assets are prioritized on the DAL. The DAL is a valuable tool that assists in allocating FP resources within the land operations area. **When allocating FP resources, planning should consider deployment configurations and employment operations that maximize the areas to be defended with available systems.**

e. **Force Protection Conditions.** FPCONs are a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved program standardizing the military Services' identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats against US personnel and facilities. This program facilitates inter-Service coordination and support for antiterrorism activities. **There are four FPCONs above normal.**

(1) **FPCON ALPHA.** This condition applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher FPCONs resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

(2) **FPCON BRAVO.** This condition applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.

(3) **FPCON CHARLIE.** This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this FPCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

(4) **FPCON DELTA.** This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a localized condition.

f. **Additional Considerations for Joint Land Force Protection Across Expanded Distances**

(1) The JFC may designate the JFLCC as the JSC and establish a JSA, which is a **specific land area within a JFC's operational area** designated to facilitate the protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. **The size of a JSA may vary considerably** and is highly dependent on the size of the operational area, logistic support requirements, threat, and scope of the joint operation. **A JSA** is not necessarily contiguous to the combat zone. A JSA can be adapted to any modern environment. In any circumstance, a **JSA may be segmented and may contain isolated pockets of relatively secure support areas that may collectively make up a JSA.**

(2) **The dimensions and configuration of the JSA may be particularly fluid.** However, locales established within the operational area might be "de facto" JSAs such as metropolitan zones or regions isolated by geographic boundaries that become relatively segregated from the main areas of conflict. The JFC may designate such areas as a part of the JSA. As support facilities, population receptiveness, and overall HN attitudes may be unpredictable and unreliable; the joint force will normally have to rely on its own resources for support until lines of communication are established.

(3) The effective use and positioning of military assets in the JSA is critical to successful operations. Both mission support and security should be considered when positioning assets throughout the JSA. **As the JSC, the JFLCC should consider organizing appropriate bases into base clusters and designating base and base cluster commanders.**

g. **Joint Land Force Protection Integration**

(1) Although other agencies or components may have primary responsibility for specific JSA functions, **the JSC is responsible for coordinating the FP aspects** of all functions throughout the JSA. **The JSC's overall coordination responsibility for FP of the JSA does not lessen the responsibility that component elements residing or operating in the JSA have for their own security.**

(2) Specific responsibilities include coordinating with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure that the overall JSA security plan is developed and coordinated with appropriate US, multinational, and HN commands.

(3) The JSC ensures that security posture in the JSA supports the JFC's concept of operations, that sufficient response forces have been identified to respond to anticipated threats to the JSA, that positioning and stationing of units and facilities in the JSA are made with due consideration for security, that appropriate liaison is established with multinational and HN commands for coordination of FP issues, and that any additional security forces (US, multinational, and/or HN) are properly integrated into an overall JSA defense plan.

(4) In addition, the JSC may need to request consolidation of joint land force component engineer resources to ensure an adequate capability to construct FP facilities and defensive barriers and to clear land transportation routes of adversary mines, improvised explosive devices, and other impediments.

h. **Prioritization.** Notwithstanding that FP must embrace the whole force, **it is unlikely that the capability will exist to protect all force elements to the same degree. Therefore, priority should be given to force critical vulnerabilities**, both tangible like C2 nodes; intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance assets; or combat service support resources, and intangible, such as public opinion, political will (at home and abroad), and multinational cohesion.

9. Joint Land Protection Checklist

- **Tasks and Authorities:** Has the JFLCC been designated as the JSC?

  •• If so, has the JSC established priorities for FP within the joint rear area to include construction and assignment of personnel for FP tasks?

  •• Is the JSA clearly established?

- **Mission and Vulnerabilities Analysis:** Has an analysis been conducted to assess joint land force vulnerabilities (including coalition forces) and the adversary's capabilities?

  •• What is the adversary's capability to conduct conventional deep operations or asymmetric attacks?

  •• What has been done to reduce the likelihood of fratricide?

  •• Is there a genuine requirement for air defense?

- **Protection Measures:** What actions have been taken to:

  •• **P**revent or deter an adversary's employment of CBRNE weapons?

  •• What passive defense and consequence management operations are planned to counter, mitigate, and manage the effects of a CBRNE attack or industrial toxic accident?

  •• What defensive measures have been taken to protect and defend information, computers, and networks?

  •• Are there plans for conducting conventional personnel recovery operations in support of land operations?

- **Host Nation:** Has HN support been integrated into the FP plan? Has the JFLCC plan/system been synchronized with HN efforts? Are there acceptable ROE?

- **Risk Analysis and Priorities:** Has a thorough analysis, using a common intelligence picture and criteria, been done for the land AO?

  •• Have FP capabilities been prioritized against the most mission critical/vulnerable points?

  •• Have resources (forces, engineering effort, contract support, etc.) been applied according to these priorities?

- **Established System and Process:** Has the JFLCC formed a land component FPWG or OFPB to constantly evaluate threat, capabilities and risk, and provide recommendations to the Commander? Who is responsible and do they have the requisite staff and authorities to accomplish these tasks?

CHAPTER 5

JOINT LAND INTELLIGENCE

Nothing is more worthy of the attention of a good general than the endeavor to penetrate the designs of the enemy.

Niccolo Machiavelli
Discorsi, xviii, 1531

1. Introduction

a. **The JFLCC defines and drives intelligence responsibilities for the entire joint force land component**. He prioritizes intelligence requirements of subordinate land forces and provides representation for the joint force land component and its subordinates at the JFC's daily intelligence briefings. **The JFLCC provides the focus and direction for joint force land component intelligence production.**

b. Operational-level intelligence assessment requirements have grown in scope and complexity and are more than just an intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process. **The intelligence assessment provides information on the adversary's infrastructure, institutions, ethnic seams (even clans and tribes when they apply), culture, and history, thus contributing to a holistic portrayal of the battlespace suitable for warfare in an information age.** This complexity and broadened scope of requirements puts increasing pressure on intelligence analysts who often function at the strategic and operational levels. **The commander's intent drives intelligence collection priorities.**

c. Intelligence collection and dissemination must be continuous and rigorous to take advantage of security cooperation activities within the operational area.

d. ISR resources likely will continue to be in high demand throughout the joint force. Accordingly, clearly articulated PIRs, guided by the JFLCC's CCIRs and vetted with the JFC, are essential to applying ISR assets against the right efforts in synchronization with the joint force ISR efforts.

e. In this regard, getting accurate and timely battle damage assessments (BDA), so central to effects-based operations, will remain a challenge for the foreseeable future. Given its importance to mission success, this component of combat assessment requires thorough training in combat intelligence collection, intelligence architectures, and doctrine. It should be emphasized that BDA is as much of an art as a science and, as such, accurate BDA cannot rely exclusively on technical collection means.

f. "Shared intelligence" should be well established, as the land component will almost certainly be part of a multinational coalition in future operations. The JFLCC must be willing to assess and accept some risk to provide multinational partners prudent, useful access to intelligence resources and products. Analytical collaboration is essential throughout the land

component. It further requires mutual intelligence planning, establishing divisions of labor to take advantage of all capabilities while avoiding duplication of effort, defining responsibilities, and seeking consensus on procedures for adapting to changing circumstances. To be effective, liaison elements must have access to, and training on, intelligence databases.

2. The Joint Force Land Component Commander's Interface in the Intelligence Process

a. **The JFLCC is the JFC's focal point for intelligence collection and analysis, target development, and combat assessment of adversary land forces**. The JFLCC states operational requirements and provides continuous feedback to ensure optimum ISR support to operations.

b. The intelligence process is a simplified conceptual model of how intelligence operations are conducted. **The process is composed of six phases: planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination and integration; and evaluation and feedback.** This construct is optimal—in reality however, the intelligence process may not encompass the entire cycle (See Figure 5-1).



Figure 5-1. The Intelligence Process

c. At each phase of the intelligence process, **it is important to share collected information** between Service intelligence communities, multinational partners, other supported governmental agencies, and selected nongovernmental organizations to consolidate the return of information, promote fusion, and prevent the unnecessary retasking of scarce assets.

3. Joint Land Intelligence Requirements

a. **PIRs are the JFLCC's statement of the intelligence aspects of the CCIRs.** When establishing PIRs, the JFLCC requests intelligence essential to the force's ability to accomplish the assigned mission. These PIRs provide the direction of current and future intelligence activities focused on land operations. **Using the PIRs as guidance, the joint force land component intelligence staff proposes its intelligence requirements to determine how best to provide the information needed to satisfy these requirements**. These intelligence requirements require collection and can identify indicators of adversary actions or intent, which may reduce many uncertainties associated with an operation. To be most effective, the **JFLCC's total number of PIRs for any operation (or any phase of an operation) should be limited--no more than 6 to 10**.

b. **Prioritizing intelligence requirements is as important as their identification**. There will never be enough operational ISR assets to collect against all operational intelligence requirements simultaneously. Likewise, fusing all-source intelligence across the joint force, along with integrating sensors, platforms, and intelligence organizations, allows a greater number of operational tasks to be accomplished more quickly while enhancing the threat portion of the common operational picture.

c. Every opportunity should be taken to share the land components PIRs with other components, multinational forces, and OGAs. Ideally, PIRs will focus all intelligence related activities to better enable land operations to achieve the desired end state. **Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated the advantages of sharing the land component's PIRs with the other functional components, multinational forces, and OGAs.**

d. Significant changes in operational planning usually result in changes to intelligence requirements. Intelligence requirements identify specific indicators that will enhance the command's knowledge and understanding of the operational area and adversary activities.

4. Sourcing Intelligence Support

a. When the JFLCC's or JFC's ISR assets cannot satisfy the intelligence requirements, the first option for filling shortfalls should be to request assistance from strategic and/or national assets. The joint force J-2 may request tactical exploitation of national capabilities program (TENCAP) support. The J-2 can request TENCAP support, including prototype and demonstration systems, through Service TENCAP offices. If required, additional support may be requested from the intelligence community, such as the National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

b. Information from national systems is provided to the JFLCC through the JFC by direct and indirect feeds in addition to Service component TENCAP systems. Requests for ISR support should go through the joint force J-2 and the J-2 collection manager. Additional sources of information and assistance may include liaison officers or support teams assigned from the appropriate national or DOD intelligence agencies.

c. **The joint force land component may receive raw data or processed reports, based upon the specific organic TENCAP equipment available**. Depending upon the specific intelligence discipline, such as imagery intelligence (IMINT), timelines can be rapid—within seconds of collection. Other disciplines, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT) are inherently slow--hours to days from the request. Figure 5-2 contains a list of the intelligence disciplines. Additionally, the security of these systems and their sources may require the information to be sanitized before it can be made available to the user. National intelligence systems provide invaluable intelligence collection and verification, especially when local access by conventional intelligence systems is limited by range capabilities, terrain or weather masking, airspace restrictions, or political considerations.



Figure 5-2. Intelligence Disciplines

d. The joint land force Army component has space support capabilities. **The Army has space support forces that receive ISR and weather data from space platforms.** These units may be tasked through the Army component in support for joint land operations.

e. **Intelligence Agencies, Organizations, and Assets**

(1) **Interagency Organizations**

(a) **Defense Intelligence Agency.** The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has oversight of DOD all-source intelligence. DIA also provides intelligence support in counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, computer network operations, medical intelligence, proliferation of CBRNE weapons, United Nations peacekeeping and coalition support, missile and space intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, noncombatant evacuation efforts, indicators and warning (I&W), targeting, BDA, current intelligence, collection management, and intelligence architecture and systems support.

(b) **National Security Agency/Central Security Service.** NSA/Central Security Service accomplishes the SIGINT mission of the United States and ensures the protection of national security systems for all departments and agencies of the US government.

(c) **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.** The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides geospatial intelligence support to include national imagery collection management, imagery exploitation, analysis, and dissemination, geospatial and some meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) data and information. NGA creates tailored, customer-specific, geospatial and METOC intelligence, analytic services, and solutions to support military operations.

(d) **National Reconnaissance Office.** The NRO is responsible for integrating space-based reconnaissance technologies, and the engineering, development, acquisition and operation of space reconnaissance systems and related intelligence activities. NRO activities support I&W, monitoring arms control agreements, and the planning and execution of military operations.

(e) **Central Intelligence Agency.** CIA's primary areas of expertise are in HUMINT collection, all-source analysis, and the production of political and economic intelligence. However, the CIA also has operational capabilities, and these have been employed effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq. The land component should take full advantage of these capabilities in cooperation with the SOF community.

(f) **Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BI&R).** This bureau performs intelligence analysis and produces studies on a wide range of political and economic topics essential to foreign policy determination and execution.

(g) **Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.** Under the Department of Justice, the FBI has primary responsibility for CI and counterterrorism operations conducted in the United States. FBI operations overseas are generally coordinated with the CIA.

(h) **National Intelligence Support Teams**

1. The mission of a national intelligence support team (NIST) is to provide national level, all-source intelligence support from throughout the intelligence community to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. The configuration of a NIST is dependent on the mission of the supported command. NISTs are tailored from a group of intelligence and communications experts from DIA, CIA, NGA, NSA, and other agencies based upon the specific needs of the JFC. Within the NIST, the CIA cell likely will have both intelligence and operational capabilities. **The division of responsibility between the JFLCC J-2 and JFLCC J-3 with respect to these capabilities must be clearly established.**

2. Army, Marine Corps, and SOF use TROJAN SPIRIT II, joint mobile integrated communications systems, and local area intelligence networks to support subordinate joint forces and the NIST. These systems provide communications connectivity to support the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, joint deployable intelligence support system data, secure voice, and other unique intelligence communication needs.

(2) **US Army Capabilities**

(a) **US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).** US Army INSCOM provides intelligence support to strategic and operational level commanders in the areas of IMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, tactical HUMINT, CI, IO, and general military and scientific and technical intelligence. INSCOM elements include the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), which produces multi-source intelligence products, and the 902nd Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade, which performs the CI function for the Army.

(b) **Theater Military Intelligence Brigades and Groups.** INSCOM theater MI brigades and groups conduct multidiscipline intelligence operations in support of the respective Army component commander and, if designated by the JFC, the JFLCC. The Army component of each geographic combatant command has a theater intelligence brigade to provide MI support. Additionally, the Army component is tasked with establishing a joint interrogation and debriefing center to provide dedicated interrogation support to the geographic combatant commands.

(c) **National Ground Intelligence Center.** NGIC is the Service national production center for land forces intelligence and has primary production responsibility for most land force intelligence functions worldwide. The NGIC provides:

- All-source scientific, technical, and general military intelligence on foreign land forces in support of Army Title 10 requirements
- IMINT and secondary imagery dissemination to support training, exercises, and contingency planning
- Foreign materiel acquisition requirements and exploitation programs
- Current and future land threat assessments to support operational forces, the combat and materiel development community, contingency planners, force planners, war game personnel, and doctrine development organizations
- Detailed analysis and production of systems capabilities and parametric data for all foreign land and land-related systems (to include helicopters, air defense weapons, infantry, armor and anti-armor, fire support, engineer, mines, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, chemical warfare, toxic industrial chemicals with potential dual-use capability, directed-energy weapons, and command, control, and communications systems). NGIC also produces assessments of land systems trends.
- A shared production and database maintenance responsibility for selected countries
- Reinforcing support to other intelligence centers as required

(d) **1st Information Operations Command (Land).** The 1st Information Operations Command (Land) provides operations support for the IO portion of an operation from the Military Department through tactical levels. In addition, the Army is forming information operations groups in the Reserve Component to provide IO field support teams to assist commanders, including JFLCCs, with IO planning. **Support across the spectrum of IO also is provided to the JFLCC.** Primary 1st Information Operations Command (Land) functions include the following:

- Providing IO staff support to ARFOR and JFLCC staff
- Coordinating IO intelligence and CI support to operational and tactical land commanders, including the JFLCC
- Coordinating and deploying field support teams to assist ARFOR commanders and JFLCCs in the area of C2-protection, C2-attack, and C2-support planning
- Developing and sustaining rapid response capabilities and countering adversary attempts to penetrate Army command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems and processes

(3) **US Marine Corps Capabilities**

(a) **Director of Intelligence.** The Director of Intelligence (DIRINT) is the Commandant of the Marine Corps' principal intelligence staff officer and the functional manager for intelligence, counterintelligence, and cryptology matters. Through the Intelligence Division, Headquarters US Marine Corps, the DIRINT allocates resources and manpower to develop and maintain specific expertise in the areas of human and technical reconnaissance and surveillance, HUMINT, CI, IMINT, SIGINT, and TENCAP.

(b) **US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.** The US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) is a field activity under the DIRINT and the Marine Corps Service production center. MCIA supports:

- The Commandant and staff with threat assessments, estimates, and intelligence for Service planning and decision making
- Combat developers with threat data and other intelligence support for doctrine and force structure development, systems and equipment acquisition, wargaming, and training and education
- Operating force requirements for predeployment planning, training, and exercise, as well as support to contingency planning and other production not satisfied by either strategic, other Service, or national research and analytic capabilities

- As the production manager and validation authority for the Marine Corps production requirements, MCIA is fully integrated into DOD intelligence programs. MCIA can be tasked to provide expeditionary warfare intelligence to support any national, strategic, or operational command. Thus, MCIA's analysis and production capabilities, to include its Reserve production elements, support not only the Marine Corps, but also combatant commanders and operational forces.

(4) **Additionally, a Service component commander or the JFLCC may establish a joint document exploitation center (JDEC) facility and provide or coordinate all necessary JDEC personnel, logistics, communications, facilities, and transportation requirements.**

5. Joint Land Force Intelligence Collection Management Process

a. Collection management is the process **used to assess the effectiveness of the collection strategy** to satisfy original and evolving intelligence needs. In comprehensive, all-source intelligence oversight of the operational area, collection operations are likely to be complex and focused at a wide variety of potential adversaries, to include conventional and SOF units, insurgents, terrorists, and selected criminal organizations.

b. Collection managers develop collection plans based on the commander's intelligence requirements. **Collection management has two distinct functions: collection requirements management (CRM)--defining what intelligence systems must collect; and collection operations management (COM)--specifying how to collect.** CRM focuses on the requirements of the customer, is all-source oriented, and generally interacts with production elements. COM focuses on the selection of the specific intelligence disciplines and specific systems within a discipline to be used to collect information addressing the requirement and is accessible to the operators of the collection system.

c. The JFLCC should understand that the CRM and COM functions might not be organizationally distinct. Although considered separately to facilitate understanding of their different objectives, in practice the distinction between them may be vague. However, there is always a constant interface between the two as shown in Figure 5-3.

6. Joint Land Force Component Intelligence Roles and Challenges

a. Intelligence processes and efforts in the area of operation support JFLCC's intent. **Dynamic iterative search tools, virtual collaborative work environments, and COP enable intelligence personnel to nearly simultaneously exploit, analyze, produce, and disseminate relevant information.** Secure digital communications links and automated exploitation tools make it possible to immediately process data collected on some high priority targets and disseminate the results—providing timely feedback in support of the commanders' decision-making requirements. Likewise, direct "sensor-to-shooter" connectivity dramatically increases the timeliness and precision of information required to successfully engage adversary time-sensitive targets. **A clear understanding of the commander's intent by planners, collectors,**

analysts, and users of intelligence products facilitates the timeliness of the intelligence processes.



Figure 5-3. The Collection Management Cycle

b. Operational information and intelligence must be collected and shared on battlespace conditions, threat forces and their decisive points, as well as high-payoff targets, such as CBRNE weapons production, infrastructure, and delivery systems. In this regard, joint force land component intelligence collection tasks normally are distinguished from those at the tactical level by their increased shelf life and their inability to immediately influence the outcomes of operational missions. **Hence, care must be taken not to unnecessarily retask limited assets.**

c. **A sound information management plan, balancing CRM and COM functions, is essential in ensuring that all information, to include intelligence, flows to the correct destination in a timely manner.** Sharing information and intelligence between echelons is also essential for commanders to maintain a current, accurate COP on which to base decisions. Commanders must receive combat information and intelligence products in time to support decision-making—and they must receive them in a useable format.

d. **JFLCC Intelligence Interface with Multinational Partners**

(1) **In most multinational operations, the JFC and JFLCC normally are required to share intelligence with, and receive intelligence from, multinational military forces.** In some circumstances, the JFC may seek authorization to establish unique intelligence policies. Additionally, dissemination criteria will be tailored to each multinational operation, as there are inevitable differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among coalition partners.

(2) **Centralized control is desired but frequently unattainable** in multinational intelligence operations. As every coalition is different, so too are the ways in which intelligence

will be collected and disseminated within the coalition. **Due to the nature of many intelligence sources, it is unlikely that nations will make all of their sources available for tasking by the coalition.** Operational differences may include how intelligence is provided to the commander (jointly or individual Services or agencies), procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies, and the degree of security afforded by different communications systems. Administrative differences may include classification levels, personnel security clearance standards, requirements for access to sensitive intelligence, and potential translation requirements.

(3) **A multinational intelligence center may be established for acquiring, fusing, and prioritizing the intelligence requirements and contributions from each participating nation, serving both coalition and national needs. Designating a single director of intelligence for the multinational command may assist in resolving inevitable differences.** Integrating intelligence representatives and liaison personnel at each organizational level may also improve access to intelligence capabilities. Many nations may provide a national intelligence cell at the coalition force headquarters to facilitate tasking by and support to the coalition.

(4) **A coalition may compensate for the lack of standardization through increased coordination.** The communications architecture serves to coordinate multinational use of the electromagnetic spectrum, use of space assets, the location of intelligence assets, and intelligence collection targets. The personal involvement of the coalition commander in the organization and staffing of intelligence centers may be required to establish the desired level of coordination. **PIRs serve as the focus of the intelligence effort**, the answers to which can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels.

(5) Coalition members should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary, consistent with national and strategic guidance. However, **information about intelligence sources and methods should not be shared with coalition members unless approved by the appropriate national agencies**.

> ***In a battle nothing is ever as good or as bad as the reports of excited men would have it.***
>
> **Sir William Slim**
> **Unofficial History, vi, 1959**

7. Joint Land Intelligence Checklist

- **Intelligence Linked to Commander Decisions:** What are the critical Commander Decisions that the JFLCC must make during the campaign? Do the PIRs developed provide the necessary, timely information to make these decisions?

- **Priority Intel Requirements:** What are the JFLCC's PIRs and how are these tied to the decisive points and major actions of land operations during the campaign?

- **Total Requirements for the Command:** What are the total requirements for intelligence briefings and products?

  •• For the commander?

  •• For the command (to include subordinate elements)?

  •• For coalition and interagency elements?

  •• Have shortfalls in ISR requirements been identified?

- **Cycle:** Has a daily intelligence cycle been established?

  •• Have reporting time lines, recurring briefings and conferences, and collection management time lines been defined?

  •• What are the decisions that must be made as a result of this battle rhythm, and who makes them?

- **Collection:** Does the theater/land intelligence collection plan identify shortfalls in intelligence and incorporate all collection assets for tasking?

  •• What is the process for determining requirements--how are they tied to/updated based upon operational needs?

  •• How do we know the target was collected upon--how do we track nominations through execution?

  •• Do we have redundancy built into the process for high priority targets (HPTs) and decisive points?

- **Analysis:** Is the analysis effort prioritized? Has it been synchronized with the JFC's intelligence effort?

- **Coalition Integration:** What are the coalition force intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities and requirements?

  •• How and where can they be integrated into the intelligence process?

  •• Should a multinational intelligence center be established?

  •• Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlespace information with outside coalition processing and exploitation centers?

- **Sharing:** Are there effective and timely procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information policies beyond US assets? Are all coalition partners treated equally? Have compartmented and national sensitivities been considered?

- **Dissemination:** How is strategic intelligence obtained and disseminated to all elements (headquarters, staff and subordinate elements) among all LCC forces?

  •• Do the subordinate forces have secure communications/SIPR and collection assets available? What are their capabilities and limitations to link into the overall land/joint/coalition system?

  •• Are there sufficient "authorized" classified systems to support the LCC staff? The coalition staff?

- **Supported/Supporting to SOF:** What are the responsibilities and procedures for the JFLCC J-3 and J-2 in supporting and obtaining information and intelligence for/from SOF operations? OGAs operating in LCC battlespace?

- **Interrogation:** Who is in charge of enemy prisoner of war/detainee interrogation?

CHAPTER 6

JOINT LAND MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

Aptitude for war is aptitude for movement.

Napoleon I
Maxims of War, 1831

1. Commander's Considerations on Operational Movement and Maneuver

a. **In developing the Major Land Plan to position and employ forces to dominate the enemy, the JFLCC must focus on the interrelationship of movement, maneuver and shaping effects.** Due to the extended distances and time required at the operational level, the JFLCC and staff must constantly "look deep and shape long," to enable success in the tactical fight by its major subordinate commands (MSCs).

(1) **Operational Movement** is the process of receiving and integrating forces into theater, moving them out of contact with enemy forces to the point at which they must be employed for most effectiveness. From RSOI through intratheater movement to attain or maintain operational reach to facilitate actions against the enemy, the JFLCC must continuously overcome friction in intelligence, transportation, protection, and sustainment as forces speed to their points of employment either under the MSCs or under the LCC's direct control.

(2) **Operational Maneuver** is coordinating and supporting (through joint fires) the employment of forces that force enemy defeat or destruction. The JFLCC will conduct this fight through its tactical units, focusing on synchronizing their efforts to achieve maximum effect upon the enemy. In some cases, such as the employment of reserves or functional task forces, the JFLCC may employ these units directly, but will pass control of these units as soon as possible to the MSCs in contact to facilitate simplicity and unity of effort.

(3) **Shaping Effects**, both lethal and nonlethal, are planned and coordinated to induce the enemy to act/react in a manner that maneuver can exploit for success. Effective coordination with other components such as the JFACC and information operations elements, to ensure shaping is accomplished at time and location required, is essential to maximizing the effect of maneuver upon enemy weakness and is enabled by the timely movement and positioning of LCC forces.

(4) Movement, maneuver, and shaping effects, at the operational level, are planned and executed to ensure an enduring end state--defeat of the enemy is but an intermediate objective en route to the final objective--achievement of US policy objectives.

b. **The JFLCC must constantly be focused above the tactical fight**, disciplining himself and the staff to "look deep" at opportunities and envision/execute movement that will position forces for flexible employment. Envisioning and posturing will be difficult, given not only the

challenges of distances and dispersed battlespace, but also the challenges of coordination and synchronization with other functional components and the interagency as they also attempt to meet their own internal priorities.

c. **At the center of Operational Movement and Maneuver is the JFLCC's challenge of estimating and taking risk--**to be strong at the decisive points, while assuming risk through economy of force at points of lesser importance or risk. This also includes risk in force flow that enables LCC operations. Throughout, the movement and maneuver concept must incorporate maximum flexibility to give the JFLCC options to shift forces using organic and joint intratheater transportation as both threats and opportunity emerge.

d. **Transitions are critical pieces of movement and maneuver execution.** The JFLCC must ensure that the completion of one phase or stage of land operations ensures that forces are positioned and battlespace organized effectively to initiate the next part of the operation without pause, repositioning, or undue risk to the mission. This is particularly key in the transition to follow-on stability operations, where unclear and changing political and coalition conditions make it difficult for the JFLCC to envision requirements and desired outcomes.

e. **The JFLCC must organize and control the battlespace within the land AO** to achieve operational success, to include control measures, boundaries, timings, etc. The position and reasons for these measures must be disseminated and clearly understood by not only all MSCs, but also by all components and agencies that will/may share this battlespace, either under the control of or in conjunction with the JFLCC.

2. Envisioning and Developing the Concept for Operational Maneuver

a. **Concept of Maneuver. The JFLCC plans, directs, and coordinates land movement and maneuver to gain a positional advantage for operational effect on the enemy.** Maneuver **creates and exposes enemy vulnerabilities** to the massed effects of friendly combat power. The focus of maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole) rather than just to destroy them physically through attrition. **Ideally, operational maneuver secures positional advantage before an enemy acts** and either preempts enemy maneuver or ensures their destruction if they move.

b. **Planning Operational Movement and Maneuver.** The JFLCC's plan for all movements and maneuvers is derived from and must support the JFC's concept of operations, objectives, commander's intent, and the defined end state. Equally important is that it **must be synchronized, as <u>both supported and supporting</u>, with the operations of other functional components** to achieve joint synergy and maximum effects. The JFC normally determines friendly and enemy centers of gravity (COGs) and coordinates campaign planning with the **functional and Service component commanders to determine decisive points and lines of operation to the enemy COGs**. Throughout the campaign, especially one involving major combat operations (MCO) and the transition to stability operations afterward, the JFLCC should **never lose sight of the defined military and political end states**, and planning should facilitate the transition phase after MCO.

(1) **Deployment/Initial Entry.** An important strategic factor is the introduction of credible, lethal forces into the theater. The planning for and successful execution of deployment and reception of forces are essential to the subsequent execution of the land operations plan as shown in Chapter 3. If by forcible entry, initial-entry forces need enough combat power to establish and protect lodgments and begin shaping operations immediately upon arrival. A tailored force with the capability to dominate situations early enables the JFC to seize the initiative.

(2) **Integrating Movement, Maneuver and Fires.** While maneuver includes organic fires, those fires should not be confused with operational fires that will shape far in advance of JFLCC operations. Some fires will support operational and tactical maneuver while other fires are independent of maneuver to achieve specific operational and strategic effects that support the JFC's objectives. However**, the shaping fires (usually coordinated between the JFLCC and JFACC) are aimed at causing the enemy to stop, delay, or reposition forces, thus providing opportunities for land force action.** The JFLCC must ensure sufficient intratheater mobility to enable forces to be rapidly repositioned and maneuvered to exploit these induced weaknesses. Maneuver may exploit the effects of massed and/or precision firepower, and fires may be used to support/exploit effects of maneuver. CAS is an essential airpower capability to augment supporting fires during operational maneuver. These supporting fires are distinct from CAS and can be used in tactical maneuver and shaping operations. Within the land AO, the JFLCC is the supported commander for CAS.

(3) **Assigning Operational Areas for MSCs.** The JFLCC scheme of maneuver must allow for mobility differentials between land force components or units, especially for a MNF. The JFLCC may subdivide some or all of the assigned AO and will normally assign separate operational areas to subordinate land force commanders (e.g., ARFOR, MARFOR, or MNF) after considering the "battlefield geometry" that should maximize their individual operational capabilities. Those operational areas may be **contiguous or noncontiguous,** depending on missions, objectives, and mobility capabilities**.** Whether contiguous (a shared boundary between tactical units of the subordinate commanders) or noncontiguous (intervening areas between forces for which the JFLCC is responsible), **the JFLCC and those subordinate commanders must maintain flexibility, situational awareness, and coordination to prevent seams along boundaries that could be exploited by the enemy**.

c. **Control of Movement and Maneuver.** Based on the METT-TC factors, command relationships, and authority, the JFLCC will decide how to **direct and control movement and maneuver** of the joint land forces during each phase of the campaign. **The JFLCC can directly exercise that responsibility over LCC components or delegate it to the individual land component commanders in their separate operational areas.** During a dynamic, high tempo campaign, the JFLCC may choose to delegate in order to decentralize execution, allowing the JFLCC to maintain a broad but sharp focus on the unity of effort, better assess the land operations contribution to the campaign, and enhance coordination required for support from or to other functional/Service components. Land operations under such discretion still must ensure that the MSCs' **movement and maneuver adhere to the JFLCC's concept of operations,**

objectives, and intent, because the JFLCC remains responsible to the JFC for all aspects of land force operations.

d. **MNF Factors.** For MNF operations, the factors of METT-TC and a variety of political considerations may influence the size of the MNF components, the command relationships, and in turn, the authority to direct and control movement and maneuver of the MNF. Several situations are possible for controlling the movement/maneuver of MNFs. The JFC may directly command/oversee the MNF as a major component, the JFLCC may be given that authority/responsibility, or MNF units may be attached in whole or in part to one or more subordinate US land force commanders. The JFLCC must be aware of all national restrictions and employment factors governing MNF participation in order to properly plan for their integration into the campaign.

3. Key Considerations in Developing the Joint Land Maneuver Plan

a. **Movement to Attain Operational Reach.** Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward-based, can be positioned through intratheater movement within operational reach of enemy COGs or decisive points for decisive action at the appropriate location. At other times, mobilization and strategic deployment systems must be used to begin the movement of forces from CONUS or other theaters to redress any unfavorable balance of forces needed to achieve overmatching force at the appropriate location.

b. **Entering the joint operational area to attain operational reach begins with the initial positioning and movement of assets by the JFLCC.** This is very dependent upon the approval of a timely RFF and upon how the forces are to arrive in the joint operational area. **The JFLCC will have <u>one chance to "set the theater" correctly</u>--the commander must make the most of this opportunity, or it will adversely affect the entire success of ensuing land operations.**

(1) **Permissive Entry** has been the standard scheme of deployment to a HN, with subsequent JRSOI of deploying forces. T**he JFLCC influences planning for the deployment through its Service components, giving direction on their priorities, timing, etc. The JFLCC will be very involved in JRSOI,** most often guiding and establishing the system for major deployments. The JFLCC tracks and reports the closure and receipt of forces upon completion of the JRSOI process and reports to the JFC when received forces are ready for employment. OIF was an example of the latter situation. As in OIF, **deployment and intratheater movements are operational maneuver** if they achieve a positional advantage and influence the outcome of a campaign or operation.

(2) When **forcible entry operations** (amphibious landing and/or an airborne/air assault) are used to gain a lodgment in hostile or denied areas, the **JFLCC responsibilities and control includes planning and executing operational movement** from sea/air ports of embarkation to the initial employment areas, where the conduct of operational maneuver to gain initial operational bases for subsequent major land operations is achieved. This movement may be via rehearsal, staging bases, or rendezvous areas.

(a) Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. Sometimes forcible entry may be the only method for gaining access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Land forcible entry operations give the JFC unique capabilities for altering the nature of the situation, such as the opportunity for gaining the initiative at the time and place of his choosing by occupying, securing, and dominating key points for his advantage. **However, the main consideration here is the size and scope of the operational gain compared to the calculated risk and potential loss of assets.**

(b) **Forcible entry is normally complex and risky.** It requires **extensive intelligence** and **detailed coordination**. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. The forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications systems capabilities to move with forward elements. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of effort is vital. **Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.**

(c) During the JFC campaign, forcible entry operations may be used to strike directly at enemy COGs and can open new avenues for military operations. Forcible entry operations can escalate the operation horizontally, exceeding the enemy's capability to respond. For example, after establishing the main effort, a forcible entry may be used as a bold strike in the enemy rear area to establish a lodgment for follow-on forces (a second "front"), or to gain control of airfields in enemy territory. While there is an element of risk to any forcible entry, if the JFLCC combat power is overmatching, the expected operational gain should exceed the calculated risk. See JP 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations,* for more expanded guidance and details.

c. **Developing the Land Scheme of Maneuver.** Upon receipt of forces/capabilities the JFLCC completes detailed planning and coordination to execute the scheme of maneuver for the land operations portion of the JFC's campaign plan. To reinforce intent and priorities, the JFLCC typically designates a main effort for each phase if the campaign has more than one phase. Staging bases, assembly areas, lines of departure, forward operating bases, lines of operation, lines of communication, operational reach, and battlefield geometry are all essential considerations for the scheme of maneuver for both the main (decisive) and supporting efforts (shaping and sustaining operations). **A key distinction from tactical planning is the intensive effort to estimate the flow of forces in the theater and their movement/positioning requirements**. Movement and positioning of JFLCC assets over extended distances to position them for maneuver against the enemy requires intense analysis, resourcing, and synchronization. **The scheme of maneuver must result in an operational posture that facilitates what may be multiple transitions and the introduction of a wide variety of national and international military and non-military capabilities intended to achieve and enduring end state.**

d. **Establishing Bases to Gain/Maintain Operational Reach.** Basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable part of operational art**,** since it is tied to the concept of lines of operations and directly affects operational reach. It also directly influences the combat power that the joint force is capable of generating because of its impact on **critical factors such as intermediate**

staging of forces, intratheater lift/sorties, or resupply rates. **The JFLCC must balance location, operational reach, and the ability to gain/maintain momentum against force protection and sustainment in this analysis.**

(1) **Operating and staging bases, staging areas, forward operating bases, and forward arming and refueling points all contribute to the operational reach of the land forces and their support**. In particular, the arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from adversary action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with ever increasing power and ferocity.

(2) **Basing often is directly affected by political and diplomatic considerations and, as such, can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact.** US basing options span the spectrum from permanently based forces to temporary sea basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. **Bases** (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea basing) **are typically selected to be within operational reach of the opponent.**

(3) Initial movement estimates assess whether sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to sustain the operations of maneuver forces against the enemy. **Determining where to locate bases poses certain challenges for campaign planners**. Recognizing the critical role basing plays during force projection, **potential enemies may** develop strategies to prevent the buildup and sustainment of US forces in theater, **a so-called "anti-access strategy."** Planners must determine how to mitigate efforts to protect and maintain access to the theater and its infrastructure. An excellent example occurred during OIF when US forces posturing for a northern front against Iraq were denied transit-rights and HN-support from Turkey. Initially, that was a critical obstacle for the overall campaign, but it was overcome by a major forcible entry operation into northern Iraq that established operating bases for Army and special operations forces to sustain maneuver against enemy forces and protect key resource areas.

e. **Synchronizing Major Land Operations. The JFC concept of operations normally determines whether the campaign will be conducted simultaneously or sequentially among components.** For example, the JFC may require major offensive air operations to attain air superiority and interdict and attrite key enemy ground forces prior to the JFLCC beginning major land operations. Operation DESERT STORM was <u>sequential</u>, with an extensive period of air operations prior to the ground operations, but OIF was executed with <u>simultaneous</u> major air and land operations when the enemy had expected another sequential campaign. The enemy was surprised and overwhelmed and could not develop a coherent defense against the rapid advance of the land forces. Rarely will all required forces be available in theater at the outset of the campaign. **The JFLCC must evaluate the flow of forces and combat power available to determine if land forces must sequence major engagements over time as forces are generated in theater.**

f. **Shaping of the Battlespace. Shaping the battlespace is another essential consideration for the JFLCC for all phases of the campaign, and especially for the final transition to follow-on/stability operations phase.** Joint fires (especially from joint air

operations), combat engineering, special operations, information operations, civil affairs, etc., are critical in shaping the battlespace. **For success, the LCC must consider how best to shape from final campaign success through both lethal and non-lethal means from the onset of all JFLCC planning. The JFLCC may be competing with other components for limited resources/capabilities** at the same time, especially in a campaign designed for major, simultaneous, non-linear operations. The JFLCC should assess all shaping capabilities of the joint force, and for campaigns with significant socio-political effects, the transition phase may require shaping in conjunction with interagency/multinational forces. Throughout the campaign, the JFLCC shaping and maneuver should support the expected military and political end states.

(1) **Shaping activities must render the enemy vulnerable to attack, facilitate maneuver of friendly forces, and dictate the time and place for decisive battle.** Shaping can help the JFLCC gain the initiative, preserve momentum, control operational tempo, and facilitate phase transitions for the JFC's campaign. **The JFLCC should envision shaping activities that influence the enemy at operational distances to facilitate tactical effectiveness.**

(2) **The JFLCC should use joint fires, especially those provided by airpower (JFACC), to help shape the battlespace and to influence conditions for future operations**. The JFACC's reach, speed, flexibility, and ability to deliver kinetic force give the JFLCC opportunities to achieve surprise, shock, simultaneous actions, and sustained tempo through movement and maneuver.

(3) The JFLCC is responsible for coordinating shaping operations within the AO as the supported effort by the other components (JFACC/JFMCC/JFSOCC). The JFLCC should ensure subordinate components plan and coordinate/deconflict shaping operations--**especially those that may transcend their assigned boundaries--**so as not to conflict with other components' operations. This may be especially complex in an interagency/multinational force environment where visibility of such actions is not clear.

g. **Deception plans can enhance movement and maneuver for significant advantage** by feigning lines of operation/implying false objectives, and either fixing the enemy in position or causing them to commit to wasteful maneuver. Operations OVERLORD (Normandy invasion in World War II) and DESERT STORM used deception plans to fool the enemy and significantly enhance successes of friendly force movement and maneuver. The JFLCC should consider these as an integral part of inducing the enemy to position or move forces unwisely, thus opening the opportunity for the JFLCC to employ superior mobility to and maneuver against these weaknesses.

h. **Integration of Maneuver and Interdiction. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered as separate operations, but rather as complementary operations.** Joint interdiction in support of land forces should be properly synchronized with the scheme of maneuver to **place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous circumstances or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.** This was frequently the case in Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Joint interdiction may be part of shaping or decisive operations for the JFLCC or

part of the JFC's main effort. **The important consideration is to integrate the flexibility and precision/massed effects of joint interdiction into the land operations.**

(1) **Joint interdiction can facilitate maneuver operations but does not have to occur at the same place and time as the maneuver to be effective.** Joint interdiction can isolate enemy forces and control their movement into or out of the JFLCC AO. Interdiction can give friendly surface forces the time and protection they need to maneuver. **Joint interdiction can control the time of engagement to that point most advantageous to friendly forces.**

(2) On the other hand, **maneuver can play a major role in enabling effective interdiction**. Maneuver by land or naval forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surface potential. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, they can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction, and if the enemy tries to reduce interdiction losses, enemy forces risk being unable to counter friendly force maneuvers.

(3) **In a forcible entry scenario, joint interdiction may support land and amphibious maneuver operations by denying the enemy reinforcement, supply, or resupply to the objective area.** It also may interfere with enemy means of command and control or can provide a diversionary screen.

(4) The JFLCC can determine **specific targets for joint interdiction or, most preferably, give the supporting commanders mission-type instructions** that will provide the other components as much flexibility as possible. For example, the JFLCC could indicate to the JFACC that a particular group of enemy armored units are automatically the highest priority. The JFACC can then determine how best to support the JFLCC--without knowing in advance the exact location or timing of the priority target.

i. **Protecting Operational Movement and Maneuver Through Air and Missile Defense. Air and missile defense is a critical consideration for the JFLCC when moving and positioning land forces across broad distances. The threat from theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (potentially coupled with weapons of mass destruction) may be a paramount concern when balancing the air and missile defense requirements for both the theater-level and maneuver forces.** While all land components (and the JFACC) have adequate defenses against aircraft attacks, the only missile defense capabilities are part of the ARFOR (PATRIOT system) and maritime forces (e.g., AEGIS cruisers). The JFC approved air defense plan should ensure an integrated approach for optimum protection of all JFC components.

(1) **The JFLCC will control only those air and missile defenses designated for the maneuver forces.** The split of air and missile defenses (between theater-level and maneuver forces) is normally determined with JFC approval of the air defense plan. The JFLCC must coordinate air defense priorities with the JFACC/area air defense commander (AADC). **The Commander of AAMDC, who normally also is the Theater Army Air and Missile Defense Coordinator for the ARFOR, advises the JFLCC and the JFACC/AADC on air and missile defense matters.**

(2) **MARFOR and MNF.** As a land component force, the MARFOR, with organic aircraft and an air defense capability, still requires JFLCC/JFMCC defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles. Depending upon their organic air and missile defense capabilities, the MNF also may need coverage for not only ballistic missile defense, but also under the basic air defense umbrella. See Chapter 4, "Joint Land Protection."

j. **Control Measures in the Operational Area. The JFLCC builds upon the control and coordinating measures set forth by the JFC and establishes additional measures to ensure the more effective integration of joint capabilities within the AO** for the functions of maneuver, joint fire support, interdiction, counterair, and close air support. Measures include those to help coordinate and control maneuver such as boundaries, phase lines, etc., and integrating joint fires. See Chapter 7, "Joint Land Operational Fires," for a discussion of fire support coordination and airspace control measures.

(1) **Boundaries** are linear control measure used in land warfare to define geographical limits of surface AOs between adjacent units and/or formations. Within their own boundaries, units may execute fire and maneuver without close coordination with neighboring units unless otherwise restricted. Normally units do not fire across boundaries unless the fires are coordinated with the adjacent unit or the fires are beyond a FSCM such as a FSCL or coordinated fire line. However, direct and observed fires should be used when firing across boundaries at positively identified enemy forces when there is no time to coordinate with adjacent friendly units. JFLCCs may use **lateral**, **rear**, and **forward boundaries** to define subordinate AOs. Boundaries **may require relatively frequent adjustment** based on the rate of maneuver and operational environment.

(2) **Phase Lines** (PLs) are a maneuver control measure used by land forces to control and coordinate the forward and lateral movement and fires of land operations. They are usually marked by recognizable terrain features extending across the zone of action. However, given current global positioning system (GPS) technology, PLs may be placed at other non-terrain key points to delineate battlespace and coordinate operations among components. Units normally report crossing PLs, but do not halt unless specifically directed. PLs can be used to identify limits of advance, control fires, or define an AO. The purpose and required actions by forces affected by the PL will be specified in the operation order of the establishing headquarters (JFLCC).

(3) In placing control measures, **the JFLCC must understand that the JFACC views theater-wide air operations as not constrained by surface boundaries, per se.** However, because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, the airspace control authority, on behalf of the JFC, promulgates airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses of airspace**. Delivery of air weapons inside surface boundaries normally requires coordination with the surface force commanders.**

k. **Combat Identification and Identification.** The JFC directive establishing the JFLCC should include responsibilities and authorities to be used for both identification (ID) and CID. The procedures/processes used for both must be **approved and promulgated by the JFC.** ROE normally are applied to the ID/CID processes. **ID and CID differ** in that CID is good enough

for ID purposes (e.g., situational awareness), but ID procedures normally are neither timely nor accurate enough for CID, which allows an engagement decision--shoot or no-shoot.

(1) **ID** is the process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an unknown detected contact, and for ground combat operations, "discrimination between recognizable objects as being friendly or enemy." **Positive and procedural ID measures** normally are established by the JFC and used for situational awareness, including the JFC/JFLCC common operating pictures. **ID normally is not sufficient for routine engagement decisions.**

(2) **CID**, although not yet defined in doctrine, is considered the **near-real-time identification of enemy or friendly forces with such high confidence that an engagement decision (shoot or no-shoot) is possible, and a recognized means of minimizing the chance of fratricide.** Highly reliable, **near-real-time or better,** positive identification procedures (electronic or visual) are key to CID. An example of an electronic system is the Blue Force Tracker. **CID must be consistent with approved ROE for an engagement decision.**

l. **Rules of Engagement.** The JFC operations directive will include a ROE appendix to the operations annex. **The ROE approved and supplemented by the JFC** stems from the ROE approved by the JFC, based upon CJCSI 3121.01A, *Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces*, dependent upon the mission. **Serial ROE messages** are used to identify and promulgate all current ROE and anticipated amendments. **The JFLCC should anticipate and provide timely nomination of supplemental ROE to the JFC for different phases of the campaign, or whenever deemed necessary.** Dependent upon the ROE change, consideration/approval by the appropriate authority (i.e., President/Secretary of Defense, geographic combatant commander, or subordinate JFC) may take time. The JFLCC should ensure the ROE (along with CID) optimizes safeguards against fratricide among land forces, and also by air forces against land forces because of the extremely effective and very lethal weapons used by the JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFACC that are launched from beyond the line-of-sight of the target. The JFLCC will coordinate with all components to ensure promulgation, training, and compliance with the ROE. **Experience shows the weakest link is training the warfighters to the ROE, not just promulgating it, especially during the transition from major combat operations to a stability operations phase.**

4. Coordinating Operational Movement and Maneuver Among Components

a. The JFLCC should use every means available to ensure synchronization and synergy among land forces and with other functional components. While maintaining effective "supported" and "supporting" relationships with other component commands, **the JFLCC has a special relationship with the JFACC because of the significant joint fires and ISR capabilities that the JFACC offers the JFLCC during the campaign.** The JFLCC and JFACC should have an in-depth common view of how both will work to support the JFC and understand each other's plans and priorities. The JFACC normally maintains air superiority for the JFC and provides overmatching, precision, firepower for supporting land operations, whether indirectly through joint interdiction or directly by CAS.

b. **Liaison and Coordination. One of the proven requirements for successful operations is effective and efficient support relationships** (and coordination) between the JFLCC and other JFC components, and between the JFLCC and its components. Enhanced coordination requires a **robust liaison structure--in terms of quality, not merely quantity**. Most of the formal JFC component liaison teams (i.e., BCD, ACCE, special operations liaison element (SOLE), SOCCE, etc.) are now doctrinally driven, but between the JFLCC and the JFLCC components, less so. The LNOs or liaison teams may have manpower positions, but **properly manning them with experienced, quality personnel (not just placeholders) is the key. Superior LNOs/teams provide a synergistic affect on the coordination among commands, leading to clarity of focus, cohesion, and unity of effort for the mission.**

(1) **The JFLCC should consider a joint MARFOR and ARFOR liaison team** (e.g., Marines attached to the Army BCD) **as the Land Commander's LNO element to the JFACC**. In this arrangement, the team represents the JFLCC as a single force while addressing the particular capabilities needs of their individual Services. However, representation in a single liaison team does not restrict the ability of the JFC's Service components to address issues of Service concern.

(2) As the personal and official representative of the sending organizational commander, the LNO/team should be authorized direct face-to-face liaison with the receiving commander. As such, the LNO must have the **special confidence of both organizations** and can serve as a conduit of critical information. So, the **rank of the JFLCC LNOs should be sufficient** to the receiving command to enable the LNOs to effectively represent the JFLCC.

(3) The JFLCC's LNOs must have the skills, knowledge, and capabilities (interpersonal and technical communications skills) to represent the JFLCC effectively without interfering in the normal operation of the receiving headquarters. **JFLCC involvement is the key to ensuring that a competent "spokesman" is identified to represent the LCC as well as ensuring adequate reciprocal representation from other organizations.** LNOs should have their own secure communications links with their parent commands.

(4) **The size of the LNO team must fit the mission needs.** Given competing demands for manpower, the general temptation is to send a small LNO team. Unfortunately, **LNO teams not adequately manned to meet mission demands or conduct sustained 24-hour operations are ineffective.** High workloads across both planning and ongoing operations will inevitably lead to diminished productivity and costly errors that affect mission. Conversely, an LNO team that is too large can place undue demands on available workspace, communications infrastructure, and other support functions. See *MTTP for Joint Task Force Liaison Integration* (FM 3-99.3/MCRP 5-1A) for considerations and additional details regarding liaison officers/elements/teams.

(5) **The JFACC will establish an ACCE** as a direct representative to the JFLCC for interface and liaison. The ACCE assists the JFLCC staff in planning key requirements. The ACCE interface includes exchanging current intelligence and operational data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of requirements for airspace control measures, joint FSCMs, and CAS. **<u>The ACCE is not an air support operations center or tactical air control</u>**

party (integrated US Air Force elements within an Army Corps echelon and below), but can perform many air support planning functions. The size and composition of the ACCE is mission-dependent as determined by the JFACC.

5. Close Air Support Integration into Operational Maneuver

a. **CAS has a synergistic effect then employed in combination with maneuver.** As a supported commander for CAS in the AO, the JFLCC must have a system to ensure subordinate land component's CAS requirements are properly planned, coordinated, and resourced through the JTCB process. At times CAS may be the best means to exploit tactical opportunities in the offense or defense by providing firepower to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemy forces. **Operations have shown that improper procedures and techniques can result in delays, faulty employment, and fratricide of both land and air forces.**

(1) **The JFLCC establishes the priority, timing, and effects of CAS within the boundaries of the land AO.** Although simple in concept, CAS requires detailed planning, coordination, and training for effective and safe execution within dynamic operations.

(2) **For CAS, integration starts at the JFLCC level during the deep operations coordination process as shown in Chapter 7.** Whether conducting offensive or defensive operations, **commanders plan for CAS at key points throughout the depth of the battlefield**. The JFC prioritizes all joint air operations, including CAS, through the JTCB process, and the JFACC postures assets to optimize support to the requesting JFLCC units.

(3) **Marine air** under the MARFOR component normally has an aviation element with aircraft that remains under the direct control of the MARFOR and dedicated to the support of its ground element. **That does not preclude a JFLCC requesting CAS from JFACC assets for the MARFOR, or the MARFOR from making available a portion of their aviation element to support shaping or CAS for the land component as a whole. However, the JFLCC's requirements must not take away from the MARFOR's ability to provide air support to its organic ground elements.**

(4) **Army Air.** The Army considers **attack helicopters maneuver units and not a CAS system** although they can conduct attacks employing CAS tactics and procedures when operating in support of other forces. They normally remain under the operational control of the ARFOR and not the JFACC. **The preferred employment method is as an integral unit**, **operating under the control of a maneuver commander executing mission-type orders.** Also, see Chapter 2, "Command and Control of Joint Land Operations," for details of command relationships between the JFACC and ARFOR and MARFOR aviation assets.

(5) Normally the JFACC requires all potential air operations throughout the joint operational area (including most JFLCC component helicopter operations) be scheduled through the ATO in sufficient detail to maintain operational visibility for all components.

(6) **The JFLCC should ensure the land force components have sufficient joint terminal attack controller (JTACs) to coordinate air operations for the maneuver and joint**

fire support required within their operational areas in the AO. A JTAC is a qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward position, is authorized to direct the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other air operations. Acquisition of sufficient JTACs may require coordination for assets during JRSOI and subsequent joint training/certification from the JFACC.

(7) Experience has shown there will be instances where terminal attack control will be requested by personnel/units that do not have JTACs present. In these instances, JTACs, forward air controllers (airborne), and/or CAS aircrews should attempt to assist these personnel/units to the greatest extent possible to bring fires to bear in support of the ground force. Ultimately, employment of CAS within the land AO is part of the air and land commander's shared risk; trust and confidence between components is absolutely essential in these exceptions. See JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS),* for additional details for CAS.

b. **Use of Kill Boxes.** Kill boxes are not fire support or airspace control measures, but rather **theater-level area reference systems**, also described as "grid references" or "engagement zones." Missions that might utilize an area reference include counterfire, air interdiction, combat search and rescue, close air support, and counterair (particularly for theater missile defense). Surface units have historically employed kill boxes and engagement zones to focus combat power, but as tactical-level area references without accompanying FSCMs or ACMs as at the operational level. **Kill boxes were planned and heavily utilized by the JFLCC components and JFACC for air support in OIF.** Theater-level kill boxes (employed as a common area reference system) often combine FSCMs with ACMs as a single coordination and control measure. This combination of fire support and airspace coordination enables the **use of these area reference systems to be a reactive, timely, and simple tool for joint force employment and component integration**. **When properly planned and coordinated by the JFLCC and JFACC, kill boxes provide an excellent combination of an area reference system with airspace and fire support coordination measures and are particularly useful in the JLFCC AO when targeting TSTs.** See JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting,* for additional details.

6. Integration of Special Operations Forces into the Land Area of Operations

a. Recent operations have emphasized the use of "shared battlespace" where multiple air, land, and special operations forces operated simultaneously to attack enemy forces with no one component "owning" the AO. **The JFLCC and components must understand how to integrate with SOF in both a supporting and supported role.** However, many conventional maneuver units have not trained or operated directly with SOF. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and IRAQI FREEDOM proved the utility of SOF (including MNF SOF) as a major force multiplier for the JFC and demonstrated their ability to help shape the battlespace, specifically for the JFLCC. As in OIF, SOF may be assigned an AO for which they are responsible, much like a JFLCC.

b. **The JFLCC should coordinate early on with the JFSOCC about the best way they can mutually support JFC objectives and intent.** The JFC will determine the course of action based in part on planning and coordination with component commanders. The JFLCC and

JFSOCC may have separate lines of operation, as well as lines of operation where one is in support of the other.

(1) **Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).** The JFSOCC is normally the theater-level SOF component commander, a subordinate to the geographic combatant commander. The JFSOCC may also be designated a Commander, JSOTF (COMJSOTF). Under a JFSOCC and COMJSOTF, there can be multiple JSOTFs in a joint operational area based on the JFC's concept for employment. Some operations require conventional forces to be in support of SOF, under the operational/tactical control of, or in support of the JFSOCC/COMJSOTF. Other operations may have SOF under the tactical control or in support of the JFLCC or one of the land force component commanders. See JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,* for additional details for integration of SOF with conventional forces. See Chapter 2, "Command and Control of Joint Land Operations," for command relationships between JFLCC and JFSOCC.

(2) Joint training exercises and rehearsals are most desirable for the SOF-conventional force integration; however, even this has proven to be difficult. Understanding the command relationships and the detailed planning required by SOF and establishing a robust liaison between the JFSOCC and JFLCC and other task units is required. **For deep or complex operations such as forcible entry operations or raids, or when SOF may shape the battlespace for the JFLCC, short training exercises/mission rehearsals during the staging period are a must.**

(3) **Sensitive Site Exploitation.** Although discussed in US Army doctrine and only recently emerging in joint doctrine, sensitive site exploitation (SSE) operations have been assigned to joint task forces/teams that combine conventional, SOF, and special subject matter experts, including interagency representatives. During OEF and OIF, SSE joint task forces/teams were tasked to secure and exploit suspected weapons sites and other specially designated sites. For SSE, the JFLCC may be the supported commander, may provide combat support to a designated SSE joint task force, or may provide conventional force support to a JFSOCC/COMJSOTF.

c. **Other Special Operations Forces.** The JFC likely will have national-level SOF operating in the joint operational area. Although not subordinate to the JFC or other joint force components, **the planned activities of these national-level SOF must be "visible" to the JFLCC to ensure unity of effort and to preclude potential fratricide**.

7. Joint Land Movement and Maneuver Checklist

- **"Nested" Concepts:** Does the JFLCC scheme of maneuver fully support the JFC concept of operations, objectives, and defined end state? Do the JFLCC operational objectives and commander's intent provide clear and sufficient guidance to the maneuver-unit commanders?

- **Forces and Resources:** Are they sufficient to meet operational requirements:

•• Are the maneuver forces/capabilities adequate for the JFLCC scheme of maneuver and the expected phases of the campaign?

•• Do available maneuver forces/capabilities enable operational (intratheater) movement and positioning of forces to further enable maneuver?

•• Is the flow of forces into theater sufficient and timely to meet requirements at the time required in the campaign plan?

- **Operational Reach:** Do maneuver forces (including MNFs) have sufficient operational reach and sustainment to prevent unscheduled pauses (or culmination) for the chosen scheme of maneuver? What forward bases and intratheater support does the JFLCC need to enable/maintain this reach?

- **Maneuver Enhancement:** Is movement/maneuver integrated with operational protection at major points of vulnerability?

  •• Are air and missile defenses (especially missile defenses) sufficient and mobile enough to support the scheme of maneuver from JFLCC staging/operating bases through the geographic lines of operations to the final decisive points?

  •• Are other theater enablers (decontamination, detection, WMD exploitation, force protection forces, etc) sufficient through the depth of the land AO

- **Shaping for Maneuver:** Have the JFLCC plans to shape the battlespace coordinated use of all the capabilities of the joint force (especially airpower) from the line of departure and throughout the campaign, to include the transition phase after combat operations?

  •• Have plans for the JFLCC scheme of maneuver and interdiction of enemy forces been fully integrated and synchronized, so they are as mutually supportive (synergistic) as possible?

  •• Has the complete process for close air support been planned and rehearsed and are sufficient JTACS available for the joint land forces (including support for MNFs)?

- **Identification:** To help minimize fratricide, are CID techniques and procedures for the maneuver forces (including MNFs) satisfactory for the JFLCC scheme of maneuver and supporting fires/operations from other joint force components?

- **ROE:** Are the ROE, their promulgation, and ROE training satisfactory for the land forces (including MNFs) for each phase of the campaign, including a potential stability phase following major combat operations?

It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms which will insure victory.

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CHAPTER 7

JOINT LAND OPERATIONAL FIRES

"Firepower and maneuver will continue to be the crucial determinates of how military operations play out on the 21st Century battlefields. Firepower temporarily paralyzes and impairs the enemy and thus creates opportunities to translate a temporary advantage into a lasting one through exploitation by maneuver."

Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Major General, US Army (Retired)
Future Warfare

1. Introduction

a. The JFLCC is responsible for achieving a broad range of effects based on the mission and tasks assigned by the JFC. While the JFLCC can accomplish some tasks using only land component capabilities, mission accomplishment will require coordination with (and support of) other joint force components. In major combat operations, obvious examples in which the JFACC plays an important role include air defense, interdiction, ISR, and close air support. Joint doctrine provides for various command relationships such as **OPCON**, **TACON**, and **support** to facilitate cross-component coordination and clarify priorities and authority for employment of joint force capabilities.

b. **This chapter** first provides considerations related to **support relationships** and how functional components—particularly the JFLCC and JFACC—can understand and accommodate each other's requirements. It then follows with a discussion of **operational fires planning considerations**, **integration challenges**, and **low collateral damage capabilities**. The chapter concludes with a brief description of **joint land fires operations assessment** as it relates to determining the progress toward achieving operational and strategic objectives. Paragraph 7 provides relevant joint doctrine publication references. **Tab A to this chapter provides additional information on operational fires based on the experience of the CFLCC during USCENTCOM operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.**

2. Support Relationships and Priorities

Understanding support relationships is essential to cross-component coordination and operations within the land component's or JFLCC's AO. The JFC's need for unity of command and unity of effort will dictate these relationships. Although this chapter focuses on JFLCC and JFACC, similar relationships pertain in operations with the naval component or JFMCC.

a. **The land component commander is the supported commander within the AO designated by the JFC.** The JFLCC integrates and synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction within his AO and has the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing

of fires. **Within the LCC AO, the JFLCC also may be the supporting commander for some functions**. Support relationships can be established among all functional and Service component commanders, such as the coordination of operations in depth involving the JFLCC and the JFACC.

b. The JFLCC typically is designated the **supported commander** in the LCC AO for close air support, air interdiction, maritime operations, special operations, personnel recovery operations, and joint rear area operations when designated as the Joint Security Coordinator by the JFC. The JFLCC typically is designated the **supporting commander** for other components' SEAD operations, the JFMCC's seizure and holding of ports, and operations where the JFACC is designated the supported commander for certain operations. In some cases, the JFC may task the JFLCC to conduct land operations outside the LCC AO in support of another component. Similarly, the JFLCC can request support from other components for operations inside the LCC AO.

c. Synchronization of efforts within the LCC AO with joint operational area-wide operations is particularly important. To facilitate this, the JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the joint operational area, including within the JFLCC's AO. **In coordination with the JFLCC, those commanders such as the JFACC--designated by the JFC to execute joint operational area-wide functions--have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC-prioritized operations and attack targets within land and maritime AOs**. If these operations would have adverse impact within the JFLCC's AO, the commander must readjust his plan, resolve the issue with the JFACC, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

d. **Beyond these designated relationships is the necessity for JFLCC and JFACC to understand the JFC's and each other's missions, concepts of operations, capabilities, and the mechanisms for effectively and efficiently coordinating required support.** Both headquarters primarily do so in four ways:

(1) They maintain representation, as necessary, on the JFC's boards, centers, and cells, including the JTCB, JPG, CMOC, and IO cell.

(2) They share their plans and coordinate planning efforts and priorities with each other, including between their own boards, centers, and cells.

(3) They maintain their functional representation (liaison) in the other component's headquarters.

(4) They strive to understand not only the JFC's intent and that of their own commander, but also the intent of the other functional component commander. This can help keep operations "on track" and promote unity of effort in rapidly moving situations when execution outruns the plan or communications fail.

e. **In determining how best to employ land forces to achieve campaign plan objectives, the JFLCC makes a number of recommendations to the JFC that can require or affect JFACC support**. These include the following:

(1) Developing a land force scheme of maneuver, associated fire support plan, and plan for additional operational fires (including nonlethal ways and means such as offensive information operations) to support the JFC's campaign plan.

(2) Identifying targets and objectives within the JFLCC's boundaries.

(3) Establishing priorities of effort.

(4) Designating fire support coordination measures.

(5) Planning and coordinating operational fires that affect maneuver, including recommending apportionment of air interdiction and close air support in support of the JFLCC's scheme of maneuver.

f. The JFLCC should understand and consider the typical JFACC responsibilities associated with campaign planning and execution. See JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, for detailed information. **The JFACC's broad responsibilities encompass planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint air operations.** Specific tasks include the following:

(1) Developing a joint air operations plan that best supports the JFC's objectives.

(2) Recommending apportionment to the JFC of the joint air effort.

(3) Allocating and tasking available air capabilities based on the apportionment decision.

(4) Providing oversight and guidance of air operations during execution.

(5) Evaluating the results of joint air operations.

(6) Functioning as the ACA and AADC when designated by the JFC.

(7) Functioning as a supported and supporting commander when designated by the JFC.

(8) Accomplishing various missions, to include counterair, strategic attack, air interdiction, airborne ISR, CAS, and inter/intratheater mobility.

3. Operational Fires Planning

a. The JFLCC plans and executes operational fires in conjunction with operational maneuver to create conditions for success in the AO and accomplish the mission. **The JFLCC uses operational fires as the principle means for shaping land operations and creating the conditions for tactical success in the LCC AO. The JFLCC typically focuses on operational-level centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities and uses joint and combined lethal and nonlethal means to achieve decisive impact.**

b. **The JFLCC generally has five primary goals when planning operational fires**. JFLCC planners should collaborate with JFACC planners on specific information associated with these goals early and continuously during the planning process. The goals are as follow:

(1) Facilitate both operational and tactical maneuver by interdicting the adversary's deep-strike systems, disrupting the adversary's operational maneuver and tempo, and creating exploitable gaps in adversary positions.

(2) Isolate the battlespace by interdicting adversary military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

(3) Destroy critical adversary functions (such as command and control) and facilities that eliminate or substantially degrade adversary operational capabilities.

(4) Integrate nonlethal capabilities (such as offensive IO) to supplement the effects of lethal ways and means.

(5) Consider the impact of operational fires on infrastructure and indigenous capabilities with regard to implications for post-combat stability operations, reconstruction, and support to civil authorities.

c. The JFLCC controls numerous capabilities that can deliver fires at operational depths. These include attack helicopters, Marine Corps air assets, and Army Tactical Missile System. Likewise, information operations, maneuver, and special operations can achieve operational-level results. The naval component also can provide Tomahawk land attack missile and naval surface fire support if these capabilities are within range. However, the JFACC typically controls the majority of means to help shape the operational fight. **An established joint targeting process provides for coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization to maximize strategic, operational, and tactical effects of fires in compliance with the JFC's objectives, guidance, and intent**. See JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, for details on the joint targeting process.

d. **The JFLCC establishes a number of permissive and restrictive FSCMs and maneuver control measures**. The JFLCC also forwards nominations for ACMs to the airspace control authority. **FSCMs and ACMs that are designed to facilitate operations for one component possibly can impact on another component's planned operations.** See chapter 6 for a discussion of maneuver control measures.

(1) **Permissive FSCMs** include the coordinated fire line, free-fire area, and FSCL. Of these, **the FSCL is the most significant with regard to coordination between the JFLCC and the JFACC**. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of ammunition. This FSCM affects the control of fires both short of and beyond this measure. The JFLCC establishes and adjusts the FSCL within the boundaries of the JFLCC AO to facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond that line and within the JFLCC AO. **The JFLCC or establishing commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as**

required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may change frequently. A series of pre-disseminated, on-order FSCLs will facilitate coordination. Forces attacking targets beyond a FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to avoid fratricide and to ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects on JFLCC operations. In exceptional circumstances, such as for JFC TSTs, the inability to conduct this coordination may not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to coordinate may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. Short of an FSCL, the JFLCC controls all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations. **However, experience has shown that to preclude friction between the JFLCC and the JFACC, procedures for JFACC attacks on TSTs short of the FSCL also should be planned, rehearsed, and coordinated between the JFLCC and the JFACC.** Use of a common grid reference system such as "kill boxes" have proven an efficient and effective means to identify areas (combined with coordination and control measures) for joint fires. See Appendix A of JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*, for a discussion of control and coordination measures, including the coordinated fire line and free-fire area.

(2) **Restrictive FSCM** include the restrictive fire line, the no-fire area, restrictive fire area, zone of fire, and ACA. Of these, the ACA is the most significant with regard to coordinating operations between the JFLCC and the JFACC. The ACA is the primary FSCM for coordination of airspace by air support and indirect fires. ACAs are used to ensure aircrew safety and the effective use of indirect supporting surface fires by deconfliction through time and space. The ACA is a block or corridor of airspace in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. A **formal ACA** (a three dimensional box of airspace) requires detailed planning. More often an informal ACA is established using time, lateral separation, or altitude to provide separation between surface-to-surface and air-delivered weapon effects. For additional information on the ACA see JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS),* and JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*. In an informal ACA, aircraft and surface fires may be separated by time or distance (lateral, altitude, or a combination of the two). The maneuver commander who is requesting CAS or employing helicopters can request an informal ACA, which would be approved at battalion or higher level. Both types of ACAs are constructed with the assistance of the air liaison officer to ensure they meet the technical requirements of the aircraft and weapon systems. See definitions in the glossary and JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*, for additional details regarding FSCMs.

(3) Theater-wide air sorties are not constrained by surface boundaries, per se. However, because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, the airspace control authority, on behalf of the JFC, promulgates **airspace control measures** to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space. The Airspace Control Plan (ACP) normally contains procedures for establishing ACMs. The ACA, normally the JFACC, develops the ACP in coordination with all components. The ACP is then approved by the JFC.

(a) ACMs are nominated by subordinate headquarters (e.g., ARFOR or MARFOR) through the JFLCC and forwarded to the ACA in accordance with the ACP. Most ACMs impact on indirect fires trajectories and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft because of their airspace use. Some ACMs may be established to permit surface fires or UAV operations. The component

commanders ensure that nominated ACMs support rather than conflict with ground operations prior to forwarding to the JFACC's joint air operations center (JOAC). The ACA consolidates, coordinates, and deconflicts the airspace requirements of the components and publishes the ACMs in the airspace control order (ACO). **The ACO normally is published at least daily and often is distributed both separately and as a section of the JFACC's ATO.**

(b) **ACMs may be established to facilitate operations between the FSCL and the JFLCC AO forward boundary.** Examples include attack helicopter maneuver, ground infiltration and aerial insertion and/or extraction of SOF, or long-range reconnaissance /surveillance teams.

(c) Requests for changes to established ACMs within the JFLCC AO are initiated by a subordinate component's, such as a corps or Marine expeditionary force (MEF), air control element and subject to ACA approval. One common procedural ACM that impacts on the delivery of fire support is a **coordinating altitude**. A coordinating altitude separates operations of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The JFC approves the coordinating altitude, which normally is specified in the ACP. The airspace control authority is the final approving authority for changes that are requested through airspace coordination channels.

(d) See JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone,* and JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, for further information.

e. **Time-Sensitive Targets.** The JFC normally designates certain targets (typically weapon systems such as WMD, mobile rocket launchers, and surface-to-air missiles) as TSTs. TSTs are those that require immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. TSTs may be identified during the normal targeting process as planned targets, but often not targeted because their locations are unknown. They also can be unplanned or unanticipated targets. Once located, their immediate prosecution is required, potentially at the increased risk of fratricide of friendly forces**. One of the recurring issues for any JFC/JFLCC is optimizing the joint force capability against TSTs within the boundaries of the JFLCC AO. The JFC does this by collaborating with joint force components and designating TSTs in advance to the extent possible. This facilitates the compressed decision cycle required to engage fleeting targets effectively.**

(1) While the JFLCC is free to attack TSTs with assets under LCC control throughout the LCC AO, there typically will be TSTs in the LCC AO that the JFLCC cannot immediately attack. Also, **the JFC may task the JFACC to be capable of attacking TSTs throughout the joint operational area as soon as the TSTs are identified**. Normally, the JFACC must inform all affected commanders when attacking targets beyond a FSCL in sufficient time to avoid fratricide and adverse effects on JFLCC operations. **In exceptional circumstances, such as for TSTs, the JFACC may attack these targets without coordination. Even short of the FSCL, some TSTs (such as WMD) are so critical that the JFC will want them destroyed regardless of the ability or opportunity for immediate coordination between the JFACC and JFLCC.**

(2) **Experience has shown that procedures for JFACC attacks on TSTs, particularly short of the FSCL, should be planned, rehearsed, and coordinated between the JFLCC and**

the JFACC to preclude friction, fratricide, and other adverse effects. Geographic combatant commands and Service components likely to be designated as the JFLCC typically have a SOP for TST procedures. This SOP facilitates rehearsal for engaging TSTs under a variety of circumstances. The JFLCC and JFACC can accomplish integrated TST planning in a variety of ways, including through virtual collaboration, liaison, and consolidation or collocation of the TST planning effort. See Appendix B (Time-Sensitive Targeting Considerations) to JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting,* and the US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center *Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting*, for additional details.

f. **The JFLCC forms a targeting coordination board (TCB).** Among many other functions, the TCB helps develop targeting guidance and priorities, compiles subordinate units' targeting nominations, and develops a candidate target list (CTL) for JFLCC approval. The JFLCC also has representatives on the JFC's equivalent joint board (JTCB). They receive copies of the JFLCC's CTL and must be fully attuned to the priorities, objectives, and supporting rationale behind the JFLCC's targeting effort.

g. When the JFLCC submits the CTL to the JTCB, a copy goes concurrently to the JFLCC's BCD in the JFACC's JAOC. The BCD is the Army component commander's interface with the JFACC, just as the MARLNO is for the Marine component commander. The BCD and MARLNO are collocated with the JFACC's staff in the JAOC. The BCD processes land force requests for air support, monitors and interprets the land battle situation in the JAOC, and provides the necessary interface for the exchange of current operational and intelligence data. The BCD and MARLNO expedite the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with elements in the JAOC and coordinate air defense and airspace control matters. **The JFLCC should make an early decision as to which organization--the BCD or MARLNO--will be the official voice for the LCC with the JFACC.**

h. To complement the BCD, the JFACC typically establishes an air component coordination element to interface and provide liaison with the JFLCC. See Chapter 6 for more information on the ACCE.

i. The JFLCC accomplishes fires synchronization and coordination in the J-3's Fires and Effects Coordination Center (FECC) when the Army component is the JFLCC or in the force fires coordination center (FFCC) when the MEF is the JFLCC. Working with the BCD and other coordination elements, the FECC or FFCC collaborate on application of operational fires and effects, review and comment on the JFACC's apportionment recommendation, develop the JFLCC's CTL and FSCMs, and plan and coordinate, as appropriate, operational and other fires.

j. **The ATO is critical to the JFLCC as a means of shaping the operational fight**. The FECC/FFCC receives the ATO daily, "scrubs" it for non-JFLCC targets scheduled within the JFLCC's AO, and deconflicts the JFLCC's deep operations plan accordingly. It also highlights targets from the JFLCC CTL and those from components that appear on the ATO. If a nominated target does not make the ATO "cut," the FECC/FFCC must address it with other means or re-coordinate with the JFACC for possible attack of the target.

k. **During execution, decisions to modify missions or direct attacks that deviate from planned activity must be based on the JFLCC's guidance**. These decisions are made with understanding of the perspective and target priorities of other component targeting efforts throughout the campaign.

4. Operational Fires Integration Challenges

a. **The effective use of support relationships can mitigate the challenge associated with** the JFLCC's authority to establish fire support coordination measures and designate the target priority, effects, and timing of fires within his AO and the JFACC's requirement to conduct joint operational area-wide operations designated by the JFC. **Still, planning and executing operational fires is a complex process**. For example, the JFLCC and JFACC each have their own battle rhythm, as **Figure 7-1** shows. It is important that JFACC and JFLCC battle rhythm elements are timed properly with those of the JFC in order to ensure that JFLCC operational fires requirements can be accommodated as much as possible. A number of factors can "unlink" these elements, including changes in JFC guidance, discrepancies in combat assessment results, rapid successes, and the appearance of unexpected high-value or time-critical targets. Likewise, a number of factors can keep the elements linked, including the JFACC's and JFLCC's mutual understanding of the JFC's plan, "cross talk" during both plan development and execution, and effective use of the BCD and ACCE. **See Tab A to this chapter for more discussion of the JFLCC's battle rhythm based on recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.**



Figure 7-1. Battle Rhythms

b. Planning and executing operational fires will continue to be challenging due to other factors as well as battle rhythm. These include the following:

- The requirement to look out 72-96 hours to meet ATO requirements
- Integration of non-kinetic capabilities such as IO with kinetic capabilities
- The difficulty of assessing the effects of non-kinetic actions

- The tendency of land component commanders to maintain maximum control of "their" battlespace
- The failure of advanced-technology systems to always perform as expected
- The complexity of operations
- The inevitable "fog of war"

"Today, world events mandate a need to project non-lethal force across all levels of war to enable our warfighters and leaders to effectively deal with a host of traditional as well as non-traditional threats. Now more than ever, the minimal level of public tolerance for collateral damage and loss of human life, coupled with the tendency for the typical adversary to exploit our rules of engagement to his benefit, necessitates an effective and flexible application of force through non-lethal weapons."

General James L. Jones
32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps and former DOD Executive Agent for the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program

5. Collateral Damage Considerations

a. Limiting collateral damage is an important planning factor. Legal and moral considerations surround the issue of collateral damage and "drive" ROE that often complicate the JFLCC's mission. Many of the planning and coordination considerations in the previous paragraphs apply to using nonlethal capabilities as well as to lethal systems. **The term "nonlethal" is useful because it includes capabilities commonly referred to as "non-kinetic," which typically cause limited or no collateral damage.**

b. **Traditional methods** for limiting collateral damage include carefully devised ROE, thorough intelligence operations to identify the intended targets correctly, careful planning to strike only the targets that provide the desired effects, sophisticated tools and methods that help planners estimate both the amount and pattern of collateral damage caused by a wide array of weapons, mitigation techniques, and use of precision-guided munitions to increase the probability of hitting the intended targets. **Emerging methods** for limiting collateral damage include use of nonlethal capabilities that, by their nature, are generally nondestructive (from an "explosive" perspective) as well.

c. Collateral damage also can be reduced by using weapons, technologies, and other capabilities that have the specific capacity to precisely achieve a desired effect on an adversary target, system, or function while minimizing collateral damage and casualties, even though the target may be disabled or destroyed. For example, carbon-filament bombs (CBU-114) were used in both the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict and the 1999 Operation ALLIED FORCE in Yugoslavia to disable rather than destroy electrical generators and switching yards. Computer network attack (CNA) can disable or neutralize an adversary's C4I systems using computer viruses, worms, and other methods that affect only the targeted systems. **Effectively executed IO, such as CNA and deception operations, can be unrecognizable to the adversary as an attack or attempt to influence the decision maker.** Some offensive IO can engage some adversary systems from well outside the actual or potential joint operational area (including from CONUS). Finally, **the JFLCC can use some pre-approved offensive IO very early in a crisis, potentially limiting escalation.**

d. Nonlethal capabilities provide additional means to achieve specific results and offer the JFLCC the potential to achieve operational and strategic objectives while limiting collateral damage and adhering to ROE. However, the availability of nonlethal ways and means **should**

never keep the commander from using the best combination of all available capabilities to achieve the results required for mission accomplishment, given ROE at the time. Although our understanding of weapons effects and our ability to estimate collateral damage continues to improve, planners must still think through potential unintended second- and third-order effects of both lethal and nonlethal fires.

6. Operational Joint Land Fires Assessment

a. The current **combat assessment (CA)** model (see JP 3-60) has three primary components: **BDA, munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and reattack recommendations**. CA addresses the effectiveness of targeting operations. It directly affects the JFC's air apportionment decisions, as well as the JFLCC commander's decisions on executing operations or attacking targets by other means.

b. The **BDA component** compares what actually was accomplished against the target to what planners expected to be accomplished during the target formulation process. **MEA** compares the actual effectiveness of the means employed to the expected effectiveness. Together, BDA and MEA help determine the degree of success in achieving objectives. With this information, planners can make reattack recommendations if desired results were not achieved.

c. As described in JP 3-60, CA focuses on targets and target effects. **When the JFC and JFLCC incorporate results in their planning, operational assessment uses a combination of measures of performance (MOPs) and MOEs to measure task accomplishment and results attainment, respectively.** Together, these help the JFLCC determine progress toward achieving operational and strategic objectives.

d. JFCs and JFLCCs develop one or more MOEs for each desired result. An MOE gives more precision to a desired result and lessens the opportunity for subordinates to misinterpret the commander's intent. **MOEs are normally quantitative measures that can show a trend, as well as progress relative to a numerical threshold.**

e. MOEs are designed, first, to help refine the JFC's desired results during planning and, second, to give JFC tangible indicators that the operation is "doing the right things" during execution. **MOEs measure system changes--usually behavioral--in the operational environment: the effects on the military, political, economic and other battlespace systems.** They also can measure the quality of the nexus (causal link) between the strategic or operational results and the tactical tasks or actions. The totality of MOEs informs the JFCs if the battlespace is conforming to the desired strategic or operational end state. **MOEs <u>do not</u> measure task accomplishment or performance by friendly organizations or forces--**that is the role of the measures of performance.

f. During planning and execution, measurement of task accomplishment is also an aspect of an assessment. Task performance assessment has two facets: (1) measuring how well JFCs and their staffs perform, and (2) measuring the performance of tactical actions. **The principal aim**

of task assessment is to discover if "things were done right." These measurements are called measures of performance.

g. The most important MOPs are those that measure the nexus between actions and results. These **MOPs are developed to discover those actions that are producing desired or undesired results.** These measures are hard to develop, especially for actions designed to generate indirect behavioral effects. Nonetheless, these MOPs are crucial to an assessment, particularly when the MOEs suggest that progress in attaining the desired result(s) is insufficient, or worse, show regression relative to the desired objective or end state.

End State: "Terrorists leave the country of Red."

MOE: Number of hostile events by area per day.

Result: "Populace actively cooperates with friendly forces."

MOE: Number of reports from different informants by area per day.

MOE: Number of overtures to cooperate with friendly forces by area per day.

Task: "Deny sanctuary, support, transit and staging to the insurgency."

MOP: Number of munitions caches found per week.

7. References

Although other references also apply, the following are primary references for information related to operational fires:

- JP 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*
- JP 3-01.4, *JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD)*
- JP 3-01.5, *Joint Doctrine for Theater Air and Missile Defense*
- JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*
- JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*
- JP 3-09.3, *JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)*
- JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*
- JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*
- JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*

8. Joint Land Operational Fires Checklist

- **JFC's Intent and Tasks:** Does the JFLCC understand the end state desired by the JFC?

•• What are the joint tactical tasks for the land component required to achieve the stated end state?

•• Does the JFLCC staff understand the tasks and the results that the JFLCC wants to accomplish and achieve?

- **Relationship with the JFACC:**

  •• What are the supporting and supported relationships between the JFLCC and JFACC? At what points (in time and battlespace) do these relationships change?

  •• Does the JFLCC understand the JFACC's mission, intent, plan, and desired results?

  •• Liaison: Who (the BCD or the MARLNO) speaks for the land component at the JFACC?

  •• Are the BCD and MARLNO organized to ensure a single set of priorities are expressed to the JFACC?

  •• Is the team sufficiently staffed, with the appropriate rank for its commander, to effectively represent the JFLCC in the JAOC, to include participation in planning and execution of operations and coordination of JFLCC requirements?

  •• Will the JFLCC receive an ACCE with 24-hour capabilities?

- **Organic Capabilities:** Are the JFLCC's "organic" operational fires capabilities, including low collateral damage (non-lethal) capabilities for offensive information operations, sufficient to support the JFLCC's tasks?

- **Organization in the LCC:** What is JFLCC's staff organization for coordinating and synchronizing joint land fires?

  •• How will I organize my fires coordination cell (FCC) to ensure all relevant capabilities are represented?

  •• How do we ensure the effects process considers and integrates both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities?

  •• How are the FCC's efforts supported by timely intelligence?

  •• Who will chair the FCC Boards? Who will represent the JFLCC in the JFC's daily boards? DCG? J3?

  •• How will the FCC recommendations be forwarded and approved?

•• How will the staff distribute desired end state guidance (both for planning and execution)?

•• How do the current and future plans cells link into other relevant cells (if established)?

•• What is the process to obtain feedback on joint land fires results and the process to tell us whether targets have/have not been struck as requested?

- **Communications:** Are the means in place for immediate coordination/collaboration with the JFC and JFACC, particularly during execution?

- **Linkages:** How does the JFLCC establish effects collaboration links with relevant civil agencies in the area of operations?

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TAB A TO CHAPTER 7

COALITION FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND OPERATIONAL FIRES IN US CENTRAL COMMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

"The integration of operational fires by air assets, sea-based precision guided munitions, and land based-long range fires, in conjunction with a forceful land attack is proving to be devastating to Iraqi military forces. That integration is a key component of General Franks' plan."

Brigadier General Vince Brooks
Deputy Director of Operations, USCENTCOM
4 April 2003

1. Introduction

This tab provides information on how the Coalition Forces Land Component Command developed, managed, and achieved effects during recent combat operations in the USCENTCOM AOR. The reader should recognize that the focus in this tab is on operational- and tactical-level effects managed primarily through the targeting process. The land component commander also will interface with the JFC (CJTF and/or geographic combatant commander) in developing and achieving operational- and strategic-level effects independent of the targeting process.

2. The Joint Force Land Component Commander Operational Fires and Effects System

a. The JFLCC will use assigned and attached forces as well as air nominations to the JFACC to achieve operational effects within the JFLCC AO. To synchronize effects, a JFLCC **targeting battle rhythm** must be established. This battle rhythm consists of a series of boards and meetings that provides the JFLCC commander sufficient information to decide targeting priorities and resources. These decisions are disseminated to the staff and components for execution. The battle rhythm must be linked to the JFC and JFACC targeting process to allow the JFLCC to provide input to the JFC HQ with sufficient lead-time to affect the distribution of joint resources. Throughout the process, continuous assessment of current and working ATOs ensures operational effects-objectives and effects are being achieved.

b. **JFC and JFLCC Targeting Battle Rhythm.** The overall targeting process for both lethal and non-lethal fires must incorporate and synchronize the JFC's intent and priorities as well as those of the functional component commanders. The process (as represented through a series of key boards and meetings that define the battle rhythm) is depicted in **Figure 7-A-1** and described in the text that follows the figure.



Figure 7-A-1. JFLCC Targeting Battle Rhythm

(1) **Joint/Coalition Target Coordination Board (CTCB).** This is the **primary joint force board** that incorporates all components input and makes recommendations for the JFC on targeting priorities. The JFC HQ J3 chairs the CTCB. The focus of the meeting is to provide broad guidance to components for 96-120 hours out. The Deputy Commanding General-Operations (DCG-O) represents JFLCC.

(2) **Daily Effects Board (DEB).** This is the **primary land component board** for recommending and receiving commander's guidance. The DEB is chaired by the DCG-O. The purpose of this board is to provide draft effects guidance for 96 hours, and receive approved effects guidance from the DCO for 72 hours. Guidance from the DEB is sent out in the form of a daily effects guidance fragmentary order (FRAGORD). Major subordinate command LNOs are expected to attend the DEB, provide information on planned deep operations, and address MSC concerns.

(3) **Effects Guidance FRAGORD.** This order provides guidance to the BCD/ subordinate elements at the conclusion of the JFLCC DEB (essential fire support tasks [EFSTs]/essential IO tasks [EIOTs]/essential stability tasks [ESTs]).

(4) **Effects Working Group (EWG).** The FECC chief or deputy chairs the EWG. The purpose of this group is to review, in detail, operations to be conducted 96/120 hours out and synchronize effects operations. The MSC LNOs are expected to attend.

(5) **Candidate Target List Review Board.** The FECC chief or deputy chairs the CTL review board. The purpose of this working group is to review target nominations to ensure the correct targets are nominated to support the targeting objectives and do not violate either the no strike list or restricted strike list.

(6) **Combat Assessment Board (CAB).** The purpose of this board is to provide an assessment on how well the LCC is achieving the effects-objectives assigned. MSC LNOs are expected to attend and provide input on their respective command's ability to achieve the effects objectives.

c. **Effects System Interfaces with other Components**. **Figure 7-A-2** and the bullets that follow it highlight the key interfaces and times associated with the targeting battle rhythm.



Figure 7-A-2. Battle Rhythm--Key Times and Interfaces

- **96 hours out:** higher headquarters guidance received; initial JFLCC **guidance**, **objectives**, and **tasks** are drafted

- **72 hours out:** JFLCC HQ revises and approves **guidance**, **objectives**, and **tasks** for dissemination

- **48 hours out:** CTL is prepared, merged, sub-assigned, approved, and transmitted to BCD
- **24 hours out:** ATO development process occurs at JFACC
- **ATO day:** ATO execution begins
- **ATO+24 – 72 hrs:** BDA/CA process allows **measures of effectiveness** tracking.

d. **Throughout the DEB process, there is KEY INFORMATION THE STAFF MUST PROVIDE TO THE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER:**

(1) **Nominations of Effects-Objectives:** The staff develops effects objectives (EOs) and supporting essential tasks for fires (lethal), information operations (non-lethal), and stability tasks for stability and support operations. These essential tasks follow the task, purpose, end state format. Following is a sample **effects objective**, **essential fire support task**, and **essential IO task**.

Effects Objective: Destroy the ORANGELAND Regional Area Command Headquarters to deny the enemy the ability to conduct a defense in depth enabling JFLCC freedom of maneuver and to defeat enemy forces in zone.

Essential Fire Support Task:

Task. Destroy Orange City Area Command, Southern Area Command and Central Orange River Area Command Headquarters to deny the enemy the ability to command and control and execute a cohesive defense in the south and central regions of ORANGELAND.

Purpose. Enable the JFLCC to conduct offensive operations, maintain freedom of maneuver and defeat enemy forces in zone.

Method. Primary means is Strategic Attack (JFACC).

Effects. Orange City Area Command, Southern Area Command and Central Orange River Area CPs destroyed no later than A Day.

Essential Information Operations Task:

Task. Disrupt Orange City Area Command, Southern Area Command and Central Orange River Area Command Headquarters the ability to command and control subordinate formations..

Purpose. Enable the JFLCC to conduct offensive operations, maintain freedom of maneuver and defeat enemy forces in zone.

Method. Primary means is Electronic Attack (JFACC).

Effects. Orange City Area Command, Southern Area Command and Central Orange River Area CPs unable to communicate to subordinate headquarters A Day thru A + 1.

(2) **Estimate of the Situation and Recommended Guidance--96 HOURS OUT**

- Predicted enemy set 96 hours out
- Planned friendly 96-hour positions, Decision Points and FSCL changes
- JFC Targeting Guidance for 96-hour period
- JFACC Targeting Priorities
- Proposed JFLCC Effects Objectives
  - •• Prioritized Lethal (fires, maneuver, SOF, OGA) Effects Objectives
  - •• Prioritized Non-Lethal (IO, CMO, public affairs office [PAO], OGA) Effects Objectives
- Collection Plan
- Recommended Air Apportionment for 96-hour ATO
- Concerns/Issues for 96-hour time period

(3) **Estimate of the situation and recommended guidance--72 HOURS OUT**

- Weather Forecast
- Predicted enemy 72-hour set,
- Planned friendly 72-hour positions, Decision Points and FSCL changes
- JFC Targeting guidance for 72-hour period
- JFACC 72 hour priorities
- Effects Objectives for 72-hour period
  - •• Lethal (fires, maneuver, SOF, OGA) Effects Objectives
  - •• Non-Lethal (IO, CMO, PAO, OGA) Effects Objectives Prioritized
  - •• Supporting EFSTs, EIOTs, ESTs , IO products
- Collection Plan for 72-hour time period
- Concerns / Issues for 72-hour time period
- MSC Deep Attack Plan for 72-hour ATO

(4) **Estimate of the situation and confirm priorities within the execution window of the ATO--24-48 HOURS OUT**

- Weather Forecast for 24 and 48 hour ATO
- Predicted enemy 24 and 48 hour set
- Current and projected FSCMs
- Friendly 48 hour positions
- Decision points and FSCL changes
- Prioritized Lethal EOs and IO Objectives for 48 hour ATO

- •• Supporting EFSTs, EIOTs, ESTs
- Concerns/Issues for 24-48 hour time period

e. **Just as the staff provides information to the commander, there is KEY GUIDANCE THE COMMANDER MUST PROVIDE TO THE STAFF during the effects development process and DEB:**

(1) **During PLANNING**, the commander should provide broad guidance on what desired effects are to be achieved.

(2) **During EXECUTION**, there are three primary decisions that must be made by the end of the DEB. The commander must provide guidance that:

- **Confirms current effects** objectives for 48 hours out

- **Approves the effects objectives** for 72 hours out

- **Identifies draft effects** (to include the land components recommendation for air interdiction and CAS apportionment) for 96 hours out

NOTE: In each case, the commander's emphasis should be on **WHAT EFFECT** is desired, **not HOW** it will be achieved.

(3) **Commander's assessment of effects--CONFIRM OR DENY.**

(a) **Assessment is one of the most contentious areas of the targeting process.** Assessment of higher-order effects requires both science and art. Critical to the success of the CAB is the determination of MOE. While MOP typically are developed to support combat assessment (BDA, MEA, etc.), MOE help assess progress toward higher-order effects. The DCG-O should approve MOE. Delaying decisions because there is limited assessment data can limit the JFLCC's flexibility to use non-organic assets to achieve desired effects.

(b) **The commander must evaluate the feedback/assessments provided by the staff and determine whether he feels the command is achieving its effects-objectives.** This information is determined at the COMBAT ASSESMENT BOARD and briefed to the commander during the DAILY EFFECTS BOARD. At the DEB, the commander considers the staff's assessment--which typically combines quantitative data with qualitative opinions--and uses experience and judgment to evaluate progress toward achieving desired effects.

3. Key Participants

The following personnel/sections should be represented in the Effects Cell, and participate in the Daily Effects process:

Key Participants

Staff Weather Officer	C3 Info Operations	C3 Future Operations
C3 Current Operations	C3 PSYOP (if different from IO)	C3 SOF/SOCCE
C3 Fires	C2 Collections C2 Plans	C2 BDA Cell
C4	C7 (Engineer)	C9 (CMO)
SJA	NBC	PAO
Space Team Representative	MSC LNOs	ACC Director
Coalition Representatives	Component LNOs (CFSOCC, CFMCC, etc.)	
Other Government Agency representatives		

4. Major Forces

The JFLCC typically controls various forces and capabilities that can achieve operational effects, including the following:

Major Forces and Capabilities

US Army rocket and missile units
US Army and USMC cannon units
USMC fixed and rotary wing units
Units with electronic attack and jamming capabilities
JFACC and JFMCC missions and capabilities
- CAS
- Interdiction (including cruise missile attacks)
- Strategic attack (including cruise missile attacks)

US Army attack aviation units
Maneuver units
PSYOP and Civil Affairs units
SOF forces
Other Government Agencies

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CHAPTER 8

JOINT LAND SUSTAINMENT

"It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much more knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there."

General A. C. P. Wavell,

1. Commander's Considerations on Operational Sustainment

a. **Throughout the campaign, the land command will play an integral and essential role in providing the JFC the capabilities to project and sustain joint, multinational, and interagency efforts** throughout the theater until national objectives are achieved. As such, the JFLCC, as the JFC's lead component for sustainment, must proactively estimate, integrate, and synchronize a series of critical sustainment functions that enable success for the joint and coalition force through providing the required resources at the proper point in time**.**

b. **Effective operational sustainment must be independent, interdependent, and interoperable**, across the entirety of the LCC. It must be sufficiently robust to be executable across the depth and breadth of major land operations and ensure combat readiness of all land forces, to include coalition partners.

c. **Recent experience in OEF and OIF shows that the JFLCC is at the center of the JFC's efforts to establish and execute a myriad of theater sustainment functions**; failure to "set the theater" with the proper capabilities at the required times means that the joint force as a whole will pay the price. **Due to the lead component and CUL requirements usually placed upon the land component by the JFC, the JFLCC does not manage by exception–the JFLCC and his J4 must be "hands-on"** from the initial planning of the campaign through execution, ensuring that the bulk of common-user requirements of the entire force are met in a timely and adequate manner to enable operational success**.**

d. **Directive Authority for Logistics is entrusted in the combatant commander,** and his staff will coordinate and synchronize the efforts of Service and national components to provide logistic support from strategic resource bases. **Directive authority for logistics is a combatant commander authority and cannot be delegated. But as the JFC's lead component for sustainment integration, the JFLCC will execute portions of this authority** for the areas for which the JFLC is required to provide joint theater logistics (JTL). **JTL is the capability either the JFC or subordinate commands, like the JFLCC, has to apply logistic resources to generate and sustain full spectrum theater operations. JTL includes organization, authorities and processes over assigned and attached forces to achieve desired joint and operational objectives. However, even absent delegated authorities, the JFLCC must coordinate, synchronize, and prioritize the sustainment efforts** for all joint and multinational components operating within the land AO. **The JFLCC must ensure unity of sustainment effort among all land components that may transcends Service/Title 10 USC parochial**

concerns through a system that prioritizes and routes essential services and supplies to all elements of the force, based on their operational needs.

e. **Operational Sustainment is COMMANDER's BUSINESS,** and an essential enabler for operational success. As such, sustainment efforts must be dynamic, flexible, and constantly focused upon meeting the commander's intent. Conversely, changes in intent and operational focus must be clearly articulated and communicated early to ensure planning and execution can proactively adapt to meet new operational requirements, to include overcoming strategic and intratheater distances and time restrictions.

2. Joint Force Land Component Commander Sustainment Roles and Authorities

a. **Operational Sustainment is a proactive, dynamic process** that links resources provided by the strategic base with the requirements of tactical efforts, and sustains their operations through effectively prioritizing the flow, reception, and distribution of essential resources to points directed by the commander**. In all, the process enables the simultaneous execution of deployment, employment, and sustainment operations for the joint force (see Figure 8-1).**



Figure 8-1. Operational Sustainment

b. **Providing Key Capabilities.** As the JFC's lead component for sustainment, the JFLCC provides a number of key enabling capabilities for not only land forces, but for the entire military and interagency effort. The campaign plan will specify tasks to be accomplished, but recent experience shows that the LCC accomplishes or enables the following major tasks for forces that base or operate within the land AO:

(1) **Force Reception.** Establishes system and key facilities that enable the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces. This includes establishing facilities and procedures, designating temporary C2 relationships, and providing resources to arriving joint, multinational, and interagency elements. (See Chapter 3, "Joint Land Force Projection.")

(2) **Infrastructure Development.** Acquires, establishes, and (as required) constructs the mission essential facilities and capabilities that enable operational success. These includes coordination among Services and with the HN to estimate requirements, distribute/deconflict land and facilities use, and acquire, contract, or construct necessary buildings, storage, and transportation capabilities (roads, pipelines, etc).

(3) **Management of Operational Sustainment Efforts.** Working with and through Service and national components, synchronizes the estimation, planning, reception, and distribution of major theater sustainment activities accomplished within the land AO, to include:

- **Materials**–bulk reception, storage, and distribution to support the joint/combined force as a whole.

- **Maintenance--**theater-level direct and general support activities, to include contract support.

- **Movements/Distribution**–tracking and coordinating movement of materials into theater, and intratheater movement/delivery to meet operation requirements.

- **Personnel and Finance**–coordinating support to land component forces and other elements (civilian, interagency, etc.) as designated by JFC.

- **Health/Field Services--**plan, establish, and coordinate capabilities that provide required care and services for all personnel in the land AO, and in other components areas (such as SOF) as directed.

- **Contracting--**establish contingency contract capabilities and reduce competition for scarce HN resources. (See Tab B.)

(4) **Command and Control Framework.** In accordance with the JFC's and JFLCC's guidance, establish C2 relationships among components and theater enabling commands that facilitate sustainment effectiveness.

c. **JFLCC Authorities to Synchronize the Sustainment Effort.** As the lead component for sustainment for the JFC, the JFLCC operates under a number of authorities such as Service-specific, CUL, and Army support to other Services. However, the bottom line is these authorities are assigned to enable joint sustainment capabilities that provide for operational success. **No matter the authorities specifically delegated, the JFLCC efforts are empowered through the unity of effort and integration among its components** that is created through cooperation, mutual support, and adherence to common processes and priorities that benefit the entire force. As such, the JFLCC is both a "team builder" and "team player" in operational sustainment success.

(1) **The combatant commander has directive authority for logistics and provides** specific common items and services or support through subordinate commands, like the JFLCC, where it is more operationally effective and efficient for a single component to synchronize and/or provide these services for the entire joint force. The geographic combatant commander's directive authority does not discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support, even if another Service or agency is executing a portion of the total task. Based on the sustainment tasks assigned, the **JLFCC should determine early on what directive authority is required** and request approval to execute it for the JFC.

(2) **The authority to direct logistics is not resident in the JFLCC's OPCON or TACON, unless the geographic combatant commander either tasks or directs the JFLCC for a selected or common support capability.** The JFLCC CUL authority thus may be derived from one of two sources: (1) a geographic combatant commander's task or directive for a selected or common land-operation-focused support capability or (2) through short-term inter-Service support agreements between the Army and Marine Corps forces. The JFLCC must ensure that JFLCC-determined CUL requirements do not conflict or interfere with other geographic combatant commander-directed LCC AO-wide CUL requirements.

(3) **The supported combatant commander determines if common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or designated area.** The JFLCC should make recommendations about logistic support to the JFC commensurate with priorities developed for land and joint force operations. **While each Service and nation retains authority for logistic support of its forces, the JFLCC ensures support is coordinated and integrated throughout operations in the AO.**

(a) **Joint Theater Logistics.** As part of campaign planning, the combatant commander will determine which sustainment areas are best centrally provided and managed to gain the greatest synergy and efficiency in the fastest, simplest manner. The combatant commander then analyzes which component is best positioned and resourced to accomplish key sustainment tasks. The combatant commander exercises his authority by assigning responsibilities for a specific operation to a functional/Service component or agency (usually the dominant user or most capable Service/agency) that best meets the operational requirements.

(b) **Common-User Logistics.** The JFLCC or Service component forces may be required to provide significant levels of theater-wide support to other Service components, multinational partners, and NGOs. However, common user support does not relieve components

of responsibility for providing Service-peculiar supplies and services. The JFLCC should identify economies resulting from consolidating resources or tasking one or more components to provide common-user support to the remainder of the joint force.

(c) **Army Support to Other Services.** This also may be titled "Army Support to the Joint Force." Although logistic support is a Service responsibility, the Army has been designated to provide certain support to other Services and organizations in a variety of Department of Defense directives (DODD). These directives focus on strategic-level activities, but they may be related to CUL support in a specific operation. Table 8-1 lists representative tasking documents and responsibilities assigned to the Army on a relatively permanent basis (a complete listing can be found in FM 3-93 and DA Pamphlet 10-1).

Army Lead Responsibilities for Support to Other Services and Agencies	
TASKING DOCUMENT	**SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY**
SECDEF Memo/AR 40-656	Veterinary Support including food inspection
AR 40-905	Single Integrated Medical Logistics Managment (SIMLM)
DSD Memo 13/3/91	Controlled Disposal of Waste, Explosives, and Munitions
DOD Memo/JP 4-06	Mortuary Affairs Program
DODD 2310.1	Executive Agent for DOD Enemy Prisoner of War Detainee Program
DODD 4500.9	Common-User Land Transportation in Overseas Areas
DODD 4500.9	Intermodal Container Management
DODD 4500.9	Overseas Ocean Terminal Operations
DODD 4525.6	Management of Military Postal Services
DODD 4705.1	Executive Agent for Land-Based Water Resources
DODD 5030.49	Executive Agent for the Customs Inspection Program
DODD 5160.65	Single Management of Conventional Ammunition
DODD 4140.25/JP 4-03	Management of Bulk Petroleum Products, Natural Gas, and Coal and overland transportation
DODD 5515.08	Executive Agency for Processing Claims (in selected countries)
JP 4-02	Food Safety Service
OSD Memo 27	Inland Logistics Support to US Marine Corps

Table 8-1. Army Lead Responsibilities for Support to Other Services and Agencies

(4) **Service responsibility for support extends into the theater, but may be modified** when logistic support is otherwise provided by agreements with national agencies or allies or by the combatant commander's assignment of common, joint, or cross-servicing responsibilities. The combatant commander may determine that common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or a designated operational area. If so, the combatant commander may task or direct responsibility for providing or coordinating service for all Service components in the theater or designated area to the Service component that is the dominant user. **Service components and the JFLCC must identify and validate support requirements and then provide these requirements to the supporting Service component as soon as possible.**

3. Planning for Operational Sustainment

a. **Expeditionary operational sustainment must enable overlapping deployment and employment operations**, a situation that increases the natural dynamic tension and competition for lift assets, both air and sea. Analyzing how and when operations will change is essential for logisticians to anticipate and position critical assets, while factoring in long request, transportation, delivery, and assembly/distribution lead times.

b. **Early in the planning process, the JFLCC must determine those logistical functions that most facilitate responsiveness and flexibility for the joint force.** The JFLCC must analyze operational-level logistic and transportation requirements from the entire joint force perspective, focusing on the interfaces with and potential requirements of other components, functional commands, and coalition partners. Because the JFLCC will most likely provide various forms of logistical support to the total joint force, resources always will be limited. **Therefore, the key to execution success is the ability to visualize all key requirements in time and space.** Just as with other operational efforts such as fires, ISR, etc., the JFLC J3 and J4 must ensure that concepts for sustainment support the major land plan in both timeliness and quantity of resources.

c. **The concept for operational sustainment** must be fully integrated with that of other operational systems and be interoperable across the entirety of the JFLC. **The sustainment concept is an extension of the JFLCC's intent** and, as such, must address how the commander intends to "fight" sustainment just as the JFLCC fights the other LCC operational level systems to achieve joint and coalition synergy. This concept should include the following:

(1) **Intelligence analysis of enemy and host nation** capabilities and intended actions as they affect the ability of sustainment operations.

(2) **Mission and commander's intent for operational sustainment**, to include the desired operational effects that effective sustainment must produce.

(3) **Concept for sustainment operations** that includes how the LCC will:

- **Build sufficient capacity for deployment and continuous sustainment** of joint, combined, and interagency forces within the land AO (and other parts of the joint operational area as directed by the JFC).

- **Open and maintain the strategic and intratheater flow** for request, delivery and distribution of essential supplies and services from source to end user.

- **Major operation tasks and transition points, and where, when, and to what levels that operations sustainment capabilities will be postured** to meet tactical requirements and ensure continuous operations.

- **Analyze the amount of operational flexibility and risk** in each phase that the commander can expect based on sustainment considerations.

(4) **Key tasks by phase and desired states/conditions at the transition points** (between major operations and phases). These should include the key sustainment tasks by phase, direct which commands are responsible for execution, and where/when resources/capabilities must be provided for use by the LCC or joint/combined force.

(5) **Organization structure for the effort** must specify a clear, simple arrangement for theater sustainment forces that ensures every element understands which command they operate under (not under staff sections), their command relationship and reporting requirements, and where they will operate within the land AO.

d. **The key starting point for planning is the development of an accurate estimate of the total requirements that the LCC must support.** This includes not only land requirements over time and battlespace, but also may include the requirements for joint and coalition forces for the categories and services that the LCC must provide as lead component or due to CUL requirements. Historically, this has been difficult as other service components will either plan early on to support themselves, or develop estimates that are short of their requirements or not reflective of their much broader needs as the campaign progresses. **In the absence of these estimates, planners must conduct their own analysis, and conduct continuous reevaluations with components to identify emerging requirements/shortfalls in order to accurately "see the requirements" over time/space.**

4. Operational Sustainment Execution

a. Intensive planning efforts will produce a comprehensive assessment of the requirements for supporting for joint and coalition operations. The challenge will be to transform this planning effort into actual performance by JFLCC forces of a series of complex sustainment tasks. **Key to effective execution is the development of a planning and execution matrix** that includes all critical sustainment tasks, when these tasks must occur to ensure operational success, and the effects that successful execution of these tasks must create to enable JFLCC and joint/coalition force success. **This matrix is the critical tool through which all sustainment tasks are coordinated and assessed for effectiveness.**

b. Effective execution includes identifying and tracking accomplishment of the critical sustainment tasks. **These efforts are focused on satisfying the JFLCC's CCIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIR)** and providing the JFLCC with accurate, timely information on whether operations can be effectively sustained. Both CCIRs and FFIRs are dynamic and changing throughout the campaign; sustainment tracking must ensure the JFLCC and other component and subordinate decision makers have accurate, timely information among the critical "sustainment focus areas" upon which to make critical decisions.

c. **Sustainment Focus Areas.** Throughout the execution of LCC sustainment, the JFLCC will assess and provide support across a myriad of areas (see Figure 8-2 below). Key is that monitoring and ensuring success in these focus areas are integral to success of all elements and operating systems across the land command. As such, this is not solely "logistics for logisticians"--all subordinate commands and staff sections also must monitor and assess the

impacts of actions in these areas, assessing risk and providing feedback to the commander and J4 on overall operational sufficiency in these areas.



Figure 8-2. JFLCC Sustainment Focus Areas

Assessment of these areas are based upon metrics established by the J4 and J3 and **focus on whether operational capabilities are sufficient to support the ongoing campaign,** not upon "stove-pipe" quantitative goals such as pallets, days of supply, etc. These assessments of existing capabilities and their impacts on operations are integrated into the LCC daily battle rhythm, to include daily status briefs to the JFLCC as part of the battle update assessment process.

d. **Sustainment execution must be fully visible and integrated into the J3's current operations reports and orders.** As operational sustainment is integrated into all aspects of JFLCC operations, all significant actions, FRAGORDs, and operations summaries must include information on the status of and intended actions for operational sustainment, to include the risks and limitations induced by the resources available to support operations across the land AO.

e. **As in all other operational systems, intelligence is key to sustainment success.** Accurate and timely intelligence that provides a common, shared picture of enemy capabilities, emerging security threats, and the impacts of weather are as critical to sustainment as they are to operational maneuver, fires, etc. Intelligence sections within the theater sustainment command center (TSCC) must analyze and estimate the effect of adversary's actions and the physical environment (weather, terrain, etc.) on the ability to sustainment forces to execute their assigned missions. These efforts must also estimate potential enemy actions and facilitate branch and sequel planning for sustainment.

f. **Sustainment execution must also be linked to operational protection efforts across the land AO.** The J4 is represented in all protection boards and assessment activities so as to ensure theater enabling forces can accomplish their missions within acceptable limitations and risks. Because sustainment must move over extended distances and through less than secure areas, continuous vulnerability and risk assessments are an integral part of successful sustainment execution.

g. **Challenges to effective operational sustainment** are as diverse and complex as the effort itself. Based on recent operational experience, challenges may include some or all of the following:

(1) **Getting all components to estimate and provide requirements** to enable planning and flexible execution.

(2) **Changes in maneuver concept without considering sustainment feasibility** or informing sustainment planning staff of potential changes; this breakdown in communication and coordination creates a ripple effect across the sustainment system and shortcuts the J4's ability to anticipate, posture, and marshal resources in theater, adapt transportation plan, etc.

(3) **Providing supplies in sufficient bulk** to land and other joint/coalition elements, to include acquiring over strategic distances, and delivering over operational distances.

(4) **Effective LCC distribution** amid changing operational situations.

(5) **Achieving standard Army multi-command management information system connectivity over extended operational distances** without sufficient tactical satellite communications, and with coalition partners who do not possess US systems.

(6) **Shortfalls of secure and long range intra-theater communications** that is usually consumed by maneuver and fires requirements.

(7) **Challenges in establishing and maintaining integrated, joint/coalition in-transit visibility** for elements/supplies moving into and through the theater.

(8) **Extended ground and air LOCs for intratheater movement** require intensive planning and reliance on joint integration, opening of intermediate bases, joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) employment, etc.

(9) **Unforeseen requirements to support interagency, SOF, and coalition forces** that emerge from higher guidance with no warning. As forces and resources have not been programmed, the JFLCC must constitute support "out of hide" until RFFs/additional supplies can be forwarded and approved.

(10) **Failure to involve logistics planners early in the planning process can have significant negative operational effect.**

5. Organizing the Operational Sustainment Effort

a. **Structuring the Communications System Effort.** Monitoring, assessing, and ensuring effective operational sustainment is a complex and dynamic process. As such, sustainment planning and synchronization capabilities must be integrated into all operational systems within the JFLCC and JFC.

b. **For major land operations, the JFLCC will establish a TSCC** that functions as the hub of all operational efforts to plan, execute, and assess ongoing effective operational sustainment for the theater.

(1) The TSCC is a multifunctional headquarters that monitors all aspects of the major land operation from RSOI through force employment and constantly assesses the sufficiency, flexibility, and risk in operational sustainment capabilities against the mission and commander's intent. The TSCC is commanded by the Deputy Commander for Support/Sustainment, with the J4 as principal staff director. The TSCC must:

(a) **Be the single point for monitoring, executing, and assessing sustainment** capabilities in theater--the heartbeat of sustainment."

(b) **Coordinate theater-wide reception and distribution** of essential supplies and services to support operations across the land AO.

(c) **Collocate all key supporting elements, and facilitate joint information management** across all Service and multinational sustainment areas.

(d) **Be capable of fusing information and intelligence from across the land command and theater to develop and provide the JFC and JFLCC a COP** on the ongoing status and associated risk of sustaining the campaign and major land operation.

(e) **Be linked to and able to provide this sustainment COP to other headquarters**, to include the JFLCC main and forward command posts (CPs), other functional components, and the JFC headquarters, as well as those of major subordinate units.

(f) **Conduct constant assessment and feedback** on sustainment needs and capabilities through its centers and boards.

(g) **Assess and update sustainment priorities for approval by the land commander and forwarding to the JFC.** Participate in and represent the LCC in all JFC boards and processes to ensure these priorities are achieved and synchronized.

(2) Currently, the TSCC must be built through integrating a number of elements from the JFLCC rear CP, theater sustainment command (TSC), logistics support agencies (Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], etc.) and Service component logistics elements (Note: future Army UEy structures will address this shortfall). Although the flow of combat forces may be the top priority during a crisis deployment, the JFLCC and his J4 must ensure that sufficient personnel, facilities, and communications capabilities for the TSCC are resourced and on-site early in the operation, without which "setting the theater" will be very difficult at best.

c. **In establishing the command, control, and communications structure and ensuring that sustainment is integrated into planning and execution across the JFLC and joint fight**, the JFLCC, J4, and J6 must ensure coverage and information sharing across a number of areas beyond the TSCC:

(1) **With Operational Planning, J5.** Sustainment planners must be involved in operation plan (OPLAN) development, to include branches and sequels, and ensure that all maneuver options are sustainable. Planners should identify all operational tasks and establish an initial requirements matrix that delineates the sustainment tasks and forces required by phase/time to support success. During the RFF process, planners must ensure that forces are mobilized and flowed into theater to build incremental, sufficient sustainment capabilities for the joint force; any risk assumed in flowing theater sustainment forces late must be identified, assessed, and validated by the JFLCC.

(2) **With Operations, J3.** On the floor of the operational command post and forward command post, sustainment operators must be linked to the land and joint COP, and constantly assess/provide feedback to current operations on the status of sustainment capabilities. Additionally, they plan, coordinate, and provide sustainment input into FRAGORDs produced by current ops (J33) and future ops (J35).

(3) **With other Functional and Multinational Components.** Based on the JFC's requirements to sustain other forces during the campaign, the JFLCC should provide liaison and planning capabilities to these elements to monitor their efforts, identify requirements as they emerge, and adapt support to emerging needs.

(4) As noted above, sustainment planning, assessment and execution is not just a JFLC rear headquarters function. Providing representation and augmentation to other components and across other operational systems/functions within the JFLC headquarters are critical for monitoring the status of other efforts in maneuver, protection, etc., as well as initiating early and proactive planning for changes in the operational focus. As such, the JFLCC and J4 must ensure that sustainment planners and operators are resourced and available to support 24 hour operations within these other sections/systems.

d. **Battlefield Geometry and Key Nodes.** Early in the planning effort, the JFLCC must identify, arrange, and coordinate the essential bases, nodes, and lines of communications throughout the land AO. Throughout sustainment operations, the positioning, manning, facilities, protection, and movement between and through these nodes must be planned and executed as an integral part of J3 and J5 actions to "set" the theater battlespace, building combat power and synchronizing operational movement. Key theater bases, nodes, and lines that must be integrated into the LCC operational environment and operational protection efforts include:

- Air and sea ports.
- Base camps (in reception and integration/tactical assembly area).
- Staging areas (as part of RSOI process and intratheater movement).
- Storage areas for bulk supplies.
- Medical facilities.
- Enemy prisoner of war and detainee facilities.
- Transportation lines for bulk supplies (pipelines, rail, etc.).
- Forward operating bases/airfields.
- Intratheater lines of movement, such as MSRs, etc.
- Sustainment C2 nodes/headquarters.

e. **Centers and Boards.** Due to the complexity of sustainment tasks, the JFC and TSCC will organize and operate a series of functional centers and boards that analyze operational sustainment requirements, develop resource priorities and options, and forward these priorities for execution by the command. However, these centers and boards must ensure their actions are linked to the broader operational context and do not become "stovepiped" by orienting only on the success of their discrete function.

(1) **Boards are conducted at both the JFC and JFLCC levels to analyze and prioritize for commander approval a variety of sustainment actions**. At the joint force level, these boards develop requirements and priorities for requesting resources from the strategic base and employing them across the entirety of the joint operational area. **Because the JFLCC must execute a number of these requirements, the LCC must have representation on these boards.** As in other JFC boards, such as the JTCB for joint fires, **the JFLCC develops and forwards priorities that represent the operational requirements for the entire land command, and the elements it is responsible for supporting within the land AO**.

(2) **To develop these requirements and priorities**, **the JFLCC normally will conduct its own boards that mirror those of the JFC.** Composition of these boards will vary by

function, but the J4 must ensure that all Service component, MSC, and supporting agencies of the LCC whose operations are effected should have adequate representation at these boards. Boards are conducted within the battle rhythm to ensure adequate time to develop/synchronize requirements and obtain necessary commander approval of their recommendations before being forwarded to the JFC as the LCC's approved priorities.

(3) JFLCC boards are **tailored to the mission and sustainment functions required**. (See Tab A for a more complete discussion of JFLCC Centers and Boards.)

6. Considerations in Coalition Force Land Component Command Sustainment Operations

a. **In multinational operations, each participating nation will arrive in theater with its own unique logistics organization, doctrine, and resource levels.** This diversity will bring both increased capabilities and challenges, thus complicating sustainment and demanding more planning and coordination. Understanding these differences and obtaining early knowledge of the organic logistic support capabilities of participating nations will be critical to identifying the means to proactively support their needs.

(1) **Although national logistics is the overall responsibility of each contributing nation, some nations do not have the assets to fully support their forces when deployed** and must rely on nations with these capabilities. Most nations lack the deployable logistic assets to support their own forces and to provide additional logistic units for general support of the MNF as a whole.

(2) **Due to national restrictions, some partners may be reluctant to commit logistic forces to support the overall operation early during the force generation process.** This reluctance can complicate timely establishment of coalition arrangements for streamlining support and leveraging logistic assets of allies and coalition partners.

(3) **Lack of established planning organizations, especially in coalitions, leads to ad hoc logistic organization development**, which in turn adversely impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of logistic support, especially during initial stages of the campaign.

(4) Cultural and material factors, such as the receiving nation's religious constraints, or country of origin for equipment (not being combatable with US supply and repair capabilities) can also impact operations.

b. **All nations, including the United States, will likely need some type of nonorganic support.** In such cases, the JFLCC must coordinate required support to both military and civilian organizations within the guidelines and plans of the JFC. Many other nations may request CUL from the United States as a cost-effective means of providing logistics to its forces. **When these nations require such support, ensure acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) are in place early and that reciprocal agreements and funding lines are clearly identified.**

c. **A proven means of enhancing synchronization, deconfliction, and interaction (while improving control) is the use of a CFLCC coalition logistics readiness center (CLRC)**. The CFLCC should establish a CLRC in the early stages of any joint/coalition effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure. The CLRC should be the focal point for identifying requirements and providing for force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, HNS, and movement control. The CLRC should include member nations' action officers who are familiar with their nations' logistics structures and resources and who possess good language skills or linguists, and the requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent headquarters.

d. Coalition support is similar to HNS in that it is civil or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis, emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations within a coalition. The JFLCC should have the authority to coordinate coalition support activities and acquire coalition logistics status and capabilities. Multinational partners may provide sustainment support to other partners based on a preapproved standardization agreement, multipartite standardization agreement, or as directed by the MNF commander. These agreements must observe applicable laws and regulations of the contributing nations. Doctrinally, each nation is responsible for sustaining its deployed forces. **Multinational support should not supplant detailed national logistics and personnel support planning in multinational operations.**

e. **Just as for US forces, CUL responsibilities can be delineated to specific multinational partner Services** based on requirements and the nation's ability to provide materiel and services. An accounting system may be required to ensure the appropriate national or international agency is properly billed for the logistics they receive. **The JFLCC can use the following methods for executing cooperative logistics either singularly or in combination:**

(1) **Lead Nation.** Under the lead nation (LN) concept, one nation agrees to assume responsibility for coordinating or providing a range of logistic support services to either all or part of a MNF. Such services may include transportation, medical support, medical evacuation, rear area security, port of debarkation operations, engineering, and movement control. For example, the United States provided selected LN logistic support to United Nations contingents in Somalia and Haiti, and NATO allies have provided LN support in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

(2) **Role Specialization Nation.** A single nation accepts responsibility to provide a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the MNFs, usually at a determined rate of reimbursement. Provision of bulk fuel in Bosnia and Kosovo by the United States and France, respectively, are examples of role specialization nation (RSN) support. The JFLCC should strongly consider this option when a participating nation possesses unique logistic strengths. **The major difference between RSN and LN is that the RSN arrangements usually are single-item/single-service oriented, while the LNs are concerned with providing or coordinating multiple services within designated geographic regions.**

(3) **National Logistic Units for Multinational Support.** One of the more effective ways for nations to optimize use of logistic capabilities in a multinational operation is by placing national logistic units under OPCON of the multinational force commander (MNFC) for tasking

in support of the entire MNF. For many multinational operations, there is an especially urgent requirement for theater-operational level medical, engineering, and transportation capabilities.

(4) **Pooled Assets and Resources.** Two or more nations form an integrated logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to MNFs.

f. **Support provided and received by the US in multinational operations must be in accordance with existing legal authorities.** For example, 10 USC, Chapter 138, authorizes exchanging support between US Services and those of other countries. It authorizes DOD acquisition from other countries by payment or replacement-in-kind, without establishing a cross-servicing agreement. However, combat service support (CSS) authorized under 10 USC, Chapter 138, **does not include** major end items, missiles, or bombs. It **does include** food, billeting, petroleum, oils, transportation, communications services, medical services, ammunition, storage, spare parts, maintenance services, and training. The CFLCC must work with the Department of State for coordination of ACSAs. **Planners must refer to each country's specific ACSA to determine what type of support they may lawfully provide. The use of DOD resources that may directly or indirectly assist or otherwise benefit NGOs and international organizations is subject to strict legal requirements.**

g. **Challenges in Multinational Distribution**. Standardization of systems and procedures can ease the challenges. Arranging units within the operational environment to leverage interoperability of equipment in adjacent or subordinate multinational units is desirable, and planners should consider this during concept development. Potential problem areas for multinational distribution include the following:

- Differences in doctrine and procedures.
- Limited mobility to accomplish intratheater distribution.
- Interoperability and compatibility with supporting US maintenance, supply, and standard Army multi-command management information systems.
- Competing requirements among Services and coalition members for common support.
- National resource limitations that limit stockage levels, budget and infrastructure.

7. References

The following references provide additional information and detailed guidance concerning relevant joint sustainment operations:

- CJCSM 3122 series
- JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*

- JP 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control*
- JP 4-02, *Joint Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*
- JP 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations*
- JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*
- JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*
- FM 4-93.4, *Theater Support Command*
- MCWP 4-12, *Operational-Level Logistics*
- AFM 160-20, *Medical Support in Joint Operation*

8. Joint Land Sustainment Checklist

- **Tasks and Authorities:** Under the combatant commander's "directive authority" for logistics, what responsibilities and authorities has the combatant commander given the JFLCC? What are the **TOTAL Requirements** that the JFLCC must deploy/provide equipment, personnel and materials for under:

  •• Current Executive Agent agreements (for what functions/areas)?

  •• Common-user logistics?

  •• Army support to other Services (or Army support to the joint force)?

  •• Service-specific requirements (as the LCC continues as the ARFOR or MARFOR for the LCC)?

  •• Coalition forces?

  •• Interagency elements/agencies that will work with the LCC during stability operations and reconstruction?

- **Concept of Sustainment:** Have planners met the Commander's Intent?

  •• **JFC's guidance:** What major responsibilities and authorities have been assigned to the LCC? What related organization and management options (single-Service logistic support or lead Service/agency support with or without OPCON or TACON) have the combatant commander chosen for theater support?

•• What are the estimates/requirements of other components for sustainment?

•• During each phase, at the transitions, and as we move from major combat operations to stability phases, what should our capabilities be (such as, continue the attack or initiate regeneration)?

•• What major logistics tasks need to be performed, including supporting and supported relationships by phase and component? What tasks will be requested of supporting agencies. Have potential intermediate staging bases and forward operating bases been identified?

•• Have we tied logistics considerations into PAO, civil affairs, and IO to create a synchronized effort?

- **Organizing the Effort**:

  •• What are the major functions and tasks that the LCC is responsible for, and does the C2 arrangement facilitate the planning, tracking, and execution of these?

  •• How does the JFLCC interface with the JFC's JTL?

  •• Does every sustainment element work for a commander?

  •• Is a support organization such as the TSC place? How will the TSC be integrated into the C2 for sustainment?

- **Center and Boards:**

  •• Which of the combatant commander's logistics boards/centers/cells require the JFLCC attendance and representation?

  •• Which logistics boards/centers/cells should the JFLCC establish?

  •• How are these boards linked to the JFC's battle rhythm?

- **Risk:** In what sustainment or other logistic areas is the commander willing to accept risk or responsibility (such as during cross-border operations) and what level of approval is required in order to effect that?

- **Host Nation Support:** What logistic support is currently in place from contractor support and what from HNS?

  •• What authority and responsibilities does the JFLCC have for negotiating and obtaining this support?

•• What additional support is required from either contractor and/or HNS?

- **Contract Support**: What capabilities and restrictions does the JFLCC have in utilizing contract support to the joint and combined force in lieu of military capabilities?

  •• Is contingency contracting capability available from day 1 of the operation?

  •• Have identified manpower and materiel been incorporated into planning and deployment databases and contingency plans (so military forces are not requested)?

  •• Are HN agreements and negotiations capabilities in place?

  •• Are ACSAs in place for all non-US and non-military organizations that depend on the LCC for support?

  •• What can the contractor **not** provide by law, and what are the LCC's requirements to support them with military services (information, intelligence, equipment, transportation, security, etc)?

  •• Is there a joint acquisition and review board or similar process in place to prevent competition and prioritize/approve requirements for contract support?

  •• Are there established pre-deployment standards for training and equipping civilians?

- **Coalition/Other Agency Support:** What are the TOTAL requirements for common items/CUL designed for support of the multinational partners, and other organizations?

  •• What support is provided and received from MNFs through national channels?

  •• What authority does the JFLCC have over multinational/coalition support?

  •• What control/authority does the JLFCC have over these items?

  •• What Service/agency is best positioned to provide this support?

  •• What are the logistical implications of civil-military operations, such as nation building, support to military governments, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction?

- **SOF Support:** How are SOF operations, to include black units and related activities of OGAs, integrated with the overall logistical support for the land component?

- **Force Flow/Rotations:** What is the expectation of requirements for force rotations?

  •• Does the LCC have visibility of inbound and departing forces, and their requirements for support during RSOI and redeployment?

- Will they be accomplished by location, by unit, or staggered?
- Will equipment be recovered, replaced, or left in place?

- **Intratheater Movement:** How much tactical support airlift should be reserved or prioritized for logistical operations and activities?

> Logistics comprises the means and arrangements, which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act. Logistics brings the troops to this point.
>
> **Jomini**
> **Precis de l' Art de la Guerre, 1838**

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TAB A TO CHAPTER 8

LAND COMPONENT BOARDS, CENTERS, AND PROCESSES

1. Sustainment boards and centers operate at both the JFC and JFLCC levels to analyze and prioritize for commander approval a variety of sustainment actions. At the joint force level, these boards develop requirements and priorities for requesting resources from the strategic base and employing them across the entirety of the joint operational area. **Because the JFLCC must execute a number of these requirements, the land component must have representation on these boards. As in other JFC boards, such as the JTCB for joint fires, the JFLCC develops and forwards priorities that represent the operational requirements for the entire land command, and the elements it is responsible for supporting within the land AO**.

2. JFC Boards are convened to solicit and prioritize sustainment requirements across the joint and coalition force. **The JFLCC will participate** in the boards to represent the requirements and priorities set by the land command for all elements operating under its control or relying upon the LCC for sustainment. As the JFLCC may be formed from an existing Service component headquarters, it also will act as its Service's representative to the board, but will present its Service-specific requirements as part of the overall land command's requirements. In executing land operations successfully, the JFLCC will participate in many of the joint logistics boards convened by the JFC as shown in Figure 8-A-1.

Figure 8-A-1. Possible JFC Joint Logistics Boards and Centers

3. The joint transportation board and joint movement board are key boards that affect joint land operations. Other JFC boards and centers of significant importance to the JFLCC include the JTL management cell, the joint petroleum office, and the logistic procurement support board, which ensures that a properly coordinated and prioritized contracting management program exists.

4. The following is a listing of the key logistic boards that the JFLCC may establish to manage the overall operational sustainment effort:

Log Readiness Center/ Joint Logistics Center (LRC/JLC)	DJFLCC or JFLCC J-4	• Created in the early stages of any joint/coalition effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure. • Monitors sustainment and equipment readiness. Should be the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, HNS, and movement control. • **In coalition operations**, the center should include member nations' action officers who are familiar with their nations' logistics structure and resources. • Coalition nations should provide linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent headquarters**.**
Joint Movement Center/ Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JMC/DDOC)	J-4 or USTRANSCOM team	• Coordinates all requests for intra-theater transportation. • Monitors and tracks accurate, up-to-date information on movement of forces, equipment, and supplies coming into and within the land AO, to include transfer, holding, and sustainment capacities. • **Coordinates the use of facilities such as highways, rail lines, ports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment**. • **Analyzes the transportation network to ensure it is sufficient to accommodate the anticipated moves while allowing for the continued support of ongoing operations.** • Continuously monitors resource, and movement transactions and trends of performance, and the commander's operational-level priorities in order to be both effective and efficient.
Joint Petroleum Office	J-4	• In coordination with the JLC/LRC and

(JPO)		JMC/DDOC coordinates CL III bulk for all JFLCC POL services. • In conjunction with Service components, subarea petroleum offices, and Defense Energy Support Center, plans, coordinates, and oversees bulk POL support.
Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO)	J-4	• Establishes the JFLCC mortuary affairs policy for all US Services and US contractors supporting the AO. When acting as the Executive Agent, sets policies and procedures for the joint operational area. • Plans and executes mortuary affairs within the land AO. • Provides guidance to facilitate mortuary programs and maintains data (as required) pertaining to recovery, identification, and disposition of all US deceased and missing.
Logistic Procurement Support Board (LPSB)/ Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB)	DJFLCC or J-4	• Identifies contracting issues and ensures contracting programs are properly coordinated and prioritized to meet JLCCC requirements. • Eliminates duplication by arranging for single-Service contracting assignments for specific supplies and services, when appropriate. • Assesses the impact of potential loss of contractors performing essential services and planning in accordance with DOD Instructions. (See Annex E, "Working with Contractors," for more details.)
Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB)	J-4	• Evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support and construction
Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB)	J-4	• Staffed by personnel from components and DOD contracted agencies. • Establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for civil-military construction and engineering requirements. • Coordinates its activities with JFC engineering staff.

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TAB B TO CHAPTER 8

CONTRACTORS AND HOST-NATION ASSETS COORDINATION AND UTILIZATION

1. Contracting is a powerful tool that can be an effective CSS force multiplier and, for the JFLCC, has the capability of supporting nearly any type of contingency. From the onset of planning, the JFLCC must consider contracted support, foreign nation support (FNS), and HNS as potential sources of support. **Each theater Service component has the capability to initiate its own contracts for needed support.** Providing support may require contracting between foreign governments, commercial entities, international organizations, and NGOs. However, **the JFLCC must ensure that resources are apportioned wisely to eliminate waste and inefficiency within the land AO**. Moreover, the combatant commander may employ a JTL management cell or establish a contract-clearing house to ensure that Service components are not bidding against each other for the same commodity or service.

2. HNS is not the same as contractor support, though MNF contractors may affect the ability of a HN to provide HNS. HNS is support-in-kind provided to US forces to further the mutual goals of the HN and the United States. Contracted support consists of the materials and services for which the United States compensates the HN or other entity through acquisition channels. **HNS and contracted support must be deconflicted** during the CSS planning of the operation, especially in areas of limited resources.

3. Contingency contracting requires an understanding of the legal aspects, funding issues, duties and responsibilities of procurement personnel, their relationship with support staff, and the requirements for deployment preparation. The ability to work with people who have vastly different cultures, backgrounds, perspectives and, most importantly, business practices, is another aspect of contingency contracting that will have considerable impact on successful support of a joint operation. Regardless of the cultural context, contingency contracting officers must continue to follow Federal Acquisition Regulation and Service-specific supplemental guidance. Accordingly, **the JFLCC should integrate Defense Contract Management Agency personnel in the TSCC for contracting assistance and oversight**.

4. Early planning that identifies requirements and decides which ones will be satisfied by contracting and the involvement of the contractor in planning are recurring themes in the Army's doctrine and guidance for using contractor support, in general, and the LOGCAP contract, specifically**.** According to Army Field Manual 3-100.21, *Contractors on the Battlefield*, integrated planning is a governing principle of contractor support. For contractor support to be effective and responsive, its use must be considered and integrated into the planning process.

5. The three key questions the JFLCC must answer in regard to contractor support are as follow:

a. **What authority/responsibilities does the JFLCC have for contractor support?**

b. **What contingency plans are in place to ensure continuation of essential contractor services?**

c. **What organizational structure does the JFLCC have in place to manage contractor support?**

6. The supported combatant commander is responsible for overall contractor visibility and orchestrates the movement of contractors along with combat forces**. For execution, the combatant commander or subordinate JFC designates a lead Service as lead agent to plan and head contracting, finance, and resource management functions for the theater.** That Service assigns a mission chief of contracting, who publishes a joint contracting support plan governing all contracting by DOD agencies within the designated operational area. The Services and DLA conduct contracting operations in accordance with Service doctrine and DLA policy. (See Annex E, "Working with Contractors," for additional information on obtaining and managing contractor support.)

7. FNS and HNS agreements should include the authority for the JFLCC to coordinate directly with the FN/HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real estate. Whenever possible, the JFLCC should consider available and suitable FNS/HNS as an alternative to deploying logistic support from CONUS. FNS/HNS may dramatically increase responsiveness and reduce strategic airlift and sealift requirements. Even in countries where lack of government infrastructure precludes logistics assistance, local contractors may provide limited support. The JFLCC J-4 should centralize and coordinate the identification of FNS/HNS requirements and procurement within the logistics staff.

8. Early contact with local authorities and higher headquarters will help determine whether HNS or FNS is available. Civil affairs personnel are trained to identify and coordinate FNS resources and can provide valuable assistance to the JFLCC logistics staff. Before deployment, it is useful to coordinate with legal advisors, civil affairs units, and the DIA as possible sources for identifying contractor information in the area. The JFLCC J-4 should involve legal advisors in the development process for any HN/FN agreements. It is critical to determine a lead agency (United Nations, Service, component, or other agency) for contracting and negotiating for support. The geographic combatant command LNO should have knowledge of the HN and FN laws, regulations, and military command structure and be able to coordinate with the HN/FN to initiate on-site surveys.

9. Negotiations for FNS/HNS fall under two basic categories: (1) no existing FNS/HNS agreement, or (2) an existing FNS/HNS agreement already in place. When a current FNS agreement exists, the JFLCC reviews the current FNS agreement and then requests, in accordance with procedures established in the general agreement, that the HN activate logistic support items in the agreement. The JFLCC may identify additional FNS/HNS logistic support, and negotiate that additional logistical support within the framework of the general agreement. **Using existing FNS/HNS avoids duplication of effort with the FN/HN.** Where no agreement exists, the JFLCC has to establish an agreement that provides the general framework, procedures,

and authority for the supported combatant commander to conduct military-to-military negotiations. **If possible, agreements should provide for direct negotiations between the JFLCC and the FN/HN.**

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CHAPTER 9

JOINT LAND INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

It is one of the dangerous characteristics of the sort of information supplied by secret agents that it becomes rare and less explicit as the peril increases and the need for information becomes greater.

Alexis de Tocqueville, 1805-1859

1. Overview

Essential to rapid and decisive success is the ability to see and decide faster and more accurately than one's adversary. In contemporary operations involving situational diversity and complexity, the land component commander will be quickly overcome by the volume and myriad of information that flows through the LCC headquarters. Critical to success is to devise effective systems for sorting, categorizing, analyzing and utilizing this information to gain a marked advantage in decision making over an adversary. **Through focused guidance on his requirements for information, the JFLCC can achieve the decision superiority essential for future success.**

2. Information Superiority

a. **Information superiority refers to the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.** Information superiority brings together three interrelated areas:

(1) **Information Management.** Information management (IM) involves management of friendly information and information systems, to include the Battlespace Communications System (BCS).

(2) **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.** ISR involves adversary information and adversary information systems.

(3) **Information Operations.** IO include actions taken to protect (or defend) friendly information and information systems and affect (or attack) adversary information and information systems.

b. To be effective, information must be relevant. **Relevant information** is the full range of information about friendly forces, the adversary, the operations area, and anything else that affects operational decision making**.**

"We must remember that information superiority neither equates to perfect information, nor does it mean the elimination of the fog of war."

Joint Vision 2020

c. Information superiority provides the JFLCC a competitive advantage only when it is effectively converted to superior knowledge to achieve **"decision superiority"--better decisions arrived at and implemented faster then an opponent can react, or in a noncombatant situation, at a tempo that allows the force to shape the situation or react to changes and accomplish its mission.** Information systems are the architectures and functions for collecting, processing, analyzing, archiving, and disseminating information. Technology is creating an expansive potential for instant, worldwide information exchange, but **these tools cannot provide a marked advantage unless properly focused by the JFLCC through his guidance on operations and his own, fully developed CCIRs**.

d. Some information superiority considerations:

(1) **Determine as early as possible in the operation the essential information** required to support decision making; then build the systems that provide the required information superiority.

(2) **Identify and prioritize important versus routine information requirements**, i.e., those that will support the critical decisions and reports required by the LCC as opposed to less time sensitive information used for normal reporting.

(3) Ensure that **critical and required information is synchronized with higher headquarters and with other components' headquarters**, as appropriate. Ensure also that time frames for gathering, presenting and forwarding accurate information.

(4) Ensure that **shared information, both for US and multinational (allied/coalition) forces**, can be rapidly cleared, disseminated and understood.

(5) Establish measures to ensure the information received is **rapidly cleared for coalition dissemination but continuously secure**.

3. Communications Requirements

a. The JFC, through subordinate and functional/Service component commanders, ensures effective, reliable, and secure BCS services consistent with the overall joint campaign plan. **As driven by the mission, the foundation of the BCS is laid by the C2 organization of forces assigned to the joint force.** Communications are established as specified in the OPLAN and/or operation order (OPORD)--generally found in Annex K of the OPLAN/OPORD.

b. **The JFLCC will play a central role in establishing and operating the theater communications nets/systems that are required and managed by the JFC.** Theater systems may need to be supplemented based on operational needs as the campaign expands; this "running estimate" of needs must be constantly updated and synchronized as operations, coalition and interagency involvement, etc., change. Throughout, the network must be fully integrated with other components to provide theater-wide voice, data, and message connectivity between all components and elements. In addition, these systems address unique communications

connectivity requirements that provide for the appropriate interface between land forces and other components and C2 that permits timely execution of assigned missions.

c. **The JFLCC provides standardized direction and guidance on BCS matters to the LCC subordinate commanders and any other communications supporting elements.** The JFLCC establishes BCS responsibilities for units assigned, attached, and forces made available for tasking. **The Service component commands have the overall responsibility for providing BCS to their own forces (to include systems/capabilities that will interface with the JFLCC) unless otherwise directed. Communications hardware and software is a Service component responsibility.**

d. **Role of the JFLCC J-6.** The JFLCC J-6 provides critical functional expertise to the JFLCC in the BCS areas. These primary staff officers focus on key BCS issues that may have an adverse affect on the land portion of the joint campaign. Generally, they manage by exception only. Even though communications is a Service component responsibility, **those communication issues affecting the conduct of the operational mission are of critical operational concern to the JFLCC and need to be dealt with quickly.**

e. **Communications Planning.** The JFLCC J-6 needs to be heavily involved in all communications planning activities to ensure robust theater-wide voice, data, and message connectivity between all components and elements. In addition, **the JFLCC J-6 needs to ensure the communications plan addresses unique communications connectivity requirements that provide for the appropriate interface between ARFOR and MARFOR forces and the timely execution of assigned missions.** Some planning issues include:

(1) Determine when in-theater communications must be operational.

(2) If an advance echelon (ADVON) deploys by air, secure communications must be available to communicate with JFC headquarters (if established), the supported and supporting combatant commanders, other component commanders, and the appropriate interagency/US Embassy elements (as required).

(3) Once in the joint operational area, the ADVON must have all required secure voice, common-user telephone circuits, and secure record and facsimile capabilities (non-secure internet protocol router network [NIPRNET], SECRET internet protocol router network [SIPRNET], and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System [JWICS]) for effective exchange of current intelligence, graphics, planning, and adjustments to operational assessments and orders. **This capability must include strategic interfaces, as the JFLCC may be required to answer questions/participate in discussions with the interagency, multinational partners, etc.**

(4) **Conduct early planning for special operations forces and conventional forces interoperability and develop an early estimate for the additional requirements to integrate and supplement/ensure connectivity as these forces arrive in theater.** Coordinate adequate BCS support to get near-real-time imagery, signals data, and an accurate picture of the local situation to the tactical commanders.

(5) With increased potential for asymmetric and WMD threats, ensure early establishment of a threat warning system and ensure a method of disseminating these warnings has been promulgated.

(6) Involve coalition partners in classified planning. Make arrangements to get classified intelligence to/from them.

(7) Determine the need for multinational communications support--equipment and personnel. Also, ensure that the system provides for rapid translation, clearance, and disclosure of information as well as electronic/digital (rather than manual) dissemination among multinational partners.

(8) Ensure communications planners work with intelligence planners to provide communications support for intelligence systems. Ensure requirements are prioritized across the J-2, J-3, J-4, and J-6.

(9) Coordinate search and rescue (SAR), medical personnel, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) communications requirements.

f. **J-6 Organization.** Depending upon the JFLCC mission and size/number of JFLCC forces, the JFLCC J-6 staff could be organized many different ways. **A notional JFLCC J-6 staff organization is depicted in Figure 9-1.** Some organizational issues include:

(1) Ensure there are enough operators/maintenance personnel to sustain 24-hr operations.

(2) Determine required contractor support and associated implications.

(3) Determine location and accessibility of the linguists on the staff.

(4) Ensure JFLCC J-6 has a liaison on the JFC's J-6 staff.

g. **Combat Identification.** A key JFLCC responsibility is the prevention of fratricide.

(1) **Ensure CID procedures are disseminated among all coalition forces and that everyone understands them.**

(2) If the procedures are compromised, ensure there are backup procedures established that can be substituted quickly.

h. **Potential Communications Problem Areas**



Figure 9-1. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Staff Section

(1) Some US Army and US Marine Corps systems may be incompatible and can present problems. **Identify these systems as soon as possible. Areas may include COP, logistics, secure communications systems, etc.**

(2) Ensure procedures have been established for reporting meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion.

(3) Identify key communication nodes that, if lost through adversary action, natural causes, or mechanical failure, will seriously disrupt JFLCC communications.

(4) Operations will rapidly grow in scope and complexity; communications capabilities must anticipate and be in place in advance to enable these operations. Identify capabilities in place and conduct a constant "running estimate" of needs versus resources on hand for the following communications means:

- Phone Lines: Private/Commercial lines (local and international calling) and Government lines (local/Defense Switched Network)
- Cell phones (private and/or government)
- Satellite phones

- Ultrahigh frequency/very high frequency
- Secure lines (red phones)
- Digital/Web: Data networks (NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and JWICS) that include coalition requirements
- Web pages (classified and unclassified)
- Message traffic (to include personnel trained in formatting/transmitting)
- Video teleconferencing (secure and non-secure)

i. **JFLCC Personal Communications Needs. Constant, quality communications are an imperative for the JFLCC--without these he will be increasingly "tied" to the headquarters.** Considerations include the following:

(1) **Determine the type of mobile communications the JFLCC needs with him at all times**--cell phone, beeper, walkie-talkie, etc.

(2) **Identify the type and numbers of required mobile communications vehicles**, to include personal vehicle, helicopter, and fixed-wing.

(3) **Develop a "Quick Reference Communications List"** that includes primary/backup ways to communicate with JFLCC staff and commanders and key staff at the following headquarters:

- JFC and key staff (to include deputies)
- JFLCC Staff (principals/deputies)
- Other Components: JFACC, JFMCC, JSOTF (if applicable)
- Subordinate JFLCC components (Corps, Divisions, MEF, etc)
- Multinational forces--commanders and key staff/points of contact
- US Embassy and other government agencies (as applicable)
- HN--key contacts/agencies
- NGOs
- IGOs

j. **Coalition Coordination Center.** All efforts should be made to integrate multinational elements directly into the LCC headquarters. However, it this is not possible, a **proven means of enhancing stability, synchronization, deconfliction, and interaction and improving control within a coalition is the use of a coalition coordination center (CCC).** This is created in the early stages of any coalition effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure.

(1) **The CCC can be used for C2, and variations can organize and control a variety of functional areas, including logistics and civil-military operations.** Initially, a CCC can be the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, host-nation support, and movement control. **However, as a coalition matures, the role of the CCC can be expanded to include command activities. Coalition nations should be encouraged to augment this staff with linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent headquarters.**

(2) However, the JFLCC must anticipate the personnel and facilities "costs" for such an effort. The CCC will require duplicate, quality personnel and systems that represent all aspects of the LCC headquarters, to include data/web connectivity. Early establishment, set procedures, and battle rhythms that mirror those of the LCC main headquarters, and staffing with skilled personnel (to include linguists and foreign disclosure officers) are essential to the success of such centers. Keys efforts include the following:

- Establishment of a multinational communications SOP
- Identification of all relevant agreements made with multinational partners prior to operations
- Determination of the communications capabilities and limitations of the multinational forces
- Determine communications translator needs for JFLCC and multinational forces

4. Information Management

a. **IM refers to the processes a headquarters uses to obtain, manipulate, direct, and control information.** IM includes all processes involved in the creation, collection and control, dissemination, storage and retrieval, protection, and destruction of information. **<u>This is a critical LCC headquarters process and will require the JFLCC's personal attention to ensure his requirements are properly framed and met for effective decision superiority</u>.**

b. **The introduction of ambiguous or incorrect information devalues headquarters processes and must be limited by effective procedure for managing and posting information.** This may be the result of incorrectly posting draft documents as approved documents or posting information in the wrong location, causing uncertainly and a loss of accurate situational awareness. **The IM plan should provide guidance on how to best support**

decision making through timely procedures to filter, fuse, and prioritize required information.

(1) Filtering is a process of organizing information based on specific criteria--commander's decision-critical requirements must always flow to the top in a timely manner and be presented in a format that is quickly and easily understood by the commander/key decision maker.

(2) Fusion assesses information from multiple sources and develops a concise and complete summary. This is multifaceted, with intelligence, operations, and sustainment functions all involved.

(3) Prioritization focuses the efforts of the headquarters on developing information supporting the commander's decisionmaking process.

c. **The following IM elements are key to success:**

(1) Information management **is a critical operational function--designate an IM manager and clearly delineate responsibilities**, to include development of an IM plan that is coordinated with higher and component headquarters. The IM Plan must constantly evaluate how to obtain the information required, who needs the information, and the most effective/efficient ways to transfer the information to the critical point. The plan must provide for the following:

(a) **Requests for Information.** Requests for information (RFIs) provide a systematic method for requestors to obtain information. **Ensure key personnel are familiar with this process.**

(b) **Briefings and Meetings.** Promulgate any special briefing formats and identify any needed special boards or cells to be established.

(c) **Common Operational Picture.** Identify COP expectations and priorities.

(d) **Daily Operations Cycle (Battle Rhythm).** Ensure the JFLCC battle rhythm is synchronized with higher headquarters and other component battle rhythms.

(e) **Reports Development.** Identify and develop any required special reports. Ensure their location and dissemination is known to key JFLCC staff.

(f) **Multinational IM Issues.** Establish multinational access to the web page as appropriate and authorized. If necessary, establish an unclassified web page for multinational use.

(2) **Information and Information System Protection.** Establish procedures to protect both information and information systems. Ensure there are procedures for rapid destruction of classified information.

(3) **Redundancy.** Develop "backup" and alternate systems for information flow in case of loss of power, Internet connectivity, etc.

(4) **Form an IM board that is operationally-focused and acts as the focal point for resolving challenges and frictions to effective information flow**. Include representatives from key JFLCC staff sections, components, and LNOs.

(5) **Establish a website with useable links early to facilitate information posting/dissemination and reduce routine requests for information.** Designate and empower a webmaster and ensure there is a well-organized JFLCC website with links to important information. Establish a newsgroup function on the website to act as an electronic bulletin board. **Develop, promulgate and enforce standards for formatting/timely posting of information.** Refer all routine requests to this website.

(6) **Ensure the JFLCC headquarters has a viable secure/non-secure e-mail system**, to include written procedures that organize addresses functionally, a precedence system to ensure priority messages get through first, and the use of shared folders to allow others access to planning guidance and information.

(7) Provide for and emphasize the use of collaborative tools to increase the synergy and effectiveness of information filtering, flow and fusion across the JFLCC staff.

d. **Commanders Critical Information Requirements. CCIRs are a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely IM and the decision making process that affects successful mission accomplishment.** Although the CCIR process is designed for the JFC, the JFLCC may require a tailored version of CCIRs, particularly in the areas of planning for phases, branches, and sequels.

5. Information Operations

a. Information operations involve the integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, CNO, PSYOP, military deception, and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Figure 9-2 identifies the various core, supporting, and related capabilities.

b. **IO primarily are concerned with affecting adversary decisions and defending friendly decisions, whether human or automated, and are essential to achieving strategic success.** This is accomplished through the integrated employment of influence operations (PSYOP, military deception, OPSEC, and public affairs [PA]) and electronic (technical) operations (EW and CNO).

(1) **Offensive IO major objective is to affect adversary or potential adversary decision makers** to the degree that will cause them to modify personal actions, or direct their subordinates to modify or cease actions, that threaten United States national security issues. Key

Core	Supporting	Related
Electronic Warfare (EW)	Information Assurance (IA)	Public Affairs (PA)
Computer Network Operations (CNO)	Physical Security	Civil-Military Operations (CMO)
Psychological Operations (PSYOP)	Physical Attack	Military Support to Public Diplomacy
Military Deception (MILDEC)	Counterintelligence (CI)	
Operations Security (OPSEC)		

Figure 9-2. Information Operations Core, Supporting, and Related Capabilities

here is to determine early the effects desired, and determine the supporting actions that the adversary must be induced to take that facilitate LCC success. **This is a key point of involvement for the JFLCC in specifying these desired effects.**

(2) **Defensive IO must prevent adversaries from affecting friendly leader's decisions with IO-like actions. Defensive IO must account for an adversary's potential physical, electronic, and psychological reach**. An essential step is identifying the essential elements of friendly information, which must be protected from adversary intelligence gathering activities.

(3) **Influence operations** target specific audiences with products (leaflets, radio broadcasts, etc.) to deliver messages in support of approved themes. The success of these products is critically dependent upon knowledge of unique regional, cultural, and language issues influencing "receipt" of the message. **As influencing the enemy is key to operational success on land, the JFLCC should be involved in the approval process for the themes and messages while avoiding the temptation to "evaluate" the resulting products from a US cultural perspective.** All effects assessments must result from a fused, comprehensive view that interprets outcomes from the adversary's perspectives. (**Caution:** IO, PSYOP, and military deception are specifically prohibited from targeting domestic audiences).

(4) **Electronic operations** target specific adversary information or information systems for manipulation, degradation, or elimination. Since they are more direct, these actions tend to be more localized, measurable, and responsive. They lend themselves to targeting via the JTCB.

(5) **Determining adequate and measurable measures of effectiveness** (metrics or "MOE") for IO activities is challenging given the often indirect and influential nature of the operations. These metrics should be reviewed frequently to ensure they are **addressing effectiveness** (target audience performed desired action) **vice efficiency** (number of leaflets dropped, number of broadcasts made, etc.) issues.

c. **Organization.** Since IO is an operational capability, operations are planned and directed by an IO-focused staff section, augmented by representatives from other critical staff sections organized into an IO cell. **This IO cell is the critical planning and integrating element for**

ensuring non-kinetic/nonlethal effects are integrated into the overall LCC operational assessment effort. The J-3 normally exercises staff supervision over the IO staff and IO cell, and the J-3 or Deputy J3 will be heavily involved in their results. (**Note:** Evolving Army doctrine provides for the creation of a separate IO staff identified as the J-7. **Organizing under the J-3 is probably the more logical choice to ensure all "operations" are integrated and unified.**

d. **Planning.** IO planning must be completely integrated with the overall theater or campaign planning process. **There is no separate IO campaign plan--there is only IO support to the overall plan.** In practice, the IO effort, both planning and execution, must be continuous and complimentary across the full range of military operations in peace and war. In that regard, IO actions should be on-going as part of the Theater Security Cooperation Program to help define and shape the potential information environment battlefield.

e. **IO planning considerations**

(1) Determine what information conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the JFLCC's goal. Determine what the JFLCC wants a specific target audience(s) to do (ends).

(2) Determine what specific IO actions are most likely to produce that condition (ways).

(3) Determine how the IO resources of the joint land force should be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (means).

(4) Determine the likely risk to the joint force land component, civil populace, or unintended "targets" in performing that sequence of actions (risk assessment).

6. Public Affairs

a. A critical IO-related capability is PA, which has the **critical task of advancing consistent and credible information about US military forces to the American public and foreign audiences** via the news media and military journalists during operations. The trend in numbers of journalists and overall media coverage has been increasing dramatically in recent years.

b. The JFLCC must anticipate large media representation. **The trend toward larger numbers of journalists in operational areas, with sophisticated, real-time satellite connectivity, is a continued challenge to effective IO.** During OIF, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs developed and centrally managed a program to embed about 700 journalists--500 domestic and 200 international and regional--directly with US forces taking part in the operation. British forces similarly embedded another 100. The remaining 3,700 journalists in the Iraqi theater were non-embedded and prepared to cover the war more broadly.

c. The majority of journalists will be embedded with JFLCC forces and interested primarily in joint land force operations. **However, non-embedded journalists will emerge within the**

LCC AO, and PA personnel must anticipate and provide for their coverage and information requirements that may be heavily reactionary. Although the JFC will have the main PA office, the JFLCC may need one as well. Some PA considerations include the following:

(1) If a JFLCC PA office is established, **ensure the PA personnel understand they work for the JFLCC.**

(2) Determine how JFLCC PA office will interface with the JFC PA office and any other PA offices in the land component--USMC or multinational forces.

(3) Develop a media plan, to include potential solutions to anticipated problems.

(4) Determine when the JFLCC PA office should begin providing information/news stories relative to deployment.

(5) Identify who will be monitoring the major news networks to catch quickly developing stories. **NOTE: The JFLCC may need to provide facts quickly before a story gets "out of hand."**

(6) Consider establishing an office to handle historical records, record land operations, and compile combat imagery.

(7) Direct the JFLCC PA office to develop a community relations program--provide specific expectations.

(8) Determine if there will be other agencies (non-DOD) that are contributing to the JFLCC PA effort--US Information Agency, State Department, Embassy, etc.

(9) **Provide specific guidance as to how the JFLCC PA office will handle an "incident" or potential "incident."**

(10) **Determine and clearly identify who has release authority for casualty and mortuary affairs, to include information about captured, kidnapped, missing in action, or absent without leave JFLCC personnel, and enemy prisoners of war. NOTE: The instantaneous nature of battlefield communications and reporting and of fellow soldiers with access to email and satellite phones are challenging the military's very deliberate casualty reporting and notification system.**

"***Prior to operations in OIF, The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed a memorandum to all combatant commanders. It stated that expected operations would have unprecedented media attention, and as a result, commanders must consider media support as a vital part of their operations.***"

OIF Lessons Learned

d. The majority of journalists in theater will be interested in activities under JFLCC control.

(1) Ensure the JFLCC PA office has a plan to keep track of journalists. **NOTE: Many journalists will be in-country prior to the arrival of troops.**

(2) Determine how many embedded journalists there will be.

(3) Develop and promulgate any special instructions to the JFLCC subordinate commanders concerning journalists. **NOTE: Speaking with "one-voice" is important.**

(4) **Don't forget about the non-embedded journalists.** There are more of them than embedded journalists and they have a lot of "persuasive power" in their countries.

(5) If there is a media pool, determine some "rules of the road."

(6) Identify potential required JFLCC support to journalists--housing, messing, office space, security, protective equipment, immunizations, medical treatment, access to transportation and communications facilities, classified areas, etc. **NOTE: journalists usually are treated as O-4s for messing, billeting, and transportation.**

(7) Identify who handles reimbursable expenses, i.e., specifically what the JFLCC can and cannot provide at government expense. **NOTE: The JFLCC legal office should be able to answer these questions.**

e. **Anticipate many very important persons (VIPs) visiting.** Some considerations include:

(1) Determine the need for a JFLCC joint visitor bureau. If established, provide a liaison to the JFC's joint visitor bureau.

(2) Establish procedures to notify JFLCC of VIP visits.

(3) Identify linguist availability.

f. **The JFLCC will be asked for a lot of interviews and to hold press conferences**. The JFLCC public affairs staff should try to "develop a nose for news" and a sensing for when event(s) are progressing toward a potentially unfavorable outcome. Some JFLCC interview and press conference considerations are as follow:

(1) Obtain unambiguous guidance from the JFC concerning JFLCC authority to hold press conferences and grant interviews.

(2) Consider designating a specific spokesperson to routinely represent the JFLCC headquarters at press conferences and to grant interviews.

(3) Because a public affairs staff deals in bad news and truth and often must handle difficult or unpopular issues, always deal with the bad news immediately, openly and honestly.

(4) Avoid saying "No comment" as it implies the impression "we are guilty" or "we are covering up." The best response is "We are investigating and getting to the bottom of this issue."

(5) **Two cardinal rules for press conferences and interviews** :

- If you don't want to see it in print--or hear it on the air--**don't say it!**
- **Take your time to formulate your answer**--it is better to have a few blank seconds of soundtrack than say something totally wrong

7. Joint Land Information Superiority Checklist

- **Information Operations:** In forming an IO cell and integrating its efforts into the FCC, is information fully integrated as a shaping capability across all operational systems?

  •• Do IO planners and operators understand the results desired by the JFC and JFLCC, and the critical tasks that must be accomplished?

  •• Are measures of effectiveness established that can be observed, collected by existing intelligence assets, and assessed effectively?

  •• Who leads the IO effort within the headquarters? DCG? J3?

  •• Are all JFLCC staff sections, JFLCC components (US and multinational), OGAs, IGOs, and selected NGOs represented in the IO cell and planning boards?

  •• Has an IO plan been developed and included as an appendix to the JFLCC OPLAN/OPORD?

  •• How will Special Access Programs and capabilities be integrated and controlled?

  •• Has the JFLCC established a PA office? If so, has the JFLCC PA office developed a media plan? Has a JFLCC PA spokesperson been designated

  •• Has the JFLCC established a visitor bureau? If so, is there a liaison with the JFC's joint visitor bureau?

- **Managing Information:** Has the JFLCC developed a system for receiving and integrating the mass of information within the command, and sharing this information with subordinate elements and other components?

•• To prioritize information, has the JFLCC developed and promulgated initial CCIRs?

•• Has the JFLCC staff developed an information management plan?

•• Has the JFLCC established an information management board to assess requirements and recommend priorities to the commander?

- **Capabilities Analysis:** Has there been a mission analysis to determine **the total requirements** for information capabilities within the command?

  •• Has the JFLCC staff developed external and internal communications requirements? Do these requirements include communications with multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs?

  •• Has the JFLCC information manager developed and promulgated a JFLCC intranet and website to post and exchange recurring information for "pull down" and collaboration as required?

  •• Do sufficient capabilities exist to move required information over operational distances?

  •• Who approves and integrates software/hardware/change packages for the command and tracks mission accomplishment?

  •• Is there a "good idea cut-off point" for the integration of changes prior to the initiation of MCOs?

- **Sharing:** Do the multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs have access to mission essential information?

  •• What is the process and who is responsible for clearing information for release outside the headquarters and with multinational partners?

  •• Will there be a JFLCC ADVON? If so, have ADVON communications requirements been identified and satisfied?

- **Emerging Requirements:** How will the command track, approve, and resource emerging requirements as the command expands in missions, size, and span of control?

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CHAPTER 10

JOINT LAND STABILITY OPERATIONS

Gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of war.

B. H. Liddell Hart
Thoughts on War, ii, 1944

1. Transition to Stability Operations

a. **General.** A significant challenge for the JFLCC will be planning for and then executing an effective and durable transition to stability operations as sustained combat operations are concluding, but likely ongoing in some portions of the land AO. The complexity associated with this transition and follow-on stability operations demands early senior leader involvement and should include active interagency coordination. Fortunately, within the national security community, there is greater appreciation of the criticality of the "stability" and "enable civil authority" phases of the joint campaign, which should, in turn, give the JFLCC more leverage in securing adequate resources. DODD 3000.0, *Department of Defense Capabilities for Stability Operations*, defines stability operations as "Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum of peace and conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions." DODD 3000.0 indicates that stability operations are a core US military mission and that US military forces should be prepared to conduct and support, giving them priority and attention comparable to combat operations. **This recent DOD stability operations guidance reinforces the criticality of developing a joint campaign plan that takes a more holistic approach to prosecuting military operations, in concert with coalition and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to arrive at a more enduring peace (i.e., strategic success).** The JFLCC will have a critical role in translating military operational-level success to broader, strategic success. The JFLCC must plan for extended operations to address the complex tasks that follow defeat of the enemy at both the tactical and operational levels. Transitions to stability operations must be planned in-depth down to the tactical level and executed with minimum tactical pause. **This challenge involves how to effectively translate rapid military success to equally rapid civil-military success, the latter affording the greater contribution to strategic success**.

b. The "dominate" phase of a joint campaign or major operation will blend into the "stabilize" phase, which will include various stability operations. **Stability operations help restore law and order, government, and services in preparation for handover to another authority and ultimately redeployment**. However, the mere presence of US forces does not guarantee stability. Offensive and defensive operations may be necessary to defeat remnant adversaries and "spoilers" that oppose the US presence. The ability of joint forces to stabilize a crisis is directly related to their perceived ability to attack and defend as necessary. **Stability operations have a "peace enforcement" scope and can be characterized as nonlinear and conducted in noncontiguous operational areas often in support of OGAs, international agencies, or even NGOs.**

c. The JFLCC must, within the framework of the JFC's intent and concept of operations, develop an operational concept that maximizes combat overmatch capabilities while concurrently retaining those capabilities that will support a rapid transition to stability operations. The JFLCC's operational concept should include the following:

(1) **Clearly defined and attainable objectives.**

(2) **Effects guidance on the operational and strategic conditions that must be accomplished**, and how military force can accomplish or set the conditions for success.

(3) **A maneuver concept** that while rapid, allows ground commanders to maintain control of their battlespace; that facilitates fixing or neutralizing enemy formations rather that destroying them, supported by nonlethal means that offer these formations a role in the future of their country.

(4) **Guidance on the application of joint fires** informed by a careful assessment of existing infrastructure; preserve as much as you can while maintaining the initiative.

(5) **Provisions for the rapid seizure of airfields and port facilities** that can support the early introduction of humanitarian and other assistance.

(6) **Requirements for sustainment across the depth of the operation** (through completion of the "stability" and "enable civil authority" phases) that meets not only land requirements, but those of the joint, coalition, and interagency efforts which the JFLCC will be required by the JFC to support.

(7) **Force requirements and flow** that carefully balances the introduction of unique stability operations capabilities while preserving combat capabilities.

(8) **Effective transitions** with a well-understood condition set for the transition of authority to civil authorities.

2. Factors Influencing an Effective Transition to Stability Operations

a. **Force Mix.** Stability operations likely will involve **a higher proportion of combat support (CS) and CSS forces** than are employed to support offensive and defensive operations. A greater demand for military police, engineers, medical, chemical, and civil affairs (CA) personnel will arise quickly. Further, these specialties must be prepared to perform combat tasks that are usually reserved for the infantry. There likely will be a **requirement for individual augmentees and augmentation cells** to support personnel shortfalls and unique requirements to tailor the force. Augmentation supports coordination with the media, government agencies, NGOs, other multinational forces, and civil-military elements. However, augmentation requires life support, transportation, and communication.

b. **Legal Considerations.** Three bodies of law are relevant: international law, US law, and HN law. Well before hostilities commence, the JFLCC must have a clear understanding of the

implications of these bodies of law as they offer opportunity as well as constraints. Further, martial law likely will have a considerable impact on how stability operations will be executed and its use should be considered well before operations commence.

(1) **International law consists mainly of international agreements, such as treaties and customary international law, which includes the agreements and customary law known as the law of war.** The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) must advise actively and participate in every stage of the operation, from the initial planning to redeployment, recognizing that international law establishes constraints and responsibilities for an occupying power that the JFLCC must anticipate and plan for. Specifically, international law should be considered when preparing information products that will facilitate a more orderly transition to stability operations. The JFLCC also must be aware that coalition partners, in some cases, interpret international law differently and may be constrained in some areas.

(2) **US Law. Operations in peace and conflict must comply with US law, whether as a statute, executive order, regulation, or other directive from a branch or agency of the federal government.** As examples, "The Mansfield Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act (Title 22 USC, section 2291[c][1]) prohibits US personnel from performing foreign law enforcement activities overseas, Executive Order 11850 limits using chemical herbicides and riot control agents, and failure to apply fiscal principles correctly to federal activities can lead to unauthorized expenditure and potential criminal or administrative sanctions.

(3) **HN Law. If a viable HN government exists, whether at the national or the local level, domestic laws of the host nation may apply to US forces in that country unless an international agreement provides otherwise.** To the maximum extent possible, if the HN government is viable, every attempt should be made to abide by their law or to establish temporary procedures that closely match the political/cultural conditions throughout the region.

(4) **ROE used in many stability operations merely permit engagement in individual, unit, or national self-defense.** The bases for ROE are operational requirements, policy, and law. Force is used based on necessity and proportionality. The JFLCC will have to carefully consider when to transition from a less restrictive ROE (normally associated with combat) to a more restrictive ROE (during stability operations) as there will be considerable uncertainty associated with these transitions. Accordingly, graduated response is a technique that can be applied in stability operations situations. Effective ROE must be tactically sound, understandable, legally sufficient, and responsive; and must be developed in a format that can be promptly distributed to other nations. A coalition support team, if present, can assist in translating, interpreting, distributing, and teaching ROE to multinational forces. The JFLCC also should anticipate that the ROE for US forces might not necessarily be that used by coalition members.

c. **Force Application Flexibility.** Land forces must transition from primarily applying lethal force to an emphasis on cultural awareness, negotiating techniques, language skills, and nonlethal force. Service members and units at every level must be flexible and adaptive. **Stability operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.** Commanders at various levels may conduct a cordon and search in the morning and then hold a town/village meeting to discuss the status of

power generation and the security of the local water plant in the afternoon. Leaders and individual Service members must remain calm and exercise good judgment under considerable pressure.

d. **Cultural understanding.** Ideally, ground forces will have a degree of understanding of the people, the culture, traditions, and history of the indigenous people located in the operating area. Civil-military specialists, foreign area officers, and SOF can help in this area but are not available in sufficient numbers to be relied upon as the single solution set. The JFLCC must emphasize the criticality of this training as it has a significant impact on the transition to stability operations. **The initial interface between ground forces and the local people and their institutions can have significant, long-term effects, facilitating success or creating a more hostile, complex environment.** Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have reinforced the criticality of finding the time and resources to expose and train ground troops in these high pay-off areas.

e. **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.** Stability operations demand greater attention to civil considerations--the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in the land AO. The JFLCC must push the intelligence community, military and non-military, to address far more than traditional **geographical and force capability considerations**. Infrastructure status, tribal and ethnic fault lines, the status of natural resources, and social factors all influence how the JFLCC will plan and execute land operations. **Further, this broader IPB, as it is developed, must be pushed down to the absolute lowest echelon where this knowledge can be turned into better-informed tactical action.** Success in these operations requires multidisciplined, all-source, fused intelligence. A single-source approach cannot support all requirements.

(1) **Intelligence Collection.** The intelligence collection focus changes as the campaign unfolds and must be sufficiently robust to address traditional collection that supports combat operations as well as the broader collection identified above. The complicator is these two collection activities may be going on simultaneously. As ground forces move from sustained combat to stability operations, every attempt should be made to leverage whatever indigenous databases are available to inform the actions of the ground forces. Of particular value will be property owner rolls, tax rolls, and crime records; anything that offers local commanders better insight into how to deal with the local population. HUMINT is particularly important during these transitions and can prevent insurgency and terrorism activities if it is effective. Nonmilitary organizations can provide valuable information; however, they may resent being considered a source of intelligence. Because of the nature of their work, some organizations must remain independent and nonaligned with any military force. JFLCCs foster communications and share valuable information with these organizations to become familiar with cultures and sensitivities of the local population. In addition to their organic assets, collection managers must be able to synchronize their collection efforts with a broad range of collection assets operating in the AO over which they have no direct control. These assets may include CI and HUMINT collection teams under control of another agency; signals intelligence and imagery intelligence collectors under control of the JFC; and collectors under the control of friendly elements such as the HN or coalition.

(2) **CI activities remain essential during stability operations as this is the window when the force is most vulnerable.** Regardless of how decisive combat operations are, there will be elements within the society, military and non-military that will seek to adversely affect coalition operations or to shape friendly actions in a fashion that may be counter-productive in the long term.

f. **Public Affairs.** Adversaries and other organizations will use propaganda and disinformation against the land force to influence the public. PA personnel must work closely with the intelligence community to be predictive, rather than reactive, to such attacks. Effective PA informs and counters the effects of propaganda and misinformation. Key to success in this area are the following:

(1) **Consistency in Message and Themes.** Make sure the OGA and other coalition members are offering a message consistent with yours

(2) **Resources.** Do not count on leveraging the HN's telecommunications infrastructure. The ground component must have the production and dissemination capability on hand to deliver the message.

(3) **Use the "word on the street" to your advantage.** Word of mouth is one of the most trusted and effective tools in shaping perceptions and enlisting cooperation.

(4) At the first opportunity, **use the local and regional media** as an information source and as a conduit to the people.

(5) **Minimize**, to the extent possible, **US or coalition members in contact with the international press**. Get the indigenous civil and military leaders out front as soon as practical.

g. **Force Protection.** Adversaries opposed to US interests, or who seek to destabilize an area, will go to great lengths to expel US and coalition forces. They will employ terrorist tactics such as bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, ambushes, and raids and will take advantage of the regional and international media to further their efforts. **Because of unusual and uncertain threats associated with stability operations, force protection is a key consideration.** However, force protection measures must be balanced against a "bunker mentality" and diminishing interaction with the indigenous population. The JFLCC should take every opportunity to use local security forces, police or military formations, to assist in force protection.

h. **Logistics.** The JFLCC must expect the logistic challenge to increase **during the transition to stability operations,** even as the command is enjoying great success in the ground fight. The battlespace that must be supported will expand. There likely will be the addition of more coalition formations. There will be immediate requirements to support the indigenous population and civil authorities will levy requirements (e.g., transportation, supply, health service support). The JFLCC must ensure potential logistic demands during stability operations are considered during operation plan development.

(1) **HNS, contracting, and local purchases are prominent in stability operations.** They may augment or replace existing CSS capability. They can reduce dependence on the logistic system, improve response time, and free airlift and sealift for other priority needs. Contracting can be employed for limited supplies and services such as catering, maintenance and repair, sanitation, laundry, rental services such as mobile communications, and transportation. Experience has shown that commanders must not put too much reliance on HN support nor contract support. **Although both advertise well, the LCC is better served by relying on organic logistic capabilities, particularly for the periods soon after combat when conditions are still ambiguous at best.** This puts considerable stress on troop list and force flow management, but sustaining the force and assuming a degree of responsibility for the indigenous population makes it imperative that the JFLCC have a degree of ownership over these critical assets.

(2) The management of contractors and their protection will become major tasks. **Protecting contractors involves** not only active protection through the use of armed military forces to provide escort or perimeter security, but **also training and equipping of contractor personnel in self-protection (NBC and weapons)**.

i. **Command and Control**

(1) **JFLCC's Role.** The JFLCC is responsible for executing a land operation that not only fits the JFC's concept of operations and is thoroughly coordinated with and supporting of the other components, but has been fully integrated and synchronized with participating coalition forces and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. **The JFLCCs plan, more than any other component, must include mechanisms to coordinate activities with nonmilitary organizations**. The challenge of integrating additional coalition formations during transition periods, managing the press, facilitating effective operations with nonmilitary organizations that will push back on any perception of control, and the importance of turning responsibility over to civil authorities as soon as practical makes the JFLCC's C2 challenge unique and formidable.

(2) **Defining Stability Responsibilities.** Of particular importance is a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the JFC and the JFLCC beyond the "dominate" phase of the campaign. Generally, the JFC will assign the responsibility for planning and executing the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases of the campaign to the JFLCC, but there must be a common understanding of what authorities will be provided the JFLCC for both planning and execution. Optimally, the JFLCC will have a degree of direct liaison authority with selected OGAs to ensure those agencies are fully integrated in stability operations planning. However, the JFC may elect to retain this authority to reduce the demands on the JFLCC and staff in the preparation for sustained combat operations. Regardless of the approach selected, the specific responsibilities and authorities should be parsed early to facilitate effective planning and preparation.

(3) **Liaison.** The JFLCC must establish early and effective liaison arrangements with those organizations that will be heavily involved during the transition to stability operations and in the longer-term "enable civil authority" phase. The tendency is to focus liaison arrangements to support sustained combat, an absolutely essential task, but one that should not be performed to the exclusion of stability operations. The JFLCC, in coordination with the JFC and civilian

leadership, must determine where the greatest payoff will occur from positioning highly capable staff officers within OGAs, coalition formations and headquarters, and if practical, IGOs and NGOs. **These non-traditional liaison arrangements can be powerful force multipliers in the latter phases of the campaign, bringing additional resources to bear more effectively and, optimally, creating greater unity of effort.**

(4) **Information Management.** Clarity and accuracy of information are critical, especially when involving multiple agencies in activities such as scheduling airlifts and processing resources. Information sharing is essential to establish ground truth—a critical and sensitive process. Not all agencies may agree on the nature or scope of support required or on the operation's progress. **Information sharing preempts false impressions and helps other agencies execute their missions.** For example, providing overhead photography to relief officials can assist in the design and construction of needed refugee camps or aid search.

j. **Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Forces.** The very nature of stability operations places forces in direct contact with local civilians. This relationship makes CMO critical to success. Further, CA forces provide a significant, but limited, capability. Consequently, the JFLCCs plan must prioritize their use where they will be most effective. Another consideration is command relationships. The CA force may be provided in general support to the JFLCC or, if the CA command is task organized, the JFLCC may be delegated OPCON or TACON of CA forces. Regardless, the command relationship must be understood clearly.

> ***The problems of victory are more agreeable than those of defeat, but are no less pressing.***
>
> **Winston Churchill**
> **To the House of Commons, 1942**

3. Joint Force Land Component Tasks for Transition to Stability Operations

a. **Plan for the transition of responsibilities to another agency or military organization well before execution.** Only through multinational, political-military planning can a proper transition be conducted. Transitions between units in offensive and defensive operations are usually reliefs in place focused on units and operational areas. In most stability operations, however, transition by functions may be more effective. Some of these functions include medical and engineer services, local security, communications, and logistics. **Forces should not remove a capability until the replacement capability is operating.**

b. **Maintain land force continuity.** It is critical that rapid rotations of forces are not made during the transition to stability operations. It is during this period that the ground force will be establishing initial linkages with local communities and institutions and continuity is vital. Rotating in new formations and headquarters during this period is imprudent and will further complicate an already difficult evolution.

c. **Communicate a clear commander's intent.** Given the decentralized nature of stability operations, **the commander's intent (that includes end state conditions) for LCC operations is crucial and must be understood down to the lowest level.**

d. **Establish and maintain relationships with the nonmilitary players.** Stability operations likely will be conducted in support of a civilian authority (e.g., US Ambassador or Chief of Mission). Further, operating and coordination with contractors, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs likely will be required. Ideally these relationships will be initiated early in the planning process but regardless, invest in these relationships as they are critical to success.

e. **Establish bases of operation and sustainment, and implement appropriate force protection policies.** As the situation stabilizes, the land force will need to conduct follow-on actions to restore order and local government, assist in repairing infrastructure, remove weapons, and disarm factions. The land component footprint at the end of hostilities may well not be the stance that best sets conditions for effective stability operations. **Accordingly, the JFLCC and staff assign objectives and subordinate AOs, allocate forces, and establish control measures for subordinate forces to accomplish their missions with the least risk feasible.**

f. **Weight the main effort.** As conditions change on the ground, and as the priority shifts from executing sustained combat to stability operations, weighting the main effort remains applicable. Most of the resources and capabilities required to effectively support the transition to an enduring peace are in short supply. The JFLCC must recognize that up front and consider where employment of these critical capabilities can create the greatest effect. Additionally, the JFLCC must have capabilities to quickly react to changing and frictional situations before they evolve into large crises.

(1) **Task-organize small crisis-action teams to deal with situations that develop with the local population.** These multifunctional teams must deal with small problems rapidly. They should be organized with a full range of capabilities to include PA, ministry, engineers, CI, linguists, and logistic personnel, but combat elements also may be required.

(2) **Form special negotiation teams that can quickly locate to diffuse or negotiate where confrontations are anticipated or occur.** These teams must have linguists and personnel who have authority to negotiate on behalf of the chain of command.

(3) **Maintain a reserve.** An uncommitted, readily available force is just as important during the transition period as during combat operations. It may well be organized differently, but the JFLCC must have the ability to rapidly influence events on the ground during this period of vulnerability. The composition of this reserve force should be determined carefully during land component operation planning and the JFLCC must be prepared to make a strong case for the reserve force "up the chain."

g. **Organize the operational area to provide appropriate subordinate AOs.** Organizational AO boundaries down to platoon level may need to be drawn along not only geographical features (rivers and streets), but also along religious or tribal boundaries that typically equate to neighborhoods within an urban sprawl. These boundaries allow each level commander to develop his respective AO and gain battlespace awareness and long term

familiarity with the leaders and people that live there. **Subordinate AOs may be noncontiguous depending on the force size and capabilities**.

h. **Delegate the authority to subordinate force commanders to command forces, conduct liaison, and coordinate with multinational and interagency partners within their AO.**

i. **Focus on Performing Critical Tasks:**

(1) **Establish order--**police support, security, patrols. Leverage indigenous capability if it is practical. This includes reestablishing border control as soon as possible. This task is highly resource intensive but recent experience reinforces the importance of getting this done as early as possible. The JFLCC must be prepared to stand very firmly on this as a requirement.

(2) **Protect people and vital infrastructure; and restore vital human services--** hospitals, water supplies, waste and hazardous material storage and processing, emergency services (e.g., police, fire, rescue).

(3) **Support the establishment of civil administration--**legislative, judicial, and administrative functions.

(4) **Establish/restore communications and information--**television, radio, telephone, Internet, newspapers, magazines, and computer systems.

(5) **Establish/restore and protect transportation and distribution--**highways, railways, ports, waterways, pipelines, airports, mass transit, and trucking companies.

(6) **Protect energy sources--**production, storage, and distribution of electric power, oil, and natural gas.

(7) **Promote and protect commerce--**key industries and other business, banking, and finance.

(8) **Promote good governance--s**upport and assist legitimate civil authority.

j. **Provide essential support to the largest number of people. This principle guides prioritization and allocation.** Whenever feasible, land forces simultaneously accomplish as many tasks as possible. In some cases, it may be necessary to complete a lower-priority task to accomplish a higher task. For example, land forces may need to restore limited electric services (lower-priority task) to power hospital emergency rooms and shelters (higher-priority task).

k. **Manage refugees and displaced persons.** Stability operations usually require land forces to conduct internment and resettlement operations to manage internees, refugees, and internally displaced persons. During the preflight and flight stage, land forces can be called on to provide intelligence support to determine the timing, magnitude, and direction of the population movement. During the **arrival stage**, land forces may be called on to assist international organizations, NGOs, and the HN during the initial arrival of the refugees. During the **asylum**

stage, land forces may secure refugee camps and settlements in the HN while assisting with stabilization of the refugees' country of origin. During the **repatriation stage**, military support may be needed to secure repatriation crossing points, screening points, and transit sites as well as to secure returnee movement to local communities. During the **reintegration stage**, land forces may be required to assist with the security of returnees as they are absorbed into their local communities.

l. **Address the unique force protection challenges** when planning stability operations and revise the plan as necessary during execution. Among those challenges are base security; convoy security; personnel vulnerabilities; and protection of contractor, OGA, NGO, and international organization personnel, facilities, and equipment essential to mission success**.** Further, the avoidance of fratricide is compounded with the more numerous interactions with nonmilitary personnel and the difficulty in maintaining a COP with civilian organizations.

m. **Develop and maintain targeting data on targets that may not be attacked but remain valid targets.** Ensure these databases are properly transferred to rotational forces.

n. **Influence targeted groups through offensive IO to communicate intentions and reduce uncertainty.** The JFLCC should establish mechanisms such as a joint information bureau and media working groups to educate as well as inform local and international media. An informed public, with accurate and timely information, is a force multiplier. The need to be candid and responsive to requests for information must balance the need to protect operational information. Working closely with all parties, IO planners must develop the essential elements of friendly information to preclude inadvertent public disclosure of critical or sensitive information.

o. **Be prepared to negotiate.** Ground units likely will be required to plan and conduct negotiations. For example, they may negotiate for rights of passage; mediate between hostile factions; or barter for use of facilities, buildings, roads, and services. Successful negotiations should follow eight steps. Negotiators should establish communications, identify common ground, consider cultural implications, set goals, develop a plan, determine the negotiating team's composition, establish the venue, and then implement the plan. Various courses and institutions offer training on negotiations. This training is key in any situations, but ideally should be taken before the employment of forces.

> *For further guidance on considerations and procedures for negotiations, refer to Appendix E, "Negotiations," of FM 3-07*, Stability Operations and Support Operations.

p. **Develop ROE to fit the situation and apply firepower with restraint and discipline.** Precision munitions provide an important capability. Mortars, artillery, and special aircraft can provide illumination for demonstrating deterrent capability, for observing congested areas, for supporting friendly base security, or in support of patrolling maneuver forces. **Collateral damage and unexploded ordnance are significant planning factors when considering the application of fire support means.** Fire support coordination, planning, and clearance demands special arrangements with joint and multinational forces and local authorities. These arrangements include communications and language requirements, liaison personnel, and

established procedures focused on interoperability. **Nonlethal capabilities augment the means of deadly force and are particularly valuable as they enhance the ability to apply force in proportion to the threat and allow discrimination in its use.** Military deception, PSYOP, EW, counterpropaganda, and CNA illustrate elements of offensive IO that JFLCCs also use as nonlethal means to target adversaries. **ROE should provide guidelines for clearing indirect fires (both lethal and nonlethal).**

q. **Display the capability to use force in a nonthreatening manner.** Joint land forces must be capable of limited combat operations for self-defense. **A corollary to being prepared to conduct offensive and defensive operations is the need to display such preparedness in a nonthreatening manner.** The intent is to demonstrate strength and resolve without provoking an unintended response. For example, the aim of a show of force is deterrence, not goading or bullying an adversary into an attack. Within mission constraints, units display preparedness by routinely conducting combat training. Training should challenge soldiers with situations involving weapons use, levels of force, and ROE. **Consistent with OPSEC demands, land force commanders should make known to all parties the breadth and depth of available resources.** It is not prudent to inform potential adversaries of all available land force capabilities. However, displaying offensive and defensive strength can deter some adversaries from direct confrontation.

r. **Apply force selectively and discriminately. The JFLCC and subordinate commanders** must ensure their units apply lethal and nonlethal force appropriate to the mission within prescribed legal and policy limitations. They **must consider the requirements to prevent unnecessary suffering, distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and minimize the loss of life and damage to property.** These considerations constrain or dictate the level of force acceptable. Excessive or arbitrary use of force is never justified. It may lead to the need to apply ever-increasing force to maintain the same degree of order as well as to the loss of sympathy and support of the local populace. Conversely, using inadequate force jeopardizes force credibility. Inadequate force emboldens potential adversaries and raises doubts in the minds of protected groups. The JFC will issue ROE to guide the application of the JFLCC's combat power. **Ordinarily, the commander on the ground is best qualified to determine the required degree of force, consistent with the ROE.**

s. **Understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions.** Given the volatile and politically charged nature of most "stabilize" situations, individual and small unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic effects (e.g., abuse of prisoners of war, disproportionate use of force). Recognizing and avoiding potential problems requires trained, disciplined, and knowledgeable leaders and soldiers at every level. **Every soldier must understand the operational and strategic context of the mission and the potential military, political, and legal consequences of their actions or inaction.** There will be continuous observation by HN, domestic, and international populations as well as the media. **Knowing this, opponents of stabilization efforts will seize on relatively minor incidents to achieve strategic advantages. Potentially, a single act of indiscipline or rash application of force can undo months and years of disciplined effort.** Likewise, actions that are destructive to the natural or cultural environment may introduce negative perceptions that must be overcome.

t. **Establish measures of effectiveness.** This is an essential planning task and the JFLCC must force the land component staff to accomplish this task since the staff's predisposition and strength is in detailing combat operations. While developing practical MOE that support stability operations, light is shed on capabilities requirements that might otherwise have gone unidentified. Objective standards for determining progress toward the military end state are necessary and are a critical aspect of mission handover. However, these standards must be approved by the higher headquarters and be well understood by all concerned. These MOE determine the degree to which stability operations are accomplishing established objectives and end state conditions. **Criteria of success focus primarily on the condition and activity of those supported.** For example, the rate of decline in the mortality rate more accurately denotes success than the amount of food delivered.

u. **Set the conditions for success by civil authorities.** Stability operations are conducted to establish conditions for the effective transition to civil authority. However, this transition must be conducted when conditions are suitable and that may not be the case for an extended period. Optimally, the JFLCC integrates the activities of civil authorities and organizations but maintains responsibility for the operating area. When conditions permit, there will be a formal transfer of responsibility between the military and civil authorities. Even after that transfer, the military will likely continue to support security and reconstruction operations for an extended period.

v. **Managing the media.** The JFLCC must assume "embedded media," will accompany land component operations. Recent experience indicates embedded reporters, for the most part, will depart following the conclusion of sustained combat operations. Nevertheless, the JFLCC should encourage them to remain during the more complex stability operations. Important to campaign success is getting the right message out about what really happens during the reconstruction, empowerment of civil authorities, and humanitarian relief efforts; and to highlight the simple acts of kindness and compassion of coalition Service members. The press can have a significant strategic effect on campaign objectives and the JFLCC should actively support and encourage their continued engagement well beyond sustained combat.

w. **Other Joint Force Components.** When planning for transitions and the stabilize phase of the campaign, identify potential requirements for the other joint force components. There may be significant stability contributions these components can make in the latter phases of the campaign, but they must be identified early and validated by the JFC.

No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so after a careful study and estimate of the situation and arrangement of the military and political factors involved.

Mao Tse-tung
On Guerilla War, 1937

4. Coordination with Other Government, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations for the Transition to Stability Operations

a. **Leverage interagency, IGO, NGOs, joint, and multinational cooperation.** Unity of effort requires constant coordination with all involved agencies--the JFLCC must get them involved as early as possible in the planning process. **Commanders must adapt to situations where lines of authority and areas of responsibility are unclear.** Commanders coordinate and integrate civilian and military activities. Each participant will likely bring unique capabilities that will be in constant demand. **Effectively integrating these scarce resources requires planning and coordination.** Likewise, commanders make their military objectives and operational schemes clear to other agencies. Coordination makes unity of effort and effective integration work in environments where unity of command is not possible. It also lends coherence to the activities of the elements involved. Operational headquarters plan their operations to complement those of other agencies and organizations. Classification issues are a problem but can be worked through. The JFLCC should not let the staff use this as an excuse to not reach out and conduct as much lateral coordination as possible.

(1) **Establish liaison with key nonmilitary agencies early.** Establishment of coordination or liaison cells will facilitate communication between the JFLCC and key nonmilitary participants. A robust liaison team should be attached to the lead OGA and HN government, if applicable. **CA and other SOF members often possess unique capabilities to serve as liaisons.**

(2) **Establish a CMOC to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the HN.** CMOCs include representatives from as many agencies as required. Effective civil-military coordination and cooperation is necessary to mass the effects of all assets, agencies, and forces to accomplish national and multinational objectives. Effective civil-military cooperation reduces the use of US resources. **More than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is task-organized based on the mission.** Recent experience established that CMOCs provide excellent opportunities for informal coordination and engagement with a variety of NGOs. The CMOC provides them a degree of "cover" to make necessary coordination with military organizations without unduly harming their independent, neutral status.

(3) **Coordination Requirements**. The following should be coordinated through command visits, CMOC sessions, and liaison activities:

- Objectives/goals, activities, and COAs
- Operational protection
- Communications
- Intelligence and information sharing
- Logistic and other support requirements

- Release of information to the media

b. **Enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the HN.** LCC forces must consciously endeavor to enhance HN credibility and legitimacy. They should demonstrate the proper respect for HN government, police, and military forces. HN military and police forces should be integrated into all aspects of stability operations. The civil population will closely watch joint land force actions. Disrespect toward HN officials or lack of confidence in HN capabilities will discredit the HN and damage the stability effort. Understanding and respect does not happen by accident. Land forces must have a degree of understanding of the culture of the indigenous population and their institutions. **The JFLCC must not allow, if feasible, key solutions to become a US responsibility. Within their capabilities, the HN must take the lead in both developmental and security activities.** When HN capabilities are inadequate, joint land forces enhance them through training, advice, and assistance. The JFLCC, within the restrictions of international law and US policy, make maximum use of HN forces and personnel. **In any successful stability or support operation, the HN, <u>not</u> the US forces supporting it, must ultimately prevail.**

For further guidance on interagency coordination, see Annex F, "Interagency and Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations Coordination."

5. Land Component Staff Guidance

- Determine how much authority the JFLCC has to conduct interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination for posthostilities stability operations. Recommend to the JFLCC the OGAs with which the land component should be planning and developing formal liaison arrangements.

- Recommend the command authorities for the transition to stability operations.

- Secure a primary voice in developing joint IO products.

- Determine the access and limits to central emergency revolving funds and how soon they can be obtained.

- Determine the expected embedded support from OGAs.

- Establish the JFLCC as the competent authority to recommend, when conditions are sufficient, a transition to civil authority.

- Determine the likely coalition forces in the latter phases of the joint campaign and their ROE.

- Assuming JFLCC responsibility for posthostilities stability operations, determine the other components' capabilities needed and the associated level of command authority.

- Determine the Service sources of land forces that have been at least exposed to the culture, traditions, and history of the indigenous folks in the AO.

6. Joint Land Stability Operations Checklist

- **Guidance:** Do the JFLCC and other commanders clearly understand the desired strategic end state, mission, and military objectives throughout each phase of the campaign?

- **Tasks and Authorities:** How will the JFC conduct the transition to follow-on/post-hostilities stability operations?

  •• What key tasks and responsibilities will be assigned to the JFLCC?

  •• What authorities are necessary to execute post-hostilities stability operations? Does the JFLCC retain complete military authority over the LCC AO until deemed prudent to turn it over to civil authority?

  •• What civil and international agencies/authorities will the JFLCC be authorized to plan and execute operations with directly (vice through the JFC)? What is their relationship--supported vs. supporting?

  •• When/where should the JFLCC establish a CMOC(s)?

- **Planning:** Has the transition from sustained combat operations to stability operations been thoroughly analyzed for mission and capabilities requirements? Has this transition been planned and coordinated with the proper authorities (military, interagency, and, if required, international organizations), prior to the employment of forces?

- **Information Operations Supporting Plan**: Is there a well-defined, understood, and supported IO plan:

  •• That will be executed at the national level and reinforced at the theater and operational level to include nonmilitary partners?

  •• That shapes the LCC AO prior to the arrival of military forces?

  •• That informs the populace required conduct and rules during the transition to interim LCC authority.

  •• With the means to implement the plan available?

  •• Has an information sharing policy been established and communicated that ties together the land component with the OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs?

- **Forces Required**: Does the land component troop list reflect the TOTAL capabilities required to effectively set conditions for the transition to and execution of stability operations?

  •• What capabilities are realistically available from other joint force components as the "stability" phase of the campaign nears, and what are the likely command relationships?

  •• How will the LCC effectively communicate the need for these forces to decision makers as essential capabilities for dealing with instability and humanitarian challenges at transition?

  •• How will newly arrived or transitioning forces be properly trained and equipped for the unique stability operations challenges (e.g., force application, negotiations, and force protection)?

  •• Has the JFLCC and staff had the opportunity to plan and train with critical nonmilitary organizations/representatives to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities?

- **Augmentation and Liaison**: Is the LCC augmentation to external agencies and liaison structure with the appropriate military and nonmilitary organizations adequate?

- Have the legal constraints and ROE been established?

CHAPTER 11

JOINT LAND COMPONENT "COMMANDERSHIP" AND COMMUNICATIONS

A commander should have a profound understanding of human nature, the knack of smoothing out troubles, the power of winning affection while communicating energy, and the capacity for ruthless determination where required by circumstances. He needs to generate an electrifying current, and to keep a cool head in applying it.

B. H. Liddell Hart
Thoughts on War, xi, 1944

1. Introduction

a. The LCC will operate in an environment characterized by uncertainty and complexity and will interact with a range of people extraordinary in their diversity and their requirements, all seeking assistance, guidance or decision from the JFLCC. This network of people includes members of the LCC, other components, the higher headquarters, the Service headquarters, and perhaps most importantly, the senior US civilian leadership and coalition senior leaders, military and civilian alike.

b. The commander must optimize his interaction with all of these competing audiences, in many cases with little of limited time. **The art of effective commandership and senior leader communications translates to an operationally capable headquarters executing a variety of strategic level tasks.**

2. Know the Coalition Environment

a. Important to effective senior leader communications is an understanding of whom the commander should be interacting with beyond the normal bounds of the chain of command. The JFLCC has a responsibility to shape a theater and potentially execute major operations within that theater. **The JFLCC's ability to connect with and influence senior civilian and military leaders within the joint operational area is paramount.** The ability to communicate effectively with these key people involves far more than the delivery of a clear, unambiguous message. **An understanding of the culture, knowing when to engage and when not to, and how to respond to requests without inadvertently committing to action are all important to communications at this strategic level.**

b. The JFLCC should "tap" the resources of the command and the regional embassies to assure the message is consistent and reinforcing of national level objectives and to get a better understanding of the courtesies and customs expected during these engagements. **Regardless of how informal a senior leader meeting is with a counterpart at the component command level, each of these engagements can have strategic consequence.** The sooner the commander

can build effective relationships with these key leaders in the region, the sooner the command can more effectively accomplish national and theater strategic objectives.

3. Know the Interagency Environment

At the component level, the commander will interface with a broad range of civilian governmental leaders, from congressman to senior members of branches and agencies of the government to senior staff and leaders from international organizations. Each of these engagements offers opportunity and a degree of risk. Almost without exception, these people do not respond well to "military briefings" and the communication is generally more effective with fewer slides and more open discussion. As with coalition counterparts, these engagements too can have strategic outcomes. Be honest and open yet sensitive to classification issues and the "left and right limits" of the command. Importantly, many of these people do not completely understand the scope and bounds of the land component commander's charter and often will ask questions that normally should be addressed to the next higher headquarters, particularly policy related issues. **These engagements should not be avoided or passed on to subordinate general officers; they are an essential task for the JFLCC and offer great opportunity to shape and inform these key leaders, both governmental and nongovernmental.**

4. Know the Key Leaders Within the Combatant Command

a. Cross component coordination at the senior level is a powerful force multiplier and also makes the staff far more effective. Although not always easy, routine face-to-face interaction, rather than reliance solely on telephonic or electronic engagement, is "high pay-off." The greater the clarity and understanding between component commanders of their respective plans and strategies, the more effective is the command.

b. As planning transitions from deliberate to crisis action, these component-to-component relationships become even more important. The time and energy the JFLCC invests in these linkages makes component to component staff coordination all that more efficient and effective. **If it's important to the commander, it's important to the staff.**

> ***The commander must convey three governing ideas to each subordinate and to those not under command who support: the command mission, the commander's intent, and the concept of operations. What each should contain and where each should be in the operation order is the subject of discussion among writers of doctrine.***
>
> **LTG John H. Cushman, USA (Ret)**
> **Thoughts for Joint Commanders, 1993**

5. Key Tenets of Effective Senior Leader Communications and Commandership

a. FM 22-100 offers some time tested leader principles: "Be – Know – Do," characterized by a leader who has exceptional character and a strong value system and is highly capable--a "doer." This senior leader knows not only his/her business--the science piece--but also has full appreciation of the operating environment and that allows him/her to more effectively balance the science with the art. **In turn, the leader can very effectively influence others, operate large organizations effectively, and, very importantly, <u>continuously mentor and improve subordinates</u>**.

b. Senior leaders must take full advantage of every interaction with their subordinates. For example, a LCC typically is very large and, in many cases, "far-flung." In many instances, commander-subordinate interaction will be infrequent and the commander must leverage fully each of these opportunities to quickly establish respect, trust, and "team." Senior leadership also must have and demonstrate the ability to:

- Prepare organizations for the future.
- Select and develop future leaders.
- Understand importance of personal relationships.
- Impose will through guiding operational principles, clear intent, and presence.
- Deal with uncertainty.
- Stay personally and visibly involved.
- Anticipate second and third order effects.
- Demonstrate accountability and take responsibility.
- Recognize and accept the requirement to lead change.

c. The challenge for the JFLCC is to establish an environment that is challenging, and developing of subordinates, while concurrently working senior leader problem sets (interagency engagement, coalition development, and operation and campaign design). This puts a premium on the JFLCC's communications with subordinates. These communications must be cogent and concise and yet reflect the operational and strategic nature of the LCC's "work." The ability to develop clear guidance for the staff and subordinates on the one hand while retaining the longer term operational to strategic dimension of the headquarters' mission "set" is not easy. **Operationally, the JFLCC must know when to make a decision, i.e., when the time is right, even as staff and subordinates will be pressing for direction and clarification.**

d. One of the most difficult things we have to do in war is to recognize the moment for making a decision. Information comes in degrees. Shall we make a decision now or shall we wait a little longer? **It is usually more difficult to determine the moment for making a decision than it is to formulate the decision itself.**

e. Compounding the challenge is the natural but often friction-creating tardiness on the part of the next higher headquarters to issue a decision or guidance. The inelasticity associated with senior leader decision making makes commander's intent even more important. And, that intent must be crafted and issued in a fashion that is pointedly clear yet broad in scope and depth. **A common error for senior operational level leaders is to default to the tactical fight.** The staff will mirror the commander. **If the commander is consistently working the longer term shaping actions, the staff in turn will stay out of the close fight.**

6. Absolutes for Senior Leader Communications

a. **Provide vision clarity amidst ambiguity.** The uncertainty and complexity of the operational environment create natural friction and stress for large headquarters organizations. Competing demands for information, many of them offering different conclusions and the broad scope of the land component headquarters mission set, often put individuals and staffs, at worse, working at cross purposes, and, at best, working redundant actions. The commander must develop and issue guidance that simplifies and focuses the direction and effort of the headquarters and clarifies priorities (CCIRs). **The JFLCC should select out those key tasks that will have the greatest long-term and enduring effect and "wrap" commander guidance around those tasks.**

b. **Take the "long" view.** Think and act "long." Theater shaping activities are very long term in nature. Develop guidance and put into effect actions that require long lead time development. The nature of the current threat is generational. At the operational level, the combatant commander will be looking for recommendations that can affect the theater over the "long haul." **When the JFLCC looks and thinks "deep," the staff does also.**

c. **Continually demonstrate the worth of military judgment.** The JFLCC's scope of responsibility is far broader than any of his fellow components. It cuts across informational, diplomatic, and economic lines. Every military action results in a second and third order consequence. Military decision making at the operational level, particularly for the JFLCC, must weigh cause and effect across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic or "DIME" spectrum. **Carefully considered recommendations that are multi-dimensional in analysis and implementation can effectively shape strategic decision making.**

d. **Achieve strategic goals and make them stick.** At the operational level, the ground component has significant responsibility for what ultimately becomes strategic success or failure. To arrive at a strategic end state that is enduring in nature requires capabilities that can effectively address the complete depth of the campaign. The joint land force component always will be under pressure to do more with less. **Powerful and compelling thought and articulation is required to make sure the "enduring" condition set is achieved in a manner**

that capitalizes on operational level success. This success may well be very resource-intensive--be prepared to provide fully justified supporting rationale.

e. **Use coalitions to achieve strategic goals.** The broader the coalition, the greater is the likelihood of an enduring, and validated end state. The use of coalition forces more often than not is difficult, making more complex the entire mission set of the command as it affects every operational function. However, the inclusion of coalition partners in large numbers assures broader and greater international support for the campaign.

> ***Ulysses S. Grant wrote his own orders; they were masterpieces of clarity and directness. Commanders should consider doing the same with the key instructions for their subordinates: the statement of the command mission; the intent; the concept of operations; orders to primary subordinate units; and those coordinating instructions he wants to emphasize.***
>
> **LTG John H. Cushman, USA (Ret)**
> **Thoughts for Joint Commanders, 1993**

7. Measures of Success

An effective JFLCC, one that uses strategic communications to good effect and demonstrates solid operational level commandership, operates a LCC that uses information broadly and efficiently, has great retention, and has highly motivated soldiers and Marines. Individuals in the LCC understand both the mission and the intent, and they know where they fit in achieving mission success. The LCC enjoys a good reputation in the joint operational area and in Washington. **Effective senior leadership creates organizations that produce far more than the sum of their parts.**

8. Joint Land Component "Commandership" and Communications Checklist

- Has the JFLCC developed an understanding of the coalition environment?
- Has the JFLCC developed an understanding of the interagency environment?
- Has the JFLCC established a rapport with the key leaders within the combatant command?
- Has the JFLCC envisioned a plan for mentoring and improving LCC subordinate leaders?
- Does the JFLCC's guidance effectively "shape" and enable the LCC's key tasks?
- Has the JFLCC established strategic LCC goals? If so, have these goals been promulgated to the JFLCC staff and components?

- Has the LCC developed LCC measures of success? If so, have these measures been promulgated to the JFLCC staff and components?

CHAPTER 12

JOINT LAND PLANNING

"Plans are an important way for the JFLCC [joint force land component commander] to communicate with and unify the efforts of the joint land force. Planning complements and enhances joint land force C2 [command and control]. Joint land force operational planning links the tactical employment of land forces to campaign and strategic objectives through the achievement of operational goals."

JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*

1. Introduction--Scope and Responsibilities

a. **General**. Campaign planning provides a method for JFCs to achieve their **strategic** military objective. The campaign plan is the JFC's vision of accomplishing the **strategic objective** through a series of intermediate operational objectives. The language above, and the highlighted text in particular, serve to emphasize the scope of the JFLCC supporting plan--getting at and securing the "ultimate strategic objective" for the nation. The land component has the greatest role in securing that strategic objective, which is established by the national leadership, but often may not be clearly defined. The JFLCC's supporting plan must:

(1) Remain fully "nested" in the geographic combatant commander's operational construct and be thoroughly coordinated with, and supporting of, the other components but also must address those conditions on the ground that should be established, beyond major combat operations, to achieve the ultimate strategic objective. As the planning staff evolves to more "operational" planning, it must keep in mind the elements of the operational design process. The result of this process provides the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means of the overall campaign. For further details concerning operational design, refer to JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations*.

(2) Be developed in far greater depth because the JFLCC is responsible for achieving not only operational level military success but also operational level civil-military success. The JFLCC crafts a supporting ground operation plan to most effectively, and expediently, establish conditions for securing the strategic end state, which will significantly influence how operational objectives are accomplished.

(3) Clearly articulate how ground operations will be conducted, to include the support required by the other components. To execute ground operations requires more than an in-depth analysis of the disposition and strength of adversary (enemy) formations. Ground operations will be conducted in such a fashion to establish as much control as possible on the ground. That control is enabled by maneuver and the measured application of kinetic effects and the more substantial application of non-kinetic effects, using every resource available to the JFLCC

(multinational forces, interagency organizations, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and the media).

(4) **The JFLCC develops an operation plan or operation order that implements the concept of operations of the supported JFC's campaign plan as it affects the JFLCC's component forces**. Once the JFLCC acknowledges to the geographic combatant commander a clear understanding of that commander's intent, the JFLCC must move forward aggressively in developing a plan consistent with that intent, taking risk, where necessary, to refine a plan that addresses the complete depth of the operation.

b. **Organizing the Planning Effort**. JFLCC planners owe their commander a LCC plan that provides for the execution of combat operations in a manner that will optimize opportunity for strategic success beyond the predominately kinetic phase of the campaign. To do so requires the use of carefully analyzed planning assumptions, substantial horizontal and vertical staff coordination (formal and informal), to include coordination outside normal military channels, and realization on the part of the commander that **higher headquarters will not always have the answers to the hard questions, particularly as they relate to clearly defined strategic end states**. The planners should have considerable interface with their commander. The JFLCC must have the ability to continuously shape the planning effort, particularly in the early stages of plan development. The core of the planning team must include logistic, force protection, intelligence, and aviation expertise, as well as the traditional school-trained planners. The early work generally will be classified and compartmented with very limited access and these disciplines, particularly the logistic expertise, must be involved very early in the planning process. The plans shop must be sufficiently robust to support extended operation planning and subsequent campaign operations. **The planners are central to operational-level success--invest in them**.

2. Joint Force Land Component Planning Interface with Other Components--Essential for Success

a. **Working with Other Components**. Planners spend considerable time working with their fellow component planners. Ideally, they will have well developed personal as well as professional relationships as these relationships pay big dividends when things get difficult. The JFLCC should encourage the development of these working relationships and set an example by conducting routine coordination with the (C)JFACC, (C)JFSOCC, and (C)JFMCC, as appropriate.

b. Within the broader geographic combatant commander's operational construct, each component will develop a supporting plan. Comprehensive cross-component coordination assures that these supporting efforts are mutually supporting and well understood. Land component planners spend considerable time with the (C)JFACC and (C)JFSOCC planners sorting out fire control measures, forward boundaries, kill box procedures, restricted fire areas, and C2 relationships of SOF when in the (C)JFLCC's zone. Deployment planning and the allocation of lift are other areas where cross-component coordination is critical. There always is extreme competition for strategic lift, particularly airlift, and when planners have a better

understanding of each other's requirements and priorities, the allocation of this lift occurs more effectively (and with less conflict).

c. **Working with Multinational Partners**. Beyond coordination requirements with the components, planners must coordinate early plan development with multinational partners who will fight as part of the land component force. JFLCC planners also must work portions of the plan with non-US forces that are leaning toward participation but have not yet received their governments' approval. Again, it is here that relationships are key, both professional and personal. Strong relationships soften some of the friction associated with ground component planners not being free to share all information with all multinational members. **Ground planners must get a sense of what the employment parameters will be for multinational forces. Make no mistake--they will be different**. Remember, "north-to-south head nods" do not always equate to understanding. The sooner this can be discerned, the sooner the force list can be allocated against tasks, mission sets, and lift.

d. **Working with Interagency Planners**. Planners also will have to work with members of the interagency community. The extent of that coordination may be determined in large part by the geographic combatant command. Some higher headquarters will try to limit the amount of contact there is between the JFLCC planning staff and members of interagency organizations, more as a means to reduce the coordination requirements on the land component than to simply compartmentalize that coordination at the geographic combatant command level. However, given the significant amount of responsibility the land component has regarding the latter phases of the campaign, and the greater role of interagency organizations in that portion of the campaign, the **ground component is better served by involvement of interagency organizations early in plan development**. Importantly, the land component planning staff will have to rely on a number of informal coordination linkages; clear, formalized coordination lines into the broader interagency organizations have yet to fully mature.

e. **Working with Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations**. The final planning link is with nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations. This too may be withheld at the geographic combatant command level, but for the same reasons cited above, the ground component should work with these organizations as early as possible. The planners task is threefold; develop a degree of professional trust between nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations and the JFLCC, make sure these organizations understand the broad objectives of the land component, and, finally, develop an understanding and appreciation of what these organizations can be expected to contribute--what, when, and how. **These organizations can be powerful force multipliers during transition periods and during the latter phase of the campaign.** They generally are hypersensitive about maintaining their "neutrality" and independent status and may therefore be "difficult" with whom to deal. However, it is well worth the frustration and friction to develop linkages into these organizations early and to mature them throughout the planning process--**they will be on the scene whether we coordinate with them or not**. And again, they can accomplish things that can go a long way toward making the post hostilities part of the campaign a lot easier--things that the military cannot accomplish. **Remember, these organizations will be there long after the military departs.**

3. Organizing the Planning Effort

The campaign plan provides the concept of operations needed to synchronize and integrate the actions necessary to accomplish a strategic objective by accomplishing a series of intermediate objectives within a given time and space. As previously stated, the JFLCC prepares operation plans or operation orders that implement the concept of operations of the supported campaign plan as it affects his component forces.

a. **Plans to Execution.** Campaign planning and execution generally will be supported by three organizations.

(1) The plans office, whether it is the (C)J5 (Future Plans) or, if subordinated to the (C)J3, (C)J3 Plans, develops the campaign plan.

(2) As the command gets closer to execution, the (C)J5 hands the plan off to the (C)J35 (Future Operations) for execution (orders production, FRAGORDs) and actual execution is monitored by the (C)J3 in the command center.

(3) Regardless of how the command organizes its planning and execution effort, there are three functions that must be conducted; long range planning, short range planning (24 hours to 120 hours), and current operations.

(4) Although the (CJ3) is involved during the entire process, the commander may choose to maintain direct oversight over his long-range planners (campaign planners) to personally shape the plan and to free his (CJ3) to stay engaged in properly setting the theater.

(5) **However, the closer it gets to execution, the greater the CJ3's involvement as he will be the single releaser of orders (FRAGORDs), through the CJ35 shop, that transition the campaign plan from plan to action**.

b. **Future Plans. This section plans sequel operations through the (Coalition) Joint Planning Group ([C]JPG)/Operations Planning Group**. Future Plans develops the supporting component plan to the combatant commander's campaign plan, the ground campaign plan. As mentioned above, the campaign plan is developed in close coordination with a number of different organizations. The greater the coordination, vertical and horizontal, the greater the likelihood the plan will translate well in execution. The (C)JPG is the "planning forum" and synchronization center for the JFLCC planning effort. Synchronization occurs because all JFLCC staff sections and components are involved in the process. Additionally, representatives from other Service and functional components and multinational forces and interagency organizations are involved in the planning process. The core of the Future Plans office will work the plan when it still is "close-hold," minimizing others involvement. As such it is very important that the core of the Future Plans office be staffed with qualified individuals and the appropriate technical expertise. **Note**: The acronym (C)JPG will be used throughout the reminder of this chapter. What term the JFLCC uses is immaterial as long as the staff and



Figure 12-1. The C-35 (Future Ops)

components understand that the (C)JPG and Operations Planning Group perform the same functions at that level. **It should be recognized at times the planning group might be part of the J-3 (i.e., J-35--see Figure 12-1). This will require coordination between the J-3 and the J-5 to ensure there is not a duplication of effort or two sections working in opposite directions**.

c. **Future Operations.** This section conducts short range operational planning from 24 hours to 120 hours and, during execution, is the single office that produces the orders that direct operational level activity. This organization works directly for the (C)J3 and also must have the proper technical expertise as orders developed here will direct and affect every facet of the ground component's operation. **The battle hand-off between future plans and future operations must be considered a crucial point in campaign preparation and must have the commander's involvement.** This transition should be followed by the release of a directive that notifies all concerned of this change in responsibility.

d. **Current Operations.** The Command Center, run by the (C)J3, maintains visibility on the current fight. However, it is important that both the Future Plans office and the Future Operations office maintain a degree of situational awareness even as they work longer range

planning actions. The Future Plans office in particular must stay engaged in maturing plans that will support the very latest phases of the campaign and address the complexity and ambiguity associated with transition from military to civil control in a post-hostilities period.

> ***"At the end of the third inning we declared victory and said the game's over. It ain't over. It ain't going to be over in future wars. If we're talking about the future, we need to talk about not how you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you've got to look at this thing from start to finish. It's not a phased conflict; there isn't a fighting part and then another part. It is nine innings. And at the end of the game, somebody's going to declare victory. And whatever blood is poured onto the battlefield could be wasted if we don't follow it up with understanding what victory is."***
>
> **General Anthony Zinni**
> **US Marine Corps**
> **Naval Institute Forum 2003**

e. **Planning Focus**. One of the greatest contributions the commander can make for his staff is properly setting their planning and execution horizon. **The JFLCC's task is to properly shape the operational environment for the tactical actions of these subordinate formations**. At the operational level, the focus of the staff must start with and remain on the "deep fight," i.e., operating well beyond 96 hours. **This will require a much disciplined approach, far more readily achieved if the staff has been trained to think and act "deep"--stay out of the tactical fight.**

4. Forming the Planning Staff Section

a. The core staff of a land component command often is comprised primarily of the Service component commander's staff that has been designated as the joint force land component command. It should, however, reflect the overall composition of the land component command.

(1) **If the JFLCC is dual-hatted as both a Service and functional component commander,** the commander, through the chief of staff, must carefully delineate staff responsibilities relative to each major function. **The mission may make the provision of two separate staffs advisable**. This is a JFLCC decision.

(2) A plan should be established to incorporate multinational forces in the Planning Staff Section to include the equitable distribution of billets.

(a) Guidance on how to incorporate planning from members of multinational forces that may have to be located "outside the wire" must be provided.

(b) **A policy for release of classified information (information sharing) to multinational members of the Planning Staff Section requires an early JFLCC decision**.

(c) JFLCC direction should be provided to the Planning Staff Section on its use of non-English speaking members. Linguists may be of assistance but not necessarily the solution. Multinational members of the headquarters staff need to be able to communicate in the primary language of the land component command.

(3) **There will be a requirement to exchange Planning Staff Section liaison officers with other Service and functional commands' Planning Staff Sections**. A liaison officer exchange with the JFC's planning staff also would be appropriate. **Consider communications-electronics equipment requirements for liaison officers to conduct effective activities and to maintain a clear planning common operational picture**.

(4) **Determine early in the planning process the role of interagency organizations in the Planning Staff Section's organization**.

(5) During organization of the Planning Staff Section, **identify the interoperability requirements** to ensure connectivity not only between the Service and functional components' Planning Staff Sections but with multinational forces and interagency organizations as well.

b. **Establishment of Planning Staff Section's boards, centers, cells, groups, or other like organizations** (see paragraph 9 below).

(1) **The JFLCC or his representative approves** the establishment of all Planning Staff Section's boards, centers, cells, groups, or like organizations.

(2) The proponent of a Planning Staff Section board, center, cell, group, or other like organization provides an analysis of the requirement for these types of organizations, with rationale supporting a decision for or against establishing the organization to the JFLCC or his representative for approval.

(3) A logical group for the Planning Staff Section to establish is a (C)JPG to enhance the planning process. **The organization and functions of the (C)JPG should be determined by the JFLCC at the onset of land component command organization**. A "Red Cell" (see paragraph 9 below) is another organization that benefits the planning process.

5. Planning Considerations

a. Determine, in coordination with the geographic combatant commander, desired strategic end state conditions and use that as a start point for operational planning. This is a nontraditional approach as commanders and staff are trained to focus on the major combat phase of the operation. The desired end state should influence to a high degree how the major combat operations phase is planned and executed--not vice-versa.

b. **The JFLCC may be tasked to conduct Service planning as well as joint, interagency, and multinational planning**. If dual-hatted as a Service component commander **do not become "caught-up" with Service parochialism and Service-oriented issues that will impact on your ability to accomplish the land component command's mission**.

c. **The JFLCC sets the stage for all planning based on his vision of the operational area and the strategic end state**. This includes balancing the risk across the operational area and coordinating acceptable shared risk among the components. The latter is an important responsibility of the JFLCC and is facilitated by: a clear understanding of the geographic combatant commander's intent, close working relationships and a complete understanding of fellow component commanders' plans, and the JFLCC's ability to clearly articulate strategic end state objectives from the LCC perspective. The JFLCC, more than any other component commander, must visualize well beyond the major combat operations phase of the campaign and must ensure that the actions of the other component commanders focus on that visualization. The other component commanders may have more difficulty looking beyond the major combat phase, even though their actions will have considerable effect on the transition periods and beyond.

d. **JFC's planning guidance, intent, end state, and command relationships must be fully understood to ensure the JFLCC Planning Staff Section produces viable supporting plans and orders**.

e. The JFLCC's Planning Staff Section must grasp **the importance of understanding the strategic and political end states and how they impact on the mission of the land component command**.

f. **Rotation of Forces Planning**. The ground component should plan to retain responsibility for land operations well beyond the capitulation or defeat of the adversary (enemy) force. Further, the land component commander should retain full responsibility and authority for operations in the operational area until there is a secure and stable condition set. This does not preclude the rapid introduction of civil and other organizations to assist in the post hostilities transition and reconstruction activities but these organizations will not be under the control of the military authorities.

> ***In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it.***
>
> **Napoleon I**
> **Maxims of War, 1831**

6. Planning Priorities

The JFLCC's priorities reinforce the priorities of the geographic combatant commander, but also must reflect the responsibilities the JFLCC has for the broader joint and multinational force. **Properly setting the theater, joint, multinational, and interagency sustainment responsibilities and shaping operations that will facilitate a more effective transition to the desired strategic end state (information operations, strategic communications) will consume limited resources and, in many cases, cut across component lines**.

a. Determine the right force mix and carefully manage the deployment of that force to effect overlapping combat operations and transition to stability operations.

b. Supported by the component commanders, interagency organizations, multinational forces, components, the media, and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations as appropriate, develop and execute in coordination with the geographic combatant command an information operations/strategic communications effort designed to make the post-conflict transition period more effective.

c. Set the theater to support the joint and multinational force.

d. Determine operational planning principles that will guide the planning efforts of the staff. Consider these principles in the context of the complete depth of the campaign. If the operational objectives have not been identified, the JFLCC planners must derive the objectives and reach an agreement with the JFC's planners. An example from OIF follows as Figure 12-2.



Figure 12-2. CFLCC Operational Principles

7. Additional Planning Considerations

a. Expect the unexpected throughout the planning process–encourage the planners to remain flexible and discourage all from getting "wedded" to any particular plan or concept. In the planning process, it is important to remember that assumptions must be rapidly validated and become facts. If planning can continue without an assumption, it should be discarded.

b. As the command moves closer to execution, the land component will be tasked with additional responsibilities. Anticipate these late breaking requirements (e.g., additional force protection for other components, special tasks such as sensitive-site exploitation, sourcing/training new multinational members). The JFLCC needs to be kept advised on a daily basis of planning efforts, to include "roadblocks" and lack of guidance that could impact operations.

c. Justify and establish an operational reserve and carefully consider its force composition.

d. Carefully consider the requirement the land component will have for other component capabilities in the latter phases of the campaign. Make timely recommendations on the most appropriate command relationships that provide for their employment in support of the ground force.

e. Work "the seams" during the planning process, e.g., boundaries, ROE differences, and transition periods.

f. **Plan for campaign success, which is more than the successful execution of combat operations**–think post-conflict, transition, and termination.

g. Review lessons learned from other similar campaigns as part of the planning process.

h. Use a "Red Cell" to assist in mission analysis and wargaming courses of action.

i. Establish only those boards, centers, cells, and like organizations (See paragraph 9 below) that are required to accomplish the planning objectives.

j. Use joint and multinational doctrine to assist in the planning process.

k. **Provide to the JFLCC components and others only what is needed when preparing messages, orders, or other planning directives**. There is no requirement to duplicate the complete contents of orders from higher authority unless required for emphasis. Much of these contents can be referenced in JFLCC orders as long as the referenced material is readily available to all that need it–**higher authority orders should be retransmitted by the LCC only to the commands that require them**. Do not overlook the requirement to monitor subordinate planning efforts to "keep them in the right lane."

(1) This includes establishing firm timelines and milestones to make certain "time spent" equates to "quality output."

(2) The objective should be that LCC subordinate commands/organizations have sufficient time to plan and produce the necessary products required by the JFLCC.

(3) **The JFLCC needs to set conditions that lead to subordinate success from both planning and operations perspectives.**

l. **Ensure procedures exist for the integration of nonlethal weapons into operational mission planning**.

m. Seek out assistance in battle command training--get help at developing digital skills throughout the staff.

8. Suggested Planning Guidance to Land Component Planners

a. What do we know about the desired strategic end state?

b. What authority do we have to work outside the geographic combatant command--with interagency organizations, multinational forces, NGOs, and IGOs?

c. Are we going to develop a force list from an existing TPFDD or do we start from "scratch"?

d. What authority do I have for the development, approval, and dissemination of PSYOP products?

e. What can we count on for A/SPODs in the theater?

f. What do we know about the centers of gravity, the history, culture, and traditions of the people that will influence our effects determination analysis? What about the status of their infrastructure?

g. Make recommendations on when we should be the supported command and when we should be a supporting command. Be specific on limits to these relationships. **Note:** A higher headquarters directive often will delineate this support relationship.

h. We need clarity from higher headquarters on the division of labor for post-conflict responsibilities--between "we" and the geographic combatant command and "we" and civil authorities.

i. On whom can we count as multinational contributors, and do any come with particular employment constraints?

9. Boards, Centers, Cells, and Groups

a. The following is a synopsis of various boards, centers, cells, groups, or like organizations that the JFLCC Planning Staff Section may want to establish.

(1) **(Coalition) Joint Planning Group (also called Operations Planning Group).** A joint/coalition force planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the JFC.

(C)JPG membership should be a long-term assignment and members should be designated spokespersons for their respective sections or organizations. Responsibilities and authority of the (C)JPG are assigned by the JFC. Normally headed by the joint force chief planner, (C)JPG responsibilities may include, but are not limited to, crisis action planning (to include course of action development and refinement), coordination of joint force OPORD development, and planning for future operations (e.g., transition, termination, follow-on).

(2) **Red Cell.** This cell should work for the JFC and be led by a planner. This cell should include the best available regional or country-specific analysts. These analysts assemble a good estimate of the enemy's likely operational courses of action and what would be the outcome at the tactical level. The Red Cell conducts the mission analysis from the enemy's perspective to prepare for the wargaming process--it includes the following:

(a) Enemy strategic objectives.

(b) Theoretical enemy President/Secretary of Defense "mission statement" to subordinate operational commander(s).

(c) Enemy operational objectives/end state.

(d) Enemy courses of action.

(e) Tasks to subordinate units in sequence with likely friendly actions and counteractions. The result of this process is a "playbook" of enemy actions to be used during course of action analysis (wargaming).

(3) There are other JFLCC boards, centers, cells, groups, or like organizations that may require Planning Staff Section representation (e.g., ROE cell, JMC, CMOC). See the other chapters of this handbook for additional information on boards, centers, cells, groups, or like organizations. The JFLCC's battle rhythm also will provide guidance in this area.

b. The following are geographic combatant command groups that the JFLCC Planning Staff Section representatives probably would **attend either in person or via a collaborative information environment system**.

(1) **Planning Group.** This planning group may go by a number of titles (e.g., joint planning group, operations planning group) and functions in the same manner as the JFLCC (C)JPG but at the combatant command level. It is a group that the JFLCC (C)JPG would coordinate its planning effort through and work requests for information with to support the JFLCC planning process.

(2) **Joint Interagency Coordination Group.** The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet his requirements, the JIACG provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at

the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the National Security Council System.

(3) There are many boards, centers, cells, groups, or like organizations at the geographic combatant command level that may relate to some phase of the JFLCC planning process. Planning Staff Section attendance at all of these meeting probably would be impractical **but the geographic combatant command's daily battle rhythm must be scrutinized to ensure attendance at the ones that most readily will impact the JFLCC planning process and in turn support the geographic combatant commander's intent**.

10. References

The following references provide additional information and detailed guidance concerning joint planning.

a. CJCSM 3122 series

b. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*

c. JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*

d. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*

e. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*

f. FM 3-31/MCWP 3-40.7, *Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook (JFLCC)*

g. *Combatant Command Headquarters Master Training Guide*

11. Joint Land Planning Checklist

- **JFC Intent**: Does the JFLCC have a confirmed understanding of the geographic combatant commander's intent?

- **Commander's Trust and Confidence:** Does the Chief of Plans (J5 and J35) have a special trust/relationship with the commander that enables understanding of commander's intent, anticipating requirements, etc? Does he/she have access to all key meetings/VTCs?

- **Organization for Continuous Planning**: Has the JFLCC adequately structured and staffed LCC plans efforts with personnel of the right competencies and experience across the following areas:

  •• J5--major land planning, long term, in support of the campaign plan?

•• J35--future planning, intermediate term (3-30 days), focused on anticipating major requirements and positioning through strategic and intra-theater movement forces and resources for employment?

•• J33--current execution planning, responsible for daily FRAGORDs?

- **Dual Responsibilities**: If the JFLCC is dual-hatted as a Service component commander, have staff responsibilities been clearly delineated to accomplish both tasks? Would having two staffs prove to be more efficient and effective?

- **"Hand-Overs":** Has the JFLCC established an internal system to monitor what action has been taken on pending planning issues? How will plans be "handed off" between J5–J35–J33, and will members of the planning staff "move" with the plan through through execution?

- **Battle Rhythm**: Has the JFLCC established a battle rhythm with LCC planners to assure proper influence of their work? Is the planning rhythm synchronized with that of other components?

- **Key Considerations**: Has the JFLCC encouraged LCC planners to do the following?

•• Develop working relationships with other component command planners and establish linkages into interagency organizations.

•• Not get too "wedded" to a plan--remain flexible and expect change.

•• Use planning factors as a guide, not a constraint.

•• Put "markers" down for early airlift requirements.

•• Ensure the plan is written for the consumer (subordinate units).

•• Use a red team approach, to ensure in-depth analysis of action--reaction--counteraction among enemy--friendly--neutral elements throughout the plan.

•• Once the order is assembled (with all supporting annexes), develop a review process/board among senior leaders to ensure cohesions and synchronization within the order, and eliminate duplication of information.

- **Operational Planning Must Focus Beyond Military Only:** Since the LCC most likely will be assigned a lead effort in the stability and reconstruction phase of the campaign, is the JFLCC familiar with all current/emerging policy guidance and restraints? Have planners analyzed in depth the effects desired by the JFC, conditions at transition, and tasks required in each of the following areas:

- Political
- Military
- Economic
- Social/Cultural
- Infrastructure (of the area coming under LCC control/responsibility)
- Information

- **Plan the Final Phase First**: Has the JFLCC provided guidance to his staff to commence post-conflict, transition, or termination planning prior to the onset of operations? Does the planning staff understand the importance of focusing on the "back end" of the operation because it drives the planning for the "front end" of the operation?

- **Multinational Operations:** What arrangements, liaison and staff augmentations have been made to ensure participation of multinational forces in the planning process?

  - How does the JFLCC ensure participation with multinational forces across all phases of the campaign?

  - What are the capabilities and employment restraints/constraints (national and military) of each force?

  - What is the information sharing policy as it relates to planning multinational operations?

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CHAPTER 13

JOINT LAND TRAINING

Battle staffs from joint headquarters, component headquarters, and Service tactical headquarters will train and rehearse using real-world command and control systems, with tactical forces represented with extensive simulation support.

DOD Training Transformation Implementation Plan

1. Introduction

a. Because the JFLCC will most likely be established under the pressures and constraints of crisis action, it will be essential for LCC subordinate commanders to rapidly develop and implement plans that prepare the newly formed joint land headquarters for future operations. Similarly, the JFLCC must ensure units falling under its command not only meet essential units and equipment preparation standards, but also are trained on how they integrate into the LCC's operational systems, processes, etc. **Throughout, training is a continuing process for personnel, units, and the staffs as the joint land team is assembled.** Service forces are responsible for individual and unit training, but integration training is the role of the JFLCC. In addition, training should integrate multinational forces and nonmilitary organizations (e.g., interagency organizations) associated with the operation as early as possible.

b. **The basis for mission focused training will be the JFC's establishing directive that specifies the JFLCC's missions, roles, and responsibilities.** The JFLCC is then responsible to the establishing authority for analyzing these tasks and planning/executing necessary joint training of provided forces. The **focus of this training must be on the essential tasks required to operate effectively as part of the joint land team and those essential to operate effectively with other components/multinational forces.**

(1) **The JFLCC can establish a functional and integrated LCC headquarters through a defined training program that ensures all augmentees from assigned or attached forces are prepared to be effectively employed as one team.** When possible, the JFLCC should establish a predeployment joint training program to include all elements of the future LCC. Early communication and transfer of SOPs, standards, mission essential task lists or METLs, etc., are key for future units to prepare for integration into the LCC.

(2) The JFLCC headquarters will be formed around an existing headquarters with and established procedures, and made joint through assignment of personnel from the supporting force. Therefore, training must focus on accepting and integrating new personnel to ensure they understand these established procedures.

(3) Equally important will be for the JFLCC's chief of staff or J3 to conduct an accurate assessment of the new tasks and processes that the staff must understand to operate under the boards, processes and systems of their higher JFC. Key systems for integration training are as follow:

- Intelligence support request and allocation; analysis and fusion processes
- Strategic and intratheater movement request and tracking
- Effects development, targeting and execution boards and processes
- Sustainment
- Communications and Computer processes for effective information sharing, to include reporting, information reporting/posting requirements, data/reports to websites and common operational picture maintenance.
- Battlestaff rhythm and management
- Force protection assessment, vulnerability tracking, and reaction to incidents
- Plans and orders production processes

(4) **Establishing Standards for Integration.** The LCC also must ensure forces arriving in the operational area are fully prepared for synchronized joint employment. It is the responsibility of the JFLCC commander to establish the minimum acceptable standards that arriving units must meet in the RSOI process before the commander considers them fully "integrated" and prepared for employment. Unit training areas include the following:

- Regionally specific individual military skills (sanitation, medical, ethnic, environmental/terrain)
- Unit training based on projected operations, environment and terrain, to include major systems verification (weapons testing, communications, etc), helicopter environmental training (to include night vision goggles or NVGs), mission rehearsals, etc.
- Understanding and operating with HN forces/agencies, MNF, and nonmilitary organizations (when applicable)
- Interagency training, with a particular emphasis on understanding the cultures/capabilities of the governmental and nongovernmental agencies expected to be part of the mission, and how best to communicate with and operate/integrate these agencies with LCC operations

- Effective relations with locals, to include customs, culture, language phrases, religious practices, political situation, and historical background of the host nation and population of the projected operational area

- Most current enemy capabilities and tendencies

- Effective communications/interaction with the news media

- Situational awareness

- ROE (to include CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*)

- Communications exercises, to include all voice and data links with LCC headquarters

- Logistics/sustainment/transportation/medical evacuation exercises based on the projected mission

- Training on new equipment, information systems, etc., that are being implemented as combat multipliers; examples are upgrades to newer models of existing equipment, software upgrades, communications improvement packages, etc.

c. **Training Resources/Areas: The LCC will be the focal point for negotiation and establishment of training ranges, areas and facilities in the land AO.** The key initial task will be to negotiate with the HN for permission to train in country and use of established training areas (or designation/permission to utilize terrain for training). Additionally, the LCC will establish and educate arriving units on procedures for requesting and utilizing training resources. Key considerations include the following:

(1) The LCC must not assume the HN is familiar with the requirements and collateral effects (noise, rotor wash, extended ranges of weapons effects, etc.) of US training.

(2) Coordination must include both verbal and onsite coordination **with the agencies and individuals with the authority to grant the use** of the required areas. If at all possible, obtain this permission in writing, with a supporting map/diagram of the areas granted for use.

(3) The JFLCC should establish effective control measures to limit hazards/cleanup of dud-producing munitions and protect unfamiliar populace against injury.

(4) The JFLCC should establish LCC procedures for requesting and scheduling ranges, ammunition deliveries, and training areas.

(5) **The JFLCC must anticipate the post operational period, planning for cleanup and transfer back to the HN.** Use of training areas should facilitate expeditious return.

d. Sustained operations and casualties will require personnel rotations and replacements. **Commanders must make continuous individual, staff section, and unit sustainment training a priority during operations to gain/reinforce lessons learned and to maintain staff competency in the face of personnel turnover.**

2. Joint National Training Capability and US Joint Forces Command Support

a. The unique challenge for the JFLCC is to train the headquarters staff to successfully function at the joint level with joint force commanders' staffs, as well as provide the core C2 functions to support the ground fight. USC Title 10 Service training provides the venue for tactical units to practice both Service-specific and joint training tasks. There are numerous resources available to the JFLCC that support training the land component command headquarters staff. One such capability is available through US Joint Forces Command (USFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC). The Joint National Training Capability (**JNTC**) **provides command staffs and units with an integrated live, virtual, and constructive training environment that includes the correct joint context and allows global training and mission rehearsal.**

b. **The JFLCC can leverage this capability to conduct required training in preparation for employment.** The JNTC can be particularly useful during pre-deployment and pre-operational phases by allowing the JFLCC to train with subordinate Service headquarters and rehearse mission specific joint tactical tasks by eliminating the need to physically collocate the training audience. This capability can also replicate the vertical and horizontal linkages required to train with other functional components and higher headquarters. JNTC also provides the capability to train on key joint interoperability tasks at or below the functional component level. **Service component commanders that are potential JFLCC candidates can leverage the extensive support available from USJFCOM by ensuring that their staffs are familiar with the joint training system and the additional opportunities offered by the JNTC.**

3. Joint Training Policy

a. **Service component commanders are responsible for the joint training of their commands when designated as ~~a~~ JFLCC.** Policy for joint training is contained in CJCSM 3500.01B, *Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States*. The Joint Training System (JTS) is designed to assist the combatant commands, Service components, and other joint organizations and provides detailed guidance on training roles and responsibilities for a joint staff, combatant commanders, and the Services.

b. Joint land training is a shared and not a Service-specific responsibility. Figure 13-1 depicts the area of shared training responsibility between the joint force trainer (USJFCOM), the Services, and the functional component commanders.



Figure 13-1. Training Responsibilities

c. As a component of a command under a JFC, the JFLCC must consider the joint mission-essential task list of the joint force commander when developing the training requirements of the land component command headquarters and forces. **The JFLCC normally will concentrate on training Categories 1-4 (Category 1 Service Training, Category 2 Interoperability Training, Category 3 Joint Tactical Training, and Category 4 US/Multinational Interoperability Training).** Figure 13-2 depicts the JTS cycle that is discussed in detail in CJCSM 3500.01B.



Figure 13-2. Joint Training System

d. **When developing the training plan for the land component command headquarters, the JFLCC can use a combination of academic instruction and training exercises**.

(1) **Academic training** provides the commander the flexibility to train small to large audiences in specific subjects that meet the needs of the training requirements and optimize the use of scarce resources. Internal command resources, Service assets (the Army's Battle Command Training Program or BCTP and the Marine Corps' Marine Air-Ground Task Force [MAGTF] Staff Training Program or MSTP teams), or USJFCOM deployable training teams can conduct academic events.

(2) **Exercises** provide training opportunities across a broad spectrum of training audiences simultaneously or focus on a specific staff element. With distance/networked training technology, it is possible to link staff and command elements together for essential preparations/rehearsals with minimal time/travel impact. These resources also are readily tailorable to the specific mission set to create the necessary training environment for a staff element.

(3) **Initiatives such as the JNTC allow the JFLCC to set up a training plan that can link to other joint force commands to realize the added valued of command participation in worldwide events, take advantage of multiple training opportunities, and provide a more realistic training environment that more accurately reflects the actual operational environment.**

4. Individual Joint Education

a. **The competency of the staff is a critical factor in executing the mission of the land component command headquarters.** Because the JFLCC headquarters most likely will be based on an existing Army or Marine Corps headquarters, their level of competency in joint operations must be assessed.

b. The personnel assigned are primarily Service-competent company/field grade officers that have not had exposure to the joint training environment. Current initiatives to deliver distance learning and interactive web-based media provide the tools to execute individual professional development in joint doctrine, operations, and training. For JFLCC headquarters under a joint task force, the USJFCOM JWFC provides multi-media offerings that cover the following areas:

- Inter-active Courseware:
  - JTF Fundamentals
  - JTF Master Training Guide Tutorial
  - Joint Training System Tutorial
  - Doctrine Networked Education and Training or DOCNET Web Site
- Video: Joint Operations Rehearsals

5. Considerations for Multinational Training

- Unique lethal/nonlethal capabilities
- Language capabilities, requirements for translation capability
- Cultural sensitivities with regard to social, religious, political differences
- Level of training and recent experience in similar operations or the current theater of operations
- Communications systems capabilities/interoperability; requirements for cross leveling communications equipment to establish connectivity.
- Information assurance and network defense to include security restrictions on release of classified information and ability to operate on Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System or CENTRIXS
- Operational restrictions imposed by the HN

- Sustainment issues such as common user logistics and contractor support

6. References

The following references provide additional information and detailed guidance concerning training:

- CJCSI 3500.01B, *Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States*
- CJCSM 3500.03A, *Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States*
- CJCSM 3500.05A, *Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*
- CJCSI 3500.02C, *Joint Training Master Plan 2002 for the Armed Forces of the United States*
- CJCSM 3500.04C, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*
- JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*
- *Training Transformation Implementation Plan*
- FM 3-93, *The Army in Theater Operations*

7. Joint Land Training Checklist

- **Tasks and Authorities:** What responsibilities does the LCC have to train and prepare both land, joint, multinational, and interagency elements for employment within the land AO?
- **In Theater Training:** What are the unique challenges and factors that arriving LCC forces must prepare for in theater vice home base/station?
- **Integration Training:** What are the key training tasks, based on the mission, to ensure that all newly arriving LCC forces are integrated and ready for employment?

CHAPTER 14

JOINT OPERATIONS EMERGING CONSTRUCTS

"... an increased awareness and appreciation for the fact that integrating the full spectrum of military efforts with all other instruments of national power is essential to the achievement of national objectives"

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
August 2005

1. Introduction

The Defense community continues to pursue capabilities that improve joint force advantages over the adversary. Initiatives can be grouped in two categories--those that improve hardware and software and those that focus on new or refined organizational structures, processes, and ideas that change the way commanders and planners think about planning and executing joint operations. This chapter intends to familiarize the JFLCC with the second category.

NOTE: These are initiatives that geographic combatant commands are implementing incrementally. Their maturity relative to materiel, doctrine, and training will increase over time. Constructs, such as an effects-based approach to joint operations, are continually changing as the joint community explores what does and does not work in experimentation, exercises, and actual operations.

2. Emerging Constructs

a. **The Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ-CE)** is a C2 initiative directed by the Secretary of Defense, designed by USJFCOM, and fielded in geographic combatant commands.

(1) This new organization is **a full-time, joint, C2 element within the combatant commander's staff**. The SJFHQ (CE)'s daily focus is warfighting readiness, and it is a fully integrated participant in the contingency and crisis-action plans and operations of the combatant commander's staff. It provides the combatant command with a full-time, trained, and equipped joint C2 capability specifically designed to enhance situational understanding within designated focus areas and increase C2 readiness to support contingency operations. The SJFHQ (CE) exploits new organizational and operational concepts and capabilities to enhance the command's peacetime planning efforts, accelerate the efficient formation of a joint task force HQ, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force. **It helps the combatant command staff prepare a detailed systems analysis of the operational environment as well as develop and assess effects that help achieve national and theater-strategic objectives.** The combatant commander can use the SJFHQ-CE to augment a Service HQ designated as the joint task force (JTF) HQ, to form the core of a JTF HQ, or as additional augmentation to combatant command

staff planning and intelligence functions when there is no subordinate JTF and the combatant commander functions as the JFC.

(2) Although they do not depend on this new staff element, t**he JFLCC and staff should collaborate routinely with the SJFHQ-CE to leverage its capabilities since it can help the JFLCC with developing land component effects.** The SJFHQ-CE also collaborates routinely with the combatant command's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), an important source of advice and information regarding how to access and use agency capabilities in the JFLCC's area of operations.

b. **The JIACG** provides the combatant commander with a multi-functional advisory element to facilitate information sharing, planning and coordination, and political-military synthesis across the interagency community for the commander and staff. A typical JIACG could connect to the various US ambassadors and their country teams as well as to agency operational planners in Washington. The JIACG's primary role is to bridge the gap between civilian agency and military campaign planning efforts for regional engagement and potential regional crises. **Considering the typical nature of the JFLCC's potential missions (particularly during transition and stability operations), the land component command likely will be the most involved of the joint force components in facilitating unity of interagency effort within the joint operational area. Therefore, the JFLCC and staff should collaborate routinely with the JIACG.** Information on the JIACG has been included in JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*.

c. **Collaboration Capabilities.** Commanders and staffs have always collaborated during planning and execution, using available tools to facilitate the decision-making process. **However, emerging collaboration capabilities will continue to improve the JFLCC's ability to plan and execute joint operations more rapidly and efficiently than before.** These capabilities are being fielded initially with the SJFHQ-CE. Incremental enhancements are scheduled for combatant command HQ and components and **should become increasingly available to the JFLCC**. Although the value of face-to-face interaction is undisputed, these capabilities and others will increase efficiency and situational awareness, decrease the time required to make many decisions, promote a common understanding of plans and orders, bring diverse and superior experience to bear, and enhance combat effectiveness during execution.

(1) Collaboration capabilities--such as emerging secure voice, data, and video capabilities; electronic mail; and other collaborative and decision-support tools--can affect all aspects of joint operations. **Collaborating with subordinates, a JFLCC can establish commander's intent throughout the land force components without the time delay and potential misinterpretation associated with traditional messages.** JFLCC HQ planners can develop potential courses of action with the joint force HQ and subordinate component planners, regardless of physical location. Commanders can participate in course of action analysis and select a course of action without the traditional sequential briefing process. The staff can post plans and orders on interactive web pages for immediate use by subordinate elements. **This interaction can significantly compress planning timelines.** Similar benefits apply during execution, when commanders, planners, and others can decide quickly on branches and sequels

to the campaign plan and on other time-critical actions to respond to changes in the situation. All of this occurs with improved understanding of commander's intent, objectives, desired effects, and required tasks.

(2) **When designated as the LCC, the commander should assess the HQ and subordinate components' collaborative capabilities and ensure that he, his staff, and components are proficient in using available collaboration tools.** NetMeeting™ and InfoWorkSpace™ or IWS are current examples of collaboration tools that enable collaboration with a number of participants regardless of their physical location. The standardization of collaboration tools is not yet achieved, but is an important ingredient for future joint and multinational operations.

d. **A systems perspective of the operational environment aids COG identification.**

(1) The **operational environment** is the air, land, sea, space, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, legal, and others), which are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding this environment has always included a perspective broader than just the adversary's military forces and other combat capabilities within the traditional battlespace. However, current and future strategic and operational requirements and types of operations can benefit by a more comprehensive view of all systems in this environment relevant to the mission and operation at hand.

(2) A **system** is a functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole. A systems view to understanding the operational environment considers more than just an adversary's military capabilities, order of battle, and tactics. Instead, it strives to provide a perspective of interrelated systems (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and others) that comprise the operational environment, relevant to a specific joint operation (**Figure 14-1**). A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of this perspective. Understanding these systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the JFLCC's knowledge of how individual actions on one element of a system can affect other interrelated system components. Among other benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources from which to gain indications and warning. It also helps intelligence analysts with COG analysis and planners with operational design by identifying nodes in each system, the links (relationships) between the nodes, critical factors, and potential decisive points. This allows planners to consider a broader set of options to focus limited resources, create desired effects, and achieve objectives.

(3) A systems perspective also supports the concept of achieving unified action in any operation by providing the JFC, JFLCC, and their staffs with a common frame of reference for planning with agencies that represent other instruments of national power. This systems view facilitates the JFLCC's collaboration with counterparts from other agencies and organizations to determine and coordinate necessary actions that are beyond the JFLCC's command authority.



Figure 14-1. The Interconnected Operational Environment

(4) The intelligence function helps JFLCCs and their staffs understand the increasingly complex and interconnected nature of the operational environment. As part of joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB), the J-2 is responsible for managing the analysis and development of products that provide a systems understanding of the operational environment, including COG analysis. This requires collaborative relationships not only with various intelligence organizations, but also with OGAs and nongovernmental centers of excellence.

(5) A systems perspective of the operational environment assists identification of adversary COGs. In combat operations, this involves knowing an adversary's physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses and how the adversary organizes, fights, and makes decisions. Moreover, the JFC, JFLCC, and their staffs must understand other operational environment systems and their interaction with the military system. Based on understanding strategic objectives, desired effects, and the joint force's mission, the J-2 analyzes the relevant systems in the operational environment. This analysis identifies a number of **nodes--**specific physical, functional, or behavioral entities of each system. Nodes can include people, facilities, individual systems, forces, information, and other components of the system. The analysis also attempts to identify **links--**the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. The analysis includes an assessment of the important capabilities and vulnerabilities of the system and its nodes. **A COG typically will not be a single node in the system, but will consist of a set of nodes and their respective links (relationships).** For example, **Figure 14-2** shows strategic and operational COGs, each consisting of a set of nodes and links. The operational COG resides in the military system in this example, while the strategic COG focuses in the political system but overlaps with the operational COG.



Figure 14-2. Identifying Centers of Gravity

(6) From a JIPB perspective, analysis of friendly and adversary COGs is a key step. In the JIPB process, intelligence analysts identify adversary COGs. The analysis is conducted after gaining an understanding of the various systems in the operational environment. The analysis addresses the adversary's leadership, fielded forces, resources, infrastructure, population, transportation systems, and internal and external relationships. The goal is to determine from which elements the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength (means), and the will to fight. The J-2 then attempts to determine if the tentative or candidate COGs truly are critical to the adversary's strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in the planning effort. After identifying friendly and adversary COGs, the JFLCC and staff must determine how to protect or attack them, respectively. **An analysis of the identified COGs in terms of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities is vital to this process.**

(7) Understanding the relationship among the COGs not only permits but also compels greater precision in thought and expression in operational design. Planners should analyze COGs within a framework of three **critical factors--**critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities--to aid in this understanding. **Critical capabilities** are those that are considered crucial enablers for a center of gravity to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary's assumed objective(s). **Critical requirements** are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a critical capability to become fully operational. **Critical requirements** are essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. **Critical vulnerabilities** are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient, or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results.

Collectively, the terms above are referred to as **critical factors**. In general, a JFLCC must possess sufficient operational reach and combat power to take advantage of an adversary's critical vulnerabilities. Similarly, the commander must protect friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of an adversary.

(8) The most effective method to analyze friendly and adversary COGs and their critical vulnerabilities is to visualize each COG's role/function relative to each of the various systems. For example, the leader of an adversary nation could be a strategic COG in the military and political systems as well as a decisive point or key node in the nation's social system. Planners also can visualize a COG as a system i.e., what are its elements, functions, and their relationships? What elements within this system protect, sustain, or integrate its various elements or components?

(9) Once a detailed systematic analysis is completed, the planners should then try to identify the critical factors within that system. For example, **Figure 14-3** expands the COGs in **Figure 14-2** to reveal the critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities of each COG.



Figure 14-3. Analyzing Critical Factors

(a) The JFC's J-2 has determined that the adversary's armored corps is the operational COG, and the strategic COG is comprised of the adversary's president, defense minister, the armored corps commander, and a coalition partner. At the operational level, the J-2's analysis determines that the IADS is a **critical capability** for the operational-level COG. The air defense system's **critical requirements** are its mobile launchers; a sufficient supply of missiles; its C2 capabilities; and its network of radars. Comparing these critical requirements to friendly force capabilities, the J-2 also determines that the air defense system's primary weakness is its radar network. Since active radar sites are especially vulnerable to high-speed

anti-radiation missiles against which Red forces have no effective counter, J-2 analysts deduce that the radar network constitutes a **critical vulnerability**. Planners can then devise methods of attack--both kinetic and nonkinetic--to destroy or neutralize this critical vulnerability. This indirect approach should ultimately open the armored corps to attack by air, or otherwise weaken it without having to attack it directly.

(b) The J-2 also advises the JFLCC that Country X--a neighboring country sympathetic to the adversary--has agreed to support the adversary with various military resources, as long as the conflict does not spread to Country X's territory. The J-2 believes Country X represents a **critical capability** for the strategic COG. Associated **critical requirements** are identified as: the military capabilities Country X is willing to provide the adversary; Country X's proximity to the adversary; well developed lines of communication; and the proclaimed neutral or sympathetic status of other regional countries. But Country X also maintains significant economic ties with the United States, which the J-2 reasons can be exploited as a **critical vulnerability** if the US can apply appropriate diplomatic and economic pressure.

e. **Using Effects in the Planning Process**

(1) Joint operation planning integrates military actions and capabilities with those of other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose in unified action to achieve the JFC's objectives. **The use of effects is fundamental to the planning effort and is reflected in the steps of the joint operation planning process (JOPP).** This approach connects strategic and operational objectives to tactical tasks by identifying desired and undesired effects within the operational environment. Combined with a systems perspective, planners can use an understanding of desired and undesired effects to promote unified action with multinational and other agency partners.

(2) As **Figure 14-4** reflects, the combatant commander plans joint operations based on analysis of national objectives and development of theater strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational desired effects. At the operational level, a subordinate JFC and JFLCC develop supporting plans, which can include objectives supported by measurable operational-level effects. Joint operation planning uses measurable effects to relate higher-level objectives and effects to component missions and tasks.

(3) Like "end state" and "objectives," emerging joint doctrine includes "effects" as an element of operational design. Chapter IV of the "final coordination" drafts of both JP

Figure 14-4. Effects and Command Echelons

3-0 (*Joint Operations*) and JP 5-0 (*Joint Operation Planning*) discuss operational art and elements of operational design.

(4) **An "effect" is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect**. An effect, in this context, represents **a necessary condition--a prerequisite for achieving its associated objective--**while an undesired effect could inhibit progress toward the same objective. For example, the President might make the following statement regarding impending military operations in Country X: ***I want a secure and stable government in country X before US forces depart***. During mission analysis, the combatant commander considers how to achieve this strategic objective, knowing that it likely will involve the efforts of other US agencies and multinational partners. The combatant commander designates the following **desired strategic effect** associated with the President's objective: ***Country X security forces maintain internal and border security.*** In consultation with the US ambassador to Country X, the ambassador states that successful national elections following the expected regime change are essential to a stable government. So, the combatant commander designates a second desired strategic effect: ***Country X's population votes in nation-wide elections.***

Objectives prescribe friendly goals.

Effects describe battlespace behavior in the operational environment—the ***conditions*** required to achieve an objective.

Tasks direct friendly action.

Effects are created to clarify and achieve objectives.

(5) In this example, these desired strategic effects are statements about the behavior of systems in Country X necessary for Country X have a secure and stable government. Creating these effects likely would not be sufficient alone to achieve the President's objective, so the combatant commander would establish other effects as required. **The full set of desired effects would represent the necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving the strategic objective**. The combatant commander also would establish effects related to other strategic objectives.

(6) During course pf action and concept of operations development, understanding desired and undesired effects can help planners refine mission statements and tasks of the joint force components. For example, the OPORD could task the JFLCC to ***Train and deploy Country X's security forces to conduct independent internal and border security operations for the elections.*** This task links back to the strategic effects and the President's stated objective.

(7) Strategic and operational effects focus on larger aspects of various systems, while tactical-level effects typically are associated with direct results of weapons employment. **At the tactical level**, an effect typically is the proximate, first-order consequence of an action--for example, the destruction of a target by precision-guided munitions--which usually is immediate and easily recognizable. These tactical actions also can result in **indirect effects--**delayed and/or displaced consequences associated with the action that caused the direct effect. Indirect effects often are less observable or recognizable than direct effects, particularly when they involve changes in an adversary's behavior. However, an indirect, displaced effect often is the one

desired, such as the destruction of a bridge (direct effect) to delay the adversary in crossing a river (indirect effect displaced in time).

(8) **At the operational and strategic levels**, it generally is more useful for planners to understand the **direct and indirect relationships between and within the systems of the operational environment** when considering whether **a direct or indirect approach** is the best way to attain a desired effect. Thinking in terms of direct/indirect approach and desired/undesired effects helps commanders and planners amplify the meaning of strategic and operational objectives, determine the best sequence of actions to accomplish them, and develop more precise assessment measures. Understanding the behavior of systems in the operational environment supports the use of effects in JOPP. The JFLCC helps guide initial systems analysis by describing strategic and operational objectives and desired/undesired effects as part of the commander's planning guidance. The commander and planners will refine these effects and devise other effects as required after a comprehensive systems analysis identifies one or more centers of gravity.

(9) The use of effects in planning helps commanders and planners use other elements of operational design more effectively by clarifying the relationships between COGs, lines of operations, decisive points, and termination criteria. The JFC and planners continue to develop and refine effects throughout JOPP planning steps. Monitoring progress toward attaining effects continues throughout execution.

f. **Assessing Progress Toward Attaining Effects**

(1) **Assessment** is used to measure progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are met and the desired end state is achieved.

(2) **The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decisions** throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. **The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process** by the commander's need for timely information to make decisions. The assessment process helps staffs by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of commander's critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a campaign, what the priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component commanders.

(3) In a general sense, the term "**assess**" can apply to a wide range of activities that determine the status of something, such as assessing the organization's readiness and morale, assessing the suitability of a site for occupation, and assessing risk and threats. More specifically, the assessment process helps the commander and staff decide what to measure and how to measure it **to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or**

achieving an objective. During planning and preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force's ability to execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the operational environment.

(4) Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g. combat assessment) and focuses on **effects assessment (EA)**, which measures strategic and operational effects that support strategic and operational objectives. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the desired end state. EA helps the JFC and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is "doing the right things" to achieve objectives, not just "doing things right." The JFC also can use EA to determine progress toward success in those operations for which tactical-level combat assessment ways, means, and measures do not apply.

(5) The assessment process uses **MOPs** and **MOEs** to determine progress of operations toward achieving objectives and in turn the desired end state. MOPs are closely associated with task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions like: "was the action taken, where the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?" **MOEs** are generally associated with measuring changes in the operational environment, adversary, or other areas. MOEs help answer questions like: "are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?" Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects. **Figure 14-5** provides a brief vignette with examples of MOEs.

SITUATION: Two regional countries are contesting ownership of a set of islands. Both state that they have long-standing historical basis for their claims. Both are relatively equal in military capability, and **Country X** has placed limited military forces on one of the islands. **Country Y** is threatening a military response. A war between the two countries would destabilize the region, which the President considers a threat to US vital interests. He has decided to intervene and has established several strategic objectives that contribute to the desired end state. Opposite is one **objective**, two sample **effects** related to Country X, and associated **MOEs**. **Figure 5** expands the example to include sample nodes, actions, and related measures of performance (MOPs).

Desired End State: Long-term peace and stability in the region.

US Objective: Countries X and Y resolve disputed islands issue peacefully.

Effect 1: Country X engages Country Y in diplomatic efforts to resolve crisis.

MOE: Level of inflammatory rhetoric.

MOE: Volume of diplomatic communiqués.

Effect 2: Country X withdraws military forces from the island.

MOE: Level of forces on the island.

Figure 14-5. Objectives, Effects, and Measures of Effectiveness

3. References

The information in this Chapter is consistent with the Final Coordination drafts of JP 3-0 and JP 5-0, both of which are under development as this handbook approaches signature. These two "keystone" publications are projected for approval and publication late in 3rd Qtr FY 06 or early 4th Qtr FY 06.

4. Joint Operations Emerging Constructs Checklist

- **Standing Joint Force Headquarters:** Where is the combatant command's SJFHQ-CE and what is the best way to establish and maintain contact with it?

- **Interagency Coordination:** Where is the combatant command's JIACG and what is the best way to establish and maintain contact with it?

- **Collaborative Planning and Execution:** What collaboration capabilities exist in the JFLCC HQ and subordinate commands? How does the JFLCC use them?

- **Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment:** How is the JFLCC's higher HQ developing and using the systems perspective? What are the appropriate JFC/JFLCC interfaces?

- **Effects in Joint Operation Planning:** How is the JFLCC's higher HQ developing and assessing effects? What are the appropriate JFC/JFLCC interfaces?

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ANNEX A

JFLCC OPERATIONAL TASKS BY FUNCTION/GROUP

This annex contains a compendium of overviews/guidance of JFLCC overarching operational tasks organized by function/group as practiced during some phases of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM and as provided as class materials at the Joint Force Land Component Commander Course at the US Army War College.

The overarching JFLCC operational tasks are presented as tabs to this annex as shown below:

- **Tab A:** Operational Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I)
- **Tab B:** Operational Fires (Effects)
- **Tab C:** Operational Intelligence
- **Tab D:** Operational Movement and Maneuver
- **Tab E:** Operational Protection
- **Tab F:** Operational Sustainment and Distribution

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TAB A TO ANNEX A

OPERATIONAL COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INFORMATION (C4I)

Operational Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information (C4I)

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTOL

To exercise authority and direction as a commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Provides operational guidance, direction, and vision to assigned forces.
Follows the theater strategy and links operational and tactical end states. Joint force commanders employ assigned single service, joint and multinational forces to accomplish assigned missions. When directed as a joint force commander, standup a joint task force to plan, direct, and coordinate operations. Joint force commanders may develop and execute policies, plans, and programs. They provide interoperable C4 systems support for joint operations. This task is applicable across the range of military operations, including military operations other than war.

FM 3-93 (2004)

The JFLCC provides standardized direction and guidance on C4 matters to the JFLCC subordinate commanders and any other communications supporting elements, as these matters affect the operational mission. The JFLCC establishes C4 responsibilities for units assigned, attached, and forces made available for tasking. The Service component commands have the overall responsibility for providing C4 [capabilities] to their own forces unless otherwise directed.

JP3.31 (2004)

CJFLCC: C4I Major Roles

Plan, synchronize, execute, and assess major land operations for the Combatant Commander that accomplish his Campaign Objectives.

- **Support national/strategic and CCDR/operational-level decision making and policy accomplishment** through timely reporting/information and media opns.

- **Develop the major land plan** that accomplishes the JFC's operational and strategic objectives across all phases of the campaign**.**

- **Accept and integrate forces** from Army, Marine and Multinational forces into the land command; assess capabilities and provide for supplemental training/equipment

- **Synchronize land operations with other functional components** across the theater/JOA (JFACC, JFMCC, JFSOC), as well as with coalition commands, interagency elements, and international organizations

- **Establish theater signal and information management systems** that ensures continuous connectivity and effective information superiority across operational distances for all joint/coalition land forces; establish requirements and standards that ensure systems work together effectively and information is posted/readily accessible (includes tactical, operational, strategic interfaces for voice and data)

- **Work effectively with Host Nation, regional leaders/governments, and media** to preserve effective, positive and supportive relationships.

Operational Command and Control
C/JFLCC

- Establish a joint and coalition functional land headquarters that can:
  - Command and Control all Land Forces assigned, attached or OPCON
  - Assess operational situation on land for the JFC, to include host nation, coalition, and cultural factors
  - Prepare plans and orders, to include the Joint Land Operations Plan that supports the JFC's Campaign
  - Coordinate and integrate joint/multinational and interagency support
- Deployment - Assist JFC to synchronize the arrival, preparation and employment of all Land Forces under the JFLCC; suggest changes to the deployment sequence/plan.
- Acquire and communicate operational level information
- Develop a Strategic Communications Plan
- Coordinate and Execute Land Operations with other Functional Components (JFACC, JFMCC and JFSOCC), to include supported/supporting relationships to their operations
- Provide public affairs in the Joint Land Operations Area (JOA)
- Organize and control C4I capabilities support and integration among all elements of the C/JFLCC, to deployed forces across the theater, to include executive agent and ASOS responsibilities:
  - Integrate all joint/multinational forces into Theater Signal Architecture -- effectively tie together all elements of the JFLCC, to include voice, data and computer/internet comm's over operational distances
  - Ensure coalition information requirements are incorporated into LCC requirements.
  - Conduct Foreign Disclosure clearance ops
  - Information Systems: Establish standards, and provide System Administration/Oversight for Joint/Coalition Information Systems (to include intranet and internet
- Integrate space support into the joint and coalition operations

Operational Command and Control
Army Service Component/ARFOR

- Develop Army deliberate plans, consistent with CCDR direction
- Request Army forces (both combat and theater-enabling) required for land operations
- Command and Control all Army forces assigned, attached or OPCON; provide ADCON over all
- Synchronize the arrival, assessment, preparation and employment of all Army forces under the JFLCC
- Plan for, Request Forces for and Recommend Employment of Theater Signal Architecture
- Organize and control C4I capabilities and support to deployed forces across the theater, to include executive agent and ASOS responsibilities:
  - Theater communications architecture, to include voice, data and computer/internet communications
  - Integrate joint/multinational forces into Theater Signal Architecture
  - Provide and/or Integrate BASOPS Comms as Directed
  - Provide Oversight of Theater C4I Commercialization
- Information Systems: Establish standards, maintain oversight and provide System Administration/Oversight for Joint/Army/Coalition Information Systems
- Ensure system integration of comms and info systems
- Conduct joint communications training
- Integrate Space Support into the warfight

Operational Command and Control

Integrating Marine Forces (MARFOR):

Requirements:

- Staff Augmentation
- Integration into LCC battle rhythm
- Integrate the MAGTF C2 systems into the overall LCC C4I system and establish linkages with LCC global C2 systems. Common graphics and fire control measures
- Support LCC and JFC operation and exercise planning

Integration Challenges:

- Different communication architecture
- Integrating BCD and ACE
- Difference in operational level core capabilities
- Land force projection and sustainment differences
- Integration of MAW resources
- Training in LCC SOP's/battle rhythm/report
- BLUFORCE Tracker / Combat ID support

ASOS Required:

- Battle Command Systems
- Theater Signal Support
- Translator support (for HN and coalition)
- BLUFORCE Tracker / Combat ID support
- Space Support Team (Tactical-level support)

Operational Command and Control: Capabilities

Army Capabilities : UEy/JFLCC Hqs

Integrating Activities

Commander/DCG-O/DCG-S/CoS (C4I)
Operations Planning Group
Command Operations & Intelligence Center
Initiatives Group
Safety Boards
SGS
Joint Visitors Bureau

Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance

HUMINT/TFCICA
Joint Collection Management Board
Joint Intelligence Coordination Element

Op Maneuver, Fires & Effects, & Protection

Theater Requirements Cell
Effects Synchronization Board
Operational Protection Working Group

Sustainment, Distribution, & Strat/Opnal Movement

Joint Civil Military Engineering Board
Joint Facilities Utilization Board
Coalition Liaison Center
Contract Management Review Panel
Coalition Acquisition Review Board
Joint Logistics Board
Joint Distribution Board
Force Flow Fusion Center
Transportation Fusion Center

Theater Network Command

Theater Signal Command (with supporting theater brigades/battalions)

Army Space Task Force

Marine Requirements

MAGTAF Hqs - MEF or MEB

- Plan, establish, and maintain the C2 system necessary to conduct planning, decision, execution, and assessment cycles.
- Provide a C2 interface with the CJTF and JFLCC, as commanders, as well as other components, HQMC, and other forces.
- Integrate the MARFOR C2 system into the overall C2 warfare plan and establish linkages with global C2 systems.
- Identify threats and establishC2 protection measures.
- Adapt the C2 protection measures to meet changing threats.
- Adjust the C2 system as necessary to control redeployment.



Operational Command and Control: Commander Challenges

- **Clear Commander's Intent remains essential**–it anchors collective efforts in an increasingly complex, ambiguous, data-rich, and conflicting environment. Intent must address not only combat operations, but also what the commander envisions throughout the complete depth of the campaign.
- **Reality of "shared battlespace" on the ground increases the need for greater coordination among functional components**–effective, close integration of land, air, and special operations within a common AO are a significant force multiplier.
- **C4I connectivity and C2 agility (command and support relationships) are key**–the LCC must take the lead in integrating and synchronizing all systems as a baseline for a common operational picture. Battle command systems must be increasingly integrated into both training and operations. Digital skills for staff and leaders are absolutely essential.
- **"Transitions" must be completely woven into the campaign construct**–changing C2 relationships, force mix, increasing participation with LCC operations by and with coalition, interagency and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), all must focus on a common, clearly defined objective with supporting tasks.

Determining Task Organization & Force flow

- As units flow in setting and establishing the right C2 relationships—and adjust them when necessary
- Risk Management
  - (The 3 and the commander should always ask what am I worried about)
  - Key assets (EN Bridges)
- EAC, EAD assets—(ex. Aviation-Patriots, Log Units)
- Coalition Forces (Technology, Comm,)
- Set and review everyday
- Everyone works for a commander, not a staff officer

Inherent responsibilities are:	If relationship is:		
	COCOM	OPCON	TACON
Has command relationship with:	Gaining combatant commander; gaining service component commander	Gaining command	Gaining command
May be task organized by:	Gaining combatant commander; gaining service component commander	Gaining command	Parent unit
Receives logistic support from:	Gaining service component commander	Service component command; parent unit	Parent unit
Assigned position or AO by:	Gaining component commander	Gaining command	Gaining command
Provides liaison to:	As required by gaining component commander	As required by gaining command	As required by gaining command
Establishes and maintains communications with:	As required by gaining component commander	As required by gaining command	As required by gaining command & parent units
Has priorities established by:	Gaining component commander	Gaining command	Gaining command
Gaining unit can impose further command relationship/ authority of:	OPCON; TACON; direct support; mutual support; general support; close support	OPCON; TACON; direct support; mutual support; general support; close support	Direct support; mutual support; general support; close support

Figure 2-3. Joint Command Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities

OPERATIONAL COMMAND & CONTROL

(C)JFLCC

- ❑ OP 5.3 Prepare Plans and Orders
- ❑ OP 5.4 Command Subordinate Operational Forces
- ❑ OP 5.2 Assess Operational Situation
- ❑ OP 5.5 Establish, Organize and Operate a Joint Force Headquarters
- ❑ OP 5.1 Acquire and Communicate Operational Level Information and Maintain Status
- ❑ OP 5.7 Coordinate Integrate Joint/Multinational/Interagency Support
- ❑ Operate COIC
- ❑ Provide, Assess, Manage, Administer, & Maintain (C)JFLCC Data, Voice, VTC Network, & Websites
- ❑ Provide Joint/Coalition C4I Joint/ABCS System Integration/Configuration Management/Sustainment Training

ASCC

- ❑ Develop deliberate plans consistent with RCC OPLANs/CONPLANs
- ❑ Recommend employment of Theater Signal Architecture
- ❑ Accomplish assigned C^4I missions
  - ✓ Provide NETOPS and Protect Theater Signal Architecture
  - ✓ Plan/Budget/Maintain Joint/ABCS Systems Life Cycle Replacement Plan
  - ✓ Support Integration/Services into Theater Signal Architecture
  - ✓ Provide and/or Integrate BASOPS Comms as Directed
  - ✓ Provide Oversight of Theater C4I Commercialization
  - ✓ Provide Oversight & Validation of Resources for Theater Signal Architecture
  - ✓ Provide Sys Admin for Joint/Army/Coalition Information Systems
  - ✓ Maintain Operational & Functional Architectures for Joint/ Army/Coalition Info Systems
- ❑ Conduct joint communications training
- ❑ Support joint operation and exercise planning
- ❑ Provide Theater C^4I support to deployed forces & Joint/Combined

ARFOR

- ❑ Training in Army C^4I doctrine & TTPs

MARFOR/MAGTF

- ❑ Plan, establish, and maintain the C2 system necessary to conduct planning, decision, execution, and assessment cycles.
- ❑ Provide a C2 interface with the CJTF and JFLCC, as commanders, as well as other components, HQMC, and other forces.
- ❑ Integrate the MARFOR C2 system into the oberall C2 warfare plan and establ;ish linkages with global C2 sytems.
- ❑ Identify threats and establishC2 protection measures.
- ❑ Adspt the C2 protection measuresto meet changing threats.
- ❑ Adjust the C2 system as necessary to control redeployment.

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TAB B TO ANNEX A

OPERATIONAL FIRES (EFFECTS)

Operational Fires (Effects)

OPERATIONAL FIREPOWER (FIRES AND EFFECTS)

To employ lethal and nonlethal means to defeat enemy forces or to maintain freedom of movement. Operational firepower is, by its nature, primarily a joint/multinational task. Firepower refers to the delivery of all types of ordnance to include bombs, rockets, missiles, and artillery as well as other nonlethal means against enemy targets at operational depths.

FM 3-93

The JFLCC plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and executes fires and their effects in order to set the conditions for success on the battlefield. The JFLCC's focus is on shaping those adversary formations, functions, facilities and operations that could impact on the JFLCC area of operations.

JP3-31

CJFLCC: Major Roles

Fires and Effects: **Plan, synchronize, execute requirements for joint land effects – both kinetic and non-kinetic (IO) - with the JFACC and Combatant Command**

- Develop Effects Objectives for the Land AO which accomplish those set forth in the JFC's Operational Effects Tasking Order

- Single Land Commander that determines the joint fires and effects that support the joint and combined land force within the JFC's Combined Targeting Coordination Board/Process (CTCB)

- Requests, receives, employs and synchronizes all land-based joint fires and effects capabilities with other functional components (especially the CJFACC)

- Assesses effects of enemy actions on joint and coalition land forces, host nation military, government and population.

Operational Fire and Effects

CJFLCC

- Shapes for tactical and operational success - through attack on operational level targets by both lethal and non-lethal means
- Plans and Synchronizes operational level effects. As the single commander for land based fires and effects:
  - Establishes Joint force targeting guidance and priorities
  - Conducts Joint Land Force Targeting
  - Develops operational targets
  - Through a Joint Land Effects Board process, collect, prioritize and forward effects requirements for the LCC to the JFACC and CTCB.
  - Assess effects on CJFLCC operational targets
- Deploy, employ and synchronize **long-range land based fires** as joint fires
- Coordinates and employs Fire Support Coordination Measures and battlespace with other functional components
- Requests and provides Close Air Support (CAS) integration for surface forces
- Employs Psyop in the Joint Operating Area (JOA)
- Develops and executes operational Information Operations (IO) against enemy land forces and populations

Operational Fires and Effects

FM 3-93 (Draft) To employ lethal and nonlethal means to defeat enemy forces or to maintain freedom of movement. Operational firepower is, by its nature, primarily a joint/multinational task….

Army Service Component/ARFOR

- Develops requirements for, requests, and employs Army Theater Fires & Effects Forces
- Accomplish JFC assigned fires & effects missions
- Through the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), provides liaison, situational awareness and input into the targeting/engagement priorities of the CJFACC
- Coordinates employment of OPSEC measures and TTP
- Supports Strategic Communications objectives of the JFC
- Integrates PYSOPS and Information Operations into current operations utilizing forces from USACAPOC , 4th POG, CAC and 1st IOC(L) as required
- Maintain Special Technical Operations capability and interface with RCC
- Conducts joint fires & effects training
- Supports joint operation and exercise planning
- Conduct Theater Security Cooperation Activities

Operational Fires and Effects

FM 3-93 (Draft) To employ lethal and non-lethal means to defeat enemy forces or to maintain freedom of movement. Operational firepower is, by its nature, primarily a joint/multinational task….

Integrating Marine Fire and Effects Capability

Requirements:

- Integrate MAGTF liaison and connectivity to DOCC and FFCC
- Coordinate Marine ACE operations with Army Airspace command and control (A2C2)
- Link MAGTF fire support with DOCC/FFCC, collection management, BCD, AAMDC, special staff and J3 as situation dictates.
- Ensure MAGTF representation on JFLCC-level Targeting Coordination Board (TCB)
- Intergate MAGTF targeting prioroties, guidance, and selections into JFLC command taget lists and FSCMs.
- Determine and disseminate JLFC-wide TSTs
- Coordinate with JFACC to synchronize joint air operations to contribute to attainment of JFLCC objectives; deconflict use of ACE.
- Integrate both MAGTF ACE and GCE into Combat Assessment Board

Integration Challenges:

- Limited USMC long range indirect fire systems
- Limited indirect fire radar systems
- Cross Boundary Fires/Deconfliction - MLRS Support and MAW airstrikes
- BCD and MARLO integration
- BLUFORCE Tracker / Combat ID support
- Space Support Team (Tactical-level support) imagery support to MAGTF
- Dual-use potential of MAGTF ACE as interdiction and maneuver element

Operational Fires and Effects: Capabilities/Forces Required

Army Forces:

- Fires (ATACMS/MLRS)
- Atk Helo Regiment (AHR)
- BCD
- IO forces (Group)
- PSYOPS forces (Battalion)

CJFLCC Staff Capabilities (Theater focus):
Effects Development and Synchronization

- Effects Synchronization Board
- IO Working Group (within Effects Cell)
- Operations Planning Group (for overall effects synch with major land plan)
- Command Operations & Intelligence Center (dynamic requirements)
- Joint Collection Management Board (Effects Feedback)
- FSE

Marine Forces

- MAW or Air Combat Element
- GCE Arty (Arty Rgmt of MARDIV)
- MAGTF FSCC
- ANGLCO

Non-Military:

- **SOF**
- **OGA**
- **Interagency**


CJFACC
BCD3
Operational Fires & Effects
ESB1
CAB2
Joint Fires Branch
1. Effects Synchronization Board
2. Combat Assessment Board
3. Battlefield Coordination Detachment
Information Operations Branch
Assigned/Apportioned Forces Battlefield Coordination Detachment, LNOs/Planners, ACCE, MCCE, SOCCE, IA/OGA
Staff Fusion C2, C35, SOF, C7 SJA, , C9, & PAO
Dedicated manning in Maneuver & C4I Functions
(C)JFLCC Headquarters:
❑ Plan, coordinate and synchronize lethal and non-lethal effects
❑Conducts Daily Effects Synchronization Board, integrating kinetic and nonkinetic effects to accomplish LCC Objectives
❑ Develops and forwards to JFC for integration: High-payoff and High Value Targets and Time Sensitive Targets
❑ Establishes and maintains liaison and situational awarenesss with CJFACC
❑ Represents the Land Component at the JFC Combined Targeting Coordination Board
❑ Develop Measures of Effectiveness to assess execution of lethal and non-lethal effects efforts
❑ Conducts Daily Assessment for LCC Commander


Operational Effects
0700Z DAILY EFFECTS BOARD
JFLCC Staff Primaries
Receive 72 Hour Effects Guidance, 96 Hour Planning Guidance, and air apportionment approval from DCG. Pass operational guidance/intent to MSC's for next fight
EFFECTS FRAGO
• PRI
• EFST
• EIOT
• MSGS/THEMES
0430Z COMBAT ASSESSMENT BOARD
JFLCC Staff Officers
Combat Assessment of Effects Objectives from previous days flown ATO
DAILY EFFECTS BOARD
CBT ASSESSMENT BOARD
EFFECTS WORKING GROUP
TGT NOMS TO JFACC
TARGET DEVELOPMENT
CTL REVIEW
1500Z EFFECTS WORKING GROUP
JFLCC Staff Action Officers
Work 96-120 hr targeting guidance for JFLCC and issues/concerns for next DEB
2000Z Candidate Target List Review
JFLCC Staff Officers
Micro-level target validation of 72 Hour ATO target priorities, Restricted Target List and collateral damage assessment
1500Z COALITION TARGET COORDINATION BOARD
Component DCG's
Cdr, JFC issues effects guidance and intent (72-96 hours)
OIF CFLCC PROCESS

Operational Fires (Effects): Commander Challenges

- **The Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) and the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) are force multipliers** in JFACC/JFLCC synchronization, especially in a noncontiguous battlespace. The Air Force should consider codifying the ACCE; the Army should consider making the BCD commander a general officer.

- **Increasingly, the LCC must visualize end state objectives as he plans for and creates effects.** The challenge of balancing kinetic with nonkinetic effects, within the combatant commanders operational construct, will create natural friction with the other components. **The optimum mix of these effects creates control and the ability to more effectively secure enduring strategic success.** Information Operations are an integral part of shaping operations, not only during combat operations, but also as a necessary precursor to transition and follow-on stability operations. Throughout the campaign, the LCC must consider how IO can shape (in conjunction with kinetic operations) the perceptions of not only enemy leaders and formations but also the population and civilian leadership essential for "back-end" success in the campaign. This particular dimension may be the most effective tool commanders have in the war on terror—and it is not yet fully optimized.

- **Leaders need greater exposure to media figures in a training/seminar setting.** Tapping into these figures during informal, nonattribution sessions gave leaders a better sense of what media is looking for and how media can provide a more balanced and factual report—they can be a force multiplier.

- **Bottomline: Effects synchronization must become a routine, institutionalized approach/activity by the LCC, in every AOR. Land Commanders, as the lead for the Combatant Commander in setting conditions for long-term success on the ground and among the people, must clearly visualize, articulate, and ensure staff/subordinate understanding on the effects he desires and drive the effects process to accomplish the Combatant Commander's theater objectives.**

OPERATIONAL FIRES & EFFECTS

(C)JFLCC

- OP 3.1 Conduct Joint Force Targeting
- OP 3.2 Attack Operational Targets
- Develop High-payoff and High Value Targets and Prosecute TSTs
- Establish and maintain ABCS procedures and connectivity with higher and subordinate units
- Execute Daily targeting Board, serve as HQ proponent for CTCB
- Plan, coordinate and synchronize lethal and non-lethal effects
- Develop Measures of Effectiveness to assess execution of lethal and non-lethal effects efforts

ASCC

- Conduct Theater Security Cooperation Activities
- Recommend employment of Theater Fires & Effects Forces
- Accomplish assigned fires & effects missions
- Coordinate employment of OPSEC measures and TTP
- Integrate Information Operations into current operations
- Interface with Strategic Communications and provide MTTs/MPTs to subordinate units
- Maintain Special Technical Operations capability and interface with RCC
- Interface with USACAPOC , 4th POG, CAC and 1st IOC(L) as required
- Conduct joint fires & effects training
- Support joint operation and exercise planning

ARFOR

- Training in Army fires & effects doctrine & TTPs
- Monitor Force Mod and Integration efforts for all fires/effects units to include software upgrades and training proficiencies

MARFOR/MAGTF

- Participates in the development of CJTF and JFLCC campaign plans, supporting operations plans, contingency plans, and TPFDD planning (usually crisis action planning).
- Ensure that Marine Forces are adequately manned, equipped, and trained to support the theater campaign plans.
- Identify the type and amount of MARFOR necessary to provide capabilities (for both kinetic and nonkinetic effects).
- Ensure rrepresentation at applicable effects, targeting, and information operations boards, centers, and processes.

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TAB C TO ANNEX A

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

To produce the intelligence required to accomplish objectives within a joint operations area (JOA), to include planning and conducting subordinate campaigns and major operations. Operational intelligence includes determining when, where, and in what strength the enemy will stage and conduct campaigns and major operations. This task also includes providing intelligence support for friendly IO. Operational intelligence addresses the threat across the range of military operations including operations other than war. Operational surveillance and reconnaissance are included in this task. It also includes intelligence support to friendly nations and groups.

FM 3-93

The JFLCC defines intelligence responsibilities for the land component, prioritizes intelligence requirements of subordinate land forces, and provides representation for the land component and its subordinates at the JFC's daily joint targeting and coordination boards. The staff incorporates and synchronizes all ISR efforts, including human intelligence and counterintelligence efforts with the JFC's staff. The JFLCC is the JFC's focal point for adversary ground forces intelligence, target development, and combat assessment.

JP3.31

CJFLCC: Major Roles

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: **Develop requirements for, synchronize, execute collection, assess and disseminate intelligence across the LCC**

- **Receive requests for support, prioritize land requirements, and request/integrate support from national and theater-level capabilities** that support joint land-based forces, including space, signals, geo-spatial, human and special capabilities

- **Disseminate and ensure common intelligence picture** among joint and coalition forces and other components.

- Integrate and synchronize land intelligence with other functional components

- "Fight ISR" – target and dynamically retask collection assets at the points of decision to obtain the information required for decision superiority within the LCC

Operational Intelligence

CJFLCC

- Directly support theater strategic surveillance and reconnaissance requirements of the JFC
- Establish the theater intelligence, surveillance and reconnaisance (ISR) system and architecture that integrates collection, analysis and dissemination by:
  - Tactical units
  - theater land elements
  - host nation and coalition assets
  - National agencies
- "Fights" Land-focused ISR to support LCC Commander decision making - Plans and Synchronizes operational level ISR support to the LCC as a whole. As the single commander for land ISR:
  - Determines and Establishes collection priorities
  - Prepares Operational level Collection Plan to support LCC
  - Develops and forwards integrated collection requirements to the JFC
  - Tracks collection accomplishment and integrates results from multisource/multiagency collection
- Achieves a cohesive intelligence picture for the LCC; Shares and Synchronizes the LCC intelligence picture with other functional components
- Evaluates, clears and shares intelligence with coalition and host nation
- Term Fusion: analyzes broad, long-term areas (leadership, resources, infrastructure, etc) effecting LCC mission success.
- Deploy, employ and synchronize **land-based theater intelligence collection capabilities as** joint capabilities **in the Joint Land Operating Area (JLOA)**
- **Provides Effects Feedback to LCC** targeting process

Operational Intelligence

FM 3-93 (Draft) Chapter 2: To produce the intelligence required to accomplish objectives within a joint operations area (JOA), to include planning and conducting subordinate campaigns and major operations

Army Service Component/ARFOR

- **Recommend employment of intelligence capabilities**
  - Determine intelligence capability requirements and deployment prioritization
  - Determine these requirements in support of the joint, interagency, multinational force (JIM)
  - Consider the complete depth of the Campaign
- **Support the Generation of Force Intelligence Requirements**: Plan, Coordinate, Integrate, Synchronize, & Manage Theater Request for, deployment tracking and receipt of Intelligence Capabilities (RFF, RFE, ONS, TPFDD, etc.)
- **Intelligence Collection Plan:** Recommend a collection plan that completely integrates Army intelligence capability with other Service and interagency capabilities
  - Recommend the use of Army unique programs and capabilities (SAPs)
  - Consider the complete range of collection targets, enemy, institutions, government, history, culture, religion and infrastructure
- **Readiness and Training**: Recommend minimum training standards for intelligence forces and capabilities to the JFLCC
- **Support the Modernization and Integration** of Intelligence capabilities for the HQs, assigned units and all Army Intelligence units deployed in the AOR
- **Exercises/Preparation**: Coordinate and integrate Intelligence unique capabilities across the Components for exercise and training

Operational Intelligence

FM 3-93 (Draft) Chapter 3: "Produce the intelligence required to accomplish objectives within a joint operational area, to inlcude conducting subordinate campaigns and major operations …. Is information and knowledge about an adversary, obtained through observation, investigation, analysis or understanding…. Is also a component of information superiority."

Integrating Marine Force Intelligence Capability

Requirements:

- Establish clear linkage to CFLCC Hqs via intelligence architectures - train to one standard
- Develop and request additional capabilities to integrate force into LCC
- Recommend to LCC the optimization of MARFOR Intelligence capabilities
- Integrate Marine intelligence capabilities into the into LCC collection plan to accomplish assigned maneuver missions
- Conduct training and verification of combat readiness of arriving Marine Intelligence Forces and capabilities; report status to LCC
- Provide Staff Augmentation to CJ2/Intelligence staff
- Provide LNO Team to CJFLCC Hqs
- Provide interagency and HN coordination within assigned AO
- Support LCC and JFC operation and exercise planning
- Marine augmentation to LCC Staff in the CJ2

Integration Challenges:

- Integration into operational-level intelligence architecture requires augmentation – Trojan Spirit, imagery download, additional terminals/SIPR, etc
- Different TTPs/reporting practices
- Less robust staffing levels

Operational Intelligence Capabilities/Forces Required

Army Forces:

Theater Intelliegence Brigade

Special Analysis/Exploitation Capabilities: 75th XTF

CJFLCC Staff Capabilities (Theater focus):

- Support development of plans – deliberate, FUOPS, etc.
- Command support functions: SSO, Linguist request/coordination, Weather, Engineer/Topo assessment
- C2X Support
- Joint Analysis and Collection Element (JACE):
  - Fusion efforts on special interest areas (WMD threat, National Resources, Current Leadership, Future Leadership/Cultural Dynamics, etc)
  - Requirements Management: SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, and MASINT
- Counterintelligence
- Intell Sharing (Foreign Disclosure) with HN/Allies

Provide Augmentation/Reachback to National Agencies:

- CIA	- NSA
- NSA	- NGIC
- JAC	- DTRA
- NRO	- NGA

Marine Forces

Intelligence Bn, MHG
Radio Bn, MHG
Force Recon Co, MHG



Operational ISR: Commander Challenges

- **The operational-level intelligence assessment has grown in scope and complexity, far more than just IPB of the enemy's forces.** It must provide key information on the adversary's infrastructure, institutions, tribes (where appropriate), ethnic seams, culture, and history.
- **ISR resources will continue to be high demand and create natural friction between land and air components,** as each has requirements for timely and accurate effects feed back. However, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) articulated clearly by the commander are essential to applying limited assets against the right efforts.
- **"Shared intelligence" must become a fact–we will fight as a coalition** and must be willing to take some risk to get our multinational partners prudent but greater access. Liaisons with access to automated data bases are necessary and effective, but highly resource intensive.
- Availability and integration of national Capabilities is critical; LNO to LCC is key to optimizing timely and effective reachback (i.e. finding and retrieving key information in a timely/effective manner)
- **Effects Feedback: Getting at the accurate and timely assessment of BDA, a critical component of Combat Assessment, remains a challenge.** Given its importance to mission success, this requires better training (what ground formations look for and report) and improved doctrine (fixing components and technical platforms with clearly defined responsibilities and tasks).
- **Bottomline: Intelligence collection and dissemination must be continuous and rigorous and fully leverage Theater Security Cooperation activities. The complexity and scope of requirements will put increasing pressure on intelligence analysts to be fully capable of working at the operational and strategic level.**

Operational ISR: Insights (Continued)

- ISR must be "fought" actively – LCC must manuever assets, track accomplishment of tasks/requests forwarded to JFC controlled systems, and track status of efforts to collect effectively,
- The depth, breadth and complexity of information will quickly overcome the JFLCC; must establish clear priorities that focus analysis to derive the key information/facts required by the commander to make critical decisions. CCIR is the key – commander determined and focused on decision points
- The LCC must provide capabilities to Marine and coalition forces to access the breath and detail of intell/information available
- Web-based intelligence sites on the intratnet are critical to intell sharing; they allow subordinates and staff to rapidly acces required intell, and lighting reporting/coordination loads with JFC and national requestors.
- Effective relations with the CCJ2 and JFACC are critical to esuring ISR assets are focused on not only obtaining information on the enemy but also on assessing the effects desired by the LCC commander
- More is not always better – a myriad of national and theater assets are available but must be integrated into the overall intell structure/system in a phased, focused and effective manner to supply information required
- Collection and analysis don't provide an advantage unless they are linked to decision makers at all levels through effective dissemination capabilities
- Security measure and classification should protect you from intell falling into the hands of the enemy, but should not impede the flow of intell across the command to staff, tactical units and to coalition/multinational members of the LCC
- Collaboration across the broadest possible audience, particularly with national assets, produces the most holistic assessements.
- The tools chosen to communicate intelligence are important; they must fit the commander and his audiovsual needs for understanding and effectively processing information.
- Intell must know where it fits: between higher to lower, national down to tactical, and between components.
- Its not just history and current events – ISR efforts must focus on the enemy's lines of operations, and predict his decision points, critcal events, limitations and capabilities for action, etc
- Effects Feedback is an essential product of the ISR effort – must tell the LCC commander in a timely manner if he is hitting the mark or not



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TAB D TO ANNEX A

OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

Operational Movement and Maneuver

To dispose joint and/or multinational forces, conventional forces, and special operations forces (SOF) to impact the conduct of a campaign or major operation by either securing positional advantages before battle is joined or exploiting tactical success to achieve operational or strategic results. This activity includes moving or deploying land forces for operational advantage within a joint operations area and conducting maneuver to operational depths (for offensive or defensive purposes). It also includes enhancing the mobility of friendly forces and controlling battlespace on land, on and under sea, in air, or in space. Operational formations are actually composed of tactical forces moving to achieve operational or strategic operational forces.

FM 3-93

The JFLCC plans, controls, and coordinates land movement and maneuver to gain a positional advantage or a mobility differential over the adversary. The purpose is to achieve the objectives assigned in the theater or subordinate campaign plan. The objective for operational maneuver is usually to gain the positional advantage over an adversary center of gravity or decisive point.

JP3.31

CJFLCC: Major Roles

Plan, synchronize, execute joint land movement and maneuver over operational distances for major tactical units

- **Position, move and maneuver tactical forces** to gain positional advantage over the enemy and generate options for the JFC and other functional components to exploit.

- **Propose force flow** for land forces and theater enablers

- **Execute JRSOI** to build and position the joint land force for effective ops

- **Theater Enablers:** Ensure timely request, reception, movement, positioning, protection and employment of all to support the joint tactical fight

- **Deploy, prepare and employ theater mobility support** (theater engineers, bridging, etc)

- **Provide situational awareness and synchronize land movement** across the theater/JOA with other operations by other functional components (JFACC, JFMCC, JFSOC)

Operational Movement and Maneuver

CJFLCC

- ❑ Prepare the Joint Land Operational Plan, to include CONOPS, OPORDs, FRAGOS for Joint Land Ops
- ❑ Set the Theater:
  - ❑ Develop deployment plan for reception architectures/facilities, staging bases, assembly areas and battlespace that facilitates rapid force projection/build of joint and coalition force
  - ❑ Conduct Theater RSOI &T for joint and coalition forces
  - ❑ Ensure adequate Command and Control – everyone works for someone
- ❑ Conduct Operational Maneuver and Force Positioning for all assigned joint and coalition Land Forces
- ❑ Conduct Operational Movement to posture joint and coalition forces for effective employment, protection and sustainment of maneuver efforts over operational distances
- ❑ Coordinate and Synchronize with other Functional Component (special emphasis on JFACC and JFSOC) within the AOR
  - ❑ Supported/Supporting Relationships
  - ❑ Forward Boundary
  - ❑ FSCL placement/movement
  - ❑ JSOA's and SOF integration into LCC Battlespace
- ❑ Coordinate and Synchronize with Host Nation the positioning and movement of LCC forces
- ❑ IO's/IA: Control movements of international and interagency elements
- ❑ Execute Joint Theater Personnel Recovery Operations
- ❑ Transitions/Reliefs: estimate requirements, request and control forces transiting into and out of the Land AO.
- ❑ Redeployment Operations: plan, control and conduct "reverse" CJRSOI for exiting theater

Operational Movement and Maneuver

FM 3-93 (Draft) Chapter 2: "…is the disposition of joint or multinational forces, conventional forces and special operations forces to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation to achieve operational results."

Army Service Component/ARFOR

- ❑ Plan for, recommend employment of and control Army Forces to enable theater maneuver, including:
  - ❑ Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
  - ❑ Movement to posture and sustain tactical forces over operational distances
  - ❑ Assigned Maneuver to defeat enemy forces
- ❑ Generate Force Requirements: Plan, Coordinate, Integrate, Synchronize, & Manage Theater Request for, deployment tracking and receipt of Forces (RFF, RFE, ONS, TPFDD, etc.)
- ❑ Battlespace: allocate space and organize Army maneuver and theater enabling forces
- ❑ Readiness and Training: Assess arriving Army units in theater and conduct necessary in-theater/joint training
  - ❑ Plan, coordinate and execute the CDR's Training Program and Manage and Facilitate ODT and TMR Programs
  - ❑ Prep: Coordinate approval for Major Subordinate Wartrace Command's METLs and Annual Training Plans
- ❑ Coordinate Force Modernization and Integration Efforts for the HQs, assigned units and all Army units deployed in the AOR
- ❑ Exercises/Preparation: Support other components and JFC preparation, planning and exercises

Operational Movement and Maneuver

FM 3-93 (Draft) Chapter 2: "…is the disposition of joint or multinational forces, conventional forces and special operations forces to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation to achieve operational results."

Integrating Marine Forces (MARFOR):

Requirements:

- ❑ Tailor and deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) required by mission set.
- ❑ Download/configure/prepare MPF for employment – supplemental space/resources/life support
- ❑ Develop and request additional capabilities to integrate force into LCC
- ❑ Recommend to LCC the proper positioning and employment of MAGTF
- ❑ Integrate Marine maneuver forces into LCC maneuver plan to accomplish assigned maneuver missions
- ❑ Conduct training and verification of combat readiness of arriving Marine Forces; report status to LCC
- ❑ Provide LNO Team to CFLCC Hqs
- ❑ Provide interagency and HN coordination within assigned AO
- ❑ Support LCC and JFC operation and exercise planning
- ❑ Marine augmentation to LCC Staff: CJ3 and CJ 5

Integration Challenges:

- ❑ Long-Haul Transportation
- ❑ Theater/Long Range Communications (TACSAT)
- ❑ HET Support
- ❑ Ground transpo support for movement of troops from APOD to download/staging areas) MPSRON download – supplemental space/resources/life support
- ❑ Dedicated training areas/ranges
- ❑ Translator support (for HN and coalition)
- ❑ Training in LCC SOP's/battle rhythm/report req's
- ❑ BLUFORCE Tracker / Combat ID support
- ❑ Space Support Team (Tactical-level support)

Operational Movement and Maneuver: Capabilities/Forces Required

Army Forces:

Maneuver Forces: UEx (Corps/Division Equiv) (s)

Theater Opening Forces (RSOI Focus):

- RSOI C2 Headquarters (designate a subordinate Cmd?) to control process/track reception and onward movement
- C2 at critical nodes
- Air and Sea Port/Terminal Operations –
  - Management/space deconfliction
  - Download of equipment/pax
- Transportation – personnel and equipment linkup/handling/ movement from port to assembly areas
- Life Support (beddown, feeding, pers spt, etc)– ASG
- Personnel reception and tracking - AG
- Security Forces

Movement over Operational Distances:

- Long Haul Truck/Trans
- Theater Utility Lift Bde
- Movement Control
- Security Forces (for convoy/node security)

Marine Forces

Maneuver Forces (MEF / MEB)

MPF Arrival & Assembly

- Offload Preparation Party (onboard ship)
- Arrival and Assembly Operations Group (air/sea port)

Embarked Amphibious Forces

Potential ASOS:

- ❑ Long-Haul Transportation
- ❑ Theater Signal Support
- ❑ HET Support
- ❑ Ground Movement for Personnel during RSOI
- ❑ Additional resources/life support
- ❑ Dedicated training areas/ranges
- ❑ Translator support (for HN and coalition)
- ❑ BLUFORCE Tracker / Combat ID support
- ❑ Space Support Team (Tactical-level support)



(C)JFLCC

- ❑ Conduct Operational Movement
- ❑ Conduct Operational Maneuver and Force Positioning
- ❑ Conduct Theater CJRSOI and Redeployment Operations
- ❑ Prepare CONOPS, OPORDs, FRAGOS, and Plans
- ❑ Maintain CFLCC Deployable Command Posts
- ❑ Execute Joint Theater Personnel Recovery Operations
- ❑ Conduit with other Components within the AOR

Operational Movement and Maneuver: Insights from JFLCC Course Discussions

- Think operational maneuver to posture for generating tactical/situational advantages – staffs develop and apply operational solutions for tactical problems
- Force Flow must:
  - Meets JFC priorities/reqts as well as JFLCC Cdr's needs
  - Establish essential services/capabilities up front
  - Sequence of flow is critical:
    - C2, Protection,ISR, Sustainment, RSOI, Maneuver/Fires
    - Balance is key – too much of one vs not enough of others leads to reduced options/flexibility given the enemy's actions
  - Remain emotionally detached; be prepared for JFC and other components priorities to affect JFLCC flow
- Changing national strategic and political priorities (to include Ambassador's) will impact on deployment into theater (strategic) and restrictions within theater (operational movement)
- Think Flexibility and Options – Branches and sequels are not options but imperatives
- COG Assessment:
  - Understand the JFC's assessment of strategic COG and the policy factors influencing the assessment; take into account as you assess your operational COG
  - Reassess continuously -- changes in critical capabilities and vulnerabilities for each phase will drive changes in lines of operations and decisive points
- Operational Risk: Key question – "What will happen if my critical vulnerability is affected by weather or an enemy force?" (what is the worst thing that can happen and how will I react and take advantage of it?)

Insights from JFLCC Course Discussions

- **Understand/anticipate the tremendous impact of operational distances** the LCC AO on times for movement, employment, reporting, etc. - - much greater than you think . Know and understand time/distance factors.
- **Plan early for changing battlespace**, and how best to coordinate and synchronize changes with other components who also desire its use – don't think ownership, but supported – supporting and mutual use. This is especially key in amphibious operations.
- **Maneuver to advantage is a series of transitions** – military, governmental, with host nation, with populace coming under LCC control, etc; how best can the LCC prepare for and optimize?
- **Constant interface of tactical and operational leaders with situations of strategic importance** - - these should not be meeting engagements
- **Coalition:** Decide early how much of the plan will we share with the Host Nation and the Coalition; then maximize their capabilities
- **Maximize integration with other components** – how best to leverage as well as support them? Operational maneuver from the sea?
- **Key Operational question: will the maneuver advantage achieved (of gaining/denying/destroying, etc) accomplish policy objectives?**

Determining Task Organization & Force flow

- As units flow in setting and establishing the right C2 relationships—and adjust them when necessary
- Risk Management
  – (The 3 and the commander should always ask what am I worried about)
  – Key assets (EN Bridges)
- EAC, EAD assets—(ex. Aviation-Patriots, Log Units)
- Coalition Forces (Technology, Comm,)
- Set and review everyday
- Everyone works for a commander, not a staff officer

Inherent responsibilities are:	If relationship is:		
	COCOM	OPCON	TACON
Has command relationship with:	Gaining combatant commander; gaining service component commander	Gaining command	Gaining command
May be task organized by:	Gaining combatant commander; gaining service component commander	Gaining command	Parent unit
Receives logistic support from:	Gaining service component commander	Service component command; parent unit	Parent unit
Assigned position or AO by:	Gaining component commander	Gaining command	Gaining command
Provides liaison to:	As required by gaining component commander	As required by gaining command	As required by gaining command
Establishes and maintains communications with:	As required by gaining component commander	As required by gaining command	As required by gaining command & parent units
Has priorities established by:	Gaining component commander	Gaining command	Gaining command
Gaining unit can impose further command relationship/ authority of:	OPCON; TACON; direct support; mutual support; general support; close support	OPCON; TACON; direct support; mutual support; general support; close support	Direct support; mutual support; general support; close support

Figure 2-3. Joint Command Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities

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TAB E TO ANNEX A

OPERATIONAL PROTECTION

Operational Protection

To conserve the force's fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. This activity includes actions taken to counter the enemy's forces by making friendly forces (including operational formations, personnel, etc.), systems, and operational facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. This task includes protecting joint and multinational air, space, land, sea, and special operations forces; bases; A/SPODs and essential personnel; and LOCs from enemy operational maneuver and concentrated enemy air, space, ground, and sea attack; chemical and biological warfare; and terrorist attack. This task also pertains to protection of operational level forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations and groups in military operations other than war.

FM 3-93

The JFLCC will set appropriate threat conditions for his AO equal to or more restrictive than the JFC's baseline threat condition. The JFLCC may be designated as the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) by the JFC. As such, the JFLCC designated the JRAC will be responsible for coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area (JRA) in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. The JRAC is also responsible for ensuring that the surface area requirements and priorities for the JRA are integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are coordinated with the area air defense commander who is responsible for defending the airspace over the joint operational area.

JP3.31

CJFLCC: Major Roles

Protection: Plan, synchronize, execute, assess and allocate resources across the LCC to protect personnel, resources and capabilities against enemy attack.

- **Deploy and synchronize theater-level capabilities that protect joint and coalition land-based forces**, including air defense, chemical protection, route security (MP) and consequence management.

- **Coordinate with and support Host Nation efforts – "price of admission"**

- **Detainee Operations**, to include transportation, installation establishment/ operations, processing, interrogation and release

- **Sensitive Site Exploitation** (when WMD involved)

- **Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC):** as directed by the JFC, organize and synchronize protection across the theater among all joint and coalition elements based in the JFLCC AO.

Operational Protection

CJFLCC

- Establish a Protection System for the LCC that protects systems and capabilities in the JOA, to include operational forces, means and non-combatants:
  - Prevents or minimizes disruption of Support Operations.
  - Prevents or minimizes enemy interference with C4I
  - Protects Personnel and Facilities.
  - Protects use of electromagnetic spectrum and Info Systems in the JOA
  - Protects Joint Rear Area Lines of Communications across operational distances
  - Finds, Fixs, Contains and Defeats enemy incursions, to include terrorist attacks
  - Assesses and prioritizes improvements for bases, nodes and facilities
  - Removes/neutralizes operationally significant hazards
  - Controls effects of pollution and hazardous materials
  - Plans and executes Area Damage Control
- Provide operational-level air, space and missile defense; act as deputy to CJFACC as TAAMDC
- Coordinate efforts with with Host Nation Security/Police
- Conduct evacuation of non-combatants from the JOA
- Coordinate and conduct personnel recovery
- Conduct military deception in support of Campaign/Major Land Opns

Operational Protection

FM 3-93 (Draft) ….actions taken to counter the enemy's forces by making friendly forces (including operational formations, personnel, etc.), systems, and operational facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy.

Army Service Component/ARFOR

- Recommend employment of Army ADA, CBRNE, & MP forces
- Accomplish assigned force protection missions
  - Air defense of the AOR
  - Assess TIC and TIM hazard in AOR
  - Integrate countermine and UXO information across the AOR
  - Plan & execute the development of Facility FP Construction Plans
  - Conduct facility vulnerability assessments
- Army Support to Other Services (ASOS)/Executive Agency
  - EPW/Detainee Ops
  - Military Working Dog Program
  - DOD Customs pre-clearance inspection program
- Conduct joint force protection training
- Support joint operation and exercise planning
- Provide Theater operational protection support to deployed forces and Joint/Combined exercises
- Establish Theater FPCON & NBC THREATCON
- Provide policy and procedures on antiterrorism and force protection

Operational Protection: Capabilities/Forces Required

Army Forces:

Force ProtectionCapable Units

- UEx (Corps/Division Equiv) (s)
- MP CMD/Brigade (s)
- Theater Air and Missile Defense Commands (32dAAMDC)
- Patriot Bde (s)
- NBC Brigade
- Theater Engineers (Maneuver Enhancement Brigades)
- Contract Support (Constuction)
- Rear Operations Commands

CJFLCC Staff Capabilities (Theater focus): Plan for and Synchronization Protection (see next slide)

- Force Protection Capability
- MEB / MEU forces directed toward security of LOCs/bases in AO
- MAW (Air Operations Center AD integration
- RAOG: Rear Area Opns Group

Operational Protection

FM 3-93 (Draft) ….actions taken to counter the enemy's forces by making friendly forces (including operational formations, personnel, etc.), systems, and operational facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy.

Integrating Marine Forces (MARFOR):

Requirements:

- Representation on critical boards and cells (Force Protection Working Group)
- Integration of Ace into TAMD system, to include connectivity with early warning systems
- Employment of Ln Team to AAMDC, MARLO to JFACC
- Determination od DAADC and ensuring connectivity
- Fully integrate NBC defense , to include training to uniform standards, implementing the NBC Warning and reporting system, providing NBC intelligence, and deploying NBC recon and decontamination units.
- Ensure THREATCOM warnings are disseminated across MAGTF
- Integration of MAGTF with entirity of JFLC AT plan, to include threat analysis and reporting and OPSEC
- Verifying physical security measures on Army-MAGTF seams and boundaries.
- Integration of force protection measures into all phases of planning, training, and operations
- Devepoopling meet of intrgrated JFLC-wide Rear Area Security Plan under unified C2

Integration Challenges:

- Different AD/communications architectures – Early Warning Net Integration
- Insufficient Theater/Long Range Communications (TACSAT)
- Different TTPs/training practices/ Operational protection standards
- BHO line from CFMCC to CFLCC for force protection of Marine forces
- Inadequacy of Marine force protection equipment for large formations
- Translator support (for HN and coalition)
- Training in LCC SOP's/battle rhythm/report req's

ASOS Required:

- Army indirect fire capability and radars
- Military Police Support
- APO/SPOD security
- Additional forces for LOC/FOB/Convoy security
- Patriot Protection
- CBRNE Decon support
- Integration of tactical AD with TAAMD Network
- BLUFORCE Tracker / Combat ID support



Operational Protection: Commander Challenges

- **The complete scope and responsibilities associated with operational protection within the LCC and the joint force are not well understood**—it is an essential operational system wherein the LCC Commander must take the lead to establish and coordinate this effort among all joint, interagency and multinational elements operating within the AO. A board system, similar to those used to coordinate effects and sustainment, works well to bring together the right representatives to assess the battlespace and plan for and execute the Commander's priorities.

- **Early and continuous theater shaping operations can significantly enhance our force protection capabilities at intelligence collection, APOD/SPOD analysis, and infrastructure assessments.**

- **The LCC plays a lead role with the host nation, other regional states, and coalition partners in defining how force protection is planned, resourced, and executed.** The Joint Rear Area (JRA) determination by the Combatant Commander for the land component is critical. Increasingly noncontiguous battlespace poses new and difficult challenges in the "rear area," and it may be impractical to fix the land component alone with these responsibilities.

- **Coalition members** have different force protection capabilities and may operate under different ROE. These factors must be considered when assigning coalition formations roles and responsibilities.

- **The information domain will become increasingly vulnerable to threat attempts to collect against, degrade, or destroy friendly systems**—just as we become more reliant on these same systems. This entire area will require increased training at the leader and staff level and increased command emphasis on protection, particularly at the operational level.

- **Bottomline: Operational Force Protection will become increasingly challenging. It is also essential to acknowledge and plan for the command relationships and resource bill associated with meeting these joint, coalition and interagency requirements.**

OPERATIONAL PROTECTION

(C)JFLCC

- ❑ OP 6.1 Provide Operational Air, Space, and Missile Defense
- ❑ OP 6.2 Provide Protection For Operational Forces, Means, and Noncombatants
- ❑ OP 6.3 Protect Systems and Capabilities in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- ❑ OP 6.5 Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means
- ❑ OP 7.2 Coordinate active CBRNE Defense in JOA
- ❑ Develop & coordinate coalition air defense plan for the theater
- ❑ Conduct liaison with Host Nation Security/Police

ASCC

- ❑ Recommend employment of Army ADA, CBRNE, & MP forces
- ❑ Accomplish assigned force protection missions
  - ✓ Air defense of the AOR
  - ✓ Assess TIC and TIM hazard in AOR
  - ✓ Integrate countermine and UXO information across the AOR
  - ✓ Plan & execute the development of Facility FP Construction Plans
  - ✓ Conduct facility vulnerability assessments
- ❑ Army Support to Other Services (ASOS)/Executive Agency
  - ✓ EPW/Detainee Ops
  - ✓ Military Working Dog Program
  - ✓ DOD Customs pre-clearance inspection program
- ❑ Conduct joint force protection training
- ❑ Support joint operation and exercise planning
- ❑ Provide Theater operational protection support to deployed forces and Joint/Combined exercises
- ❑ Establish Theater FPCON & NBC THREATCON
- ❑ Provide policy and procedures on antiterrorism and force protection

ARFOR

- ❑ Training in Army ADA, CBRNE, & MP doctrine & TTPs
- ❑ Coordinate MP support to forward deployed Joint/Coalition units
- ❑ Receive and field force protection equipment

MARFOR/MAGTF

- ❑ Develop plans to protect key host nation economic and infrastructure assets.
- ❑ Maitain generla law & order, establish a civil defense effort, and protect government infrastructure.
- ❑ Participate in air defense of the JFLCC OA; interface with joint detectiona and warning systems.
- ❑ Consider and plan for active physical security measures.
- ❑ Link into the JFLCC rear area to coordinate and synchronize jojnt and component rear area operations.

Operational Protection

Based on OIF experience, the CFLCC accomplishes these tasks:

- Provide supervision of all operational protection functions for JLFCC;
- Provide TAMD for selected allies and critical strategic and operational assets IAW theater DAL; Ensure generation of combat power is protected from enemy air and missile threat.
- Defend maneuver forces and support offensive scheme of maneuver to maintain operational momentum without the effects of enemy air and missile threats.
- Operational Protection of the JFLCC JRA and critical JRSOI nodes from Level II/III threats;
- Support all facets of EPW operations;
- Provide for Law & Order.
- Conduct Recon, Decon, and Biodetection in support of Joint Rear Area and maneuver forces.
- Provide C2 for Site Survey Teams, and Mobile Exploitation Teams in support of JFLCC SSE Opns
- Integrate Host-Nation security forces and means.

OIF - OP Lessons Learned

- Non-contiguous battle space, geographically separated units, extended LOC's, and loosely defined rear areas – the new battlespace – are challenges to effective protection.
- JFC must clearly define the Joint Rear Area (JRA) and requirement, expectations and authorities for JFLCC
- Establish a Force Protection Working Group to determine/work critical issues for the OFPB.
- Detailed Rear Area IPB is essential to analyzing enemy objectives and determining friendly weaknesses.
- Host Nation security forces must be integrated; combat multiplier.
- Vulnerability Assessment Teams (VAT) are the eyes of the command – systemic assessment of weakness, identified SEAMS, identified areas for work/improvement
- Standardize FPCON System measures throughout theater.
- Coordination with other forces/services based inside the Land AO – service standards inside the wire, common standard outside the wire
- Learn from our coalition partners.

TAB F TO ANNEX A

OPERATIONAL SUSTAINMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

Operational Sustainment (and Distribution)

To provide logistics and personnel support activities required to sustain the force in campaigns and major operations within the joint operations area. At the theater/operational level, specific considerations include identification of operational requirements and establishment of priorities for the employment of the resources provided. This theater of operations/JOA sustaining base …. **links strategic sustainment to tactical CSS.** Operational support also pertain to support of US forces, other US government agencies, and forces of friendly countries or groups being supported by US forces, …. and includes **sustaining the tempo and the continuity of operations throughout a campaign or major operation.** This task includes obtaining sustainment support from **sources other than Military Services** and includes the following: host-nation support, logistic civil augmentation, DOD civilian support, and captured materiel.

FM 3-93

The JFLCC J-4 formulates and implements logistic plans within the AO for forces assigned or attached to the land force. The J-4 oversees the implementation of these plans by monitoring the logistic requirements of the components and performs analysis for logistical impacts on land operations.

JP3.31

CJFLCC: Major Roles

Sustainment: **synchronize the request, reception, transport and distribution of all materials/services to support the joint land force and joint force across the theater/JOA**

-**Coordinate and synchronize theater joint land movement**; integrate military, multinational and contract assets

- **Plan and establish theater facilities and infrastructure** to support theater and major land ops

- Negotiate, obtain, integrate and ensure **Host Nation Support**

- Integrate and synchronize **coalition logistics, and support to interagency/ international efforts**

❖ **Conduct sustained RSOI** for joint, follow-on, rotational and coalition forces.

(* Also listed under Movement/Maneuver)

Operational Sustainment and Distribution

CJFLCC

Coordinate Support for Forces in the Joint Operations Area

- Plan, develop requirements for and establish sustainment system and infrastructure for the theater, to include:
  - Command and Control relationships/facilities
  - Critical nodes and storage/staging bases
  - Facilities and Infrastructure
- Conduct Theater CJRSOI and Redeployment Operations
- Maintain Theater JPERSTAT
- Coordinate and conduct Joint Movement Control (Intra-theater Land)
- Establish Theater Distribution system that links strategic base to tactical requirements
- Coordinate and conduct general support/contract maintenance support for tactical forces
- Plan, organize and synchronize Joint/Combined AO Health Service Support
- Perform Budget and Resource Mangagement - Acquire, manage, and distribute funds
- Coordinate support to multinational and interagency (cross-svc agreements)
- Conduct contingency contracting and requirements review to prevent competition and duplication of efforts
- Coordinate Host Nation Assistance and Support
- Acquire, build and maintain sustainment bases/facilities that support the LCC and forces in the JOA; monitor JFC's Theater Contingency Construction priorities/status

Operational Sustainment and Distribution

FM 3-93 (Draft) To provide logistics and personnel support activities required to sustain the force in campaigns and major operations within the joint operations area. At the theater operational level, specific considerations include identification of operational requirements and establishment of priorities for the employment of the resources provided…..

Army Service Component/ARFOR

- Recommend employment of Theater Sustainment Forces
- Provide theater sustainment/distribution/movement to deployed forces & Joint/Combined exercises
- Replacement Requirements (Army) and Individual Augmentation Management/JMD
- Pers Policy/MWR/R&R and Pass Prgm/Postal Planning
- Provide Army Support to other Services, Common Item Support, and EA sustainment tasks
- Determine Funding Sources and Receive/Distribute Funding
- POL/MIL AOR Support (via FAOs)
- Plan, Program and Coordinate construction for force Bed down
- Administration and budget for Title X support for all Army Forces
- Conduct joint sustainment/distribution/movement training
- Support joint operation and exercise planning

Operational Sustainment and Distribution

FM 3-93 (Draft) Chapter 2: "…is the disposition of joint or multinational forces, conventional forces and special operations forces to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation to achieve operational results."

Integrating Marine Forces (MARFOR):

Requirements:

- ❑ Identify logistics requirements to the JFLCC
- ❑ Integrate the MLC (when established) into the TSC
- ❑ Prepare to contribute Marine lift to JFLCC logistics and sustainment operations
- ❑ provide Marine liaison and augmentation to key JFLCC HQs staff sections (CJ4 and CJ 1) and subordinate logistics formations (TSC, TRANSCOM, etc)
- ❑ Conduct fully integrated JRSOI activities
- ❑ Develop and request additional Marine logistics capabilities essential to LCC integration
- ❑ Recommend to LCC required logistics support to the Marine Forces
- ❑ Provide interagency and HN coordination within assigned AO for LCC Log Support
- ❑ Support LCC and JFC operation and exercise planning

Integration Challenges:

- ❑ Long-Haul Transportation - HET and Medium Truck Support, esp. movement from A/SPODs to staging areas
- ❑ Theater/long range communications to receive/pass logistics requirements connectivity
- ❑ Theater medical support/integration
- ❑ Coordinate facilities/resources/life support
- ❑ MPSRON offload – requirements for sea & air space/resources/life support
- ❑ Contract system integration (JARB)
- ❑ TPFDD management (separate Service planning)

Operational Sustainment: Forces Required

Army Forces (Theater Support Focus):

- Theater Sustainment C2 (TSC)
- Medical Command (Med Brigade)
- MP Brigade
- Contingency Contracting
- Theater Engineer Command (forces) and Corps of Engineers (COE) capability
- Movement Control
- Air and Sea Port/Terminal Operations
- Strategic and Intratheater Communications (to support reporting/requisitioning/distribution tracking)
- Transportation – military/contract/HN support for movement of personnel and equipment linkup/handling/ movement from port to foxhole
- Army Aviation Brigade (Theater)
- Life Support (beddown, feeding, pers spt, etc)– ASG
- Personnel reception, tracking and support – AG
- Finance support
- Mail delivery/support
- Security Forces (for facilities/convoy/nodes)

Marine Forces

- Marine Logistics Command (MLC) (when established)
- FSSG
- MPF Arrival & Assembly
  - Offload Preparation Party (onboard ship)
  - Arrival and Assembly Operations Group (air/sea port)



Operational Sustainment and Distribution: Commander Challenges

- **Reception operations support the entire force but must be centrally managed and controlled—no "free-lancing."** Directive Authority is required, and those arriving in theater must comply with the established procedures of the LCC—no "rolling your own."
- **Effective operational sustainment is independent, interdependent, and interoperable**—developed and executed throughout the depth and breadth of the LCC AO to ensure success for all elements.
- **Key to the above is getting an accurate estimate of requirements for the entire joint and coalition force as early as possible.** We must improve on the requirements determination across the services, and requirements determination must consider the complete depth of the campaign, to include transition and stability operations.
- **Operational sustainment must enable overlapping deployment and employment operations—**and the LCC must be aware that increases the natural tension and competition for lift. Make the case that the land component logistically supports the total force.
- **As in all other operational systems, clear Commander's Intent is critical to sustainment planning.** Knowing how and when operations will change is essential to anticipating and positioning critical assets, many with long request, transportation, and delivery lead times.
- **Bottomline: Campaign-level operational sustainment is an inherently joint function that requires greater joint training and integration—requirements determination is critical**

OPERATIONAL SUSTAINMENT

(C)JFLCC

- OP 4.4 Coordinate Support for Forces in the Joint Operations Area
- Conduct Theater CJRSOI and Redeployment Operations
- Maintain Theater JPERSTAT
- Organize, Plan Joint/Combined AOR Health Service Support
- Perform Budget Execution
- Assist Host Nation (HA) in Populace and Resource Control
- Monitor Theater Contingency Construction status, track and allocate critical supplies (JMPAB)

ASCC

- Recommend employment of Theater Sustainment Forces
- Accomplish assigned sustainment/distribution/movement missions
- Replacement Requirements (Army) and Individual Augmentation Management/JMD
- Pers Policy/MWR/R&R and Pass Prgm/Postal Planning
- Provide Army Support to other Services, Common Item Support, and EA sustainment tasks
- Determine Funding Sources and Receive/Distribute Funding
- POL/MIL AOR Support (via FAOs)
- Plan, Program and Coordinate construction for force Bed down
- Administration and budget for Title X support
- Conduct joint sustainment/distribution/movement training
- Support joint operation and exercise planning
- Provide theater sustainment/distribution/movement to deployed forces & Joint/Combined exercises

ARFOR

- Training in Army sustainment/distribution/movement doctrine & TTPs
- Personnel Actions/Congressional Inquiries/Strength Management
- Property Book Management for Army Materiel
- Army Troop Medical Clinic oversight
- Provide oversight of Theater Budget Development/Execution
- Plan, Program and Coordinate MILCON, Contingency and O&M construction
- Monitor and Execute Army AOR AIK Programs

MARFOR/MAGTF

- Be responsible for administrative support, quality of life, casualty replacement, decedent affairs, and replacement training.
- Identify and coordinate required USMC logistical support at the operational level.
- Organize logistic support throughout the communications zone.
- Develop agreements with other component commanders and participate in component & command level working groups.
- Conduct force sustainment planning and force reception planning.
- Refine USMC forces personnel, sustainment, transportation, and reception requirements.
- Obtain needed infrastructure support.
- During employment, concentrate on sustainment sourcing, intra-theater transportation asset allocation, facility and base development, host-nation support, and health services management.
- During redeployment, focus on reconstituting USMC forces.

ARMY EXECUTIVE AGENCY

- BEDDOWN SUPPORT -- COMPONENT COMMANDS
- MGMT OF OVERLAND PETROLEUM SUPPORT
- SINGLE MANAGER FOR CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION
- MGMT OF IN-THEATER SURFACE, SEALIFT & INLAND WATERWAY TRANSPORTATION
- SINGLE INTEGRATED MEDICAL LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
- MGMT OF EPW DETAINEE PROGRAM (CL I & IV)
- DOD VETERINARY SERVICES (SANITATION/FOOD)
- JOINT MORTUARY AFFAIRS

"SEEING THE RQMTS KEY"

JOINT, COALITION AND INTERAGENCY REQ'S--
VISUALIZING THINGS NOT YET CONSIDERED:
HOW DO YOU "SEE" THESE RQMTS??


Theater Sustainment Command
++
TSC
X
Theater Opening
• Force Reception and Distribution Operations
• Operates the Theater-Base Distribution Hub
• Operational Support and Sustainment
• Human Resources and Financial Management support
X
Theater Sust Bde (UEX/UEY)
• Configures, distributes and retrogrades supplies
• Stores bulk supplies for distro
• Provides Level II med care and med resupply on an area basis
• Field level & select sust level maint
• Financial management, procurement, and contracting support to bdes
• Provides Postal, Replacement Ops, Strength Mgmt support
X
Theater Dist
• Operates modes, nodes, convoy halt stops and distro centers
• Operates SSAs
• Movement control
• Executes Theater distribution
• Transports all classes of supply except Class IIIB from hub to the Sustainment Brigade or BSB
III
Theater Petroleum
• Operates Pipeline, Terminal Operating, and Petroleum Supply units
• Provides POL Inland distribution
• Operates petroleum labs
• Theater-wide GS level water supply
• Theater Water Quality Surveillance
I
HUMAN RES CENTER
• Primary human resources provider
• C2 of Human Resources support.
X
AL&T
• Provides interface with AMC for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
• Provide LOGCAP, Tech Reps, and contractor support
• Provides supervision for Contingency Contracting
III
Theater Aviation Maintenance
• Provides depot level Avn Maint in Theater
• Operates TAMP
III
EOD
• C2 of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) functions
• EOD Policy
• C2 for 2-6 EOD Bns
I
FIN MGT CENTER
• Financial management functions
• Banking and currency support
• Conducts EPW, CI, Local National pay support
• Limited pay support
• Tracks commitments and obligations


Objective Theater Engineer Structure
Multiple Bde(s) based on TAA ROA, and/or METT-TC scenarios
++
Theater Engineer Command
X
Engineer
• C2 of 3-7 Engineer Battalions
II
Prime Power
I
TOPO
Mine Expl Haz Ctr
Diving Dets
Real Estrate/ Th Const Mgt Teams
• Deployable Engineer Command and Control Headquarters in support to theater joint, interagency, and multi-national forces.
• Coordinates and develops OPLANs and OPORDs in support of UEY engineer requirements.
•Extension and reach-back to OCE to support the combatant commander.
• Operates the Army's portion of the Theater Construction and Real Estate Mgt in the AOR.
• C2 of 3-5 Engineer Brigades. Provides engineer support to UEx, MEF, or Multinational forces
• Executes Geospatial Services and products to JFLCC elements.


Modular Medical Support
UA
UEx
UEy
Tactical
Operational
Strategic-Theater
MED CO
FST
GND AMB
Air Ambulance
CAB Med Plt
MED BDE
MED BN
CSH
Evac
ASMC
MEDLOG
Head & Neck
Surveillance
Food Proc
Combat Stress
Dialysis
UEy Plugs
METT-TC
UEy Theater MEDCOM
Med BDE
MED BN
CSH
Evac
ASMC
MEDLOG
Dental
HHD Vet
MLMC
Head & Neck
Combat Stress
Inf Disease
Minimal Care
Pathology
Food Procurement
Surveillance
Blood
Dialysis
Prev-Medicine
Animal Surgery
Tele-Medicine
Special Care
Global MEDCOM
LEVEL V Hospitalization
Medical Treatment/Specialty Consultation Support
Medical Logistics Management
Laboratory Services
Veterinary Support
Joint
• Medical Evacuation
• Veterinary Services (Vet Surveillance, Food Procurement)
• Theater Blood Support
• Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager
Provided by AVN BDE

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ANNEX B

JOINT LAND FORCE CAPABILITIES

It is a fact that infantry attacks always halt and fail at those points where preparation has been insufficient; once more we see that the power of organization is greater than the bravery of the troops.

Ferdinand Foch
After the Artois and Champagne battles, 1917

1. Overview

a. The campaign plan at theater level or joint task force (JTF) level and operation plan at JTF level are key command and control (C2) instruments used by commanders. One of the **fundamental purposes of such plans is to achieve synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, special operations, and space forces as well as capabilities provided by supporting combatant commands and Defense and other agencies and organizations**.

b. The goal of synchronized employment is to **effectively use each participating element against the highest priority mission and to achieve the highest possible level of synergy** among all participating elements.

c. Joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinate Service and functional component commanders must be familiar with capabilities and limitations of component forces. JFCs and their **component commanders must integrate and synchronize operations in such a manner as to apply force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents.**

2. Joint Force Land Component

a. **US Army and US Marine Corps forces normally comprise the bulk of the joint force land component**

b. While most joint operations conducted today also are multinational operations, the contributions of most multinational (allied/coalition) land forces are significantly smaller in number and less capable in terms of applying the latest available technology and weapons systems. In addition, most multinational partners lack the strategic mobility to rapidly deploy large numbers of land forces, even if they had such forces available to deploy.

3. US Marine Corps Forces

The Marine Corps maintains a unique capability in expeditionary operations that provides a wide range of power projection options in support of US interests. Additionally, **Marine Corps maritime pre-positioning force (MPF)** employment options offer a **rapid global response, timely buildup of combat power, enhanced tactical mobility, and an increased measure of combat sustainability**.

a. The US Marine Corps provides the joint force with unique capabilities and expertise. It is focused on expeditionary operations and trained to conduct forcible entry from the sea with combined arms forces. Sea-based operations enable the Marine Corps to provide land forces with fires, logistics, intelligence, communications, and other support from ships.

b. Marine Corps operating forces are organized into **Marine air-ground task forces** (MAGTFs). MAGTFs provide crisis response options that can be tailored to meet any situation. MAGTFs possess organic CSS and are self-sustaining. MAGTFs range in size from **Marine expeditionary force** (MEF) through **Marine expeditionary unit** (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) to the special purpose MAGTF. MAGTFs are capable of missions across the full range of military operations, including **forcible entry** and **seizing lodgments** for the introduction of reinforcements. They can deploy by Navy amphibious ships or Air Force strategic airlift. **The organization and structure of a MAGTF always includes a command element (CE), ground combat element, aviation combat element, and combat service support element (CSSE). This structure is readily adaptable to forming the core of a JTF.**

(1) **MEFs are the largest standing MAGTFs.** They consist of a CE and one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and force service support groups. A nominal MEF consists of approximately 46,000 Marine and Navy personnel and normally is commanded by a lieutenant general. There are three standing MEFs in the Marine Corps.

(2) **The MEU(SOC) is the standard forward-deployed Marine expeditionary organization.** Each MEU(SOC) is task organized for specific missions. and is self-sustaining for 15 days. MEU(SOC)s undergo intensive predeployment training and are augmented with selected personnel and equipment to enhance capabilities such as specialized demolition operations, clandestine surveillance and reconnaissance, raids, and in-extremis hostage recovery. A MEU(SOC) is commanded by a colonel and consists of approximately 2,000 Marines and sailors. A nominal MEU(SOC) is organized with the following components: a standing CE; an infantry battalion reinforced with artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, armor, assault amphibian units; reinforced helicopter squadron with transport, utility, and attack helicopters, detachment of vertical and/or short takeoff and landing fixed-wing attack aircraft; other detachments as required; and a task-organized CSSE.

(3) **Air contingency Forces (ACFs). ACFs are designated alert forces capable of deploying by strategic airlift on short notice.** Lead elements of an ACF can deploy within 16 hours of notification. Unlike other MAGTFs, the ACF does not have a forcible entry capability; it requires a secure airfield to offload.

(4) **Special purpose MAGTFs are formed on an "as needed" basis to accomplish specific, usually short-term, missions.** Special purpose MAGTFs contain the same elements as other MAGTFs, but are typically smaller than a Marine expeditionary unit.

c. The **MPF** provides an added dimension in mobility, readiness, and global responsiveness. The MPF program involves specially designed ships that are organized into squadrons. These squadrons are strategically positioned around the globe and reduce MAGTF response time from weeks to days by prepositioning the bulk of equipment and 30 days supplies for a 17,300 Marine force. **Personnel and selected equipment can be airlifted quickly to an objective area to join with the MPF equipment at a secure site.** Equipment and supplies can also be selectively offloaded to support smaller MAGTFs.

d. **The Marine Corps Reserve, comprised of a division, an air wing, a force service support group, and two civil affairs groups, is closely integrated with the active duty Marine Corps forces.** They routinely practice reserve integration plans to augment or reinforce crisis response missions, and to add combat power for operations, particularly at the high end of the conflict spectrum. During Operation DESERT STORM, for example, 53 percent of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve end strength was activated.

4. US Army Forces

The Army is the nation's decisive land warfare force. The ability of Army forces to compel adversaries, deter aggression, reassure allies and friends, and provide support to the nation as an instrument of national policy is directly related to the quality and quantity of force it is able to apply.

a. Army forces accomplish assigned missions through the execution of four general types of military actions: **offensive defensive, stability, and support**. Army forces apply military power in a manner designed to gain and exploit freedom of action. The Army's constant aim is to **seize the initiative, maintain momentum, and exploit success** in order to **control the nature, scope, and tempo** of an operation.

b. Army units strike simultaneously throughout the battlespace to control, neutralize, or destroy objectives. Army units use information dominance, precision fires, dominant maneuver, full-force protection, and focused logistics to conduct distributed, simultaneous, precise operations at a tempo and level of intensity enemy forces cannot match. This destroys the enemy's ability to conduct coordinated, effective operations. Army operations exhibit rapid deployment, decisive application of forces, and the staying power necessary to achieve long-term success.

c. Army Modular Organizations Overview

(1) To meet joint requirements, the Army is reorganizing its forces. The new modular organizations provide a mix of land combat power that can be task organized for any combination of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction , or civil support operations as

part of a joint campaign. The new organizations to meet the challenges of the 21st century operation are **brigade combat teams (BCTs) and units of execution (UEs) X and Y.**

(2) **BCTs are stand-alone combined arms organizations**. There are **three types** of BCTs: heavy, infantry, and Stryker. UExs exercise command and control of Army forces at the tactical and operational levels. Army components at theater level are organized as UEys. In addition, specialized brigades may be assigned to both UExs and UEys when the situation requires their capabilities.

d. Higher Echelons

(1) Between now and 2010, two higher headquarters will replace existing divisions, corps, and echelons above corps. These headquarters are currently designed to be:

- **UEx** (tasked tactical-level, primary warfighting missions)
- **UEy** (theater-/operational-level land force and joint warfighting and support).

(2) While the tendency is to think of these echelons as linear improvements to division/corps or armies, they are not. Both higher echelons will be complementary, modular entities designed to employ task-organized forces within integrated joint campaigns.

(3) UEy

(a) **The UEy will be the Army theater-level headquarters for each CCDR.** The UEy consolidates most functions performed by current Corps and Army Service Component Command (ASCC) into a single operational echelon. The UEy commander performs the administrative control **(ADCON) functions and tasks of the Army force (ARFOR)** commander when the UEy is under combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of a CCDR. It will be the primary vehicle for **Army Support to the Joint Force (ASJF)** within the CCDR's area of responsibility (AOR). It supports Army, joint, and multinational forces deployed to joint operations areas (JOAs) the CCDR establishes. In **major combat operations,** where the CCDR is the JFC, the UEy commander may become the **joint force land component commander** (JFLCC) and exercise operational control over committed land forces. When required for smaller contingencies, the UEy **provides a JTF-capable headquarters** to control forces within a JOA.

(b) The **CCDR will tailor the UEy to meet the needs of joint forces** in the theater. The UEy structure provides the UEy commander with flexibility to adapt the command and control system to meet requirements. Each UEy will have a headquarters with deployable command posts and will be assigned a mix of forces to support the theater. While the type and size of the forces may vary considerably between combatant commands, the UEy normally controls theater sustainment, signal (network operations--NETOPS), intelligence, medical, and civil affairs capabilities. These subordinate elements may range in size from a brigade to a full theater command, depending on theater requirements. As the ASCC, the UEy commander exercises ADCON of all Army forces in the AOR. The ASCC also integrates Army forces into

the execution of regional security cooperation plans and provides Army support to joint forces, interagency elements, and multinational forces, as directed by the CCDR. For major combat operations or theater war, the UEy may provide the JFLCC and headquarters. At the same time, the UEy will continue to perform the ASCC functions. See Figure B-1.



Figure B-1. UEy Theater Functions and Responsibilities

(c) **The UEy is an integrated, functionally organized land force headquarters.** Three broad design concepts underlie the UEy organization as shown below:

1. **Regionally focused, globally networked organization.** The UEy is not a "pooled" headquarters. It remains the senior Army headquarters for the theater and does not deploy to another theater.

2. **Expeditionary Army and Joint Operations.** Second, the UEy design recognizes that the full capability required for protracted major combat operations is too expensive to maintain full capability in every UEy on a standing basis. However, the UEy design does provide enough capability to enable the initial phase of an operation, while providing a flexible platform for Army and joint augmentation in the event of expansion to a major campaign. Key also is that the UEy is not just a supporting headquarters, but also is capable of complex operations and fully capable of serving as a JTF for lesser contingencies or the JFLCC for CCDR-level major operations.

3. **Regional Army Support and ADCON.** Third, the UEy must provide ADCON over all Army forces assigned to the theater and control Army support to joint, interagency, and multinational elements as directed by the CCDR. The latter is a continuous task performed by the UEy, regardless of whether it also is controlling land forces in a major operation.

e. **Army Support to the Joint Force**

(1) Unlike the Cold War, the joint operating environment and full spectrum operations call for different organizational structures. Joint forces that deploy rapidly into unprepared theaters with little or no advance materiel build-up need adequate, flexible, capabilities from all functional categories: command and control, battlespace awareness, protection, sustainment, and force application. Because of deployment considerations, however, CCDRs and JTF commanders want the smallest, most flexible structures possible. The Army, charged with special responsibilities to enable the theater as a whole, has a particular interest in redesigning and providing these organizations.

(2) **This modular design also allows other Service headquarters to receive and employ Army enabling units directly, without an intervening Army headquarters.** As examples, a maneuver enhancement (ME) brigade could be placed under operational control (OPCON) of a Marine expeditionary force (MEF). In this case, the UEy continues to exercise ADCON for the ME brigade. In addition, the UEy provides Army capabilities (for example, NETOPS) to support the MEF as needed. Other examples may include OPCON of a missile-heavy fires brigade to the joint force air component, an attack helicopters unit to the JSOTF, or a task-organized sustainment brigade to a joint special operations task force.

(3) **UEy Level Brigades: Theater Enabling Capabilities**

(a) **A mix of functional supporting brigades and units will be assigned to the supporting commands at the UEy level.** Theater aviation brigades will be assigned to the Theater Aviation Command of the UEy to provide requisite capabilities for theater troops, primarily fixed wing, cargo, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) support. Functional supporting brigades may be attached or under OPCON of a UEx or a component commander. They normally will be augmented by theater-level command and control and sustainment organizations if they are operating directly under a JFC and not as part of a theater command. See Figure B-2.

(b) **The UEy may allocate functional brigades to the UEx** to support the force as a whole or to carry out a particular task. For example, in addition to a ME brigade, a UEx might receive a military police brigade to control displaced civilian and handle detainees. In this case, the ME brigade may provide engineering support to the MP brigade. The following are capabilities that the UEy will offer to the joint fight at the operational level:

1. **Command and Control/ Battlespace Awareness. Intelligence and communications functional support continues to be an important contribution by Army**



Figure B-2. UEy/ASCC

forces to joint capabilities. The Army also provides specialized liaison teams to multinational or joint partners as well as the BCD to the JFACC. Automated management of intelligence requirements has helped open channels of communications between intelligence officers of joint and component staffs. Because theater operations are inherently multinational and interagency, the levels of cooperation between foreign and US forces and between the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies have also improved**. Theater-level, joint enabling capabilities that Army forces bring are as follow:**

a. **Theater Network Operations Commands/Brigades.** Network operations (NETOPS) units provide the Army portion of the joint, global communications architecture and control modular units in that field to provide communications and automation interoperability and security.

b. **Theater Intelligence Brigades.** The Army operates theater-focused intelligence brigades that provide enhanced HUMINT/CI, aerial reconnaissance, UAV, and SIGINT support to the JFC or JFLCC. These units contribute substantially to manning joint and multinational interrogation, exploitation, analysis, and collection centers as part of the joint force.

c. **Space Support Teams.** The Army has a variety of teams from Army Space Command that provide enhanced access to space based products, theater missile warning, and limited countersatellite surveillance.

d. **Information Operations.** Army specialized teams provide enhanced capabilities for planning IO, conducting vulnerability assessments, and providing information assurance. Other Army units from Special Operations Command provide psychological operations capabilities.

2. **Operational Protection.** Army forces **provide an array of specialized capabilities to facilitate protecting the joint force as well as conducting stability and reconstruction operations.** In addition, Army headquarters may be tasked to serve as the Joint Security Coordinator for synchronization of the protection of designated Joint Security Areas.

a. **Army Air and Missile Defense Command/Brigades.** These units provide Patriot missile and short range defense units for the protection of theater critical and forward deployed Army and Marine forces from enemy ballistic and cruise missiles.

b. **Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Brigades/Elements.** These units include modular capabilities for chemical and biological detection as well as decontamination. Additional Army units are suitable for supervising and conducting explosive ordnance disposal or sensitive site exploitation.

c. **Military Police Commands/Brigades.** The Army includes specialized units for conducting detainee operations as well as Combat Support MP units for security operations.

d. **Theater Engineer Commands/Brigades.** Engineer capabilities have evolved toward greater jointness and have become more interchangeable. Navy Seabees, Air Force "Red Horse" engineers, and Army construction engineers can now replace one another without complications and understand each other's capabilities and requirements far better. The Army, however, still provides a substantial portion of the theater combat and construction forces, as well as more specialized route clearance and facilities management capabilities.

e. **Civil Affairs Brigades**. Army civil affairs units provide unique capabilities for interface with indigenous populations at all governmental levels during full spectrum operations.

f. **Sustainment**

Army and joint force elements propose to replace materiel-based logistic operations with distribution-based, highly automated and better-integrated systems that will facilitate expeditionary operations. Better logistic forecasting and reporting, improved transportation and materiel handling, revolutionary asset visibility, and enhanced sharing of information and materiel among components, civilian agencies, and multinational partners all contribute. The

end result will be a vertically integrated joint support system that enables Army logisticians to deliver better service to the theater and to the transformed land component

(1) **Theater Sustainment Commands (TSCs).** The TSC will be the Army component's operational-level logistic command. Under the OPCON of the UEy commander, it will provide theater support and serve as the logistics, personnel, and financial management headquarters for the Army component. Should the CCDR form a joint theater support activity, the TSC will serve as the Army component. The TSC will employ one or more deployable command posts and sustainment brigades to operate a theater-level Army logistics base in the JOA or at an intermediate staging base. Sustainment or single-functional brigade composition will be determined by theater characteristics and operational needs. Other specialized transportation terminal and contractor/contract management units may be attached. Distribution-based logistics will reduce the need for in-theater storage and multiple transfers of materiel. The TSC will have full visibility of all services and supplies, current information on force logistics needs, and the ability to direct incoming supplies and materiel to the right units.

(2) **Medical Deployment Support Commands (MDSC).** Regionally aligned with each UEy, the MDSC provides the Army's portion of the theater medical capability, to include Tier III hospitals, specialized labs/teams, and medical logistics functions.

g. **Force Application (Maneuver and Fires)**

The Army provides a variety of capabilities to the joint force in the area of force application. These include special operating forces as well as the more conventional capabilities of the **UEx and its mix of BCTs**. Army multifunctional brigades such as Fires and Aviation also provide force application.

(1) **UEx**

(a) **The primary warfighting modular headquarters will be the UEx.** The UEx combines the functions of today's division with that of the corps. The primary task of the UEx is to direct operations of its subordinate BCTs. The UEx contains the resources needed to be the joint force land component (JFLCC) for smaller contingencies. With appropriate joint augmentation it can serve as a JTF headquarters. The UEx itself is a self-contained headquarters with two deployable command posts and organic signal, security, and combat service support. The UEx is not a fixed formation. The UEx commands a tailored mix of forces determined by the CCDR based on the mission and designated by the UEy for tactical land operations. The operating strength of a UEx can range from a few thousand to more than 40,000. The UEx will not have any organic forces beyond the elements that make up the headquarters.

(b) In major combat operations, a UEx will typically operate along a line of operations or in an AO to establish the military conditions required to achieve a designated end state. The **UEx controls up to six BCTs** in high/mid-intensity combat operations and may control more BCTs in protracted stability operations. The BCTs may include any mix of heavy, infantry, or Stryker BCTs. When BCTs equipped with the Future Combat System are fielded, a UEx will be able to control them as well.

(c) The **flexibility of a fully modular UEx headquarters** allows considerable latitude in assigning responsibilities formerly allocated to standing echelons. For example, one UEx also may be used as an intermediate tactical headquarters above other UEx formations, multinational forces, or other large formations. In essence, it can serve the same purpose as the World War II corps, functioning as an intermediate tactical headquarters with control of powerful field forces. This capability relieves the JFLCC, JTF commander, or CCDR of the requirement for planning and synchronizing land operations conducted by very large formations (two or more UExs). **Other possibilities include the use of a UEx as a multinational land headquarters or JTF headquarters** in contingency operations not requiring very large formations. For both of the latter options, the UEx requires augmentation--but far less than that required by today's division.

(2) **Brigade Combat Teams**

(a) UEx commanders will exercise mission command over BCTs. Mission command reduces the number of coordinating and supporting tasks, while the BCTs fight with greater independence in more widely separated engagements and battles. BCT commanders are expected to receive minimal orders from the UEx commander, seize the initiative, and collaborate with other BCT commanders in the UEx to accomplish the mission. BCTs will be the primary organizations for fighting tactical engagements and battles. **BCTs will have one of three standard designs: heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), or Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT).** These BCTs include battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistic subunits.

(b) The Army leadership has reduced the number of combat maneuver battalions in HBCTs and IBCTs from the three normally organized under divisional brigades to two in BCTs. However, BCTs also include an organic cavalry squadron not found in divisional brigade organizations. The cavalry squadron gives BCT commanders an enhanced ability to develop combat information, to include fighting for information when necessary. **BCTs have organic close combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities.** They are organized as combined arms units down to battalion level. Cross-attachment of companies between battalions, common in divisional brigades, will no longer be required. This will increase the cohesiveness of battalions. A command and control system that includes networked information systems, combined with advanced sensors and better analysis and information management, will allow BCT commanders to see, understand, and share tactical information more rapidly. Longer-range precision weapons and sensors will permit some engagements to begin before maneuver formations make contact. More precise lethal and suppressive close combat weapons make it possible to conclude combat more rapidly. In addition, leaders will develop combat power more effectively because of a higher leader-to-led ratio, advanced information systems to support command and control, and their greater capability for reconnaissance.

(c) **Under mission command, UEx commanders will assign BCT commanders their missions,** giving them a broad concept of operations and the UEx commander's intent for orientation. UEx commanders also will designate an AO or line of operations for each BCT. As in all land operations, the UEx order will give BCT commanders the greatest possible tactical

latitude and freedom of action. **UEx commanders also will assign supporting forces to BCTs from their pool of support brigades to fit them for their specific missions**.

(d) Beginning in 2014, the Army will modernize BCTs with the Future Combat System (FCS). FCS-equipped BCTs will have greater lethality and be easier to deploy and sustain than anything in the current force. The BCT organization will facilitate conversion to FCS.

(3) **Support Brigades**

(a) **A mix of other brigades supports the UEx and the BCTs. These brigades include** a multifunctional aviation brigade, a battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB), a Maneuver Enhancement (ME) brigade, a fires brigade, and a sustainment brigade. These brigades will be organized as combined arms units intended to support BCTs and carry out specific tasks in support of echelons above BCT.

(b) Unlike BCTs but like UExs, **support brigades will not be fixed organizations**. Support brigades are designed around a base of organic elements to which a mix of additional capabilities is added, based on the campaign or major operation. To make the brigades both tailorable and effective, the brigade headquarters includes the necessary expertise to control many different capabilities. Each brigade base also includes signal and sustainment capabilities.

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ANNEX C

JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVE

I am a strong believer in transacting official business by The Written Word.

Winston Churchill
Their Finest Hour, 1949

SAMPLE JFLCC ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVE

DATE/TIME GROUP
FM CDRUSCENTCOM
TO COMARCENT
COMMARCENT
COMAFCENT
COMNAVCENT
COMSOCCENT
INFO CDRUSEUCOM
CDRUSPACOM
CDRUSJFCOM
CDRUSSOCOM
CDRUSTRANSCOM
CDRUSSTRATCOM
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
SUBJ/ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVE FOR COALITION JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER (CJFLCC) FOR OPERATION DESTROY ENEMIES//
REF/A/ OPERATION ORDER 1000-05/OPERATION DESTROY ENEMIES/ REF/B/ JP 0-2/UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF)/REF/C/JP 3-31/COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR JOINT LAND OPERATIONS/REF/D/JP 3-08/INTERAGENCY COORDINATION DURING JOINT OPERATIONS/REF/E/JP 3-10/JOINT DOCTRINE FOR REAR AREA OPERATIONS//
POC/COL I. M. OPERATIONS/J3A/DSN 123-4567//
1. PURPOSE: THIS MESSAGE DESIGNATES COMARCENT AS THE CJFLCC FOR OPERATION DESTROY ENEMIES. WITH THIS DESIGNATION, CJFLCC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL AREA PER REF A LAND FORCE COMMITTED TO THIS OPERATION WILL BE OPCON TO THE CJFLCC. THIS DIRECTIVE REMAINS VALID

UNTIL THE COMPLETION OF OPERATION DESTROY ENEMIES OR UNTIL OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY CDRUSCENTCOM.//
2. BACKGROUND: INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES AND SECDEF GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY SEPARATE MEANS. CDRUSCENTCOM WILL PLAN AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS AS OUTLINED IN THE MISSION STATEMENT AND WITHIN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS PROVIDED IN REF A.//
3. MISSION: CJFLCC WILL PLAN AND CONDUCT SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING JOINT AND COALITION LAND OPERATIONS AS TASKED IN REF A.//
4. FORCES: ALL USA AND USMC FORCES ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO USCENTCOM FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE OPCON TO THE CJFLCC. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF JOINT LAND FORCES IS OUTLINED IN REFS B AND C. UPON MISSION ANALYSIS AND IF REQUIRED, CJFLCC WILL FORWARD REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL LAND FORCE ASSETS TO CDRUSCENTCOM.//
5. COORDINATION: CJFLCC WILL PLAN, COORDINATE, AND CONDUCT LAND OPERATIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE COMBATANT COMMANDER'S OPERATIONAL CONSTRUCT AND FULLY COORDINATED WITH, AND REINFORCING OF, THE OTHER COMPONENTS PER REF A, WHICH DETAILS SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. COORDINATION WITH MULTINATIONAL LAND FORCES, OTHER US GOVERNMENT AND NONGOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED AREA OF OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW REFS B AND D. COORDINATION OR COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL WILL BE FORWARDED TO CDRUSCENTCOM FOR ADJUDICATION.//
6. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES: JFLCC IS DESIGNATED AS THE JOINT REAR AREA COORDINATOR (JRAC) FOR THE JRA AS OUTLINED IN REF A. ADDITIONAL JRAC GUIDANCE IS CONTAINED IN REF E. DESIGNATED AREA OF OPERATIONS-WIDE ADDITIONAL JFLCC RESPONSIBILITIES ARE PROVIDED IN REF A. THESE INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITIED TO GROUND SUPPORT TO THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE, SECURITY FOR CRITICAL FACILITIES AND MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES, SPECIFIED DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR LOGISTICS, PROMULGATION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, DEVELOPMENT OF FORCE PROTECTION AND COMBAT IDENTIFICATION SOPS, INTERFACE WITH MULTINATIONAL LAND FORCES (IF THE CJFLCC IS NOT ALSO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER), AND DESIGNATED LEAD AGENT RESPONSIBILITIES, TO INCLUDE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING CONTRACTORS IN THE DESIGNATED AREA OF OPERATIONS.//
7. JOINT LAND FORCE EFFECTS ASSESSMENT: JFLCC WILL PROVIDE EFFECTS ASSESSMENTS AT DESIGNATED INTERVALS TO ASSIST IN USCENTCOM OVERALL COMBAT ASSESSMENT.//
8. USCENTCOM POC IS COL I M OPERATIONS, J3A, DSN 123-4567, COMM (555) 321-7654, E-MAIL: IVAN.OPERATIONS@HQ.CENTCOM.MIL, FAX DSN 123-5678 OR COMM (555) 321-8765.//
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ANNEX D

WORKING WITH THE HOST NATION

1. General

Host-nation support (HNS) is the civil and military assistance provided by a host nation (HN) to the forces located in or transiting through that HN's territory. Efficient use of available HNS can greatly aid a tailored force package and augment the deployed sustainment force structure. **HNS can reduce the need for early arriving forces and materiel to support joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration, shrink strategic lift requirements, and minimize the in-theater logistic footprint.**

2. Types of HNS

The authority of the United States to negotiate and conclude agreements with foreign governments is assigned by US Code to the Department of State within the framework of implementing government regulations. Negotiations and conclusion of certain aspects of HNS agreements are delegated to the Department of Defense and ultimately to the supported combatant commander.

a. **Planned. Planned HNS is support that has been identified and requested during peacetime for provision in time of crisis or war.** Agreements are developed to obtain assured HNS for all programmed force requirements. Requirements planning should be for support of generic units operating within a bilateral scenario. Defense cooperation agreements, status-of forces agreements, and technical agreements (to include transit agreements) must be negotiated ahead of time and include the status of civilian contractors accompanying the force.

(1) **US and HN Bilateral Agreements.** Bilateral agreements entered into by members of the coalition should be revealed to other members of the coalition **(typically, the US does not reveal financial-related information)**.

(2) **Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.** Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements are flexible bilateral agreements that may be used for the purpose of obtaining HNS.

b. **Ad Hoc. Ad hoc HNS is support requested during crisis or war that was not identified, planned, or agreed upon during peacetime.**

(1) **Commanders must obtain authority to negotiate (through the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of State) and then actively seek bilateral agreements** to support JRSOI of forces, equipment, and supplies.

(2) Civil affairs personnel are trained to identify HNS resources and can provide valuable assistance.

(3) Every effort should be made to **obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals**. The most effective negotiations occur when military members show competence in local language and customs.

(4) Due to limited resources and support to its own forces and population, ad hoc requests may be neither completely fulfilled nor provided to support valid requirements.

3. Coordinating HNS

The supported combatant commander has overall responsibility to ensure the proper use of HNS within the operational area. The **supported combatant commander may appoint one Service or component commander (e.g., JFLCC) to be the lead to conduct HNS arrangements** to avoid duplication of effort and to control costs**.** The JFLCC should ensure that effective HN coordination is quickly established to support specific and implied missions. HN coordination should be centralized as much as possible to effectively use the assistance provided by the HN and other nations. **Three factors influence the use of HNS:**

- **Capability, dependability, and willingness** of the HN to provide assistance.
- **Risk** associated with a dependence on HNS.
- The **effect on security** of US forces.

4. HNS Suitability Factors

Factors in determining the suitability of using HN resources to accomplish specific missions and functions include the following:

- Capability, dependability, and willingness of the HN to provide and sustain identified resource needs.
- Shortfalls in US force structure, as well as areas where US force structure requirements could be reduced by using HNS resources.
- Effect of HNS on the morale of US personnel.
- Operations security and reliability.
- Capability of US forces to accept and manage HN resources.
- The risk associated with HNS being available in the type and quantity agreed upon.

5. Assistance Sought From Host Nations

Such assistance can include, but is not limited to, **transportation, civilian labor, supplies, services, rear area protection, facilities, contracting, petroleum, oils, lubricants, acquisition of equipment, food, airlift, use of facilities, storage services, port services, billeting, clothing, base operations support** (e.g., billeting, laundry and dry cleaning facilities, maintenance areas and hardstands, training areas and facilities, recreation areas and facilities)**, maintenance services, calibration services, and construction equipment**.

6. Activities Inappropriate for HNS

Some functions and services are inappropriate for a HN to provide. Usually the decision is based on security and the need for national control. Following are some of the functions, but not all-inclusive, not appropriate for HNS: **C2** of health service support, supply, service, maintenance, replacement, and communications; **patient administration**; **triage, treatment, and hospitalization of the sick, injured, and wounded** (unless approved by the combatant commander); **medical supply accountability; veterinary subsistence inspection; law and order operations of US forces, control and maintenance of nuclear and chemical ammunition; repair of nuclear weapons delivery sites; US prisoner confinement operations; accountability and security of enemy prisoners of war retained in US custody; and identification and burial of US dead**.

7. US Host-Nation Support Agreement Negotiation Process

JFLCCs should ensure legal counsel is involved in the development of all HN agreements. HNS agreements should be written to avoid import and export duties; value-added taxes on goods imported, exported, or acquired in country by or on behalf of the United States. **Additionally, specify what the landing and port fees will be for the use of both airfields and seaports.**

a. The initial agreement is the general agreement that is negotiated on a bilateral basis between the State Department and the comparable ministry of foreign affairs within the nation.

b. When the general agreement is concluded, the commands begin developing the next level of HN documentation, the technical agreement or arrangement (TA). The **TA addresses broad functional areas and includes definitions, responsibilities, and procedures** to provide guidance to the components for detailed HNS planning. **The TA negotiations are explicitly restricted to the US and HN representatives.**

c. The next step is the **level of agreement**. **A joint planning commission**, co-chaired by the senior officials of the supported combatant command and the HN ministry of defense, conducts this step. This commission (or group) **codifies the policy and**

guidance needed to conduct joint bilateral HNS planning into a document, annexed by specific subject area, and known as the Joint Logistics Support Plan (JLSP). The **JLSP identifies the type of support the HN is able and willing to provide**. The United States then needs to develop and submit the concept of requirements (COR) to the HN. This **COR is a statement of functional HNS requirements that the components need to support deploying US forces**. Once the COR is approved by the HN the statement of requirements (SOR) is submitted. The **SOR identifies in detail the type and amount of HNS required by the unit to accomplish its tasks**. The SOR should be expressed as a quantifiable workload that the HN can plan to allocate resources against during execution.

d. The SORs are then provided to the joint implementation committee, which established the detailed procedures for US commands to obtain SOR related HNS from the nation. These procedures become the Joint Implementation Plan.

e. **Either the United States or the HN can initiate modifications to an existing HNS agreement.**

8. Operation Plan/Operation Order

a. **Concept of Operations. The JFLCC should summarize the concept for use of HNS.** The JFLCC HNS concept of operations should cover the overall status of negotiations and agreements, to include customs requirements, by country or treaty organization, presumed HNS, and the reliability of HNS.

b. **Tasks. The JFLCC should assign responsibilities for coordinating and managing HNS to military organizations, including Service component commanders.** Further, the JFLCC should identify the office of primary responsibility for each type of HNS managed separately within the joint land component.

c. **Limiting Factors.** The JFLCC outline support limitations that are due to lack of HNS agreements, operational impact, status of any current negotiations, and prospects for availability of the required support on an emergency basis during execution of the operation.

> *For specific requirements and format see* ***CJCSM 3122.03A****,* Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance.

ANNEX E

WORKING WITH CONTRACTORS

1. Introduction

a. Recent operations have changed the way to view and use contractors. The military has become increasingly dependent on contractor support for combat essential capabilities. **The key is for the commander to make a call early on as to what capabilities are required to fill the gaps caused by fast moving, crisis action situations. Effective contractor management within the battlespace also is essential to ensure that contractor-provided support is properly orchestrated and synchronized with the overall operation support plan, and that contractor employees are properly accounted for, protected, and supported.**

b. As each operation differs, this Annex will provide references and suggestions on generic contracting issues for the JFLCC. The guidance is NOT all-inclusive, nor are all items contained herein required for all situations. The JFLCC and contracting officer must determine which to use based on the situation and must be cognizant of their cost implications. **Each contingency evolves differently and each combatant commander will issue contractor implementation guidance that impacts the employment of contractors in their AOR. In addition, employment of contractors may be impacted, country-by-country, by HN laws, and by existing status-of-forces agreements.** Often JFLCCs will need clarification on specific requirements applicable to their operational area. This should be done through their respective Service contract management chain or the combatant commander, as appropriate. **Legal review of clause applicability is incumbent upon the contracting authority.**

c. **The JFLCC and components must abide by applicable law, regulations, and international agreements.** While implementing appropriate contractor planning, deployment, and redeployment requirements, the JFLCC must adhere to theater management procedures as they relate to the management of contractor personnel during contingency operations. In addition, **the JFLCC must ensure that the contract, as the legal basis for the relationship between the government and contractor, carefully specifies the terms and conditions under which the contractor is to perform, as well as procedures to process contractor personnel prior to deployment.** Contracts also must ensure the specific support relationship between the contractor and the government contains standardized clauses to guarantee efficient deployment, employment, and redeployment of contractor personnel.

2. Management of Contractors

a. **The JFLCC should focus on considerations that would best optimize and integrate contractor support into the overall land operations. Identifying key contractor support capabilities that are required early on to fill the supporting gaps resulting from slow reserve mobilization can do this. The section on "Key Issues and Questions" in this annex will help frame and focus the LCC on which key contractor support is required early on.**

b. **Commanders may not have direct control over contractors or their employees**. **Management of contractor activities is accomplished through the requiring unit or activity contracting officer representative (COR) that supports the contracting organization in coordination with the combatant commander. With the diversity of contractor on the battlespace, to include international and US contractors that may not directly work for the JFLCC, it becomes critical that the JFLCC understands what his authority over these types of contractors, and once conflicts arise, how to resolve them. Commanders must manage contractors through the contracting officer and their appointed CORs in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.** The specific duties and responsibilities of a COR are delegated in writing by the contracting officer. Typically, a COR is responsible for assisting the contracting officer in the following areas:

(1) Maintaining liaison and direct communications with both the contractor and the contracting officer.

(2) Monitoring the contractor's performance, notifying the contracting officer of deficiencies noticed during surveillance, and recommending appropriate corrective action.

(3) Verifying that the contractor performed the technical and management requirements of the contract.

(4) Performing all necessary inspections.

(5) Verifying that the contractor corrected all correctable deficiencies.

(6) Accepting government supplies and services.

(7) Verifying invoices.

(8) When applicable, coordinating the deployment/redeployment preparation for contractor employees who deploy with the force.

(9) Assisting in contractor-employee day-to-day management to include visibility and accountability reporting, as well as other contractor operations management issues that may affect contractor or unit requirements.

c. Although the COR provides a vital link between the military and the contractor, there are certain limits to his/her authority. **A COR is prohibited from the following:**

(1) Making any agreement with the contractor requiring the obligation of public funds.

(2) Making any commitments or changes that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract.

(3) Encouraging the contractor by words, actions, or a failure to act to undertake new work or an extension of existing work beyond the contract period.

(4) Authorizing a contractor to obtain property for use under a contract.

(5) Interfering with the contractor's management prerogative by "supervising" contractor employees or otherwise directing their work efforts.

d. **Commanders and planners must be aware that contractor support may result in conflicts with military force movements.** Contractor personnel, equipment, and supplies must either be prepositioned (a costly option) or they will compete for transportation resources with military forces and civilian requirements during the deployment process. This is why all contracted support must be coordinated as directed by the combatant commander.

e. **While the combatant commander has overall responsibility and authority over contracting within his AOR and determines what authority and responsibilities the JFLCC will have when working with contractors, the JFLCC must continually evaluate his contractor support requirements and request from the combatant commander the authority he requires to effectively manage contractors in his operational area.**

3. Plans and Databases

a. Contractor support should not be considered just another support option when planning military operations. There are some very unique planning considerations involved when planning for this type of support. Proper planning should, however, make contractor-provided support reasonably transparent to the end user. Planning for contractor support identifies the full extent of contractor involvement, how and where contractor support should be provided, and any responsibilities the Army may have in supporting the contractor. Also, the need for contingency arrangements if a contractor fails to or is prevented from performing his or her duties, must be considered. **Special consideration must be given to system-support requirements where no military support is currently available.**

b. The overall contractor presence, along with its activities and movement, must be orchestrated with those of military forces. Contractor visibility couples contractor employee accountability information with additional contract-related information, to include the number of contractors companies there are supporting the operation, where they operate, when they provide support, the criticality of their support as well as their command-support mission and relationships. Contractor visibility information is necessary for the J-2, J-3, J-4, provost marshal, and surgeon to complete their specific planning requirements.

c. Currently there are no standard procedures or automated systems specifically designed to capture visibility of the myriad contractors within the battlespace. Furthermore, there is no one lead staff element responsible for establishing and maintaining contractor visibility. Therefore, it is imperative that mission specific responsibilities and procedures be identified and codified early in the planning process. For a detailed discussion on contract visibility, see Chapter 4, "Managing," of FM 3-100.21, *Contractors on the Battlefield*.

d. Although contractor deployment and redeployment is a major consideration for all military operations, it is highly dependent on the type of contractor providing support. The J-3 staff must be fully cognizant of contractor deployment and redeployment requirements. By definition, theater support contractors do not deploy or redeploy to and from the AO. System and external support contractors on the other hand, will have to deploy some or all of their equipment and personnel into the AO, except when they are already forward deployed, such as in Korea and Southwest Asia, or when they hire local nationals as part of their contract.

e. A very important planning consideration is how these systems and external support contractors actually deploy and redeploy. In a non-restricted theater, they may self-deploy utilizing commercial assets. In a restricted theater, they most likely will deploy utilizing military-deployment processes and strategic-lift assets. **How and when contractors enter the operation must be planned and stipulated in OPLANs and OPORDs to ensure supporting contracting activities can be incorporate into deployment and redeployment requirements.** This will allow contractors to efficiently plan and prepare for movement of personnel and equipment. **Failure to identify and coordinate the method of arriving in the AO may interfere with the organized flow of forces into the operational area.**

f. Force protection measures for contractor support must be based on battlespace-location decisions made by the combatant commander and JFLCC. Protecting contractors who are in direct support of JFLCC forces in the battlespace is a JFLCC responsibility via the J-3 staff. When contractors perform direct support of JFLCC forces in potentially hostile areas, the supported military forces must assure the protection of the contractor's operations and personnel. JFLCC commanders and planners must determine the need for contractor force protection early in the planning process and identify forces to provide security. Mission, threat, and location determine the degree of force protection needed. To maintain force protection for contractors, the JFLCC, the supporting contracting officer, and the responsible requiring unit or activity must establish and utilize procedures to identify contractors and their status and location within the AO.

g. **The JFLCC should develop a contracting support plan as part of LCC OPLANs and OPORDs to provide the following information:**

(1) An outline of the procedures and policies for implementation of contracting support in the AO, assuring full utilization of HN, FN, LOGCAP, Armed Forces Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), ACSA, and construction capabilities contract (CONCAP) resources.

(2) Consideration for contracting solutions during logistic planning, to include incorporation in the JFLCC OPLAN/OPORD.

(3) Identification of subordinate commands' requirements that may be met by HN, FN, LOGCAP, CONCAP, AFCAP, ACSA, or contracting support.

(4) Development of an area database containing all available information concerning local resources. The database may include area studies, locally developed logistic support data, a complete listing of existing LOGCAP, CONCAP, HN, and FN agreements available in the AO,

and recommendations from State Department Foreign Service personnel. Information also may come from the United States or civilian organizations (such as nongovernmental organizations or international organizations) familiar with the area. This part of the contracting support plan must be continually updated. The database should address security and quality control aspects of contracting, to include inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style actions and fraud.

h. The Logistic Procurement Support Board (LPSB)/ Joint Acquisition Board (JARB).

(1) Chaired by J-4 and includes representatives from each component J-4, multination partners, contract lawyers, and J-3 (as appropriate).

(2) Established to identify contracting issues and ensure contracting programs are properly coordinated and prioritized to meet JFLCC's requirements. Considerations include the following:

- Criticality
- Cost
- Timeliness
- Administrative effort
- Quality

(3) Validate the requirements, and make a source selection utilizing the "Best Value to the US Government" method. Sources may include the following:

- HNS
- Troop labor
- Purchase through Joint Contracting Center
- Other nation sources (to include US contractors)

(4) Eliminate duplication by arranging for single-Service contracting assignments for specific supplies and services, when appropriate.

(5) Assess the impact of potential loss of contractors performing essential services and planning in accordance with DOD Instruction 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crisis* and DOD Instruction 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces*.

(6) Coordinate with US Embassies and host countries for acquisition of supplies and services and for operations by contractors performing under US contracts.

(7) Provide an exchange of information among contracting activities covering such matters as sources of supply, prices, and contractor performance.

(8) Once approved, place contractor support requirements details in the JFLCC OPLAN/OPORD.

4. Key Issues and Questions

a. Commanders and their staffs must manage the total contractor force supporting the JFLCC units within the AO. Just as each operation is different, so are the responsibilities a JFLCC may have when dealing with contractor support. **The combatant commander determines the authority and many of the responsibilities that the JFLCC will have when working with contractors.** No single publication or instruction could address all the issues that the JFLCC may encounter; however, the following are key questions and issues that should be addressed when engaging contractor support:

(1) What authority and responsibilities does the JFLCC have for contractor support? The combatant commander can give as little or as much as he feels appropriate.

(2) What contingency plans are in place to ensure continuation of essential contractor services in accordance with DODD 1100.18, *Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning,* DODI 1100.19, *Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning Policies and Procedures,* and DODI 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential Contractor Services During Crises*, should the contractor fail to provide them or terminate the contract? **Planning for continuation of essential contractor support includes ensuring all contracts contain appropriate language in the statement of work to identify services designated as mission essential and require the development of contractor contingency plans for those tasks that have been identified as essential to provide reasonable assurance of continuation during crisis conditions**.

(3) What are the specific operational area admission policies, procedures, and requirements with regard to theater admission? These may include country and theater clearances, waiver authority, immunizations, required training or equipment, and any restrictions necessary to assure proper management, security and accountability of contingency contractor personnel that are deployed to the JFLCC AO? What are the JFLCC responsibilities with regard to theater admission? (See DOD 4500.54-G, *DOD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG)*, for specific procedures.)

(4) What are the theater accountability/visibility requirements with regard to contractors? Accountability of contractors in an AO is required for FP, allocating resources, and administration. DOD components must maintain by-name accountability of US citizen contractor personnel who deploy in support of military operations.

(5) What impact do the SOFAs have on use of contractors (if any)?

(6) What international or national laws impact contractors' legal status?

(7) What specific operational contractor policies and requirements (to include restrictions imposed by applicable international agreements and contractor-related deployment, management, FP, medical, and other support requirements) has the combatant commander identified and directed for this operation?

(8) What are the theater policies and procedures for providing contractors with military clothing? **Generally, commanders shall not issue military clothing to contractor personnel or allow the wearing of military or military look-alike uniforms.**

(9) What are the theaters FP policies? **Generally, commanders shall provide FP for contractor personnel through military means, commensurate with the level of FP provided DOD civilians, unless valid contract terms place that responsibility with another party.**

(10) What are the theater's policies on contractors carrying weapons? **Contractor personnel are not permitted to carry personally owned firearms or ammunition, or be armed during contingency operations unless acting under special instructions.** Any consideration to arm contractor personnel for the purposes of providing security shall be carefully reviewed on a case-by-case basis and approved by the geographic combatant commander or a specifically identified designee, no lower than the Flag officer level.

(11) What special training responsibilities does the JFLCC have in regards to training contractors?

(12) What are the theater's contractor personnel recovery, missing persons, and casualties' policies and procedures? **What are the JFLCC responsibilities regarding these areas?**

(13) What are the theater's mortuary affairs policies with regard to contractors? **Contractor personnel who die while in direct support of US forces shall fall under the DOD mortuary affairs program.**

(14) What are the theater contractor's medical support and evacuation policies? **In addition to resuscitative care, all US citizen and US legal alien contractor personnel who provide contract services in support of US forces in contingency operations are authorized health service support equivalent to that provided to other deployed DOD civilian personnel in accordance with DOD and CJCS directives.**

(15) What other government/military support are contractors authorized (such as postal, commissary, morale, welfare, and recreation, and exchange services)?

(16) What are the theater and JFLCC authority and responsibilities for contractor discipline and management? **Commanders have limited authority to take disciplinary action against contractor personnel and only the Department of Justice may prosecute**

misconduct under applicable federal laws. Normally, commanders should seek the assistance of their legal staff, the contracting officer responsible for the contract, and the contractor's management team.

(17) What specific restrictions has the combatant commander placed on the use of contractors? **There are no specific DOD-level restrictions on the location or timing of contractor support during military operations.** However, the combatant commander, in close coordination with the Service component commands and selected DOD agencies, may place specific restrictions on locations or timing of contractor support based on the operational situation, realizing that such restriction may decrease the component's ability to maintain and sustain adequate combat power at the point and time required.

(18) **Duties of contractors are established solely by the terms of their contract--they are not subject to military regulations or the Uniform Code of Military Justice (except during a declared war). Authority over contractors is exercised through the contracting officer.**

(19) What are the risks to contractors? Commanders must consider the difficulties/risks facing contractors when hostile action against them is likely. If failure of the contractor to provide the required support could jeopardize the overall success of the operation, contractor support may not be suitable.

(20) What Service/organization is assigned as the lead theater contingency contracting organization? In many cases, the Army will be assigned the lead Service responsible for these CUL theater support contracts. This organization performs the contracting functions for the JFLCC forces and ensures all approved requests for theater contractor support are processed in accordance with joint and combatant commander's guidance. **The JFLCC must manage contractors through the contracting officer.**

(21) What system is established to ensure contract compliance? Contract compliance is ensuring that the contractor is doing what the contract requires. The key to effective contract compliance is making sure that planners consider the variety of requirements relating to contractor support, include them in OPLANs/OPORDs, and communicate these plans to the contracting structure so that they can be included in applicable contracts.

(22) Ensure no contractor employees perform military functions, nor should they be working in scenarios that involve military combat operations where they might be perceived as combatants.

(23) Review all international agreements and HN support agreements to ensure they are taken into account when planning for contractor support. **Support agreements may affect contracting by restricting services to be contracted, by limiting contracted services to HN contractors, or, in some cases, by prohibiting contractor use altogether.**

(24) Review any applicable SOFAs to determine their impact on the status and use of contractors in support of contingency operations. Planners and contracting officers should

consult with their servicing legal office to ensure all applicable agreements have been considered and reviewed. When feasible, the Department of Defense, coordinating with the Department of State, will negotiate agreements that address the status of contractor personnel. Ideally, contractor personnel should be given the same status as DOD civilians for the purpose of providing operational support to US forces in accordance with JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.

(25) **Consider establishing a joint contracting office(s) or LPSB** to ensure that a properly coordinated and prioritized contracting management program, in line with warfighting concerns, exists. They should be staffed by personnel from all the Services and warranted contracting officers operating in the AO (to include linguists and interpreters when required). **The joint contracting office or LPSB would be responsible for the following:**

(a) Providing coordination and cooperation among Services that maintain parallel contracting organizations within the AO (to preclude inter-Service competition for local supplies or services) and also obtaining the most advantageous prices through consolidation of requirements to more effectively utilize scarce personnel resources.

(b) Establishing coordination and cooperation with civil affairs, finance and accounting activities, and legal support.

(c) Ensuring the Federal Acquisition Regulation is followed.

(d) In UN operations, ensuring contracting will be accomplished and funded through the UN logistic system to the maximum extent possible.

(e) Providing guidance on the consolidation of purchases.

(f) Identifying contracting issues that may affect other unified commands to the appropriate Joint Staff office of primary responsibility.

(g) Assessing the impact of a potential loss of contractors performing essential services and planning.

(h) Coordinating with US Embassies and host countries for contracting of supplies, services, and operations by contractors performing under US contracts.

(i) Eliminating duplication by arranging for single-Service contracting assignments for specified supplies and services, when appropriate.

(j) Providing an exchange of information among contracting activities covering such matters as sources of supply, prices, and contractor performance.

(k) Developing and issuing command contracting policy covering matters unique to that command, or authorizing subordinate commands to issue such policies unique to their operational area.

(l) Providing support to the Joint Logistic Board in addressing assigned projects on studies that involve acquisition and/or contracting policies and procedures affecting the unified commands.

(m) Developing policies and procedures that continually improve the coordination of contract administration services performed overseas.

(n) Distributing LPSB summaries to other commands to share information on contracting issues of mutual interest.

(o) Establishing procedures to coordinate procurement with the supply operations of the command or area.

(p) Prescribing payment procedures consistent with currency-control requirements and international agreements.

(q) Promulgating, as necessary, joint classification and compensation guides governing wages, living allowances, and other benefits for third-country national and indigenous employees, in coordination with appropriate agencies.

5. Laws and Regulations

a. Theater contracting involves three main bodies of law: international, HN, and US law. **The JFLCC must ensure that a Judge Advocate or legal counsel is consulted at the outset and is involved in planning and reviews of all OPLANs and OPORDs** to ensure compliance with various international, US, and HN laws and applicable treaties, SOFAs, status of mission agreements, memoranda of understanding, and memoranda of agreements.

b. The type and quality of support that a contractor provides is similar to that provided by military CS and CSS units. However, there are some fundamental differences that commanders and their staffs must be aware of. These differences include the following:

(1) **Contractors perform only tasks specified in contracts.** "Other duties as assigned" does not apply in a contract environment.

(2) **Contractors and their employees are not combatants, but civilians "authorized" to accompany the force in the field.** Authorization to accompany the force is demonstrated by the possession of a DD Form 489 (Geneva Conventions Identity Card for Persons who Accompany the Armed Forces). **This status must not be jeopardized by the ways in which they provide contracted support.**

(3) **Contractor status as civilians accompanying the force in the field is clearly defined in the Geneva Conventions and other international agreements.** They are generally defined as persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof and are responsible for the welfare of the armed forces.

c. **Contractors are expected to be self-sufficient, handling all actions necessary to perform under the terms and conditions of the contract without significant assistance from the government.** However, in some circumstances, it is appropriate and necessary for the government to provide support to a contractor when deployed into an AO. Government-furnished support may be appropriate if it is less expensive than contractor-provided support. **Additionally, government-furnished support may be necessary when the government controls the support needed or is the only source of support, such as transportation within the AOR.**

6. Acquisition, Cross-Service, and Host-Nation Agreements

a. **Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.** ACSAs are flexible bilateral agreements that may be used for the purpose of obtaining HNS (or support from other coalition countries). **ACSAs provide combatant commanders with alternative, potentially more efficient sources of logistic support to US forces during deployments and contingency operations.** They have been successfully employed during Operations DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE, JOINT ENDEAVOR, and IRAQI FREEDOM.

b. HN, FN, and cross-service support agreements exist with numerous countries. New HN and cross-service support agreements may be negotiated for a specific operation. **These agreements permit acquisitions and transfers of specific categories of logistic support to take advantage of existing stocks in the supply systems of the United States and allied nations.** The operational-level commander must carefully weigh the risks associated with HNS against using US forces to provide the support. HNS is an excellent source of common support, but is very theater and situation dependent. Available support depends on the geographical area, prior agreements, and friendliness of the nations in the area, and the nation's willingness and ability to provide it at the time it is needed. In some potential theaters of operation, agreements may exist between the United States and the HN. In others, no nation may be friendly to the United States, in which case no HNS will be available--at least not initially.

c. Providing support to the JFLCC and its subordinates may require contracting interaction with foreign governments, commercial entities, NGOs, and international organizations. Contracting can be an effective force multiplier of CSS for deployed forces. When properly used, contracting is another essential tool of the JFLCC in support of the mission. **Contracting can bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic support units can deploy or before scheduled LOGCAP, CONCAP, AFCAP, ACSA, or FN resources can provide support.** It also is valuable where no FN agreements exist, or where FN agreements do not provide for the supplies or services required. This also requires close coordination with civil affairs, finance and accounting activities, and legal support.

7. References

a. DODI 1000.13, *Identification (ID) Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Dependents, and Other Eligible Individuals,* 5 Dec 97

b. DODI 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential Contractor Services During Crises,* 6 Nov 90

c. DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces*

d. CJCSM 3150.13, *Joint Reporting Structure -- Personnel Manua*l, August 1, 1999

e. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,* 6 Apr 2000

f. JP 4-01.8, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration*, 13 June 2000

g. JP 4-04, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support*, 27 Sep 2001

h. JP 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operation*, 11 Jun 2001

i. JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*, 25 Sep 2002.

j. FM 3-100.21, *Contractors on the Battlefield*.

ANNEX F

INTERAGENCY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COORDINATION

1. General

Interagency coordination occurs between agencies of the US Government (USG) including the Department of Defense for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, **intergovernmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) coordination** refer to coordination between elements of DOD and IGOs and NGOs to achieve an objective. An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], United Nations [UN]). NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. NGOs may be local, national, or transnational organizations (e.g., American Red Cross, International Red Cross).

2. Engagement

Participating OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs should be part of the land component's collaborative planning and coordination efforts. However, the bounds of engagement will be approved by the CCDR. Ideally, and in concert with the higher headquarters, the JFLCC will seek to establish planning and coordination relationships with selected US government (USG) departments and agencies (Department of State [DOS], Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], US Agency For International Development [USAID], Department of Justice, Department of Transportation) as early as possible in plan development. The transition from hostilities to stability will, in large part, rest with how effective the capabilities of these OGAs can be brought to bear in the operational area. Likewise, early and close coordination with IGOs and NGOs will facilitate a more effective transition. **Each community offers particular coordination challenges through which the JFLCC will have to work.**

a. **OGAs.** USG organizations outside the bounds of the Department of Defense have different lines of authority and different priorities. There is little over-arching statutory direction that defines and codifies roles and responsibilities of OGAs relative to support to the Department of Defense and the CCDR in campaign planning and execution. However, increasingly there is a realization in the USG that our national security must have more of the "D," "I," and "E" in the DIME construct. What that means for the JFLCC is perhaps better reception by the OGAs. Given the lack of defined roles and authorities, establishing informal coordination linkages may be sufficient in the beginning to sort out who can be expected to bring what to the land operation. **The JFLCC should seek out connectivity with the participating OGAs, but keep the CCDR informed.**

b. **IGOs.** These organizations have well-defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to fully participate in planning and coordination. The extent of IGO cooperation with the land component will vary and will be contingent on the nature of the mission and US military's role (i.e., belligerent, peacekeeper, provider of aid). Although appropriate IGOs may participate at some level in defining the problem, ultimately their goals and objectives are independent of the land component.

c. **NGOs.** These organizations pose another unique challenge. Fully recognizing their dependence on the land component for access, and almost always, security, they still must retain their "neutral and independent status." The JFLCC is well served by working these organizations into "stability" phase planning and execution. The objective should be to use them as force multipliers as soon as security conditions permit, however, they will be reluctant to appear under the control and direction of military authorities. The JFLCC, supported by the proper OGAs (DOS, USAID), can effectively work through these challenges by sharing as much as OPSEC will allow regarding land operation objectives, the security situation, and planned CMO. The JFLCC and staff should diligently protect and project the image of these organizations as "neutral and independent," even as informal coordination lines are opened.

3. Key Interagency Organizations

Developing relationships with the organizations listed below prior to hostilities offers an important opportunity to more effectively conduct shaping and theater security cooperation activities. Further, it will facilitate support relationships should combat operations be required.

a. **The Security Assistance Organization (SAO) is a joint organization.** The chief of the US diplomatic mission directs and supervises the SAO chief to accomplish the SAO's security assistance mission. The geographic CCDR commands the SAO in all matters that are not functions of the chief of the US diplomatic mission. Although subordinate to the CCDR, the JFLCC should take full advantage of the country expertise found in these organizations. Their expertise can help the JFLCC better understand how specific countries in the AOR will respond to coalition operations, can facilitate intelligence collection, and can offer insights on the consequences of combat operations and how best to mitigate those consequences in the "stabilize" phase of a campaign.

b. **Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).** This Department of State office leads, coordinates, and institutionalizes the USG's civilian capacity to prepare for posthostilities situations. S/CRS helps stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. S/CRS coordinates and integrates USG civilian stabilization and reconstruction activities undertaken by experts in other offices, agencies, and departments to ensure unity of effort, provide implementers with more effective and rapid response capabilities, identify gaps, and remove barriers. S/CRS has established standing forums for consultation; planning; developing, coordinating, and implementing policies; and managing operations. Since its inception in August 2004, S/CRS, in cooperation with OGAs, is assessing the capabilities of the USG, private sector, IGOs, and NGOs.

c. **The CIA coordinates the intelligence activities of other US departments and agencies and provides dedicated assistance to the CCDR during the preparation for and execution of campaigns.** This support includes operational as well as intelligence capabilities. The extent of the relationship that the JFLCC has with the CIA will be determined in large part by the CCDR. The JFLCC should request DIRLAUTH with the CIA and as early as possible. Not only will the CIA play an important role in campaign planning and during sustained combat, but it can be a major contributor during the "stability" and "enable civil authority" phases as well. The JFLCC must carefully consider how his staff will interface with the CIA. It is generally believed that the JFLCC intelligence directorate should be the single entry point, but recent experience suggests otherwise. The CIA has operational capabilities that are separate and distinct from its intelligence capabilities, and it is those that must be properly integrated and synchronized by the JFLCC operations directorate.

d. **USAID supervises and gives general direction on all nonmilitary assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 480, and related legislation.** This organization will play a large role in posthostilities and the JFLCC should get them involved in planning and execution as soon as possible. The CCDR will determine the scope of this linkage and may want to keep most of the interface at his level. If that is the case, the JFLCC must place liaison in the CCDR's staff to influence how, what, and when USAID will make their contributions. They are a very powerful force multiplier and can significantly influence how well the latter phases of the campaign are performed.

e. **NGOs.** The number of NGOs in the AO may run into the hundreds. **Over 350 such agencies are registered with the USAID.** As mentioned above, the first line of security for most NGOs is adherence to a strict principle of neutrality. **Actions that blur the distinction between relief workers and military forces may be perceived as a threat to this principle, resulting in increased risk to civilian aid workers and less cooperation with the land component.**

(1) The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience make NGOs valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward the operation. While some organizations seek the protection of the armed forces or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be fear of compromising their position with the local populace or suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. **Staffs should consult these organizations, along with the host-nation government (if applicable), to identify local issues and concerns that the proposed public affairs guidance should reflect.**

(2) **In most situations, the NGOs need logistics, communication, and security capabilities.** In such missions, however, the role of the armed forces should be to enable--not perform--NGOs' tasks. Often US military assistance has proven to be the critical difference that enabled success of an operation. Mutually beneficial arrangements between the land forces and NGOs may be critical to the success of the operation.

f. **UN.** The UN headquarters coordinates peace operations and humanitarian assistance around the world. It also will be heavily involved in the latter phases of a campaign and it is helpful if the JFLCC can establish at least informal linkages. The two organizations most likely to be on the ground are the World Food program and the UN High Commission for Refugees. The degree of connectivity and cooperation the land component has with these organizations will be determined in large part by the political and diplomatic circumstances surrounding the military action. However, should conditions not be ideal at the national and international level, there are professionals in these organizations at the "tactical level" that are committed to providing relief and assistance.

4. Organizing for Interagency Success

a. Obtain clarity from the CCDR on the extent of JFLCC coordination authority/DIRLAUTH with the OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs; it may vary from organization to organization.

b. Identify all of the interagency partners with which the JFLCC should be coordinating.

c. Determine the role and scope of the OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs in supporting the land operations plan (i.e., what does the land component want them to provide and what is it they will require from the land component?)

d. Fully leverage the JIACG that will be established at the combatant command.

e. Closely coordinate with the OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to determine the practical objectives and COAs for their efforts.

f. Develop a clear understanding of the desired strategic end state with the OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs.

g. Identify the potential obstacles to unity of effort.

h. Identify the required resources and suppliers.

i. Consider establishing interagency assessment teams that can rapidly deploy to evaluate the situation.

j. Include interagency partners in ongoing operational planning.

5. Coordination Mechanisms

a. **Interagency Liaison officers.** The JFLCC should assign a liaison or liaison team as appropriate to OGAs. Liaison officers (LNOs) are a focal point for communications in interagency coordination. Civil affairs or special forces liaison elements may be available to serve as LNOs. Using contracted interpreters to augment liaison teams may be another option, although in some cases their loyalties may affect reliability. Liaison teams are formed when a

24-hour representational capability is required. Teams are tailored to the specific situation and may require CJCS-controlled communications assets. Individual LNOs are assigned when 24-hour representation is not required and adequate communications with the JFLCC staff are available. **LNOs centralize direction and facilitate understanding while conducting operations with external agencies or forces.** Supported agencies, departments, and organizations need a much clearer understanding of the military planning process. This is best accomplished by direct liaison. LNOs normally work closely with the operations officer to seek and resolve interagency problems. **Liaison teams should establish authoritative representation of the commander, accurately interpret the commander's intentions, and explain the capabilities of the force.** Conversely, the teams interpret the intentions and capabilities of the nonmilitary organizations. Liaison teams provide input while developing courses of action for future operations. They also work to maximize current operations through proactive interaction with the agencies, departments, and organizations to which they are attached.

b. **CMOC.** The number of CMOCs supporting a given operation may vary based on mission analysis. **Commanders at any echelon may establish a CMOC.** The decision to establish a CMOC stems from civil-military coordination requirements. The distance from the headquarters serving a particular geographic or tactical area can also influence the decision. **A JFLCC may establish sector CMOCs.** A CMOC usually conducts daily meetings to identify needs and available resources. The PAO should attend daily CMOC meetings. As an active member of the CMOC, the PAO must ensure that member agencies agree on message and press releases and develop a group consensus in response to media queries. **Although each agency's message need not be identical, agencies must not contradict each other.**

(1) **Purpose.** A CMOC provides a way to develop a relationship between military forces, OGAs, civilian authorities, NGOs, IGOs, and the population.

(2) **Composition.** The organization of the CMOC is operational area- and mission-dependent—flexible in size and composition. See Figure F-1 for a notional CMOC organization.

(3) **Authority.** The CMOC is a coordinating body and generally neither sets policy nor conducts operations.

(4) **Functions.** A CMOC conducts meetings as required to highlight requirements and to identify organizations able and willing to meet these needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate representative for action. Figure F-2 lists some CMOC functions.



Figure F-1. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

c. The **Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)** is an interagency staff group, normally found at the combatant command level that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. **The JFLCC must have highly capable staff representation in the JIACG.** Composed of US government (USG) civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR, the JIACG provides the command with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other civilian departments and agencies. The JIACG complements the interagency coordination that takes place at the national strategic level through the National Security Council System. JIACG members participate in deliberate, crisis, and theater security cooperation and transition planning and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize joint force operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments. Nevertheless, the JIACG likely will not be fully staffed by the. Accordingly, the JFLCC may need to establish personal or land component staff reinforcing links with the OGAs so unity of effort (and purpose) can be realized.

CIVIL–MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER FUNCTIONS

- Providing nonmilitary agencies with a coordinating point and information exchange for activities and matters that are civilian related.
- Coordinating relief efforts with US and/or multinational commands, United Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies.
- Providing interface with State Department Public Affairs officers, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Country Team.
- Assisting in the transfer of operational responsibility to nonmilitary agencies.
- Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command.
- Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support.
- Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service components.
- Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support.
- Coordinating with disaster assistance response team deployed by USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
- Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers.
- Convening follow-on assessment groups.

Figure F-2. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions

d. **Other Coordination Centers.** A mechanism for coordinating the activities of IGOs and NGOs may be established by the HN or intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN, NATO). **Some examples are outlined in Table F-1. The JFLCC and land component staff, liaisons, and subordinate forces likely will coordinate with and/or respond to requests from these organizations.**

Coordinating Center	Description
Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)	This center is usually established by a host-nation government or UN. The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy in large-scale FHA operations. It is responsible for policy making and coordinating, but does not exercise command and control. The HOC may submit requests for support to a commander through a CMOC. HOCs were established in the UN operations in Somalia and Rwanda.

On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC)	The OSOCC is a support organization to a HOC. It assists in gathering, evaluating, collecting, and disseminating HOC information. During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the UN deployed an OSOCC—which had essentially the same functions as a CMOC—and helped transmit CMOC responsibilities to the UN.
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Center	CIMIC is a NATO doctrinal concept that roughly equates to the US term "civil-military operations." Thus, when the NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina established a center for coordination with the NGOs community, it was known as the CIMIC center rather than a CMOC, but it performed the same functions.

Table F-1. Interagency Coordinating Centers

ANNEX G

PHASES OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

1. Phase I - Situation Monitoring

a. The joint force commander (JFC) (i.e., supported combatant commander) monitors his area of responsibility, identifies that an event has occurred, recognizes that an event is a problem or a potential problem, reports the event, and assesses the event.

b. President, Secretary of Defense, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directs the initial focus of crisis action planning (CAP) to help resolve the situation to the appropriate JFC.

c. The JFC provides an assessment of the event to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. A course of action (COA) also may be submitted depending on the time sensitivity of the situation. This may be the only alternative considered by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when making the decision to develop military options to resolve a situation.

e. The JFC may issue a directive (e.g., warning order) to subordinate units to keep them apprised of the situation and potential operations.

f. **The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) may be established to monitor the situation and make preparatory plans to commence CAP.** More direct involvement of the JFLCC will depend on the JFC's guidance. Land component command monitoring of the situation is particularly important for the J-2. The JFLCC assembles a special team(s) to monitor the situation and develop military options for its resolution. A joint planning group or similar team at the land component command level may be formed to accomplish these activities.

2. Phase II - Planning

a. The Planning Phase includes COA and detailed plan development.

b. COA development begins with a decision to develop possible military COAs, normally transmitted by a planning directive (e.g., warning order) to the JFC and other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community. A CJCS alert or planning order also may be issued depending on the situation, and ends when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyzes the COAs contained in the supported commander’s estimate and presents them to the President and Secretary of Defense for selection. The JFC, in turn, issues a planning directive to the land component command and other subordinate units.

c. **The JFLCC provides information by means of a planning directive to the land component command Service and functional components for their action.** The JFLCC also

forwards higher headquarters' directives to his Service and functional components, as appropriate.

d. The JFLCC also continues to monitor the situation and review any existing documentation (plans and area studies) pertaining to the area in question.

e. **The JFC conducts concurrent and parallel planning with the JFLCC to facilitate more rapid employment of the land component command.** Force requirements established and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) development commences for each COA (time permitting).

f. The JFLCC conducts similar concurrent and parallel planning with his Service and functional components.

g. The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) reviews the proposed COAs and prepares deployment estimates. When possible, USTRANSCOM or its representative should participate in the development of COAs.

h. **The JFLCC evaluates requirements (forces and equipment) for the land component command and discusses these issues with the JFC.**

i. Selection of a COA by the Secretary of Defense initiates further execution planning. Upon receipt of the Secretary of Defense decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an alert order. This order is approved by the Secretary of Defense and issued to the appropriate JFC and other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community to announce the COA selection by the Secretary of Defense and to initiate execution planning. These actions already may have taken place based on the situation.

j. **The JFC issues a directive (e.g., alert or planning order) to the JFLCC to commence detailed execution planning.** Again, this already may have occurred, based on the situation.

k. The JFLCC commences more detailed execution planning. Determination of land component command force requirements continues, as well as its overall organization.

l. **The JFLCC issues a directive (e.g., alert or planning order) to his components to commence execution planning.** As previously stated, the JFLCC does not need to repeat all that is stated in the directives from higher authority; again, provide only what is needed to his components. **It also would be prudent for the JFLCC to make directives and other information from higher authority available to the components.**

m. The Secretary of Defense approved COA is transformed into an operation order (OPORD) by the JFC.

n. **The JFLCC develops an OPORD based on the JFC's OPORD--**JOPES procedures are used to develop the OPORD.

o. **The JFLCC works with his components to develop unsourced force requirements and have them entered into the appropriate TPFDD and coordinates these efforts with the JFC, as appropriate.** As directed by the JFC, supporting commanders, component commanders, and providing organizations source the force requirements and validate the sourcing and accurate cargo and personnel detail to the JFC. **The JFLCC monitors the sourcing process and makes recommendations to the JFC to ensure land component command operational needs are satisfied.** The land components must be familiar with TPFDD preparation.

p. The JFC validates the TPFDD to the Commander, USTRANSCOM--all changes to the validated TPFDD by sourcing commanders and organizations must be coordinated through the JFC, who revalidates the TPFDD prior to any action by Commander, USTRANSCOM.

q. **The JFLCC issues the OPORD to his components.**

3. Phase III - Execution

a. The Execution Phase begins when the President or Secretary of Defense decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis.

b. Only the President or Secretary of Defense can authorize the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue an execute order that directs the supported commander to initiate military action and conduct military operations.

c. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff execute order directs the deployment and employment of forces, defines the timing for the initiation of operations, and conveys guidance not provided earlier.

d. **The JFC issues an execute order to the JFLCC that directs the execution of the OPORD.**

e. **The JFLCC issues an execute order to his components and other commands as necessary.** As with other directives, the JFLCC provides in the execute order only that information required by his components. Retransmission of higher authority directives to the components should continue.

f. Execution continues until the operation is terminated, the mission is accomplished, or the mission is revised.

g. Figure G-1 below depicts the CAP process.



Figure G-1. Three Phases of Crisis Action Planning and Key Documents

ANNEX H

REACHBACK CONTACTS

1. Joint Reachback Contacts

a. Joint Warfighting Center

Chief, Joint Doctrine Group
USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center
116 Lake View Parkway
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

POC: LTC James W. Purvis
DSN: 668-6742, Comm (757) 203-6742
NIPRNET: james.purvis@jfcom.mil
SIPRNET: jw119@hq.jfcom.smil.mil

b. Joint Doctrine Joint Electronic Library

NIPRNET: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.html
SIPRNET: http://nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/dj9j7ead/doctrine/index.html

2. US Army Forces Reachback Contacts

a. US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Requirements Integration Directorate
Joint and Allied Doctrine Division (ATFC-RD)
429 Fenwick Road, Modular 2
Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000

POC: LTC Karl Wingenbach
DSN: 680-3892, Comm: (757) 788-3892
NIPRNET: wingenbachk@Monroe.army.mil

b. US Army War College

Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations
US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks
Carlisle, PA 17013-5210

(717) 245-3862

3. US Marine Corps Forces Reachback Contact

a. **Marine Corps Combat Development Command**

Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Joint Doctrine Branch
3300 Russell Road
Suite 318A
Quantico, VA 22134-5021

POC: LtCol David Pere
DSN: 278-2872, Comm: (703) 784-2872
NIPRNET: david.pere@usmc.mil

ANNEX I

REFERENCES

DOD Directives

DODI 1000.13, *Identification (ID) Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Dependents, and Other Eligible Individuals*

DODD 1100.18, *Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning*

DODI 1100.19, *Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning Policies and Procedures*

DODI 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises*

DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces*

CJCS Directives

CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), vol I, (Planning Policies and Procedures)*

CJCSM 3122.02C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), vol III, (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution)*

CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, vol II, Planning Formats and Guidance*

CJCSM 3150.13, *Joint Reporting Structure – Personnel Manual*

CJCSM 3500.04, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*

CJCSM 3500.05A, *Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*

Joint Publications

JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*

JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*

JP 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*

JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*

JP 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*

JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*

JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*

JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, *vols I & II*

JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*

JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*

JP 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations*

JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*

JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*

JP 3-33, *Joint Force Capabilities*

JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*

JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*

JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*

JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*

JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*

JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*

JP 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*

JP 3-63, *Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations*

JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*

JP 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control*

JP 4-01.8, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration*

JP 4-04, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support*

JP 4-05, *Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning*

JP 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations*

JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*

JP 4-09, *Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution*

JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*

JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*

JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*

JP 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support to Joint Operations*

Multi-Service Publications

FM 2-31/MCWP 3-40/7, *Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook (JFLCC)*

FM 3-99.3/MCRP 5-1A, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force Liaison Integration*

US Army Publications

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*

FM 3-93, *The Army in Theater Operations*

FM 3-100.21, *Contractors on the Battlefield*

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ANNEX J

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS AND USER NOTES

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College and Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA 17013-5210. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for this publication is the Director, Joint Force Land Component Commander Course, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College.

3. Change Recommendations

a. **Urgent Changes.** Urgent changes to this publication may be submitted telephonically to the above OPR at (717) 245-3862.

b. **Routine Changes.** Routine changes to this publication may be submitted in writing to the mailing address in Paragraph 1 above.

USER NOTES

DATE	NOTES

DATE	NOTES

GLOSSARY

PART 1--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC	area air defense commander
AADP	area air defense plan
AAMDC	United States Army Air and Missile Defense Command
AAW	antiair warfare
AC	Active Component
ACA	airspace control authority
ACCE	air component coordination element
ACE	aviation combat element
ACM	airspace coordination measure
ACO	airspace control order
ACP	airspace control plan
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
A/DACG	arrival/departure airfield control group
ADVON	advance echelon
AMOCC	air mobility operations control center
AO	area of operations
AOC	air operations center
AOR	area of responsibility
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
ARFOR	United States Army forces
ASCC	United States Army Service component command
A/SPOD	aerial/sea port of debarkation
AT	antiterrorism
ATO	air tasking order
BCD	battlefield coordination detachment
BDA	battle damage assessment
BCS	battlespace communications system
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CA	combat assessment; civil affairs
CAB	combat assessment board
CAS	close air support
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives
CCC	coalition coordination center
CCIRs	commander's critical information requirements
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	combat identification
(C)JPG	(coalition) joint planning group

CLRC	coalition logistics readiness center
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CNA	computer network attack
CND	computer network defense
CNE	computer network exploitation
CNO	computer network operations
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COG	center of gravity
COM	collection operations management
COMAFFOR	commander, United States Air Force forces
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
COR	contracting officer's representative; concept of requirements
CP	command post
CRC	control and reporting center (USAF)
CRM	collection requirements management
CS	combat support
CSS	combat service support
CT	counterterrorism
CTCB	coalition targeting coordination board
CTL	candidate target list
CUL	common-user logistics
DAL	defended assets list
DCA	defensive counterair
DCG-O	Deputy Commanding General-Operations
DEB	daily effects board
DEPORD	deployment order
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRINT	Director of Intelligence (USMC)
DIRMOBFOR	director of mobility forces
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DS	direct support
EA	effects assessment
EFST	essential fire support tasks
EIOT	essential information operations tasks
EST	essential stability tasks
EW	electronic warfare
EWG	effects working group
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	fires coordination center

FECC	fires and effects coordination center (US Army)
FFCC	force fires coordination center (USMC)
FFIR	friendly force information requirements
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FM	field manual
FN	foreign nation
FNS	foreign nation support
FP	force protection
FPCON	force protection condition
FPWG	force protection working group
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
FSCL	fire support coordination line
FSCM	fire support coordination measure
GAT	guidance, apportionment, and targeting
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GCE	ground combat element
GPS	global positioning system
GS	general support
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HPT	high priority target
HUMINT	human intelligence
I&W	indications and warning
IADS	integrated air defense system
IAW	in accordance with
ID	identification
IGOs	intergovernmental organizations
IM	information management
IMINT	imagery intelligence
INSCOM	Intelligence and Security Command (US Army)
IO	information operations
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JAOC	joint air operations area
JDEC	joint document exploitation center
JECB	joint effects coordination board
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFRG-II	joint force requirements generator II
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander

JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIPB	joint intelligence of the battlespace
JLSP	Joint Logistics Support Plan
JMC	joint movement center
JMD	joint manning document
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPP	Joint Operation Planning Process
JP	joint publication
JPG	joint planning group
JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
JRAC	joint rear area coordinator
JRSOI	joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JRSOI&T	joint reception, staging, onward movement, integration, and training
JS	Joint Staff
JSA	joint security area
JSC	joint security coordinator
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTAC	joint tactical attack controller
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JTF	joint task force
JTL	joint theater logistics
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LCC	land component command
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	line of communications
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MARFOR	United States Marine Corps forces
MARLNO	United States Marine Corps liaison officer
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MCIA	United States Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MCO	major combat operation
MEA	munitions effectiveness assessment
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MHE	materials handling equipment
MI	military intelligence (US Army)
MNF	multinational force
MNFC	multinational force commander
MNL	multinational logistics
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOG	maximum (aircraft) on ground
MOP	measure of performance

MSC	major subordinate command
MSR	main supply route
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NFA	no-fire area
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
NGOs	nongovernmental organizations
NIPRNET	non-secure internet protocol router network
NIST	national intelligence support team
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
OCA	offensive counterair
OEF	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
OFPB	operational force protection board
OGAs	other governmental organizations
OIF	Operation IRAQI FREDOM
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs office
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PL	phase line
PRCC	personnel recovery coordination cell
PREPO	prepositioning force
PSYOP	psychological operations
RC	Reserve Component
RFA	restricted fire area
RFF	request for forces
RFI	request for information
ROE	rules of engagement
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SADC	sector air defense commander (USMC)
SEAD	suppression of enemy air defenses
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIPRNET	SECRET internet protocol router network
SJA	staff judge advocate
SMO	strategic mobility officer

SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SOLE	special operations liaison element
SOR	statement of requirements
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SSE	sensitive site exploitation
TA	technical agreement; technical arrangement
TAAMDCOORD	theater Army air and missile defense coordinator
TACC	tanker/airlift control center; tactical air command center (USMC)
TACON	tactical control
TAOC	tactical air operation center
TC-AIMS II	Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System II
TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program
TET	targeting effects team
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL	time-phased force deployment list
TSC	theater sustainment command
TSCC	theater sustainment command center
TST	time-sensitive target
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operation Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VAT	vulnerability assessment team
VIP	very important person
WMD	weapon of mass destruction

PART 2--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

air component coordination element. An Air Force component element that interfaces and provides liaison with the joint force land component commander, or commander Army forces. The air component coordination element is the senior Air Force element assisting the joint force land component commander, or commander Army forces in planning air component supporting and supported requirements. The air component coordination element is responsible to the joint force air component commander and coordinates with the joint force land component commander's staff, representing the joint force air component commander's needs in either a supporting or supported role. Also called **ACCE**. (JP 1-02)

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02)

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander's headquarters. Also called **AADC**. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called **AO**. (JP 1-02)

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. (JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems

(air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called **BDA**. (JP 1-02)

battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JP 1-02)

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called **CMO**. (JP 1-02)

close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational

control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM**. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. Also called **CA**. (JP 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies.) (JP 1-02)

commander's critical information requirements. A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decisionmaking process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. Also called **CCIR**. (JP 1-02)

deployment. 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. **2.** The movement of forces within operational areas. **3.** The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. **4.** The relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (JP 1-02)

directive authority for logistics. Combatant commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. (JP 1-02)

director of mobility forces. Normally a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility or joint operations area and possesses an extensive background in air mobility operations. When established, the director of mobility forces serves as the designated agent for all air mobility issues in the area of responsibility or joint operations area, and for other duties as directed. The director of mobility forces exercises coordinating authority between the air operations center (or appropriate theater command and control node), the tanker airlift control center, the air mobility operations control center (when established and when supporting subordinate command objectives), and the joint movement center, in order to expedite the resolution of air mobility issues. The director of mobility forces may be sourced from the theater's organizations or US Transportation Command. Additionally, the director of mobility forces, when designated, will ensure the effective integration of intertheater and intratheater air mobility operations, and facilitate the conduct of intratheater air mobility operations. Also called **DIRMOBFOR**. (JP 1-02)

direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. Also called **DS**. (JP 1-02)

fires. The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (JP 1-02)

flexible deterrent option. A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the right signal. The flexible deterrent option is the means by which the various deterrent options available to a commander (such as economic, diplomatic, political, and military measures) are implemented into the planning process. (JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

force closure. The point in time when a supported joint force commander determines that sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned operational area to carry out assigned tasks. (JP 1-02)

force tracking. The identification of units and their specific modes of transport during movement to an objective area. (JP 1-02)

force projection. The ability to project the military element of national power from the continental United States (CONUS) or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater. (JP 1-02)

general support. 1. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. 2. A tactical artillery mission. Also called **GS**. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called **HNS**. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support agreement. Basic agreement normally concluded at government-to government or government- to-combatant commander level. These agreements may include general agreements, umbrella agreements, and memoranda of understanding. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called **IO**. (JP 1-02)

integration. 1. In force protection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution. **2.** The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. **3.** In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1-02)

intermediate staging base. A temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the host nation. Also called **ISB**. (JP 1-02)

intratheater airlift. Airlift conducted within a theater. Assets assigned to a geographic combatant commander or attached to a subordinate joint force commander normally conduct intratheater airlift operations. Intratheater airlift provides air movement and delivery of personnel and equipment directly into objective areas through air landing, airdrop, extraction, or other delivery techniques as well as the air logistic support of all theater forces, including those engaged in combat operations, to meet specific theater objectives and requirements. During large-scale operations, US Transportation Command assets may be tasked to augment intratheater airlift operations, and may be temporarily attached to a joint force commander. Formerly referred to as theater airlift. (JP 1-02)

intertheater airlift. The common-user airlift linking theaters to the continental United States and to other theaters as well as the airlift within the continental United States. The majority of these air mobility assets is assigned to the Commander, United States Transportation Command. Because of the intertheater ranges usually involved, intertheater airlift is normally conducted by the heavy, longer range, intercontinental airlift assets but may be augmented with shorter range aircraft when required. Formerly referred to as "strategic airlift." (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFACC**. (JP 1-02)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFLCC**. (JP 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made

available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFMCC**. (JP 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFSOCC**. (JP 1-02)

joint movement center. The center established to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned operational area, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a joint force commander. Also called **JMC**. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A system that provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and combatant command-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations. Also called **JOPES**. (JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called **JOA**. (JP 1-02)

joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. A phase of joint force projection occurring in the operational area. This phase comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. Also called **JRSOI**. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for

mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called **JSOA**. (JP 1-02)

joint targeting coordination board. A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called **JTCB**. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called **JTF**. (JP 1-02)

land control operations. The employment of ground forces, supported by naval and air forces (as appropriate) to achieve military objectives in vital land areas. Such operations include destruction of opposing ground forces, securing key terrain, protection of vital land lines of communications, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of land operations. (JP 1-02)

Marine air-ground task force. The Marine Corps principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a combat service support element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. Also called **MAGTF**. (JP 1-02)

Marine expeditionary force. The largest Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and the Marine Corps principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. Also called **MEF**. (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called **MNF**. (JP 1-02)

multinational force commander. A general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander's command authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called **MNFC**. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the framework of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). Also called **NGOs**. (JP 1-02)

onward movement. The relocation of forces capable o meeting the commander's operational requirements to the initial point of their mission execution. This includes the movement of associated Sustainment, equipment, and personnel. (JP 1-02)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. (JP 1-02)

port of debarkation. The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. This may be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation; for unit requirements; it may or may not coincide with the destination. Also called **POD**. (JP 1-02)

port of embarkation. The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. This may be a seaport or aerial port from which personnel and equipment flow to a port of debarkation; for unit and nonunit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin. Also called **POE**. (JP 1-02)

power projection. The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power - political, economic, informational, or military - to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. (JP 1-02)

reception. 1. All ground arrangements connected with the delivery and disposition of air or sea drops. Includes selection and preparation of site, signals for warning and approach, facilitation of secure departure of agents, speedy collection of delivered articles, and their prompt removal to storage places having maximum security. When a group is involved, it may be called a reception committee. **2.** Arrangements to welcome and provide secure quarters or transportation for defectors, escapees, evaders, or incoming agents. **3.** The process of receiving, offloading, marshalling, and transporting of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the strategic and/or intratheater deployment phase to a sea, air, or surface transportation point of debarkation to the marshalling area. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called **ROE**. (JP 1-02)

sensitive site exploitation. A related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to exploit personnel documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents. Also called **SSE**. (JP 1-02)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)

staging. Assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel in preparation for onward movement. The organizing and preparation for movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel at designated areas to incrementally build forces capable of meeting the operational commander's requirements. (JP 1-02)

strategic mobility. The capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called **TACON**. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called **TPFDD**. (JP 1-02)

transportation closure. The actual arrival date of a specified movement requirement at port of debarkation. (JP 1-02)

validate. Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and US Transportation Command that all the information records in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error-free for automation purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs. (JP 1-02)

validation. 1. A process normally associated with the collection of intelligence that provides official status to an identified requirement and confirms that the requirement is appropriate for a given collector and has not been previously satisfied. **2.** In computer modeling and simulation, the process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model or simulation. **3.** Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and US Transportation Command that all the information records in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error free for automation purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs. (JP 1-02)

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