

PEACE & STABILITY OPERATIONS JOURNAL ONLINE

VOLUME 2, ISSUE 1

OCTOBER 2011

THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PEACEKEEPING & STABILITY OPERATIONS INSTITUTE

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**Gangs and Insurgencies:
A Comparative Analysis**



**How Much is Enough? Analyzing Soldier-to-Civilian Ratios
in Occupation**

**The High Cost of Good Intentions:
17 Years of Foreign Aid and State-building in Rwanda**



Microfinance and Small Business

New Media and Conflict


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DIRECTOR'S CORNER

by Colonel Cliff Crofford

October 2011



This issue of the PKSOI Peace and Stability Operations Journal Online is unique because it is the first complete edition of our Journal written entirely by our interns.

We have a robust internship program of both graduate and undergraduate students who are here year-round in three blocks, generally, corresponding to the Spring, Summer, and Fall college semesters. Since 2009, PKSOI has had approximately 60 interns. The largest group each year is here in the summer (19 this year), and it is also the most balanced between graduate and undergraduate students (about 50/50). In the Fall and Spring, we ordinarily have 2-5 interns who tend to be mostly undergraduate students. For more information on PKSOI's internship program, please contact Ms. Karen Finkendiner @ [click here](#).



Of course, none of this would be possible without the support of the academic institutions that entrust us with their students for various periods of time. Some of our contributors are: Tufts, Dickinson, Penn State, Syracuse, Pittsburgh, Georgetown, William and Mary, the Naval Academy, and West Point. Most of our interns are affiliated for an entire semester, but we have others that are here for a period of weeks at various times throughout the summer. We are truly grateful to our many supporting colleges and universities.

Due to space limitations, we were unable to include all intern papers in this issue, or, for that matter, complete papers. Rather, this issue includes a sampling of condensed papers. Our intent is to provide a broad overview of the kinds of questions our interns tackle, their approaches, and conclusions. For a more complete look at our interns' work, we will soon publish an Intern Anthology that will include more of their comprehensive products. In this issue, we strive only to provide a sample of what our interns produce.

Not all of our interns write articles – many work on projects, more operational in nature, that are used in other publications. As an example, Matthew Levenson, a graduate student at the University of Georgia; Kenneth Martin, a doctoral student at Concordia University, Canada; and Michael Busovicki, a

graduate student at the University of Pittsburgh contributed to PKSOI's draft of the Army's Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATP) manuals on Protection of Civilians and Mass Atrocity Response Operations.

This Journal begins with the list of Interns and their project assignments. In the first article, "Gangs and Insurgencies: A Comparative Analysis," Ms. Rachel Baras, uses the urban gangs of Rio de Janeiro and the Taliban as her primary case studies. She concludes with nine major points of comparison to consider when defining problems and contemplating responses.

In the second article, "The High Costs of Good Intentions: 17 Years of Foreign Aid and State-building in Rwanda," Ms. Sara Masciola compares and contrasts Rwanda to Cambodia, Haiti and Bosnia.

Midshipman Jeremy Wallace tackles a difficult subject in "How Much is Enough? Analyzing Soldier-to-Civilian Ratios in Occupation." Although this is a vexing and topical matter, he finds that the U.S. military has struggled with the same question throughout its history.

In "Microfinance and Small Business," Mr. James Pagano tackles the potential empowering effects for women in Afghanistan and Iraq and how the U.S. Military can support these efforts.

Lastly, Mr. Michael Fishman, looks at "New Media and Conflict," another timely area of interest. He provides an overview of how the new media affected recent events in Moldova.

As we round out this quarter's Journal, we are excited to highlight the 17th Annual Conference of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). The U.S. Army War College and PKSOI are delighted to host this event at Carlisle Barracks from 14-18 November 2011. It will be the first time the IAPTC's Annual Conference has ever been held in the United States, and we are looking forward to welcoming our domestic and international partners for this momentous occasion. 

PKSOI INTERN PROJECT ASSIGNMENTS

INTERN/UNIVERSITY	STATUS	PROJECT FOCUS
Rachel Baras Tufts	Undergraduate	Gangs & Insurgencies
Michael Bruno USNA	Undergraduate	History of PKI/PKSOI
Michael Busovicki University of Pittsburgh	Graduate	ATTP Manual
Hai Do University of Pittsburgh	Graduate	Team Leader: Bibliography Project
Michael Fishman Tufts	Undergraduate	Social Networking in Conflict
Sehyoun Han University for Peace (Costa Rica)	Graduate	Policy and Operational Integration
Nathan Hillison Illinois College	Undergraduate	Ad Hoc Mission Specific Teams
Danielle Humphrey University of Pittsburgh	Graduate	Employment Generation in Post Conflict Societies
Kari Kietzer Syracuse University	Graduate	Counter Corruption
Matthew Levenson University of Georgia	Graduate	Protection of Civilians
Kenneth Martin Concordia University (Canada)	Graduate (Ph.D.)	Protection of Civilians
Sarah Masciola University of Pittsburgh	Graduate	Foreign Aid
Rhys McCormick Pennsylvania State University	Undergraduate	Local/State Policing Expertise in Stability Operations
James Pagano Dickinson College	Undergraduate	Micro-Loans
Scott Raymond University of Michigan	Undergraduate	IT Project/Counter Corruption
Andrew Scott Georgetown University	Undergraduate	Disaster Management/Resiliency
Jeremy Wallace USNA	Undergraduate	Ratio of Mil/Civ in Stability Operations
Dionne Whitby Pennsylvania State University	Undergraduate	Analytical Framework for Lessons Learned
Philippa Whybrow University of Lincoln (UK)	Undergraduate	Counter Corruption
Steven Yu Tufts	Undergraduate	Bibliography Project

Gangs and Insurgencies: A Comparative Analysis

Ms. Rachel Baras, Tufts



Introduction

In the midst of a now decade-long Global War on Terror, the U.S. military currently finds itself engaged in conflicts throughout the world. Among others, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Pakistan are some of the most high-profile sites of U.S. military operations. All feature insurgent groups tied to anti-West extremism, which employ mixtures of terrorism and guerrilla warfare to achieve their aims.

In this context, non-state actors have grown in prominence as threats to national security. While non-state actor involvement in war is by no means a “new” occurrence -- examples include the Philippine-American War, Cuban Revolution, and Lebanese Civil War, among others -- the direct challenge of quashing groups like the Taliban and Al Qaeda has highlighted the need to develop U.S. military capacity in a new direction. Most notably, the 2002 National Security Strategy emphasized the need to focus on irregular warfare¹ as a growing threat, as did the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Concurrently, researchers from the military and academia have built connections between the types of conflict falling under the irregular warfare umbrella. Citing the role of the populace, the common links to illegal trafficking, and the associated damage to government legitimacy, researchers have developed a growing body of analysis comparing two types of non-state actors: insurgencies and criminal gangs.

This connection is not necessarily intuitive. Criminal gangs have customarily fallen under the jurisdiction of police, whereas insurgencies are strictly a military matter. Whereas insurgencies are defined by their ideologically-based motives, criminal gangs tend to claim no political motivations whatsoever. And while the power of the insurgency is thought to be inherently conflictual with the government, gangs are oftentimes thought to introduce crime and violence into a community while posing little threat to government sovereignty.

Indeed, if one were to compare the Taliban insurgency of Afghanistan with the drug gangs of Rio de Janeiro, the similarities would seem few and far between. The Taliban has a clear



HELMAND PROVINCE, Afghanistan (May 8, 2009) - An Afghan National Police officer picks up a bag of opium. Afghan National Police officers, along with U.S. Special Operations Soldiers, discovered 600 pounds of opium May 7, 2009, during a cordon and search operation of a known Taliban safe house, collection center and trauma center in Babaji Village, in Afghanistan's Helmand province. Photo by Cpl. Sean K. Harp, U.S. Air Force.

ideology, is strongest in the most rural areas of the country, and makes an effort to come into contact with and attack Coalition Forces and Afghan government officials. In contrast, the drug gangs of Rio de Janeiro have no clear political aspirations, are dependent on their urban environments, and while occasionally terrorizing the populace through attacks on public transportation (usually in response to the promise of hardline security policies in the run up to elections), they rarely initiate conflict with the government itself outside of their areas of control.

Comparing gangs and insurgencies necessitates a familiarity with their differences and commonalities, and deep understanding of the ultimate limits to comparison. In the full paper (to be published in the soon-to-be-released PKSOI Intern Anthology), the urban gangs of Rio de Janeiro and the Taliban insurgency were used as the primary case studies. The Rio de Janeiro gangs were chosen because of their engagement in large-scale, illicit commerce, because of their influence over their territories, and because their origins illuminate the societal factors that contributed to the consolidation of their power in

the city. Meanwhile, the Taliban insurgency is useful as a model because of the centrality of ideology to its mission, its threat to the Afghan government, and ties to the populace. Of course, these two cases were also chosen for their relevance today: with the World Cup and Olympics taking place in Rio de Janeiro in 2014 and 2016, respectively, the world is watching to see how Rio de Janeiro tackles the security situation within the favelas; likewise, as the war in Afghanistan now nears its tenth year, the international community and Afghan government's continuing efforts to defeat the Taliban will surely be used as a reference for counterinsurgency in the years to come.²

LITERATURE REVIEW: EXISTENT COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF GANGS AND INSURGENCIES

The purposes and functions of gangs and insurgencies are not straightforward, with the qualities traditionally attributed to one increasingly encroaching on the other, and vice versa. Numerous scholars have investigated this trend, most notably Max Manwaring, John P. Sullivan, Nicholas Haussler, and Steven Metz.

In "Street Gangs: the New Urban Insurgency", Max Manwaring argues that because gangs undermine the authority of the government as the sole enforcer of law, gangs therefore threaten state sovereignty. In the long term, he rationalizes, "these non-state actors must eventually seize political power to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want." Because gangs control "ungoverned" places, infiltrate and support corruption within the government, and weaken security forces, they pose security threats that are comparable to those of typical insurgencies.³ According to this logic, it is insignificant whether this threat arises due to political versus commercial motivations – the political impacts have the potential to be the same.

As the author of numerous articles and papers on this subject, John P. Sullivan echoes Manwaring's argument. He cites the role of the gang as conflict mediator, tax collector, and "law" enforcer as specific ways in which gangs undermine the government. In some areas, gangs go to the extent of defending their territories militarily and making it virtually impossible for state policing forces to enter and impose a state presence.⁴ Unlike Manwaring, however, he does consider overt political aims to be significant to gang evolution as threats. As he writes, the most sophisticated gangs are unique in that "power acquisition, rather than simple market protection, has become a prime concern."⁵ In his work, he focuses on the evolution of gangs from simple to sophisticated and argues that the politicized, sophisticated

gangs are the "new frontier" threat that is closest to insurgency. Thus, given that political aims are the distinguishing factor between sophisticated and less sophisticated gangs, these political aims are indeed noteworthy when assessing gang threats as insurgencies.

In this field, Sullivan is best known for introducing the Generation Gang Model as a way of conceptualizing the growing threat of gangs in the modern world. In his Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Nicholas Haussler applies the Model to Iraq's Sunni insurgency. After providing an overview of both gang theory and the Sunni insurgency, he makes an argument that the insurgency progressed in structural and practical sophistication according to the characteristics described in Model. In doing so, he showed that gangs and insurgencies are similar, both in their internal functions and missions and in how they relate to other actors in their environments. As Manwaring did in his own paper, Haussler brings the gang-insurgency connection to more relevance by applying gang theories to real-life insurgencies.

Finally, Steven Metz describes the convergence of gangs and insurgencies in his 1993 paper, "The Future of Insurgency". He approaches this convergence from two angles: one that echoes Manwaring's approach to political threat, and another that supports Sullivan's acknowledgement of overt political agenda. On one hand, he writes that criminal gangs are finding that they are forced to incorporate political agendas in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the communities they control. On the other, he offers an approach similar to the one articulated by Manwaring and Sullivan: that the combination of minimal governmental oversight and tremendous opportunities to acquire wealth in places like Latin America allow criminal organizations to develop in strength until they pose legitimate security threats to legitimate governments.

Most of this existent research analyzes the similar impacts of gangs and insurgencies. Like Haussler, however, this paper looks to compare gangs' and insurgencies' similar natures: their types, structure, effects on communities, and so on.

BASELINE DEFINITIONS OF GANGS AND INSURGENCIES

Definition of a Gang

Malcolm Klein, an expert in street gangs and criminology, points to two features that are necessary for a "gang" label. First, the group must be oriented toward some sort of criminal activity, be it human trafficking, drug trafficking, weapons trafficking,

or otherwise. He stresses, however, that this indicator does not imply that crime is the core focus of the gang, and writes: “Note carefully, however, that I specify orientation, not a pattern of serious criminal activity...” Second, the group must self-identify as a gang, “a group set apart from others.” Self-recognition can be fostered through the designation of gang colors, symbols, etc.⁶ This type of exclusivity is furthered by the price of entrance, as not just anyone can join: most gangs set an initiation process for new members, requiring them to prove themselves. Members may be required to commit theft, perform small supporting functions for full-fledged members, or carry out an assault.⁷ In the Rio de Janeiro gangs, members enter the traffic by first acting as a packager, lookout, or, more rarely, selling small amounts of marijuana or cocaine.

Irving Spergel provides a broader perspective, and defines gangs in terms of positive and negative perceptions. Positive perceptions point to the gang’s role as a substitute for family and kinship, and propose that the gang introduces organization and coherency into unstable, chaotic environments. With this view, crime is not the unifying force; rather, brotherhood is. Meanwhile, negative perceptions emphasize the criminal nature of gangs. Theorists who fall into this camp emphasize the growing centrality of criminal activity and argue that gangs pose a greater threat in the current age than ever before. At the same time, they point to the vicious cycle that can emerge from a gang presence: while it may introduce a type of structure to members’ lives, its dominance has corrosive effects on the power balance of the community. Spergel argues that while both approaches are accurate in certain ways, they do not account for the wide variation in how gangs behave, both across gangs and over time.⁸

Definition of an Insurgency

Definitions of insurgencies, meanwhile, tend to emphasize their political nature over their criminal one. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms provides the following definition:

“Insurgency – The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.”⁹

Two key elements are listed here: a) the use of “subversion and violence”, and b) the aim to “overthrow or force change of a governing authority.” This definition – technically accurate – does not provide much in the way of specificity. Bard O’Neill, author



Taliban insurgents turn themselves in to Afghan National Security Forces at a forward operating base in Puza-i-Eshan. Their defections come in the midst of Operation Taohid II, and Afghan-led operation designed to defeat the insurgency, provide humanitarian supplies to the people, and enable development projects in the area. (Photo by ISAF Public Affairs)

of “Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse” frames the definition in a different way, recognizing the insurgency as a “struggle” that includes not one but two actors in the insurgency: the insurgent group itself and the opposing governing authority. O’Neill writes:

“..a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g. organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”

Thus, there are two ways of defining an insurgency: as a group, and as a type of warfare. In the latter definition, the insurgency/government struggle (depending on the type) could also include the populace in between, whose loyalty may fluctuate between the government and the insurgency and whose action/inaction can certainly affect the outcome of the conflict. In this paper, however, references to “insurgency” imply the group itself.¹⁰

Additionally, like the Department of Defense definition, this definition assigns two attributes to insurgencies which, in a way, can be viewed in terms of means and motive: violence and ideology. Most importantly, the core motivation of an insurgency is not just commercial or cultural, but political. Thus, an insurgent group would target the political system, specific policies, authorities, or state identity (i.e. calling for separation or autonomy).

GANG AND INSURGENCY TYPES

Within the broad definitions of gangs and insurgencies exist multiple forms, each operating under different priorities, extents of control, and internal structures. By breaking down the definitions of gangs and insurgencies, it is easier to assess their mechanisms and ultimate motivations.

Gang Types: The Generation Gang Model

As articulated by John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker in their article “Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords”, there are three levels to the Generation Gang Model: first generation, second generation, and third generation. The first generation gangs are the least sophisticated in structure and smallest in territory controlled. While violence is a feature of these gangs, it tends to be less sophisticated, completely apolitical, and interferes in community life to a lesser degree than the higher gang generations.¹¹ In contrast, second generation gangs control a wider territory, at times spanning multiple cities or states. At the same time, the focus of the gang expands to focus on commercial benefits in addition to the existent social ones. Leadership organization is more structured and hierarchical than first generation gangs, and second generation gangs will become involved in politics to further their agendas in the system or suppress law enforcement interference in their markets. In order to control these markets, the gangs employ more violence – leading to a community life that is increasingly dominated by the gang’s violent presence.¹² Narco-cartels (such as those in Mexico) and organized crime groups exist at the higher end of threats to governments. Other examples of this type of gang include the Latin Kings of the U.S. and the favela gangs of Rio de Janeiro.¹³ Third generation gangs are much rarer, but at the same time their reach is more threatening. Whereas the first generation and second generation gangs are limited to specific territories, third generation gangs are global. While it is difficult to classify gangs and cartels as fitting squarely into the third generation, some criminal organizations possess varying degrees of the defining characteristics, most notably the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Eighteenth Street (M-18) gangs.¹⁴

The characteristics of these three generations are captured in the chart on the next page:

Second and third generation gangs pose the greatest threat to state power, aided by the centrality of violence and illicit commerce to their missions. Given that existent comparisons draw parallels between insurgencies’ and gangs’ challenges to government, and since these two pose the greatest legitimate threats to


government, the second and third generation gangs are the ones typically referred to in comparative analyses. Gangs and insurgencies are similar in that they tend to only operate in a limited number of cities or states; that is, they are not global (unlike the third generation model).

Insurgency Types: Liberation and National

As noted, different insurgencies possess different aims: secession from the state (e.g. the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey); reform of the state’s distribution of benefits (e.g. Animal Liberation Front in the U.K.); preservation of the status quo in the face of change (e.g. the Ku Klux Klan in the U.S.); or complete revolution (e.g. the Taliban in Afghanistan). In this paper, references to insurgencies will specifically apply to those that call for the complete overthrow or elimination of the government. This decision is primarily made because in the existent literature on the gang-insurgency relationship, gangs are considered in terms of the threat of operating beyond the control of the government in their territories. Within this designation exist two insurgency sub-types: liberation and national insurgencies. In “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century”, authors Steven Metz and Raymond Millen define each. A liberation insurgency targets a government that is seen to be an outside occupying force because of race, ethnicity, or culture. Examples provided in this paper include the insurgency in Rhodesia and the Palestinian insurgency in Israel. This type of conflict is linear (as opposed to the national insurgency’s triangular type), involving the insurgent and government with little influence from other actors. insurgency’s triangular type), involving the insurgent and government with little influence from other actors.

Meanwhile, a national insurgency is one that functions in an environment where the government is seen as a somewhat-legitimate, if flawed. As the authors write, “The distinctions between the insurgents and the regime are based on economic class, ideology, identity (ethnicity, race, religion), or some other political factor.” Moreover, the struggle does not solely involve the insurgency and government; as mentioned, it also includes other actors.

The authors highlight the fact that the boundary between the two types of insurgencies is not always clear. As they write, “A single insurgency can contain elements of both, and shift emphasis during its lifespan.” The Taliban insurgency is a case in point in that it contains qualities of both liberation and national insurgencies. It is clear that the Taliban considers the current Afghan government to be completely alien to their culture and, in the case of the Coalition Forces, to their region as a whole.



Whether or not the Taliban insurgency is considered a national or liberation insurgency is significant, as national insurgencies are much easier to counter. Given that the government does possess a certain amount of legitimacy in a national insurgency, the government can solve the conflict by proving that it can fix the root causes of the conflict by reform. This approach does not work for liberation insurgencies; as the authors write, “What motivates the [liberation] insurgents is not the lack of jobs, schools, or the right to vote, but resentment at occupation, interference, and rule by outsiders or those perceived as outsiders.”¹⁵ It is no wonder, then, that the Taliban insurgency would prefer to put forth the message to the populace that it is conducting a liberation insurgency; when the insurgency is thought of in this way, no amount of government reform would sway the populace to their side.

Given that these models are in part determined by the ideological message of the insurgency, there are limits to applying it to gangs (since gangs claim no political ideology). However, the characteristics of the gang/government/community relationship allow this framework to still be useful in carrying out successful counter-gang efforts. As with insurgencies, the government’s relationship with the residents of drug trafficking areas varies, too. On one hand, the struggle may hold the characteristics of a national insurgency: the government is oftentimes viewed by the people as corrupt, predatory, and negligent, and since gangs have the capacity to provide relatively better security and economic benefits, the community may be swayed to support the gangs. At the same time, the community organizations, militias, and residents can play major roles in the success or failure of counter-gang efforts, thereby creating the triangular model of

interactions found in national insurgencies. However, as the gang uses propaganda to reinforce the police as “the other”, and as the government presence is reduced to violent incursions that alienate the populace, the community may become increasingly loyal to the gangs not solely because the gangs treat them any better, but because the gang members and gang culture are integrated into the community fabric while the government is seen as a completely alien force.

TIPPING POINT: Containment vs. Attack

In combating gangs and insurgencies, governments have two general options: to attack the threat head-on, or to adopt a policy of containment. In *The Accidental Guerrilla*, David Kilcullen highlights the risks of choosing the first option: by attacking the insurgency rather than simply containing it, the government legitimizes the insurgency as a credible threat, and in doing so creates an even more potent threat than before. About the Al-Qaeda (AQ) insurgency, he writes:

“By intervening directly against AQ...we have not only waded into someone else’s domestic dispute but have also treated AQ as a peer competitor worthy of our top priority and full attention, thus immensely increasing AQ’s credibility and clout in its struggle for ascendancy over the ummah [Muslim world].”¹⁶

As demonstrated in the “vicious cycle” described above, the same risk applies to gangs: by attacking them head-on, the government risks alienating the people and creating a calculus that establishes the gang as a lesser threat than the government.

At the same time, containment has its risks as well: taking no aggressive action against a movement may in effect provide them with a secure space in which to build up their power. Gangs can maintain and develop their markets, while insurgencies can work to regroup and acquire funding (as the Taliban did in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan immediately following the invasion). Thus, a government faces a dilemma: to violently address the threat and potentially legitimize it further, or to contain it at the risk of creating a tolerant environment in which the threat can increase in strength.

In the case of Rio de Janeiro, if the gang violence were contained within the favelas, then the government would perhaps be willing to consider the territories as a “lost cause”, except that they do not hold sole control over them. In “Children of the Drug Trade”, Dowdney asserts that gangs gained so much power as a result of this approach. Instead of competing with the government for control, they simply fill the vacuum that the government left behind.¹⁷

CONCLUSION¹⁸

This paper is a starting point. It aims to provide a broad overview of gangs and insurgencies. It is also a recognition that the threat of the “non-state actor” to sovereign states is growing and new research will explore this comparison and others and will also compare responses, whether they be by the military or police. The purpose of the project was to analyze gangs and insurgencies together. The main points of comparison are summarized as follows:

- Gangs and insurgencies are unique in that they straddle a fine line between mere social organization and real security threat. Unlike conventional warfare – with relatively unambiguous fighting forces and comparable weaponry between adversaries – the concept of a gang and an insurgency can be misapplied easily. Without knowing the crucial criteria for each, a government can call a group of kids a gang, and peaceful political movement an insurgency – and then use these determinations as justification for unwarranted police or military action. With this risk in mind, it is especially important to have familiarity with gangs’ and insurgencies’ definitions.
- The generation gang model is used to conceptualize the varying levels of gangs, but can be applied to insurgencies as well. While the focus of this paper is on the comparison of gangs to insurgencies, this framework could prove useful for classifying insurgencies and determining which insurgencies are useful as references for others.

- Likewise, the qualities that distinguish national insurgencies from liberation ones can illuminate the relationship between gangs, the police, and the community. Insurgencies like the Taliban would prefer to consider themselves as liberation insurgencies, as this identity is more compelling to a community member who might ordinarily be a “fence-sitter”, or would call for government reform instead of an outright overthrow. While gangs do not have political ideologies and would therefore not claim to protect a community from foreign actors, the community’s perception of the government as “alien” is to the gang’s benefit: it turns the community away from the government and toward the gang as a familiar presence. As such, the liberation model of gangs and insurgencies (acting in contrast to the distant and illegitimate government) reinforces the need for governments to establish connections to the community. In the case of the Afghan counterinsurgency, this would take the form of the international community transferring all power to the Afghan government, while in the case of the Rio de Janeiro gangs, this would take the form of transferring control from the UPP police to local organizations.

- The qualities that distinguish roles within gangs and insurgencies illuminate the need to adopt different approaches to each level. It is more difficult to reintegrate drug trafficking gang leaders into licit economies than it is to reintegrate the lower-level gang members. Likewise, it is more difficult to gain the loyalty of ideologically-motivated insurgent leaders than it is to appeal to the grievance-motivated (or forcibly compelled) lower-level insurgent. In both cases, it may be more effective to focus more energy on separating leaders from the lower ranks than to tackle the groups as uniform entities.

- Both counter-gang and counterinsurgency efforts are susceptible to raising unrealistic expectations among community members. For those tackling gangs and insurgencies, it would be worthwhile to look at the other’s strategies for maintaining workable expectations while continuing to increase community welfare.

- Gangs and insurgencies are only able to thrive if they are able to replenish their ranks. Some recruit by force, but many recruit through providing status, money, and camaraderie to incoming members. To eliminate gangs and insurgencies is to leave behind a vacuum that can be easily filled by vigilante militias, other criminal groups, and predatory warlords. The effort to remove gang and insurgent presence from communities must be complemented by an equal effort to provide alternatives for would-be gang members

and insurgents, as well as an equal effort to quell newly-emergent criminal activity.

- While it is useful to compare gangs and insurgencies, it is crucial that they remain distinct from one another. This is especially true for gangs: while they indeed pose a threat to society and the government, to treat them as an insurgency and assign them political aspirations is inaccurate and will lead to an inappropriate response.

- It is well-known that war and crime affect not only the government and its adversaries, but the populace as well. While this link between gangs and insurgencies may seem obvious, it is intended to encourage those tackling gang-related violence and those facing insurgencies to use each other as references for reducing collateral damage.

- Most simply, community marginality results when a whole community is stigmatized and discriminated against simply by virtue of their false association with the offending gang or insurgency. The connections that gangs and insurgencies have with communities and ethnic groups contribute to these groups' marginality in the greater city and/or state. In order to prevent fissures within the population, it is necessary for the government to tackle the issue of prejudices in other segments of the population. This can be done by supporting community organizations that tackle this issue, passing anti-discrimination legislation, instituting preferred hiring schemes, or by way of another method. The role of the greater community has the potential to be overlooked, but is crucial to long-term stability. 

¹ Irregular warfare, as defined in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” (See: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/i/19843.html)

² **Note:** while the existence of the Rio de Janeiro gangs rests on the drug trade, it is important to keep in mind that while drugs are a “popular” commodity for trafficking, they are merely one option among other illicit trafficking industries like weapons, humans, and wildlife. As will be argued in this paper, the lessons learned from the case of Rio de Janeiro can be applied to both drug trafficking and non-drug trafficking groups.

³ Max G. Manwaring. “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency”. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005).

⁴ John P. Sullivan. “Criminal Insurgency in the Americas.” *Small Wars Journal*, 2010.

⁵ John P. Sullivan. “Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels, and Net Warriors.” *Transnational Organized Crime*. Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1997. 95-108.

⁶ Malcolm W. Klein. *The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control*. (New York: Oxford UP, 1997.)

⁷ Oliver Bangerter. “Territorial Gangs and Their Consequences for Humanitarian Players.” *International Review of the Red Cross*, 878th ed. Vol. 92. (Cambridge, UK: International Committee of the Red Cross/Cambridge UP, 2010).

⁸ Irving A. Spergel. *The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach*. (New York: Oxford UP, 1995.)

⁹ United States Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02. 2010.

¹⁰ Bard E. O’Neill. *Insurgency & Terrorism: from Revolution to Apocalypse*. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2005). Note: this view of insurgencies is supported further by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, who list asymmetric violence and political mobilization as attributes of insurgencies in their paper, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century”.

¹¹ John Sullivan and Robert Bunker. “Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 2003. 40-53.

¹² Sullivan and Bunker, “Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords.”

¹³ Sullivan, “Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels, and Net Warriors.”

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Steven Metz and Raymond Millen. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004.)

¹⁶ David Kilcullen. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009)

¹⁷ Dowdney, “Children of the Drug Trade”.

¹⁸ **NOTE:** The full paper compares roles and motivation of gang members, their threats to governing authorities, minimizing negative effects on civilian populations and targeting centers of gravity. This paper will be published as part of the intern anthology.

The High Cost of Good Intentions: 17 Years of Foreign Aid and State-building in Rwanda

by Ms. Sara Masciola, University Of Pittsburgh



Introduction

The merits of foreign aid to Third World and post-conflict nations have been debated vigorously over the past decade. Popular books like William Easterly's *The White Man's Burden* regret that only a fraction of the money spent on such nations reaches the people whom it is meant to help. Others argue that funding would be better utilized for domestic purposes rather than gambled away to nations with little oversight of development programs. More recently, high debt in developed countries has inspired deliberation on excessive spending, with foreign aid potentially placed on the chopping block.

Foreign aid, however, makes up a small fraction of American gross domestic product (GDP) and could potentially reap large dividends as a tool of foreign policy. Before policymakers argue about the "better" uses of limited funds, the benefits of foreign aid—its effect on the development and stabilization of the recipient nation—should be closely examined, as the cost-benefit ratio is potentially favorable. This study is an attempt to do so, using Rwanda as a case study to scrutinize the utilization of foreign funding overseas.

In the post-genocide era, Rwanda has endeavored to secure itself politically and economically. As a major player in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Rwanda's stabilization could anchor an otherwise volatile area. As a geographically small country, however, its success has not always been a priority for the developed world, especially as they focus on the Middle Eastern wars. So, a substantial amount of foreign aid has been given to Rwanda while it maintains a moderate freedom in the administration of such funds. For this reason, the nation presents an interesting case study, as its state-building efforts are somewhat clear-cut and portray a relatively unambiguous example of the foreign aid process.

For the purposes of this article, "state-building" will inherently refer to an end goal—it is a process meant to empower central and local government to protect citizens from external and internal threats, including extreme poverty, national epidemics, political oppression, and military attack. Though the term 'human security' varies in meaning, state-building in Rwanda



KIGALI, Rwanda (Jan. 26, 2011) - U.S. Army 402nd Civil Affairs Team surgeon Colonel David Hayes and members of the Rwanda Defense Force discuss principles of patient triage January 26, 2011. Members of both services partnered together for a seminar on medical evacuation procedures and rotary wing operations in support of the RDF's deployment preparation for the United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Kathrine McDowell)

might be perceived as aligning with Edward Newman's explanation: "Traditional security sees state legitimacy looking outward to the international system for power, recognition, and independence. Human security forces the state to look inward to the 'people from where it draws its legitimacy.'"¹ Therefore, as the security of the Rwandan people increases, the state is strengthened, and state-building might be perceived as successful. How foreign aid contributes to such security is the topic at hand.

This article summarizes a much larger report. It first explores aid flows in post-genocide Rwanda and the correlation between international funding and Rwandans' standard of living. After determining that progress in poverty reduction, disease control, and education is not consistently connected to increases in foreign aid, political stability and military competence are gauged. Next, summaries of case studies of foreign aid to Cambodia, Haiti, and Bosnia are compared with Rwandan development over time. The implications of parallels are used to make suggestions for the donor community regarding future allotments of foreign aid.

History: 1994-Present

For one hundred days in the spring and summer of 1994, Rwanda's Hutu government led the majority-Hutu population in massacring Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The plane of Hutu president Habyarimana had been shot down, and the government blamed Tutsis and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—a group of exiled Rwandans fighting the government from Uganda—for his death, using it as an excuse to start an extermination campaign. An estimated 800,000 people were killed, most often with machetes. The absence of outside rescue continues to plague the global community so determined to prevent post-Holocaust genocides. Belgian troops withdrew from Rwanda in early spring as a reaction to the murder of nine of its soldiers, a calculated tactic by the government to prevent foreign interference in the coming genocide. Meanwhile, the international community knew the extent of the killing but was hesitant to send peacekeepers into harm's way. The United States, in particular, was skittish about deploying American soldiers in the aftermath of 1993 Somalia. Therefore, a small contingent of UN soldiers led by Romeo Dallaire resided in Rwanda without the forces or mandate to effectively stop the killing.


When the RPF defeated the Rwandan government and ended the massacres in July 1994, the group's leader, Paul Kagame, became vice president of Rwanda. After nine years of transitional government led by the RPF, Kagame was elected president in 2003, with 95% of the vote. He defeated two Hutu candidates amidst criticisms of fraud by the EU observer mission, the main opposition candidate, and human rights groups.² In the aftermath of the RPF's victory in 1994, Hutus fled across the border

into present-day Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Exiled Tutsis began to return to Rwanda. International humanitarian workers responded to the resultant refugee crisis, and nations donated generously to help rebuild the war-torn country. The process of state-building began almost immediately. Foreign aid flowed through Rwanda even during the massacres of the early nineties, but after losing a sizeable portion of its citizens in 1994, contributions from other nations became even more significant. Economically, the deaths and subsequent refugee crisis distorted the country's tax base, GDP, labor force, and system of property rights. Politically, a new government was transitioning into power and needed the support of its remaining citizens and the armed forces. Intervention from the global community may have been late, but it was still necessary for Rwanda's survival.

Foreign Aid and its Impact on Rwanda's Progress

U.S. policymakers must consider whether or not millions of dollars in official development assistance (ODA) and public investment are having a valuable impact on Rwandan economic and political development and stability. ODA includes aid given by governments and multilateral organizations. Ninety-five percent is in the form of grants, and for the past several years, the U.S. has been the single largest contributor of ODA to Rwanda.³ To assess the effects of foreign aid on state-building, ODA was measured from the pre- and post-genocide years. Though most charitable income is generated by transnational and international agencies⁴, using ODA data alone obscures a full representation of foreign aid in Rwanda, as it does not include funding from international NGOs financed by private sources. This category of aid is also limited to those agencies

Figure 1






Figure 2
Source: United Nations Development Programme Human Development Reports

with a permanent presence in Rwanda.⁵ However, even the IMF has bemoaned the inadequate data available to track NGO spending; so, only the trajectory of ODA is followed to ensure the accuracy of the data that is reported.

As Figure 1 demonstrates, international financing continued through the 1994 genocide, only to plummet between 1996 and 2000. The immediate post-genocide period (1994-1995) was accompanied by large amounts of ODA, particularly emergency humanitarian assistance to help with the massive flow of refugees. The 1996 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda reported that only 35.3% of aid given in 1994 was used within Rwanda, with the rest spent on refugees outside of its borders. “Gradually, Rwanda’s intervention in the DRC and a switch away from emergency relief caused foreign aid to slow. In the early 2000s, assistance again began to surge, reaching \$934,380,000 in 2009. This was partially due to reduced military operations in the DRC, and the new president’s commitments to poverty reduction, anti-corruption, and long-term independence from aid and debt (all pleasing to the global community). If Rwanda’s state-building—measured first through human development—positively correlates with foreign aid, there may be foundation for a later argument of causation.

UN Human Development Index (HDI) values for corresponding years demonstrate that this is not the case. The index measures standards of living using education (years of school), wealth (income), and health (life expectancy) indicators. Assuming that foreign aid is at least partially devoted

to improvement in these three categories, one might expect a plunge in HDI between 1995 and 2000 (during the downturn in ODA), followed by a spiked recovery as aid increased. In fact, the five years following the war were paralleled by a jump in the HDI rankings, only to level off—even decrease—in the midst of massive budget swells (Figure 2). It is also interesting that the drop in human development between 2005 and 2010 corresponds with a renewed emphasis on general budget support for the Rwandan government rather than project-based funding. As more money bypasses the structure of planned tasks, the effectiveness of the funds seems to dissipate.

ODA, however, is hardly the sole, decisive factor in HDI shifts. For example, inclusion of life expectancy in the overall index value means that an HDI increase does not have to be the result of proactive spending. The early 1990s saw massacres and the loss of 800,000 Rwandans. Therefore, the late-90s increase in life expectancy was not only a result of better medical treatment (it was), but also due to the fact that genocide had ended.⁷ In addition, survivors and returning refugees overtook abandoned property, which may have increased their wealth. Subsequent HDI stagnation suggests either that earlier values were thus inflated or that population growth reduced overall per capita benefits, for Rwanda consistently remains in the lowest HDI ranking (“low human development”) despite a substantial NGO and donor presence. Therefore, higher levels of ODA do not directly correspond with better HDI scores, but depend on a variety of factors related to the recipient nation’s management of funds and capacity for reform, as well as responsible distribution by donors.

Correlation vs. Causation and the Problem of Development Statistics

The correlative evidence presented still leaves room for misdiagnosis unless international funding can be directly connected to Rwanda's progress in state-building. Otherwise, it is impractical to determine the true source of stability and development. National groups independent of foreign financing may have caused change in sectors that international funding barely reached.

Furthermore, interpretation of current data does not explain reasons for success, nor is it always useful to predict future progress. First, reverse causality is a possibility when considering donor motivations. Funds could be provided/retracted because of developments on the ground, rather than progress depending upon aid. Second, a common argument is that aid is given to countries precisely because they are having problems. To indicate that ODA is failing because these problems are not instantly reversed is to misunderstand the depth of societal decay. Third, it is necessary to understand who initiated each project. If foreigners were the instigators, plans may not be continued by the Rwandan government once aid lessens or is changed to general budget support.

So, the correlation of high ODA and low HDI scores says little about causality. If foreign aid is rampant but not reaching the sectors that need it most, it would be difficult to accuse international donors of being useless—they are experiencing an allocation problem. For Rwanda, though, this does not seem to be the case. There are indications that funds are being funneled into the poverty, health, and education sectors (the HDI categories), and the next section will address in more detail the extent to which the expenditures produce results. In some cases, monetary contributions are not enough to reverse the problems affecting Rwanda's future stability.

The Impact of Aid: Wealth, Health and Education

Wealth and Poverty: GDP in Rwanda has made a remarkable recovery since 1994, but the effects of development efforts on poverty reduction are less apparent. A 2007 UN development report claimed that the Rwandan government does not spend international aid efficiently enough to reduce poverty. The UNDP for Rwanda lamented that, "...the aid that reaches Rwanda is not currently aligned with the MDGs, is not adequately targeted towards the poor and is not efficiently coordinated or monitored. Increasing aid flows to Rwanda under these conditions is likely to increase the waste and distortions created by large inflows..."⁸ The UN's concern, however, is mostly

with foreign donors, whose aid is unpredictable and project-driven—a combination, in their opinion, that makes it difficult for the Rwandan government to create long-term development programs based on the country's needs.⁹ Additionally, World Bank data paints a discouraging picture of wealth distribution. The gap between rich and poor is not only expanding, but is also revealing an economic division along ethnic lines. Observers have already noted the potential for violence stemming from an income gap. Rwanda still remains dependent on ODA and that FDI is relatively small.

Healthcare: Donor Activity vs. Local Needs: The health sector has traditionally received a large proportion of Rwanda's foreign aid. Between 2000 and 2006, health expenditures rose from \$73 million to \$301.6 million, due in large part to funds from GFATM (Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria) and PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief).¹⁰ The Rwandan Ministry of Health (MOH) estimated in 2006 that the government would need to spend an additional \$20 per capita on the health sector in order to reach their Millennium Development Goal (MDG) in child mortality by 2015.¹¹ Even sharp increases in donor funding cannot alleviate the problem, as indicated by USAID's 2008 Corruption Assessment of the Rwandan Health Sector. This report noted that foreign-led campaigns against major diseases "have made it more difficult for the MOH to control and coordinate donor health activities to ensure that their programs are compatible with GOR priorities."¹² Therefore, foreign aid to the health sector—though increasing and a main priority for donors—remains inadequately low and complicates the distribution of services for local officials. Concerns about disease in refugee camps—along with the malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS pandemics raging today—are most likely to attract the attention of humanitarians, who are provided with a tangible problem to solve. Vaccinating a population and offering mosquito nets is relatively simpler than establishing a nationwide healthcare system from scratch. To the dismay of the Rwandan leadership, the focus on disease eradication can ignore local needs. However, as 80% of health sector funding is provided by foreign donors (2008), the many successes that do occur in the field could be reasonably attributed to international involvement. There may not be a one-to-one ratio between dollars spent and health coverage provided, but compared to other sectors of Rwandan society, the transformation of the health system has been considered praiseworthy by domestic and international observers.

Education and Ethnic Violence: Successful state-building depends on a country's ability to prevent further violence and to return society to normalized relations. The Rwandan gov-

ernment uses its educational system to ease this transition and to prevent ethnic divisions from returning the nation to war. Education-based economic opportunity for future generations theoretically curbs resentment and societal divisions between ethnic groups. Considering the asymmetrical income distribution emerging in Rwanda, government efforts seem to be appropriately focused. Receiving the necessary financial aid, the Rwandan government now spends more than twice as much on education as on health, with additional funding provided by the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (promoting education equity).¹³ Efforts seem to be paying off. The 2010 Least Developed Countries Report labels Rwanda as “on track” to meet its MDG in primary education enrollment. Additionally, the UNDP education index for Rwanda—measuring gross enrollment ratio and adult literacy rates—has risen sharply over the past decade.

ODA and Rwanda

Politics: The Failed States Index operates on a scale from 1-10, with higher values indicating a greater threat of instability. Rwanda has consistently been on the list of top 50 countries facing a failed state, ranking number 12 in 2005 and jumping to number 34 in 2011 after years of uncertain progress.¹⁴ The rankings, however, only show that other countries have done worse than Rwanda in the past 7 years; when compared to itself, Rwanda’s index score in 2005 (8.3) and its score in 2011 (8.2) illustrate a lack of permanent progress over time.

Pumping more aid into Rwandan may correlate with limited improvement from 2006 to 2009, but progress made on human rights and rule of law eventually stagnates and then reverses. The figures also deteriorate in the years following presidential elections (2003 and 2010), which suggests that domestic political opportunities hold more sway over government actions than the [apparently futile] threat of reduced international funding.

Since Kagame and the RPF took power in 1994, they have attempted to establish the legitimacy of the government. This task was easier in the aftermath of civil war because the RPF is universally credited for stopping the genocide. After the genocide, international guilt provided leeway for the RPF that otherwise would have been replaced with condemnation over its human rights abuses.

To be fair, operations in the DRC did stem from a legitimate security threat. *Genocidaires* who had fled across the border continued their atrocities, often using the safety of refugee camps as bases for operations. RPF soldiers, however, did not

clearly demarcate the line between war-fighting and retribution. The operational necessity of certain brutalities is still in question. Nor were the human rights abuses reserved for the DRC. The immediate post-genocide period was accompanied by revenge killings of many Hutu leaders still in the country, including judges, local government officials, clerics, and teachers; the RPA is a well-documented source of the killings.¹⁵ When donors finally began to notice the abuses of the GOR, Kagame became increasingly defiant, unwilling to have Rwanda’s “political options” hampered by financial pressures.

Real democracy, however, remains elusive. The first “democratization process” began in 2001, as the government’s transition period ended. Local elections were held, but RPF appointees controlled the voting system, the use of finger printing circumvented efforts at a secret ballot, and Human Rights Watch found the election to be “flawed from the beginning.”¹⁶ After the 2003 presidential election, grassroots political activity continued to be banned, and pluralism was reduced with further restrictions on political parties.¹⁷ In 2010—after the five-year USAID program and over a decade of democracy assistance from the U.S. —Kagame won the presidential elections with 93% of the vote.¹⁸ The international community expressed widespread concern about pre-election coercion, as arrests and assassinations plagued opposition leaders and independent journalists.¹⁹ NGOs in Rwanda have also been targets of political oppression. Human rights groups are particularly vulnerable if they denounce government actions.

Military: If there is one sector that has received high international praise for its ability to promote Rwanda’s national goals, it is the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), formerly the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). A few months after the genocide, Kagame and his officers began to integrate increased numbers of Hutus and ex-FAR soldiers into the RPA. RPF leaders disseminated a common military doctrine to all soldiers, advancing a unified strategic purpose for the entire army. Since 1994, the combined force has proven remarkably effective militarily. In 1996, the army defeated Hutu extremists in northern Rwanda and later completed an efficient invasion and campaign against former *genocidaires* in the DRC. More recently, Rwandan troops have been engaged in peacekeeping operations, impressing the international community with its professionalism. Successful military integration and ground force proficiency give the impression that Rwandan state-building, in general, should be based on the success story of the armed forces. On the surface, it is a technical triumph, with the army often hailed as the most well-organized and -operated military force in Africa. However, to prevent a return to violence, the state must

have more than strength. Problems associated with the Congo wars persist. Though efficient, the Rwandan army is accused of natural resource looting and crimes against humanity.

The underlying issue apparent in this testimony is the military threat to Rwandan citizens unwilling to follow the government line. Rwanda may unnerve its neighbors, but that is the nature of power politics. When the army is seen as a threat internally, it may be a sign that state-building has started to skirt the line of authoritarianism. As recent as February 2011, Jane's Military and Security Assessment for Rwanda warned that, "the RDF remains tightly controlled by politicized elements of the old Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)/RPA."²⁰ Furthermore, in language usually reserved for countries like Pakistan, Rwanda-expert Filip Reyntjens described the African nation as "an army with a state rather than a state with an army...effectively run by a military regime."²¹

Case Studies

Rwanda and Cambodia: Much like Rwanda, Cambodia suffered a genocide that destroyed the country's social and material infrastructure. From 1975-1979, the Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Pol Pot murdered roughly 1.7 million of its own people. Many of the victims were urbanites and those considered to be "educated." When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, ending the genocide, the result was a nation without a qualified workforce to run the state. The current Prime Minister, Hun Sen, has been in a leadership role since the early 1980s, when he was supported by the Vietnamese government. Though elected today, Sen's rise parallels that of Kagame. The Cambodian government also approaches civil society like the Rwandan leadership. The political similarities between Rwanda and Cambodia would, nevertheless, be meaningless for the purposes of this paper were it not for the trans-border consistency of foreign aid donors and their unquestioning support for the regimes of both countries. Much like Rwanda, the Cambodian leadership concentrated solely on the centralization of state power in the years following the genocide. Political shortcomings amidst substantial foreign aid have also become common because of government corruption and manipulation of funding. Rwanda is exceptional in one sense: unlike Hun Sen, Kagame's regime has dedicated itself to fighting corruption, persuading donors that grants and investments will not be siphoned away from their original projects. Without the stability of government accountability, however, the switch toward general budget support widens opportunities for misappropriation. Once Rwanda's principled reputation and financial partnerships have been fully established, what legal mechanisms are in place to prevent a



From left, Jules Paul Ndamage, mayor of the Kicukuru district, leads U.S. Chargé d Affairs with the U.S. Embassy to Rwanda Anne Casper and John Rwagasore, headmaster of the school, on a tour through the dining hall during the dedication ceremony at Masaka Secondary School in Kigali, Rwanda, July 9, 2010. The construction project upgrading existing facilities and building new ones at the school is a joint effort between the U.S. Embassy to Rwanda, the Rwanda Ministry of Education and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Also pictured is U.S. Navy Capt. Scott Vasina. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Larry Foos/Released)

slide toward corruption, especially as the country continues to prosper?

Rwanda and Haiti: Like Rwanda, Haiti has been the recipient of a growing amount of ODA in the past decade. In fact, Rwanda and Haiti received a roughly equivalent amount of assistance in 2008,²² and the OECD often categorizes Haiti as economically comparable to East Africa. Spikes in Haitian aid are mostly due to natural disasters and the ensuing crisis response. Even controlling for 2010, observers almost universally consider Haiti to be a foreign aid failure. Billions have been funneled into the Haitian economy, yet its development has been limited, if non-existent. A 2006 report by the National Academy of Public Administration highlights some of Haiti's greatest faults within the wealth, health, and education sectors.²³ The findings are analogous to some of the main issues plaguing Rwanda. The results highlight high poverty rates, unequal income distribution, health epidemics, and a need for greater concentration on higher education for its citizens. Second, like Rwanda and Cambodia, Haiti has been highly dependent on aid to meet its needs. Unlike Rwanda, however, the former Aristide government made little effort to move away from its reliance on inter-

national financing and showed scant interest in governance or national reconstruction. Finally, disputes between the Haitian President and Parliament impede donors from coordinating their actions with either group. Rules on aid expenditure are rarely agreed upon and even less frequently passed, making the international-national partnership a shaky affair. On this point, the benefits of one-party leadership in Rwanda are understandable.

Rwanda and Bosnia: The perils of ethnic conflict also surfaced in the mid-90s Balkans. In May 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the Serbian government in Belgrade, initiating the breakup of Yugoslavia. Following the secession, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum (boycotted by Bosnian Serbs) and voted overwhelmingly for its own republic. An armed struggle between the resistant Bosnian Serbs (supported by Serbia), Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnian Croats broke out, which included an ethnic cleansing campaign by the Bosnian Serbs against the Muslims. NATO intervention eventually resulted in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords and agreement on a multiethnic government. The first elections took place in September 1996 under international supervision.²⁴ Bosnia's proximity to Europe strengthened Western resolve to rebuild its war-torn infrastructure and political system. Immediately following war's end, emergency funding for state-building projects began to flow eastward, but problems arose just as quickly. Within a year, donors threatened to partially withhold funds because the Bosnian government was not complying with main components of the peace agreement. By the late 1990s, disturbing reports of continued disregard for Dayton compelled donors to carry out their threats. Yet, early accusations of financial mismanagement did not detract in any resolute manner the amount of foreign aid contributed to Bosnia. Given its location in Europe, a high degree of funding and above-average results would be expected. Peace, funding, and amicably concerned (albeit self-interested) neighbors make an ideal environment for aid to flourish. Indeed, Bosnia-Herzegovina is classified as a "highly developed country" in the UN Human Development Reports. Political progress is even less apparent. Independent observers often cite corruption as the reason for misappropriation of aid and continued ethnic divisions as the reason for flawed democracy. As for flawed democracy, ethnic divisions are still challenging the existence of the state. Bosnia's foreign aid debacle sheds greater light on Rwanda's situation in four ways. First, Bosnian's corruption issue shows that Kagame's strategy to attract FDI is well-founded. Second, Bosnia's government structure requiring equal representation of each ethnic group illustrates the problems that Rwanda has avoided with a Tutsi-led government. Third, Bosnia shows that foreign donors can be finicky with their investments

even when the target country is in Europe. Finally, the Bosnian case exemplifies the potential failures of conditionality. Even when threats were carried out against the Bosnian government, aid was not significantly reduced, and the problems about which donors complained persisted.

Collective Lessons Learned: Implications of Foreign Aid Policy on Unstable Nations

The relationship between foreign aid allocation and the four countries under discussion demonstrate similar patterns. Rwanda, Cambodia, Haiti, and Bosnia benefitted from the emergency aid bestowed upon them in the immediate aftermath of their crises. Afterward, all four nations experienced stunted recovery: each lacked the infrastructure and human capital to maintain foreign-induced changes; motivation to continue global projects waned as funding decreased; and three out of four underwent stagnating, and then decreasing, HDI values (Cambodia's HDI had been rising but dropped between 2005 and 2010; Bosnia's values were inconclusive.). Yet, ODA consistently increased for all four nations, regardless of political resistance to donors and inefficient use of funds.

Why donors do not withhold their aid is an open debate. The plethora of information available on governments shirking on their promises makes it almost certain that global ignorance is not the reason. Instead, multilateral organizations frequently cite their concern that the people of a recipient nation will suffer if aid stops. Even if the government uses funds in unscrupulous ways, it is not worth punishing innocent civilians.

Second, the façade of real change in unstable countries may be enough for donors. Even superficial reforms can be reported to domestic audiences as "progress." In other words, artificial transformations provide an illusion of donor power, while political realities demonstrate the limits of that power. To publicize shortcomings beyond mere statements of disappointment threatens to reveal the extent of the donor-recipient imbalance and would require donors to right alleged wrongs. As a matter of pride and rationality, it is easier for donors to make their pledges and then monitor from a distance, keeping deeper intervention at bay while stabilizing governments through appeasement.

Finally, placing conditions on aid rarely succeeds. Though monitoring the use of funding is often necessary in the political sector to prevent abuse of power and corruption, this is not always the case with regard to economic and health reforms. The "conditions" set by global donors may be an inappropriate

response. Another reason that foreign aid might receive lackluster results relates to national security. Global donors' strategic concerns dictate aid policy more than a concern for human rights in recipient countries.

Irresponsible distribution of aid, however, could lead to instability. Differences in resource distribution amongst provinces can exacerbate ethnic cleavages when national groups are separated geographically (Bosnia) or politically (Rwanda). Beyond strict conditionality, however, donors do have the ability to dictate the marginal utilization of their aid. Therefore, if a long-term global strategy is the principal concern for donor countries, it is inadequate to measure the effects of foreign aid by technical results—voter registration, election turnout, number of troops trained, etc. Genuinely democratic politics and an accountable leadership determine the use of those technical results. 

¹ Taylor Owen, "Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (September 2004): 377.

² Ibid.

³ Official Development Assistance (ODA) Report (Inaugural Edition): FY 2009/2010," Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2010): 13-14.

⁴ Josh Kron, "Rwanda and the Charity Industrial Complex," *New African*, No. 481 (February 2009): 55.

⁵ Official Development Assistance (ODA) Report, 8.

⁶ Andy Storey, "Non-Neutral Humanitarianism: NGOs and the Rwanda Crisis," *Development in Practice*, Vol. 7, No. 4, Special Double Issue (November 1997): 386.

⁷ For 1994 data, the UNDP defined life expectancy as "the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child's life."

⁸ "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development," National Human Development Report for Rwanda, United Nations Development Programme for Rwanda (2007): ii.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Andreas Kalk, Friederike Amani Paul, Eva Grabosch, "'Paying for Performance' in Rwanda: Does it Pay Off?" *Tropical Medicine and International Health*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (February 2010): 186.

¹¹ "Scaling Up to Achieve the Health MDGs in Rwanda: A Background Study for the High-Level Forum Meeting," Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Ministry of Health (12-13 June 2006): 7.

¹² Sheldon Gellar, Abdou Salam Fall, Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Barbara Friday, "Corruption Assessment of Rwandan Health Sector," United States Agency for International Development, 23 December 2008, http://www.usaid.gov/rw/our_work/for_partners/images/rwandahealthsectorcorruptionassessment.pdf: 2.

¹³ "Turning Vision 2020," 23.

¹⁴ "The Failed States Index 2005," The Fund for Peace, 2006, <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2005>. AND "The Failed States Index 2011 Interactive Grid," The Fund for Peace, 2011, <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011>.

¹⁵ Filip Reyntjens, "Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising 'Liberation' and 'Democratisation,'" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 6 (2006): 1105.

¹⁶ Filip Reyntjens, "Post-1994 Politics," 1106-1107.

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²² Aid to Fragile States: Focus on Haiti," Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_44454474_1_1_1_1,00.html.

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How Much is Enough? Analyzing Soldier-to-Civilian Ratios in Occupation

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History is littered with examples where the inability to stabilize a nation at the conclusion of military operations has led to even more complex problems. In accordance with modern Western tradition, the invading nation achieves proper stabilization by providing security and basic services to the civilian population, while working towards a peaceful transfer of power back to the subdued country's home government. If done correctly, the foreign nation can avoid a costly insurgency and gain a valuable diplomatic partner. While the United States' military is aware of this premise, its performance in Iraq during the early occupation leads one to question why the United States was unable to achieve this desired outcome. If the "Surge" of 2008 proved anything, it is that the size of an occupying force is one of the most important, if not the most important, factor in providing the security and services necessary in a successful occupation. How many soldiers are enough, however? By analyzing the examples of United States' military occupations of Mexico, Confederate States of America, the Philippines, Germany, and Iraq and taking into account the circumstances unique to each case, it is perhaps possible to discern the optimal ratio of occupying force per occupied population in a future conflict.

The Mexican-American War, fought from 1846 to 1848, is most remembered for fulfilling Manifest Destiny and providing the training ground for the future leaders of the Civil War. Militarily, however, the Mexican-American War provides the first example of a successful occupation by American forces. The policies employed by General Winfield Scott in Vera Cruz and Mexico City would set the pattern for future policies employed by the United States' military.¹ Meanwhile, analyzing Scott's fellow officer and professional rival, General Zachary Taylor, and his experiences in northern Mexico provides counter-examples to Scott's successful occupation.

Scott, even after a string of military successes, was still in a precarious situation in early 1847.² His army of several thousand men, small even by the standards of the day, could not hope to subjugate a nation of 7 million without gaining the acceptance of the Mexican people. With this knowledge, Scott proceeded carefully after the surrender of Vera Cruz on 27 March 1847.³ While controlling the city, Scott moved quickly to secure the population.⁴ The general declared martial law in the city, a precaution to protect the Mexican citizens as well as his own men.



The Green Zone is the most common name for the International Zone of Baghdad. It is a 10 square kilometers (3.9 sq mi) area of central Baghdad, Iraq, that was the governmental center of the Coalition Provisional Authority and remains the center of the international presence in the city. Its official name beginning under the Iraqi Interim Government is the International Zone, though Green Zone remains the most commonly used term.

While there was robbing and looting before the formal surrender of Vera Cruz, Scott looked to stamp out unruly behavior. Under his governance, Scott heavily punished cases of murder, rape, assaults, robbery, and the destruction of public, private, and religious property. Both Mexicans and Americans were subject to these provisions, but Scott wisely allowed a Mexican commission to try the civilian population, and an American commission to weigh the crimes of soldiers. Under Scott's system, justice was fierce. Punishments included fines, imprisonment, forced labor, lashes, and even hanging in the case of an American soldier convicted of rape.⁵ When American transgressions continued, Scott made a personal plea to his officers and "good soldiers" to curb the illegal behavior of their comrades. A week later, Isaac Stevens, an American engineer, informed his wife that "scarcely an outrage has been committed in the city."⁶

The general did more than just prevent crime, however. He also "regulated food prices, issued 10,000 rations to the poor, and paid idle citizens to clean debris out of the streets."⁷ Further, American soldiers loaned money and shared their food with

needy residents. As a show of respect to the clergy of a deeply religious population, Scott ordered his men to salute priests and personally requested permission to use two local churches. Despite his protestant upbringing, Scott and his staff donned dress uniforms and were active participants in religious services at the Vera Cruz cathedral.⁸ Scott's strict discipline and show of respect to the native population paid dividends. Guerilla bands that could have otherwise posed a serious threat to his army never gained the support necessary to be more than an annoyance.

Scott's policies of "strict discipline, respect for property, reverence to religion, purchase of supplies, and like measures" helped maintain security and prevent uprisings in every city he occupied. In perhaps his most impressive feat, the general captured and held Mexico City, a metropolis of 200,000, with only 7,000 soldiers, a soldier-to-civilian ratio of 3.5 percent.⁹ While Scott acted in accordance with the principles that led to a successful occupation, his success was also a product of the times and circumstance. First, the vast majority of the Mexican population was indifferent or accepting of the American presence. The aristocracy had fled from the Americans' advance, and the extremely poor did not notice a change in their livelihood. Meanwhile, the industrious middle class, which comprised much of the population, benefited financially from an American presence flush with cash compared with its regular clientele.¹⁰ Further, by driving out the military and aristocracy, two organizations about which the common citizens always complained, the American military engendered at least some good will.¹¹ Of further help, General Santa Anna, the Mexican military commander and head of state, was not beloved by his people. He had been the "on again, off again" dictator of Mexico for nearly 20 years, revoking democratic privileges and indulging his own appetites at the expense of the state. In his last failed presidency, he faced a rebellion and two states declared themselves independent republics. Unsurprisingly, Santa Anna's return to politics was not greeted with enthusiasm in many circles.¹²

Militarily, Scott's army benefitted from only needing to occupy one city at a time, and consequently did not have to spread his forces thinly over a wide area. Furthermore, Scott was not required to subdue the surrounding countryside, meaning he could concentrate his forces in the city he occupied. The ability to mount a successful insurgency was also curtailed by the times. Operating on the assumption that it takes one to two bullets to kill a soldier, an ambush with manually reloading firearms, taking 20-30 seconds to load, would not be nearly as effective as the same ambush with automatic weapons.¹³ To combat sniping, Scott stated that his army would raze the block of any house caught firing upon his soldiers, a move of dubious legality

in today's world. In a similar manner, Scott's soldiers did not face the scrutiny of the international press as American soldiers do today. Finally, the mainstay of modern insurgencies, the improvised explosive device, had not yet been invented. Still, what Scott managed to accomplish was undoubtedly impressive. What can one take away from the study of Scott's occupation of Mexico City? Strict discipline enforced by all levels of the army, observance of local customs, meeting the economic and physiological needs of the local inhabitants, and a population disillusioned with its current leadership can all aid in the successful occupation of a population.

Where Scott employed a blueprint for success, Zachary Taylor's initial struggles in occupation were the equal of Scott's accomplishments. Having no plan for pacification, Taylor did nothing to instill discipline in his ranks. Suffering from increased boredom due to the conclusion of conventional military operations and taking full advantage of the lackadaisical environment, the men began a pattern of farm raiding, plundering, assaults, rape, and even murder. In addition to their crimes, the soldiers' rampant racism and anti-Catholicism inflamed the local population. Consequently, the tide of public opinion shifted against the Americans, and Mexicans of multiple backgrounds began conducting guerilla operations. With time, these irregular forces began serious harassment of the U.S. supply lines and isolated garrisons. While the U.S. Army managed to mitigate these threats with active patrols and increasing convoy security at first, "American commanders finally supplemented tactical measures with more enlightened policies to reduce violence against civilians."¹⁴

Among these policies, military governors "instituted strict curfews, moved garrisons out of city centers, set up road blocks to keep soldiers away from populated areas, and threatened to discharge any unit whose members indiscriminately slaughtered Mexican livestock or plundered from locals."¹⁵ When this did not stem the violence, Taylor also held local governments responsible for U.S. materiel destroyed in their jurisdiction, and organized lightly armed police forces comprised of Mexican citizens to root out guerrillas and their supporters, although this idea was largely ineffective. In the harshest of measures, the Army began holding entire towns responsible for the failure to turn over guerrillas. Further, any Mexican found supporting guerrillas with material would pay fines and forfeit all personal possessions. Fortunately for the Americans, the combined institution of these measures curtailed attacks considerably in northern Mexico.¹⁶

Taylor's military governor in Saltillo, Bvt. Major General John E. Wool, attributed the success in combating guerrilla opera-

tions to three basic principles. First, holding local leaders personally responsible for the infractions committed under their jurisdiction. Second, the financial contributions the United States demanded for destroyed property from the local area made citizens reluctant to harbor guerrillas. Finally, the use of a local police force greatly increased the amount of intelligence the American forces received. Not everyone agrees with Wool's opinion, however. Other reasons for success include "the large number of troops on security duty, their offensive operations against partisans, and the measures taken to at least separate the volunteer troops from the civilian operations."¹⁷ Given the lack of Mexican records it is difficult to find Taylor's soldier-to-civilian ratio, but logic dictates it needed to be sufficiently higher before his reforms.

Less than 20 years later, many of the combatants of the Mexican War found themselves taking up arms again, this time against their fellow countrymen. During the course of the American Civil War, the Union captured and occupied several Confederate cities, mostly located on the Gulf Coast or banks of the Mississippi River. The city of New Orleans provides a case study into the occupation methods of the Federal army during the Civil War. According to the 1860 census, New Orleans numbered 168,675 citizens, making it the largest city in the Confederacy. Given its location as both a large population center and hub of commerce at the mouth of the Mississippi, the city posed an attractive target to Union forces. Admiral Farragut captured New Orleans on 29 April 1862, and Major General Benjamin Butler moved in with a force of 5,000 troops to occupy the city.¹⁸

Not all of these soldiers were destined to stay in New Orleans, however. Butler needed to hold eastern Louisiana, including the current capital, Baton Rouge. The general later states that "We were 2500 men in a city of... 150,000 inhabitants."¹⁹ This puts the soldier-to-civilian ratio at 1.6 percent, a little less than half the ratio enjoyed by Scott in Mexico City. Butler began his occupation by declaring martial law for the New Orleans' inhabitants. He distributed captured Confederate food supplies to the city's starving, employed citizens in support of the Union army and to clean up the city, reduced stagnant water to combat disease, reestablished international trade by acquiring cotton from the Northeast, and heavily taxed the wealthy to establish social programs for the city's poor. While Butler's policies tended to make him popular with the lower class, not all his actions were well received. He executed William Mumford for taking down an American flag hung by Farragut from the New Orleans mint, passed a law mandating that any woman insulting a Union soldier be treated as a prostitute, and armed three regiments of African-Americans to serve as militia. Over-

all however, by gaining the support of the poorest classes, Butler managed to keep control of the city, and even received large amounts of informal intelligence and counter-espionage services from people he aided. Proof of Butler's success came during the Confederate counter-attack on 5 August 1862. More significant than driving off the attacking force, the city did not engage in an uprising to support the assault as the Confederates had hoped.

Butler described the New Orleans' citizens as "all hostile, bitter, defiant, explosive, standing literally in a magazine, a spark only needed for destruction."²⁰ How did the general manage to keep the peace with essentially half the manpower available to Scott? Like Scott, Butler was quick to establish martial law. Although he operated under controversial practices and did not earn the respect of the population as Scott managed, Butler mitigated this problem by providing economic relief, food, and sanitation for the city. Reviled by part of the city's inhabitants, Butler still maintained the support of the majority of citizens, and turned them into a useful military asset against the possible recapture of the New Orleans. The general also had an advantage over Scott in having no language or cultural difference from the city he occupied. Further, with the majority of male residents off fighting in the conventional Confederate forces, the chances of an armed insurrection were severely reduced. For military thinkers, Butler's tale reaffirms the importance of restoring an occupied city's economy, and demonstrates how the local population can be used as an asset during an occupation.

In one of the small "brush fire" wars that would plague the United States in the early twentieth century, the nation became embroiled in the conflict starting in 1899 after annexing the Philippines following the Spanish-American War. As with Scott in Mexico City, the capital of the Philippines, Manila, proves to be an interesting case study of occupation. Containing 250,000 residents, the city also provided an obstacle of similar size to what Scott encountered in 1847. On 13 August 1898, the United States' 8th Army received the surrender of the city from the Spanish, fought off Philippine rebels' intent on the country's independence, and took control of the capital. The 8th Army had 10,900 men under its command, putting the ratio of soldiers-to-civilians at 4.4 percent. Sensing hostility from the Filipinos, General Arthur MacArthur instituted mounted police patrols of 3,000 strong, disbanded and disarmed the local Filipino police force, established a court system for both civilians and soldiers, and formed a police division named Provost Guard Separate Brigade comprised of 3,200 troops from three regiments. With the exodus of the talented and experienced Spanish administrative officials, it was necessary for the Army to assume the functions of city government until appropriate civil

officials could be developed. The military government reformed the antiquated Spanish system by relying on the Spanish companies and infrastructure already in place to provide water and electricity for the city, and established a bureau to monitor food quality and inspect street vendors. In time, the military reopened the Spanish primary school system and slowly introduced English language instruction for its 5,000 students.²¹

Despite this detailed and efficient plan for pacification, insurgent activity, which had been originally organized to overthrow the Spanish colonial authorities, was slowly building momentum in the city. The insurgent movement gained unexpected energy with President McKinley's proclamation of "peaceful annexation" of the Philippines. In the following weeks, General Emilio Aguinaldo managed to organize close to 6,000 rebels in and around the city to launch an assault on the American government. Before he could execute his plans, however, U.S. forces launched an attack that devastated Aguinaldo's forces, and prevented the mass uprising he sought to create. Despite the victory, the experience shook U.S. forces. The new military governor, General Elwell Otis, responded with "liberal reforms and harsh repressions."²² Otis instituted a strict military curfew beginning at 7 PM and reopened local courts to aid the Provost Courts in prosecuting those who disobeyed the new ordinance. Otis also established a Bureau of Information which employed a small number of American and Filipino agents charged with breaking up subversive groups in the capital. Finally, Otis augmented his military police with 246 native officers, giving the Americans much needed intelligence about the city's inhabitants.²³ These measures proved very effective in combating insurrection, and the Army returned nominal control of the government in July of 1900.

The Manila occupation was an incredibly unique experience compared with other instances of controlling foreign cities. The Americans took control of a city already being attacked by a fully formed insurgency, but managed to defeat the insurgents and diminish their offensive capabilities while the Americans occupied the city. As was the case in Mexico City and New Orleans, the American military governors moved quickly to provide security and services to the population, both after the initial occupation and the subsequent rebellion. The Army's integration of local citizens into the security system of military police significantly aided its ability to gather intelligence and arrest insurgents. Although brutal atrocities on both sides of the conflict provide a sad legacy for the war, the lack of bloodshed in Manila is a testament to American officers competence in administering military government.²⁴

The next conflict that required the United States to employ occupation during active conflict was World War II. Fortunately for the U.S. military, specifically the Army, strategists were busy before and during the early portion of the war considering the possibility of occupying Germany. During World War I, occupation was explored by the U.S. Army which surmised that a successful occupation force would contain .1 percent officers of the total invading strength.²⁵ While this recognition is a positive step in occupational thinking, Scott, Butler, and MacArthur had no formal training in the matter and did not take into account the population of the occupied area. Unfortunately, heavy analysis of occupational governments was not conducted again until the JAG composed FM 27-5, Military Government in 1940.²⁶ The U.S. military went one step further in 1942 with the establishment of the School of Military Government, which based its number of students from the percentage established in World War I. This represented the first time the United States thoroughly planned and trained for occupation, rather than detailing military commanders to install governments as territory fell into U.S. possession. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also provided formal national guidance from Washington by issuing a directive to General Dwight D. Eisenhower on principles of the occupation. The directive, JCS 1607, included its provisions "that Germany would be treated as a defeated enemy and that occupation forces would exert limited control of the economy and distribution of goods and food to prevent disease and unrest. Fraternalization was strictly forbidden between soldiers and the German people while the troops oversaw the extirpation of Nazism and militarism."²⁷

The occupation of Germany during combat operations continued for only a brief period. Coercing the surrender of the Nazi government resisting in Berlin from the time of the amphibious landing at Normandy the previous June took less than a year. During this period, however, the Rhineland Campaign shows the progression of U.S. occupational policy. Fortunately for the Americans, the Nazi government ordered the evacuation of its cities and towns as the Allied forces advanced, freeing the Americans from administering government to even more people. For those left behind, the Americans would first post a "Notice to the Population" announcing the occupation. Second, the Americans found or appointed a sympathetic mayor to establish a link to the population. Third, the population was disarmed of any weapons, and forced to turn-in communication devices as well. Finally, the rules of martial law, such as curfews, circulation limitations, gathering restrictions, and registering adults were instituted.²⁸

Gathering specific numbers on the soldier-to-civilian ratio in Germany before VE-Day is a difficult task. While some prewar

city populations are known, it is difficult to estimate how many civilians fled or were killed in fighting. Further, the occupation happened in such a short time that it reduced the number of viable examples. However, a few cases exist where it is possible to examine the amount of occupying soldiers to occupied population. In the German city of Aachen, 35 officers and 48 enlisted personnel (83 soldiers total) presided over a population of 14,000.²⁹ This force was augmented, at least for a time, by the 690th Field Artillery Battalion acting as military police, putting the overall strength of the occupying force at around 700 people. As the front shifted however, the battalion would move with it, leaving only the original occupation detachment. However, this provided enough time for the artillery battalion to aid the detachment in the manpower intensive activities, such as registering adults and confiscating weapons. Overall, the soldier-to-civilian ratio in Aachen fluctuated anywhere between .59 percent and 5.0 percent. In the German town of Monschau, a quiet town of 1,100 residents, an average detachment of two officers, a warrant officer, and six enlisted men (9 soldiers total) controlled the city.³⁰ Consequently, the soldier-to-civilian ratio was a paltry .82 percent.

Throughout the U.S. Army's occupation of cities, this is by far the smallest ratio of an occupied area seen thus far. The American forces enjoyed many more inherent advantages than previously seen, however. With the Nazi order to evacuate, actual Nazis who were more likely to actively resist the occupation moved east further into the interior of the country. This had the fortunate side effect of removing the local government, making it necessary for the Army to appoint its own local leaders sympathetic to the Americans. Further, brought up in a society that naturally obeyed authority, the occupiers found their jobs unhampered by the expected sabotage, ambush, and sniping.³¹ In addition to cultural reasons for the German submissiveness, the country's people were understandably war-weary after five years of conflict. With the Nazi regime retreating on two fronts, people began worrying about reconstructing their own lives, which required them to not cause trouble.³² Also of use, Germany's status as an industrialized nation meant the citizens understood much about sanitation and infrastructure, freeing the U.S. military from having to provide it. On the American side, the soldiers engaged in occupation were far different than their predecessors. The officers had been educated at the School for Military Government or equivalent civilian university. They had the benefit of a concrete plan laid out in the Military Government handbook, which was further tempered by experiences in North Africa and Sicily. Likewise, they had enlisted personnel trained as military police, not regular soldiers merely assigned to the duty. While the American occupational experience in Germany was undoubtedly a success, the planning and


training prior to entering the country laid the foundation for achievement.

The lessons learned in World War II Germany were largely ignored in the decades that followed, however. Military thinkers were too busy devising war plans to counter the Soviet threat to consider the prospect of nation building. The manual distributed to World War II officers instructing proper governance in occupied territories was replaced by superseding manuals that failed to address this problem. The February 2001 manual, Joint Publication 3-57, Civil Operations, contained only a single reference to occupation in hostile territory.³³ This almost 60 year gap in U.S. military strategy would prove to be costly in Iraq.³⁴

The conventional operations in Iraq were undeniably planned well. U.S. forces defeated their Iraqi adversaries with relative ease, and "major combat operations" ceased within months of the invasion. Eight years later, the United States still remains embroiled in conflict; a situation largely attributed to a lack of planning in the Phase IV, or Post-Hostility Operations. Commanding General Tommy Frank's main priorities in the occupation, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and security were not flawed. However, the execution of Phase IV led to a myriad of problems during the occupation.

Much of the problems with instituting Phase IV has stemmed from the way Phase III was conducted, brilliant in the conventional style of warfare as it was, and the transitional period between the two segments. Phase III called for a quick drive to capture the Iraqi capital, summed up with Frank's alleged favorite term "Speed Kills." Unfortunately, this style of warfare did not defeat future insurgents; it only served to bypass them. In addition, the fear of weapons of mass destruction prevented the military from destroying conventional weaponry, in the event they were biologically hazardous or nuclear in nature. Further, once cities fell to American forces, they lacked a coherent plan to deal with the lawlessness and anarchy that ensued, causing many Iraqis to think that either the United States lacked compassion for their plight or were incapable of preventing it.³⁵

Perhaps the biggest problem of all, however, was the lack of available forces to complete the necessary tasks. Franks desired 250,000 troops for the occupation of the country, a figure that was in agreement with several other forecasts about the necessary number of troop levels. Washington was incredulous, however. Paul Wolfowitz stated in a meeting "I don't see why it would take more troops to occupy a country than to take down a regime."³⁶ When the invasion commenced on 20 March 2003, the entire invasion force was 145,000 soldiers



including the British contribution, a big enough contingent to defeat Iraq's conventional forces, but not nearly large enough to pacify the country.³⁷ A number of problems results from an insufficient amount of troops. First, the American military was incapable of stopping the looting that tainted their image and destroyed valuable infrastructure. Second, the border with Syria was relatively unguarded, allowing the free flow of insurgents and supplies between the two countries. Finally, there were not nearly enough soldiers to manage detainees and provide security. Commanders were forced to make a decision between guarding supply routes and enemy prisoners of war or preventing the population from looting and other lawless activities. Unfortunately, this "pick your poison" scenario created problems regardless of which decision was made.³⁸

While the whole country lacked sufficient troops, the occupation of Baghdad exemplifies the problems associated with occupying an urban area with an inadequate force. The capital of Iraq was home to some 5 million people at the time of the invasion, but a mere 20,000 soldiers were available to control the city.³⁹ This put the soldier-to-civilian ratio at .40 percent, the most diminutive ratio witnessed thus far, and far smaller than 3.5 percent and 4.4 percent the United States employed during its prior occupations of capitals, Mexico City and Manila. Surprisingly, the number is even smaller than the entire country's ratio of .58 percent, an unfortunate reality when one considers the importance of the city. Due to this shortage of soldiers and the continued hostilities with Fedayeen fighters, the U.S. lacked the numbers necessary to enforce a martial law and disarm the population.

This lack of force was also just one of the things that went wrong in Baghdad, however. On the operational level, some

units who had planned for only combat operations could not be withdrawn in accordance with the original timetable, and consequently lacked the sufficient training to handle post-Saddam Baghdad. On the policy side, the United States hesitated to call itself an occupier, but instead considered its military a "liberating force." Though being "liberators" instead of "occupiers" did not prevent the U.S. from taking measures to prevent looting; the U.S. did not bring enough forces to prevent looting without resorting to deadly force, an unacceptable option to most of the international community and most Americans. The troops available were not trained to provide civil security. The United States eventually conceded its status as an occupying power in May 2003, but the damage caused to the infrastructure of Baghdad and squandering of good-will engendered by the removal of Saddam was well gone.⁴⁰

Baghdad is the first city the United States has occupied where one can question success. There were a number of factors that hindered the military from pacifying the Iraqi capital. The government foolishly refused to take the responsibilities of an occupation, Franks' strategy left large pockets of insurgents, the Iraqis had unrealistic expectations of American capability, the Americans lacked sufficient training in military occupation, and Baghdad was a veritable arsenal of weapons and explosives, but the proper amount of soldiers would have done much to correct this. With such a troop concentration, the U.S. could have enforced a martial law to stop looting, provide security, and maintain authority in the city. Following, the military could have disarmed the population in accordance with the practices developed in Germany. The lack of force was assuredly not the United State's only issue in Baghdad and Iraq at large, but it was the most constricting factor in solving problems as they arose.

With an eye towards strategic planning, how many soldiers would it take to occupy a city like Tripoli, assuming Dictator Omar Gaddafi leaves the city but does not surrender his forces? First, it is necessary to consider Tripoli's population, which stands at 1,065,405 people according to the 2006 census. Given the current civil war against Gaddafi's regime, it is safe to assume he lacks universal support, even in his own capital. That makes the situation somewhat similar to what Scott encountered in Mexico City, which was also the lowest ratio used to successfully occupy a foreign capital. To garner that same 3.5 percent soldier-to-civilian ratio, it would require just under 37,200 troops. However, given the training and experience of the current military due to Iraq and Afghanistan, that number could be reduced significantly, as was the case for the U.S. in Germany. Further, the Libyan civil war has created an organized native rebel force capable of considerably aiding U.S. forces in the case of occupation. On the negative side, possible insurgents have been battling for around six months, which diminishes their chances of war fatigue. Further, the proliferation of firearms would be a serious obstacle to overcome. Assuming a sound initial plan to provide security however, the U.S. could possibly occupy Tripoli with 32,000-35,000 troops.

History is most useful when it aids humanity in its current endeavors. Fortunately for the United States military, the organization has tried its hand at occupation several times over the past two centuries. These experiences provide a bank of examples from which one can draw conclusions about successful and unsuccessful occupation practices. If circumstance dictates the U.S. military must invade and maintain a nation, it must stress physical and economic security, respect for the civilian population, disarmament, and training and education for its soldiers. Most importantly, however, it must provide a sufficient force to facilitate these other lessons. Without a proper soldier-to-civilian ratio, even the most efficient occupation plan is destined to fail. 

¹ Timothy D. Johnson, *Gallant Army* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 58.

² John Eisenhower, *So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico 1846-1848* (New York: Random House, 1990), 266.

³ *Ibid.*, 265.

⁴ Johnson, *Gallant Army*, 55.

⁵ Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 266.

⁶ Johnson, *Gallant Army*, 57.

⁷ Johnson, *Gallant Army*, 55.

⁸ Eisenhower, *So Far from God*, 267.

⁹ Johnson, *Gallant Army*, 242.

¹⁰ Johnson, *Gallant Army*, 109.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, 34.

¹³ While this is a logical conclusion, modern marksmanship is generally poorer than that of the past, meaning the advantage enjoyed by modern guerrillas in this scenario may not be as high as one might perceive.

¹⁴ Stephen A. Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico* (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006) 19-23.

¹⁵ Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico*, 23.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁸ Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 53.

¹⁹ Stephanie McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning, Power and Politics in the Civil War South* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 7.

²⁰ McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning*, 10.

²¹ Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press), 66.

²² McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 68.

²³ *Ibid.*, 69.

²⁴ McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 64.

²⁵ Colonel Allen W. Kiefer, *Lessons Forgotten: Comparing the Occupation of Germany With Iraq* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 5.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Kiefer, *Lessons Forgotten*, 13.

²⁸ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany* (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1976), 136.

²⁹ Ziemke, *Occupation of Germany*, 145.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 149.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 146.

³² Ziemke, *Occupation of Germany*, 139.

³³ Kiefer, *Lessons Forgotten*, 19.

³⁴ In this analysis, Afghanistan is not discussed due its reality as a "failed state" at the time of invasion. Although the Taliban had nominal control of the country, that conflict was as much about instituting a government as replacing one.

³⁵ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 88.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 121.

³⁷ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 117.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 148.

³⁹ Colonel Lyle W. Cayce, *Liberation or Occupation? How Failure to Apply Occupation Law During Operation Iraqi Freedom Threatened U.S. Strategic Interests* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 9.

⁴⁰ Cayce, *Liberation or Occupation*, 13

Microfinance and Small Business: The Potential Empowering Effects for Women in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Supporting Role of the United States Military

by Mr. James Pagano, Dickinson College



“Engage the Women...when women support COIN efforts, families support COIN efforts... female counterinsurgents, including interagency people, are required to do this effectively” (FM3-24, A-35, a.k.a. The Petraeus Doctrine)

Introduction

The practice of microfinance, and microloans specifically, has been widely hailed as a potential solution to global poverty. Proponents of microfinance are particularly excited by the potential of these loans to empower impoverished women throughout the world. This investment strategy is significant to the study of global stability because it has the potential to reduce violence, increase economic growth, and alleviate poverty.

Currently, the U.S. military focuses primarily on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While by no means the same, both countries share similar issues that make them logical sites for microfinance practices. Based on the theories that drive the microfinance movement, both of these war-torn nations stand to make significant, positive gains from the increased availability of financial services for their respective impoverished populations. Furthermore, both nations provide a significant opportunity to test the capacity of microfinance to empower women, who in both nations enjoy relatively few rights.

Microfinance 101

In most wealthy countries the majority of the population enjoys widespread access to capital and financial services. Consumers enjoy access to loans, savings accounts, mortgages, and credit at generally reasonable levels of interest. This is not the case in many developing countries. The banks that exist in these countries only offer their services to the nation’s wealthy and not to the larger impoverished majorities.¹

Thus, the poor have very few viable alternatives. Only pawnshops or local moneylenders charging exorbitant interest rates offer them credit. In essence, the poor are precluded from obtaining capital and certain financial services. Coupled with a

lack of viable financial options, nations with large poor populations often suffer from low quality of governance, such as corruption, basic service deficits, and questionable public policies. These issues cause higher transaction costs, a lack of confidence in institutions and a reluctance of legitimate banks and NGOs to participate.² In addition to the larger quality of governance issues, banks have historically viewed the poor as high-risk borrowers and a difficult demographic to serve as they often live scattered throughout rural communities.³ This opportunity gap perpetuates the vicious cycle of poverty that afflicts billions of people across the world. Microfinance seeks to change this problem.

Microfinance is the practice of offering financial services to very small businesses, groups, or individuals who have very little wealth and generally limited collateral. The most common and widely celebrated subset of microfinance is microloaning (also microcrediting), the practice of providing a small loan to a disadvantaged individual so he or she can invest in capital to allow them to create or expand an existing income generating activity.⁴ For example, recipients use these small loans to buy livestock, such as a chicken. The recipients then breed their livestock, provide them adequate nutrition and sell their eggs to make a profit and generate additional income. These small businesses, or microenterprises, serve as engines for growth in regions that face high unemployment, endemic poverty, and general underdevelopment.⁵ The loans then serve three purposes. First, the loans provide seed money to small-scale businesses that can spur economic growth in the future. Second, these small businesses provide an opportunity for income generation, which in turn will help alleviate poverty at the local level. Lastly, microfinance seeks to provide financial services to disadvantaged populations that may suffer weak local financial systems or discrimination from larger banks. These groups frequently include women, the poor, informal business owners, and rural workers.⁶

Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus developed the groundbreaking practice of loaning to the world’s most impoverished populations. In 1976 Yunus, an economics professor from Bangladesh, made his first microloan in the amount of only \$27 and

later that year founded the Grameen Bank (Village Bank).⁷ After witnessing the effects of this first loan, Yunus began to view credit as a fundamental human right. His objectives for providing credit to the poor on suitable terms and teaching them sound financial practices proved highly effective in his native Bangladesh. The practice of offering the poor unsecured loans at specified interest rates with set amounts to be paid back at specified dates has spread throughout the world. Today, microfinance institutions (MFIs) exist in over 100 countries worldwide. As of 2006, an estimated one hundred million people had received microfinance in some form.⁸ The Grameen Bank alone has served over seven million people in Bangladesh. A staggering 98% of the planet's poorest individuals repay their loans in full. Yunus and the Grameen Bank received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for their effort to reduce global poverty, improve human rights, and strengthen the prospects for world peace. According to Yunus, poverty results in the unintentional denial of many basic human rights and is incompatible with long-term, stable peace. He has set the goal of reaching 175 million people with microfinance by 2015 and pulling at least half of those out of poverty. The cost amounts to less than US \$1.25 a day.⁹

In the beginning of the microfinance revolution, all MFIs were non-profit. This meant that none of their loans required collateral, allowing the extension of loans to populations with no collateral. Typically, these loans last for a period of between six months and a year with set repayments dates that generally vary between bi-weekly and weekly. Microloans often go to women as they have proven themselves more responsible, more likely to pay back the loans, and more likely to recycle their gains into the welfare of their family and children.¹⁰ Grameen bank is also famous for implementing a group lending strategy. Though loans are granted on an individual basis, the group provides both support and pressure. Microloans typically charge interest rates higher than those charged on commercial bank loans; however, these rates still dwarf the rates charged by local moneylenders. The very high transaction costs associated with microlending necessitate these higher rates, as only higher rates of interest make the loans profitable for banks. The non-profit model often depends on the high repayment rates of borrowers and the donations of philanthropists and host governments. This dependence has prompted many to label it as "unsustainable." Today, MFIs are split between non-profit and conventional banks.

Some debate exists over the ideal organization for a microfinance institute. Each of the divergent perspectives addresses three main qualities: self-sufficiency, achievement of social good, and permanence. Multiple scholars believe MFIs should

focus primarily on financial self-sufficiency, supporting the permanence of the institution and independence from state subsidies or private donations.¹¹ The opposing view proposes that positive social benefits must trump all other interests. If an institution has made laudable progress in poverty reduction, its funders, whether private or public, will and ought to continue to invest in the institution. From either perspective, some degree of self-sufficiency is required. Even an institution that relies on subsidies should not run steep losses. This would imply the organization is not doing its job correctly, as microloans are not meant to be charity. Part of the reason that microloans are more effective than handouts is because the poor borrower is more accountable in the microfinance model.¹²

The Effects of Economic Empowerment

Poverty alleviation and economic growth are not the only reasons microfinance has become such a popular method of development aid. Many proponents argue that in addition to reducing poverty and promoting growth, microfinance has the potential to change the social status of poor women in the world. These advocates believe that this may be the primary reason it should continue as a preferred method of providing economic assistance. Over the past forty years, it has become clear that poor women borrow money more efficiently than men. This is true both statistically (women have a higher repayment rate than men) and also anecdotally (women are more likely to recycle the wealth they generate back into the household). Women borrowers will spend the proceeds generated from a loan on the education and nutrition of their children more frequently than men, as well as distribute food and education in a more egalitarian way with respect to gender.¹³

The effects of increased empowerment are theoretically very powerful. Sometimes the effects are referred to as the "virtuous spirals,"¹⁴ as they enhance and build on one another. In fact, one scholar went so far as to refer to economic empowerment as the "magic potion" of development and the solution to inequitable gender roles. In this context, economic power refers to "control of income and other key economic resources (e.g., land, animals...)." The distinction between "control of" and "earning" income also forms an important part of the underlying arguments supporting women's economic empowerment.¹⁵ "Control" implies the women have some say as to how money is spent, where simple "earning" means that women generate income but don't necessarily decide how it is allocated. Control helps women gain increased equality and a higher degree of influence over their own lives. This higher degree of autonomy leads to direct investment in the human capital of children, direct increases


in a nation's wealth and well-being and indirect improvements in a nation's income growth by corresponding reductions in fertility rates. Some evidence also suggests that improvements in female influence may lead to reduced violence, conflict and corruption.¹⁶ Given such bright prospects for positive change, it is no surprise many scholars express such tremendous, though at times unrealistic, optimism for the effects of microfinance. Such promise bears further exploration to adequately understand the potential power of microfinance.

Women's control over income will have positive societal implications. History has shown that women spend differently than men. Women tend to spend less money on their own interests and more on their children than men, even if that means forgoing their own health for the benefit of their children. Fertility rates also decrease as the woman of the house is able to leverage her income clout to make or take part in family planning decisions. Female empowerment theory also postulates that increased female economic clout leads to national increases in

wealth and well-being, a theory that rests on two basic propositions. As previously stated, women with higher incomes have more say in decision-making as it pertains to family planning. A country's fertility rate has an inverse relationship to national income; therefore, lower fertility rates lead to higher national income. Women are more likely to have healthy educated children when they have fewer children. Second, female empowerment increases national wealth due to the previously stated tendency of women to educate their children. Though such education may not result in immediate economic gains, economists accept that investments in education spur economic growth and viability in the future.¹⁷

The prospects for female empowerment as a result of microfinance are promising, but many of the proposed benefits are largely theoretical. Do these theories hold true in the real world, and if so, which specific practices have actually empowered women? Conflicting reports regarding the capacity of microfinance to empower women exist and come to very different

Figure 1: Geographic Coverage of Formal Microfinance Industry as of 2008¹⁹






Figure 2: Map of Afghanistan by Security Concerns 2009

conclusions on the future utility of microfinance and micro-loans.¹⁸ Widespread research shows that microfinance often fails to reach the very poorest individuals. Indeed, this issue has become a serious point of contention amongst microfinance scholars. Unfortunately, these extremely impoverished individuals often lack the skills and abilities to absorb any level of debt and require highly involved specialized programs to succeed in microfinance. Safety net programs such as food, nutrition, and health assistance have a more significant impact on the extremely poor.

The Role of the Military in Supporting Microfinance

The U.S. military continues to play a crucial role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, especially as each country continues to struggle to solidify its national security. The ongoing security threats have caused the military to adapt its strategy to utilize more tools of economic development as a means to undermine insurgent support. Microfinance represents one of many development tools available to the military. While the visibility of microfinance programs pales in comparison to larger infrastructure programs, microfinance

may be effective in delivering direct long-term relief from the poverty and marginalization that many believe creates insurgent support. The capacity for microfinance to empower women will further the goal of creating secure and peaceful societies.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Microfinance

As mentioned earlier, the precarious security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan increases the price of microfinance, in turn reducing the profitability and viability of the practice. The military must continue to work with MFIs and NGOs to help defray the extra security costs. Currently, microfinance exists mainly in the most secure provinces, reinforcing the existing security environment in stable areas, though less stable areas remain unreachable. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) represent a possible means to further expanding the practice of microfinance to more volatile regions. PRTs, the joint civil-military teams comprised of military personnel and development specialists, have played an increasingly important role since their introduction in 2002. As of 2008, the U.S. operated over 30 PRTs between Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, in Afghanistan, the United States, NATO and other member nations operate over 50 PRTs. Serving as the primary civil-military

partnership in both Iraq and Afghanistan, PRTs are a logical tool to use in furthering the reach and results of microfinance operations. To date, PRTs have sought to support microfinance efforts in both countries to some effect; however, a more consistent, results oriented approach by PRTs will make them more effective and ultimately benefit Iraqi and Afghan citizens as well as the U.S. military.

Despite the priority NATO and the military give to PRTs, many remain skeptical and others outright oppose their presence and continued use. Many of the complaints leveled against PRTs seem directly contradictory; however, consideration of these complaints can help better inform PRT practices with respect to advancing microfinance. President Karzai claims that Afghans look to the PRTs for assistance instead of local or central government officials.²⁰ Instead of creating government legitimacy, PRTs effectively reduce opportunities for government to function, according to Karzai. Members of the humanitarian relief sector also view PRTs negatively and contend that working alongside the military, human rights workers become targets of militants and lose their neutrality.²¹ Still others believe that PRTs cause mission drift for NGOs and humanitarian organizations. A perceived overemphasis on counterinsurgency means that the NGOs working with PRTs cannot necessarily serve the neediest populations. Some believe the United States focuses too much on large, visible projects such as schools or road construction that do not meet the needs of the people but rather seek to garner support for the U.S. military's continued presence.²²

Despite the various criticisms leveled against PRTs, they are a reality of the current reconstruction efforts and represent an opportunity to emphasize civil-military relations. Whether PRTs should remain a priority for the military is beyond the scope of this paper; however, as long as PRTs remain, they can and should shape the practice of microfinance in a way that empowers women and stabilizes both countries in a sustainable way.

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) is another tool the military can utilize in supporting microfinance. This program provides military commanders a specific amount of funding to support local reconstruction and stabilization efforts in amounts less than \$500,000.²³ CERP first emerged in Iraq following the collapse of the Ba'athist regime and reports show that CERP quickly and effectively delivered relief, especially relative to more lengthy appropriations processes. In Iraq, commanders have used these funds to create temporary employment opportunities among other projects.²⁴

CERP can be used to help institutionalize and expand the microfinance industries in both Iraq and Afghanistan, though current rules surrounding it somewhat limit its utility with respect to microfinance. These funds can be allocated as grants in ways that further the military's goal of consolidating gains. Commanders can utilize CERP funds in both Iraq and Afghanistan to help the microfinance industry address the skills deficit. According to guidelines set out by the military, commanders can utilize CERP for "economic, financial, and management improvements," focusing on "economic development."²⁵ While the legality of CERP funding for MFIs was initially unclear, more recent documents make CERP funding for microfinance permissible within certain rules.²⁶ Providing CERP funds to MFIs willing to educate and train local populations in the skills necessary to support and expand microfinance will not only improve education but also create more employment options. Education in this area must include basics mathematics, appraisal skills, basic banking and basic business practices. Providing education and employment opportunities will in-turn serve to expand the microfinance industry and address one of the identified barriers to microfinance expansion.

Conclusion

The United States military should use its position and influence in Iraq and Afghanistan to support microfinance as part of a broader post-conflict reconstruction plan. Microfinance, which has been practiced in developing countries since the 1970s, has the potential to reduce poverty and empower women. These two impacts stand to positively reinforce and expand the existing stability and security situations that currently exists in these countries.

Microfinance, the practice of offering small loans (microloans) and other financial services to impoverished populations, provides an escape from the persistent cycle of poverty. By extending loans to poor individuals, these people can make use of innate entrepreneurial abilities to start small businesses or assist in family care to improve the quality of their lives. This method of development differs from traditional grants and awards in that the recipients are accountable, expected to pay back the loans in order to receive future assistance.

Microfinance strongly influences female empowerment.²⁷ Women who receive loans have high repayment rates and are more likely to invest in their children. Giving women loans allows them to gain economic clout, earn community and household respect as well as have a voice in financial decisions. Increased female empowerment correlates to increased literacy, improved child health and reduced corruption and violence.²⁸

Microfinance spread to both Iraq and Afghanistan following the respective U.S. led invasions. The microfinance industry has grown in both countries, but this growth has occurred in ways that impede its effectiveness. Iraq and Afghanistan both have histories of female oppression. Legal policies of exclusion along with strong cultural practice preclude women from contributing to economic growth and cultural advancement. These restrictions have caused female microfinance outreach to lag behind regional averages. This lag reduces the profitability of microfinance institutions and diminishes the economic and cultural benefits a community or country can receive from a robust microfinance program.

Precarious security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan increase the price of microfinance, in turn reducing the viability of the practice. The military must continue to work with MFIs and NGOs to help defray the extra security costs. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) should play a role in reducing these costs, advocating and informing communities of potential microfinance opportunities. The extension and creation of PRT programs meant to assist in providing transport and security to MFIs will increase the viability of microfinance.

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) can also be used to help institutionalize and expand the microfinance industries in both Afghanistan and Iraq. CERP funds in both Iraq and Afghanistan can address the skills deficit faced by the microfinance industry by providing funds for vocational training. Targeted CERP funding can also help influence existing MFIs to extend a greater share of loans to women. Promising small incentives to institutions extending a percentage of loans to women above the market average will increase the impact on female empowerment.

The empowerment of women in Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with reductions in poverty stands to improve the prospects of military success. History shows microfinance can be an effective tool in simultaneously delivering both ends. As such, the military should seek to influence the microfinance industry to reach more women and inform communities about the potential benefits of microfinance. 

¹ "The Hidden Wealth of the Poor," *The Economist*, November 5, 2005, 377.

² *Ibid.*

³ Ina Kota, "Microfinance: Banking for the Poor," *Finance and Development* 44, no. 2 (June 2007).

⁴ Janney Carpenter, "Microcredit in Transitional Economies," *Organization of Economically Developed Countries*. 1996,

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⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ "Who We Are." Grameen Foundation. <http://www.grameen-foundation.org/> (accessed June 9, 2011).

⁸ Alina M. Zapalska, Brozik, Dallas, Rudd, Denis. "The Success of Micro-financing." *Problems and Perspectives in Management*. (2007) 86.

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¹¹ Janney Carpenter, "Microcredit in Transitional Economies." Heather Montgomery; John Weiss. "Great Expectations: Microfinance and Poverty Reduction in Asia and Latin America" ADB Institute Research Paper Series. 2005.

¹² Linda Mayoux, "Questioning Virtuous Spirals: Micro-finance and Women's Empowerment in Africa." *Journal of International Development* 11, (1999) 958.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Rae Bloomberg, "Women's Economic Empowerment as the "Magic Potion" of Development," UNESCO. 2005 (2).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Linda Mayoux. "Questioning Virtuous Spirals," 973.

¹⁹ Maliha Hamid Hussein, *State of Microfinance in Afghanistan*. Bangladesh: Institute of Microfinance. 2009. pp.10-12.

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²¹ Sean M. Donnelly, "Development as Counterinsurgency: Militarization of Microfinance". *International Studies Association Annual*, (March 17, 2011).

²² *Ibid.*

²³ U.S. Combined Arms Center. *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System*. 2009. Prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

²⁴ Mark Martins, "The Commander's Emergency Response Program," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 37 (2005).

²⁵ *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System*, p. 14-15.

²⁶ US Department of Defense. *Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan*. 2011. p. 148-153.

²⁷ Mayoux, *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

New Media and Conflict

by Mr. Michael Fishman, Tufts



As global internet proliferation has increased, new tools have become available which give users unprecedented access to information, as well as control over its distribution. Tools like social networking and self-publishing have changed the nature of information networks in dramatic ways. Debates rage in the academic community over the effect of these new tools on culture, civil society, and politics. New tools are being introduced constantly and become popular or irrelevant quickly. The following are some of the tools, services, and trends which represent developments in the media environment.

Social Media: An umbrella term for internet platforms in which user-generated content is shared amongst a community. Refers broadly to change on the internet, and is generally linked with terms such as “Web 2.0” and “user generated content”.

Blog: Short for “Weblog,” a blog is a website in which users post content that is viewable by the public. These entries are displayed in reverse-chronological order; the most recent entry is displayed first when a reader views the site. Blogs include original content as well as links to other sources. They serve as sources of news, commentary, special interest information, or as personal diaries. Popular blogs may be hosted by their own websites, but there are services online which allow you to set up a blog for free. The collective community of all blogs is known as the “blogosphere.”

News and politics blogs tend to have a distinct political outlook. The Huffington Post, launched in 2005, combines commentary with news aggregated from traditional media sources and is seen as liberal. The Drudge Report, a blog which originated as an e-mail chain, functions similarly to The Huffington Post, but leans conservative. It is famous for being the first news outlet to break the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Many blogs do not focus on news and politics, such as Treehugger.com, a lifestyle blog supporting and promoting environmentally friendly lifestyles. Services like [Blogspot](#), [Livejournal](#), and [Wordpress](#) allow users to create blogs for free.

Facebook: Currently the most popular social networking site worldwide, Facebook is a website which combines social networking with blogging, gaming, and video-call services. A Facebook user creates a “page” which contains personal information: name, age, education and work history, tastes in music and

movies, etc. A person connects to other people on Facebook by becoming “friends” a mutually agreed upon dynamic by which their two profiles are linked. A user can post text, pictures, videos, and links. A user, upon signing into Facebook, sees a “news feed”, a collection of recent updates from the people they are friends with (“Mark shared a link” “Jessica’s relationship status went from “In A Relationship” to “Single”). Facebook also includes functions to organize “groups” around particular interests, as well as plan “events”. Facebook has come under scrutiny for its privacy policies, occasionally unveiling features which publicly publish information without the users’ consent. Facebook also enforces a “True name” policy, which requires users to use their legal name, a policy which has been criticized for putting activists at risk. While Facebook is the most popular social networking service globally, with approximately 650 million unique users per month, other variants and copies exist throughout the world, such as Russia’s V-Kontakte, the Brazilian Orkut(run by Google) or China’s RenRen.

Twitter: A “Micro-Blogging” service which allows users to post 140-character messages called “tweets.” Twitter users “follow” other users, receiving their tweets in a reverse-chronological timeline. Twitter is unique in that utilizes both the internet and cellphones, making it a “resilient” tool. A Twitter user does not even need an internet-enabled phone to send and receive Tweets, as the service’s 140 character limit was designed to function with a phone’s texting capabilities. Tweets can be addressed to specific users, or can be organized by “Hashtags”. A hashtag is a way of organizing tweets by topic in an easily searchable way: #Jan25” organized tweets about the original Egyptian Tahrir Square protests, while “#WorldCup2010” organized tweets about the World Cup held in South Africa. A user can search for a hashtag to find tweets on a subject from any Twitter user worldwide. Twitter users may include a “location” in their profiles, but this location does not necessarily reflect reality and is unverified.

YouTube: A service which allows users to post and share videos. Each video has a “comments” section where users can discuss the video. The administrators of YouTube – owned by Google -- do not permit videos that contain material that is deemed to be defamatory, pornographic, or encouraging criminal conduct. It enforces these content regulations by a way of “community policing.” If users believe a video is in violation of the site’s

regulations, they “flag” it, and it is then reviewed by moderators who decide whether or not the video is in violation. Videos can be viewed on the site or “embedded” for viewing elsewhere.

LinkedIn: A social networking website tailored to professionals. Users form “connections” with professional contacts, and use these networks to collaborate or assist in employment. Communication between unconnected users on LinkedIn requires either a preexisting offline relationship or the use of an intermediary common contact. For example, someone searching for a job might see that a former colleague of theirs is working for a prospective employer, and use this as a way to reach out.

Google+: A new social networking platform launched by Google. Though it is new and only in the “Beta” phase -- a testing period in which users may only join by invitation and new features are tested out before opening it to the public -- it offers a few new services and features that distinguish it from other social networks. Users connect by placing each other in “circles,” allowing them to organize their contacts by various groupings (Book Club, Family, College Friends, etc.). The service also offers the “hangout” feature, allowing easy group videoconferencing.

Flickr: A popular photo and video sharing site that includes some community functions. A user can post images and display those images on other websites. Flickr also allows users to attach “tags,” a form of metadata which makes the images searchable by content. For example, a picture might be tagged as “StPatricksDay” “Wedding” or “Protest.”

Wiki: A Wiki is a type of website which allows for multiple contributors, often allowing anyone to edit. The most famous of this is Wikipedia, which has used an open-information format to attempt to create a free encyclopedia, however a wiki can be created for any purpose.

Moldova 2009:

Moldova was one of the first cases in which new media played a role in the outcome of conflict. On April 6, 2009, rallies were organized in the Piata Marii Adunari Nationale, the largest square in Moldova’s capital city of Chişinău to protest a Communist electoral victory. On April 7th, the protest became unruly. With 10,000 people in the square, riots began. Authorities had disabled cell phone reception in the area of the protests (a common tactic used by governments cracking down on protests) but due to the ability of many cell phones to access satellite internet, users were able to send some text messages and use Twitter. Protesters used the #pman hashtag (referring

to the square in which the protests occurred) which quickly became one of the most popular topics on Twitter for that day. The protester did not primarily use Twitter to communicate amongst themselves, but rather to disseminate information about the protests. These Tweets allowed the Moldovan diaspora, a large group due to Moldova’s distressed economy, to follow along with the events in the square and “participate” in the protests by forwarding and re-posting the messages of the protesters to raise awareness.¹

While Moldova was celebrated by some as a “Twitter Revolution,”² an example of the way in which social media would eventually bring about the demise of authoritarian states, the reality was more complex. It is clear now that Twitter played a small role -- if it played one at all -- in organizing the protests on the ground. For example, it is unclear how many Twitter users were active in Moldova at the time, and there are indications that the number may have been quite small.³ However, the impact of these new media technologies should not be measured by the number of users during a protest, but by their power to send information quickly and distribute it to many people. Moldovans used Twitter not only to communicate amongst themselves, but also to disseminate information about the protests around the world. This communication allowed the Moldovan diaspora, a large group due to Moldova’s distressed economy⁴, to follow along with the events in the square and “participate” in the protests by forwarding and re-posting the messages of the protesters to raise global awareness of their national struggle. Although these movements eventually failed due to a failure of political leadership, one should not completely dismiss the value of social media in this situation: it provided international attention, recognition, and support for the protesters. However, one should not overstate its value either: the presence of social networking tools was insufficient on their own to facilitate a revolution when other problematic factors worked against it.


Iran

Many commentators in the Western media considered the 2009 election protests in Iran a “Twitter Revolution,” and watched the events closely, hoping that new technology could lead to the overthrow a powerful autocratic adversary. One commentator claimed that “this is it. The big one. This is the first revolution that has been catapulted onto a global stage and transformed by social media.”⁵ This enthusiasm was largely misdirected, and may have been actively detrimental to the interests of American foreign policy. The election itself did not focus on the center of power in Iran – which remained in the hands of the unelected Supreme Leader – but on the office of president, the highest secular position on the country. Iran, in 2009, was one of the most internet-active countries in the Middle East. In the years

before the revolution, internet access in Iran had grown rapidly, reaching about 35% of the population before the protests, compared to an average of 26% in the Middle East as a whole.⁶ The Iranian blogosphere was vibrant and active, and was considered within the country to be the “most open public communications platform for political discourse.”⁷ However, Iranian government officials placed strict and wide ranging limitations on internet usage. Internet speed was severely limited for households, making it extremely difficult to download multimedia content and thus access alternatives to state-run media. Iran’s constitutionally enshrined censorship of media extended to the internet, but the diffuse nature of internet expression resulted in spotty censorship. In 2009, Iran’s internet filtering in political and social areas was ranked as “pervasive.”⁸

When official election results favoring incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were released, many Iranians claimed they were fraudulent and took to the streets. The Green Movement, the reformist wing of Iranian politics was the primary force behind the protests. The Green Movement mainly con-

sisted of the young and educated, groups which typically enjoy higher levels of internet proficiency than the general population. As protesters started to take to the streets, the Iranian government deployed a host of conventional repressive strategies – police violence and accusations of foreign instigation – as well as strategies geared toward new media. As has been common for many years in states which wish to stop protests, text messaging was shut down for three weeks following the protests. State security services hacked websites for the Green movement.⁹ Journalists were detained, forced to stay in their hotel rooms or houses, or expelled from the country. In the past, this situation would have severely limited the amount of information able to leave the country; however the proliferation of video and photo sharing technologies changed the information dynamic. The west could now receive real-time images, videos, and updates of protests occurring inside Iran. Despite this ability, in the face of the authorities’ violent crackdown, the protests waned and Ahmadinejad remained in the presidency.





@mousavi1388
Mehrossein Mousavi

ALL internet & mobile networks are cut.
We ask everyone in Tehran to go onto
their rooftops and shout ALAHO AKBAR
in protest #IranElection

13 Jun 09 via web

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Many commentators in the Western media saw Twitter as playing a key role. In “The Revolution Will Be Twittered”¹⁰ Andrew Sullivan of *The Atlantic* claimed that protests were actually organized on Twitter, using tweets like this as an example: From this information, Sullivan made bold claims. New media meant that “you cannot stop people any longer. You cannot control them any longer.” Others claimed that the internet had provided a space for organization outside of the government’s gaze by allowing the protesters to “surprise” the government. Though the security forces knew to take down mobile phone services, they were slower to block the internet and social networking sites, reflecting an inability of the “old guard” to grasp the way that the internet was used. The proliferation of cameras was frequently cited as a key dynamic: the ability to send pictures and video of demonstrations and police brutality to the outside world was seen as key to sustaining the protest. The video of the death of Neda Agha-Soltan, a young woman shot by the pro-government Basij militia was a key example of this: highlighting the brutality of the regime and galvanizing protesters. Jared Cohen, a 27 year old official at the U.S. State Department, asked Twitter management to delay scheduled site maintenance which would have taken the service offline for a few hours while the protests occurred. Although administration officials later made clear that this was a low level communication by an employee who already was in frequent contact with Twitter management, the implications were clear: the foreign policy establishment viewed the internet not only as a business and communications service but as a tool for advancing democracy worldwide.

However, after the protests, doubts arose about the role which new media played. Evgeny Morozov, the leading academic “cyber-skeptic,” has written extensively on this subject, arguing that the internet is not inherently democratic, and that dictators can use it as a tool as easily as their opponents. While much discussion of the protests occurred online – it was one of Twitter’s top “trending topics” in the weeks following the election – it remains unclear how much of the online discus-

sion actually came from inside Iran. Like in Moldova, there is no way to tell how many active Twitter users existed inside the country, but the number appeared to be low (less than 1% of the population) before the protests.¹¹ Cyber-skeptics point to the case of Oxfordgirl, a Twitter user. Profiled in *The Guardian* under the title “Oxfordgirl vs. Ahmedinejad,” she seemed an example of the internet as a tool of the freedom fighter. “Before they started blocking mobile phones I was almost co-ordinating people’s individual movements – ‘Go to such and such street,’ or ‘Don’t go there, the Basij [militia] are waiting,’” the article quoted her as saying. Of course, not only was she outside of Iran, but her claims made little sense given that cell networks were completely shut off during days of protest.¹² It remains unclear whether Twitter and social media had a ground level effect on the Tehran protests, but it seems unlikely. There were discussions of the protests on Twitter, but that does not mean that these had a decisive organizational nature. There were tweets, and there were protests, but there is no clear causal link, despite the claims of many western commentators. According to Mehdi Yahyanejad, the manager of one of the foremost Farsi-language websites, Twitter had no effect on the revolution. He said that in Western media “there was a lot of buzz, but once you look... you see most of it are Americans talking among themselves.”¹³

The internet may even have led to harm for the protesters. It allowed harmful rumors to spread as quickly as true, useful information: unverifiable information circulated over Twitter claiming that the police were pouring acid and boiling water on crowds, causing panic. Worst among these rumors was the case of Saeedeh Pouraghay, who was allegedly arrested for shouting “Allaho Akbar” on her rooftop, raped, disfigured, and murdered. Her story spread over social networks, and she became a martyr for the Green Movement, but the story turned out to be a hoax. Evgeny Morozov points out that this story may have been a hoax propagated by the Iranian security forces itself and intended to be debunked in order to bring into question the legitimacy of further claims of police brutality.

Iranian security services made use of the internet during and after the protests as well. Officials sent out mass text messages warning Iranians in Tehran to avoid street protests. Security personnel gathered information on Iranians living abroad and threatened their relatives in Iran if they expressed support for the “Green revolution.” After the protests, a special unit in the prosecutor’s office was created to investigate and prosecute internet crimes, mostly regime critics. Regime officials have used information gathered online to find Iranian relatives of expatriate bloggers and harass them.¹⁴ Iranian officials have also used the online record of a person’s contacts. In one instance immigration control officials questioning a woman travelling into Iran after the revolution asked if she had a Facebook: though

she said no, the officers searched Facebook for her name, found her account, and noted the names of her “friends.” After the protests, security personnel searched the internet to gather publically available pictures and video of protests, publishing them online and asking the public for help in identifying the protesters. The police claimed that this type of identification helped with the arrest of at least 40 people. The Iranian experience lead Evgeny Morozov to make this claim: “if the dictator doesn’t fall in the end, the benefits of social mobilization afforded by the internet are probably outweighed by its costs (i.e. the ease of tracking down dissidents – let alone organizers of the protests).”¹⁵

The example of Iran shows the internet’s potential in a revolutionary context as well as its limitations and dangers. The internet’s ability to spread information quickly and widely can benefit to those opposing dictators, as it makes it impossible for a government to engage in what Zeynep Tufekci calls “whack-a-protest.”¹⁶ In this model, a government responds to protests (which normally begin in limited geographic areas) with quarantine, expulsion of journalists, and violent repression; the government thus expends minimal resources to contain dissent. New media makes this tactic impossible: protests will be immediately seen not only throughout the country but around the world, turning what would once have been a short-lived, regional incident into a nationwide or transnational movement. However, the internet’s role in ground-level organization appears to be largely insignificant. The case of “Oxfordgirl” illustrates this well: though a useful source for Westerners looking for information from Iran, she played an insignificant role in Tehran itself. Further, the internet poses risks to citizens, activists, and protesters who leave extensive digital records which security forces can access as well as those who they are attempting to communicate with. Thus, new media could endanger dissidents should the regime remain in power.

Lessons:

Although the role of social media in conflict will be a critical factor in 21st century conflict, it is important to neither overstate its influence nor to assume that it will influence events the same in every conflict. New technology offers tools which provide great power to the individual: the ability to share and publish information, the ability to organize people quickly and without great expense, and the ability to communicate instantaneously around the globe. However, the internet also provides powerful tools to governments with which to identify dissenters, track criminals, and spread propaganda. The future of conflict will be shaped not only by technological improvements -- such as cyber-censorship software or improved cybersecurity for dissidents – but also by social patterns created by this new

technology. Ultimately, one should not look to the technology but the way people use this technology. The internet will not set the world free, but people using the internet have new strategies and tactics available to further their political and societal goal. 

¹ Morozov, Evgeny. “Moldova’s Twitter Revolution” Net.Effect. 2009

² Morozov, “Moldova’s Twitter Revolution”

³ Morozov, Evgeny. “More analysis of Twitter’s role in Moldova” Net Effect. 2009

⁴ CIA World Factbook. Updated Sept 27, 2011.

⁵ “Q&A With Clay Shirky on Twitter and Iran” TED Blog. 2009

⁶ “Internet Filtering in Iran”. OpenNet Initiative. 2009

⁷ “Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere”. Berkman Center for Internet & Society. 2008.

⁸ “Internet Filtering in Iran”. OpenNet Initiative. 2009

⁹ “Iran” Freedom on the Net 2011. Freedom House, 2011.

¹⁰ Sullivan, Andrew “The Revolution Will Be Twittered”. The Atlantic.

¹¹ Morozov, Evgeny. “More analysis of Twitter’s role in Moldova” Net Effect. 2009

¹² Net Delusion, Morozov

¹³ Musgrove, Mike. “Twitter is a Player in Iran’s Drama”. The Washington Post. 2009

¹⁴ “Iran” Freedom on the Net 2011. Freedom House, 2011

¹⁵ Morozov, Evgeny. “What if Tunisia’s revolution ended up like Iran’s?” Net.Effect, 2011.

¹⁶ Tufekci, Zeynep. June, 2011 The Power of Strong Ties, The Power of Weak Ties. Personal Democracy Forum, 2011. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=67XXm-RukKg&feature=player_embedded#!>

A sleek new user interface and a mobile application – two major Lines of Effort for SOLLIMS development in FY'12.

FY'12 looks to be a very busy year for the SOLLIMS development team. We will be pursuing two major lines of effort for this year – moving to a sleek, new user interface for the existing SOLLIMS site; and, providing users the ability to work offline via a SOLLIMS mobile application referred to as “e.SOLLIMS”. The new user interface – Line of Effort 1 – for SOLLIMS will integrate the latest web development presentation techniques – e.g. expanding, drop-down menus, scrolling content, stacked drop-down menus, floating menus - we are borrowing ideas from many LL web sites; with the SOLLIMS lessons database backend. All of this intended to give the user a more satisfying web/online experience.

Line of Effort 2 – the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) program is looking to expand its availability and capabilities to the Stability Operations Military and non-DOD communities

of practice by offering a Mobile Application that provides the ability to capture Observations, Insight and Lessons (OIL) and view reference libraries in low or no bandwidth environments. In addition, the “app” will provide selected SOLLIMS functionality when connected to the Internet. This capability / “app” is being referred to as “e.SOLLIMS”. “e.SOLLIMS” will be developed as a “device independent” application, meaning that the application would be designed to work on a variety of web-enabled devices, in particular 3G/4G Smartphones, iPads™, as well as laptops and PCs. Likewise, e.SOLLIMS will provide the capability to conduct off-line data collection (OIL) and the ability to access to user defined, previously downloaded reference documentation, lessons, etc.

In short, when connected to the Internet with any web-enabled device (smartphone, laptop, PC) e.SOLLIMS can provide a mobile front end for SOLLIMS Prime with full SOLLIMS capability; when not connected to the internet, e.SOLLIMS allows for OIL data entry and storage for future upload to SOLLIMS Prime; users will also be able to access their downloaded SOLLIMS Prime reference content.



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Volume 2, Issue 1

October 2011

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