



# Security Cooperation Concept Plan (SCCP)

March 2015

*“Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches – primarily through Security Cooperation efforts designed to build the capacity of partner governments and their security forces - in order to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention.”<sup>1</sup>*

**Version 9.0**

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<sup>1</sup> Statement by United States Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, January 2009.

## Preface

It has long been the national security policy and strategy of the United States to support the professional development and sustainable capacity and capability of foreign security forces, supporting security institutions, and our partner nation (PN) security sector organizations.<sup>2</sup>

NEW CENTURY US (NCUS) is pleased to continue to support the Department of Defense (DoD) and other Federal Executive Branch departments and agencies in the conduct of our national security policy and strategy and their corresponding Security Cooperation (SC)<sup>3</sup>, Security Assistance (SA), Security Force Assistance (SFA)<sup>4</sup>, Stability Operations (SO)<sup>5</sup> Functionally Based Security Force Assistance (FBSFA) and Defense Institution Building (DIB)<sup>6</sup> activities across the full range of military operations.

With our proven experience and core cadre of Security Assistance Mentors and Advisors (SAMAs) that form our scalable Deployed Security Assistance Teams (DSATs)<sup>7</sup> to our *“Shape, Prepare, Engage, Educate, and Develop (SPEED)”* operating concept, NCUS sustains the capacity to offer the DoD, other Federal Executive Branch departments and agencies, international, regional, and intergovernmental security cooperation organizations, geographic and functional Combatant Commands (GCCs and FCCs) and joint and combined joint task force (JTF and CJTF) commanders an unprecedented level of cost-effective and results-oriented Security Cooperation (SC), Security Assistance (SA), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Stability Operations (SO) Functionally Based Security Force Assistance (FBSFA) and Defense Institution Building (DIB) support.

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<sup>2</sup> Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, *“U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy,”* dated April 5, 2013.

<sup>3</sup> See DoD Directive (DoDD) 5132.03, *“DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.”*

<sup>4</sup> See DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.68, *“Security Force Assistance.”*

<sup>5</sup> See DoDI 3000.05, *“Stability Operations.”*

<sup>6</sup> See DoD Directive (DoDD) 5205.82 *“Defense Institution Building (DIB) issued dated January 27, 2016.*

<sup>7</sup> The President and the Secretary of Defense have given new strategic guidance to articulate priorities for a 21st century defense that sustains U.S. global leadership. This strategic guidance describes a joint force that will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. See TRADOC PAM 525-3-0, *“Army Capstone Concept.”*

NCUS can conduct these activities across multiple domains using a comprehensive unity of effort<sup>8</sup> and unified action approach designed to produce immediate, long-term, and enduring improvements to a PN's capacity to secure their homeland, achieve nationwide stabilization, defend against internal and external threats to their stability, set the conditions for a PN's security forces and institutions to contribute to coalition and multinational operations and humanitarian relief efforts and contribute to overall regional growth and stability.

Successfully performing functionally based SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities that build intelligent partnership capacity requires all NCUS SAMAs and DSATs to understand a PN's advisor network<sup>9</sup> - from the ministry level down to the lowest supporting institution levels - as well as understand the entire range of functional processes that are execution-critical<sup>10</sup> to a PN achieving, maintaining, and sustaining the highest state of sustainable security force capacity and capability possible.<sup>11</sup>

Together, and effectively conducted, these SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB capacity-building efforts can set the conditions for PNs to provide for their own sustainable security and self-defense, contribute effectively to broader regional and global security challenges, establish and sustain security relationships with domestic, regional, and international security institutions and further U.S. national security interests.<sup>12</sup>

NCUS remains committed to supporting U.S. Security Sector Assistance initiatives by supporting efforts that directly contribute to *"Building Intelligent Capacity."*<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See Joint Publication (JP) 1, *"Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States."* Unity of effort is defined as *"the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action."*

<sup>9</sup> General (GEN) Stanley McCrystal, *"Lesson From Iraq: It Takes A Network to Defeat A Network,"* June 2013. See: <https://www.exbellum.com/blog/13-lesson-from-iraq-it-takes-a-network-to-defeat-a-network-by-stan-mcchrysal>

<sup>10</sup> NCUS defines "execution-critical" as "any major deficiency that negatively affects the capability of a security sector force to meet and sustain their security force responsibilities." Examples of such deficiencies include reported readiness, preparedness and capability and capacity shortfalls, actual failures to meet security sector response timelines, responsibilities, functions, and tasks and major equipping, sustainment, and logistics shortfalls.

<sup>11</sup> Achieving *"sustainable security outcomes in support of Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands and Joint requirements"* is one of twenty U.S. Army Warfighting Challenges. See: <http://www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/army-warfighting-challenges.aspx>.

<sup>12</sup> See Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *"Stability Operations,"* and U.S. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07 *"Stability."*

<sup>13</sup> See New Century-US statement before the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress Subcommittee on Intelligence: *"Past, Present, and Future Irregular Warfare Challenges: Private Sector Perspectives,"* dated June 28, 2013.

# Security Cooperation Concept Plan (SCCP)

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction

#### 1-1. Purpose.

a. The NEW CENTURY US (NCUS) “*Security Cooperation Concept Plan (SCCP)*” describes how NCUS supports the United States Government (USG) national security, defense, and military policies and strategies related to Building Partnership Capacity (BPC)<sup>14</sup> in order to promote specific U.S. security interests; develop allied and friendly military capabilities and capacities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provides U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.<sup>15</sup>

b. NCUS SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB capacity-building efforts encompass a broad, whole of government, and comprehensive range of SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB initiatives<sup>16</sup> that are designed to:

(1) Assist PNs develop, professionalize and sustain the highest state of security force capability and capacity possible consistent with resources;

(2) Enhance joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM)<sup>17</sup> operational practices and enable more effective coalition operations;

(3) Sustain U.S. global leadership and ability to project power despite anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges, and;

(4) Produce measurable, sustainable and enduring PN CM improvements.

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<sup>14</sup> It is interesting that the phrase “building partner capacity” and “building partnership capacity” are used interchangeably between the Joint Staff and the Services and often the other Federal Executive Branch Departments and Agencies. NEW CENTURY US uses the term “building partnership capacity (BPC)” as contained and defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02).

<sup>15</sup> See Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), V 1.0. The JOAC contains 30 JOAC Capabilities, three being “Engagement” functions (JOA-028 thru JOA-030). See also U.S. Army TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, “*Functional Concept for Engagement*” (previously TRADOC Pam 525-8-4, “*Building Partner Capacity*.”).

<sup>16</sup> These stated initiatives are included in U.S. Presidential, Federal Executive Branch Department and Agency and formally recognized intergovernmental and multinational policy and strategy issuances and are included in the comprehensive listing of References as either a required (requires compliance) or related (generally accepted guidance) issuance.

<sup>17</sup> See Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, dated April 5, 2013 titled “*U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy*,” and the emphasis on a “whole of government” approach.

c. The remainder of the NCUS SCCP outlines the assumptions, functions, roles and responsibilities of NCUS Security Assistance Mentors and Advisors (SAMAs), our SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB planning and assessment methodologies for building PN capacity, the minimum mission-essential knowledge, skills, attributes (KSAs) and education requirements our SAMA professionals must maintain and other SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB tasks our SAMAs and DSATs plan to perform when primarily supporting U.S. efforts to conduct FBSFA activities that are directly related to supporting the development of the sustainable capability and capacity of PN security forces and institutions.

1-2. References. Required and related references are in Appendix A.

1-3. Explanation of abbreviations, terms, and special terms. Abbreviations, terms, and special terms are found in the glossary. To the greatest extent possible, NCUS utilizes formally approved and recognized U.S., NATO, Allied Administrative Publication (AAP), and PN terms and abbreviations.<sup>18</sup>

## **Chapter 2**

Security Cooperation (SC), Security Assistance (SA), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Stability Operations (SO), Functionally Based Security Force Assistance (FBSFA) and Defense Institution Building (DIB) Overview

2–1. National and theater strategy and planning.

a. U.S. national defense and military security strategy provide the basis for the global, regional, and functional strategic end states specified in the Department of Defense (DoD) Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).<sup>19</sup>

b. For each SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB strategic end state, geographic combatant commands (COCOMs) must establish intermediate military objectives — goals the commands expect to achieve through their campaign and theater engagement plans (TEPs) — as milestones to measure progress toward achieving directed end states.

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<sup>18</sup> Primary source is Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* available at: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod\\_dictionary/index.html](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/index.html).

<sup>19</sup> See Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, *Security Force Assistance* Chapter II and U.S. Army ADP 3-07 *Stability* (page 3) for comments on *Whole Of Government* and *Comprehensive* approaches to conducting SC, SFA, and SO.

c. Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) develop theater campaign and contingency plans to achieve those end states. Functional Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) develop global campaign plans focused on their functional areas. The Department of the Army (DA) develops The Army Plan (TAP) to provide the capabilities necessary to support those plans. Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) develop campaign support plans to support both by providing capabilities and conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities.

d. Other Federal Executive Departments and Agencies contribute to U.S. national security strategy efforts with the U.S. Department of State (DoS) generally the lead Department on SC, SA, SFA, SO and FBSFA programs<sup>20</sup> and issues.<sup>21</sup> When delegated, the DoD has authority and responsibility to administer select SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB programs and missions. The DoD does not administer all SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB programs, although DoD-administered programs are generally a sub-set of the overall DoS SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB effort.

(1) See U.S. Department of State (DoS) “Description of Security Cooperation (SC) Programs” <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/197601.pdf> for additional information on DoS roles and responsibilities related to foreign assistance programs.

(2) For the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) see:

(a) DoD Directive (DoDD) 5132.03, “*DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*,”

(b) DoD Directive (DoDD) 5205.82, “*Defense Institution Building*,”

(c) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05, “*Stability Operations*.”

(d) DoDI 5000.68, “*Security Force Assistance (SFA)*.”

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<sup>20</sup> These are 22 United States Code (USC), “Foreign Relations and Intercourse,” programs. See <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22>.

<sup>21</sup> See: <http://www.dsca.mil/2014-foreign-customer-guide/major-usg-stakeholders-in-fms>.

e. NCUS plans on conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities utilizing the functionally based security force assistance (FBSFA)<sup>22</sup> concept as recently promulgated in the NATO/ISAF “*Resolute Support Security Force Assistance Guide 3.0.*” Conducting activities utilizing the FBSFA approach places a security force and supporting security force institution on a critical path toward self-reliance while reinforcing the USG political objectives of ensuring allies, friends, and fragile, failing, or failed and recovering nation states that the USG will remain a reliable SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB partner.

f. A FBSFA effort also ensures all SC, SA, SFA, and SO activity is directly linked to Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) and Defense Institution Building (DIB) as promulgated by U.S. policy, DoD and Joint and Service policy, operating concepts, and doctrine and addresses specific SC, SA, SFA, SO, BPC and DIB tasks that, when conducted with PNs, are specific, realistic, achievable, measurable, time-bound, sustainable and enduring.

g. When conducting FBSCA tasks, the NCUS task structure is based on agreed to:

- Lines of Operation (LOO)
- Lines of Effort (LOE)
- Lines of Development (LOD)
- Measures of Performance (MOP)
- Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
- Capacity Milestones (CM)<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Functionally Based Security Force Assistance and the abbreviation FBSFA are unique to NATO/ISAF. FBSFA is an advisory effort focused on functions, systems processes and organizational development to achieve sustainable security force systems. FBSFA is defined as “an enduring unity of effort and common purpose to align advisors at multiple echelons, to Train, Advise and Assist (TAA) vertical processes while also achieving horizontal coordination. Unity of effort requires the alignment, coordination and synchronization of the advisors within defined essential function (EF) categories primarily conducted at the strategic and operational levels but may also include tactical level efforts.

<sup>23</sup> Capacity Milestones (CM) is a unique NEW CENTURY US term and abbreviation and is intended to improve the reliability of assessing partner capacity improvements. See SIGAR Audit 10-11, available at <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2010-06-29audit-10-11.pdf>. See Also the DODIG Report 2012-028 on the IJC CUAT rating system, available at: <http://www.dodig.mil/spo/reports/dodig-2012-028.pdf>. Both systems assessed as inadequate.

## 2–2. Assumptions.

a. The DoD, supporting U.S. Government (USG) Federal Departments and Agencies, and international PNs that conduct FBSFA BPC and Engagement activities will continue to lack sufficient USG personnel, dedicated structure, and budget authority to perform SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities.

b. The DoD has a limited capacity and capability to conduct SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB without using private sector Security Assistance Mentor and Advisor (SAMA) personnel. DoD downsizing will exacerbate these limited SAMA capacities and capabilities while DoD BPC and Engagement missions related to conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB will continue to increase.<sup>24</sup>

c. SAMA functions will continue to include, but not be limited to Security Cooperation (SC), Security Assistance (SA), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Stability Operations (SO), Engagement, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), FBSFA activities and Defense Institution Building (DIB) all of which are integral parts of US national security and foreign policy with SC being an integral element of the DoD mission.<sup>25</sup>

d. The DoD will continue to seek commercially available SAMA sources.

e. NCUS will remain prepared to conduct SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities in permissive and non-permissive environments and under uncertain, complex, and often chaotic and hostile circumstances and environments with fragile, failing, or failed and recovering PN states.

(1) This requires NCUS sustaining an exceptionally high degree of corporate and individual operational adaptability<sup>26</sup> and SAMA teams that understand the “human terrain,” of social, cultural, historical, political, economic, and population and urban geography of the area of operations (AO) consistent with minimum Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) requirements specified in Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01A *“Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability, Identification, Planning and Sourcing.”*

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<sup>24</sup> See DoD Strategic Guidance *“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense”, A Challenging Global Security Environment.”*

<sup>25</sup> See DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5132.13, “Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel,” available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/513213p.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> Operational adaptability is not a formally recognized term within the DoD, but is a special term used in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-0, “The Army Capstone Concept,” and is defined as *“The ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions.”* Available at: <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf>.

(2) In addition, NCUS shall incorporate established policy, doctrine, procedural processes and guidance, and related Operation Plan (OPLAN), Operation Order (OPORD, Request for Forces (RFF) and related contract-specified SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB performance requirements in corporate readiness and preparedness metrics.

f. NCUS SAMAs shall possess a high degree of resiliency, exhibit a continuous desire to work as a cohesive team, and promote a whole of government and comprehensive approach to achieving SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB unity of effort and unified action. Similar to the “whole of government” approach, NCUS shall continue to exhibit a “whole of corporate” approach to conducting these activities in order to produce sustainable capacity milestones (CM) and provide efficient, effective and world-class SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB support to the DoD, the USG, multinational and coalition partners, and Partner Nations.

g. NCUS will mitigate risk by continuously monitoring execution-critical issues that include, but are not limited to:

(1) Changes to SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB authorities, guidelines, goals, objectives and end-states;

(2) limits on the ability to work with non-Ministry of Defense and other security sector forces and organizations;

(3) limits on USG appropriations and related funding authorizations;

(4) United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and;

(5) coalition and PN will.<sup>27</sup>

h. Based upon unacceptable risk or other circumstances, NCUS understands the USG may terminate for convenience (T4C) select SC, SFA, SO, FBSFA, DIB and related 22 USC activities and commitments.<sup>28</sup>

i. U.S. national security, defense, and military strategies and policies will continue to emphasize Engagement, SO, DIB and BPC as key policy objectives.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> See RAND Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, “*What Works Best When Conducting Security Cooperation*,” Report CT-441, dated October 21, 2015.

<sup>28</sup> See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 49. Available at: <http://www.acquisition.gov/far/>.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. National Security Strategy, 2015, states: “U.S. forces will continue to defend the homeland, conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement.”

i. Military and civilian end-strength reductions and Federal budget reductions levied against the Departments of State and Defense may require these Departments to have a greater reliance on private sector provided SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB expertise and support.<sup>30</sup>

2-3. Ways. Conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB related 22 USC (“*Foreign Relations and Intercourse*”) activities in order to build partnership capacity are generally conducted through USG, NATO-led or PN contracting sources and NCUS may be designated as a prime or sub-contractor for these efforts. Detailed “BPC Programs” information is available for review at: <http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-15>.

2-4. Means.

a. NCUS shall generally accomplish SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA DIB and related activities utilizing a functional and scalable Deployed Security Assistance Team (DSAT) organizational structure.

b. A NCUS DSAT is a functional and scalable “*Shape, Prepare, Engage, Educate, and Develop*” (SPEED)<sup>31</sup> structure that is designed to perform exceptionally well in uncertain, complex, chaotic, hostile and permissive as well as non-permissive environments.

c. A DSAT is comprised of seasoned SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB professionals<sup>32</sup> that exhibit a strategic view of strengthening governance and the rule of law and understand that DIB and BPC through SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities is the USG’s most influential public-sector export.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> See U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) published “*Military Engagement and Forward Presence: Down but Not Out as a Tool to Shape and Win*” 2016, by Dr. John R. Deni, pp vii. Dr. Deni argues that “Dr. Deni argues that “*some persistent biases and some more recent trends in defense strategy, planning, and budgeting are likely to have the effect of reducing the options available to current and future senior U.S. leaders*” in reference to conducting adequate Engagement activities.

<sup>31</sup> A unique NEW CENTURY US term and abbreviation. The abbreviation is not intended to convey an order of priority or lineal application of these functions but, taken together, conveys the “whole of corporate” approach to producing measurable capacity milestones (CMs).

<sup>32</sup> See the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Manual (DSCA 5105-38-M), “Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)” available at: <http://www.samm.dsca.mil/listing/authorization-letter>.

<sup>33</sup> See “*Geopolitics - An Introductory Reader*” edited by Jason Dittmer and Joanne Sharp, pp 212 and by

d. A DSAT may also conduct, or promote the conduct of, SO that encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities that are generally performed outside the United States (OCONUS) in coordination with other instruments of national power that are focused on maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment, providing essential governmental services, developing emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and conducting humanitarian relief efforts. See DoD Instruction (DoDI 3000.05, “*Stability Operations*,” for additional policy guidance. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>.

e. Use of a scalable NCUS DSAT structure is consistent with the need for NCUS to be prepared to adjust to a broad range of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of threats and challenges that may occur while conducting SC, SFA, SO, FBSFA and related missions and activities.<sup>34</sup>

## 2-5. Ends.

a. By definition, SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities are activities that are conducted across all phases of military operations (O-V),<sup>35</sup> should build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, should develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and should provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

b. NCUS shall conduct these activities with the goal of producing specific, realistic, achievable, measurable, time-bound and sustainable capacity milestones (CMs). The contracting principal generally establishes the contract requirements and deliverables. NCUS may have an opportunity to shape these contractual requirements and deliverables when NCUS responds to a USG “sources sought” solicitation or when contract negotiations occur to shape a SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA or DIB statement of work (SOW). Should those opportunities arise, NCUS remains prepared to suggest that the conduct of such activities be in accordance with the SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB Task structure identified at paragraph 3-1.

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<sup>34</sup> NEW CENTURY US understands that the “Institutional” level may be a significant consideration in the frame of the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels of conducting war and contingency operations, particularly when designing, implementing, managing and conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB learning and education activities OCONUS.

<sup>35</sup> See Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” Figure V-3. Available at: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf).

2–6. Principles of SPEED. The following eight principles guide the execution of the NCUS “*Shape, Prepare, Engage, Educate and Develop (SPEED)*” concept:

a. Execution-Critical. All SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB efforts shall be considered execution-critical requirements and be focused on assisting the PN achieve minimum mission-essential and execution-critical PN capacity and capability improvements. An execution-critical effort is intended to correct PN deficiencies that negatively affect the PN to be able to perform minimum security force tasks or that prevent execution of the PN security forces mandated roles and responsibilities. Examples of such deficiencies include such things as failure to be able to perform assigned security force tasks consistent with current host nation law, policy or decree or an inability to provide timely and sustainable logistics support.

b. Accountable. Activities conducted by NCUS shall be based on a “measurable results” approach that directly enhance USG efforts to build Defense and Security Institution processes and sustainable capacity that will place PN security institutions on a critical path toward sustainable self-reliance while reinforcing the USG political objectives of ensuring allies, friends, and fragile states that the USG will remain a reliable security partner.

(1) Capacity Milestone (CM) outcomes shall be consistent with U.S. interests and a PNs ability to absorb train, advise, and assist (TAA) support, available technology, and PN systems and procedures.

(2) CM outcomes shall be measured and assessed against achieving sustainable doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) capability improvements in order to provide the PN a “*cross-domain synergy*”<sup>36</sup> opportunity consistent with PN willingness. Efforts that can be made to work more efficiently should be efforts that are not working that can realistically be redesigned, terminated, or replaced. In summary, effective measurement and assessment provides a good analytic foundation from which to recommend SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB process improvements and assist USG and PN leadership better focus accountability and resource allocation.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> See JOAC, page 16. Joint synergy has been a strength of U.S. joint forces for decades. Whereas joint synergy focuses on the integration of Service capabilities, “*cross-domain synergy*” requires the integration across all domains without regard for which Service provides the action or capability.

<sup>37</sup> See RAND Report RR-935, “*A Building Partner Capacity Assessment Framework: Tracking Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, Disrupters, and Workarounds,*” dated 2015.

c. Time-bound. Time is of the essence, and NCUS SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities will be planned and conducted to produce immediate and sustainable improvements to a PN's capacity, compliment DoD's Future Year's Defense Program (FYDP) planning, and provide for adaptive, versatile and, when necessary, scalable delivery of discreet capabilities for politically sensitive, austere, and non-contiguous environments. Understanding that resources, regional developments, and relationships may require operational adaptability and change, NCUS shall maintain a "whole of corporate" and "comprehensive" long-term planning effort to ensure continuous USG interagency and international coordination and sustainable PN progress is maintained.<sup>38</sup>

d. Specific. NCUS shall strive to have clearly defined, specific and execution-critical SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB goals and objectives that directly support respective partnership capacity requirements, assure and reassure allies, contributes to deterring adversaries, and contributes to maintaining U.S. operational access and partner relationships.<sup>39</sup>

e. Strategic. NCUS shall endeavor to provide strategic, operational and tactical-level solutions to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report on DoD's imbalanced approach to BPC and the tendency of DoD to "*focus on training and equipping troops without paying enough attention to the systems and processes that guide defense establishments,*" particularly PN Ministries of Defense and Interior.<sup>40</sup>

f. Enabled. To the extent possible, NCUS shall support activities aimed at developing PN institutional capabilities and capacities across the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and utilize unclassified and classified USG enabling systems and commercial enabling systems to conduct SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities with PN participation.

g. Educated. The velocity of change in the world requires NCUS SAMAs to achieve and sustain the highest state of SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB education possible. Recommended no-cost, on-line SC, SFA, SO, FBSFA, BPC and Engagement training and education sources are at appendix B.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> NCUS took a similar approach when NCUS instituted the "Legacy Program." Legacy was first implemented in the western Iraqi province of Anbar and is currently in place in Afghanistan. So successful, it was cited in both the 2011 and 2012 NDAs as a program of interest for further use in other counterinsurgency (COIN) environments. See NCUS Testimony to the 112<sup>th</sup> Congressional Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats, dated June 28, 2013.

<sup>39</sup> See "*Joint Operational Access Concept V 1.0,*" dated 17 January 2012.

<sup>40</sup> See the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) program details on the "second track focus" of building partner capacity at:

[http://defenseassistance.org/index.php?tags\\_txt=Defense%20Institution%20Reform%20Initiative&used\\_firm=yes](http://defenseassistance.org/index.php?tags_txt=Defense%20Institution%20Reform%20Initiative&used_firm=yes).

<sup>41</sup> See RAND Report MG-990, "*Developing U.S. Army Officers' Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments,*" dated 2011.

h. Lessons Learned. NCUS shall endeavor to collect, report, and maintain cross-domain synergy SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA, and DIB lessons learned.

(1) While no comprehensive USG effort currently exists to collect SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB lessons learned, NCUS will primarily work with the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and utilize the PKSOI managed “*Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS)*” to capture appropriate SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB lessons learned.<sup>42</sup>

(2) In addition to utilizing SOLLIMS, NCUS will utilize other JS, Service, and Federal Executive Branch lessons learned systems to include:

(a) The “*Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS)*”;<sup>43</sup>

(b) The U.S. Army’s “*Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)*” system;

(c) The JCISFA portal in order for JCISFA to capture, analyze, exchange and archive SFA lessons learned;

(d) The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) managed “*Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)*” Program if available and when applicable, and;

(e) Other Federal Executive Department and Agency and military Service lessons learned and related information exchange systems.

(3) NCUS believes the “lessons learned” function is a particularly important area of opportunity to exploit for the USG given the importance that SC, SFA, SO, FBSFA, DIB, BPC and Engagement activities have in promoting U.S. foreign policy and improving the global security environment.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> SOLLIMS is a US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) initiative that offers a collaborative, Knowledge Management environment for the global Peace and Stability Operations (P/SO) community, by providing multiple collections of peace and stability operations references, the ability to implement focused Communities of Practice (CoP), professional forums and blogs, as well as a robust, online repository/structured database containing Peace and Stability Operations (P/SO) related Observations, Lessons, and Insights. SOLLIMS is intended to focus at the Strategic Theater / Strategic National and Operational levels.

<sup>43</sup> See Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3150.25E, “*Joint Lessons Learned Program.*”

<sup>44</sup> Sixteen Security Sector Reform, Reconstruction, and Stabilization (RRS) Joint Lessons Learned (JLL) were submitted by a current NCUS employee for CSTC-A in 2006. These were the first RRS lessons learned submitted to JFCOM under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) that were related to Building Partnership Capacity (BPC). Two of the sixteen lessons learned were identified as DOTMLPF items of interest by JFCOM.

## Chapter 3

### SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB Task Structure

3-1. The NCUS SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB Task Structure is generally based on, and directly linked to, BPC and Engagement guidance as promulgated by Joint and Service policy, directives, and related operating concepts and guidance and will address specific Tasks that are specific, realistic, achievable, measurable, time-bound and sustainable by the PN's security force institutions. NCUS SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB Task structure is based on six measurable criteria as follows:

a. Lines of Operation (LOO).

(1) SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB LOO are generally defined by USG national security policy and strategy and are generally categorized as essential functions (EF) by the GCCs and FCCs or as defined as strategic national (SN), strategic theater (ST), operational (OP), or tactical tasks in the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and separate Military Department (agency) universal task lists and directives. The UJTL is a menu of tasks in a common language, which serves as the foundation for joint operations planning across the range of military and interagency operations. The UJTL supports DoD in the conduct of joint force development, readiness reporting, experimentation, joint training and education, and lessons learned. The UJTL, and separate agency universal task lists, are available at: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtl\\_tasks.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtl_tasks.htm).

(2) A LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s) while a line of effort (LOE) links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose – cause and effect - to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.<sup>45</sup>

b. Lines of Effort (LOE).

(1) LOE link multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose – cause and effect - to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.

(2) For the specific purposes of conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities, these LOE may focus on policy-level functions performed at the Ministerial level, warfighting functions performed at the operational or tactical levels, or capacity development sub-functions identified by the USG or PN at an institutional level.

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<sup>45</sup> See JP 5-0, "Joint Operation Planning."

(3) LOE could include professional and personal development, training and education, planning and programming, and other leader development activities that are directly related to BPC of a PN security institution or individual. Regardless, all LOE must be specific, realistic, achievable, measurable, time-bound and sustainable by the PN institution and individual.

c. Lines of Development (LOD). The current and future coalition operating environment (FCOE)<sup>46</sup> requires SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB practitioners consider four interoperability challenges (Compatibility, Capabilities Integration, Information Sharing and Interagency Coordination) and two cross-functional challenges (Strategic Communication and Legal Requirements).

(1) The NATO Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) uses these four interoperability challenges as focal points upon which to orient multinational capability development.<sup>47</sup> The challenges are then analyzed and structured into nine lines of development (LOD):

- Leadership Development
- Command and Control
- Education and Training
- Doctrine
- Logistics
- Knowledge Advantage
- Shared Situational Awareness
- Organizational Constructs, and
- Planning

(2) From the analysis, key capability gaps can be identified within each interoperability and cross-functional challenge. The fundamental risk of not progressing towards interoperability in these functional areas results in PN forces that are ill-equipped and ineffective against the challenges they may face in the world to come. NCUS considers these LOD to ensure NCUS DSAT efforts remain oriented toward improving multinational capability and sustainable PN capacity and capability.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> A NATO Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) term.

<sup>47</sup> See NATO MIC Coalition Building Guide, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, dated July 2014, available at the All Partners Access Network (APAN): [https://community.apan.org/mic/p/coalition\\_building\\_guide.aspx](https://community.apan.org/mic/p/coalition_building_guide.aspx).

<sup>48</sup> Particularly appropriate to consider when US forces conduct SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities under NATO-led missions like the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission-Afghanistan (RSM-A). The MIC LOD align with US Joint Staff (JS) "DOTmLPF-P" and U.S. Army "DOTMLPF" capability and interoperability development guidance.

d. Measures of Performance (MOP). MOP are used to assess actions that are tied to measuring PN task accomplishment. MOP must be specific and measurable, generally in output, time, percent, or other measurable standard.<sup>49</sup>

e. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). MOE are used to assess changes in PN system behavior, capability, capacity, or an operational environment and are linked to measuring the attainment of an end state, an objective, or an effect. MOE are designed to measure the relevance of actions being performed.

f. Capacity Milestones (CMs).

(1) A CM is a pre-determined capacity goal or objective end-state that a PN strives to achieve, sustain, and over time, improve. CMs can be a compilation of PN or JIIM developed CM criteria (legislation, policy, political will, regulation, directives, decrees, resolutions, strategy, treaties, development goals, campaigns, and other formal issuances) or a combination of these criteria and other formally recognized issuances or operating environment opportunities and obstacles.<sup>50</sup>

(2) CMs shall be supported by tasks that address the required doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities and CMs shall be related to specific, realistic, achievable, measurable, time-bound and sustainable criteria and may also be measured against DoD “SMART” criteria.<sup>51</sup>

(3) CMs should produce results that are specific, realistic, supportable, sustainable and enduring that can be coordinated through appropriate PN and JIIM channels, take into account the constraints and restraints of both the U.S. and the PN’s available resources and be time-bound by stating the time frame by which the effect or CM can realistically be achieved and sustained.

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<sup>49</sup> See Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, “*Joint Operations*.”

<sup>50</sup> Obstacles include, but are not limited to, natural (geophysical, hydrological, climatological, biological, etc.) and man-made (technological, economic, financial, armed conflict, rebellion, political, social etc.) disasters, crises, and emergencies that are no-notice, short-notice, or generally accepted as potential future occurrences that have a realistic probability of taking place.

<sup>51</sup> SMART criteria are “*Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Timely*” performance measurement criteria. See DoD Instruction (DoDI 1400.05 (Feb 4, 2016), pp 9.

## Chapter 4

### Shape, Prepare, Engage, Educate and Develop (SPEED) Concept

#### 4-1. Background.

a. When U.S. Forces are authorized to conduct combat operations and other direct-action activities against an enemy, conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities may, and often do, occur simultaneously across the range of military operations.

b. While early termination of combat is desired and transition to conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB tasks is desired, there may be overlap. NCUS understands that military planners and supporting contractors should keep in mind that combat and direct-action against an enemy that is conducted by our international partners during the transition to a “stability phase” may continue after U.S. military forces are reduced or are withdrawn. It is here that flexibility is key, and the NCUS SPEED Concept adds flexibility value when operating in transition environment.

c. General SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB developmental tasks conducted by U.S. forces are generally designed to “*organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess*” (known as “OTERA-A”) PN forces. These functional tasks serve primarily as SFA capability areas.<sup>52</sup>

d. Each element of the OTERA-A task construct can be used to develop, change, or improve the capability and capacity of a PN security force. By conducting an assessment of the PN security force through the lens of U.S. interests and objectives, coupled with shared interests of JIIM partners and the PN capability and willingness to participate in the SO transition phase, U.S. forces can determine which area or areas within the OTERA-A construct they can leverage to improve the PN security force to the desired capability and capacity as rapidly as possible. At this point, all planners should determine what is realistically achievable and in the best interests of the PN security force, or “what is good enough” for all parties to arrive at a measurable CM improvement.

e. The NCUS “SPEED” Concept of conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities enhances the OTERA-A effort - and the NCUS SPEED concept is explained in greater detail below:

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<sup>52</sup> See U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-22, “*Army Support to Security Cooperation.*”

#### 4-2. NCUS “SPEED” Concept.

a. Shape. Similar to the US military conducting “*operational preparation of the environment (OPE)*,” NCUS believes that shaping the environment to conduct SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities is essential to successfully conducting these activities and that shaping activities should remain a part of an ongoing SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB effort.<sup>53</sup>

(1) NCUS SAMAs and DSATs are sensitive to the USG’s conduct of engagement activities that support a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC), country team and JIIM partners. We understand that conducting these engagement activities help shape the operational environment, keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict, and serve to develop and build PN capabilities and capacities that can be leveraged while U.S. forces may be conducting combat and direct-action activities against an enemy and are concurrently conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities.<sup>54</sup>

(2) In addition, NCUS SAMAs and DSATs understand that our and our PN) Special Operations Forces (SOF) seek to enhance situational awareness of the security environment in order to anticipate, forewarn, prevent, or forestall further crises, chaos, or hostilities and when integrated into the conduct of SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities promote interoperability. Interoperability between conventional forces (CF) and SOF creates unique capabilities for achieving a greater degree of SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB CM goals and objectives that may not otherwise be attainable. In short, CF and SOF interoperability is a force multiplier ideally suited for use when conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities.

(3) In summary, NCUS believes that the SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB shaping activity must be conducted across the range of military operations and shaping is an execution-critical component of conducting successful SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities that can directly contribute to a successful Security Sector Assistance (SSA) campaign.

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<sup>53</sup> See JP 5-0, Chapter III, pp III-8. Understanding the operational environment helps a JFC to better identify the problem; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how these actions affect achieving a military end state.

<sup>54</sup> Directly supports unity of effort and unified action.

b. Prepare. NCUS believes that all SAMAs must achieve and maintain the highest state of comprehensive Security Sector Assistance (SSA) readiness and preparedness possible in order to directly support a greater degree of cooperative security situational awareness and situational understanding to benefit a Partner Nation. NCUS believes that conducting successful cooperative security activities occur when SAMAs clearly understand their SAMA roles, understand how they fit into the overall cooperative security effort, and are able to produce results that are consistent with the JIIM and PN requirements and needs.

c. Engage. NCUS SAMAs understand that engagement activities serve as a key component of SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts and includes civil-military operations (CMO), direct-action, and military information support operations (MISO). NCUS SAMAs understand that the concurrent conduct of COIN, CMO, NATO-led Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), MISO, humanitarian assistance (HA) and defense support of civil authority (DSCA) can benefit cooperative security activities conducted by SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB personnel. The complexity and uncertainty in the global environment means that NCUS must remain agile, flexible, and well-prepared to support the USG tackle a broad range of challenges and provide innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieving U.S. national security objectives. NCUS remains engaged in these activities and is well prepared to facilitate a high level of interaction between U.S. forces and our unified action partners.<sup>55</sup>

d. Educate. NCUS SAMAs understand that current and future US forces must be prepared to conduct irregular warfare (IW) activities that involve combinations of lethal and nonlethal actions by conventional and specially trained and educated forces and SAMAs must also have a deep understanding of a PN's language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC); proficiency in supporting small-unit tactics and the ability to conduct SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities alongside indigenous combat formations in permissive, non-permissive, and hostile environments. This requires NCUS SAMAs to continue their professional and personal development and education in order to remain prepared to support these activities - as well as be prepared to share the value of this type of education with PN security forces and institutions.

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<sup>55</sup> See TRADOC PAM 525-8-5, *"U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement,"* and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, *"Security Force Assistance,"* page xii, *"Other Operations and Activities."*

e. Develop. NCUS believes the end-state of any SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB effort is that the PN security forces achieve sustainable and enduring improvements in capacity development at the strategic-national, operational, and tactical levels as well as at the institutional and individual leadership levels. NCUS SAMAs understand that mentoring and advising is about expanding the scope of a PNs ability to develop knowledge that directly contributes to a PN achieving, and sustaining improved CMs. To accomplish this, NCUS SAMAs strive to develop and maintain a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach<sup>56</sup> with all parties involved.

f. From a corporate-level perspective, NCUS remains prepared to support and conduct SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities in permissive, non-permissive and hostile environments and under uncertain, complex, and often chaotic circumstances with fragile, failing, or failed states that require an exceptionally high degree of corporate and individual operational adaptability to recover. The NCUS SPEED Concept is designed to facilitate these activities.

## **Chapter 5**

### SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB Assessment methodology and processes

#### 5-1. Assessment methodology.

a. The most difficult part of any SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activity is assessing the progress of the host nation in achieving sustainable and enduring CMs. The NCUS assessment methodology will generally be based on, and follow, DoD guidance and contract deliverable requirements.<sup>57</sup>

b. The NCUS assessment methodology entails three distinct tasks:

(1) Continuously monitoring the situation and the progress of the SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB mission;

(2) Evaluating the mission against measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) to determine sustainable progress relative to the CM objectives and end states, and;

(3) Developing specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and timely (SMART) recommendations for SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB improvement.

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<sup>56</sup> Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, “*Stability*,” discusses the “*comprehensive approach*” issue.

<sup>57</sup> See Joint Staff J-7 “*Commander’s Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution*.”

## 5-2. Assessment processes.

a. NCUS DSATs are cognizant of the fact that the U.S. goals of performing SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities at the tactical and operational levels often reflects a “dual-mandate” process of conducting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB nation building activities concurrent with U.S. and partner forces conducting offensive combat and direct-action activities (activities designed to disrupt, dismantle, defeat and destroy enemy and insurgent forces) while U.S. and partner forces are organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and building, advising and assisting and assessing (“OTERA-A”)<sup>58</sup> a PN improve their security force functional capacities.

b. NCUS assessment methodology and processes will remain synchronized to these efforts to ensure the highest state of PN capacity is achieved and sustained consistent with USG-directed tasks, conditions, and standards.

c. Assessment of NCUS participation in supporting SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities is a key component of the NCUS management process and is comprised of objective, subjective, quantitative, and qualitative measurement criteria. The goal of the NCUS assessment process is to ensure NCUS can more accurately measure which actions and activities imply success when conducting these activities in a dynamic and often unpredictable environment.

d. NCUS believes that using objective, subjective, quantitative and qualitative assessment indicators can reduce, or eliminate, the likelihood and impact of skewed perspectives that could result from an overreliance on either expert opinion or direct observation. In summary, NCUS believes that success is a matter of obstacles – and overcoming them.

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<sup>58</sup> See Army Field Manual (FM) 3-22, “*Army Support to Security Cooperation*,” (paragraph 4-11) for details. The NEW CENTURY US “*Shape, Prepare, Engage, Educate, and Develop (SPEED)*” Concept enhances performance of the OTERA-A developmental tasks.

## Glossary

### Section I

#### Abbreviations

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
ABCA	American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies' Program
ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project and Emergency Capacity Building Project
ACC	Army Capstone Concept
ACF	Army Concept Framework
ACIS	Arms Control and International Security
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AO	area of operations
AOC	Army Operating Concept
APAN	All Partners Access Network
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
AUTL	Army Universal Task List
BPC	Building Partnership Capacity
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAO	civil affairs operations
CBA	capability-based assessment
CDDR	combatant commander
CF	conventional force or forces
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	combined joint task force
CM	capacity milestone(s) or capability milestones
CMO	civil-military operations
COCOM	combatant command
COIN	counterinsurgency
CSDHR	civilian security, democracy, and human rights
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
CUAT	Commander's Unit Assessment Tool
DA	Department of the Army
DIRI	Defense Institution Reform Initiative
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DODIG	Department of Defense Inspector General
DoS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities

DSAT	Deployed Security Assistance Team
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
EF	essential function(s)
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FBSFA	functionally based security force assistance
FCC	functional combatant command or commander
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	Field Manual
FCC	functional combatant command
FCOE	future coalition operating environment
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GCC	geographic combatant command or commander
GEF	guidance for employment of the force
HA	humanitarian assistance
HCT	humanitarian country team
HN	host nation
HNA	humanitarian needs assessment
IA	interagency
IASC	inter-agency standing committee
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
JDN	Joint Doctrine Note
JFC	joint force commander
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command (inactivated)
JLL	joint lessons learned
JOAC	Joint Operational Access Concept
JP	Joint Publication
JS	joint staff
JSCP	joint strategic capabilities plan
JTF	joint task force
KSA	knowledge, skills, and attributes or abilities
LOD	lines of development
LOE	lines of effort
LOO	lines of operation
MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
MIRA	Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment
MISO	military information support operations
MOE	measures of effectiveness
MOP	measures of performance

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCUS	New Century – United States
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
OP	operational
OTERA-A	organize, train, equip, rebuild-build, advise and assist, and Assess
PKSOI	Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
PN	partner nation
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive(s)
PSC	product service code
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RC	required capability
RRS	reform, reconstruction and stabilization
RS	Resolute Support
RSM	Resolute Support Mission
SAMA	security assistance mentors and advisors
SAMM	Security Assistance Management Manual
SCCP	Security Cooperation Concept Plan
SCO	Security Cooperation Organization
SFA	security force assistance
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SN	strategic national
ST	strategic theater
SO	stability operations
SOF	special operations forces
SOLLIMS	stability operations lessons learned information management system
SPEED	shape, prepare, engage, educate and develop
TAA	train, advise and assist
TAP	The Army Plan
TEP	theater engagement plan
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
T4C	termination or terminate for convenience
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
U.S.	United States
USAWC	U.S. Army War College
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government

**Section II**

## Terms

See Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *“The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”*

**Section III**

## Special terms

## DSAT

A scalable New Century-US (NCUS) Deployed Security Assistance Team.

## MIRA

The Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) is a joint needs assessment tool that can be used in sudden onset emergencies, including IASC System-Wide level 3 Emergency Responses (L3 Responses). It is a precursor to cluster/sectoral needs assessments and provides a process for collecting and analyzing information on affected people and their needs to inform strategic response planning.

## OCHA

The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort. OCHA's mission is to (1) Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; (2) Advocate the rights of people in need; (3) Promote preparedness and prevention; and (4) Facilitate sustainable solutions.

## SPEED

The New Century-US concept used in supporting USG and JIIM efforts in the conduct of SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB activities. SPEED Concept principles are Shape, Prepare, Engage, Educate and Develop.

## **Appendix A**

Required and related publications and issuances

### **Section I**

Required publications and issuances

DoD Directive (DoDD) 5132.03

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05

Stability Operations

DoDI 5000.68

Security Force Assistance

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01A

Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, Planning and Sourcing

AR 12–1

Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy

AR 12–7

Security Assistance Teams

AR 12–15

Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training

AR 34–1

Multinational Force Capability

AR 70–41

International Cooperative Research, Development, and Acquisition

DA PAM 11–31

Army Security Cooperation Handbook

JP 3–22

Foreign Internal Defense

Joint Operating Concept

Cooperative Security, 2008

Joint Operating Concept

Stability Operations, 2004

## **Section II**

Related publications and issuances

Presidential Policy Directives

10 USC 184

Regional Centers for Security Studies

10 USC 2166

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

22 USC

Foreign Relations and Intercourse

32 USC

National Guard

33 USC 2323a

Interagency and international support authority

U.S. National Security Strategy

U.S. DoD Strategic Guidance

“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense”

CJCSI 3150.25E

Joint Lessons Learned Program

NATO Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Coalition Building Guide (CBG),  
Volumes I-III

NATO/ISAF Resolute Support (RS) Security Force Assistance (SFA) Guide

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

Security Force Handbook

Afghan National Security Documents<sup>59</sup>:

- Afghan National Threat Assessment
- Afghan National Security Policy
- Afghan National Security Strategy
- Afghan National Military Strategy
- Afghan Ministry of Interior Strategy
- Afghan National Campaign Plan

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<sup>59</sup> [http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/RSM/20150224\\_national\\_strategy\\_final.pdf](http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/RSM/20150224_national_strategy_final.pdf)

National Defense University (NDU), Institute for National Strategic Studies  
Capability Development in Support of Comprehensive Approaches: Transforming  
International Civil-Military Interactions (2011)

RAND Arroyo Center  
Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations (SO)  
(Report MG942 or ADA522751, 2010)

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)  
OCHA Strategic Plan 2014-2017

United States Forces Command (USFORSCOM)  
Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) Training Requirements 2016 (AFOP-TCO)

## **Appendix B**

SC, SA, SFA, SO, FBSFA and DIB training and education sources

NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Center of Excellence (COE)  
<http://www.cimic-coe.org/products/training-education/course-landscape/nato-cmi-cimic-awareness-course/>

Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center  
<http://www.dliflc.edu/products/>

International Security Sector Advisory Team  
<http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/E-Learning>

Joint Deployment Training Center  
<http://www.jdtc.eustis.army.mil/> (requires SIPRNET)

Joint Electronic Library, Doctrine Network (DOCNET)  
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet>

Joint Knowledge Online (JKO)  
<https://jkodirect.jten.mil/Atlas2/faces/page/login/Login.seam>

Joint Language University (JLU)  
<https://jlu.wbtrain.com/sumtotal/jlu2.0/HOME/index.asp>

Peace Operations Training Institute (United Nations)  
<http://www.peaceopstraining.org/>

DoD Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)

<http://www.disamjournal.org/articles/security-cooperation-information-portal-scip-788>

United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

<http://www.usip.org/online-courses>

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management Systems (SOLLIMS) Portal

<https://www.pksoi.org>

Defense Acquisition University (DAU)

<http://www.dau.mil/default.aspx>