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James Cockayne & Adam Lupel

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Introduction: Rethinking the Relationship Between Peace Operations and Organized Crime

JAMES COCKAYNE and ADAM LUPEL

Peace operations are increasingly on the front line in the international community's fight against organized crime. In venues as diverse as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Haiti, Iraq and West Africa, multiple international interventions have struggled with a variety of protection rackets, corruption and trafficking in a wide range of licit and illicit commodities: guns, drugs, oil, cars, diamonds, timber – and human beings. This introduction to the Special Issue on peace operations and organized crime discusses the concept of 'organized crime' as a label, and suggests ways of differentiating organized crime groups on the basis of their social governance roles, resources and strategies towards authority structures – such as peace operations.

The threat posed by organized crime to international and human security has become a matter of considerable strategic concern for national and international decision-makers. In 2004, the high-level panel appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that 'organized criminal activities undermine peacebuilding efforts and fuel many civil wars through illicit trade in conflict commodities and small arms'.¹ The title of a note prepared by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and approved by the UN Chief Executives' Board in the same year – 'Organized crime and corruption are threats to security and development: the role of the United Nations system' – reflected similar concerns.² And in late 2007, the UN Security Council issued a presidential statement recognizing 'drug and human trafficking' as a 'threat to peace consolidation in Guinea-Bissau and the stability of West Africa', going on to refer Guinea-Bissau to the UN Peacebuilding Commission.³

So it is somewhat surprising how little thought has been devoted to the role of peace operations in tackling organized crime. While scholars and practitioners often draw attention to the links between organized crime and state fragility,⁴ armed conflict,⁵ and terrorism,⁶ there is a surprising dearth of systematic thought addressing the complex relationship between organized crime and peace operations.

There are three exceptions to this general truth. First, spurred by scandal and much-needed civil society pressure, peacekeepers' role in responding to – and implication in – sexual abuse and human trafficking has received particular attention, from both external commentators and practitioners in the field.⁷ Second, out of peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in many settings, the complex challenges of tackling corruption have come to the fore.⁸ And third, spurred in particular by events in Afghanistan, there are increasing calls for fresh thinking on

counter-narcotics policy better to marry it to peacebuilding objectives.⁹ What this demonstrates, however, is that the literature addressing the relationship between peace operations and organized crime is fragmented and reactive. There have been only isolated attempts to provide systematic and forward-looking thinking on this relationship.¹⁰

This Special Issue of *International Peacekeeping* seeks to address the gap in the literature – and to problematize the emerging orthodoxy that portrays organized crime as an external threat to the liberal peace championed by Western and allied states and delivered through peace operations. To the extent that there is a coherent view emerging from the fragmented existing literature (and related literatures, such as that examining economic agendas in civil wars), it might be summarized as suggesting that organized crime emerges out of rational actors' exploitation of the weak conditions of governance inherent in conflict-affected territories:

Quite apart from the petty criminality that typically accompanies warfare, contemporary conflicts have become systematically criminalized, as insurgent groups and rogue regimes engage in illegal economic activities either directly or through linkages with neighbouring states, informal trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups, arms traffickers and mercenaries, as well as legally operating commercial entities, each of which may have a vested interest in the prolongation of conflict and instability.¹¹

However accurate in descriptive terms, the danger of thus characterizing contemporary conflict as 'systematically criminalized' is that it may blur significant differences between different actors involved in this 'criminal system'. It may give rise to simplistic policy prescriptions and end up characterizing entire populations engaged in conflict as 'criminals' that must be repressed by the 'international community' acting through peace operations and other forms of international intervention. There is a danger that such a binary analysis – pitting conflict against peace, and criminal non-state actors against legal state actors – will obscure a more complex story. As Peter Andreas notes in this volume, '[c]riminal enterprise too often provides an easy and convenient villain.'

Effective maintenance of international peace and security requires a nuanced analysis of the role of organized crime in local and transnational political economies, and an understanding of how existing international tools, such as peace operations, sanctions, and international law enforcement cooperation, will interact with them. This Special Issue is an attempt to provide scholars, practitioners and policymakers with a richer evidentiary base detailing the complex interactions between peace operations and organized crime, a more nuanced analytical framework for making sense of those interactions, and thus an improved basis for effective policymaking and operational response.

The central research question addressed in this Special Issue is straightforward: what are the intended and unintended relationships between peace operations and organized crime? Our aim is to answer this through a range of case studies, two cross-cutting thematic pieces, and a concluding synthesis that draws lessons for future peace operations.¹²

The cases selected for inclusion reflect two parameters: first, limited space and, second, the fact that this is the first attempt systematically to examine the complex relationships between peace operations and organized crime. Accordingly, we have sought to balance geographic, chronological, and thematic breadth in the cases covered (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq and West Africa) with an approach that provides an in-depth analysis of each case. The trade-offs have meant that we have included Afghanistan and Iraq, which may not obviously fall within the scope of ‘peace operations’ and excluded cases that readers might expect to appear such as the African Great Lakes¹³ and Kosovo – where the UN mission (UNMIK) exceptionally exercised executive authority and grappled directly with, and was perhaps even penetrated by, organized crime.¹⁴ But before introducing the articles that follow, we must first explain what is meant by the term ‘organized crime’ and why it is important to analyse it in relation to peace operations.

Understanding ‘Organized Crime’

Contemporary peace operations are confronted by a range of forms of organization of violence, including not only ‘traditional’ armed separatist and rebel groups, but also warlords, quasi-*caudillos*, *mafiosi*, gangs, bandits and drug traffickers, who might spoil the operation’s progress. During times of peace, state sovereignty tends to obscure non-state capacities and informal power and economic arrangements from the international community’s gaze.

But when a state’s coercive, capital-raising and service provision capacities are weak, these alternative forms of organization become more readily apparent, emerging from behind the veil of sovereignty.¹⁵ Contemporary non-state armed actors often coexist with, and even penetrate, states, splicing together transnational networks and traditional, local authority structures.¹⁶ They often constitute complex oligopolies (rather than monopolies) of violence. Yet we have given contemporary peace operations few analytical tools with which to understand them – and they often require peacekeepers to manage these adversaries with tools designed for managing interstate conflict or more ‘traditional’ civil wars.

Until the end of the 1990s, the international community’s interventions were prompted primarily by ‘conflict’. Internal political and humanitarian crises and crime were secondary objects of inquiry or action by the ‘international community’ – especially the UN Security Council. When the Cold War ended, domestic humanitarian and political crises increasingly found their way onto the council’s agenda, and became the occasions for council-backed interventions – even as they were treated within the discourse of ‘conflict’, adapted to encompass those internal conflicts that might be said to threaten international peace and security. At the same time, the council increasingly developed technologies of criminalization (such as sanctions lists and international criminal tribunals) to control the illicit activities of governmental regimes and non-state actors. Some of these technologies – such as sanctioning processes – remained largely endogenous to the Security Council and its suborgans. Others, such as

international criminal tribunals, have taken on a trajectory of their own, producing doctrines such as ‘joint criminal enterprise’ and the non-immunity of heads of state for international crimes that present a radically different analysis of, and tools for governing, international political and economic life, piercing the veil of sovereignty. Confronted by violent disorder today, international agencies have a range of labels – including ‘conflict’, ‘crime’ and even ‘corruption’ – that they can apply. These offer a range of analytical frameworks and are likely to produce a range of policy and operational responses, such as peace operations, sanctions and criminal prosecution.

‘Organized Crime’ as a Label

Labels matter. The following discussion draws on the labelling theory of criminology, and other symbolic interactionist perspectives in the social sciences, by highlighting the power of labels and labellers in structuring social interaction.¹⁷ Calling violent disorder ‘crime’ suggests that there has been a violation of an international norm. And crimes are typically met with coercive responses to correct the deviation and hold the responsible actor accountable. By contrast, labelling disorder as ‘conflict’ suggests the existence of two or more adversarial actors, and possible impartiality about the need to restore the normative *status quo* through coercive action. Rather, peace and stability may be the only objective of response.

Whether violent disorder is labelled ‘crime’ or ‘conflict’ may also depend on how the Security Council, specifically, chooses to characterize the motivations of the violent actors involved. When motivations are seen as stemming from political grievances, disorder is frequently characterized as ‘conflict’, but when motivations are seen as arising from pecuniary greed, disorder is often labelled as the product of ‘crime’.¹⁸ In contrast, the labels of *crisis* and *collapse* suggest a description of structures and systems, rather than an assessment of agency – and point to the need for systemic and institution-building responses. These systemic labels are also linked to the concepts of state ‘fragility’, ‘weakness’ and ‘failure’,¹⁹ increasingly used to justify international intervention on the basis that such states risk becoming incubators of larger threats to the international community.²⁰ In particular, ‘weak’, ‘failing’ or ‘fragile’ states are increasingly seen as offering structural conditions of weak governance that criminal actors – including foreign criminal actors – may seek out and exploit.²¹ This is exactly the type of analysis applied by the Security Council in its statements on Guinea-Bissau, which point to the risk that drug trafficking poses, and more broadly to regional peace and security. And, as Carolyn Moser and Dennis Rodgers have pointed out, all of these labels exclude more slow-moving structural change – such as urbanization and economic liberalization – as both potential cause and effect of violent disorder, and all thus ignore the role that the international community’s political and economic policies may have played in fomenting it.²² Yet the international community’s policies and operational activities may have a singular structuring effect on this disorder – for example, by cutting off belligerents from legitimate access to international financial markets, or from arms, diamond or other export and import revenues.

Moreover, how the UN and member states choose to label violent disorder signals a predisposition for or against certain policy responses. This is radically evident in debates over whether ‘peace’ or ‘justice’ should guide international responses to violent crisis and conflict around the world. Like these and earlier attempts to ‘outlaw’ states by labelling them as ‘rogue’ regimes, members of an ‘axis of evil’ or some other tag,²³ ‘[c]riminalization may . . . add considerable political complexity to diplomatic efforts to secure peace, particularly where those targeted as criminals are still critical interlocutors in peace negotiations.’²⁴ Labelling a phenomenon as ‘crime’ implies the need for a punitive response, excluding criminals from legitimate social interactions. Political processes may – in contrast – require overlooking earlier ‘transgressions’ (or involvement in conflict) in favour of inclusive social interactions.²⁵ Similarly, labelling a situation of violence as one of political ‘crisis’, ‘collapse’ or ‘state failure’ may risk understating the role of specific actors, particularly those operating with economic motives. Heiko Nitzschke provides a cogent analysis:

the tendency of peace processes to date has been to neglect the economic dimensions of conflict. Instead, they are relegated to the secondary stage of post-conflict reconstruction, where they are treated as a largely technical or humanitarian matter rather than as an integral part of successful peacemaking.²⁶

Seeing disorder through the lens of state ‘failure’, ‘weakness’ or ‘fragility’ inevitably produces a ‘negative logic’, which leads the international community to try to ‘build’ the state that they find missing.²⁷ The danger of such an approach lies not only in the difficulty of mobilizing the political will and necessary resources for such a complex task, but also in the unintended consequences of such an approach, given the complexity of the environments in which statebuilding occurs.²⁸ These may include not only activating unrecognized feedback mechanisms, but also undoing the livelihood-sustaining and security-providing aspects of alternative forms of non-state governance – including those that we might label ‘organized crime’.

Understanding the Governance Role of ‘Organized Crime’

A framework for analysing the role of alternative forms of governance – including organized crime – would thus seem to be an essential tool for peace operations if they are to prevent such actors from spoiling peace, and even more so if they are to find ways to work with them as partners to make, keep and build peace. While a comprehensive typology is beyond the scope of this article, we offer here some basic distinctions that may be helpful for the specific focus of our discussion of peace operations and *organized crime*, treating it as an ideal type.

It is possible to distinguish organized crime from many other violent non-state actors that peace operations may encounter on at least three bases, each of which affects the ‘governance role’ played by organized crime. First, organized crime is essentially clandestine. In some cases, legitimate forms of governance (whether states or the international community) may turn a blind eye to the existence of organized crime. But these are the ‘exceptions that prove the rule’, in the sense

that they prove that organized crime, because of its criminality, is hidden. Second, and not unrelated, organized crime is driven first and foremost by the profit motive, and not by the will to political power, or the objective of exercising territorial rule or acquiring sovereignty. Organized criminals may instrumentally take on quasi-sovereign governmental attributes over a limited territory or a given population, but this is in service of a larger profit motive. And of course, there are also many forms of organized violence that deviate from this ideal-type characterization of ‘organized crime’, demonstrating mixed motives. Third, as a result, organized crime may coexist with functional state capacity, whereas warlords and bandits tend to represent functional substitutes for it. Organized crime networks often seek to corrupt and penetrate state hierarchies, whereas other forms of organized violence often seek to remain apart from the state.

If we exclude the question of clandestine organization (which is an axiomatic characteristic of organized crime), we can place organized crime in relation to other ideal types of organized non-state violence (both licit and illicit), as shown in Table 1.

Yet this typology is of limited value to policymakers because it lumps together licit actors such as private security companies and illicit actors such as trafficking networks. While these groups may share organizational and motivational characteristics, this typology says little about the range of operational tools available to policymakers in seeking to control their activities. Many private security companies, for example, operate in the legal realm, and so must be regulated by legal-regulatory tools such as contract, legislation and market incentives. Illicit actors, such as trafficking networks and insurgencies, by contrast, will be subject to a different range of legal-regulatory and other tools, including criminal law enforcement or even military intervention. An additional descriptive criterion of differentiation is therefore required to help predict what tools states and the international community will respond with.

One key criterion seems to be the non-state actors’ strategy in relation to existing authority structures. Entirely licit actors, such as some private security companies, adopt a submissive strategy. But illicit actors, such as organized crime and insurgent groups, are often characterized as taking one of three other strategies. *Predatory* groups prey upon the resources of local authority structures, in open

TABLE 1:
TERRITORIAL AND MOTIVATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF CONTEMPORARY
ORGANIZED NON-STATE VIOLENCE

	Territorial organization	Non-territorial organization
Profit motive	Some forms of organized crime (protection rackets, bandits)	Contemporary private military and security companies, mercenary bands, trafficking networks, cybercriminals
Political or other non-economic motive	Insurgencies, national liberation movements, warlords	Transnational armed and terrorist groups

conflict with them. This often involves plundering the resources currently under the control of other authority structures, sometimes characterized as ‘primitive capital accumulation’. *Parasitic* groups prey upon these same resources, but at a level or in a manner that is sustainable. This often involves the extraction of rents (rather than the consumption of the underlying resource) from populations or existing authority structures – including in the form of protection rackets. *Symbiotic* groups coexist with existing authority structures, either through overlaps of membership or through other clandestine arrangements of reciprocity and joint venture arrangements.²⁹

A further dimension of differentiation can also be introduced by breaking down the governance resources of existing authority structures. According to Max Weber’s ‘types of legitimate domination’, these ‘resources’ fall into three categories: (1) the means of coercion; (2) capital; (3) legitimacy.³⁰ Differentiating organized non-state actors against these two dimensions – strategy and resources – produces the matrix set out in Table 2.

This analytic framework, elements of which are picked up in the articles that follow, potentially offers several benefits for understanding the complex relationship between organized crime (and other organized non-state violent actors), conflict, and international responses.

First, it permits understanding of these actors in context. The violent non-state actors that peace operations encounter are not simply stand-alone actors, but central players in larger social systems. They are not simply economic, atomistic, rational utilitarian-maximizers, but providers and consumers of social meaning. And what their activities ‘mean’ to those who suffer and benefit from them – from ‘foot-soldiers’ in trafficking networks to civilian recipients of a warlord’s largesse – often differs radically from the meaning ascribed to them by external actors that label these activities as ‘crime’.³¹ Whether such actors are best treated as engaged in activities that are more akin to conflict or to crime may depend in part on how they relate to their social environment: predatory groups’ approach to capital accumulation is much more akin to what we typically label ‘conflict’, while symbiotic groups are closer to what we usually describe as ‘organized crime’ (with parasites somewhere in between).

Second, this framework makes clear that how these groups relate to existing authority structures – especially states – has significant implications for how they are managed, especially given the foundational commitment in the international system to state sovereignty. Predatory groups have very different incentive structures from symbiotic groups – they are unlikely, for example, to be susceptible to inducement to enter a coalition government with the existing authorities (or may abuse the opportunity if they are given the chance), and may be susceptible more to alterations in opportunity structures in the illicit rather than in the licit economy. In contrast, managing symbiotic and parasitic groups through state structures (such as national police forces) may be particularly difficult, given their likely penetration of those state structures.

On a third related point, the framework may even facilitate saying something about which types of organized non-state violence peace operations are likely to find involved in specific theatres. Drug trans-shippers, for example, seem more

TABLE 2:
STRATEGIES OF CONTEMPORARY ORGANIZED NON-STATE VIOLENCE TOWARDS
GOVERNANCE RESOURCES

	Coercion	Capital	Legitimacy
<i>Predatory strategy:</i> e.g., RUF, some actors in eastern DRC, Taliban-linked groups	Predator raises own coercion or co-opts aspects of the state's security structures (e.g., AFRC in Sierra Leone) which is used to attack existing authority structure	Predator plunders capital from existing authority structure (i.e., plundering of a state's natural resources) – primitive capital accumulation and asset transfer	Predator ignores or even attacks existing authority structures' legitimacy. Usually appeals to alternative forms of legitimacy (i.e., non-rational, non-bureaucratic forms – often charismatic, traditional or religious)
<i>Parasitic relationship:</i> e.g., Italian mafia, Russian <i>mafiya</i>	Parasite raises own coercion or co-opts state's coercion and may seek to impose protection racket over existing authority structure or its members	Parasite extracts capital from existing authority structure on constant, stable basis – rent extraction and market pressure (e.g., road taxes)	Parasite appeals to traditional or charismatic sources of legitimacy, or to rational economic motives, but may refrain from outright attacks on existing authority's legitimacy
<i>Symbiotic relationship:</i> e.g., some Balkan wartime criminal groups, Charles Taylor's group	Symbiot may raise own coercion or may operate in joint venture with the state coercion	Symbiot may have reciprocal capital-raising and distributive functions with state, in form of joint venture or market sharing – rent extraction and limited productive capital accumulation	Merging of the legitimacy of the state and the symbiot – state relies on non-rational, non-bureaucratic forms of legitimacy and/or symbiot adopts rational or even bureaucratic legitimacy (e.g., as state-sanctioned public-service provider)

likely to take a parasitic or symbiotic approach than a predatory approach, since what they need is non-interference by the state, not open conflict; drug producers, in contrast, may take a more predatory approach, since their revenue-raising activities may require possession of productive commodities – land and labour. This has significant implications for managing each of these groups. Hence the differences between narco-trafficking through Haiti and narco-production in Afghanistan – detailed in these pages – and the need for a law-enforcement-based response to the former and a military response to the latter.

Fourth, the framework may also help us understand and explain the changing strategies of some of these violent non-state actors, particularly the classic post-conflict movement from predator to parasite to symbiot – and even to notionally 'submissive' or licit actor. This is the trajectory followed by the likes of Charles Taylor, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),³² some Shi'a groups in Iraq

(see Williams in this issue) and some Afghan warlords.³³ Predation is inherently unstable and has high input costs, even if with the high risks involved come potentially high rewards. Symbiosis offers a longer-term, lower-cost, and more peaceful ‘business plan’, if sufficient clandestine links to the state can be established.

Finally, the analytical framework characterizes organized non-state violence according to the approach it takes to authority structures, rather than to states. This not only allows analysis where states are weak or failed, but also allows for improved thinking about how these groups target other structures of authority, such as political parties – or peace operations themselves. As many of the articles in this Special Issue illustrate, the presence of a peace operation changes the dynamics of the organization of coercion, capital, and legitimacy in a territory, affecting both supply and demand sides, as well as the transaction costs involved in the organization of each of these factors, in both intended and unintended ways.³⁴ In extreme cases, parasitic, and even symbiotic groups have been detected *within* peace operations – witness the involvement of Nigerian ECOWAS soldiers in West Africa’s illicit conflict economy, the involvement of Sri Lankan forces in Haiti’s sex economy, the involvement of Ukrainian troops and DynCorp employees working with a peace operation in Balkans in similar activities, the alleged involvement of Pakistani forces in gold smuggling in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the alleged involvement of UNMIK personnel in corruption and organized crime in Kosovo.³⁵ In some cases, this appears to have involved local groups targeting and corrupting peace operations, but, in others, it involves national military contingents importing external crime networks into the country in question.

This analytical framework thus offers some basic tools for understanding organized crime, and its relationship to authority structures including peace operations. Some of these tools are deployed in the articles that follow, but a more comprehensive application of the tools to conflicts around the world must await another occasion. What the analytical framework cannot do, however, is explain why this relationship between peace operations and organized crime matters. It is to that question we now turn.

Why Is the Relationship Between Peace Operations and Organized Crime Important?

The orthodox perspective on the relationship between peace operations and organized crime characterizes the latter as a potential spoiler of peace processes. If this perspective is a useful way of understanding the relationship, it is important for peace operations to understand organized crime – and their own relationship to organized crime. Yet, since organized crime (and other forms of organized non-state violence) may wield certain governance resources, we suggest that organized crime may in some circumstances be a potential *partner* for peace, and not merely a ‘peace spoiler’. This ‘unorthodox’ view suggests that it is important for peace operations to understand when organized crime may be a partner for peace – and how their own conduct may determine whether criminals are spoilers or partners.

The seminal piece analysing the relationship between state development and organized crime by Charles Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', is an obvious place to start.³⁶ 'If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest', ran his argument, then 'war making and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organized crime'.³⁷ Tilly claimed that in early modern Europe, it was war that made states. Since war belonged on a continuum with other forms of private entrepreneurial violence such as banditry, gangland rivalry, and policing, we ought to understand states in relation to the structures that supported such activities. States were, in other words, to be understood as a special form of violent entrepreneurship on a spectrum with organized crime.³⁸

Of course, Tilly himself cautioned that '[t]he Third World of the twentieth century does not greatly resemble Europe of the sixteenth or seventeenth century'.³⁹ And today, violence – and 'protection' – are organized globally, even as they are applied locally.⁴⁰ Assembling coercion, capital and legitimacy from around the world, organizers of violence provide a range of forms of 'protection' to their constituents, including physical protection from external threats including other violent actors or, in some cases, from threats they themselves manufacture (the so-called protection 'racket'); economic protection (including by providing livelihoods and, in many cases, economic safety nets, such as the humanitarian assistance provided by the Japanese *yakuza* after the Kobe earthquake, or the minimum wage and social security system provided by narco-producers in Colombia); and normative protection (including rough justice and in some cases defence of traditional norms or rights against 'attacks' by the state and external market forces).

Just as it did when Tilly wrote his seminal article over 20 years ago, this term – 'protection' – 'sounds two contrasting tones ... one comforting ... one ominous'.⁴¹ And now, as then,

[w]hich image the word 'protection' brings to mind depends mainly on our assessment of the reality and externality of the threat. Someone who produces both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it is a racketeer. Someone who provides a needed shield but has little control over the danger's appearance qualifies as a legitimate protector, especially if his price is no higher than his competitor's.⁴²

Seen from this perspective, we might go so far as to say that contemporary peace operations offer their own globally organized, but locally applied, 'system of protection' – an idea developed further in the analysis of Haiti in this issue.⁴³ Whereas early modern European states formed as the result of domestic organizational innovation in response to external security threats, today's states tend to be built through the importation of foreign organizational technologies in response to internal security threats.⁴⁴ Integrated missions and peace operations play a key role in assembling and delivering these external technologies in the form of coercion (particularly through UNDPKO and national military and police contingents), capital (through UNDP, the Bretton Woods

institutions, and bilateral arrangements), and legitimacy (through OHCHR, Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and others). Where Tilly could liken war-making and statemaking to organized crime, we can – at a stretch – liken peacekeeping and peacebuilding to organized crime, since each involves offering a civilian population a ‘system of protection’.

Of course, the comparison ends there: peacekeeping and peacebuilding are typically justified through reference to a ‘liberal peace’ valuing human autonomy – while organized crime is inherently authoritarian, violent and repressive, and does not shy away from threatening individual liberty.⁴⁵ The value of such a comparison is the reminder that contemporary international interventions are often in an existential competition with other forms of non-state-organized violence, with each side seeking to portray itself as a legitimate protector, and the ‘other’ side as the illegitimate ‘criminal’.⁴⁶ In delivering this internationally backed system of protection, peace operations must contend with resistance from existing authority structures, and must respond to the adaptations of these groups to the disruptions caused by the integration of the local security and economic market into global arrangements. The resulting competition may be violent, economic or normative – or all three at once.⁴⁷ And these struggles are likely to be long and hard: long, because of the access of both sides to global sources of coercion and capital, and hard, because of the deliberate appeals by each side to mutually incompatible forms of legitimacy, casting the struggle in existential terms.

Attempts to confront organized crime and other forms of organized non-state violence in peace operations thus tend to present two faces. In Afghanistan, is the ‘international community’ a legitimate protector offering a life based on liberal values and protection from harm to individual autonomy, as it would seek to portray itself? Or is it a threat to livelihoods based on a legitimate opium economy, and to organizations that protect Islamic values? In Haiti, is the international community a source of protection from local thugs and traffickers, or is it a threat to daily livelihoods and to the democratic wishes of the electoral majority? In the Balkans and in West Africa, has the international community served as a legitimate protector of civilians and popular sovereignty, or as a vehicle for the destruction of traditional authority structures and the erection, in their ashes, of states that serve Western interests in political containment and neo-liberal economic integration?

Our responses to these questions, and the success of the international community in promoting its preferred model of liberal, democratic states effectively discharging their responsibility to protect, will both depend on a more nuanced analysis of – and response to – the forms of non-state-organized violence that peace operations now encounter and must confront. If peace operations and organized crime can be understood as embodying contending forces in conflict and post-conflict political economies, each with access to governance resources such as coercion, capital and legitimacy, then understanding the relationship between these forces is crucial to understanding how to stabilize – or even transform – those political economies to build effective and responsible states and secure peace. This is the central importance of the enquiry undertaken here.

In This Special Issue

This volume contains six case studies and two thematic analyses exploring the relationship between peace operations and organized crime. The six case studies, organized roughly chronologically, are preceded and followed by examinations of some of the tools relevant to peace operations' efforts to tackle organized crime. The opening article by Victoria K. Holt and Alix J. Boucher focuses on existing tools, and the later article by Robert Muggah and Keith Krause examines emerging approaches to armed violence reduction. We close by highlighting lessons learned from these analyses and drawing policy conclusions.

Holt and Boucher examine existing UN responses to corruption and organized crime in their article 'Framing the Issue: UN Responses to Corruption and Criminal Networks in Post-Conflict Settings'. They focus on the relationship between Security Council-mandated peace operations and panels (and groups) of experts mandated by the council to investigate violations of UN sanctions, and they argue for the increased integration of such efforts.

Next, Peter Andreas explores 'Symbiosis Between Peace Operations and Illicit Business in Bosnia' between 1992 and 1995 in the first of six case studies. Andreas goes beyond traditional lines of enquiry exploring the relationship between belligerents and criminal activities by examining the impact criminal activities have on a different armed actor involved in conflict situations: international peacekeepers. He provides a detailed analysis of the role of peace operations in shaping and reshaping criminalized economies during the war in Bosnia, and also explores how these patterns extended into the post-conflict setting.

In 'Understanding Criminality in West African Conflicts', William Reno starts – like Andreas – from the orthodox view that links incentives for illicit economic activities with the behaviour of armed groups, treating that behaviour as a product of rational choice. Andreas applies that same analysis to the relationships between those armed groups and international peacekeepers. Reno takes a different tack, implicitly problematizing 'rational choice' in conflict situations, by exploring how 'criminality' in West African armed conflicts has been socially constructed. His analysis suggests that labelling certain forms of violence 'organized crime' has risked predisposing international interventions to certain mistakes in the region.

While Reno's article on West Africa deals with international interventions' responses to pre-existing 'criminal' networks, Patrick Gavigan's article on Guatemala deals with criminal networks that have grown stronger during an internationally backed peace process, and despite the presence of a UN verification mission there for a decade. In 'Organized Crime, Illicit Power Structures and Guatemala's Threatened Peace Processes', Gavigan explores, among other things, how the weakness of the Guatemalan state, opportunities in drug transshipment, and the failure to understand how the internationally backed peace process threatened illicit economic interests created the conditions for the emergence of criminal spoilers and, ultimately, a 'corporate mafia state'.

While Gavigan's analysis of the international community's intervention in Guatemala seems to suggest that political-criminal networks grew even as the

international presence looked on, James Cockayne's analysis of the situation in Haiti suggests an even more troubling notion: that the international community's interventions during the 1990s unintentionally facilitated the increasing influence of organized criminality, in both local and transnational forms. In 'Winning Haiti's Protection Competition: Organized Crime and Peace Operations Past, Present and Future', Cockayne describes how international interventions during the 1990s, particularly broad trade sanctions, and faltering police reform efforts played into the competition within Haiti between different groups offering 'protection', and led to the embedding of this local 'protection competition' within a larger regional criminal economy.

Vanda Felbab-Brown's article, 'Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention', also deals with a long-running conflict that has been significantly affected by the illicit narcotics economy. Felbab-Brown carefully analyses the trade-offs between security, development and statebuilding involved in fighting the narco-economy in Afghanistan. She argues that international interventions to date have failed to redress the 'fundamental structural problems of the overall economy, the economic superiority of illicit narcotics production, or the social pressures towards opium poppy cultivation'.

Our final case study, 'Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq', by Phil Williams, details how organized crime has emerged as a major, if under-acknowledged, 'spoiler' in that country since 2003. Williams argues that a 'fundamental shift of attitude and assessment' is required: '[o]rganized crime in Iraq is not an outlier or an anomaly; it is integrally related to state collapse, multiple, competing power centres, and the lack of economic opportunities, as well as the disappearance of the norms and standards of permissible behaviour in a civilized society'. He concludes with a prescription for specific measures necessary to address the role of organized crime in fuelling violence in Iraq.

Following these six case studies, the Issue returns to a thematic analysis with Robert Muggah and Keith Krause's 'Closing the Gap Between Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Insecurity: Towards a Violence Reduction Agenda'. They argue that existing peace operations tools, such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and small arms control programming, often have a limited capacity to deal with the heterogeneous forms of armed violence, including criminal violence, that emerge in post-conflict settings. They argue that these tools can be sharpened by drawing on lessons from the criminal justice and public health sectors, in particular by paying attention to the spatial, temporal and demographic aspects of the distribution of violence, and by targeting risk factors alongside actors and their tools of violence.

Finally, our conclusion draws a series of lessons learned from the preceding articles. We describe organized crime as both a potential enemy and a potential ally of peace operations. We highlight the need to distinguish between strategies for containing organized crime and for transforming the political economies in which it flourishes. And we present ideas for developing intelligent, transnational and transitional law enforcement that can make the most of organized crime as a potential ally for transforming political economies, while containing the threat it presents as an enemy to building effective and responsible states.

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NOTES

1. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, UN Doc., A/59/565, 2 Dec. 2004. Transnational organized crime has also been characterized as a security threat by the United States, the European Union, and other states. For an overview, see James Cockayne, 'Transnational Organized Crime: Multilateral Responses to a Rising Threat', Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, New York: International Peace Academy, Apr. 2007.
2. Summary of the conclusions of the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) at its first regular session, Vienna, 2–3 Apr. 2004, Chief Executives Board, UN Doc., CEB/2004/1, 3 May 2004, pp.7–10. The CEB endorsed several measures proposed in the note, including efforts to systematize and better coordinate the approach to transnational organized crime by a variety of UN system bodies.
3. UN Doc., S/PRST/2007/38, 19 Oct. 2007.
4. Stewart Patrick, 'Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of Spillovers', Working Paper 73, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, Mar. 2006; Barnett Rubin and Alexandra Guáqueta, *Fighting Drugs and Building Peace: Towards Policy Coherence Between Counter-Narcotics and Peace Building*, New York: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2007; Vanda Felbab-Brown, 'Kicking the Opium Habit? Afghanistan's Drug Economy and Politics Since the 1980s', *Conflict, Security, and Development*, Vol.6, No.2, 2006, pp.127–49; Svante E. Cornell, 'Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol.30, No.3, 2007, pp.207–27.
5. See Phil Williams and John T. Picarelli, 'Combating Organized Crime in Armed Conflict', in Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke (eds), *Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005, pp.123–52.
6. See, for example, Alex P. Schmid, 'The Links Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorist Crimes', *Transnational Organized Crime*, Vol.2, No.4, 1996, pp.40–82; Tamara Makarenko, 'The Crime–Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism', *Global Crime*, Vol.6, No.1, 2004, pp.129–45; Mark S. Hamm and Cécile Van de Voorde, 'Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research, and Prevention', *Trends in Organized Crime*, Vol.9, No.2, Winter 2005, pp.18–51; Louise Shelley, John Picarelli, Allison Irby, et al., 'Methods and Motives: Exploring Links Between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism', report by National Institute of Justice: Washington, DC, 23 June 2005.
7. See, for example, Sarah E. Mendelson, *Barracks and Brothels: Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the Balkans*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2005; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Human Trafficking and United Nations Peacekeeping', policy paper, New York, Mar. 2004.
8. See especially Christine S. Cheng and Dominik Zaum (eds), *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Corruption*, Special Issue of *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.3, June 2008; Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose and Jason Terry, *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States*, Stimson Center Report No.61, Washington, DC, Mar. 2007; Philippe Le Billon, 'Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts', *Journal of International Development*, Vol.15, 2003, pp.413–26; see also the details on the Tufts University seminar, The Nexus: Corruption, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, 12–13 Apr. 2007, accessed at <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/corruptionconf/>.
9. Rubin and Guáqueta (see n.4 above).
10. These isolated attempts include Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, *Transnational Crime and Peacekeeping: Comparative Perspectives*, Conference Report, Wheaton, IL, 6–7 Sept. 2001; Irv Marucelj, 'Mature Peacekeeping Operations as Facilitators of Organized

- Crime', Working Paper Series No. 2005-01, Institute for Research on Public Policy, accessed at www.irpp.org/wp/archive/wp2005-01.pdf.
11. Heiko Nitzschke, *Transforming War Economies: Challenges for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding*, Report of the 725th Wilton Park Conference with the International Peace Academy, Wilton House, Sussex, UK, 27–29 Oct. 2003, p.4. See also Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (2nd edn), 2007; Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh with Jonathan Goodhand, *War Economies in a Regional Context: The Challenge of Transformation*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. For economic analysis, see Halvor Mehlum, Karl Ove Moene and Ragnar Torvik, 'Plunder & Protection, Inc.', memo. 29 May 2002, accessed at <http://129.3.20.41/eps/dev/papers/0210/0210002.pdf> ('Disorder and violence increase the willingness to pay for protection and leave higher shares of the rents from trafficking to each warlord and roving bandit', implying an economic incentive for criminals in contributing to violence – p.12); Paul Collier, 'Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.44, No.6, 2000, pp.839–53.
 12. See James Cockayne and Daniel Pfister, 'Peace Operations and Organised Crime', Geneva Paper Series No.2, Geneva and New York: Geneva Center for Security Policy and International Peace Institute, 2008.
 13. But see Filip Reyntjens, 'The Privatisation and Criminalisation of Public Space in the Geopolitics of the Great Lakes Region', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.43, No.4, 2005, pp.587–607.
 14. See Francesco Strazzari, 'L'Oeuvre au noir: The Shadow Economy of Kosovo's Independence', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.2, 2008, pp.155–70.
 15. Cf. Nazih Richani, 'Systems of Violence and Their Political Economy in Post-Conflict Situations', work in progress, accessed at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCONFLICT/Resources/RichaniRvsd2007.doc>, Mar. 2007. On codification of 'new' and 'old' wars, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?', *World Politics*, Vol.54, Oct. 2001, pp.99–118.
 16. See Daniel Biró, 'The Unbearable Lightness of . . . Violence: Warlordism as an Alternative Form of Governance in the "Westphalian Periphery"', in Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach (eds), *State Failure Revisited II: Actors of Violence and Alternative Forms of Governance*, Institut für Entwicklung un Frieden (INEF) Report 89/2007, Universität Duisberg Essen, pp.7–49; Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*, Oxford: International African Institute, James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1999; William Reno, 'How Sovereignty Matters: International Markets and the Political Economy of Local Politics in Weak States', in Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham (eds), *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global–Local Networks of Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.197–215.
 17. The term 'labelling theory' is derived from Howard Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*, New York: Free Press, 1963; see also Clarence Schrag, *Crime and Justice: American Style*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971; Raymond Paternoster and Lee Ann Iovanni, 'The Labeling Perspective and Delinquency: An Elaboration of the Theory and Assessment of the Evidence', *Justice Quarterly*, Vol.6, 1989, pp.359–94.
 18. This ties these labels to the 'greed versus grievance' debate in understanding civil wars. See Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
 19. For international responses to state failure, see Sebastian von Einsiedel, 'Policy responses to state failure', in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur (eds), *Making States Work*, New York: United Nations University Press, 2005, pp.13–15.
 20. See Patrick, 'Weak States and Global Threats' (see n.4 above).
 21. Phil Williams, 'Transnational Criminal Enterprises, Conflict, and Instability', in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.97–112.
 22. Caroline Moser and Dennis Rodgers, *Change, Violence, and Insecurity in Non-Conflict Situations*, Overseas Development Institute, London, Working Paper 245, Mar. 2005. See also Michael Pugh, 'Crime and Capitalism in Kosovo's Transformation', paper at International Studies Association Convention, Hawaii, Mar. 2005.
 23. See Gerry Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
 24. Nitzschke (see n.11 above), p.6. See also Williams and Picarelli (see n.5 above), p.126.
 25. The exclusive consequences of labelling have been at the heart of criminological labelling theory since Becker (see n.17 above).

26. Nitzschke (see n.11 above), p.7.
27. Cf. Biró (see n.16 above).
28. See Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur, *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*, New York: United Nations University, 2007.
29. For related discussions, see Cockayne, 'Transnational Organized Crime' (see n.1 above); Alfredo Rangel Suárez, 'Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia', *Journal of International Economic Affairs*, Vol.53, No.2, 2000, pp.577–601; A. Peter Lupsha, 'Transnational Organized Crime Versus the Nation-State', *Transnational Organized Crime*, Vol.2, No.1, 1996, pp.21–46.
30. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittch (eds), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978 (see pp.212–302, 941–56).
31. For an exploration of the contextual aspects of the 'meaning' of shadow actors, see especially the ethnographic work of Carolyn Nordstrom, *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Our emphasis on organizers of violence as organizers of 'meaning' seeks to chart a symbolic interactionist course between the pure rational-choice theorists of civil war dynamics, such as Fearon, and sociopsychological explanations, such as that provided by Kaufman. See Jim Fearon, 'Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.49, No.4, 2005, pp.483–507; Stuart J. Kaufman, 'Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence', *International Security*, Vol.30, No.4, 2006, pp.45–86.
32. See generally Nika Stražisar Teran, 'Peacebuilding and Organized Crime: The Cases of Kosovo and Liberia', SwissPeace Working Paper, 1/2007, Bern, 2007.
33. Antonio Giustozzi, 'Warlords into Businessmen: The Afghan Transition 2002–2005', paper at seminar on 'Transforming War Economies', Plymouth University, 16–18 June 2005; Kimberley Marten, 'Warlordism in Comparative Perspective', *International Security*, Vol.31, No.3, 2006/07, pp.41–73.
34. See generally Aoi et al. (see n.28 above).
35. See especially the reports in *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), beginning with 'Report from Unmikistan, Land of the Future', 25 June 2007.
36. Charles Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.169–91.
37. *Ibid.*, p.169.
38. Tilly uses the term 'entrepreneur' in his analysis. For more recent treatments, see Vadim Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002; James Cockayne, 'The Global Reorganization of Legitimate Violence: Military Entrepreneurs and the Private Face of International Humanitarian Law', *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol.88, No.863, 2006.
39. Tilly (see n.36 above), p.169.
40. See, for example, William Reno, 'Order and Commerce in Turbulent Areas: 19th Century Lessons, 21st Century Practice', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.25, No.4, 2004, pp.607–25.
41. Tilly (see n.36 above), p.170. We use the term 'protection' to highlight the connections between peace operations and the concept of the 'responsibility to protect'.
42. Tilly (see n.36 above), p.171.
43. We use the idea of a 'system' to highlight the complexity of the political, social, and economic arrangements involved, and the potential for unintended consequences such as feedback, spillover and moral hazard. See Aoi et al. (see n.28 above), pp.3–19; Richani (see n.15 above).
44. Cf. Biró (see n.16 above).
45. On the authoritarian nature of organized crime, see Louise I. Shelley, 'Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism', in H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (eds), *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, pp.25–51.
46. As used by the accused in international criminal tribunals who try to portray 'the international' as criminal and appealing to shared norms of nationalism and community loyalty. See further James Cockayne, 'Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes Trials as Unsuccessful Degradation Ceremonies', *Journal of Human Rights*, Vol.4, No.4, 2005, pp.455–73.
47. For the differences between economic competition in markets and on the battlefield, see Halvor Mehlum and Karl Ove Moene, *Battlefields and Marketplaces*, memorandum, 5 June 2002, accessed at www.oekonomi.uio.no/memo/memopdf/memo112002.pdf.