FOREWORD


The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an Introduction that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “Quick Look” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related Lessons Learned Report, and (4) links to additional reports and other references that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Security Sector Reform available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account.
in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [http://pksoi.army.mil](http://pksoi.army.mil) and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [https://sollims.pksoi.org](https://sollims.pksoi.org) to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

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**KABUL, Afghanistan (29 Dec 2014).** Leaders from the European Union Police (EUPOL) Mission Afghanistan and the German Police Project Team (GPPT) participated in a joint ceremony to sign a “Memorandum of Cooperation” hosted by U.S. Brigadier General Burke Whitman, Resolute Support (RS) Deputy Advisor to the Ministry of Interior (MoI). “The three organizations EUPOL, GPPT, and ISAF/RS are here today to memorialize our greater collaboration in the form of a memorandum of cooperation,” said Brigadier General Whitman. “The memorandum symbolizes a renewed spirit of coordination among the entities in their common goal to develop the professionalism and sustainable capacity of the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police to protect and serve the people of Afghanistan.”

[Photo provided by Armando Perez, RS News]
INTRODUCTION

This edition of the Sampler explores the challenges and complexities of Security Sector Reform. Along with a selection of thought-provoking lessons, this Sampler also provides an extensive list of related publications and links.

While U.S./coalition or international actors may be actively engaged in security activities in the initial phases of peace/stability operations, it is also essential to address Security Sector Reform (SSR) requirements – to improve host nation (HN) security capacity and to ensure that HN policies, plans, programs, and activities are put into place to more effectively provide safety, security, and justice for the HN population. However, based upon conditions within the HN, challenges to SSR may be significant:

Local security institutions are often viewed as corrupt, abusive, and lacking in public service ethos. Reshaping this perception among the population, building the capacity of security institutions, creating civilian oversight structures to ensure accountability, and developing sound security policies are all elements of SSR that have proven very difficult. It is a major gap that must be filled.

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction
USIP and PKSOI, 2011 [section 6.11.1]

Other major challenges typically include: shortfalls in collecting/sharing critical information about threats, weak HN corrections institutions, lack of oversight on private security firms, inadequate reintegration plans/programs, and deficiencies in border security systems. Nonetheless, the following guidelines have been identified as key starting points/elements for developing an approach to SSR:

1. Ensure that reforms reflect the security needs of the HN population.
2. Strengthening security forces is not enough; promote good governance and legitimate civilian oversight to ensure long-term accountability.
3. Prevent infiltration of security forces through robust vetting.
4. Focus on public service ethos and competence when training security forces.
5. Support the improvement of police-community relations and police responsiveness.
6. Ensure coherence of strategy and effort among major actors.
7. Promote the civil authority of the state; long-term stability depends on it.

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction
USIP and PKSOI, 2011 [sections 6.7.18 – 6.7.25]

Besides these seven guidelines, numerous lessons within the SOLLIMS database reveal other key insights that have markedly contributed to successful SSR programs in certain host nations – as well as various factors and situations where significant changes/“course corrections” were needed. These insights and recommendations are summarized in the Conclusion paragraph of this Sampler.
# Security Sector Reform

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Burundi’s Security Sector Development (SSD) program is noteworthy for having advanced security sector effectiveness and democratic accountability since its inception in 2009. [Read More ...]

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its “golden hour” (mid-2003 to 2005) were absolutely critical for post conflict-recovery and for establishing a viable foundation for further stabilization work. [Read More ...]

Building effective and accountable security ministries is essential for attaining long-term security in post-conflict countries. For Afghanistan, the U.S. Department of Defense developed and implemented the Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) program to address this requirement. [Read More ...]

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has embarked on modernizing the military establishment and reorienting its values, in order to be effective in the delivery of defense and security services to the people. [Read More ...]

In 1999 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1272 granting authority used for several UN missions over the next decade, each seeking to aid the East Timor state into independence from Indonesia. [Read More ...]

Chile provides a notable case in security sector development – advancing beyond a culture in which policy and law favored military priorities and interests (in the early 1990s) to a point where there is balance, mutual respect, and routine accommodation between the Ministry of Defense and other agencies. [Read More ...]

Security Sector Reform (SSR) provisions are important items in peace agreements. [Read More ...]

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) does not come about by accident; it requires foresight, detailed planning, adequate resourcing, and continuous assessment. [Read More ...]
SUBJECT: Security Sector Reform

1. GENERAL

Security Sector Reform (SSR) requires a judicious, comprehensive approach by both the host nation and those involved in assisting it. The SSR approach / strategy must carefully take into account the conditions, challenges, and gaps of the host nation – and it must be acceptable to the host nation’s population, as well as sustainable over the long term. SSR, by nature, requires a long-term commitment of resources by both the host nation and those assisting it – in order to overcome the complexities and challenges involved, and to allow time for modifications to meet changing conditions and requirements.

This report includes observations, insights, and lessons from several recent SSR endeavors – including Burundi, Liberia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Chile. It also includes experiences/analyses on the integration of SSR into peace agreements, and incorporation of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) within an SSR strategy. Common threads among these discussions and experiences are: meeting local needs, developing SSR plans through dialogue, crafting solutions that are sustainable, having flexibility to meet changing conditions, and instilling strong commitment of time and resources.

2. LESSONS

a. TOPIC. Security Sector Development Program in Burundi (1553)

Observation.

Burundi’s Security Sector Development (SSD) program is noteworthy for having advanced security sector effectiveness and democratic accountability since its inception in 2009. This SSD program is a bilateral program between Burundi and the Netherlands. In five years’ time, this program has increased transparency and accountability in Burundi’s security sector, improved the perception of the security forces (especially the army) among the population, and improved the quality of security service provision.

Discussion.

When it was launched in 2009, the Burundi-Netherlands SSD program aimed for transformative change of Burundi’s security sector. At that point in time, which
was roughly four years after Burundi’s civil war had ended, a large rift still existed between society at large and the security sector. In many parts of the county, the public harbored strong resentment of the military and especially the police. This lack of trust and confidence in the security sector resulted in people sometimes taking the law into their own hands, with acts of vigilantism and “mob justice.” In order to address this problem, and to advance peace and security for its citizens, Burundi, in conjunction with the Netherlands, embarked on an ambitious SSD program.

The two countries first developed a shared vision of a transparent, accountable, democratically governed, fiscally sustainable security sector capable of delivering security and justice to all Burundian citizens. They also established the following strategic objectives for the SSD program:

- Affirmation of the principles of partnership between the two governments through political dialogue
- Accountability of the security services to civil authorities
- Adherence of the security services to national and international law
- Adherence of the security services to the general principles of public expenditure
- Impartiality on the part of the security services
- Professionalism of the security services

The SSD program managers adopted a highly flexible approach, taking conditions on the ground as their starting point, and then slowly initiating changes/ actions (based upon conditions and needs) to progressively achieve the shared vision and strategic objectives. The SSD program began with basic, concrete activities during the first 2-year phase (2009-2011) and focused on building trust and relationships. For example, the program started with small activities such as refurbishing Army kitchens and improving police capacity to maintain communications equipment. Having established credibility by generating tangible benefits for Burundian security actors, the program progressively promoted activities aimed at changing attitudes and behaviors of security actors – such as developing a code of ethics and ethics courses for the police and the armed forces, promoting dialogue among security personnel about the application of the code, and inviting civil society actors to take part in evaluating troops' adherence to ethics norms when dealing with civilians.

By the end of second 2-year phase of the program (2011-2013), the program achieved the following results:

- Important barriers to transparency in the security sector had eroded, and security issues were increasingly acknowledged by many to be the legitimate concern of the full range of Burundian stakeholders, including civil society.
• Dialogue on SSR and specifically governance-related aspects of SSR was occurring more frequently among key stakeholders in multiple forums inside and outside the government.
• The program provided an increasingly inclusive forum for discussion and debate, as key oversight actors (the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman’s Office, and the Auditor General) and key security actors (the National Intelligence Service and the National Security Council) participated. A diverse group of civil society actors also began engaging on a frequent basis.
• The program made progress in achieving the governance objectives of the SSD’s Memorandum of Understanding (signed at the outset of the SSD program between the governments of Burundi and the Netherlands), particularly in terms of strengthening security sector accountability to civil authorities and adherence to national and international law, as well as introducing the concept of financial accountability to the security services.

Overall, there are four primary reasons why the SSD program has been so successful at improving security and justice governance in Burundi: 1) the program has put politics center stage; 2) it has established results progressively; 3) it has prioritized the gradual development of ownership; and, 4) it has matched timeframe with ambition and environment. Synopsis follows:

1. **Putting politics center stage.** The SSD program proactively addressed the "politics" of change at both the national and operational levels on a daily basis. The program established a ministerial-level Political Committee to conduct high-level dialogue between partners; a Steering Committee to approve strategies, projects, and budgets; and working-level Program Management Units to develop, execute, and oversee the projects. As political issues arose – such as certain institutions trying to control change, lessen impacts, or maximize benefits – the Political Committee worked to address and resolve them. Dutch Embassy officials were keen to help the Political Committee and the parties involved in arriving at solutions for contentious issues, and thereby keeping the program moving forward.

2. **Establishing results progressively.** The SSD program developed work plans on a 2-year basis, but was flexible enough to adjust/respond to emerging needs. The program was not tied to objectives that made sense in year one, but were no longer feasible or salient in year two or beyond. The program was not tied to a binding framework, it had a long-term (8-year) time horizon, and relationships of trust were emphasized between the two governments and within the program. Trust-building began through initial delivery of equipment, training, and minor infrastructure improvements. As trust was built, the SSD program progressively moved on to improving the police force’s vehicle maintenance system, the police force’s counter-terrorism capacity, and the Burundian Army’s
logistics system, as well as incorporating activities to change attitudes and behaviors of security actors.

3. Prioritizing the gradual development of ownership. Responsibility and authority for determining the strategic direction of the SSD program, identifying and developing activities/projects, and then managing SSD program activities have been progressively transferred to Burundian stakeholders – not just security actors, but also civil society actors. From the outset, the intention was to engage the public / civil society on the SSD program. However, the inclusion of civil society organizations (CSOs) was initially very contentious for many Burundian government officials. To address this challenge, skilled facilitators were brought in to establish dialogue between parliamentarians and CSOs. Besides this dialogue, they demonstrated how this cooperation and ownership had worked in other African countries, they scheduled open houses at military/police facilities, and they encouraged confidence-building activities. Because of this engagement/inclusion, security has gradually become "everyone's affair" in Burundi.

4. Matching timeframe with ambition and environment. SSD’s 8-year timeframe has enabled Burundian stakeholders to gradually understand what SSR implies and to adjust attitudes and behaviors so that sustainable change could take root. At the outset, key Burundian stakeholders did not truly understand what the reforms (envisioned by the SSD program) entailed, why they were important, or how to implement a process of institutional changes. Therefore, SSD program managers did not immediately attempt to tackle complex issues such as revising legal/security frameworks or instituting transparent budget management procedures. Instead, the SSD program managers first set out to build trust among actors/stakeholders, and then took steps to educate the senior Burundian political leaders, local government officials and civil society leaders about the importance of transparency, accountability, respect for human rights, roles of actors in creating a safe and secure environment, and so on.

Recommendation.

In a post-conflict environment where society at large perceives the security forces as unprofessional, repressive, and corrupt, it is recommended that the host nation government consider "transformative" security sector reform/development, along the lines of the Burundi-Netherlands SSD program, in order to improve/strengthen governance of the security sector. In taking this approach:

1. Put "politics" center stage; i.e., establish mechanisms to address and resolve "political" issues/disputes.

2. Allow flexible programming to meet emerging needs and to progressively achieve results.
3. Prioritize the gradual development of host nation ownership, including civil society ownership.

4. Set a long-term timeframe, to allow ambitions/reforms to be achieved under challenging conditions/environment.

5. Begin with a shared vision among partners at the outset, and set strategic objectives.

6. Utilize an hierarchy of management (e.g., Political Committee, Steering Committee, Program Management Units) to direct, guide, and manage activities at the appropriate level on a continuous basis, with stakeholder involvement at all levels.

**Implications.**

Without security sector transformation and security-governance initiatives in post-conflict situations, and without the involvement of civil society, any existing repressive/corrupt/unprofessional security forces will continue to be at odds with those they should be serving/protecting.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the publication "Lessons from Burundi’s Security Sector Reform Process," by Nicole Ball, Africa Security Brief No. 29, November 2014.

**Comments.**

Related documents:


b. **TOPIC. Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform** (703)

**Observation.**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its "golden hour" (mid-2003
to 2005) were absolutely critical for post-conflict recovery and for establishing a viable foundation for further stabilization work. Although every peacebuilding context presents its own set of unique and complex challenges, certain key areas of action addressed within the Liberian security sector may also be applicable to wider peacebuilding efforts, particularly for nations recovering from an abrupt end to a civil war. Key areas of action successfully implemented in Liberia revolved around consolidating the state’s monopoly of force, maintaining the momentum of peacebuilding, integrating SSR with DDR, operationalizing human security, and mobilizing networks for peace.

**Discussion.**

Upon the conclusion of its 14-year civil war, in August 2003, Liberia faced an incredibly difficult situation with regard to post-conflict peacebuilding. From a pre-war population of three million, more than 250,000 people had been killed, and another one million people were displaced or missing. Pillaging, looting, abductions, torture, rape, and other human rights abuses had occurred on a massive scale throughout the conflict period. Most Liberians had lived in constant fear of the military and police forces, not to mention the numerous warring factions. Liberia’s infrastructure had been totally destroyed, with no functioning electrical grids, no public running water, no sewage, and no other public utilities. Throughout the capital of Monrovia, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) lived in slums consisting of tin shacks and garbage. After 14 years of violence, chaos, and fear, a pause for peace came about when President Taylor accepted an offer of asylum from Nigeria.

Seeing a “golden hour” for peacebuilding upon the exile of President Taylor, the United Nations, the United States, and certain key leaders/practitioners (including the authors of *Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia* – see Event Description paragraph below) immediately focused their engagement on Security Sector Reform (SSR).

An initial priority was to consolidate the state’s monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law. Probably the most critical action taken in this regard was the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) program, which was implemented by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in a quick, if not hasty, manner on 7 December 2003. Launching the DDRR program quickly, and involving many of the ex-combatants in transitional labor, kept these ex-combatants focused on material gains and employment – rather than on renewing violence. Simple monetary compensation for the arms/ammunition surrendered was a key factor for gaining their cooperation. Another motive for these combatants to show up at a DDRR site was temporary amnesty. Blanket or general amnesty was never issued in Liberia; however, temporary amnesty proved to be vital to the success of the DDRR program. A conscious decision was made – in the interest of disarming and demobilizing
armed groups – to postpone the implementation of transitional justice in favor of temporary amnesty, and this approach paid large dividends.

The DDRR program succeeded in disarming and demobilizing 101,449 combatants, and it collected 61,918 weapons and 6,486,136 units of ammunition. Throughout execution of the DDRR program, UNMIL disposed of the collected ordinance, and it worked to seal off Liberia’s borders from outside interference.

An early threat to the DDRR program surfaced during a 10-day period in December 2003. Significant riots broke out at one of the DDRR sites (Camp Schefflin), posing a major threat to the UNMIL contingent there. Consequently, UNMIL put a halt to the DDRR program. However, within four months, once additional UN peacekeepers were on the ground, UNMIL re-energized the program and resumed execution in full force. That persistence gave a reassuring message to the Liberian government, and to all Liberians, that disarmament, demobilization, and peacebuilding were moving forward and that momentum would be maintained. The pace of disarmament and demobilization picked up quickly.

Similarly, persistence in "maintaining momentum” kept the crucial 2005 Liberian presidential elections on schedule. In opposition, many senior statesmen, interim government officials, and potential candidates had pushed hard for holding party conventions and for rewriting the constitution in advance of any elections. However, their motives may have been self-serving – to prolong their time in office/exposure, or even to have an opportunity to divert resources (funds from the February 2004 donor conference) for their personal gains rather than for the good of Liberia. Fortunately, the UN, U.S., and certain key leaders in Liberia stood firm on keeping the November 2005 elections on schedule. This resulted in the first female head of state for Africa (Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson), but more importantly resulted in a new, legitimate government recognized by the vast majority of all Liberians – to establish and uphold the rule of law.

To consolidate a "monopoly of force" for this new government to uphold the rule of law, the UN, U.S., and leadership involved took the approach of integrating DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The UN worked the "Disarmament" piece – as it systematically disarmed the legacy national military force. The U.S. simultaneously worked the "Demobilization and Reintegration" pieces, while at the same time restructuring and reforming the national military force. The entire DDR/SSR program included recruiting, vetting, training, equipping, fielding, sustaining and mentoring the new force. The program also involved constructing new military bases across the country, establishing a professional defense ministry, drafting a national defense strategy, and redesigning the force structure. The point of intersection between DDR and SSR was "reintegration" – the process of reincorporating as many appropriate ex-combatants into the new military as possible. For the select few who were able to pass the vetting process, "reintegration" not only gave them quick employment in the new military, but also served to build trust (between former
enemies) and let them become an integral part of the greater Liberian peace-building effort. Due to the downsizing of the military, however, other avenues for reintegration for most ex-combatants (economic avenues, such as public works programs) had to be pursued.

Likewise, the UN and U.S. integrated DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Liberian National Police (LNP). The highly corrupt, brutal police force that had operated during the Taylor years was, unfortunately, still largely intact after the civil war. Its officers posed a significant threat to the state and to peace. In response to this threat, the United States initially put much a much higher priority and much greater attention on reforming the LNP than on reforming the AFL. The U.S. and UNMIL demobilized (purged) all unqualified policemen, vetted/reintegrated a small number of personnel, conducted extensive recruiting/vetting/training of new police forces, established a new police academy, and developed an emergency infrastructure. UNMIL took on the major role of training the LNP, worked with various international partners to build new police stations and barracks, and equipped the force with vehicles and logistics. Also, efforts were made to increase female representation in the force.

A unique approach taken by recovery leaders and new governmental leaders was the effort to operationalize "human security." The primary focus here was to ensure that the population could gain "freedom from fear" of the military. A number of steps were taken to ensure the new AFL would not appear threatening to the people. As stated earlier, a vetting process was used to screen all of the candidates for the AFL. Secondly, the AFL’s force structure was addressed: its size was made deliberately small, it contained no special units (to preclude any loyalties to a specific person, vice the state), and it was ethnically balanced – with all tribes equally represented. Third, non-traditional training was highly emphasized, covering the following subjects: discipline, moral judgment, respect for the laws of war, Liberian history, the Liberian constitution, civics, and literacy. Also, Liberians were taught to be the trainers of the AFL, so that they could take stock in professionalizing their own military.

Finally, besides the many SSR and DDR actions to consolidate the state’s monopoly of force, another key short-term action was to "mobilize networks for peace" – for the purpose of counterbalancing networks for war. Conflict-recovery leaders were extremely proactive in promoting the actions of peace-minded groups and in establishing multilateral, national, and nongovernmental webs of people and organizations who wanted a warless Liberia. As nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) trickled back into the country, and as evacuated embassy staff personnel returned, these groups/people were significantly helped by the UN, by the embassies, and by recovery leaders to enhance reintegration and reestablishment of social/support networks. Finally, Liberian women’s peace groups were considerably assisted in networking aspects, as they grew to be active informal groups for promoting local, community-based security systems.
**Recommendation.**

In the immediate aftermath of civil war, when a "golden hour" or "window of opportunity" is presented to lay a foundation for peacebuilding and to impact and include the (former) warring factions, leaders/practitioners should immediately address the following areas of the security sector:

1. Consolidate the state's monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law.
3. Integrate DDR and SSR in the transformation of military and police forces.
4. Operationalize "human security."
5. Mobilize "networks for peace" to counterbalance the "networks for war."

**Implications.**

If a post-conflict state does not gain a monopoly of force through prompt reform of its security sector, then it will lack the means to uphold the rule of law and may face renewed competition from insurgents, militias, organized crime, and revolutionary movements – who can challenge the state's legitimacy, threaten citizens/communities, and potentially push the state back into wide-scale conflict.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia," by John Blaney, Jacques Paul Klein, and Sean McFate, a policy analysis brief from the Stanley Foundation, June 2010.

**Comments.**

c. **TOPIC.** The MoDA Program – Building Ministerial Capacity in Afghanistan (712)

**Observation.**

Building effective and accountable security ministries is essential for attaining long-term security in post-conflict countries. For Afghanistan, the U.S. Defense Department developed and implemented the Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) program to address this requirement. Key elements of this program are: focused selection & backfill, advisor-specific predeployment training, "embedded" partnering, extensive use of reachback, and security-related manpower development.

**Discussion.**

Building upon its many advisory and capacity-building experiences, and drawing upon its pool of civilian experts for bolstering efforts in Afghanistan's security ministries, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) established the MoDA program in 2009. This program has paired senior-level DoD civilian specialists/advisors with certain officials in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Afghanistan. In the first iteration of the MoDA program, 17 senior DoD civilians deployed in the summer of 2010 – to advise senior officials in the Afghan DoD and MoI in specialized fields such as logistics, financial administration, and human resources. This program has marked a significant evolution in DoD's approach to institutional capacity-building – in that it combines rigorous predeployment training and mentoring/advisory skill development with a deliberate reachback capability allowing these senior advisors to make maximum use of DoD resources.

**Focused Selection & Backfill.** The MoDA program has drawn upon deployment mechanisms developed by the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to recruit only the most qualified DoD civilians for ministerial advisory duties. To generate selection criteria, the MoDA program office has worked with American and NATO officials and the Afghan government to identify specific positions and requirements within the MoD and MoI related to long-term security sector reform. The MoDA then pinpointed experienced, senior specialists within the DoD, including the DoD staff, possessing the requisite expertise to match those positions/requirements. Deployment duration has been set at one year – allowing for continuity and long-term impact – with many specialists/advisors extending for a 2nd year. The MoDA program has employed an effective backfill mechanism; it provides funds to the parent organization of the recruited specialist, allowing it to hire a backfill on a temporary basis. This backfill mechanism has significantly aided recruitment in that it reduces strain on the parent organization and it provides assurance to the employee that he shall return to his regular position upon redeployment.
**Advisor-Specific Predeployment Training.** Intensive advisor-specific predeployment training has allowed the MoDA specialists/advisors to be immediately effective upon their arrival in Afghanistan. The deploying specialist/advisors have received seven weeks of extensive training in cultural, language, and advisory skills. The core competencies have been mentoring/advisory skills focused on: (1) the promotion of local/host nation ownership of their programs/projects, (2) the development/design of projects that can be sustained over time, (3) the advisor's ability to demonstrate empathy, humility, and respect; and, (4) the promotion of value and of doing no harm. Deploying specialists/advisors have received intensive language and cultural instruction: 1.5 hours daily, with a ratio of one native speaker for every three students. In the latter part of the course, specialists/advisors participated in a 10-day field training exercise at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Indiana, which replicated conditions of living/operating at a forward operating base, and which tested mentoring/advisory skills through the use of native Afghan role players and interpreters.

**“ Embedded” Partnering.** The MoDA program has placed the trained advisors directly into MoD and MoI facilities, such that the advisors have continuous interaction with their counterpart officials. This has allowed the U.S. advisor and Afghan counterpart to constantly share information and work together throughout the planning and execution of projects/activities, and, perhaps most importantly, to build trust in one another and close personal relationships.

**Extensive Use of Reachback.** The MoDA program has encouraged extensive use reachback to draw on the full range of DoD organizations and resources. Reachback to parent and other organizations of DoD has occurred continuously. Deployed MoDA advisors have reached back to obtain such diverse resources/tools as an "English as a Second Language" curriculum; a computer skills courses, command checklists for conducting audits; DoD procedures for weapons accountability and ammunition management; "pull" and "push" systems/procedures for delivering supplies; and, various logistics reporting tools.

**Security-related Manpower Development.** Both the Afghan MoD and MoI have established new "recruiting and training commands" within their ministries – with responsibilities and resources for recruiting demographically representative personnel and for establishing common training standards. These two ministries also went on to implement comprehensive personnel systems that included merit-based promotion and various career paths. The MoDA program has contributed to these manpower development efforts within the MoD and MoI, and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan was extensively involved as well. Establishment of these key systems for security-related manpower development not only builds security capacity, but serves to sustain it into the future.
**Recommendation.**

1. DoD should apply the MoDA program to future stability operations.

2. Other USG departments/agencies should consider incorporating certain aspects of the MoDA program into their own programs for institutional capacity-building (if not already doing so): focused selection & backfill, advisor-specific preddeployment training, "embedded" partnering, extensive use of reachback, and host nation manpower development.

**Implications.**

If the MoDA program is not utilized in future stability operations, then ministerial capacity-building may suffer from less than optimal selection & training programs, and may not achieve optimal levels of cooperation & trust – otherwise attainable through embedded partnering.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity for an Enduring Security Force," by James A. Schear, William B. Caldwell IV, and Frank C. Digiovanni," PRISM, Volume 2, Number 2, March 2011.

**Comments.**

Related documents:


d. **TOPIC.** Credible Institutions for Successful SSR – The Philippines  
(1164)

**Observation.**

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has embarked on modernizing the military establishment and reorienting its values, in order to be effective in the delivery of defense and security services to the people. A large part of this endeavor has been incorporating respect for human rights and observance of the rule of law in discharging its military duties and functions.

**Discussion.**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a tool for addressing an insurgency problem. A government must be able to establish a safe and secure environment in order to create the conditions conducive to development. This can only be done if the government agency or agencies concerned are capable of performing their missions, and if the people they have sworn to serve are supporting the agency/agencies.

One of the challenges of the AFP in its counterinsurgency operations was its declining credibility, especially during the martial law years from 1971 to 1981. The local populace had accused the AFP of various human rights violations. It was alleged that the military establishment acted with excessive use of military power without due regard to the basic human rights of the people in the discharge of duties. Moreover, rule of law was not observed. Because the military was very powerful during the dictatorship period in the 1970s, military units were violating local laws with impunity. Because of these actions, the AFP became alienated from the people. As a result, the strength of the insurgents increased, and tactical offensives likewise increased. These conditions destroyed the military's credibility for carrying out its missions effectively.

To address the declining credibility of the AFP, the AFP embarked on reorienting its values towards respecting human rights and observing the principle of rule of law in the discharge of duties. Various seminars, dialogues, and training sessions on International Humanitarian Law and related protocols were conducted with the aim of improving the performance of the AFP. These events were done in collaboration with governmental and nongovernmental organizations responsible for promoting and protecting human rights. Moreover, the AFP modernization program was launched to enhance the capability of the military in addressing security challenges. This two-pronged approach of value formation and modernization has improved the ability and capability of the AFP in providing safety and security for the public. The key in this approach is gaining the trust and confidence of the people who are the recipients of the military services.
**Recommendation.**

Instill and promote human rights and the rule of law in the military. It is imperative that the legitimate coercive instruments of the government respect the people they have sworn to serve and protect. The military can only be effective if it gains the support of the people.

**Implications.**

SSR and counterinsurgency cannot proceed successfully unless values – with respect to human rights and the rule of law – are instilled within military organizations working among the people.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the experience of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in its efforts to re-orient its values and organizational culture to improve security services being provided to the community. This lesson was developed for U.S. Army War College PKSOI elective course PS2229 - Security Sector Reform: A Whole of Government Approach.

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e. **TOPIC. Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste** (854)

**Observation.**

In 1999 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1272 granting authority used for several UN missions over the next decade, each seeking to aid the East Timor state into independence from Indonesia. Despite conditions appearing ideal for this transition and the development of security sector reform, the process instead broke down resulting in a humanitarian crisis requiring additional international assistance. The primary causes of this failure apply broadly to similar efforts and should be considered in the planning of future operations. Even now, the population is faced with many armed groups as well as continued ripples stemming from the mishandling of the initial transition to independence.

**Discussion.**

**Police**

Initial efforts focused on establishing sustainable police forces with the intent to increase professionalization over time. This meant that recruiting focused on numbers of recruits rather than the qualification of those recruits. In many cases
this resulted in recruits who were unfit for duty either because of personal temperament or associations. This recruiting practice led to a poorly trained force that was not trusted by the people.

Police indiscretions from the previous regime combined with new indiscretions caused by poor recruiting standards limited community trust of the police. This was enhanced by a lack of community involvement in the prioritization of training and focus of enforcement. Many of these prioritization issues stemmed from overzealous timelines from the international community. The timelines were not driven by ground truth but instead by the expectations of the international community. The Timorese excelled in areas in which they were familiar (mainly community policing and structured reporting relationships) while dramatically failing in others (human rights, chain of command decisions) that were imposed from the outside, or culturally foreign.

Police force local units that were established in advance of UN intervention were more successful at gaining the trust of the population and introducing new norms in the rule of law. Of course, some tradeoffs were required at the local level; security forces sometimes failed to abide by human rights and democratic standards for the sake of ensuring stability.

Military

The military in contrast drew its initial force from the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL). UN officials chose this approach because the FALINTIL was already known to the people and had much of the initial training required. These decisions made for an effective base for the military to build upon. It also, because of the demographic, skewed the culture of the military outside of the public norm. The military’s priorities and culture were not consistent with that of the country as a whole. This effect was compounded because, due to their higher readiness and funding, the military performed many traditional police functions while the police were generating.

Roles and Functions

Independence meant rapid drain of experience from Indonesians not party to the new state. This left many civilian offices vacant and gutted the fledgling administration's ability to offer basic services. This meant that the international community was left to fill in these holes in the interim, often with poor coordination. The resulting hodgepodge of structures created by different international cultures resulted in inconsistent policies across different areas even in the face of some standard operation procedures offered by the central government.

Although the host nation was well prepared for policing functions in which they had experience and training, the same could not be said for other areas.
Because the military had a higher level of training, the international community regularly used it for social and political threats, such as internal law enforcement and security issues that the police were deemed under trained or under-resourced to accomplish – causing confusion of roles and responsibilities. It also caused the police to feel 2nd class next to the army, which fueled societal and political divides since the majority of the army came from one political group. This infighting caused the population to lose trust in both services as they came to see both groups as untrustworthy and political. In 2006 this tension boiled over into armed conflict. This conflict required additional UN intervention to bring a semblance of stability back to the country. The UN continues to work to fully establish the rule of law.

**Recommendation.**

The rift between the police and army as well as the overall failure of the mission had several distinct causes. While the end effect of addressing these issues is difficult to show, the wide consensus is that the situation would have been much improved with the following recommendations:

1. Include the community when determining police priorities for an area.

2. Give consideration to mixing groups and classes when forming new government organizations in order to minimize tensions between the new government organizations.

3. Create the transition schedule based upon when the host nation is prepared to handle specific tasks rather than based upon international priorities. Set up partners for success even if the required timeline isn't preferred. Some international priorities (such as corruption or human rights) may have to temporarily take a back burner in order to plan for the long term.

4. Allow senior officials, who know their culture, have a larger say in dictating priorities for new organizations.

5. Be clear about the roles and functions of each service and don't borrow a more established service to fill the role of a newer service without careful planning and great need. It would be preferable to support the culture of the organizations and take a less favorable short term result in exchange for long term viability and respect between government agencies. It is preferable to use international aid to fill short term gaps because it causes less damage to the organizational culture in most cases.

6. Coordinate all participating international players to ensure consistency of training and culture throughout the government.
7. Create substantial oversight to support a policy of hiring and promoting the most qualified applicants in a corruption free environment. Shortcuts that fill the rolls with unqualified persons will be detrimental in the long run.

8. Because of the small staffs and limited power of offices of security cooperation, it is often most effective to engage governments at a high level in order to form a solid policy base from which to base more tactical development. In particular, there is an opportunity to line up international and host country goals at a high level to ensure that the culture and priorities of both parties is included in the plan.

9. UN and international mentors can better leverage ministry level officials to work through political matters rather than try to inexpertly navigate the local culture. The process might be slower but it will tend to be more accurate and sustainable long term. It will also help provide good experience to the newly created ministries and build public support for the institutions the international community is trying to transition power to.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the publication "Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste: Missed Opportunities and Hard Lessons in Empowering the Host-Nation," Nicholas J. Armstrong, Jaqueline Chura-Beaver, and Isaac Kfir, April 2012.

1. TOPIC. Security Sector Development in Chile (1554)

Observation.

Chile provides a notable case in security sector development – advancing beyond a culture in which policy and law favored military priorities and interests (in the early 1990s), to a point where there is balance, mutual respect, and routine accommodation between the Ministry of Defense and other agencies.

Discussion.

In the early 1990s, elected politicians in Chile appeared to be exceptionally constrained in reversing policies and laws that favored military priorities and interests. This was due to factors such as: the 1980 Constitution and the 1989 Organic Law of the Armed Forces which afforded certain powers to the President and to the military; military autonomy in certain government and legislative positions; the military's assigned role/responsibility in enforcing social norms and ideological guidelines put forth by the President; Presidential power to dismiss
and appoint military leadership as desired; and, the President's ability to shield from view military spending and procurement processes. Much of this Presidential power and military autonomy was the legacy of President Pinochet (1973-1989 timeframe). In the early 1990s, the military was authorized 4 of 9 seats in the Senate, 2 of 7 seats in the Constitutional Tribunal, and a majority of seats in the National Security Council. However, all of these authorizations/privileges have been removed over time.

In the 1990s, Chilean civilian and military officials engaged in a slow, deliberate process of legislative and bureaucratic reforms to change the powers of the President and the autonomy given to the military. Military prerogatives became slowly watered down over time to reflect civilian interests and inputs. Chilean civilian and military personnel likewise made a conscious decision in the 1990s to subject their positions/actions on security and defense to the scrutiny of the other side – publicly articulating concerns, issues, and plans to discover where shared understandings could be found and common ground built. Through these debates and dialogue, a common lexicon was essentially established between both sides. Also, because of this dialogue and understanding, a productive set of Defense Policy iterations took shape, culminating in the formal Defense Strategy of 2012 that was developed with consultation and cooperation between agencies. Today, security dialogues in Chile reflect the plural interests of all sides of the security and political sectors.

In the 1990s, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was actually considered a marginal organization within the government, and it was accordingly sidestepped by senior military leaders in their decision-making. However, the careful stewardship of then Minister of Defense Michele Bachelet (2002-2004) paved the way for significant reforms to take place in the MOD, to include the creation of a Joint Chiefs of Staff and the development of Joint doctrine. The Minister of Defense came to be seen then as the central person to initiate major reforms, to bring the other civilian and ministry sides into the process, and to serve as a buffer, or bridge, between involved or competing government organizations. Most importantly, the MOD cultivated a role in relation to the military as its "facilitator" in solving interagency challenges, its "representative" to address military problems, its "translator" of defense issues of detailed specificity that could operationalize policy objectives, its "broker" between the government agencies, and its "shield" to help address/blunt criticisms of the military.

**Recommendation.**

Those involved in the long-term process of security sector development should consider the noteworthy steps taken by Chilean officials to:

1. Correct any imbalances at the national level involving excessive military authority or autonomy.
2. Build common ground between military and civilian officials, and ensure that defense policy and defense strategy are developed accordingly.

3. Utilize the Ministry of Defense to lock in civilian authority (over the military), while effectively representing and facilitating military interests within the interagency.

**Implications.**

Without security sector development that effectively balances civilian and military interests, divisive positions between civilian and military officials may become hardened over time and produce constant friction on security (and other) issues.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "Best Practices Crossing the Pacific: Security Sector Development from the Andes to Asia," by Justin Nankivell, PhD, 28 April 2014.

**g. TOPIC. Integrating SSR Provisions in Peace Agreements (531)**

**Observation.**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) provisions are important items in peace agreements. There are many risks associated with failing to address and integrate SSR issues into peace negotiations and agreements.

**Discussion.**

The report “Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements” is the result of a research project which examined peace agreements from eight countries in Africa (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia), two from Central America (El Salvador and Guatemala), and one from Asia (East Timor). The report demonstrates that there is a potentially high price to be paid for failing to integrate SSR issues into peace negotiations and agreements at the very outset, or for doing so in a selective and shallow manner.

The risks associated with failing to incorporate SSR provisions include:

- subsequent reforms will lack buy-in
- failure to anticipate activities of spoilers
• unrealistic view of reform efforts and required resources
• poorly conceived and coordinated reforms
• dysfunctional and ineffective security and justice institutions
• sense of impunity and militaristic practices carried over from the war
• worsening poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and crime

**Recommendation.**

1. SSR provisions need to be included in a consistent way in every peace agreement. Try to avoid a 'one-size-fits-all' approach and tailor SSR provisions to the situation; support comprehensive SSR provision by meaningful implementation mechanism and appropriate international support; avoid overselling SSR which may lead to unrealistic expectations.

2. Encourage a broad range of stakeholders in the peace negotiations; include women and youth in peace negotiations; include security concerns from non-state armed groups, civil society, and women's groups.

3. Design negotiations in such a way as to foster trust, mutual confidence, and commitment to a common vision of the future.

4. Implementation mechanisms should be as representative, participatory, and transparent as possible, and subject to monitoring, evaluation, and oversight by a neutral agency, preferably the United Nations. Successful implementation also requires national ownership; dedicated and meaningful resources; addressing other root causes of conflict alongside SSR.

5. Implement strategies for containing spoilers. Strategies include patient, open-ended negotiations, inducements, and sanctions. The goal is to not inadvertently entrench or increase the power and influence of spoilers.

6. Legitimate non-state justice and security organs should be integrated into peace agreements and into the design of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and SSR exercises. Demobilizing armed opposition movements and converting them into legitimate political parties are not only essential for channeling violence into peaceful political competition, but also for nurturing a credible democratic opposition.

7. There is a need to understand the 'contextual politics' of SSR and to pay attention at the outset to the impact that the political arrangements installed under a peace agreement may have on the implementation of SSR; encourage mutual trust, consensus building, and national reconciliation through the peace negotiations as an essential prop of a post-conflict security strategy; support and empower NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs), and women's groups that are committed to peace and dialogue, enabling them to fully participate in the SSR process.
8. Decision-makers and practitioners must include political analysis in their strategies and approaches to SSR processes; the SSR process needs to include more than physical disarmament but also demilitarizing the national political culture and the minds of those involved in acts of violence.

9. The international community, United Nations, and regional organizations need improved capacity and strategies to be more effective in SSR. The regional organizations should accept and comply with a common SSR framework.

10. The United Nations needs to: write SSR provisions more comprehensively and coherently into its mandates; better balance mandates and resources within its missions; address the disconnect between short-term peacekeeping needs and long-term institutional reforms; clarify the division of labor among the UN organizational departments and divisions; improve and increase technical capacity and resources; use bilateral leads in SSR; improve accountability in the UN staff and its member states.

11. SSR needs to be seen as a long-term commitment. Donors should commit their support for at least ten years. International commitments and assistance need to continue well beyond formal conclusion of peacekeeping missions.

12. SSR planning should precede DDR. DDR should be planned with an awareness of future security constructs and defense and security personnel planning and training requirements; DDR should be conducted, wherever possible, on a regional instead of local or national basis; the international community should emphasize more the reintegration of former fighters into society and SSR.

13. Begin an SSR operation with an initial security needs assessment followed as soon as possible by the development of a strategic framework; include broad consultations in the needs assessment and designing the strategic framework; agree on and insist on which organization(s) will lead the SSR operation; promote coherence and coordination across national governmental departments involved in SSR.

14. Strengthen justice and rule of law provisions in peace agreements; take into account traditional and non-formal justice institutions.

15. Practitioners should explore the commonalities and differences between transitional justice and SSR; find and integrate those things between the two that can improve peace building.


17. Legislature/parliamentarian governance and oversight has to be strengthened in step with security sector reforms.
18. Local ownership has to be the priority – ultimately this is where SSR commitment and sustainability derives; international entities must support rather than preempt local ownership; build capacity for local ownership to succeed; involve NGOs and civilian think tanks in SSR; develop and empower national and regional SSR networks; security institutions must be viewed as primary stakeholders in SSR.

19. Be more even-handed with support for peacekeeping operations and SSR. Africa is mentioned as a region not treated fairly or provided enough resources.

20. Planning needs to consider longer-term financial and fiscal sustainability issues especially after UN missions and operations officially cease; multi-lateral funding mechanisms, like the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, should be used in peacekeeping programs to strengthen local ownership.

21. Institute external evaluation of SSR programs and make it a matter of practice and standard procedure.

22. Link economic development to security through SSR. The fiscal, macroeconomic, and development framework should support SSR instead of undermining it. Poverty reduction and managing natural resources are important issues that should be addressed in SSR.

23. Related recommendations include funding more SSR-related research and changing the notion that SSR in not for post-conflict situations only. The scope of SSR can be applied to all transitioning countries and even to advanced countries where security governance is a problem.

**Implications.**

1. Security Sector Reform is one of the most, if not the most, important factor in peace building. It is the linchpin of all the other factors. Planners must give SSR careful thought and evaluation and extend it out past an envisioned peacekeeping operation or mission. The UN planners should be a highly adaptable and creative group who can develop SSR initiatives while depending on limited and constrained resources.

2. Negotiators and planners alike have to be in synch to implement and sustain SSR in peace agreements. A good, broad-based SSR plan improves the chance of success for peace agreements.

3. In the background of the recommendations is the difficulty in resourcing SSR initiatives and peacekeeping, in general.
4. Local ownership of SSR is the ultimate goal in peace building. However, that does not free the UN and member nations from responsibility. In the long-term, the UN and others will have to monitor, evaluate, and commit resources to ensure SSR is being done effectively and according to peace agreements.

**Event Description.**


h. **TOPIC. DDR as a Component of Security Sector Reform (1157)**

**Observation.**

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) does not come about by accident; it requires foresight, detailed planning, adequate resourcing, and continuous assessment. Indicators for success need to be closely monitored and the window of opportunity exploited once it presents itself.

**Discussion.**

DDR plays a critical role in the restoration of lasting peace and stability, paving the way for Security Sector Reform (SSR). DDR needs to be preceded by a comprehensive peace process involving all the warring factions. The DDR program must be sufficiently sponsored/supported at the outset, because it is manpower intensive and resource consuming. In launching and executing the program, broad-based notifications/announcements about the DDR program are essential; key avenues are the media, social networks, advocacy groups, churches, and governmental leadership at all levels.

The emphasis during Demobilization and Disarmament needs to be on the accountability of ex-combatants, their weapons, their exact numbers, and their disposition. Special attention must be placed on the locations of mines/minefields, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and bomb-making materials. In the case of mines/minefields, this has oftentimes proven difficult because they were unmarked, and ex-combatants did not have relevant maps to use as references. The emphasis during Reintegration is still on ex-combatants, however, an array of resources/actors must become involved – social workers, psychologists, the judiciary, and other independent bodies – in order to ensure that the process is transparent, open, and fair.
Synchronization of all DDR policies, plans, programs, and messaging is critical from the outset. For DDR to be successful, it needs to be first coordinated at the highest possible level – involving the warring factions (as feasible), the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), political leadership, UN agencies, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, social welfare services, and – perhaps most importantly – donors. Without proper funding from the UN and other international donors, implementation of DDR may not be possible.

The involvement of other UN resources – armed troop contingents, military observers, and UN civilian police – is also crucial, especially for the provision of security at demobilization centers/assembly areas. Communication sources/resources and the synchronization of DDR messages – through the HN government, the cooperation of media, advocacy groups including churches, and civil society groups – cannot be over emphasized. Once elements of warring factions have indicated some interest/presented a window of opportunity, reinforcement of the messages and assurances of trust become even more important.

The most critical challenge to DDR is winning the hearts and minds of combatants to volunteer for the program, and this is only achieved through building trust and establishing appropriate facilities and services. Without thorough logistic support, DDR implementation may prove difficult. Provision of favorable living conditions and recreational facilities at assembly areas can be a catalyst for DDR success. However experience has shown that former combatants do not want to stay at assembly areas for an extended timeframe. Reintegrating them back into communities as early as possible is preferable, whereas keeping them longer than necessary creates additional logistics and security requirements. Also, without the provision of services in the form of life skills/employment training, social support structures, professional counseling, truth and reconciliation measures, and resettlement assistance, the chances of successful reintegration have been limited.

Again, DDR does not come about without extensive stakeholder involvement. It requires careful planning, sufficient resourcing, and continuous monitoring and assessment. Indicators for success need to be closely monitored and the window of opportunity exploited once it presents itself.

**Recommendation.**

1. Coordinate DDR concepts/efforts at the highest possible level. Involve the warring factions (if feasible), the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), host nation political leadership, government agencies, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (as applicable), social welfare services, and donors.
2. Maximize and synchronize DDR communication efforts – through government offices, the media, advocacy groups, civil society groups, and public forums. Build trust and maintain this trust.

**Implication.**

1. Without support from the highest levels of government and without the involvement of the society, advocacy groups, donors, and other interested parties, DDR will not be successful.

2. Without winning the hearts and minds and establishing long-lasting trust, DDR cannot be successful. Therefore, all promises made to ex-combatants like resettlement, truth and reconciliation, social support, and employment training should be met; otherwise, ex-combatants will feel betrayed and may again resort to fighting.

**Event Description.**

This lesson was based on classroom readings and past experiences by students discussed during U.S. Army War College PKSOI elective course PS2229 – Security Sector Reform: A Whole of Government Approach.

3. **CONCLUSION**

Recent SSR experiences (lessons in this Sampler – covering Burundi, Liberia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Chile) showcase the importance of judicious, comprehensive SSR plans/programs for fragile countries working toward a better future. Key points from these various SSR endeavors include:

- SSR provisions need to be included in every peace agreement. Try to avoid a “one-size-fits-all” approach and tailor SSR provisions to the host nation situation; support comprehensive SSR provisions by meaningful implementation mechanisms and appropriate international support; and, avoid overselling SSR which could lead to unrealistic expectations.

- Put “politics” center stage; i.e., establish mechanisms to address and resolve “political” issues/disputes. There is a need to understand the “politics” of SSR and to pay attention at the outset to the impact that the political arrangements installed under a peace agreement might have on the implementation of SSR; encourage mutual trust, consensus building, and national reconciliation through the peace negotiations as an essential component of post-conflict security strategy; support and empower NGOs, civil society organizations
(CSOs), and women's groups committed to peace and dialogue, enabling them to fully participate in the SSR process.

- Begin an SSR approach with an initial security needs assessment followed as soon as possible by the development of a strategic framework; include broad consultations in the needs assessment and designing the strategic framework; agree on and insist on which organization(s) will lead the SSR operation; promote coherence and coordination across national governmental departments involved in SSR.

- Establish a shared vision among partners at the outset, and set strategic objectives for SSR.

- Correct any imbalances at the national level involving excessive military authority or autonomy.

- Strengthen justice and rule of law provisions in peace agreements; take into account traditional and non-formal justice institutions.

- Continue to build common ground between military and civilian officials throughout the SSR process, and ensure that defense policy and defense strategy are developed accordingly.

- SSR needs to be seen as a long-term commitment. Set a long-term timeframe, to allow ambitions/reforms to be achieved under the challenging conditions/environment.

- Donors should commit their support for the duration of the SSR timespan. International commitments and assistance need to continue well beyond formal conclusion of peace/stability missions.

- Implementation mechanisms should be as representative, participatory, and transparent as possible, and subject to monitoring, evaluation, and oversight by a neutral agency, such as the United Nations.

- Manage SSR activities at the appropriate level on a continuous basis, with stakeholder involvement at all levels.

- Emphasize the gradual development of host nation (HN) ownership, including civil society ownership. SSR sustainability requires dedicated, meaningful resources from the HN.

- Allow flexible programming to meet emerging needs and to progressively achieve results.

- Be clear about the roles and functions of each security service/force.

- Instill and promote human rights and the rule of law in the security forces. It is imperative that they respect the people whom they have sworn to serve and protect.

- Create substantial oversight to support a policy of hiring and promoting the most qualified applicants in a corruption free environment.
Shortcuts that fill the rolls with unqualified persons will be detrimental in the long run.

- SSR planning should precede, and shape, DDR. DDR needs to be planned with an awareness of future security constructs, personnel requirements, and training requirements and opportunities. DDR should be conducted, wherever possible, on a regional basis. In DDR plans and programs, the international community and host nation should emphasize the reintegration of former fighters into society.

- Maximize and synchronize DDR communication efforts – through government offices, the media, advocacy groups, civil society groups, and public forums. Seek to build and maintain trust for DDR.

- Institute external evaluations of SSR and DDR programs, and make this a matter of practice and standard operating procedure.

- Local ownership should be the top priority – ultimately this is where SSR commitment and sustainability derive. International entities must support rather than preempt local ownership; build capacity for local ownership to succeed; involve NGOs and civil society groups; and, develop and empower national and regional SSR networks.

- Legislative/parliamentarian governance and oversight should be strengthened in step with security sector reforms.

Through wider dissemination of the aforementioned lessons and their inclusion in planning with host nation partners, significant impacts can be made during the course of future SSR endeavors.

4. **COMMAND POC**

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Related Documents, References, and Links
[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]


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