

# TRANSITIONS: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

## Interim Summary Conference Report


November 16 - 18  
Carlisle Barracks



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# Interim Summary

## Contents

**Background**

**Strategic Context**

**Definition**

**Insights and Conclusions**

- **Intervention and Transition**
- **Inherent Security Dilemma**
- **Sovereignty and Legitimacy**
- **Success**
- **Context Matters**
- **Complex Process**
- **Leadership and Personalities**
- **Partnership**
- **Whole of Government and Comprehensive Approaches**
- **Civil Society**
- **Local Ownership**
- **Goals and Objectives**
- **Sustainability, Capacity-Building, and Resilience**
- **Relationship Building**
- **Structuring**
- **Strategic Communications**
- **Resources**
- **Corruption and Dependency**
- **Obstacles**
- **Role of Expectations**
- **Role of Education and Learning**

**Key Note Speakers and Panelists**

**Conference Co-Sponsors**




# Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions

## Conference 16-18 November 2010

### Interim Summary



Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions was hosted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in November 2010. With the support of thirteen co-sponsors spanning government, academic, international and non-governmental sectors, the conference served as a vehicle to explore a broader and more common understanding of post-conflict and post-disaster transitions and their proper practice—creating a baseline for various communities to further expand understanding and practice of this important strategic concept. In order to establish this baseline, the conference pursued the objectives and methodology depicted below.



The conference brought together key thinkers and practitioners from international academia, civilian agencies and organizations, and military services to examine the issues, challenges, and solutions in the empowerment of host nation governments and civil society and subsequent transition of responsibility and control to these indigenous agencies and organizations. Additionally, the conference advanced opportunities for new thinking, networking, and collaboration among the various communities involved in transition activities. An edited text of conference presentations will be released in early 2011.

### Strategic Context

In the 21st Century, all states are vulnerable to instability and may need assistance from other states and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to recover from natural disasters, conflict, or chronic societal problems. Such assistance ends as the host nation “transitions” back from a period of crisis to self-sufficiency, while other actors, mostly from outside the host nation, transition out of their assumed roles and responsibilities.

Assistance and interventions in so-called fragile and failing states, or as a result of conflict, pose particularly difficult transition challenges. All transitions invariably pose issues involving sovereignty, legitimacy, dependency, and social reform; however, in the latter cases transition is particularly difficult because intervention in these states usually initiates a transformation of the indigenous society to better fit the shared global narrative of the 21st Century world order. Managing transitions—at all levels—requires close cooperation between the host nation, other governments and militaries, and civil society.

Transitions are fundamentally political processes. The sum product of all actions and the fruit of the transition processes at all levels contribute to successful states that can govern themselves effectively and provide for their own populations through cooperation and legitimate competition—a positively competing nation-state. This is not a perfect state, but a state that can engage with a high degree of normalcy in the world order. Such an end state fits the aspirations of responsible modern states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this regard, all pursue actions within a strategic framework of state building, which shapes the nature of the host nation. Significantly, in these transition processes the host nations are simultaneously undertaking nation-building, state-building, and modernization—an incredibly difficult challenge. Transitions are ultimately not about an exit strategy for the outside actors, but about creating a favorable normalcy in relations among peoples and states for a viable state and world order.

## Definition

Transition is a term with multiple meanings and has recently achieved “buzz word” prominence as the world wrestles with ending interventions successfully. Its uses range from describing the “handoff” of a mission from one military organization to another, to describing the transformation of a traditional state into a modern 21st Century nation-state. Such usage is not without merit; however, if transition is too liberally interpreted or applied as a term, it ultimately loses its utility to inform the strategic practice of returning to an acceptable normalcy with and within these troubled states.

The most perplexing transitions are ultimately transitions of responsibility and accountability for state and social functions from external authorities and providers to host nation authorities and providers that uphold rule of law, stimulate development, provide security and services, avoid dependency, and nurture a host nation that contributes to the international order. In this way, the host nation government reclaims its sovereignty and legitimacy both with its people and the international community. Although transition manifests itself at different levels

and phases, it requires a strategic definition to inform overall practice:

A process or set of processes leading to a specific decision point in conditions and time that morally and legitimately justifies the transfer of responsibility, authority, power (capabilities, resources, and influence), and accountability for governmental responsibilities to aspiring host nation agencies and authorities from external and internal actors who have assumed host state functions of sovereignty through challenge, necessity, or practice. Transition’s moral and legitimacy qualities are manifested by host nation societal acceptance of the government in power, adherence to accepted international standards of good governance, and evidence of sufficient capacity for success. Transition is inherently complex and occurs incrementally on multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) over time, but success is ultimately defined-domestically and internationally-by acceptable host nation exercise of sovereignty. (Reference “Thinking Strategically About Transition,” *PKSOI Bulletin, Volume 2, Issue 3, April 2010, and Harnessing Post Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer, PKSOI Papers, Sep 2010.*)

## Insights and Conclusions

- **Intervention and Transition.** In the 21st Century world order, interventions are by definition political and transitory. No modern state is pursuing territorial annexation and all international forums condemn its contemplation. Many non-state actors, for their own reasons, have come to similar conclusions about the necessary transitory nature of their assistance. Consequently, any intervention, big or small, short or long-term, governmental or civil, begs the question of the desirable terms on which to end. Regardless of outside actor roles, such consideration always leads to a desired end state in which the host nation government and civil society can successfully manage its own affairs. The challenge of transition is how to best arrive as close to this end state as possible. Hence, *transition is a linchpin in the success of overall intervention policy and strategy, and state-building, an inherent strategic framework.* Thus, transitions are inherently strategic in nature. Like most stability operations challenges, *transitions focus on the human domain—interactions among people and how these interactions shape the environment.* Intervention policy must be contemplated comprehensively to develop clear and acceptable strategic and operational objectives for transition.

- **Inherent Security Dilemma.** Intervention in a state, in any manner, creates security dilemmas for internal populations, elites, and other regional and global actors. The intervener leads where necessary, seeks partners to act when appropriate, and clearly and consistently affirms objectives to all. Progress in transition heightens anxiety for all. What looks like right to one actor creates threats and opportunities for others. Change frightens individuals and threatens existing power relationships. External and internal actors are logically more active as interests are more clearly affected. Hence, *risks elevate during transitions*. Transition activity may create greater instability unless such concerns are alleviated or channeled towards positive ends. Reactions are individual, local, national, regional, and global. A successful transition is dependent on the resolution of these internal and external security dilemmas. *Consequently, negotiation is inherent to transitions.*
- **Sovereignty and Legitimacy.** *Sovereignty and legitimacy form a strategic nexus in transitions.* The act of intervention implies some degree of shared sovereignty between the host nation and other actors. Consequently, there are obvious challenges to the host nation's sovereignty and legitimacy, but there are intrinsic risks for outside actors also. Constituent issues related to each actor drive transition. If the host nation government exercises sovereignty effectively, it garners legitimacy at home and abroad and is supported. If the host nation cannot effectively and appropriately exercise sovereignty, it loses legitimacy at home and abroad, leading to internal political challenges or instability and declining international support. In the latter case, supporting governments, IGOs, and NGOs will find their own constituents and others questioning their involvement—regardless of valid interests or motivations. Since interventions are by nature a challenge to host nation sovereignty and legitimacy *success in transitioning logically leads to push back from host governments.*
- **Success.** Definitions and measurements of success are critical. The goal of any transition is to inculcate a peaceful and prosperous host nation stability and form constructive relationships within the international order. Success in transition is measured not by some “gold standard” for transformation, but by the host state's continued progress. *State-building is not an all or nothing proposition: incremental progress over time counts. It is ultimately not an act of creation, but one of development.* For those who intervene, successful transition is about facilitating host nation development while meeting individual organizational goals or national interests. Progress is composed of a series of small steps with occasional broader leaps, rather than one big jump into the 21st Century. Nonetheless, progress in any form can lead to exponential gain while small transgressions may result in disaster. *Transition undertakings are more often indirect as opposed to direct and are about shaping positive outcomes as opposed to directing specific accomplishments.* In this regard, objectives serve to shape and motivate—goals as opposed to being absolute end states. Partnership, patience, and parsimony are more powerful than non-indigenous accomplishments and unrestricted spending.
- **Context Matters.** Context matters at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical—national, provincial, and local. *Each intervention and transition is unique even though common concepts and doctrine may aid in understanding any particular circumstance.* A valid strategic appraisal and its proper use are paramount to success. Both strategic and local operational environments must be understood and accounted for in planning. Root causes must be determined and addressed in operations whenever possible. Transitions, by definition, occur in dynamic environments. *Continuous reassessment of context and situation at all levels is imperative to calibrate plans correctly.* Policy and strategy provide unifying goals and direction for operations and tactics, but subordinate levels must also inform the policy making and strategy formulation. Objectives at all levels must be broad enough to provide flexibility and adaptability for subordinate levels and changed when necessary to respond to contextual dynamics.
- **Complex Process.** Intervening in the affairs of host nations makes transition inherently complex. It is not an event, but a shared process that results in the host nation achieving an acceptable degree of normalcy in its domestic and international affairs—it reestablishes state power and authority and implies adoption of modern ideas of sovereignty and legitimacy. Fragile and failed state problems tend to be more systemic in nature, rather than technical. Outside actors are usually not well organized or equipped to deal with these types of problems. They require a systemic approach and consideration of near and long-term objectives, as well as potential second and third order effects. *Transition must occur on multiple levels, in multiple sectors and venues, and in various interconnected temporal and cultural*

*dimensions. It is neither linear in planning nor predictable in time. It must accommodate both continuities and changes for progress to occur. Effective planning nested in good policy and strategy is the key. Synchronization and sequencing across the spectrum of activities is critical. Templates and models can be useful, but also dangerous, in complex operations. They are only marginal or partial solutions to these types of difficulties and can be misleading. Complex operations require strategies and planning that are civil-military in nature for the specific environment. Consequently, transition is a strategic level question even though it has operational and tactical components. We have to make a differentiation between big “T” and little “t” transitions, losing sight of neither what is important nor what is necessary: both the distinctness and the interrelationship of the two must be acknowledged in planning and implementation.*

- **Leadership and Personalities.** *Transition success is exponentially affected by leadership and personalities. Extraordinary leadership is a fundamental aspect of successful transitions. Leadership within the host nation, supporting nations, and supporting organizations must create and pursue visions for host nation prosperity and stability that are evident for constituents and multiple populations. At the highest levels, leaders create national and organizational narratives to provide common identities and purpose. Such narratives write a new chapter for the host nation populace, explaining why external involvement and support is necessary to advance the state as a whole. Supporting states and organizations must find narratives that explain their support to their own constituents and others. The vision and direction of leadership tie together the myriad activities that transition power, authority, responsibility, and accountability from intervening actors to the host nation, or anticipate and plan for gaps and emerging requirements. Leaders in all agencies and activities at all levels are integral to success and are interdependent. Collectively, leadership spans the divide among host nation authorities and supporting nations, communicates to multiple audiences and populations, creates unity of purpose and effort from the policy to tactical levels, and sets conditions for success. When personalities negatively affect leadership responsibilities, progress is retarded, costs escalate, and the risk of failure increases. Credible leaders drive the success of transition.*

- **Partnership.** *Partnership is driven by the degree actors can agree on the why, what, who, when, where, and how of transition; the more actors agree, the more likely transition will be successful. In these environments, partnerships evolve based on conditions and needs. A clear conveyance and understanding of the interests of all involved is imperative to successful transition. While compromise by one or another partner is inherent to some degree in an effective partnership, the failure to adequately address the legitimate interests of any partner affects the success of the transition. In particular, there has to be a quid pro quo between interveners and the host nation to engage in a cooperative venture to ensure stability. In a similar manner, differing priorities and timelines are matters of negotiation. Strategy and planning by the host nation and supporting states or organizations—in a collaborative partnership—create a framework for properly integrated actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that establish conditions enabling and enacting transition.*
- **Whole of Government and Comprehensive Approaches.** *In most cases, transitions are bigger than what anyone can undertake alone. For larger efforts whole of government and comprehensive efforts are required. Whole of government needs to be understood in the context that any outside state’s decision to be involved must be undertaken with consideration of, and full support of, all the branches and agencies of the government. For some agencies, participation in whole of government efforts of this nature represents new requirements and necessitates appropriate authorities and resources. At the same time, an interagency effort cannot be perceived by the host nation and its population as a series of individual external agency actions; its power lies in both its unity of effort and statement of national support. Equally important, the host nation must also achieve a whole of government and social gestalt. Strategic transition is not advanced by a divided house. It is also clear that our involvement in fragile and failed states requires a more comprehensive approach—one that includes perhaps multinational forces, differing roles for multiple states or IGOs, and integrated support by NGOs and other parts of civil society. There are gains in legitimacy, talent, and capability of more and closer collaboration. Transition must work in concert within the security, political, economic, and socio-psychological realms, taking into consideration all the actors and populations involved. Ultimately diplomacy, development, and defense all play roles in the transitional process.*

- **Civil Society.** While it is important to build good governance capacity, *many other relevant civil institutions are necessary to make societies sustainable.* Civil society is defining new domestic and international roles for itself in the 21st Century as a result of greater interconnectedness, rising social expectations, greater collective wealth, and a more universal view of human rights and security. In a very real sense, the broadest manifestations of “civil society”— private voluntary organizations (PVOs), (NGOs), and the private sector (business, etc.) are actors on the national and global stages. They add to the complexity of the environment for governments and militaries because they pursue their own objectives and agendas. Nonetheless, they share the same strategic, operational, and tactical space and represent a vast reservoir of talent and resources. *Engagement of indigenous civil society should be started early in the game to capitalize on vertical social capital.* Civil society organizations have contributed to the democratization of most modern states and help create a citizen-oriented state. Active citizens affect the way the government behaves and interacts with society. Gauging civil activities can help focus the role of government and measure its effectiveness. Civil society also functions to combine identities and narratives for a national response to common problems. A “whole of society” approach is desirable when rebuilding: the state does not need to provide all services to the people. Instead, it can adopt frameworks by which civil society public-private partnering can better provide some of these services. *The security community also needs to understand the different types of civil institutions present in societies and how they can affect the military’s success in security and transitions.*
- **Local Ownership.** There is a social fabric inherent to all stability operations, and this lies mostly in local networks that build structure and resiliency in societies. *Local ownership is a guiding principle of assistance and transition.* Recent NGO, IGO, and US experiences establish that the host nation must undertake and own transition to be self-sustaining. Outsiders tend to categorize problems in ways that become counterproductive to rebuilding the indigenous society. The practice of local ownership focuses transition activities away from outsiders, predetermined external preferences, and outside competition and shifts them toward the people and society undergoing transition. Local ownership potentially brings a more sophisticated and nuanced local knowledge and cultural competence. The host society, agencies, and government must take ownership for

the key components of successful states: security, rule of law, good governance, and economic development. Good local practices build resistance to dependency and corruption while building capacity and sustainability in the host society’s structures and activities. On the other hand, transition can neither lag too far behind indigenous expectations nor too far exceed indigenous acceptance. Ultimately, at the highest levels, the inter-venor must correctly judge and negotiate how and when to step back and countenance greater local ownership. Such stepping back means that objectives may be at risk and progress may be less efficient or even redefined. *Understanding how to hand back or accept what has been undertaken for a host nation and when to do it is as much art as science for all involved.*

- **Goals and Objectives.** *Goals and objectives must be founded in reality, in both what is needed and what is possible within the host nation.* Goals and objectives should establish realistic expectations that can move the state and its people forward and can be met with the resources available. *Analysis should be less threat driven and more needs and opportunities based. A thorough understanding of how incentivizing and de-incentivizing work relative to objectives and their supporting systems must be developed and applied.* If the host nation, supporting states, and organizations have valid interests, they must be accommodated in the objectives for transition. Expediency is never a substitute for moral legitimacy in determining and pursuing goals and objectives. Universal human rights are valid objectives for international support to demand and for indigenous populations to expect: they are essential to a successful 21st Century state and world order. Based on a proper assessment, objectives must also be timed to collective progress and the willingness of indigenous persons to take ownership. In operational and tactical planning there are no magical end-states to be achieved, only acceptable steady states or progress in support of a sovereign, successful state.
- **Sustainability, Capacity-Building, and Resilience.** At its core, *successful transition is about the relationships among sustainability, capacity building, and resilience.* Transitions in large part must be driven by the host nation’s human capacity to adapt to a changing social environment and the ability to sustain and build on the development that has occurred. Therefore, sustainability and resilience take precedence in capacity building. Projects or capabilities that are not sustainable

cannot lead to developed capacity and resilience: they are largely resources wasted and can be counterproductive as local expectations are disappointed. Such precedence, as opposed to a purely capabilities or projects mindset, logically leads to improved analysis, clearer priorities, more realistic expectations, and achievable goals. For example, indiscriminate replacement of existing institutions and systems can create unanticipated issues and costs. Better analysis might suggest creating complimentary structures and programs that are acceptable and sustainable. A focus on developing “adaptive capacity” within host institutions might encourage capacity building and resilience by helping host institutions better prepare to deal with potential crises and changes. At the same time, all such endeavors offer an opportunity to leap-frog old industry and technology, advance education and training, and adopt new ideas that can strengthen society, economic development, and governance, if appropriately integrated. Integration is critical. There is a convergence of frameworks in successful transition activities: there must be a satisfaction of local issues while also advancing national interests. A fragile or failing state has sufficient capacity—security, governance, economic, and social at local and national levels—built when it competes effectively and acts responsibly at home and abroad. This level of capacity creates sufficient resiliency to rapidly recover to a state of normalcy in the face of crisis.

- **Relationship Building.** *Transitions represent changes in relationships.* Cultural understanding and relationship building are important. Power boundaries and incentives change with the withdrawal of interveners, and the consequences of withdrawal merit thought ahead of time. In transitions, at whatever level, relationships among the host nation representatives and supporting nations and organizations are crucial, but the international community should also encourage locals to create enduring, positive relationships amongst themselves. Proper relationships build trust and encourage constructive risk taking. Relationships bridge the differences among conflicting values, interests, and cultures and the gap between perceived needs and available resources. *Creating sound and enduring relationships may be an equal imperative to planning and resources.*
- **Structuring.** Transition must be structured for success. *Structuring takes many venues.* The US government has been described as too big, too bureaucratic, top-

heavy, top-down, risk adverse, impersonal, and disconnected. While guidance and bureaucracy are essential in large enterprises to establish direction and boundaries and manage collective progress and resources, neither can be allowed to hamper the necessary agility and anticipatory action required at the various levels of interaction; both reorganization and streamlining processes can address these. Modern technology has the ability to provide real-time information sharing and translation capabilities that can help in complex environments, but these have not been adopted into our structures. At the same time, there is a need to develop managerial and leadership capabilities, rather than focusing exclusively on technical skills. Unwillingness to restructure leaves existing preferences and capabilities that supplant the actual needs of the operating environment. Likewise, a more multilateral approach to stability operations that quells negativity is generally preferable, even if more problematic. Ultimately, success is more likely when more friends are involved in the process, but this requires different structuring that facilitates the creation of sustainable, mutually beneficial results.

- **Strategic Communications.** *Building a network of willing actors and supportive populations is essential to making transition a success.* The world is now “social, mobile, and global.” People have unprecedented access to communications, and information sharing at every level is important in transitions. Populations need a common narrative to avoid the challenge of competing and counter narratives. Competing and counter narratives undermine stability and stymie transitional progress. Transition must be explained in acceptable terms to multiple audiences. Leaders promoting transition need to build individual, collective, and common understandings at the same time. *At the strategic level, leaders must constantly and consistently communicate to their subordinates and partners, indigenous and domestic populations, and other global actors and populations why transition is necessary and how it is to unfold.* Sincerity, honesty and unity of voice count. Hubris detracts from intent and slows momentum.
- **Resources.** *Resources include much more than dollars and material goods.* Every resource assessment should include indigenous human capital, institutions, material, and capabilities—real and potential. Local capacity can help expedite transition for the benefit of all. Policymakers need to look at economy of force and restraint

to make transition feasible over the long term. The size and nature of the footprint—or troop presence—for transition can be counterproductive to long-term goals. *Parsimony is an emerging guiding principle because it recognizes multiple resource challenges, discourages redundancy, and reinforces indigenous ownership.*

- **Corruption and Dependency.** Properly pursued, transition minimizes corruption and dependency and creates structures for a successful 21st Century state. *Corruption and dependency are the handmaidens of intervention and transition.* Intervention corrupts any existing structure and creates new dependencies. Transition activities tend to further exacerbate these. Too often, corruption is viewed as just a law enforcement problem, but *both corruption and dependency are systemic problems in recovering and developing societies.* There are specific frameworks for looking at both these issues. The correction or avoidance of corruption and dependency hinges on partner policy choices about indigenous institutional structures and the molding of incentives and dis-incentives in line with transition objectives and activities.
- **Obstacles.** Transitions are difficult endeavors, and obstacles are numerous throughout the process. Differing interests, objectives, and priorities are inherent to the process and pose unique challenges. Others are self-imposed. *Organizational cultures and firewalls, over classification and lack of information sharing, under resourcing, over resourcing, overly complex and counterproductive funding authorities, lack of and inadequate legal authorities, poor organizational structures and management practices, inadequate education and training, and resource competition are common examples of the latter.* Less common are the problems associated with typical intervention and transition mindsets. Often, outsiders’ “best intentions” for the host nation create the greatest impediments to progress by focusing on unrealistic goals or corrupting the economy by an influx of inflationary resources. In a similar manner, too large a presence, regardless of the tactical good done, may be strategically counterproductive. The paradox of best intentions is that the whole is often less than the sum of its parts.
- **Role of Expectations.** Expectation management among internal and external populations and actors is key in successful transitions. Understanding expectations is only one aspect of this process. An equally

important aspect is not creating expectations through promises and actions that may later be unachievable or unsustainable. *Expectation management requires forthright strategic communications and negotiations in regard to what is important to host nation success, the challenges involved, and the indigenous support required.* Ultimately, if the latter is provided and timely delivery is achieved, expectations are met and the supported state and its people are vested in their own future.

- **Role of Education and Learning.** The literature and discussion on transitions and the issues of governance are maturing. Transition is clearly interdisciplinary and comprehensive in nature. Recent experiences show that transitions and related issues can be thought about in theoretical and conceptual terms. While there are no cookie cutter solutions, these intellectual foundations will serve to educate, train, and build flexible doctrine that provide for increased success in transitions. At the same time, these foundations will provide common vocabulary and concepts agencies and organizations from across the spectrum of communities can use to share insights and methods on how to engage this process.



MG Gregg Martin, Commandant U.S. Army War College welcomes participants.



COL Stephen T. Smith, Director PKSOI closes conference.

## Keynote Speakers

### Ambassador (Ret.) John E. Herbst

Director, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University

Former Department of State, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

### GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, Ret.

Former Commander, International Security Assistance Force and US Forces – Afghanistan

### Dr. Rich Yarger

Ministry Reform Analyst, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

### James Young

Enterprise Manager, Google DoD

## Panel 1: Theory and Study

Focused on theory and study in regard to transition, looking at the intellectual study of the issues, challenges, threats & opportunities, and processes associated with the successful transition of responsibility and accountability for state and social functions from external authorities and providers to host nation authorities and providers.

### Moderator: Michael J. Dziedzic

United States Institute of Peace

## Panelists

### Dr. Charles (Chip) Hauss

Alliance for Peacebuilding

*“Blind Men and Political Elephants: Phase 4 Democratization, Peacebuilding Transitions”*

### Helge Lurås

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

*“Politics, Institutions and State-Building: Lessons from Bosnia”*

### LTC José M. Madera

US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)

*“Leading Through, By, and With: The Challenge of Managing Transitions when the US is Not the Lead Partner”*

### Alix J. Boucher

Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University

*“The Role of Fighting Corruption in Facilitating Transition in Afghanistan”*

### Dr. Ann Phillips

The Marshall Center

*“Local Ownership: Importance and Impediments”*



Ambassador John Herbst



GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, Ret.

## Panel 2: Government and Civil Society Insights and Practice

Explored the experience and knowledge gained from external governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in transitioning responsibility and accountability for state and social functions from external authorities and providers to host nation authorities and providers.

**Moderator:** Larry H. Brady  
PKSOI/USAID

### Panelists

**CPT Jennifer Glossinger**  
350th Civil Affairs Command, US Army  
*“Women Affecting Economic Stability and Military Operations”*

**Bryan Kurtz,**  
Kurtz Group  
**Patrick M. Bryski,**  
Deloitte Consulting  
*“Post Conflict Transformation of Bosnia’s Banking System to Promote Private Enterprise and Generate Employment while Transitioning from USAID to Local Control”*

**Shakir Jawad, Gregg Nakano MALD, Maysaa Mahmood, Ph.D., Ali Al-Ameri, MD**  
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences  
Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine  
*“Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Health Sector: Host Nation Perspective”*

**Joseph Pak**  
Office of the Under Secretary for Defense Analysis, Field Support Team–Korea  
*“Transition – Post Korean War, Republic of Korea”*

**Howard (Roy) Williams**  
Center for Humanitarian Cooperation

**Bill Hyde**  
USAID  
*“Haiti, 2010: Coming out of Disaster”*

## Panel 3: The Military Role

Examined the roles and experience in the transition process in various scenarios and from differing perspectives.

**Moderator:** Angel M. Rabasa  
RAND Corporation

### Panelists

**Col Ian Rigden**  
United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit  
*“Transition of Security to a Host Nation”*

**Brad Baylor,**  
**Jeanne Burington**  
Joint Center for Operational Analysis  
US Joint Forces Command  
*“Transition to Stability Operations”*

**Lisa Schirch**  
3D Security Initiative, Eastern Mennonite University  
*“A Civil-Military Roadmap on Human Security”*



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