



## PKSOI Perspective

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### Building a Nexus for Stability Operations 03 March 2010

by Mark Gerner

*“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers,  
but only a soldier can do it.”<sup>i</sup>*

Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskold

#### *Strategy, policy, doctrine.*

A few years before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US Army began a transformation to meet challenges of the new century. A series of Service Chiefs personally led this effort, and though details were argued from various views of how large or how agile or expeditionary a new force must be, there was widespread agreement about the need to make the Army modular, more agile, and more rapidly responsive to the Regional Combatant Commanders.<sup>ii</sup> Senior leaders cultivated cultures of transformed thinking about a new kind of Army, designed around agile units of modular capabilities, whose assets would be available for employment into a variety of operational settings, and whose basis would shift from Army division to Brigade Combat Team. For several decades of the Cold War, the Army had approached its role in land combat as part of measurable land campaigns, comprised of capabilities that were programmed in time phases. The depiction of land campaigns was largely about programming large formations of the Army into "logic regions," places on the program in time and in space that land organizations could expect in mature theaters of war, largely because a US force presence was already in place. Stability operations were accounted for and recognized, but as a secondary role; a consequence of the planned campaign.

The Army's approach to transformation could be seen as a kind of intellectual mobilization as new concepts developed for new environments, and the formal adoption of "full spectrum operations" as the overarching operational concept speaks to an important mix of Soldiers' war experiences and well-developed theory of what the Army can expect to face in the near future. The concept is,

Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and non-lethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment... <sup>iii</sup>

In the policy and strategy circles, the Army and other services undertook serious

coordination of planning shortly after 9/11. The most obvious changes that resulted were the changed structures and authorities that included the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, an overhaul of the national intelligence services and structures, the establishment of US Northern Command and US Africa Command, as well as multiple changes in policies and authorities to make capabilities more operationally oriented. The Department of State adopted new structures and began to execute policies in close coordination with US military efforts, especially in the area of the policies of stabilization and reconstruction.

Part of the Army's transformed doctrine included improved planning methods, with a keen focus on tailoring forces. A long standing practice for planners, the need to tailor capabilities is more keenly important because traditionally large formations of corps or divisions have very little dedicated forces beyond their headquarters. Their composition must be tailored to each expected scenario. Tailoring is aimed principally at formations beyond BCT's, and it is complex when operational requirements involve many non-standard aspects of a nation, its security and police forces, and its people. But the assembled details also present the advantage of operational flexibility once the capabilities are employed. They are smaller and less demanding to support, so the operational problem shifts from that of logistical assets to that of force tracking, authority, and operational guidance to all formations. Army capabilities are defined in relation to some aspect of a joint operational concept.

Modular doctrine combined with the operational concept postures the Army to meet the demands of stability operations. "Civil Military Coordination" or "Cooperation" (each called "CIMI") is a term of art not normally associated with US combat operations. The United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) generally uses "coordination," and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) generally refers to "cooperation" among member nations. In June 2004 the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of the U.N. adopted a doctrine called "Civil Military Relations in Complex Emergencies" to address the use of military and civil defense capacities.<sup>iv</sup> That decision began a series of agreements between nations as to how to coordinate both military and civilian capacities in interventions. When these agreements were adopted, their emphasis was that risk assessments as well as military commitments would elevate in priority. Stability Operations are often characterized by what is absent rather than by what is present. Friction is expected in these operations, not only because of their physical nature, but because the focus of them is the people themselves. In many cases, the original purpose of the operations is about tribal or sectarian conflict, each of which thrives on friction.

Developed during operations of large campaigns of World War II, the concept of Civil Military Cooperation went dormant until the early 1990's. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, while nations of Europe began to experience new security conditions, the trend was to move *status quo* of Cold War military and diplomatic competition toward, which supported "peacekeeping" operations to more pro-active policies that supported "peace building" operations. Governments that were motivated to bring democratic values to their people were to be built. The link between the governance of the people and application of land power became a major planning principle.


Today, CIMC doctrine is a collection of concepts for effective capabilities. The engagement of the US military in stability operations will need to continue to find ways to assess itself around well defined capabilities that do not fit well defined numbers, through a whole of government approach.

**Stabilization and stability operations.**

National Security Presidential Directive 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, assigns responsibility to the Secretary of State, the responsibility to "...coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities..."<sup>v</sup> The Department of Defense manages a broad set of tasks under US Security policies that are called "Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction, (SSTR)."<sup>vi</sup> The policy, known by its label "DODD 3000.05" recognizes stability operations as "military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions," and specifies that their priority will be comparable to combat operations.<sup>vii</sup> NSPD 44 and DODD 3000.05 represent an effort toward many have called a "whole of government" approach to foreign and defense policy and reflect a wide ranging set of recent experiences.

**Military Support  
Stabilization, Security, Transition & Reconstruction**

*"Stability Operations are a core US military mission that the DoD shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities." DoDD 3000.05*



**Figure One**

Figure One is an array of elements within the US "Whole of Government" strategy. Although the phases are depicted in sequence, there is no predictive model. For example, actions in phase III (Dominate the enemy) can be coincident with phase "0" (Shape the environment). Most operations are managed by local Department of State official, applying the Interagency Management System (IMS) and authorities reside with the US Chief of Mission or Ambassador. The policy is one manifestation of the principle of civilian control, to include defined operational conditions. Among the first considerations is to determine the parameters and measures of policies. In a speech in September 2008 at the National Defense University, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates chose "balance" as his theme. He said, "...between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and stability operations, as well as helping partners build capacity, and maintaining our traditional edge, above all our technological edge – against the military forces of other nation states..."<sup>viii</sup> His assessment is a call to action,

My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support – including in the Pentagon- for the capabilities needed to win the wars we are in, and of the kinds of missions we are most likely to undertake in the future...As the national Defense Strategy puts it, success will require us to "tap the full strength of America and its people-civilian and military, public sector and private."<sup>ix</sup>

Army organizations should expect that full spectrum operations "involve continuous interaction between friendly forces and ... multinational partners, adversaries, civil authorities, business leaders, and other civilian agencies," while "enemies and adversaries may consist of multiple competing elements...", as described in an Army guideline for stability operations.<sup>x</sup> The Army's doctrine also now teaches that civil authorities within the area of operations include all manner of religious, tribal, provincial, and business leaders. The emphasis is on the population, as compared to finding a recognizable conventional military threat base. Army's policy document illustrates 32 sets of factors, each a collection of organization or discipline that have some kind of impact on US stability operations. They are organized into categories of 'Peacetime Military Engagement (multinational exercises, security assistance, recovery operations, counter drug operations, joint and combined exchange training), 'Peace Operations (peacekeeping, peace building, peacemaking, peace enforcement, conflict prevention), 'Limited Intervention (consequence management, non-combatant evacuation, foreign humanitarian assistance) and 'Irregular Warfare' (foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare combating terrorism).<sup>x1</sup> The effort to cover the range is clear, and the outline itself serves to remind that the label "stability operations" as a category is as much a label to link military operations to others as it is to define what soldiers are doing. The power of the operational experiences is reflected in Army Field Manual 1, *The Army*,

The Army's contribution to joint operations is land power - the ability – by threat, use, or occupation, to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit, control over land, resources, and people. Land power includes the ability to... establish and maintain a

stable environment that sets the conditions for a lasting peace, address the consequences of catastrophic events...support and provide a base from which forces can influence and dominate the air and sea dimensions of the joint operational area..."<sup>xii</sup>

Sources of doctrine for stability operations include not only military experiences, but diplomatic agreements and policies that hope to counter unstable conditions that lead to breeding grounds of terrorism. The relationship between stabilization, reconstruction, and development as tools to counter sanctuary for terrorists, is growing concept, especially in border regions. The ability to counter enemy sanctuaries is an essential task that can be done only through Civil-Military cooperation. If enemy sanctuaries are part of the concept, then an objective may be to make them toxic to enemy power of any kind and the simultaneous application of multiple capabilities—physical, psychological, ideological/intellectual and temporal—must be planned to address multiple objectives.<sup>xiii</sup>

Management of stabilization policies is conducted by the Office of the Secretary for Conflict Resolution and Stabilization, whose mission is to "lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy."<sup>xiv</sup>

United States policy is to work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.<sup>xv</sup>

'Safe haven,' reflects a military judgment about borders, geographic areas that must involve a mix of political and military cooperation for any hope of success in complex tribal, ethnic, and multinational relations. The US Government primary method is now an "Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization," described as a design for "highly complex crises and operations which are national or security priorities, involve widespread instability, may require military operations, and where multiple U.S. agencies will be engaged in the policy and programmatic response..."<sup>xvi</sup> There is a shared dependency between military and other operations, and operational variables describe the relationship between military aspects of an environment and the population. Joint planners analyze the operational environment in terms of six interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure, physical environment and time.<sup>xvii</sup>

The *Joint Capstone Concept* commits the military to operations that "typically operate in conjunction with other agencies of the U.S. and partner governments" and emphasizes that

the success of the operation depends on the success of the teaming.<sup>xviii</sup> Army Regulation 10-87, *Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units*, authorizes commands to coordinate directly with other Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, or Direct Reporting Unit commanders, HQDA, other Department of Defense headquarters and agencies, as well as other government agencies as required, on matters of mutual interest.<sup>xix</sup>

## Integrating Stability Operations




Figure Two

Figure Two portrays key elements of command as well as Civil-Military Operations, and applies CIMIC as a concept to connect echelons.<sup>xx</sup> CIMIC is "a military function that supports the commander's mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military forces and civil actors in the commander's area of operations."<sup>xxi</sup> Characteristics include an integration model to address what some have called 'new realities' that have had a major impact on the relationships between military and humanitarian actions. Stuart Gordon, writing in 2001, named three components: an increasing demand for 'coherence' in multidimensional interventions; the increasing incidence of donor government involvement in emergencies both practically and in terms of influencing the decision making of the agencies themselves and an increased and more frequent military presence in essentially 'humanitarian activities.'<sup>xxii</sup>

The language of CIMIC was developed during World War II, and it includes coordination in support of the mission between the commander and the civil population, by working with national and local authorities, international, national and non-governmental organizations.<sup>xxiii</sup> The purpose of CIMIC can be specifically 'humanitarian' when employed as a tool of diplomacy or rigidly subordinated to and supportive of the senior military commander's mission. Historically CIMIC has been both about building peace and preparing for war. The authors of current courses on how to develop the relationships involved in Civil Military Cooperation skills and capacities write that the "UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination, The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has, under the authority of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), facilitated the development of a series of UN humanitarian civil-military coordination policies and guidelines. These include guidelines use military and civil defense organizations for disaster relief as well as armed escorts for convoys and United Nations humanitarian activities.

UN guidelines for humanitarian military coordination employ principles of humanitarian operations, including decisions to accept military, using military assets only where there is no comparable civilian alternative, and applying military assets to meet critical humanitarian needs. The idea that the military is used as a tool of last resort underlies the doctrine, and humanitarian operations always retain their civilian nature and character. Operations remain under overall authority of the humanitarian organization responsible for that operation, whatever the specific command arrangements for the military asset itself. The guidelines emphasize that the military asset should operate unarmed and are civilian in appearance; countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organization responsible for that deployment.<sup>xxiv</sup>

CIMIC controlling headquarters advise on all matters of civilian environment, transform commanders' guidance into CIMIC concepts, activate CIMIC centres, and maintain the CIMIC network as widely as possible. They participate in humanitarian planning, especially concerning security issues. The headquarters to manage the statement of required capabilities is the combatant commander. The first level of analysis places isolates each of the five lines on the continuum between military tasks and US Government tasks in the theater of operations. A comparison between the two is reflected in *Essential Task Matrix* (ETM), the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, and the Unified Joint Task List (UJTL). The tasks passed to the Joint Forces Command, as the force provider, will engage in the requirements and force provision process. CIMIC principles and practices can support the ideas expressed in these documents to achieve unity of effort with other agencies. US military cultural differences notwithstanding, the details of such concepts hold promise for how to address them. But something is now absent, a series of transition steps to carry planners from strategic objective to operational concept of employment, to selection of required organizations and capabilities. Sufficiently complex when the scenarios are military in nature, when they shift into the domain of stability operations, plans to match tasks to units often have no workable model. CIMIC assists with application of proven methods of

what part of military forces is needed for a variety of governance and humanitarian tasks.

To be effective in this regard, one must accept that relationship between kinds of power and kinds of influence now comes from many sources. The application of such principles without losing authority over one's own forces and without losing control of military outcomes is yet another balance point.

***Civil Affairs Operations - Civil Military Operations.***

In a recent report, a RAND study group examined "how the Army can assist in making key civilian agencies more capable partners... in the planning and execution of stability operations..."<sup>xxv</sup> The report offers a series of civilian-military comparisons through eight elements of Provisional Reconstruction Teams, as well as multiple sets of skills that orient on areas of the *Essential Task Matrix*. The Department of State and the US Agency for International Development have plans for defined capabilities that can be compared to the *Unified Joint Task List* that the Joint Task Force Commander plans. The operations center on what is known as Civil Affairs Operations, activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces, government and non-government civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions.

Civil military operations may be performed by designated Civil Affairs forces or by other forces designated by the commander. Civil military operations consider the need to control the behavior of civilians in the objective areas and to make judgments about their disposition. Conditions vary, and the need to either physically separate the need to either maintain populations in their homes and jurisdictions, or to separate them, sometimes by physically moving them, sometimes by finding ways for them to agree to cooperate with military authorities and to remain, Civil Affairs Operations are military activities planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by Civil Affairs forces through, with, or by the indigenous population and institutions, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, or other government agencies to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of CMO or other US objectives." <sup>xxvi</sup>

***Providing tailored capabilities.***

The "surge" operations in Iraq in 2006-2007, with the integration of approximately five additional brigade combat teams and an additional Army division is a clear example of successful tailoring in operational planning. Combined with a changed operational concept for ground forces, Army and marine headquarters adjusted the management of capability and oriented them across an expanded set of objectives, and began to address the wider

aspects of security and stability.<sup>xxvii</sup> Army Modular Force doctrine has changed the Army from operations and structures that were based on divisions, to smaller, adaptable, rapidly deployable and sustainable modules and smaller structures.

At the baseline of the concept of Army modularity, "critical thinking," not technology, was considered the most critical asset.<sup>xxviii</sup> That design principle, on several levels, is proving itself in a variety of full spectrum operations. The force is provided in time cycles with modules of capabilities by applying functional brigade formations can address both "theater-fixed" and expeditionary, rotational requirements.




Figure Three

Military capability is "...the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability..."<sup>xxix</sup> Figure Three visualizes eight Joint Functional Capabilities aligned to Army capabilities. Some Army operational capabilities can be aligned to six joint functional concepts (force application, protection, focused logistics, battle space awareness, net-centric operations, and command and control), and about 20-30 Army management capabilities aligned to two management joint functional concepts (Training and Force Management). Planners must translate combat and functional brigades into modular capabilities, because the brigades contain several kinds of capabilities, in modular form, that must be made available in forms that maintain their integrity at team

and small unit level. They vary in the ability to combine with other capabilities.

A method to align civilian and military planner has been the subject of much work by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, the Department of State, US Agency for International Development and others.

The object of force tailoring is to collect a set of organizations made available in time to one of the five lines of operation (civil security, governance, economic development, essential services, and civil control). Army organizations or elements of them are placed into available pools of forces, with the expectation they will be grouped into further combinations that will support the element of the task. In the example, the illustration, the operational task "essential services" is chosen. The object of this phase of planning is to produce a set of organizations, logically grouped around the task "essential services" and then tailored into time periods. They remain under command of larger functional brigades, with operational guidance to train for the expected conditions of an area. This planning step should result in a loosely formed task force, to include an estimate of how many soldiers and skills. The concept is to approach this operational management will be a form of a task force, the term loosely applied.

Each packaged force is a combination of logically arranged Army modules and individuals, organized in time for expected availability, and matched to joint task lists and likely to tasks of the US Government, through the ETM. The relationship of that model to the needs of the theater and area of operation must be left to the theater and operational planner. This view of how to provide capabilities is different than organizational views of the past because it plans for modules of various functional commands to be organized grouped in ways that depart from their parent functional brigades. The concept is a logical extension of the Army's "force generation doctrine for provision of capabilities."<sup>xxx</sup>

Early in the deliberate planning process, a concept for civil-military cooperation should surface on a variety of topics that characterize the operations envisioned. The Army's recently revised Army Unified Task List (AUTL) in combination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Unified Joint Task List (UJTL) is one start point of analysis. Theater-strategic tasks are arrayed by hierarchy and by function. When compared to tasks documented in by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) the Essential Task Matrix (ETM) can be aligned to categories of capabilities. <sup>xxxxi</sup> Another useful product in this phase of planning for stability tasks is the Pamphlet 6, *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)*. Part of the "Joint Warfighting Series" by US Joint Forces Command, it contains several practical methods and tasks to coordinate military and civilian agencies.<sup>xxxii</sup> Time must be matched to the phases of what the military operations envision, because the task matrix is organized into three general timeframes: Initial Response, Transformation, and Sustainment. Each of these is mapped to five major areas, and in turn each area is further defined. In "Security," specified tasks include food security, shelter and non-food relief, humanitarian demining, public health, education, social protection, while under "Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure" they include

employment generation, monetary policy, infrastructure, etc. The relationship of such tasks to the operational military plans is part of the Civil-Military Cooperation planning.

### ***Conclusion***

There remains a close relationship between what comprises stability operations and what we know about insurgent war and guerilla war. In a comprehensive history of about 2,000 years of guerilla, insurgent, and stability operations, *War in the Shadows*, Robert B. Asprey said that his main purpose was to explain the years of the Vietnam War. His view went beyond the early days of a “Post 9-11” world,

There is still much to learn and much to explain. So long as Western governments fail to work with less democratically minded governments in trying to eradicate in whole or in part the basic reasons for regional insurgencies, these will continue to burst forth. xxxiii

In July 2008, General David Patraeus published a letter to the force in Iraq that included a pictogram called “Anaconda Strategy for AQI.” It is a depiction of enemy centers of gravity surrounded by a series of concentric pressures, delivered by six types of coalition capabilities. These include interagency, kinetics, politics, intelligence, detainee operations, and non-kinetics. Religious, education, jobs programs, information operations, and other factors were additional factors within those types of capabilities, and each was recognized as priority concerns of the command.<sup>xxxiv</sup> Few sound like traditional military roles or missions, but that is now the job at hand. The accompanying letter outlines a comprehensive approach to the population in a manner that recognizes the linkages between civilian and military capabilities. As the Secretary of Defense warned, the problems are increasingly complex and the need to address them grows stronger. This need can be met by planning that invites and applies concepts of Civil Military Cooperation, and to combine their best practices with the best experiences of US doctrine to meet US policy objectives.

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<sup>i</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994). The cited quotation evokes policy debates of the 1990’s when the Army was engaged in multiple peace and “nation-building” operations. One doctrine was known as “Military Operations Other Than War,” or ‘MOOTW,’ presenting a challenging context of defining operations in the negative sense. In the May/June 1995 issue of *Foreign Affairs* Eliot A. Cohen reviewed the Field Manual and wrote, “The manual holds that the basic tenets of army operations, as outlined in the operations manual for all-out conflict, apply to peacekeeping operations as well, a debatable proposition. In a conscientious effort to adapt the army to these uncomfortable (but hardly unprecedented) missions, the writers search for clarifying assumptions...But some of their assertions, -- a clearly defined mission is the key to successful planning and execution of a peace operation...-- lead one to ask how likely reality is to fit doctrine.”

<sup>ii</sup> Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Hart Sinnreich, *Conceptual Basis of a Transformed US*

*Army*, Land Warfare Paper No. 40 (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the US Army, March 2002), pp. 5-8. This paper is one of the most concise and important documents to describe the reason and the nature of new kind of Army. Among major points, the authors point to “implications for the conduct of military operations and explore the following topics: “general purpose capabilities, operational maneuver from strategic distances, multidimensional operations, and adaptive force dominance.”

iii Department of the Army, Field Manual 3.0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: February 2008) , page 3-1.

iv Cedric de Coning, and Stephen E. Henthorne, Stephen E., *Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC)*, (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2008). p. 5.

v The White House, *National Security Presidential Directive 44, Manangement of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 7, 2005), p. 2.

vi Department of Defense Directive No. 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, November 28, 2005), p. 2.

vii Ibid.

viii Robert Gates, Speech, *National Defense Strategy*, National Defense University,” September 29, 2008.

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See also Robert Gates, “Reprogramming The Pentagon for A New Age,” *Foreign Affairs*, Jan – Feb 2009.

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy>

ix Ibid.

x Department of the Army, *Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), p. 2-3.

xi Ibid. p. 6.

xii Department of the Army, Field Manual 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005), p. 1-1.

xiii Robert Ryan, *Sanctuary* (Student Manuscript) (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: US Air War College, 2006).

xiv Web site, US Department of State, S/CRS, [www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm).

xv [www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html](http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html).

xvi Robert Ladiner, *The Interagency Planning Process Under NSPD-44*; Presentation to the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Seminar in Stability Operations, National Defense University. (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, S/CRS). [www.crs.state.gov](http://www.crs.state.gov).

xvii Department of the Army, Field Manual 3.0 *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of The Army, 2008), p. 1-5.

xviii US Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, version 3.0. (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2009), p. 1.

xix Army Regulation 10-87, *Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units*. (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007), pp. 3-8.

xx See Timothy Zack and Mark Gerner, "USAR Force Management: Translating Strategies Into Capabilities," *Oracle*. (FA 50 Newsletter,) [www.fa50.army.mil](http://www.fa50.army.mil). April 2008, p. 12-14.

xxi Stephen Henthorne, interview on Canadian Forces doctrine for CIMIC. (DND-B-GL-355-001/FP-001).

xxii Stuart Gordon, extract, *Civil Affairs and Military Government* (London: HMSO, 1966), p361. (Sandhurst: Royal Military Academy), 2001.

xxiii Cedric de Coning, and Stephen E. Henthorne, *Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC)*, (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2008). Functions of CIMIC include "Liaison and information management," "Mission Support," and "Community Support," described on p. 12. The "Response Matrix, (p. 14) outlines CIMIC operational concepts.

xxiv Ibid.

xxv James E. Barnett II, Derek Eaton, Terrence K. Kelley, Zachary Haldeman, Brooke K. Stearns, Thomas S. Szayna, *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations*. (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2008), xvi to xxi (unpublished).

xxvi Department of the Army, FM 3-05, *US Army Special Operations Forces*. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2008), p. 1-5. Also see chapter 3.

xxvii Discussions with LTC (Ret) William Epley, Army Historian, US Army Center of Army Military History and author of a draft book about the history of the III US Corps in Iraq during the "Surge" and related operations, covering the time frame from 2006 through late 2007. Among the topics of force provision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army synchronized the capabilities, many of which proved essential to a variety of stability operations.

xxviii Association of the United States Army, *The US Army: A Modular Force for the 21st Century*. (Arlington, VA: AUSA Torchbearer Issue, March 2005), p. 21.

xxix *Ibid.*

xxx See General Charles C. Campbell, “ARFORGEN: Refining the Model, Maturing the Process,” *Army*, June 2009, pp. 50-54.

xxxii Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2005), p. 1-1 - 1-6.

xxxiii US Joint Forces Command Pamphlet 6, *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)* (Suffolk, VA: Doctrine and Education Group, US Joint Forces Command, 2004), p. 1.

xxxiiii Robert B. Asprey, *War In The Shadows: The Guerilla In History* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1994), p xiii. Asprey concludes with a warning about Afghanistan, “Unfortunately, the anarchic situation continues as regional guerilla leaders lorded it over independent fiefdoms such as the enclaves belonging to Sayer Jaffer Naderi and Rashid Dostum in the north. Despite almost constant fighting in and around Kabul, all attempts to bring about meaningful peace negotiations have failed. As of this writing, December 1993, the war goes on – and with it the probable dissolution of Afghanistan as we have known it.” (pp. 1212-1213).

xxxv David H. Patraeus, “Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” with chart, “Anaconda Strategy vs. AQI.” Headquarters, US Multinational Force Iraq, 15 July 2008. MNFI-Baghdad, APO AE 09342-1400.