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PKSOI Director's Corner

Welcome to the first edition of the PKSOI Bulletin. This publication will be posted on a recurring basis to share information about and prompt discussion concerning peace and stability operations. The central theme for this edition is the recent release of US Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations. This groundbreaking manual is as notable for the degree to which civilian organizations contributed throughout its development as it is for formally capturing for the first time this integral part of full spectrum operations. If you aren't already familiar with FM 3-07, the articles that



follow may well lead you to pick it up. I encourage you to return to this site frequently, and provide your feedback and contributions to this important dialogue.

COL John Kardos, Director PKSOI

IN THIS ISSUE

- **New Doctrine for a New Era**
by William Flavin
- **The New Balance: Optimizing Land Forces for Unconventional Threats**
by Nate Freier
- **Roadmap from Conflict to Peace**
by Steve Leonard
- **An Open Door-** by Beth Cole
- **Calendar of Events**

New Doctrine for a New Era

by William Flavin

Introduction

In 1914, the U.S. Army War College, in support of the U.S. government's policy to suppress Mexican Irregulars and, as President Wilson stated, "teach the South American republics to elect good men," prepared, "A Study of the Pacification of Mexico and Establishment of Civil Government." The four officers who produced this study were veterans of other overseas constabulary operations and infused the study with their practical experience. One of the members wrote the following warning:

*"[Besides] it is their government, not ours (except for the moment), and if organic or radical change be desirable, the right and duty of making them belong to the people of the country, not to the United States. And it may well be doubted if great changes imposed by us, even though theoretically in the direction of reform, would serve any good purpose or last long after our departure. In national, as in private life, people must, to a great extent, work out their own salvation and build their own careers."*¹

The officer almost a century ago thus captured the central challenge of stability operations: How can external actors tackle the root causes of conflict and support a transformation process that leads to legitimate governance in another country? ² On October 7, 2008 the US Army published FM 3-07 Stability Operations a manual that, for the first time, strives to answer these questions.

Addressing Stability Operations

Since the U.S. engagement in the Balkans in 1995, the U.S. military and the U.S. government have been reassessing their ability to deal with multi-dimensional operations conduct among the people. The complexity, size and duration of the Bosnia operation impacted the U.S. in a way that previous smaller operations, such as in Panama and Haiti, had not. In referring to Bosnia's impact on the U.S. military, one Clinton Department of Defense official said, "There is nothing like hanging to focus a man's mind."³ By the end of the 1990s, the Army had developed its initial thoughts on the "full spectrum operations" concept, the Marine Corps rolled out its "three block war," and Clinton had signed Presidential Decision Directive 56 on "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," all attempting to address stability operations.

A normative framework slowly emerged as a result of the Balkan engagements. In 1997, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) issued their *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* that described the foundations for good governance and civil society, as well as the priority areas to support post-conflict recovery. The development of the sector pillars for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was one of the first examples of the practical application of a framework. In 2001, the OECD updated its guidelines based on these peace building

Roadmap From Conflict to Peace

by Steve Leonard
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experiences.⁴ In 2002, the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (now the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute PKSOI). Later the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Institute for Defense Analysis produced similar frameworks. This work provided the solid ground upon which future U.S. Military doctrine and government policy would be based.⁵

U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq focused U.S. policy still further. While the Balkans awakened the US Army to the nature of peace operations, Iraq and Afghanistan required the US Army and the US Government to address the reality of peace building in the context of continuing unrest. In 2004, the Defense Science Board's summer study focused on stabilization and reconstruction operations in the context of the challenges of Iraq. The study concluded that the key to success was better management and greater capacity. CSIS published *Winning the Peace* and established a center for Post Conflict Reconstruction and to provide actionable recommendations to policy makers. RAND Corporation conducted focused research into nation building and in 2003 published *America's Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq* followed in 2007 with *The Beginners' Guide to Nation-Building*. The USIP has developed several projects on rule of law, post conflict reconstruction, and is developing measures of effectiveness. In 2005, USIP published *The Quest for Viable Peace* that proposed a strategic approach to dealing with such complex situations and laid the ground for future doctrinal thought. In 2005, the Army's Chief Staff established several working groups to determine how to increase the Army's capabilities to plan and conduct stability operations in a joint, interagency and multinational context. These focus areas identified ongoing actions, recommended future initiatives and determined the doctrine, training and leader development proficiencies the Army would need.

Based on these studies, the reality of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ever wider engagement by the world community through the UN, EU, and other international organizations in difficult and dynamic conflicts, policy makers in the Department of Defense and Department of State influenced by discussions in Congress took action. On August 5, 2004, the Secretary of State announced the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) directly under the Secretary's Office. SCRS mandate to enhance the U.S. government's institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failed, failing and post- conflict states and complex emergencies. On 7 December 2005, the President issued National Security Defense Directive, 44 giving the Department of State to mandate the interagency efforts for reconstruction and stabilization.⁶

The Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defense (DOD) Directive DODD 3000.05 in November 2005. The Directive emphasized that stability operations were no longer secondary to combat operations, stating: *Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.*

The Directive further stressed that stability operations were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations. Thus, the Directive elevated stability operations to a status equal to that of the offense and defense. That fundamental change in emphasis set in motion the development of a new doctrine for a new era.

Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations

At the heart of the new Army doctrine is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector. The comprehensive approach ensures unity of effort among a very rich and diverse group of actors while fostering the development of new

The Combined Arms Center and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute are announcing the release of Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, during the AUSA Fall Symposium in Washington, DC, on October 6. The manual, a highly-collaborative effort written in cooperation with a number of stakeholders across the United States Government, the nongovernmental community, and the private sector, represents the most widely-vetted doctrine ever produced by the Army. This doctrine, described as the "roadmap from violent conflict to stable peace" is considered a companion piece to FM 3-24, the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine published in 2006, providing the principles and fundamentals that guide stability activities in support of full spectrum operations.

FM 3-07 introduces the concept of a comprehensive approach to stability operations, integrating the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector. It ensures unity of effort while fostering the development of new capabilities to shape the operational environment in ways that preclude future military intervention. While the manual addresses military stability operations within the broader context of United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts, it also describes the role of military forces in supporting those efforts by leveraging the coercive and constructive capabilities of the force to establish a safe and secure environment and help transition responsibility to a legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law. This transition is fundamental to the shift towards long-term development activities where military forces support broader efforts to achieve national and international objectives. The more effective those military efforts are at setting the conditions to facilitate efforts of the other instruments of national power, the more likely that long-term commitment of substantial military forces will not be required.

capabilities to shape the operational environment in ways that preclude the requirement for future military intervention. It postures the military to perform a role common throughout US history—ensuring the safety and security of the local populace, assisting with reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and public services. Equally important, it defines the role of military forces in support of the civilian agencies charged with leading these complex endeavors.

In a comprehensive approach, military forces establish conditions that facilitate the efforts of the other instruments of national and international power – providing the requisite security and control to stabilize an operational area. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, addresses military stability operations within the broader context of United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts. It describes the role of military forces in supporting those broader efforts by leveraging the coercive and constructive capabilities of the force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and help transition responsibility to a legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law. This transition is fundamental to the shift in focus toward long-term development activities where military forces support broader efforts in pursuit of national and international objectives. Success

in these endeavors typically requires a long-term commitment by external actors and is ultimately determined by the support and participation of the host-nation populace as our planners from a century ago recognized.

However, the manual also provides doctrine on how those capabilities are leveraged in support of a partner nation as part of peacetime military engagement. Those activities, executed in a relatively benign security environment as an element of a combatant commander's theater security cooperation plans, share many of the same broad goals as stability operations conducted in the aftermath of conflict or disaster. The objective is to build partner capacity, strengthen legitimate governance, maintain rule of law, foster economic growth, and help to forge a strong sense of national unity. Ideally, these are addressed before, rather than after, conflict. Conducted within the context of peacetime military engagement, they are essential to sustaining the long-term viability of host nations and provide the foundation for multinational cooperation that helps to maintain the global balance of power.⁷

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

The key to this comprehensive approach is conflict transformation. Conflict transformation focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change. Conflict transformation is the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations. It aims in close cooperation with the host nation to set the conditions for a sustainable positive trajectory where transformational processes can directly address civil strife or violent conflict. It seeks to address grievances and the drivers of conflict and instability while supporting host government institutions that have both legitimacy and the capacity to provide basic services, economic opportunity, and public order and security. Achieving a viable, sustained peace is all about transforming a society.

Real transformation alters the existing war-hardened power structure—otherwise it is not transformation, but probably a stalemate or temporary ceasefire. The means to a transformed society is through local leaders. Because the existing power structure must be changed toward moderation, this requires a comprehensive framework and an integrating method and structure understood and accepted by all participants. Such frameworks, methods and structures cannot be hoisted upon an unsuspecting populace, but are developed in partnership with local leaders.

Legitimacy and capacity building are essential to achieving this transformation.

Legitimacy is central to building trust and confidence among the people. Legitimacy is a multifaceted principle that impacts every aspect of stability operations from every conceivable perspective. Within national strategy, legitimacy is a central principle for intervention: both the legitimacy of the host nation government and the legitimacy of the mission. The legitimacy of the government has many facets. It generally represents the legitimacy of the supporting institutions and societal systems of the host-nation.

Legitimacy derives from the legal framework that governs the state and the source of that authority. It reflects not only the supremacy of the law, but also the foundation upon which the law was developed: the collective will of the people through the consent of the governed. It reflects, or is a measure of, the perceptions of several groups: the local populace, individuals serving within the civil institutions of the host nation, neighboring states, the international community, and the American public.

Building institutional capacity in the host nation is fundamental to success in stability operations. Capacity building is the process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems. It includes efforts to improve governance capacity, political moderation, and good governance—ethos as well as structure—as part of broader capacity-building activities within a society. Supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks, capacity building is a long-term, continuing process, in which all actors contribute to enhancing the host nation's human, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities⁸.

STABILITY FRAMEWORK

The success of these efforts requires an overarching framework that serves as a guide to develop strategy in pursuit of broader national or international policy goals. The following purpose-based framework, derived from ongoing work within the USG and led by the USIP, is founded on five broad conditions that describe the desired end state of a successful stability operation. In turn, a series of objectives link the execution of tactical tasks to that end state.

This framework provides the underpinnings for strategic, whole of government planning, yet also serves as a focal point for integrating operational- and tactical-level tasks. It is flexible and adaptive enough to support activities across the spectrum of conflict but relies on concrete principles and fundamentals in application. Within the framework, the end state conditions include the following:

- Safe and Secure Environment
 - Unifying Principle: Ability of the people to have a safe and secure environment in which individuals are able to conduct their daily lives without fear of systemic or large-scale violence.
- Rule of Law
 - Unifying Principle: Ability of the people to have equal access to a self-sustaining justice system that is consistent with international human rights standards and is equally applied.
- Stable Governance
 - Unifying Principle: Ability of the people to compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.
- Sustainable Economy
 - Unifying Principle: Ability of the people to have a system of economic governance bound by laws that enables the pursuit of opportunities for livelihood and prosperity.
- Social Well-Being
 - Unifying Principle: Ability of the people to be free from want of basic necessities and to live peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.

Principles for Success

As the planners in 1914 understood, the people of the affected nation determine the outcome. Therefore, the process must build on the leadership, participation and commitment of a country and its people. Andrew Natsios, former Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) identifies ownership as the “first” and most important principle. Sustained long-term peace and stability can only be achieved by the local stakeholders. The international community should strive to establish a legitimate process that will insure that the peoples of a region can invest in their own future. This process should be in line with the local cultural and economy, as well as social realities. The new UN doctrine on peacekeeping operations lists the promotion of national and local ownership as a key fundamental. Here is what the new doctrine states:

In planning and executing a United Nations peacekeeping operation's core activities, every effort should be made to promote national and local and ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between national actors. Effective approaches to national and local ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.

The doctrine further states that all personnel in the mission should be aware of the potential that their presence can undermine national authority and independent capacity.⁹

The US Army manual recognizes that the US development community relies on specific operating principles for stabilization, reconstruction, and development assistance. The principles have been tested through years of practical application and understanding the cultural and socioeconomic

influences in the host nation. Understanding these generally accepted principles enables those involved in development, and in the development aspects of stabilization and reconstruction, to incorporate techniques and procedures effectively. Then those involved can help countries improve the economic and social conditions of their people. The USAID principles for reconstruction and development are ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility, and accountability. FM 3-07 devotes an annex to the explanation of these principles. Ownership is identified as a key consideration.

The principle of ownership creates conditions of success by building on the leadership, participation, and commitment of the host nation and its people. Ownership implies relying on the host nation to establish and drive the development priorities. The host nation leads this unified effort with support from external donor organizations. Ownership begins with and is focused on the people. It is founded on community involvement. This is fundamental to success, since the host-nation government may not exist or may lack the legitimacy to assume full ownership for peaceful governing processes.

When ownership exists and a community invests itself in a project, citizens will defend, maintain, and expand the project after donor organizations have left. Citizens will abandon what donor organizations leave behind if they perceive that the project fails to meet their needs or does not belong to them. The development community achieves positive results when it patiently engages national and local leaders in their own development rather than trying to impose development quickly and autocratically from the outside¹⁰.

Here are the other key US AID principles listed in FM 3-07:

Capacity Building: Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills and promote appropriate policies.

Sustainability: Design programs to ensure their impact endures.

Selectivity: Allocate resources based on need, local commitment and foreign policy interests.

Assessment: Conduct careful research, adapt best practices and design for local conditions.

Results: Direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable and strategically focused objectives.

Partnership: Collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors, non-profit organizations, the private sector, international organizations and universities.

Flexibility: Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities and maximize efficiency.

Accountability: Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.¹¹

These principles accord well with the core functions of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation which are to:

- a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.¹²

FM 3-07 clarifies that all of these principles are applied in the context of establishing a rule of law and not a rule of man. The manual states:

Effective rule of law establishes authority vested in the people, protects rights, exerts a check on all branches of government, and complements efforts to build security. It accounts for the customs, culture, and ethnicity of the local populace. Adherence to the rule of law is essential to legitimate and effective governance. Rule of law enhances the legitimacy of the host-nation government by establishing principles that limit the power of the

state and by setting rules and procedures that prohibit accumulating autocratic or oligarchic power. It dictates government conduct according to prescribed and publicly recognized regulations while protecting the rights of all members of society. It also provides a vehicle for resolving disputes nonviolently and in a manner integral to establishing enduring peace and stability.¹³

Supporting conflict transformation using a comprehensive approach in a stability framework context attending to the development principles to build a stability society that is governed by the rule of law and considers democratic principles provides the individuals who are trying to accomplish these complex tasks a guide post for success. This manual, the result of intensive interagency collaboration and discussion lays down a way of thinking about complex problems.

CONCLUSION

As in 1914, engaging with other countries to "help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system...to provide enduring security for the American people"¹⁴ remains the goal of the United States. Achieving this goal is difficult work that will take generations and requires a coherent vision with the appropriate concepts, tools, and resources to achieve that vision. FM 3-07 provides a concept and framework to begin the work.

Endnotes

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3. Sarah Sewall, "Telephone Interview with Tammy S. Schultz," 2005.

4. OECD/DAC, "Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict" (Paris; OECD, 2001)7, 9, 97.

5. Necla Tschirgi, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievement, Limitations, Challenges* (New York: International Peace Academy, 7 October 2004) 7, provides the background. PKI, now PKSOI, used these products to write the peace building chapter of JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations 2006 that is in final draft and will soon be posted at the following web address: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.html. The CSIS has since formed a dedicated section to this topic. <http://www.csis.org/researchfocus/pcr/>

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12. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations, 2008) 23.

13. U.S. Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, October 2008), 1-9.

14. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2006) iv.

An Open Door

by Beth Cole
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The new Army Stability Operations doctrine, Field Manual 3-07, fulfills a civil-military promise offered more than three years ago in a tense room crowded with heads of non-governmental humanitarian assistance organizations and U.S. military representatives. On that day, in March of 2005, a dialogue was launched under the new Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Non-Permissive Environments. One of its first agenda items was doctrine.

Facilitated by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), the Working Group – composed of InterAction, the umbrella organization for U.S. humanitarian organizations, and the Department of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development – meets regularly to discuss the impact of ongoing violence in non-permissive environments on the relationship between the government and non-government actors. The participants decided at their first meeting to try to improve understanding of each other's roles and responsibilities through doctrine, training and education.

The integrated process of doctrine, training and education in the U.S. military, the participants felt, offered the most effective avenue for millions of soldiers to learn about the unique, often misunderstood, role of these non-governmental institutions. While non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often participate in military exercises and address classes at the array of military teaching institutions, the number of venues across the vast U.S. military far exceeds the ability of NGOs to participate. This sporadic activity also has proven to be inadequate in the face of unparalleled challenges to civil-military relations in post 9-11 environments.

Today, military and civilian actors are conducting activities in a space where both insurgents are hunted and schools and clinics built. NGOs strive to provide assistance and survive, literally, without guns and ammunition. Increasingly they are targets because of their activities in support of peace and their vulnerability as soft targets, especially where the U.S. military is a belligerent. The actions of the U.S. military have an impact on NGO's, even though there is no intent to do harm. The way out of this dangerous situation relies, in part, on the ability of every participant to understand how to assist those in need and minimize the risk of harm. This requires knowledge of international law and human rights conventions, the Sphere standards for humanitarian assistance and the humanitarian charter and other "doctrine" that guides the non-governmental community on the part of the military. A parallel process for NGOs to learn how the military operates is equally important. This is no small undertaking.

A decision by the U.S. Army to write new stability operations doctrine, in the midst of challenging operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, provided the first opportunity to test the promise made in 2005. Under the leadership of Lt. General William Caldwell and the Army's doctrine center at Ft. Leavenworth, the writers of Field Manual 3-07 decided to open the door to the non-governmental community in the process of creating the doctrine. This was truly an historic move. A welcome move.

This led to an extraordinary process that allowed Interaction and its members the opportunity to provide critical input to the Army's

new stability operations doctrine in an open and deliberative process. InterAction, World Vision, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, Refugees International, the International Rescue Committee, the International Committee of the Red Cross and others received drafts over a six month time period and were given time to meet and discuss the emerging doctrine. Their comments were transmitted through the USIP to the Army.

But General Caldwell's team went a step further. The doctrine writers flew to Washington, D.C. and sat with NGO representatives for many hours to review their comments in a structured workshop at InterAction's headquarters. The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and USIP facilitated this unprecedented discussion and helped guide participants through the draft of the doctrine.

The final product, Field Manual 3-07, is a new kind of doctrine for the U.S. Army. With true recognition of the contributions of many actors to the battle for peace, this doctrine reflects the input of both civilian and military government institutions and both government and non-government organizations. It is a model for our future.

A PKSOI "Quick-Look" Strategic Insight The New Balance: Optimizing Land Forces for Unconventional Threats

by Nate Freier
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Investment strategists must avoid the pitfall of using uncertainty as a rationale to avoid major change – Andrew Krepenevich²

The next Secretary of Defense must make critical choices about the future of land forces. This "quick look" strategic insight seeks to frame high-level defense decisionmaking on the future missioning of U.S. landpower in an increasingly "unconventional" environment.³ The conclusions in this paper are preliminary. Use of the term "unconventional" in this work is not the same as that implied in the idea of "unconventional warfare."⁴ Instead, "unconventional" here is intended to capture those new or newly appreciated non-traditional, defense-relevant conditions that are endemic to the contemporary security environment and quite separate from traditional warfighting. Among these are insurgency, terrorism, civil war, state failure and collapse, proliferation, strategically consequential criminal activity, and "hybrid war."

A naturally conservative U.S. defense and military establishment has opted to pursue "full spectrum" balance to offset long-range uncertainty about the future character and relative importance of these and other more conventional military threats.⁵ Most agree with this approach in principle. Differences, however, arise in the precise definition of balance and subsequent identification of the most important "pivot" or "balance" point against which military forces in general and land forces specifically should focus. In this respect, future optimization of U.S. land forces — i.e., where should DoD target landpower doctrine and capabilities — is one among a handful of key defense questions for the new administration and its defense team. As senior defense decisionmakers tackle this question, they should carefully consider Krepenevich's caution about uncertainty above. Uncertainty cannot be a blanket authorization for a lack of focus.

Pursuit of "full spectrum" balance may actually create real imbalance between what land forces can and prefer to do versus what they must do. In this regard, "balance" should not become a euphemism for weighting all

points on the spectrum of conflict equally.⁶ Land forces have proven that they *can* succeed in classical counterinsurgency (COIN) and traditional warfighting. Further still, some landpower advocates would *prefer* to (re-)optimize for future major combat operations (MCO) as the U.S. ultimately reduces its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, prudent horizon scanning indicates that land forces *must* become more capable at persistently managing a wider range of land-centric unconventional threats of purpose and context that include, but are not limited to, classical COIN.⁷ And, they must consider doing so while continuing to accept some prudent risk in the area of MCO.

Land forces are already posturing themselves for “full-spectrum balance” through doctrine development. The Army has dutifully responded to contemporary conditions by completing three pieces of new or revised doctrine — **FM 3-0 Operations**, **FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency**, and **FM 3-07 Stability Operations** (stabilization).⁸ All three are intended to shape senior Army leader thinking about future land-based operations. Combined, these doctrinal efforts represent a concrete expression of the contemporary “sense of the Army” on future landpower employment.

The latter two — on COIN and stabilization — rightly focus on new unconventional security demands that have recently fallen disproportionately on the shoulders of U.S. soldiers and marines. Not surprisingly, however, the most important among these — the capstone **FM 3-0** — remains focused on achieving “full spectrum” balance. **FM 3-0** has introduced the idea that *stability operations* are now a co-equal component of military planning in foreign contingencies (alongside *offensive* and *defense operations*) — ostensibly redefining a new balance in the emphasis of U.S. land forces.⁹ In Army doctrine, the real balance between these becomes a function of their sequencing and blending in operational campaigns. In this respect, **FM 3-0** might be considered additive but perhaps not transformational.

An alternative perspective on the future missioning of land forces might be prudent. The real question on the subject of balance occurs at levels higher than doctrine. Doctrine and policy are separate animals. Doctrine outlines how the military intends to respond operationally to policy guidance under a variety of circumstances. Policymakers determine when, under what circumstances, and to what extent the military employs its standing doctrine to achieve policy ends.

In this respect, the author suggests that DoD should consider pursuing a ***wider unconventional revolution*** in land force missioning and employment as a matter of policy, optimizing the land components for decisive intervention against those non-traditional and often non-military threats (like those outlined at the outset) likeliest to pose the most common and compelling hazards to U.S. interests. The author argues that land forces should increasingly focus against a new “***unconventional pivot point***” on an alternative spectrum of conflict. This pivot point would define a new balance for landpower capabilities and missions, posturing them first and foremost to meet a number of less traditional military demands.

One certainty requires wholesale reevaluation of the future role of U.S. land forces. A single immutable certainty about the security environment calls for a more revolutionary look at future landpower missioning. ***Unconventional security challenges will continue to dominate the landpower operating space for the foreseeable future.*** This challenge set lies substantially outside the confines of conventional warfighting and will be defined by three principal characteristics.

The first characteristic is the ***increasing prominence of unconventional threats of “purpose” and “context.”***¹¹ Unconventional security challenges most relevant to U.S. land forces will principally be “non-military” in origin and character. They will also likely be quite violent.¹² These challenges will emerge from or will be embedded in vulnerable foreign populations. Further still, favorable outcomes against them will ultimately rely on decisive engagement of both U.S. and partner

militaries, as well as key non-military actors across the wider USG and international community. Landpower, in this regard, will be a vessel for the synchronized delivery of lethal and non-lethal U.S. power. It should be optimized for those unconventional environments where a pre-existing political and security order has failed and restoration of a new order is only possible through comprehensive whole-of-government responses that by necessity rely on violence or the threat of violence for their success. Under these circumstances, landpower will enable positive outcomes but likely will not be the decisive instrument for achieving them.

Unconventional “threats of purpose” originate in a bad actor’s hostile intentions. They manifest themselves as hostile, purpose-driven non-military actions like terrorism, insurgency, “unrestricted warfare,” criminality; and unfriendly or aggressive social, political, and economic agitation. Unconventional “threats of context” challenge core interests by triggering human insecurity. They include, but are not limited to, failing or failed governance, civil war and civil violence, public health crises, under-development, political disaffection, environmental degradation, and natural or human disaster. Most unconventional threats of purpose and context are, by definition, land-centric and inherently human in their origins and/or consequences. This alone argues strongly for their becoming central considerations in the institutional decisionmaking of the land components.

The second characteristic is ***the likelihood that both threats of purpose and context will commonly combine into complex “hybrids.”***¹⁴ The most compelling unconventional, foreign security challenges confronting U.S. land forces will be complex hybrids of “purposeful” and “contextual” threats. This view is gaining increased currency in official defense decisionmaking. The author offers three examples as illustrations. Individually or collectively they are not wholly representative of all “hybrid” challenges.

The first sees purposeful state and non-state opponent’s free-riding on adverse contextual conditions within or across the international system or victim states and populations to achieve ends that are anathema to core U.S. interests. Another sees collapse of functioning order in a major state where the U.S. is forced to contend simultaneously with a victim state’s residual traditional and catastrophic military capacity (possibly including WMD), while attempting to reestablish stable conditions against purposeful irregular resistance and widespread contextual human insecurity. Finally, a third envisions a capable state actor exploiting adverse contextual conditions in a single state or across a vulnerable region through violent surrogates and other-than-military means, while holding significant military capacity in reserve to discourage traditional U.S. retaliation. Here traditional state opponents may employ military force but only in ways that avoid direct confrontation with the United States.

The third and final characteristic is the ***decreasing utility of traditional military power.*** Effective management of persistent violent conflict and resistance should remain the core business of DoD and its land components. Nonetheless, future landpower relevance hinges on its continuing to push against long-held defense convention about what constitutes violent security threats and appropriate land component contributions in response to them. The common refrain of “fighting and winning America’s wars” will likely mean something quite different than it meant in the past. Conflict and war may not have changed much in their fundamental precepts. Nonetheless, the precise conditions that constitute war or consequential conflict have.

Traditional military conflict is not inconceivable in the contemporary environment. It is, however, more avoidable, manageable, and anomalous than conservative military assessments acknowledge. Much of the risk associated with the prospect of traditional warfights can be mitigated through an integrated whole-of-government strategy that applies some military, but, more importantly, significant non-military resources heavily against its occurrence.

Together, these three characteristics point toward U.S. land forces continuing to trade some excessive conventional overmatch to further optimize for foreign contingencies where a pre-existing indigenous order has been seriously undermined or incapacitated by violent internal and transnational conflict — the form and character of which fails to conform to traditional military convention.¹⁶ Indeed, it is increasingly reasonable to argue that defeat of internal threats to basic public order and restoration and maintenance of minimum essential political, security, and economic conditions within victim states combined might constitute the new ‘major combat operation’ for U.S. land forces. As argued above, circumstances like this might arise through hostile action by purposeful state and/or non-state competitors; the ruinous confluence of adverse contextual factors; or some combination of the two.

The next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will be decisive with respect to the future missioning of U.S. landpower. The forthcoming QDR will be the second conducted with significant U.S. land forces already committed to active irregular operations overseas.¹⁷ It is undeniable that recent American experience in foreign wars will weigh heavily on its outcome. Indeed, as argued above, military doctrine is rapidly accounting for this experience and adjusting as a consequence. However, defense analysts and senior defense and military leaders must answer two critical questions. First, are the military’s recent doctrinal and structural adjustments indicative of real change in the culture of the United States military and its increasing responsibilities for combating unconventional, often non-military threats? And, second, does the stable of incoming defense policymakers adequately appreciate the implications of the environment and its characteristics, as they relate to the future missioning and employment of U.S. landpower? Answers to both are currently a toss-up.

Exactly how America’s recent combat experience will impact strategic decisions by the next DoD team is unclear. Equally unclear is the extent to which future defense and national security decisionmakers are willing to continue to push against traditional military conventions that have prevailed through and beyond the Cold War. It is clear, however, that recent U.S. experience in unconventional conflicts will have a material impact on American land forces. From now until QDR 09’s delivery to Congress in a year, there will be intense debates over the orientation, structure, and use of landpower abroad. There are three big choices facing the next Secretary of Defense with respect to land forces. They include:

First, continue to *pursue “full-spectrum” balance*. This option continues measured adjustment to the new more unconventional strategic and operational environment, while still investing in a near co-equal hedge against future traditional threats;

Second, undertake a *wider “unconventional” revolution* inside the land components. This option accelerates and expands reorientation of U.S. land capabilities, renormalizing them against unconventional threats of purpose and context, while hedging against high-intensity conflict with appropriate investment in naval, air, and coercive/persuasive non-military instruments; and finally,¹⁸

Third, engage in *“institutional regression.”* This option sees a ‘counter-revolutionary’ reaction inside land forces against perceived over-optimization for non-traditional threats, opting instead to refocus land capabilities and missions on military challenges that are institutionally more comfortable. This would have the net effect of returning unconventional challenges to ‘boutique’ status, largely assigning the competency for combating them to special operating forces (SOF).¹⁹ This option is both consistent with latent military preferences for traditional warfighting and, at the same time, potentially more cost effective than the other two.²⁰

The first choice is the likeliest course of action but may not be the most prudent. The first option (*full-spectrum balance*) is consistent with the views of the current defense team. It seeks to ‘have it all,’ by optimizing

for the full spectrum of conflict regardless of how likely or unlikely future operations are on any point along it. It would see land forces balanced between the demands of a known present (dispersed employment in unconventional environments) and an unknown future (maintenance of excessive overmatch as a hedge against future high-end traditional conflict).

The third choice (*institutional regression*), on the other hand, is a strategic by most measures. Yet, traditional military biases indicate that it cannot be discounted. Here land forces revert to their traditional role as the principal arm of decision against miscalculating state-based military opponents.

Of the three, the second choice (*wider unconventional revolution*) is the institutional orphan. Its meaningful consideration is inhibited by innate military conservatism. It takes on the concept of balance (‘having it all’) directly and instead selects a prudent *unconventional pivot point* on the spectrum of conflict from which land forces can adjust to future conditions. This pivot point allows landpower leaders to optimize for the widest range of unconventional challenges while retaining some flexibility to reorient against future high-end traditional challenges, given adequate strategic warning.

It buys down risk against a range of likely unconventional threats while accepting increased risk in traditional warfighting. To date, this option lies unconsidered inside the defense establishment. None-the-less, the policy sea-change attending presidential transition may provide a window of opportunity for its meaningful consideration in the upcoming QDR.

The current spectrum of conflict is not optimal for determining the best pivot point for the future optimization of U.S. land components. Identifying the most appropriate unconventional “pivot point” for U.S. landpower is an essential first step toward realistically pursuing more wide-ranging revolutionary change in their capabilities and missioning. Army doctrine describes a linear spectrum of conflict that runs from “a stable peace” to “general war”.²¹ An alternative and more appropriate spectrum is at a minimum three dimensional (see Figure 1).

The first (x) axis — running left to right — represents the nature of purposeful threats in a given conflict environment. It ranges from disorganized, purely criminal threats on one side to more sophisticated, organized, military-like, or military threats on the other. The second (y) axis — running vertically — represents the permissiveness and level of on-going violence in a given conflict zone.²² Finally, a third axis (z) runs front to back. This axis represents the degree to which vulnerable third party partners in a given a conflict area exercise sovereign control over political and security outcomes.²³ Judgments on this are the result of dispassionate evaluation of their relative control over the instruments of violence, their degree of functioning political control over their constituent territory, and finally, the relative effectiveness of their formal government institutions.²⁴

A single label defines the new target for optimizing landpower on this




Figure 1: An Alternative Spectrum of Conflict and the New “Unconventional Pivot Point”

alternative spectrum of conflict—*decisive intervention in unconventional environments*. This becomes the new “pivot” or “balance” point for landpower (depicted in the yellow shading in Figure 1 above). Optimization should occur according to four key considerations. U.S. land forces should be optimized as the deliverer of decisive lethal and non-lethal capabilities under complex circumstances where: **1) vital interests are challenged by violent unconventional threats; 2) the degree of violence itself is quite high and the environment is, in the main, non-permissive; 3) the physical threats in the environment demonstrate some military-like or military organization and sophistication** (but not necessarily that commonly associated with high-end MCO); and finally, **4) third party partners have suffered a substantial loss or a complete failure of control over political and security outcomes.**²⁶

A wider unconventional revolution would redefine balance for land forces. Full-spectrum balance remains a legitimate goal across the defense establishment. This quick look paper argues, however, that pursuit of “full-spectrum” balance in land forces specifically is fraught with unwarranted near- and mid-term strategic risk. “Full-spectrum” balance might result in land forces sub-optimizing for their likeliest unconventional challenges in the name of hedging against an ill-defined traditional future. Pursuit of ***a wider unconventional revolution***, on the other hand, resets the balance point for land forces to best posture them for decisive intervention with lethal and non-lethal capabilities against a range of compelling unconventional threats of purpose and context, while the remainder of the defense enterprise balances more broadly against lower probability high-end traditional challenges.

Endnotes

1. This “quick look” working paper is intended to provide the basis for a longer and more detailed treatment of this subject. The findings are preliminary. The author invites wide engagement by the defense and national security community as the study proceeds.

2. Andrew Krepenovich, Strategy for the Long Haul: Defense Investment Strategies for an Uncertain World, Available from: http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20080821.Defense_Investment/R.20080821.Defense_Investment.pdf, Accessed September 25th, 2008.

3. See Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), FM 3-0: Operations, February 2008, p. 1-15. The United States Army describes “land power” as “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land resources, and people.” For the remainder of this paper, the author employs this term as shorthand for DoD’s land force components—the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps.

4. See Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 26 August 2008), Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, Accessed October 6th, 2008, p. 574.

5. See HQDA, February 2008, p. 3-1. The new Army “Operations” doctrine observes, “The Army’s operational concept is full spectrum operations: Army forces combine offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.”

6. For a doctrinal depiction of the “spectrum of conflict,” see HQDA, February 2008, p. 2-1.

7. Detailed discussions of “defense-relevant unconventional threats of purpose and context” are included in two forthcoming works by the author. The first is a joint PKSOI/SSI monograph entitled “Known Unknowns: Unconventional ‘Strategic Shocks’ in Future Defense Strategy.” The second is a CSIS monograph entitled “Shifting Emphasis: Leaders, Strategists, and Operators in a Period of Persistent Unconventional Challenge.”

8. FM 3-07 Stability Operations was released October 6th, 2008.

9. HQDA, February 2008, p. 3-1.

10. Ibid.

11. The author describes the concepts of “defense-relevant, unconventional” threats and “threats of purpose and context” in more detail in two forthcoming publications. The first is a CSIS monograph entitled “Shifting Emphasis: Strategic Leaders, Strategists, and Operators in an Era of Persistent Unconventional Challenge.” The second is a joint PKSOI/SSI monograph entitled “Known Unknowns: Unconventional ‘Strategic Shocks’ in Defense Strategy Development.”

12. The author discusses both of these again in the aforementioned forthcoming works. Non-military threats connote security challenges, activities, capabilities, or circumstances whose origin and form have little in common with traditional armed forces or traditional armed conflict. “Non-military,” in this context, does not necessarily mean non-state or disordered.

13. For a description of the Chinese concept of “unrestricted warfare” see Qiao Liang and Wang Xiansui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999, Available from <http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf>, Accessed October 8th, 2008.

14. Ibid. See also Nathan Freier, Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Traditional, Irregular, Catastrophic, and Hybrid Challenges in Context, May 2007, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub782.pdf, accessed September 22, 2008.

15. See Robert M. Gates, Speech: National Defense University (Washington, D.C.), As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., September 29th, 2008, Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1279>, Accessed October 2, 2008. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently observed in remarks at the National Defense University, “We can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction – from the sophisticated to the simple – being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.”

16. See Gates, September, 29th, 2008. The current Secretary of Defense agrees. He recently observed, “Let’s be honest with ourselves. The most likely catastrophic threats...are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressive states.”

17. See Department of Defense (DoD), Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>, Accessed September 26th, 2008. The 2006 QDR recognized this explicitly when it observed, “The Department of Defense conducted the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in the fourth year of a long war, a war that is irregular in its nature.”

18. See Gates, 2008. With an eye on contemporary traditional challenges specifically, the current Secretary of Defense hinted at this when he observed, “We have ample, untapped striking power in our air and sea forces should the need arise to deter or punish aggression – whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, or across the Taiwan Strait.”

19. There are hints of this even in current Army doctrine. See, for example, United States Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0: Operations, February 2008, Available from <http://downloads.army.mil/fm3-0/FM3-0.pdf>, Accessed September 22, 2008, p. 2-10. First, defining “irregular warfare” as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population,” it then goes on to observe, “Special operations conduct most irregular warfare operations. Sometimes conventional forces support them, other times special operations forces operate alone.”

20. For example, presumably this option would be less manpower intensive. See Josh Rogin, After War, A Military Budget Crunch Looms, CQ.com, May 21, 2007, Available from <http://public.cq.com/docs/cqt/news110-000002516524.html>, Accessed October 2, 2008. Last year, Josh Rogin, of Congressional Quarterly observed, “After the Iraq War winds down and emergency defense spending subsides, the effects of long-term force structure decisions made during wartime likely will ripple through future defense budgets and could have significant implications for defense transformation...With significantly fewer resources, the Pentagon would be forced to choose between paying soldiers or purchasing new weapons.”

21. See HQDA, February 2008, p. 2-1.

22. The author arrived at the latter “permissive” versus “non-permissive” consideration after discussions with Mr. Tom Dempsey of the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

23. The author added this axis after discussions with Mr. Sam Brannen, a fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.

24. The author would again acknowledge the help of CSIS's Sam Brannen in this regard.

25. This chart cannot be adequately reflected in two dimensions. A more refined product will be promulgated in the larger work.

26. The author will expand on this in much greater detail in the larger work.

CALENDER OF EVENTS

Conferences, Seminars and Working Groups

Event: Challenges Forum
Focus: "Partnerships - the United Nations, the European Union and the Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations: Examples of Cooperation within the Framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter".
Sponsor: Challenges International Partnership
Dates: 20-22 October 2008
Location: École Militaire, Paris, FR

Event: Seminar/Conference – Building "Whole of Community" Conflict Prevention [<https://members.ccoportal.org/building-whole-of-community-conflict-prevention>]
Focus/Purpose: Examine how civil society leaders are relating to government and military actors to achieve conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
Sponsor: Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)
Dates: 30 October 2008
Location: Washington, DC

Event: International Conference – "Security, Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Defense Sans Frontieres: Learning from the Past and Preparing for the Future." [<https://media6.magma.ca/www.casis.ca/register.html>]
Sponsor: Canadian Assn for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS)
Focus: Discussion topics include – non-traditional intelligence providers and consumers; managing public perceptions on intelligence organizations; reform of security sector in the Arab world.
Dates: 30 October – 1 November 2008
Location: Crowne Plaze Hotel, Ottawa, Canada

Event: Workshops- Center for Naval Analysis (CNA/PKSOI Implementing FM 3.07)
Focus/Purpose: Focus on the US military role in security sector reform, rebuilding nation-states, governance and economic development.
Dates: 16 October, 22 October, 12 November 2008
Location: CNA Headquarters, Alexandria VA
Contact: Marty Weaver, CNA

Exercises and Experiments

Event: Austere Challenge (AC09) – IA Writing Conference
Focus/Purpose: Develop IMS documentation and concept for S/CRS participation
Sponsor: US European Command (EUCOM)
Dates: 27-31 October 2008
Location: Collins Hall, Carlisle Barracks, PA USA
POC: COL Scott Wuestner, scott.wuestner@us.army.mil

Event: Unified Quest 08 IA Spiral Conference
Focus: Building partner capacity in Irregular Warfare environments; enabling IA campaign planning.
Sponsor: US Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Dates: 3- 7 November 2008 (UQ08: 23-28 April 2008)
Location: Carlisle Barracks, PA USA
POC: James Embrey, james.embrey@us.army.mil

Event: Expeditionary Warrior (EW09)
Focus: Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counter Insurgency (COIN), Special Operations Forces (SOF), General Purpose Forces (GPF) in an Interagency context.
Sponsor: US Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL)
Dates: 2-7 March 2009
Location: Quantico, VA USA
POC: COL Scott Wuestner, scott.wuestner@us.army.mil

Event: Viking 08
Focus: Stability Operations/Peace Operations – coordination and integration with UN/NATO/European Union agencies and elements.
Sponsor: US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)/ NATO
Dates: 2-14 Nov 2008
Location: Sweden
POC: LT COL David Kosinski, david.kosinski@us.army.mil

Event: AC 09 Exercise
Date: April- May 8, 2009
POC: Curtis.Baccard@EUCOM.mil