



TRANSITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT PROJECT

**Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group
Capability Study**

Noetic Corporation
January 2009



Distribution

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The information and concepts presented in this paper are the products of research and liaison with individuals with experience of working with or alongside the Australian Federal Police (AFP). This was conducted by Noetic over the period March-July 2008. The major themes have been presented to representatives of relevant agencies at workshops held in June and July. Representatives of the following U.S. Government stakeholder agencies contributed to and were consulted in this project:

- **Department of State:** Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).

- **United States Agency for International Development (USAID).**
- **Department of Justice.** International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP); and the United States Marshals Service (USMS).
- **Department of Defense.** Office of the Secretary of Defense – Policy (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) (SO/LIC&IC); Headquarters Department of the Army, Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG); U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).
- **Department of Homeland Security (DHS).** Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE).

Input obtained from representatives of Australian Government agencies has been used in the preparation of this document the views expressed here are Noetic's and are not official Australian government statements and they are not official statements of the AFP. Any errors in this paper are the responsibility of the authors and not any representative of the Australian or United States Governments.

CONTENTS

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYMENT GROUP CAPABILITY STUDY

Distribution	i
Authors	i

INTRODUCTION 1

Background.....	1
Aim	1
Scope.....	1
Methodology	2

PART 1: HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA’S TRANSITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY 3

AFP Background.....	3
Australian Law Enforcement Community.....	5
Authorities and Budget	6
Evolution of AFP Roles and Responsibilities	9

PART 2: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS..... 14

AFP Operational Continuum.....	14
Critical Partnerships.....	18

PART 3: IDG CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT 20

Doctrine	20
Organization	21
Training.....	22
Materiel (Equipment)	23
Leadership and Education	23
Personnel.....	24
Facilities.....	26
Capability Development.....	26

ANNEX A - CASE STUDY: EAST TIMOR 27

Introduction	27
Background.....	28
Mandate and Mission.....	30
Capacity Building	31

ANNEX B - CASE STUDY: SOLOMON ISLANDS 33

Introduction.....	33
Background.....	34
Mandate and Mission.....	35
Military and Police Coordination	36
Participating Police Force Capability	38
RAMSI Operational Phases	41

ANNEX C - PERSONS INTERVIEWED 44

ANNEX D - AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART..... 45

ANNEX E - INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYMENT GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE .. 46

ANNEX F - OPERATIONAL RESPONSE UNITS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 477

ANNEX G - OPERATIONAL SUPPORT UNIT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 488

INTRODUCTION

Background

Transitional Law Enforcement (TLE) is becoming increasingly recognized as a key element in successful reconstruction and stabilization operations in countries where the rule of law and normal government functions have failed. A detailed description of the role and various elements of TLE is contained in the capstone document for this project.¹

This paper is one of four deliverables of the first stage of a broader project that seeks to detail the range of approaches to TLE as the basis for examination of how a TLE capability could be further developed in the United States (U.S.). The TLE Project is sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and involves various agencies within the Departments of Defense, State and Justice as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development. This paper describes the Australian Government's approach to the provision of a TLE capability through the Australian Federal Police's (AFP) International Deployment Group (IDG). This examination of the AFP's IDG capability will support a capstone document describing TLE requirements across a spectrum of operating environments². The capstone document will be considered in conjunction with a survey and analysis of the international TLE environment and of current U.S. TLE authorities. The AFP's IDG is intended to serve as a model for U.S. stakeholders to consider in the development of their TLE capability.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to describe the AFP's TLE capability, principally focusing on the IDG.

Scope

The scope of this paper is limited to the activities of the AFP's IDG and its interaction with relevant Whole of Government (WoG) stakeholders.

The paper is divided into three parts:

- + Part 1 describes the history of the IDG, including the roles and responsibilities of its parent organization (the AFP), and the development of the IDG following years of involvement by the AFP in international policing operations.
- + Part 2 explains the IDG's concept of operations.
- + Part 3 details the AFP capability management framework as it relates to the IDG.

¹ See Noetic Corporation, *Considerations for the Employment of Transitional Law Enforcement Capabilities (DRAFT)*, Prepared for Emerging Capabilities Division (OSD), November 2008

² Noetic Corporation, *Considerations for the Employment of Transitional Law Enforcement Capabilities (DRAFT)*, Prepared for Emerging Capabilities Division (OSD), November 2008

Two case studies on policing deployments to East Timor and the Solomon Islands are also included. They describe the objective of each mission and the practical application of the AFP's TLE capabilities in differing circumstances.

Footnotes are used throughout this study to identify the U.S. equivalent to Australian organizations, where appropriate and relevant.

Methodology

Noetic conducted extensive research on the historical and operational aspects of the AFP's IDG through publicly available material. This research was validated and supplemented by interviews with subject matter experts from police, military and government policy backgrounds. A listing of individuals interviewed can be found at Annex C.

PART 1: HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA'S TRANSITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY

AFP Background

The AFP has been involved in a range of policing operations in the international environment throughout its relatively short history³. In February 2004, the Australian Government created the IDG as a formal subset of the AFP to institutionalize and enhance the AFP's capacity to undertake international deployments in support of reconstruction and stabilization operations. It is necessary to recognize that the AFP's IDG operates in the international TLE environment as 'invited peace builders, not peace makers,' the latter being a role for the Australian Defence Force (ADF)⁴; and as 'capacity builders' not as a long-term alternative to the police force of the host country. Consequently, the AFP considers traditional peacekeeping as the foundation of the IDG's capacity development work. Capacity development includes civil policing and can be broadly defined as those activities that ensure the host country has an appropriate policing model that is sustainable and delivers a safe and secure environment for its people.

The AFP is a Federal agency with broad national and international responsibilities in the areas of counter terrorism, crime fighting, and capacity building. The AFP employs just over 6000 people, of which 2450 are attached to Australian national or international policing operations; nearly 1400 are Protective Service Officers (PSOs)⁵; 800 are dedicated to policing the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)⁶; and the remainder performs technical, logistical or administrative functions. Last year, an additional 215 officers were seconded to the AFP from the police forces of other Australian states and territories to support various tasks. Functionally, the AFP is managed according to the outcomes and outputs defined by a 2004 Ministerial Direction. Key areas are Border and International Network, Aviation Security, ACT Policing, Economic and Special Operations, Counter Terrorism, and the IDG. The AFP's current organizational chart can be found at Annex D.

The IDG is currently experiencing a period of rapid expansion. The organization, which began with fewer than 500 staff in 2004, has a recruitment goal of 1200 officers, which is likely to be met by the end of 2008. The IDG is still evolving but within a short period has built a record of success within an operational context of increasing relevance throughout the world. The Australian Government has significantly increased investment in this capability in response to regional stability concerns. The IDG is also subject to increased interest from other nations because of its unique capabilities. Its uniqueness rests in the IDG's utility as a standing deployable law enforcement capability. The IDG's successes

³ The AFP was formed in 1979.

⁴ The ADF is equivalent to the U.S. military, with an Army, Navy, and Air Force. Of the three Services, the Australian Army has played the most significant role in reconstruction and stabilization operations.

⁵ The Protective Service is equivalent to the U.S. Secret Service but without responsibility for investigation of currency offences. Protective Service Officer's have specific powers of arrest for Commonwealth Offences relating to their working area under the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979*.

⁶ The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Police (noting that these are an element of the AFP) are the Australian equivalent to U.S. Capital Police with the additional responsibility for providing law enforcement throughout the ACT, a function performed by the City of Washington DC Police in the U.S..

arise from the effective deployment of civil policing skills rather than military expertise (though there are 'hardened' elements within the IDG).

The AFP (and the IDG especially) is a product of Australia's specific geo-strategic circumstances. The Australian Government's history of deploying the AFP's international policing capability reveals the significance of Australia's WoG approach to national security challenges and other circumstances where the Government believes action is in the best interests of Australia, including responding to calls for assistance from 'failing or failed states'. The Australian Public Service Commission defines WoG as public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. Approaches to WoG are both formal and informal and include policy development, program management and service delivery. The successful deployment of IDG officers overseas represents a WoG success. However, the Government continues to focus on ways to strengthen and improve its ability to function as a coordinated entity.

Australia's WoG approach should be understood in the context of the size of the Australian population (20.6 million people compared to 303.8 million people in the U.S.), and the corresponding impact on the size of its military, diplomatic corps, police and broader public service. The relative smallness of the Australian Government necessitates a WoG approach to decision-making on important issues. The crisis machinery of the Australian Government cannot be effective if agencies are isolated. The National Security Policy Framework and associated decision makers must function cooperatively. This necessary interaction between decision makers leads to inter-departmental and inter-agency familiarity with roles, functions and capabilities and a greater awareness of what is required to successfully implement policy. It should be noted that, as a parliamentary democracy, national security authority in the Australian context is not the equivalent of the President⁷ and Congress⁸. The Australian arrangements result in a high-level community of senior officials and practitioners that develop policy and procedures and (in line with Cabinet decisions) allocate resources and implement agreed policies.

At the operational level, the IDG has been deployed alongside the ADF and has also worked closely with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)⁹ and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)¹⁰. The specifics of each mission dictated how the WoG approach was applied and which entity assumed the status of lead agency. The heads of the organizations were able to meet frequently and plan a way forward, adjusting to emerging developments in the operation and different resource demands. This WoG approach, encompassing policy-making to conducting operations and involving all key stakeholders, accounts for the IDG's capacity to provide the appropriate level and type of capability at the right time. This approach is cognizant of all of the dimensions of the Australian Government's internal policies, foreign relations positions and the constitutional issues surrounding the provision of assistance (possibly including an armed presence) within another sovereign country.

⁷ The Australian equivalent of the President is the Prime Minister noting that he/she is the head of the elected government but not the Head of State.

⁸ The Australian equivalent of Congress is the Parliament of Australia, comprising the House of Representatives and the Senate.

⁹ The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is equivalent to the U.S. Department of State.

¹⁰ The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) is equivalent to the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Australian Law Enforcement Community

The number of law enforcement bodies in Australia is limited when compared to the equivalent segment in the U.S., reflecting the nature of Australia's federated states under the Australian Constitution. Domestic law enforcement bodies in Australia are the AFP and the state and territory police forces, of which there are seven (see Figure 1). The AFP has responsibility for enforcing criminal law in the ACT and for Commonwealth criminal law throughout Australia and internationally, for protecting high office holders and the missions and representatives of other countries; and for the security of federal government installations and activities, including maintaining a presence at major airports. The state and territory police forces are sizable, and their authority reflects the constitutional mandate for criminal law to be set at the state and territory level. The responsibility for law enforcement does not devolve beyond the state and territory level. For example, there are no county or metropolitan specific police forces in Australia. The size of the each state or territory police force is relative to population, with most of Australia's population concentrated along the east coast. The breakdown of the state and territory police forces, listing the number of officers and the population of the state or territory, is as follows:

- + New South Wales: 14,500 officers, 6.7 million people;
- + Victoria: 13,600 officers, 5.1 million people;
- + Queensland: 9,000 officers, 4.3 million people;
- + Western Australia: 5,000 officers, 2 million people;
- + Southern Australia: 5,000 officers, 1.6 million people;
- + Tasmania: 1,200 officers. 0.5 million; and
- + Northern Territory: 1,100 officers, 0.2 million.

As noted, responsibility for law enforcement within the ACT rests with ACT Policing which is a part of the AFP. ACT Policing is comprised of 800 officers, while the population of the ACT is 0.3 million people.



Figure 1: Australia’s State and Territory Police Forces

The police forces of each of the states and the Northern Territory do not, of themselves, have any specific role in international law enforcement efforts. The Australian Constitution provides that foreign relations powers are specifically matters for the Commonwealth Government. However, the federated nature of the Australian constituency and the cooperative arrangements that exist between the Federal, State Governments and the Northern Territory, ensure that state and territory police officers can be part of international law enforcement efforts when necessary, but do so under the auspices of the AFP and related Commonwealth international treaties and arrangements.

Authorities and Budget

The AFP is Australia’s federal law enforcement agency and international policing body, established in 1979 under the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979* (AFP Act 1979). The AFP Act details two key outcomes:

- + The investigation and prevention of crime against the Commonwealth and protection of Commonwealth interests in Australia and overseas, and
- + Policing creates a safe and secure environment in the ACT.

The AFP's core functions are set out in Section 8 of the AFP Act 1979. These core functions have remained the same since the inception of the force but the organizational structures and resourcing for the two key outcomes have evolved over time. Figure 2 details the specific outputs to each of the outcomes. These outputs – established by Ministerial direction¹¹ in August 2004, and issued under the *AFP Act 1979* -- outline the Australian Government's priorities and expectations for the AFP.




Figure 2: AFP Outcomes & Outputs

The AFP falls within the Attorney General's portfolio. The Commissioner of the AFP reports to the Minister for Home Affairs, who is responsible for setting policy for the AFP, though is subordinate to the Attorney General, who holds a Cabinet position and sets broad direction for federal law enforcement. An important aspect of the functioning of the AFP is that it is a statutory authority. Therefore the Australian Government annually sets the budget for the organization and provides general directions in writing to the Commissioner; however, the Commissioner operates independently and is accountable for the operational activities of the organization.

The AFP is required to report annually to Parliament against the outputs outlined above. For outputs listed under Outcome 1, funding is provided from the Attorney General's portfolio, while the output under Outcome 2 is not funded through the AFP's budget, but by a contractual arrangement with the ACT Government, noting that the AFP is required (by the *AFP Act 1979*) to provide policing services for the ACT.

The AFP's role is to enforce the Federal laws of Australia, both criminal and civil (such as the Proceeds of Crime legislation) and to protect the interests of the Australian Government domestically and internationally. In the last decade, funding for the AFP increased by 34.1% to reach \$849.9M (note all

¹¹ In 2004, under the Howard Government, the Minister for Justice and Customs represented the AFP. With the election of the Rudd Government in 2007, this Ministry was abolished and the AFP is now represented by the Minister for Home Affairs.

figures in this paper are in Australian dollars) in 2006/07. Under both the Coalition Howard Government¹² and the newly elected Labor Party Rudd Government, the AFP has been prioritized for expansion and further investment. The Howard Government established the IDG in 2004 to respond to regional security concerns and to contribute to the international policing requirements articulated by Australia's allies.

In the Australian Government's 2006/2007 budget, the IDG funding level was \$258.9M and mission-specific funding was as follows: \$137.4M for the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI); 47.5M for Papua New Guinea and \$30.2M for East Timor. This allocation indicates the IDG's Australian-based costs were funded to the level of \$44M.¹³ Also, in August 2006, the Howard Government announced a proposal to provide the AFP with an additional \$493.2M to support significant staff increases (to include but not limited to IDG positions). The AFP's total budget for 2007/2008 was \$1.053 Billion and the total amount allocated to the IDG within the AFP portfolio was \$263.7M.

The AFP's funding in the 2008/09 Federal Budget was \$1.4 Billion. The Rudd Government announced that part of the increase (\$219 million) would be provided to aid AFP initiatives in the areas of specialized training, facilities and information needs for its intelligence, aviation security and IDG elements.¹⁴ Such sizeable increases in funding bolster the AFP's institutional capacity for international policing operations and provide the organization with opportunities to invest in improved training and recruit specific skill sets.

The 2008/09 and out-years budget announcements included funding of \$80.1M to build better policing strategies for Pacific countries, an additional \$53.7M over two years to develop a more effective and accountable police service for East Timor, \$47M to deploy additional sworn police to assist in capacity building and narcotic roles in Afghanistan, and \$13.7M to support the Iraqi Police Service with the training of its police members. The IDG, in partnership with other agencies, will participate extensively in each of these projects.

The IDG thus provides the AFP response to Government directions related to capacity building programs, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions and, regional assistance missions. Missions that do not operate under the authority of the UN operate under regional assistance and other bilateral agreements. The IDG is projected to reach its authorized personnel establishment of 1,200 by the end of 2008 and represents the most robust international policing capability Australia has ever possessed.

In addition to the increase in overall numbers, the AFP continues to invest in arrangements with the Australian states and the Northern Territory to both increase the supply of police officers available for operations and to strengthen the diversity of skill sets within the AFP. State and territory law enforcement officers typically bring a broader skill set, with particular strengths in community policing, an

¹² The Howard Government consisted of both the Liberal and the National parties, and was referred to as the Coalition Government.

¹³ Due to the institutional arrangements within a parliamentary democracy, policy is finalized and monies are appropriated nearly concurrently. As a result, the specificity on funding levels does not reach the level of granularity it does in the U.S.. However, a 2007 audit completed and made publicly available by the Australian National Audit Office made the 2006/2007 funding breakdown possible.

¹⁴ Note that this increase is provided in addition to the AFP base funding.

important aspect of international civil policing operations. Currently, more than 200 officers from the states and the Northern Territory are assigned to the AFP. Those assigned officers mainly support the IDG and also the area of Aviation Security¹⁵.

The *AFP Act of 1979* provides the AFP with the authority to swear in state and territory police as special members of the AFP. The contribution by the state and territory police varies, but the AFP has negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with each state and the Northern Territory that specifies the terms and conditions of any such contribution. When a state or territory police officer is assigned to the AFP, the AFP assumes responsibility for paying their salary. Each MOU addresses terms and conditions including an administrative payment that covers the cost of recruiting and backfilling the position at the state or territory level. When the IDG reaches its goal of 1200 officers, the organization will become self-sustaining. However, the relationship with the states and the Northern Territory is viewed by the AFP as mutually beneficial, as it diversifies skills sets and brings in police officers with stronger community police skills than the average federal officer.¹⁶

Evolution of AFP Roles and Responsibilities

The AFP was established in 1978 following the bombing of the Sydney Hilton Hotel¹⁷. The formal incorporation of the force occurred in 1979. The newly-created AFP represented a combination of officers from the then ACT Police, the Commonwealth Police¹⁸ and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics¹⁹. The AFP's initial focus was domestic crime fighting with the understanding that certain elements of fighting domestic crime required international initiatives focused on disrupting the drug trade. Currently, the AFP focuses on counter terrorism, crime fighting, and capacity building. The main vehicle for the provision of the AFP's TLE capability is through capacity building operations. However, these operations are strengthened by the international networks the AFP has established through past and ongoing crime fighting and counter terrorism operations.

The AFP's counter terrorism focus was heightened following the terrorist attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001. One immediate change was the reintegration of the Australian Protective Service, which had been part of the AFP at inception but was separated from the AFP in 1984. This reintegration ensures close coordination on counter terrorism work. The AFP PSOs protect the personnel and property of the Australian Government, foreign governments, and international treaty organizations. The key functions of the PSOs relate to counter terrorism first response activities at Australia's major airports and protection of sensitive sites across Australia.

¹⁵ Aviation Security principally involves AFP officers assigned to airports. Australia's equivalent to the U.S. Transport Security Agency is the Office of Transport Security within the federal Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government.

¹⁶ See the 'Personnel' section within Capability Management (Part 3) for further information on personnel seconded from the states and the Northern Territory.

¹⁷ A bomb was placed in a trash can and exploded when the can was emptied into a garbage truck on 13 February 1978. Two garbage collectors and one policeman were killed and eleven people injured. At the time the Sydney Hilton was hosting the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting. This was Australia's first encounter with domestic terrorism.

¹⁸ The Commonwealth Police were the former Australian federal policing entity.

¹⁹ The Federal Bureau of Narcotics performed functions similar to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration but specific to narcotics trafficking.

For counter terrorism operations, the AFP maintains a close working relationship with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)²⁰, as well as other domestic intelligence agencies, in order to ensure that criminal investigations into threats to national security are coordinated appropriately with ASIO's security intelligence responsibilities. In the counter terrorism field the AFP also works closely with other federal agencies with law enforcement responsibilities within the Attorney-General's portfolio, including the Australian Customs Service²¹, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, the Australian Crime Commission, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and CrimTrac²², and with officers within the Attorney-General's Department with responsibility for national and international legal affairs and arrangements.

Within the area of crime fighting, in addition to the officers posted throughout Australia, members of the AFP are currently deployed to approximately 30 posts in 27 countries. AFP members posted overseas focus on investigations and intelligence operations against transnational crime, including terrorism, in cooperation with host country law enforcement agencies in both hemispheres²³. Although the IDG functions separately, it benefits from, and maintains close links with these deployed AFP networks.

Australia's involvement in the Southeast Asia region has deepened during the past two decades. Figure 3 displays parts of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. Growing instability in a number of Pacific Island countries in the late 1990s highlighted the absence of any institutionalized regional arrangements to curtail conflict and affirmed Australia's interest in maintaining regional security and stability. Concerns about the threat posed by transnational crime to the security, sovereignty and economic integrity of Pacific Island countries deepened Australia's resolve to support capacity building through involvement in reconstruction and stabilization operations. Consequently, as Australia's involvement in the region increased, the need to formalize the AFP role emerged.

²⁰ The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) collects domestic intelligence and therefore performs a role similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

²¹ The Australian Customs Services is the equivalent to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency within the Department of Homeland Security.

²² CrimTrac is a recently created (2000) federal agency that assists Australia's police forces with support services specific to forensic science and information technology, including the population and maintenance of national level databases. This capability along with the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, the Australian Crime Commission, and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions is not housed in a single federal entity in the U.S..

²³ Note that these posts are AFP-specific and are not related to the personnel assigned to Australia's diplomatic missions.



Figure 3: Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands

Prior to the establishment of the IDG, the AFP contributed to international policing activities on an ad hoc basis by increasing operational tempo for the life of the mission and then decreasing the level of support to the point of withdrawal from the activity. The AFP would essentially borrow resources from within the organization to support the mission. Prior to 2004, when the Australian Government committed to an international policing mission the AFP typically chose a leader for the operation from current operational staff, who would in turn choose the remainder of the team. Little support was available to the team for the conduct of its mission. This ad hoc approach became untenable with the increasing requirements for international policing missions, such as those mounted in the Solomon Islands and East Timor, which drew heavily on the resources of the AFP.

The establishment of the IDG as a standing capability allows the AFP to engage in international operations without causing significant disruption to the state and Northern Territory police forces and to the other areas of its operations. Upon the formation of the IDG, Prime Minister Howard explained:

They [IDG personnel] will have the permanent ongoing responsibility of taking part in international deployments. They will obviously incorporate many of the people that are now on deployment in the Solomon Islands and to be deployed in the near future in Papua New Guinea. The difference is that we're going to have a separate dedicated group and the people involved in it will have the full-time responsibility of taking part in international deployments. The weakness of the current arrangement [is that] a police officer might be working, for example in the Victorian Police, go on deployment in the region on the understanding that he or she would then return to service in the Victorian Police. That creates difficulties for the state police forces because it is essentially ad hoc. And, of course, as these officers are involved in apprehension in other counties they're required to give evidence in court when people are charged, that also creates further demands on their time and logic suggests that we should have a separate dedicated force²⁴.

The AFP Annual Report identifies that the IDG's international involvement is divided between peacekeeping and capacity building. Capacity building missions represent 89% of the IDG's work. The distinction between the two types of missions is that capacity building missions are traditionally regional while the peacekeeping work is related directly to a UN mission. Therefore, the majority of the IDG's

²⁴ Australian Government, The Prime Minister's International Deployment Speech, 2 February 2004.

international involvement to date has been in response to regional instability and part of that response has been to contribute to capacity building arrangements.

Although the IDG was not formalized until 2004, the Australian law enforcement community's involvement in international operations dates back to 1964 when Australian police were deployed as part of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). That mission continues today with ten AFP personnel deployed to Cyprus on a permanent basis. The timeline in Figure 4 details the history of the AFP's international engagement.




Figure 4: Timeline of AFP International Deployments²⁵

1964
CYPRUS

1988
THAILAND

1989
NAMIBIA

1992
CAMBODIA

1964

1970

1978
SYDNEY
HILTON
BOMBING

1980

1984
AUSTRALIAN
PROTECTIVE
SERVICE SEPARATE

1979
AFP ACT

1987
LAW ENFORCEMENT
COOPERATION PROGRAM

1990

²⁵ Timeline created by author. Background information for timeline collected from the AFP Annual Report, 2006-2007.

The current Missions and Operations component of the IDG involves nearly 400 men and women who are supporting policing operations in Cyprus, Jordan, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Sudan, East Timor, Tonga, Vanuatu, Cambodia and Afghanistan (as shown in Figure 5 including the year the each mission commenced). By the end of this year (2008), the Missions and Operations component is projected to grow to 750.




Figure 5: Current IDG Deployments²⁶

²⁶ This figure is based on the AFP's representation of IDG deployments, featured in an AFP power point presentation delivered 16 June 2008, entitled 'International Deployment Group Operational Response Group'.

PART 2: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This part of the report will focus on the manner in which the IDG operates when deployed on offshore missions. A comprehensive understanding of the IDG's concept of operations requires an explanation of the environments in which it operates and the critical partnerships that enables its operations. These critical partnerships represent a facet of Australia's WoG approach to capacity building missions. In a 2002 Ministerial Statement entitled, 'Australian Aid: Investing in Growth, Stability and Prosperity', the Howard Government acknowledged that the effectiveness of Australia's engagement in fragile states would depend on its capacity to apply an integrated approach among its ministries.

Within the operational continuum, the AFP considers each possible mission as being unique and requiring a tailored response that recognizes a diversity of tasks, responsibilities and outcomes from government stakeholders. The objective of each mission, and the effect that Australia is trying to achieve remains paramount throughout the operation – the specifics of how the operation will be conducted are determined according to the overall objective and an ongoing analysis of the situation on the ground.

AFP Operational Continuum

AFP policymakers, drawing upon operational experience amassed over a range of deployments, articulated their approach to international operations in a submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs²⁷ in March 2007. This committee conducted an inquiry into Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations. While recognizing that the Australian Government will continue to contribute to peacekeeping operations, the AFP submission highlights that the concept of peacekeeping does not encompass the AFP's range or capabilities or depth of operational experience.

The AFP explained its approach through an operational continuum spanning six operating environments:

- + state normalcy;
- + pre-crisis;
- + increasing tension/fragile state;
- + tension/conflict/failed state;
- + conflict resolution/ceasefire; and
- + restoration/capacity building.

²⁷ The U.S. equivalent of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Both of these committees perform oversight functions. Note that in the Australian system there are no separate appropriations committees.

The activities conducted by the AFP differ according to the level of conflict and the conditions set out in the bilateral or multilateral agreement(s) used to formalize the AFP offshore engagement. The AFP believes there is a role for police across the continuum but that their contribution in a high intensity conflict would be limited due to the level of threat and their capacity to provide effective support to the military. The differing levels of military and police involvement across the operational continuum are shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6: The Operational Continuum²⁸

Threshold of Armed Conflict

Cessation of Armed Conflict

The ability to attain and sustain stability within a fragile state depends on the appropriate contribution and transition of primacy between the military and the police. Australia's WoG approach to peacekeeping and capacity building operations provides the necessary flexibility for the AFP and the ADF to establish mission-specific concepts of operations. The AFP has operated in a number of offshore environments, ranging from settings where there is an absence of government institutions and almost complete breakdown in the rule of law to environments where the coaching and mentoring of police is the key objective of the mission.

The initial cessation of conflict will usually require an effective military response supported by a police capability to provide rule of law activities along with the critical functions provided by humanitarian agencies. The IDG's ability to contribute to a mission increases as the situation on the ground moves along the operational continuum towards stabilization and normalcy. Deploying police too early is equivalent to sending police onto the battlefield – the officers are exposed to an environment for which they are neither trained nor equipped. An important aspect of this continuum is recognition of the potential for a situation to quickly regress, as was the case in East Timor in 2006²⁹. In any mission, the

State Normalcy

Pre-crisis

Increasing tension

Failed State

Peacemaking

Peacebuilding

²⁸ A version of this figure can be found in the AFP's submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 2007. In the original figure the green bell curve represented combined involvement by military, police, and humanitarian agencies. The blue inverted curve was added to illustrate increased police involvement in the pre- and post-conflict environments. This figure is not precise. Rather, the figure is used to generally demonstrate the different levels of military and police involvement related to the environment.

²⁹ See Annex A, Case Study East Timor for further information.

IDG's overarching aim is to uphold the rule of law and people's rights through capacity development in support of regional law enforcement.

The AFP always operates in conjunction with either the police services of the host nation or those of other participating countries, or both, noting that the AFP is always 'invited' by either the host nation or the UN under a specific mission. AFP assistance delivered offshore depends on the needs and requests of the host nation. IDG 'services' can be broken down into four mission categories:

- + multilateral law enforcement capacity building missions,
- + bilateral law enforcement capacity building programs,
- + international monitoring missions, and
- + international peace operation missions as civilian police with the United Nations.

The type of mission is defined by the genesis of the engagement – the Australian Government either responds to a request for assistance from the host nation, from an allied nation engaged in capacity building or from the UN.

The application of civil policing skills is vital to establishing and sustaining a stable environment. Within the operational continuum, civil policing activities are only effective in a pre- or post-conflict environment. The level of violence in existence in a community thus directly impacts on the AFP ability to contribute their main skill set.

Effective civil police³⁰ work depends on the perception within the community that the police are fair, honest and consistent. The civil policing that occurs on international deployments does not exactly mirror the police work conducted within Australia, but the civil policing function is the work that either moves a fragile state along the continuum to a functional state with an established rule of law, or prevents the breakdown of rule of law by strengthening civil institutions, including (but not limited to) the police. Effective civil policing operations create an environment that instills confidence. In functional states, police officers spend the majority of their time talking, walking and writing. This is the desired end-state for fragile states, with the host nation's police force engaging in these activities in lieu of an intervention force.

Training and mentoring activities represent the majority of the civil policing work conducted by the AFP on offshore missions. Reconstruction and stabilization operations often require the delivery of basic training on human rights and ethical policing. The delivery of this training can be particularly challenging because of language and cultural barriers. Mentoring can take several different forms. In response to a request from the British Government, four members of the IDG are currently engaged in mentoring the Afghan Police Force (with an additional eight budgeted for in the 2008/2009 Federal Budget). This arrangement has proved successful. Previously the military had responsibility for this training but were

³⁰ Civil police work generally refers to policing focused on detection, prosecution, and the broader prevention of crime, primarily through presence in and partnership with the community.

not able to pass on community policing skills effectively. Currently in Afghanistan this mentoring is occurring with members of the Afghan Police Force on a one-to-one basis, which is not always possible in reconstruction and stabilization operations. Some situations may better lend themselves to mentoring in leadership roles as an alternative to higher numbers of IDG members serving as examples of good policing behavior.

Within the operational continuum, there is an acknowledged grey area between what are police missions and what are military missions. The AFP has recently established a 200-strong Operational Response Group (ORG) that aims to reduce the extent of this grey area. The tactical capability of the ORG serves to stabilize an environment teetering between military conflict and civil disorder, and also acts as a stand-by capability to address civil disorder during ongoing missions. The ORG supports the larger civil policing mission by influencing the environment to the extent that civil policing activities are made possible. It is important to note that the ORG was not created to augment ADF capabilities. The ORG is viewed as a collective response, and the AFP is not willing for the ORG to be divided by the ADF into sub-sets to support a military-led mission.

The creation and maintenance of public order presents a formidable challenge to stabilization efforts as public order must be established in order for reconstruction operations to begin in earnest. The ORG functions as a stabilizing force with the ability to function in higher risk environments, with the expectation that their functionality will be required for a relatively short period of time (maximum of thirty days). See Annex E for a breakdown of the ORG's structure.

The ORG is supported by the Operational Support Units (OSU), whose operational elements are stationed in Brisbane, Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne. These Australian-based support functions enhance ORG readiness and facilitate its capacity to play a leading role in some of the IDG's more hazardous operations. The OSUs provide technical support to the ORG ranging from negotiators responsible for providing conflict de-escalation and supporting the resolution of complex situations, marine operators responsible for delivering maritime capabilities to the ORG via the deployment of maritime assets, air support responsible for delivering specialist aviation and technical capabilities, a designated Marksman Reconnaissance Team that provides advanced weapons systems and surveillance operations assets, and a Specialist Operations Support Team (SOST). The SOST provides the group with technical advice, resources and protection capability. Annex F and G provide a breakdown of ORU and OSU structure respectively.

The ORG's Tactical Response Teams (TRT) provide a high-level tactical response capability for AFP domestic and international operations. It has the capacity to resolve high risk incidents, provide support to public order policing, undertake patrols in remote areas, provide police protection in high risk situations as well as support the personal security of deployed members.

The ORG's current participation in the Solomon Islands marks the first deployment of a complete TRT on an overseas mission. In 2006, a TRT was deployed in support of the AFP response to the East Timor crisis with IDG members directing initiatives to maintain law and order in a situation of widespread civil disorder and violence. The TRT also responded to the Tonga riots in that nation's capital in 2006 to assist with the restoration of law and order. In March 2008, a 70-strong TRT force was deployed to East

Timor to undertake a crowd control operation following an assassination attempt against President Jose Ramos-Horta.

The ORG's Stability Response Teams (SRT) provide an immediate response to incidents of civil disorder, crowd control and riot situations in support of AFP international operations. SRT members receive specialized weapons training and provide specialized support, including communications, negotiation and maritime support. The SRT's training package draws on expertise from a range of sources, including the UK public order package, state and territory public order packages and the practical experience gained by the AFP in responding to serious international public order incidents over the past two years

Critical Partnerships

The strength of the AFP's relationships with DFAT, the ADF, and AusAID contributes to the integrity of Australia's WoG approach, and therefore the ability of the Australian Government to continue to provide comprehensive assistance to fragile or failing states. DFAT serves as the lead agency for the development of the policy framework for all international deployments. The National Security Committee of Cabinet determines whether or not a deployment will take place, and although the main provider (typically the ADF or the AFP) will run operations, DFAT remains involved. For example, for the Solomon Islands, East Timor, and Afghanistan missions there are standing Interdepartmental Committees, all led by DFAT. DFAT plays a critical role in ensuring the WoG approach is effectively applied.

AFP partnership with AusAID has intensified over the past two years as the AFP's capacity building operations have expanded to include justice sector reforms. An AFP officer is embedded in AusAID's Fragile States Unit. This officer provides practical policing input to the development of diagnostic, analytical, and planning advice to government agencies dealing with the issue of fragile states. Some of the AFP's recent operations with AusAID have been funded through AusAID's portfolio, such as the participation in the Cambodian Criminal Justice Assistance Program.

The recent operational experience of the ADF and the AFP in East Timor and the Solomon Islands has reinforced the need for the ADF and the AFP to address interoperability issues. As a result, mutually agreed milestones were formalized in the Interoperability Joint Terms of Reference (TOR) signed by ADF and AFP senior leadership in November 2006. The desired effect of the ADF/AFP Interoperability Review is that through comprehensive mission reviews, whatever has been effective or ineffective will be captured and applied to improve interoperability at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Mapping common ground in the areas of doctrine and organizational planning requires an increase in the number of joint training activities as a way of introducing military and policing components to the different planning methods, operational language and working cultures of the respective organizations. An element of the TOR milestones related to embedding two AFP officers within the ADF's Joint

Operations Command (one in the Plans cell and another in the Operations cell), and one in the ADF Warfare Centre, with a focus on doctrine development.³¹

At the time of writing, the ADF/AFP Interoperability Review has benefitted from a full year of working group meetings that have resulted in 142 recommendations, of which 40 were considered strategic. The working groups, which continue to meet, are organised on a functional basis into eight separate groups: Legal; Command and Control; Administration and Logistics; Education, Training, and Doctrine; Operations; Information and Communications Systems; Intelligence; and Capability Development. Recognizing the importance of the ADF and the AFP providing two different services to a host nation, many of these groups have moved beyond technical interoperability and are addressing issues related to ensuring that the ADF and AFP are complementary providers during a deployment.

In the Solomon Islands in 2003, the AFP operated as the lead agency for a multinational mission comprised of police from New Zealand and 13 Pacific Island nations, called the Participating Police Force (PPF). The stabilization of the situation on the ground in the Solomon Islands was achieved by the careful balancing of PPF's capabilities and the military's capabilities. Within the first 100 days of operations, the PPF made 350 arrests, laid 600 charges and collected 3,700 firearms without firing a shot.³² This was, in part, a product of the extensive joint strategic planning undertaken by the police and military components of the mission. The PPF initiated policies and procedures to regulate the number of military personnel at a given place at any given time and, in doing so, ensured police primacy. Importantly, the PPF conducted police activities rather than military activities (as is the case in more traditional forms of peacekeeping). Public perceptions factor heavily into a host nation's patience with foreign forces and the activities of the PPF were accepted by the community because police operations were exactly what the Solomon Islands needed to stabilize their communities.

³¹ The focus of the ADF's Joint Operations Command is similar to the focus of the unified Combatant Commands in the U.S., though it is not a direct equivalent. The ADF Warfare Centre is similar to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command though the ADF Warfare Centre represents all Services.

³² Please note that the IDG was not officially created at this point but the AFP provided police officers to the Participating Police Force. The successful deployment of AFP officers in the Solomon Islands contributed to the development and resourcing of the IDG.

PART 3: IDG CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT

A definition of capability is the ability to achieve a desired effect in a specific operating environment. There is a recognized capability gap in stabilization and reconstruction operations for TLE. The inherent challenge in addressing this gap rests in the fact that there is no spare policing capacity in the world. Law enforcement capability is being employed and maximized within police forces at the community, state, and federal levels and along most borders between nations. These different levels of law enforcement are called upon in times of crisis to lend their expertise. Unfortunately, the 'borrowed' nature of these forces often negates their ability to provide a meaningful, extended contribution in the event of a crisis. The uniqueness of the IDG rests in the fact that it is a standing law enforcement capability specifically established to undertake international deployments.

According to an Australian National Audit Office³³ report, a benefit expected from the creation of the IDG was the development of AFP expertise in the various operational and logistical aspects of overseas deployments. The AFP invests in building IDG capacity by boosting numbers and augmenting operational readiness through training, sustainability and refinement of the IDG's structure. The AFP's investment in the building blocks of capability - doctrine development, organizational enhancement, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities - is described below.

Doctrine

Overall, the AFP does not have a standing doctrine development capability, though the IDG established a Peace Operations and Doctrine Development Team in 2006. This team analyses peace operations issues impacting upon the deployment of police and develops immediate planning guidance as well as strategic and operational level philosophical guidance for IDG activities. The Peace Operations and Doctrine Development Team coordinates IDG involvement with collaborative research projects, including coordinating independent assessments by academia.

This team is strengthened by the National Security and International Law Enforcement Section within the Commissioner's office, which provides policy and guidance for the IDG, among other entities. The section's involvement with the IDG focuses on the enhancement of interoperability with the ADF, and analysis of the AFP missions to the Solomon Islands, East Timor and Sudan. This section also supports the Commissioner's commitments to the Secretaries Committee on National Security and the National Security Committee of Cabinet³⁴.

The AFP recognizes that the complexity of peace operations has elevated the importance of doctrine for the AFP. International policing presents unique challenges and doctrine that would address ambiguity with guidance on 'how to think' will enable officers to act effectively in situations well outside their previous policing experience. This will be particularly useful for officers who are new to international operations or assigned through one of the state police forces. The IDG's Doctrine Team is currently

³³ The Australian National Audit Office is the equivalent of the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

³⁴ The National Security Committee of Cabinet is led by the Prime Minister and receives lead operational support from the Attorney General, though the committee approaches national security issues through a WoG approach.

focused on rule of law theory and doctrine because, as described earlier, within the operational continuum, the AFP seeks to be involved with fragile states pre-conflict in order to maximize effect and prevent the conditions that elevate the level of conflict.

Organization

The IDG's organizational structure is represented in the Figure 7 below.



Figure 7: IDG Organizational Structure

The National Manager reports to the Deputy Commissioner, Operations. The IDG is comprised of four sub units: Missions and Operations, Planning and Development, the ORG, and Corporate Services.³⁵

The Missions and Operations sub unit is comprised entirely of deployable officers, and is currently undergoing a staff increase from 350 in 2007 to a target of 750 by the end of 2008. The ORG is comprised of approximately 200 officers trained to respond tactically to both domestic and international crises. Approximately 250 members of the IDG are based in Australia (A-based) and work near Canberra. The A-based personnel are predominantly assigned to the Planning and Development, and Corporate Services areas, which support the IDG in planning and with its logistics needs.

The organizational structure pictured does not adequately represent the breadth of specialized skills available to the IDG. The IDG deploys capability according to the mission requirements. Specialist skills such as forensics, information technology, intelligence and communications are deployed on an as needed basis. The arrangements within the AFP generally reflect an approach of 'resource sharing' of specialized personnel and facilities across operational units. Thus when the IDG requires specialized assistance that is outside the immediate command structure, such as forensic support, sharing of personnel is undertaken to ensure the organization's objectives are met.

Specialist forensics assistance was required recently in East Timor, Sri Lanka, Tonga, and Thailand. This assistance took the form of deployed crime scene, firearms identification and disaster victim identification personnel, and also involved analysis conducted by the AFP Laboratory Services. In addition to this specialist assistance, Radio and Electronic Services has provided the IDG with equipment and radio networks and training on tracking systems for international deployments.

³⁵ A mission specific organizational breakdown is provided in Annex B: Case Study Solomon Islands outlined in the National Counter Terrorism Plan 2005.

In 2007, to support growing requirements for information to improve capability in complex operating environments, an intelligence management section was incorporated into the IDG structure. IDG Intelligence advises AFP management and ensures that trained intelligence personnel are deployed on missions. Some IDG intelligence personnel will work with host nation police forces to develop the host nation criminal intelligence capacity.

Training

IDG recruits are required to have a minimum of four years' policing experience prior to joining the IDG, so training principally focuses on preparing members for deployment. The deployment training package has been developed through an iterative process that has evolved from an initial short training module to multidimensional module that prioritizes scenario-based training. In 2007, the IDG expanded to include an Internal Training Team to monitor the training process as the organization dramatically increased its numbers. The training team is based in Australia, but there is a deployable element called the Deployable Planning Team that can assist with the training of IDG officers in-country.

All IDG members undertake a 35-day training course focused on coaching and mentoring skills, communications skills, forensics, humanitarian assistance, civil/military relations, safety and security, human rights and host country cultural issues. Current IDG training exceeds all of the requirements for the UN's Standard Generic Training Modules. Country-specific profiles and an introduction to host country personnel are incorporated into the training. This training includes 5-10 days in the field, and the utilization of scenario-based training in a recently constructed village. Three of the 35 training days are dedicated to mission specific training. Trainees are provided with country profiles specific to their mission and are trained to arrive in country with an appreciation of the local law. Police officers from Pacific Island nations (Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Cook Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) participate in different elements of the training. Members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police work at a higher level as attachments to IDG directing staff, focusing on developing realistic scenarios and allowing the trainees deploying to the Solomon Islands to establish direct networks with host country police.

There are specialized training courses provided to the police deployed as a part of the ORG. The ORG Training Team develops and implements training that focused on meeting the National Counter Terrorism Committee requirements specific to police tactical group standard³⁶. Other resources within the AFP that are engaged on IDG operations on an as needed basis (investigative, forensic, legal, and intelligence) utilize their own skills-based training courses.

There are specialized diplomacy courses, provided in conjunction with the Australian National University, to police whose work requires significant levels of contact with diplomats or at senior government levels both within Australia and overseas. Language training and ADF interoperability training related to command and control arrangements is provided on an as needed basis. The AFP

³⁶ These standards correspond to operational leadership requirements of police in the event of a terrorist attack, outlined in the *National Counter Terrorism Plan* of 2005.

operates a Culture and Language Centre that has assisted the IDG in identifying language tuition services for members assigned to some missions, such as Vanuatu. The AFP is considering expanding the Centre's role in IDG training, including cultural presentations on Australia to host nations to further cultural understanding. The Australian Institute for Police Management (AIPM) – a shared resource of the AFP and the state and territory police services – provides senior mission command training for officers chosen to lead missions. Finally, IDG members undergo specific training for UN peacekeeping missions in addition to the training provided in Australia.

Materiel (Equipment)

The IDG holds and acquires as necessary all the required materiel to support its on-shore and off-shore operations, particularly where the IDG will be operating in less developed countries or where infrastructure has been substantially impaired and cannot adequately support operational requirements. The principles adopted by the IDG for off-shore deployments include establishing accommodation and ablution facilities; power generation; sanitary and medical arrangements; food acquisition and preparation arrangements; communication and transportation; stores and inventories such that the mission can, if necessary, be conducted independently of local facilities and suppliers. Where possible during off-shore missions, and subject to appropriate security and other standards being satisfied, local facilities and suppliers are utilized in line with the philosophy of achieving as much integration with the local population as possible.³⁷

Leadership and Education

The IDG component of the AFP continues to evolve and adapt to cope with an increase in personnel as well as increased operational tempo. The IDG utilizes universities for external evaluations of operations and actively incorporates lessons learnt. The AFP measures IDG performance by tracking the improvements implemented within the host nation's police force. The AFP approaches interoperability issues seriously and has assigned senior officers to the Joint Operations Command and the ADF Warfare Centre, where officers receive on-the-job education. AFP officers attend the ADF's Command and Staff College³⁸ and the higher-level Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies³⁹ and members of the ADF participate in the AFP learning environments, such as the AIPM, for mutual benefit. AFP officers also work within AusAID's Fragile States Unit and the Office of Development Effectiveness. These partnerships contribute to the development of shared capabilities to apply to stabilization and capacity building operations. Collaborative work with universities supplements officers' education.

In addition to enhanced education through partnerships, IDG officers will soon benefit from a three-year career stream focused on international policing currently under development by the IDG. This career stream represents another approach the AFP is taking to strengthen international policing.

³⁷ A mission-specific description of materiel can be found in Annex B - Case Study on Solomon Islands.

³⁸ The Australian Command and Staff College is the joint equivalent of the U.S. Command and General Staff College

³⁹ The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies is the joint equivalent of the U.S. War College and National Defense University.

Personnel

Capability is impacted by the level of funding allocated to an organization and the quality of the people the organization can attract. The IDG has benefitted from the Federal Government's significant investment in the international deployment activities of the AFP, and in the number of applicants interested in serving with the IDG. For example, the IDG recently received in excess of 100 applications for four positions in Afghanistan.

IDG personnel are unionized like other members of the AFP and align themselves with the same negotiated collective agreement for the payment of salaries and related terms and conditions of service as other members of the AFP, which typically results in a three-year contract open for renewal. However, personnel assigned to the Missions and Operations unit are required to deploy wherever the AFP needs them to go, with the exception of the current high threat mission in Afghanistan that is voluntary. IDG members within the Missions and Operation unit are paid a base salary plus a readiness allowance, which requires them to deploy with 28 days' notice. This base salary is commensurate with other AFP officers at their level within the structure defined by the collective agreement. When deployed, IDG members receive their base salary plus a 65% tax concession plus the corresponding mission-specific allowances. Members of the IDG who serve within the ORG are required to be ready to deploy in 48 hours, and are compensated at a higher level within their base salary (essentially arising from a higher readiness level) plus they receive a mission allowance when deployed.⁴⁰

In March 2007, there were approximately 350 police serving overseas on IDG operations (a combination of peacekeeping/UN missions and capacity building operations). Of the 350 deployed in 2007, approximately 100 members were drawn from the state and territory police forces based on agreements formalized between the AFP and the individual states and the Northern Territory. This number has decreased during 2008 to less than 70 state and territory officers as the IDG has added more permanent members to its Missions and Operations unit. The AFP requests assistance from the states and territory police forces for international operations on an as-needed basis, and those seconded officers are always deployed. The IDG will 'normalize' the state officer's salary – i.e. pay the state officer at the AFP officer level or pay above that level if the seconded officer earns more than the salary allocated to the position being filled.

Over 250 A-based staff are employed at the IDG center in Canberra. The areas supported by the A-based members include: Contracts and Logistics, HR and Finance, Foreign Policy Liaison, Forensics, Information Technology, Intelligence, Protective Service, Strategy Planning, Monitoring and Governance, Well-being and OH&S Services, Marketing and Public Affairs, Ministerial, Mission Administration, Operational Response, Pacific Islands Police Advisor, and Training.

When the IDG reaches its personnel target of 1200 officers, this will include 750 officers for the Missions and Operations Unit and 200 officers for the ORG. The ORG's goal of 200 officers is based on a

⁴⁰ Note that ORG deployments are typically shorter than deployments for the Mission and Operations Unit so the higher base salary is an incentive.

requirement for four 50-person groupings at different readiness levels. The AFP determined that 750 officers was the 'right' level of staffing by first calculating the number of officers required to fulfill UN commitments at the current level and then calculating the number of officers required to staff an Asia Pacific operation in an operational space the size of Dili on a 24-hour, seven days a week basis. This number included officers to fill the following functional areas: general duties, investigative, forensics, traffic, and enabling services.

In keeping with the IDG's current experience in the Solomon Islands, this group of officers from the five functional areas would be able to transition from a stabilizing to a capacity building force. In the Solomon Islands, the officers who were dedicated to performing investigations are now observing/mentoring members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police in their conduct of investigations. The 750 officers also includes a group of approximately 50 positions held for 'other duties' because the organization recognizes the need to be able to cope with the unknown. Under the current legislative arrangements, these positions can be filled by whatever expertise is required. For example, the development of a host nation police force may be hampered by low literacy rates among its members. Thus the IDG has the capacity to fund individuals with expertise in language training to strengthen the host nation's police force.

The AFP's current recruitment profile for the IDG is focused on obtaining officers with at least four years' experience in the areas identified in their calculation of the 750 requirement; these areas being general duties, investigative, forensics, traffic, and enabling services. The four-year requirement is based on the UN's five-year experience requirement, noting that those officers recruited with only four years' experience will undergo at least a year of training prior to deployment. State and territory officers who join the IDG are paid according to the position they applied for, which is usually commensurate with their previous base salary, though the incentives while deployed and the readiness allowances generally results in higher remuneration.

Finally, when at full staffing, the IDG will dedicate a certain number (to be determined) as 'hubbed' or regional allocation positions. For example, an IDG officer within the Missions and Operations Unit, working at full deployment capacity, would spend a total of two years deployed and after taking requisite leave and undergoing refresher training, there would be approximately eleven weeks left to fill in a three year contract. During those eleven weeks the officer will work as regular AFP officer in one of the AFP's state offices. The office manager of that AFP state office will be responsible for ensuring that the IDG officer is not engaged in any work that would prevent his or her ability to deploy at short notice on an IDG mission. In times when the IDG's international commitments are less than 750, the AFP state office will employ that officer. The financial arrangements are as follows: the IDG will pay the salary of the 'hubbed' officer, though once the officer is engaged in necessary work at the state level; the AFP state office will reimburse the IDG for the amount that would have been spent using a non-IDG officer to complete the work. At present, the percentage of members held against 'hubbed' positions is small. However, these arrangements ensure that the IDG has the capability to escalate its operational responses as necessary.

Facilities

The IDG has largely self-contained support arrangements within the broader AFP structure. The IDG training, equipment, and administrative facilities are located at Majura, on the outskirts of Canberra. This facility is primarily used by the IDG but provides functionality to the AFP's counterterrorism, search and rescue, protection and forensics activities. A \$2.8M AFP International Training Complex in Majura was opened in 2005. The facility is purpose-built to enable police officers to engage in scenario-based training inside a made-to-order Pacific Islands village. Off-shore missions are generally planned and constructed around the concept of each mission being independently maintained, with IDG facilities and equipment moved into and out of locations as necessary and as dictated by operational circumstances.

Capability Development

The IDG's ability to be deployed for lengthy periods on off-shore operations is being enhanced by the time and effort that is being invested by personnel to build up their expertise prior to deployments. The potential to maximize on this experience is high as the AFP considers a numbers of long term commitments in the region. According to an Australian Senate Report on Peacekeeping Operations, the lesson from recent experience and research on the long-term challenge of state fragility is that 'fragile states stay fragile for about 50 years before they start to turn'. Participants should not seek 'to withdraw precipitously from a post-conflict state, presuming all will be well. As Timor Leste...showed again quite clearly [in 2006], it is less than ideal to keep having to send in the ADF to stabilize a situation that keeps deteriorating.' This reality points to the importance of the IDG being capable of sustaining longer term deployments.

Areas where IDG capability might be augmented or expanded include: preparedness for deployments, civil/military cooperation, organizational planning, culture and language, the ability to operate in a more hostile environment, greater cross-pollination with the military to enhance interoperability and planning, and the establishment of a more focused integration of police/military elements during the transitional phase of operations.

ANNEX A

CASE STUDY: EAST TIMOR

Introduction

The role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in East Timor has evolved over time, with the AFP first deploying officers to East Timor in 1999. As the AFP completes the recruitment for the International Deployment Group (IDG) and begins the process of formalizing the IDG's operational experiences into doctrine, East Timor provides an appropriate case study. The AFP's commitment to East Timor, similar to the Solomon Islands, is viewed as a long-term, enduring commitment to the successful restoration of the rule of law.



Figure 1: Political Map of East Timor⁴¹

This case study will provide:

- + background on the historical conditions that led to the 1999 independence referendum and the corresponding militia violence that prompted significant Australian-led international involvement,
- + a brief explanation of the mandate and mission in East Timor, and
- + information on the current capacity building programs being run in East Timor.

⁴¹ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bp.html>.

Background

East Timor⁴² was colonized by the Portuguese in the 16th century, and with the exception of a brief period of Japanese rule during the Second World War, Portugal remained in control until the East Timorese declared independence in 1975. Due to geographical proximity, many East Timorese fled to Indonesia during Portuguese rule. Indonesia invaded East Timor nine days after the declaration of independence. Indonesia spent more than two decades mired in a largely unsuccessful and violent pacification campaign. Australia did not interfere during these years, though a series of United Nations (UN) resolutions between 1976 and 1980 demanded the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor along with the right for East Timorese self-determination. The tempo of violence decreased after 1980 but civil unrest in the urban centers was still common and the country suffered from famine and disease.

In mid-1999, Indonesian President Habibie proposed a vote on special autonomy for the East Timorese people to be conducted and supervised by the UN. Habibie's action sparked widespread violence instigated by local militia gangs with close ties to the Indonesia military. These gangs conducted a campaign of orchestrated violence to intimidate the local population from seeking independence. The United Nations Security Council responded by creating the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), focused on the conduct of a ballot free from intimidation or threat of violence. The Australia Government joined UNAMET as a major contributor. On 30 August 1999, the UN supervised a referendum on independence, which was subsequently voted for by the majority of the East Timorese. However, anti-independence militia, organized and supported by Indonesia, met the referendum with extreme violence and the destruction of 70% of East Timor's economic infrastructure. The UN mandated, Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) arrived in September 1999 (a month after independence was granted) and was able to stabilize East Timor.

In October 1999, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) replaced UNAMET and formalized East Timor's transition from an Indonesian province to an entity under UN sovereignty. UNTAET (which subsumed INTERFET and its military security responsibilities in February 2000) was responsible for all aspects of governance of East Timor (including the conduct of a Constituent Assembly election in August 2001) until East Timor was recognized as an independent state in May 2002.

UN support to the fledging East Timorese state was then provided by the UN Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISSET: 20 May 2002–20 May 2005) and the smaller UN Office in Timor Leste (UNOTIL: until May 2006). UNMISSET included responsibility for the extant Peacekeeping Force (PKF), though the PKF was gradually withdrawn over the course of the next three years. Both UNMISSET and UNOTIL were primarily capacity building missions.

⁴² East Timor is roughly the size of Connecticut.

Both UNMISSET and UNOTIL included specific law enforcement responsibilities relating to strengthening the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL) and establishing a Serious Crimes Unit to investigate crimes committed during the course of events in 1999⁴³. During this period, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) and AFP conducted capacity building programs for their Timorese military and police counterparts under bilateral agreements. The ADF supported the Timor Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL) under the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) and the AFP providing training to the PNTL under the Timor Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP), which was created by the AFP in 2004 as a joint program with contributions from the United Kingdom.

Despite the presence of international support from the UN, Australia and other nations, the somewhat fragile security situation unraveled during the first five months of 2006. A series of expulsions and desertions from the F-FDTL led to outbreaks of communal unrest that the PNTL were unable to contain. In a controversial decision, the Timorese government deployed the F-FDTL to resolve the civil unrest. The heavy-handed response of the Timorese military resulted in outbreaks of fighting throughout Dili, the Timorese capital city.

In response to the escalating security and political crisis in May 2006, the Timorese Government requested assistance from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal. The ADF led a UN-recognized International Stabilization Force (ISF), with military contributions from Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal. The ISF successfully restored stability. In July 2006, the AFP mounted a parallel operation, called Operation SERENE, in which the AFP assumed full responsibility for delivering civil policing services in Dili, and at its highest level was comprised of 200 AFP officers. On 25 August 2006, the UN officially terminated UNOTIL and replaced the mission with a significantly larger multidimensional UN Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT)⁴⁴. UNMIT included a large UN Police (UNPOL) contingent, with a capacity building mission focused on the rehabilitation of the dysfunctional PNTL. The UN requested that Australia's Operation SERENE AFP officers be incorporated into the UNPOL contingent. 50 officers joined the UNPOL contingent.

After rebels under the leadership of former F-FDTL officer Alfredo Reinado attempted to assassinate the East Timorese President and Prime Minister in February 2008, Australia reinforced its commitment to East Timor by an additional company of ADF personnel and 50–70 members of the AFP. This was in addition to the 50 AFP members assigned to the UN mission (UNPOL). At the time of writing, the AFP continues to contribute 54 AFP officers to UNPOL and is projecting an additional 80 officers being assigned to the TLPDP, which seeks to train up to 2000 East Timorese police officers. In June 2008, the AFP's commitment to TLPDP was enhanced to address the unrest that may evolve out of the bleak unemployment situation in East Timor: 20,000 people out of a total population of approximately one million are out of work and no new jobs have been created within the last year.

⁴³ UNSC Resolution 1401, dated 17 May 2002 and UNSC Resolution 1599, dated 28 April 2005.

⁴⁴ UNSC Resolution 1704, dated 25 August 2006.

Mandate and Mission

With the deteriorating security situation in East Timor in 1999 resulting in a deepening humanitarian crisis, the Security Council, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted Resolution 1264. This resolution condemned all acts of violence in East Timor and authorized the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure. INTERFET was authorized to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate. INTERFET's mandate was to:

- + restore peace and security in East Timor;
- + protect and support UNAMET in undertaking its tasks; and
- + within force capabilities, facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.

The resolution also determined that the Government of Indonesia, taking into account INTERFET's mandate, would continue to have responsibility for peace and security in East Timor until Indonesia's authority was transferred to the UN. 31 countries contributed forces to Operation STABILIZE, which deployed to Dili on 20 September 1999, mobilized across the country and moved quickly to restore order. The operation was confronted by sporadic isolated clashes. While Indonesian troops quickly withdrew, they destroyed their facilities before crossing the border to West Timor and undertook little, if any action, to curb the militias.

Australia's political efforts to end the violence in East Timor were widely supported by the international community and were further facilitated by a shift in Indonesia's internal political situation. At the same time, however, the ADF provided a highly professional response in mobilizing and sustaining a joint offshore force. While INTERFET encountered minimal armed resistance, it was prepared to fight in order to uphold its mandate. Its determined posture contributed to the withdrawal of patronage of the militia by the Indonesian military and thus effectively contributed to the collapse of the militias. While the overall level of operational intensity remained low, some force components were required to maintain a high level of combat readiness and were engaged in combat at short notice.

Fielding a force that was capable of achieving its mandate in a meaningful way fell largely on the shoulders of Australia as the lead nation. In this context, providing a 'policing plus' role that has come to characterize most peacekeeping missions at the time was not deemed appropriate. As Major General Cosgrove, INTERFET's Commander stated, 'We found there [East Timor] ... that forces structured and equipped, ready if necessary, for war were actually very effective, probably more effective than had they been less capable ... Our troops were able to starkly demonstrate to all parties the penalties and sanctions that would accompany any attempt to deliver on the wealth of violent rhetoric. Our high-end capabilities meant that with battlefield mobility and surveillance systems we were able to seem ubiquitous.'⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Major General P. J. Cosgrove, 4 April 2000, cited in Alan Ryan, 'Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks': Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor,' Study Paper No. 304, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, November 2000, p.18.

The UN presence in East Timor established a secure environment in a very short period to support the holding of democratic elections on 30 August 2001 and, in doing so, began the process of transitioning authority to the Fretilin Party with a view to the UN leaving by June 2006.

Capacity Building

One of the most pressing issues INTERFET faced from the outset of operations in 1999 was how to establish a transitional law enforcement capability. With the collapse of Indonesian authority, along with the judicial and detention systems in East Timor, the predominantly military force of INTERFET exercised its authority to provide for transitional law enforcement and maintain law and order. Since there were no available functionaries to perform magisterial or judicial type roles, INTERFET's objective was to ensure that the UN mobilized a pre-trial capability to assess detainees, whereby at end of 90 days, they could be reviewed further or put on trial.

INTERFET established a Detainee Management Unit (DMU) combining the established pre-trial capability with the UN capability. Security Council Resolution 1264 provided the appropriate legal basis for the DMU as an interim judicial system pending the re-establishment of a civil judiciary, which was created on 7 January 2000. Moreover, by applying the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1959 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons⁴⁶ (GC IV), the military was able to undertake a law and order role consistent with the principles of international law.

In April 2006, when the entire East Timor public security system failed, the East Timorese President asked the Australian Prime Minister for assistance in the form of a robust stabilization force. An Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) deployed to East Timor in late May. In May 2006 AFP officers conducted a scoping mission in East Timor, and accepted an initial role of supporting the ADF in the restoration of law and order, which was accomplished through the ISF.

The AFP officers currently deployed to East Timor (at 80 officers) will often work with military patrols while engaging in evidence gathering, intelligence collection and forensic investigation. The police and military personnel collaborate at the tactical level to maximize the effectiveness of response capabilities to undertake assigned tasks. With military security to depend on, the AFP can more easily provide civil policing services and develop host nation police capacity.

The AFP's capacity building role in East Timor is focused on strengthening the local police and working with the UN to develop a sustainable rule of law structure including effective police, government, legal, security, financial and administrative systems. These tasks are predicated on the AFP's ability to accurately perceive the unique governance and civil service requirements of the environment, supply specialist skills, and monitor developments to ensure alignment across all lines of operation within Australia's Whole of Government (WoG) approach.

46 Geneva Convention IV was designed to regulate the relationship between foreign military forces and a civilian population where the force exercises sole authority or is the only agency with the capacity to exercise authority in a distinct territory. Michael J. Kelly cited in 'INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor,' [http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources/2000/INTERFET%20DETAINEE%20MANAGEMENT%20UNIT%20\(e\).pdf](http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources/2000/INTERFET%20DETAINEE%20MANAGEMENT%20UNIT%20(e).pdf)

While the role of the AFP in capacity building in East Timor is significant, the ADF continues to be the foundation for Australia's WoG response as it is the main government agency capable of projecting power off-shore and providing mission security and support to government agencies in-theatre. This is especially important in East Timor, where the security situation remains precarious. The leadership of the AFP considers East Timor a challenge as they determine the appropriate law enforcement building blocks required for a steady state, and the appropriate time to introduce those efforts. The international policing doctrine being developed by the AFP seeks to articulate the relationship between rule of law programs and fragile states. East Timor, a nation experiencing independence and democracy for the first time, remains fragile, and the AFP's approach to the restoration of sustainable rule of law continues to adapt to the conditions on the ground.

ANNEX B

CASE STUDY: SOLOMON ISLANDS

Introduction

The Solomon Islands is administratively organized into nine provinces and one capital territory. The Solomon Islands attained independence from the British in 1978. The islands have suffered from ethnic violence, corruption, and crime throughout the past thirty years. The severity of recent ethnic violence and the corresponding collapse of the economy in 2003 led the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)⁴⁷ to respond to Solomon Islands Prime Minister Allan Kemakaza's request for international assistance. The PIF endorsed the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), an Australian-led regional intervention mission to restore law and order and rebuild government institutions in the Solomon Islands. There were two unique elements of RAMSI. In contrast to most regionally-mandated operations, RAMSI was police-led rather than military-led. Second, the mission combined a robust military presence with a law enforcement contingent whose objectives were longer-term stability and economic recovery. The achievement of those objectives demands a continuing mutual commitment, focused on capacity building efforts, by the PIF and the Solomon Islands Government.

The following case study will provide:

- + background information on the recent unrest in the Solomon Islands and the conditions that led to the RAMSI intervention;
- + an understanding of RAMSI's mandate and mission;
- + an explanation of the military and police coordination that preceded the RAMSI mission and continues today;
- + a breakdown of the capability provided by the Participating Police Force (led by the Australian Federal Police's (AFP) International Deployment Group (IDG)) to the RAMSI mission; and
- + a description of RAMSI's operational phases including key achievements within the initial phases and the PPF's challenges in the current phase.

⁴⁷ The Pacific Islands Forum, formally referred to as the South Pacific Forum, was founded in 1971, and functions as the political and economic policy center for the region. Decisions are made by consensus. Pacific Island Forum membership includes 16 independent states: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga, Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Niue, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.



Figure 1: Political Map of the Solomon Islands⁴⁸

Background

In the mid-1990s, tensions between the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) and the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), supported by elements of the Malaitan-dominated Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP), escalated into open conflict in the Solomon Islands. Violence in 1998 created a new dynamic where increased lawlessness, infighting and large-scale brutality contributed to eventual state collapse. Over 200 people were killed and 30,000 Malaitans were displaced from their homes in rural Guadalcanal. Calls for a regional intervention mission were considered following requests by successive Solomon Islands' prime ministers for more substantial international support. The PIF first authorized collective action in response to a security crisis in a member state in the form of the Biketawa Declaration on Mutual Assistance in 2000⁴⁹. However, in general, prior to RAMSI, Australia, New Zealand and their Pacific Island neighbors maintained a posture of non-involvement and preference for conventional aid donations over intervention⁵⁰.

An initial small-scale stability operation was deployed to the Solomon Islands in October 2000 at the request of the signatories to the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA)⁵¹. The TPA supported the

⁴⁸ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bp.html>.

⁴⁹ Ethnic violence and lawlessness in the Solomon Islands led the PIF, headed by Australia and New Zealand, to pass the Biketawa Declaration in 2000. The declaration tempered 'the Pacific Way' doctrine of non-interference, stating that dealing with strife in any member country was now a regional responsibility.

⁵⁰ There was an initiative to reform the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) by means of an AusAID funded police project and a British senior police officer was appointed to head the RSIP.

⁵¹ The Australian-brokered Townsville Peace Agreement (2002) was reached followed talks between representatives from the Solomon Islands Government and the militias in 2000. While the agreement increased the level of aid to the Solomon Islands and supported the deployment of an International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT), which was

deployment of an International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT), which operated as an unarmed group focused on providing the indigenous Solomon Islands Peace Monitoring Council (PMC) with confidence building programs. The IPMT was staffed with approximately 50 personnel drawn from different functional areas: the Australian and New Zealand defense forces and foreign ministries, the Australian Agency for International Aid (AusAID), the AFP and New Zealand Police, as well as police from the Cook Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu and a number of other Commonwealth countries.

The IPMT oversaw the surrender of arms (approximately 2,000); however, the group's withdrawal in June 2002 largely arose due to the operational constraints that had undermined its capacity to effect change on the ground. An important component of the IPMT's mandate was to avoid 'mission creep' and to maintain a clear exit strategy. The IPMT was not provided with the necessary enforcement authority to pursue disarmament; consequently the IPMT was a weak presence unable to bring about lasting peace. In the development of RAMSI, these lessons were heeded and arrangements were put in place to provide real 'teeth' to the mission.⁵²

Mandate and Mission

RAMSI deployed in response to formal requests from the Prime Minister and the Governor-General of Solomon Islands for assistance. RAMSI's deployment was further legitimized by enabling legislation passed by the Solomon Islands Parliament and incorporated into a treaty between the Government of the Solomon Islands and the PIF on 24 July 2003. RAMSI's mandate was (and is) 'to reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions and authorities in the Solomon Islands and to ensure respect for the Constitution and implementation of the laws.'⁵³ The mandate established the legal framework required to initiate RAMSI's objectives, which were outlined in the statement on the 'Offer by the Government of Australia for Strengthened Assistance to the Solomon Islands'. Restoring security and economic recovery were identified as RAMSI's overarching aims.

The following objectives were mandated under the aim of restoring security:

- + reform of the RSIP,
- + removal of illegal weapons,
- + restoration of the ability to investigate and prosecute new criminal offences,
- + strengthening of the courts and prison system, and

deployed for a one-and-a-half year period, it had little effect on the ground and was unable to create the conditions necessary to ameliorate the ongoing crisis. See Dinnen, 'Police Building in Weak States, p. 96; 'Insecurity and Conflicts in the Pacific Region: Analysis and Conclusions from the Seminar on Security and Conflict Prevention in the Pacific Region, prepared by Sonja Siegmund, *Pacific Issues Paper*, No. 7, Pacific Unit, July 2003, p. 9 and Stephen Hoadley, 'Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia; Towards a New Paradigm,' Working Paper No. 20/5, Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Wellington, 2005, p. 9.

⁵² During RAMSI, police were legally empowered to start enforcing the law from the first day of operations.

⁵³ Graham Fletcher, 'Australia's Policy, Strategy, Mandate', *Solomon Islands Update: Crisis and Intervention*, 25 August 2003.

+ protection of key state institutions and their personnel from intimidation⁵⁴

A military component of approximately 1,800 personnel drawn from across the region (Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea) was deployed to assist the Australian-led, multinational Participating Police Force (PPF) in the restoration of law and order. This military force was reduced in July 2004 to a steady state of approximately 100 personnel in-country to provide a security guarantee.

RAMSI operates as a combined regional assistance effort. This point has been reinforced by the mission's official name, Operation HELPEM FREN (helping a friend), and by its multinational character. Twelve countries were involved in the initial deployment. The PPF participants from small Pacific Island nations provide the mission with a greater understanding of cultural context and traditional reconciliation issues. Although the extent of the police contribution by the members of the PIF has varied throughout the mission, the mission now includes police officers drawn all PIF members. Australia continues to lead the force and contributes the majority of the law enforcement personnel.

Military and Police Coordination

While initial PPF operations depended on the mission security and support provided by the extensive military element of RAMSI, the mission was scaled back early on (July 2004), where the initial heavy military footprint was replaced by an emphasis on policing and civilian capacity building. As the mission's public face, the police lead operations. The multinational military forces attached to the mission are not authorized to act independently of the PPF in order to arrest suspected criminals or to restore law and order. Around 140 ADF personnel support the approximately 210 police and 169 Australian civilian advisers currently attached to RAMSI,⁵⁵ while other PIF members continue to make smaller contributions. The military's role in the Solomon Islands is largely restricted to protection and security duties, including the provision of an in-theatre quick reaction force (QRF). The military also provides logistical support, including transport, as well as a coordinating headquarters.

Prior to the actual deployment to the Solomon Islands, the PPF and the contributing military component undertook extensive joint planning, which resulted in a clear division of labor. As Special Coordinator for RAMSI, and lead diplomat from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Nick Warner stated, 'we came in with a very large potent military force ... We did that quite deliberately so that we didn't have to use military force during this operation, and it worked⁵⁶.' Any initial fears expressed over the robust military component at the start of operations were dispelled by the way in which the military personnel conducted themselves ' in a low-key, disciplined and professional way'⁵⁷.

However, despite the drawdown of military numbers, the benefits arising from joint planning teams continue to be a major factor in RAMSI's ongoing operational success. Concerted efforts were made by both the police and the military to coordinate mission outcomes prior to the initial deployment to the

⁵⁴ Solomon Islands Government, Policy Statement on the 'Offer by the Government of Australia for Strengthened Assistance to the Solomon Islands', 2003.

⁵⁵ http://www.ramsi.org/files/cn/australia_fact_sheet.pdf.

⁵⁶ Nick Warner in Michael Fullilove, 'RAMSI and State Building in Solomon Islands,' *Defender*, Autumn 2006, p. 34.

⁵⁷ Michael Fullilove, 'RAMSI and State Building,' p. 34.

Solomon Islands. Organizational plans were discussed, rehearsed and agreed upon by all the players in an effort to establish each contingent's functions, roles and responsibilities while also establishing clear expectations from the outset. From the initial planning phase through to the conduct of operations, the military component attached to RAMSI has provided security and mission support to the civil advisers and police forces responsible for restoring law and order.

In the initial phases of the operation, cooperation between the different national contingents and between the PPF and RAMSI's military component was successfully managed and allowed for the swift restoration of law and order. This was, in part, a product of the extensive joint planning undertaken by the police and military components of RAMSI. The PPF initiated policies and procedures to regulate the number of military personnel in a given place at any given time and, in doing so, ensured PPF dominance.

As RAMSI enters its fifth year of operations, the need for the development of joint doctrine to enhance inter-agency command and control, intelligence assessment, conduct of operations and the delivery of logistic support is evident. In an inter-agency operation where RAMSI police, working alongside indigenous police, are backed by a multinational military contingent, 'developing a common appreciation system needs to be accompanied by review aimed at devising an inter-agency campaign'.⁵⁸ The RAMSI approach has been designed along 'single-agency lines' with military, civil advisers and police planning staffs situated separately. While the creation of working groups has enhanced interoperability to some degree, senior military personnel attached to RAMSI have argued that the differences in ADF/AFP methodology impede inter-agency cooperation in the Solomons.

⁵⁸ See John Hutcheson, 'Helping a Friend: An Australian Military Commander's Perspective on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands,' *Australian Army Journal*, Vol. II, No. 2, 2006, pp. 47-54, which highlights the importance of the ADF/APF/DFAT 'working group approach' and makes recommendations for the production of an inter-agency handbook based on the RAMSI experience and modelled, to some extent, on the *ABCA Coalitions Operations Handbook* to facilitate working relations and enhance inter-agency operational culture.

Participating Police Force Capability

Doctrine

The PPF does not operate under formal doctrine. However, since Australia is the lead nation in the mission, the AFP had the responsibility for initial planning, which relied heavily on the AFP's previous international deployment experiences. In the absence of doctrine, the AFP (with assistance from the ADF) identified and managed risks and sent a scoping mission to the Solomon Islands prior to deployment to determine the types of assistance most needed and the mission's logistical requirements.

Organization

Table 1 below shows that there are currently representatives from all PIF member nations in the PPF. RAMSI benefitted from the multinational nature of its police component. The participation of police officers from Pacific Island states other than Australia and New Zealand was critical to RAMSI's legitimacy and acceptance because these other states share the culture of the Solomon Islanders.

PPF Officers	July 2004	July 2005	July 2006	March 2007
AFP	208	294	172	227
New Zealand	35	31	35	36
Fiji	15	13	15	8
Tonga	12	12	12	10
Samoa	10	9	9	7
Vanuatu	12	5	11	3
Kiribati	5	5	5	5
Nauru	3	4	-	5
Cook Islands	2	2	-	2
Papua New Guinea	-	10	-	6
Tuvalu	-	2	-	2
Marshall Islands	-	-	-	1
Palau	-	-	-	2
FSM	-	-	-	2
Niue	-	-	-	2
Total	302	387	259	318

Table 1: Participating Police Force Numbers⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Table prepared by the Australian National Audit Office for *Audit Report No.53 2006-2007: Australian Federal Police Overseas Operations*, p. 39.

Currently, the PPF is headed by a Commander that also serves as the Deputy Commissioner of the RSIP. Figure 2 below displays the organizational structure of the PPF.




Figure 2: Organizational Structure of the Participating Police Force⁶⁰

Training

In response to the Australian Government’s decision to accept the request for assistance from the Prime Minister and the Governor-General of the Solomon Islands, the AFP began planning for a deployment to take place in 70 days. Although the initial deployees received only three days of formal training, the amount of training provided to RAMSI members has increased and since 2005 has been conducted in three phases:

- + International Pre-Deployment Training (IPDT);
- + Mission Specific Briefing; and
- + In-mission Induction

The IPDT runs for seven weeks and is mandatory for both AFP members and the PPF staff from the other Pacific Islands contributing nations. This course includes mission briefings, physical competency assessments, forensics, firearms, navigation theory, media awareness and personal hygiene. Also

⁶⁰ Table prepared by the Australian National Audit Office for *Audit Report No.53 2006-2007: Australian Federal Police Overseas Operations*

covered are administrative issues (pay and conditions, financial management responsibilities), and Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S). The IPDT concludes with a week-long field phase conducted at the Majura training complex and village, located on the outskirts of Canberra. The mission-specific briefing is short (half-day) and focuses on communicating the current state of RAMSI. The in-mission induction typically requires a day-and-a-half and addresses expectations of deployees, disciplinary actions, and firearm procedures. The in-mission induction also provides an overview of the current operating environment along with some practical insights. The overall aim of the training is to prepare PPF personnel for the difficulties associated with the mission, to assist in the building of rapport and working relationships between the various national contingents, and to ensure that deployed police possess the minimum skill level required and have a solid knowledge of standard operating procedures.

Materiel

Officers are provided with a firearm and personal protection equipment.

Leadership and Education

The PPF is led by the AFP.

Personnel

The PPF operation in the Solomon Islands is particularly well-resourced, both financially and in terms of manpower. Table 2 below provides an expenditure breakdown for the AFP's contribution to RAMSI in 2006/2007, including the amount dedicated to mission-specific personnel. From the time of the initial announcement of the intention to deploy to the day of deployment, the AFP recruited and deployed a sufficient number of police allowing the PPF to establish a ready presence by embarking on joint patrols with the military within the initial hours of deployment.

Category	Amount
Employees (all mission-specific personnel)	\$33.2M
Suppliers (includes payments to contractors for goods and services and payments to state police jurisdictions in respect of detailed personnel)	\$77.7M
Mission-based fixed cost (depreciation)	\$2.8M
Fixed-office costs (Australia-based costs of supporting the mission)	\$23.6M
Total	\$137.3M

Table 2: 2006-2007 RAMSI Expenditure Breakdown⁶¹

⁶¹ Information in this table was taken from the Australian National Audit Office for *Audit Report No.53 2006-2007 Australian Federal Police Overseas Operations*.

The AFP experienced some initial difficulties staffing the operation. One year into the operation, the AFP established a 'wave' model to offer to potential deployees. This model allowed officers to choose from the following choices in terms of the length of their deployment: 40, 60, 80, or 100 weeks. This model has been successful. In the AFP's 2007 expression of interest round, 800 applications were received for approximately 200 positions. However, the AFP anticipates that as the mission continues, and existing experienced members rotate through, staffing challenge will resurface while new recruits are in training and gaining the necessary experience⁶².

Facilities

Most AFP personnel are working in or near the capital city of the Solomon Islands, Honiara. The AFP has leased a site known as the Guadacanal Beach Resort (GBR) for \$462,000 annually, which is approximately sixteen kilometers from Honiara and had previously been leased by the AFP for use during the IPMT. The GBR is able to accommodate 350 personnel deployed medium to long-term, and up to 700 personnel deployed for a short period as a surge element. Force protection measures at GBR include a perimeter security system around the main facility provided by members of the ORG and the ADF rifle platoon.

RAMSI Operational Phases

The PPF's participation in RAMSI is divided into three phases. Table 3 below outlines the objectives of each phase. Although there is a general timeframe attached to each phase, the phases are not entirely sequential or discrete. For example, civil unrest in Honiara in April of 2006 resulted in the destruction of public buildings and injuries to approximately thirty members of the PPF. Although the PPF was executing Phase Three objectives, the priority shifted to the restoration of law and order, with an increased police and military presence until the situation stabilized.

Phase One provided the PPF with initial success: over 4,000 arrests were made, including the surrender of rebel leader Harold Keke, and more than 3,700 weapons were collected/confiscated. Further, the military assisted the PPF in rebuilding 16 police stations. Phase Two involved the successful investigation and prosecution of a number of high profile individuals arrested in Phase One. Phase Three is unequivocally the most complex and challenging phase.

In 2005, the leadership of the PPF formally reviewed Phases One and Two in order to effectively set the objectives for Phase Three. This review identified the following as focus areas: annual business planning, human resources, major and minor police posts, intelligence, armed police, external agencies, fire service, maritime, general orders and instructions, in-service training, and police housing. These foci resulted in three major projects. The objectives associated with each of these projects are outlined in Table 3.

⁶² Australian National Audit Office for *Audit Report No.53 2006-2007 Australian Federal Police Overseas Operations*, pp. 49-50.

Phase	Name	Timeframe	Objectives
Phase One	Restore Law and Order	Jul–Dec 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Initial deployment and force establishment + Restoration of basic law, order, and security + Removal of illegally held weapons from the community + Disarmament and neutralization of key militants
Phase Two	Consolidate Law and Order	Jan–Dec 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Consolidation of the rule of law + Institutional reform + Building community trust and confidence + Creating an environment for economic reconstruction and commerce
Phase Three	Capacity Development and Sustainability	Jan 2005–present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Learning and Development Project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhance the professional skills, knowledgeable and expertise of all ranks in the RSIP through effective on-the-job training and sustainable formal training and education • Establish an effective RSIP Police Academy able to deliver sustainable learning outcomes for the police service • Develop an effectively trained, professional, ethical and knowledgeable police force which has community support and respect • Develop an accredited RSIP learning and development program + Force structure review project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement an effective, ethical, sustainable structure for the RSIP able to provide government directed law enforcement and security outcomes • Where possible, shift corporate and logistical functions of the organization to the private sector • Develop and implement a government endorsed Police Capability Plan • Develop fire fighting and prevention services for the Solomon Islands + Legislation and corporate governance project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Update legislation affecting the structure, management and operation of the RSIP • Develop a contemporary legislative and corporate governance framework that enables effective, efficient and ethical operation and management of the RSIP on a sustainable basis • Implement a staff training and awareness program to make members of the RSIP aware of revised legislative provisions and governance framework

Table 3: Three Phases of PPF's Contribution to RAMSI⁶³

At the time of writing, most of the objectives listed in Phase Three are underway, and unlike Phase 2, when the RSIP were observing the PPF officers undertaking police work, the PPF are now acting as observers while the RSIP undertake investigations, receive statements from witnesses, etc. This phase presents significant practical challenges for the PPF, some related to deficiencies in English literacy among the RSIP but mainly related to the difference between the operational culture of the AFP and the operational culture of the RSIP. The AFP manages itself through systems, reviews, and reports. To some extent, the AFP-led PPF is attempting to introduce these systems into the Solomon Islands where the capacity to change is not advancing as quickly as the PPF would like, and this is constraining progress. However, the nature of capacity building work requires frequent adaptation and the PPF continue to consider new approaches. Currently the PPF officers are striving to obtain the right balance

⁶³ Information for table gathered from the Australian National Audit Office for *Audit Report No.53 2006-2007 Australian Federal Police Overseas Operations*, pp. 65-74.

between completing police work in cases where the RSIP do not have the expertise, and standing back as the RSIP's capability increases. Planning for a PPF drawdown will present another set of challenges for the PPF.

ANNEX C

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

- + **Australian Federal Police** (current and former members – positions are listed for current members)
 - Dr Tony Murney, Manager, International Deployment Group, Governance and Future Business
 - Allen Mortensen, Manager, International Deployment Group, Future Strategies
 - Nick Keam, Coordinator Doctrine, International Deployment Group
 - Steve Lancaster, Commander, Operational Response Group
 - Ben McDevitt, Executive Director, CrimTrac
 - Adrien Whiddett, Consultant
 - John Valentin, Consultant


- + **Australian Defense Force** (members with direct experience working with AFP officers on recent deployments - Solomon Islands and East Timor)
 - BRIG Justin Kelly
 - COL John Frewen
 - COL John Smith
 - COL Nick Rountree

- + **Policymakers**
 - Mike Kelly, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence

ANNEX D

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Source: http://www.afp.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/62609/Executive_Chart.pdf, Current as of April 2008.




ANNEX E

INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYMENT GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Source: Presentation conducted by Steve Lancaster, IDG ORG Commander, 20 June 2008.



ORG STRUCTURE




ANNEX F

OPERATIONAL RESPONSE UNIT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Source: Presentation conducted by Steve Lancaster, IDG ORG Commander, 20 June 2008.



OPERATIONAL RESPONSE UNITS (ORU)



ANNEX G

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT UNIT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Source: Presentation conducted by Steve Lancaster, IDG ORG Commander, 20 June 2008.

